

THE PHONEY PEACE

POWER AND CULTURE IN CENTRAL EUROPE 1945-49


edited by

ROBERT B. PYNSENT

School of Slavonic and East European Studies
University College London

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Copy-edited and typeset by John Andrew

Cerberus Russian Language Solutions & Publishing Services

Tel/Fax: +44 (0)20 8889 1322

Internet: <http://www.cerberus.org>

E-mail: john.andrew@cerberus.org

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Contents

	Notes on the Contributors	ix
	Preface	xiii
1	Introduction <i>Robert B. Pynsent</i>	1
2	‘East of the Elbe’: The Communist Take-over and the Past <i>László Péter</i>	17
3	Austria and the ‘Jewish Question’, 1945–50 <i>Robert S. Wistrich</i>	39
4	Jews and Poles on the Barricades of Warsaw: Two Polish Plays on the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising <i>Halina Filipowicz</i>	58
5	The Politicization of Mass Murder: Immediate Czech Reactions to the Shoah, 1945–49 <i>Derek Paton</i>	71
6	‘Old Wine in a New Bottle’: The Jews as Perceived in Post-war Communist Poland, 1945–47 <i>Joanna Michlic</i>	87
7	Yugoslav and British Policy towards the Carinthian Question, 1941–45 <i>Dušan Biber</i>	100
8	The Sorbian Movement in Lusatia, 1945–1948 <i>Peter Schurmann</i>	113
9	How Soviet Was the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, 1945–49? <i>Martin McCauley</i>	119
10	A ‘Soviet’ Currency Reform in Germany. The Soviet Union and the Question of German Currency, 1945–48 <i>Jochen Laufer</i>	131
11	Reform and Retribution: The British Impact on the Re-establishment of the Rule of Law in Germany after the Second World War <i>Ulrike Walton-Jordan</i>	137

12	Young People and Youth Movements in the Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany <i>Gareth Pritchard</i>	149
13	Compensation for Nationalized American Property in Czechoslovakia, 1945–49 <i>Slavomír Michálek</i>	162
14	National or Social Revolution? Liquidating the Latifundia in Czechoslovakia, 1945–48 <i>Eagle Glassheim</i>	171
15	The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia: Western Policy and Response <i>Abbott Gleason</i>	182
16	Austria and the Bohemian Lands, 1945–49: The Two Paths of Two Neighbours <i>Arnold Suppan</i>	194
17	Chiliastic Factors in Post-War Czech Literature and the World of Jan Karafiát's <i>Little Beetles</i> <i>Vladimír Macura</i>	200
18	The Drama of Local Power: Theatre as Politics and Metaphor in Bolesław Drobnier's Cracow <i>Laurie Koloski</i>	207
19	'Unreconstructable Girondins': Hungarian Radicals after the Second World War <i>Attila Pók</i>	216
20	British Political Attitudes to Hungary through the Workings of the British Component of the Allied Control Commission, 1945–47 <i>Éva Figder</i>	221
21	Václav Černý, 1945–48 <i>Peter Bugge</i>	230
22	'Verachtet mir die Meister nicht': The Furtwängler Case <i>Richard Aczel</i>	241
23	Surrealism and the Catholic <i>Moderna</i> in Slovakia, 1945–48 <i>Ludwig Richter</i>	257
24	'National Revival': The Programme of a Newspaper <i>Petra Bombíková</i>	263

25	Panslavism in the Work of Czech Writers in Wartime Exile <i>Vladimír Papoušek</i>	270
26	Catastrophe and Renewal: On the Post-War Situation of German Literature <i>David Midgley</i>	279
27	Austria's Second Coming: The Literary Response to a Restored Austria in the Early Years of the Second Republic <i>Anthony Bushell</i>	288
28	The Rise and Fall of Bourgeois Literature in Hungary, 1945–49 <i>Mihály Szegedy-Maszák</i>	294
29	Transition in the Work of Václav Řezáč <i>Alena Přibáňová</i>	306
30	Stanisław Dygat and the 'Re-evaluation of the Intelligentsia' in Polish Fiction, 1945–49 <i>Hans-Christian Trepte</i>	310
31	Days of Judgement: Egon Hostovský and the Period 1945–48 <i>Radojka Miljević</i>	317
32	Warsaw in 1945–55: The Emergence of a New Chronotope <i>Wojciech Tomasik</i>	328
33	Building the Organs of State Power: Soviet 'Cadres' and the Polish People's Army, 1945–49 <i>Paul Latawski</i>	337
34	Jan Racek, Zdeněk Nejedlý and the Construction of Czech Music History after the Second World War <i>Geoffrey Chew</i>	346
35	Reflections of Ideological Values in the Standard Concise Dictionary of Czech (1937–52) <i>Tom Dickins</i>	359
36	Horses for Courses, or: Hitching Czech to the Soviet Bandwagon <i>David Short</i>	385
37	Polish Linguistic Issues at the End of the Second World War: Unfinished Business, <i>Język Polski</i> 1939–45 <i>Nigel Gotteri</i>	397

38	The Label <i>Pre-socialist</i> in Hungarian Lexicography of the 1950s <i>Peter Sherwood</i>	406
39	Between State and Nation: The Central Czech Amateur Theatre Association, 1945–48 <i>Andreas Beckmann</i>	443
40	Anxiety in the Early Works of Dominik Tatarka <i>Kathleen Hayes</i>	455
41	The Path towards Socialist Realism in Czechoslovakia, 1945–48 <i>Tim Beasley-Murray</i>	465
42	1948: From Socialism to Socialism. Czech Literature and the Party <i>Michal Bauer</i>	477
43	Czech Women Writers in Transition <i>Robert B. Pynsent</i>	485
	Index	506

Notes on the Contributors

Richard Aczel teaches English Literature at the University of Cologne, but his research interests remain equally Hungarian and English literature, and he has published on the literature of the Monarchy as a whole. He is also a translator.

Michal Bauer teaches Czech literature at the University of South Bohemia at České Budějovice. He has published chiefly on Czech literature since 1945.

Tim Beasley-Murray teaches Slovak Studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. His research interests include literary theory and Modernism, and the aesthetics of the inter-war period. He has published chiefly on Slovak literature.

Andreas Beckmann is based in Prague and is working on a PhD in Czech cultural and political history.

Dušan Biber spent his academic life as a researcher at the Institute of Social Sciences and Institute of Contemporary History in Belgrade and, from 1974, at the Institute for Contemporary History in Ljubljana.

Petra Bombíková is a research worker at the Institute of Slovak Literature of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. She has published chiefly on Slovak literature since the Second World War.

Peter Bugge lectures on Central European History at the University of Aarhus. He has published many articles on Czech history and literature and a book on Czech political history.

Anthony Bushell is Professor of German and Head of the School of Modern Languages, University of Wales, Bangor. He is general editor of the series *Austrian Studies in Context*. He has written numerous articles on post-war German and Austrian literature.

Geoffrey Chew teaches music at Royal Holloway College, University of London, and has published extensively on music from the seventeenth century onwards.

Tom Dickins teaches Russian at the University of Wolverhampton. His research interests include Czech and Russian language and literature, sociolinguistics and lexicology. He has also written a number of Czech and Russian language teaching materials.

Éva Figder works for the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Her research interests include British foreign policy in Central Europe with particular reference to Hungary between 1945 and 1950.

Halina Filipowicz is Professor of Polish Literature at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. She is the author of *A Laboratory of Impure Forms: The Plays of Tadeusz Różewicz* (1991) and co-editor of *The Great Tradition: Dramatic and Musical Theatre in Austria and Central Europe* (forthcoming).

Eagle Glassheim is Assistant Professor of History at Princeton University. His research interests include the Bohemian nobility from 1848 to 1948, the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans after the Second World War, and Czech–German relations in the twentieth century.

Abbott Gleason is a Professor of History at Brown University and Director, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, 1999–2000. His current research includes mythologies of ‘national identity’. Among his several books is a history of a term, *Totalitarianism*.

Nigel Gotteri teaches Russian and Polish at the University of Sheffield. He publishes on linguistics, especially Slavonic linguistics, has edited (with Edward Garden) a volume of Tchaikovsky's letters, and is co-author (with Joanna Michalak Gray) of the new *Teach Yourself Polish* (1997).

Kathleen Hayes received her PhD from the University of London in 1997. She has taught Czech literature and history at the Charles University and at New York University in Prague. At present she is working on a translation of short stories by Czech women writers from the *Fin de siècle*.

Laurie Koloski received her PhD in history from Stanford University in 1998 and is currently Assistant Professor of European History, College of William and Mary, Virginia.

Paul Latawski is a Senior Lecturer in International Affairs at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. He is also an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies in London. His principal research interests include contemporary Poland and security policy in Central Europe.

Jochen Laufer did his doctoral work at the Humboldt University in Berlin, and subsequently (1987–90) worked at the Historical Institute of the GDR Academy of Sciences. Since then he has been working at the Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam. He has published numerous articles on Soviet policy towards Germany in 1944–49.

Vladimír Macura, who died in 1999, was Director of the Institute of Czech Literature of the Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague. He published extensively in the field of the semiotics of culture and theory of literature (for example, *Signs of Birth* [1983]; *The Happy Age* [1992]; *The Boots of President Masaryk* [1993]; and *The Czech Dream* [1998]). He also published four novels. He was awarded the Czech State Prize for Literature in 1998.

Martin McCauley was Senior Lecturer in Russian Politics at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He has written and edited a large number of books on the Soviet Union and the GDR.

Joanna Michlic is a doctoral student at the Department of Hebrew and Jewish Studies, UCL and the European Institute, LSE. Her research interests include nationalism and problems of ethnic minorities in East Central Europe, and the history of Polish Jewry.

Slavomír Michálek works at the Historical Institute of the Slovak Academy of Sciences. His main research interests are American foreign policy towards Czechoslovakia after the Second World War and Slovaks in the Czechoslovak diplomatic service.

David Midgley is a University Lecturer in German and Fellow of St John's College, Cambridge. He is the author of *Writing Weimar: Critical Realism in German Literature 1918–1933* (2000).

Radojka Miljević took a PhD at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies in Czech Literature. She is a member of the Editorial Board of the journal *The Slavonic and East European Review*.

Vladimír Papoušek teaches Czech literature at the University of South Bohemia at České Budějovice, and has published books and articles mainly on twentieth-century Czech literature.

Derek Paton read International Relations at Toronto and East European Studies at London. He is a researcher at the Institute of Contemporary History, Prague, concerned particularly with the years 1945–48 in Bohemia. He has co-edited a number of academic volumes.

László Péter is Professor Emeritus of Hungarian History at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He has published extensively in English and Hungarian, especially on constitutional history and political ideas.

Attila Pók is Deputy Director of the Institute of History in the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He has also held posts at the Institute of European Studies, Vienna (since 1988) and the University of Chicago (1993). His major research interest is the history of democratic political thought in Hungary.

Alena Přibáňová teaches Czech literature at Brno University.

Gareth Pritchard is Lecturer in History at the University of Wales, Swansea. His main research interests are the allied occupation of Germany after World War II, and the working class in the German Democratic Republic. His book *The Making of the GDR, 1945–1953: From Antifascism to Stalinism* will appear in 2000.

Robert Pynsent is Professor of Czech and Slovak Literature at University College London. He has published many books and articles, usually on Czech or Slovak cultural history.

Ludwig Richter is emeritus professor at the Centre for Research on the Humanities in East Central Europe, Leipzig. He has published a large number of books and articles, mainly on Slovak literature.

Peter Schurmann works at the Sorbian Institute in Bautzen. His research interests concentrate on the minorities policy of the GDR towards the Sorbs in Lower and Upper Lusatia.

Peter Sherwood is Senior Lecturer in Hungarian Language and Literature at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. He was co-editor of the Magyar-Ország *Concise Hungarian–English Dictionary* and is working on a ‘Learner’s Dictionary of Hungarian’.

David Short teaches Czech and Slovak at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. His research interests include the development of languages and of attitudes to language. He has published a large number of articles and books, chiefly on the Czech and Slovak languages.

Arnold Suppan is Professor of East European History at the University of Vienna. His latest publications include *Jugoslawien und Oesterreich 1918–1938* (1996) and *Zwischen Adria und Karawanken* (1998).

Mihály Szegedy-Maszák teaches Comparative Literature at Budapest and Central European Studies at Indiana. He has published eight books and about two hundred longer essays on literary theory, Romanticism, and twentieth-century literature. In 1997 he was awarded the Hungarian Order of Merit.

Wojciech Tomasik is Associate Professor at the Pedagogical University of Bydgoszcz. He has published books on Socialist Realism (*Polska powiesc tendencyjna 1949–1955* [1988], *Slowo o socrealizmie* [1991], *Inzynieria dusz* [1999]) and literary theory (*Od Bally'ego do Banfield* [1992]).

Hans-Christian Trepte teaches at Leipzig University and the Centre for Research on the Humanities in East Central Europe, also in Leipzig. His research interests include Polish emigré literature.

Ulrike Walton-Jordan is a Research Fellow at the Centre for German-Jewish Studies at the University of Sussex. Her research and publications focus on Second-World-War British and German history.

Robert Wistrich is Academic Chairman of the Centre for Austrian Studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, where he holds the Neuberger Chair for the History of Central European Jewry. Among his many books is *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph* (1989) which won the Austrian State Prize for History in 1991.

Preface

This book comprises a selection of the papers, now in a revised form, presented at a conference entitled ‘Another Transition. Politics and Culture in Central Europe, 1945–49’. In their title or their substance many chapters reflect that original title. The editor and publishers agreed on the present title since the term ‘transition’ (i) has become so redolent of the post-Communist era and (ii) has become a cultural historical cliché used particularly of the 1890s, but then of the 1920s, then the Second World War itself. The new title, *The Phoney Peace*, is intended to evoke the tensions that obtained in Central Europe between the defeat of Germany and its allies in 1945 and the fully-armed Cold War. The subtitle indicates what is different about this book from other recent volumes on the period: the emphasis on culture in its broadest sense — everything from law, theatre, fiction, to the attempts to maintain or re-establish a social culture. Many chapters concern the successful or failed coming to terms with the Shoah.

The semantic compass of the term ‘Central Europe’ remains a subject of discussion. For this book, Central Europe in the period 1945–49 was a denotative geographical concept Germany, Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Even in those days the term did not have a stable meaning. When, soon after the First World War, the Scottish historian of things central and south-east European, R. W. Seton-Watson, was appointed to a chair of Central European History at London University, a Moravian Slovak wrote to congratulate him on his appointment and express his relief that the term ‘Central European’ would at last keep the Hungarians in their place (in the Balkans). Slovenia is included in this book not because, since independence, it has generally come to be regarded as part of Central Europe (though Slovene is a South Slavonic, not a West Slavonic language), but because Slovenia was for many hundreds of years part of Austria. Even as part of ‘south-east Europe’ at the time, Slovenia’s problems were with Central or Western Europe.

Most of the area that was in Central Europe in 1945 became ‘sovietoid’ at some time within the period this volume concerns. In 1949, most of Germany, the one-time American, British and (recent) French zones of occupation, began to emerge out of Central Europe to become part of Western Europe. Germany is, however, not the odd man out in this volume that it might appear to be. That place is clearly taken by Austria, whose future was not finally decided until it became a free state in 1955. In fact, all the countries the authors of the chapters here deal with were odd men out in some way or another. This book demonstrates that.

The odd women and men out in this volume are those who gave papers at the conference which are for a variety of reasons not included here. I should like to thank them warmly for their contributions to the conference (some of their papers led to particularly lively debate). The conference began on Easter Day 1998, and many participants sacrificed more than chocolate eggs to be there.

‘Another Transition’ was also the last large-scale multidisciplinary conference to be held at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies before it merged with University College London. It thus constituted something of a ‘rite of transition’ in itself. Many bodies were very generous in their support of this rite, and thus also of this book. Without Mercedes-Benz (UK) nothing could have happened at all, and I should like to express my sincerest gratitude to the board of directors for their confidence in the project. Without the British Academy, the British Association for Central and Eastern Europe, the British Council (Bratislava and Warsaw), and Malév Hungarian Airlines, the majority of the speakers at the conference would have not been able to come. I am extremely grateful for their generosity.

I should like also to thank the many anonymous readers who dealt so constructively with the papers I sent them, and László Péter who acted *arbiter elegantiae* for the whole volume. Another of the contributors to this volume, Vladimír Macura, will be remembered particularly fondly by all participants. He came in full knowledge that he was seriously sick. More than any other, Macura strove to support and, indeed, create scholarly standards in literary studies in Husák's Czechoslovakia.

Finally, 'and name it gratitude, the word is poor', I thank Hayley Frapwell, who did everything. She ran the conference, performed all sorts of wonders with electronics and recast most chapters in this book.¹ And still she smiled.

Robert B. Pynsent
London, May 2000

1 Every Preface must have at least one footnote. I would exploit that convention to express my enormous gratitude to the copy-editor and general adviser to this volume, John Andrew, and to Mary Joyce, who picked up the pieces after Hayley Frapwell left the School and swept my incompetence with e-mail, computers and so forth under the carpet of her digitalization. Without Dessislava Dragneva's help with the index I should have been desperate.

1 Introduction

ROBERT B. PYNSENT

The Cold War was pretty hot for those born on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain. Indeed, it was not very cold even for those living in western Germany, and particularly West Berlin, at least until the 1970s. And one does not forget the families divided by the Wall. Furthermore, no one could take lightly what one so frequently heard on the wireless in 1989 from elderly GDR citizens, that they felt the Second World War had now ended at last.

This book is concerned with a brief period in Central European history after the hot war which looked like a respite between two forms of totalitarianism: a respite but a phoney peace. Except for *émigrés* who returned from Moscow or the West and except for resistance fighters, most people had somehow or other been implicated at least passively in the survival of occupation or of local Fascist regimes. Suspicion was the order of the day, and suspicion could be attached to anyone, even resistance fighters, except those men and women who had survived exile in the USSR. This book studies primarily the impact of the war on post-war politics and culture, and the manner in which the occupying or liberating powers together with indigenous forces determined cultural developments even before the final Communist victory in 1948 or 1949, and before the creation of Bizonia. The chapters analyse different aspects of the causes of unease or of the unease itself. What the book discovers is that, with the exception of western Germany and, to a degree, Austria (where, as Suppan points out in his chapter, the Communist Party was spectacularly unsuccessful), it was hardly a period of hope. Very few people indeed regretted the military defeat of Nazism, but soon after the inhabitants of most of Central Europe realized that they had fallen into the Soviet sphere of influence joy at liberation from Nazism or Fascism began to diminish. It very quickly became evident that the war had not changed Stalin: his more liberal attitude to the Church and the West had been simply a survival tactic. What did change was the geopolitical situation in Central Europe, to Stalin's advantage.

In most of Central Europe the transition from 1945 to 1948/49 began with a very brief period, a year or so, when culture seemed to be returning more or less to the state it had been in before the war. That is true even of Poland, where a civil war was being fought. Much literature consisted of war memoirs, testimonies to German brutality and, often, to local heroism. At the beginning these works were barely censored, and most of the praise of the Soviets was voluntary, indeed genuinely enthusiastic. At the latest by mid-1946, however, the intensity of the politicization of art began to increase rapidly. Most chapters in this book trace this politicization of culture; the rest provide insights into the political, military and social structures that encouraged or enforced this politicization.

Many chapters look forward past 1948 or 1949, the imposition of fully sovietoid socialism, and many more look backwards to the war itself. Indeed, one may say that any book about Central Europe in the period of transition will also be a book about the Second World War. It will also, however, be a book about how that war, or a war-like atmosphere, was prolonged. However frail the pre-war democratic credentials of Central Europe (Péter discusses this in his chapter), Wandycz sums up what seems to be historical fact thus: 'The Second World War, or rather its outcome, reversed the course of history of East Central Europe. Traditionally a borderland or a semi-periphery of the West, the region became a

I am grateful to László Péter for acting as reader for this Introduction and for his useful suggestions.

westward extension of the Soviet East.’¹ Nevertheless it was the war just as much as its outcome that actually changed the course, perhaps reversed it. The brutality of Stalinism had the soil tilled for it by the brutality of Nazism, and, except for Poland in our period and region, Stalinist brutality appeared less harsh. Even in Poland, where from the start the Soviets did their best to dominate the political, military and, to a degree, cultural élites, to finish off Hitler’s work, one cannot compare anything the Soviets did to what Hitler did. Hitler had removed by murder one of the most vital cultural and economic forces in the region, the Jews, and the Shoah is a major theme of this volume; Wistrich demonstrates how the Austrians have tended to avoid the issue, and Filipowicz, Michlic and Paton write about ambivalent Polish and Czech attitudes in the immediate post-war period. Of course, many thousands of non-Jewish Germans, Poles and Czechs (and somewhat fewer non-Jewish Slovaks and Hungarians) also died in the camps, but not millions. Indeed, a man who comes across as something of a naive villain in this book, President Beneš, also lost relations and close associates in Auschwitz. My point is no doubt banal, but it still needs making: Hitler brutalized Central Europe. Without bearing that in mind, one cannot understand the political and cultural atmosphere of 1945–49 in the region, or the subsequent years, particularly in those parts of Central Europe that became people’s democracies.

One of Beneš’s relations who survived Auschwitz and an even worse imprisonment in the underground concentration camp of Nordhausen-Mittelbau, where V-2 rockets were built, was the journalist Jiří Beneš. He was a great admirer of the courage shown by Jews in the camps as well as a compassionate observer. I quote two passages from Beneš’s war memoir, both reports (with names and addresses of Czechoslovak witnesses) of events he did not see himself. No one perhaps needs to be reminded of German savagery; I quote these two passages because Beneš’s more or less documentary work was widely read, and what people were reading constitutes a most important component of the cultural atmosphere of our period. The following concerns the death from typhoid of two of Edvard Beneš’s relations, Marie Benešová and her daughter, Jarmila Krajcová, and of the wife and daughter, Věra, of the former Czechoslovak Minister of Social Security, Jaromir Nečas:

The first to die was Mrs Nečasová. Actually on 28 October [that is, the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia]. The others died later. The SS had their corpses thrown out with their blankets onto a pile in front of the hut. There were large numbers of rats there, and they gnawed away at the bodies. In the morning I could recognize Věra Nečasová by her sweater; I had given it to her. She felt so cold as she was dying [...]. It was not possible to recognize any of the others.²

The speaker here is a Jewish nurse. Probably the most horrific passage in the book concerns the way in which people were given a ‘wood anaesthetic’, that is, knocked on the head with a wooden club before being thrown into the Birkenau crematoria. The following is, however, more to my point. The setting is the small concentration camp of Ellrich near Nordhausen:

It had been noticed that someone had been cutting off the testicles and what remained of calves, and cutting out the kidneys of the corpses that were stacked for cremation. The guards began keeping watch by the corpses and they caught one of the prisoners in the act. When interrogated the prisoner said that he was so hungry that he could not restrain himself from eating human flesh. After roll-call the *Lagerführer* had him led out before the assembled prisoners; he then had a corpse brought along and forced the prisoner to show the others how

1 Piotr S. Wandycz, *The Price of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe from the Middle Ages to the Present*, London and New York, 1992, p. 236.

2 Jiří Beneš, *V německém zajetí*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 107.

he carried out his cannibalism. [...] Mass hysteria overtook the watching prisoners and they tore the cannibal to pieces.³

One of the two men Beneš most admired in Auschwitz was Alexej Čepička, who managed to save hundreds of lives. Subsequently, Čepička as Minister of Justice from 1948 to 1950 sovietized the Czechoslovak judiciary, organized the purge of judges and lawyers and introduced penal servitude camps. After that he became minister of defence (1950–56), further sovietized the armed forces and introduced a penal servitude corps. After the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party he no longer held senior positions, and was eventually expelled from the Party, as possibly the most hated of all Czechoslovak Stalinists, in 1963.

Paton mentions in his chapter the German method of torture by serving prisoners with over-seasoned food and subsequently denying them water. Paton mentions the British airman who suffered this torture and was then beaten to death. That same method was used when Čepička was Minister of Justice on a parish priest who was accused of contriving a miracle in his church. Instead of subsequently beating the prisoner to death, like the Germans, the Czech torturer gave this priest, Josef Toufar, acid to drink.⁴ Toufar died on the second anniversary of the Communist coup; Čepička died six weeks short of the first anniversary of the beginning of the ‘Velvet Revolution’.

There was a difference between the Germans and the Czechs in that if a prisoner died under torture in the late 1940s or early 1950s, the interrogating officer was occasionally punished, usually by transfer to a less attractive job. Prisoners were sometimes driven off and killed many miles away from the prison; one such case concerned a man who was arrested on the grounds that he was planning to assassinate a prominent politician and an even more prominent general. His state security (StB) interrogators pretended to be from an American intelligence service. When, after extensive interrogation, the prisoner still would not admit his planned crime, he was driven away and shot, lest he reveal StB methods. When the methods used on prisoners in custody in Uherské Hradiště became known to the local population in March 1949, an enquiry was set up. A police doctor and an examining magistrate visited the victims in the local prison. I quote only two accounts, and not the more gruesome. First:

Jan Dvořák, 43 years, grammar-school master.

Interrogated three times. Beaten in the face, beaten on the soles of both feet. Consequent swelling of the feet and serious haematomas. Electric shocks used. Kicked in the back. At present being treated for inflammation of the kidneys. Treatment, diet. Apparently could not walk for fourteen days. Difficulties with walking. Paraesthesia of both legs, more in the right. Clear signs of trauma on legs. Physically weak, markedly pale, sickly. Uncertain gait, stumbles. Suffers from insomnia, constant fear. Nervous spasms of face muscles. Whole body trembling. Weepy.

Second:

Josef Pavelka, 34 years, labourer.

Interrogated three times, two beatings across soles of feet with rubber tubing so that he could not walk for a week. On one occasion repeated use of electric shocks. Twice during interrogation released stool involuntarily.⁵

3 Ibid., p. 259.

4 František Drašner, *Čihošťský zázrak ve světle svědeckých výpovědí a dokumentů*, Havlíčkův Brod, 1990, p. 6.

5 In these quotations, I change personal names, not only because not to do so could bring pain to surviving relations, but also because, although the documents I have used were distributed at a

A special ward was set up at the main Prague mental hospital in Bohnice (Ward N5) for prisoners of the StB who broke down under interrogation. For some years the security guards would allow these prisoners visits or at least food parcels. A secret order (A-1081/01-51) was sent out by the commander of the StB on 27 February 1951 stating that such visits were against regulations and must cease forthwith.

Naturally, it was not only the brutalization attending the war that affected the people and the politicians of Central Europe. The war represented, to use Schöpflin's phrase, a 'caesura'.⁶ No possibility of returning to some pre-war *status quo* existed, not only in Germany and Austria, but also in the other Central European states. Poland did, however, perhaps have the potential, in the remnants of the Home Army and the members of the élite who had spent the war in the West, to create a better version of the social *status quo*, in spite of the facts that it had suffered greater losses than any other population in our region apart from Germany, and that it had been wheeled westwards by the Great Powers. At least that is what the Soviets were clearly afraid of. Péter and Pók suggest in their chapters that avoiding a sovietoid society had been possible in Hungary as well, but the Soviets appear to have been confident that a people's democracy was ineluctable in Hungary, too. By early 1942 Western diplomats were coming to the conclusion that Czechoslovakia was serving the interests of the Soviet government.⁷ The 'caesura' actually involved the *Stunde Null* (see Midgley's chapter), a fresh start. In the interests of that fresh start much was spoken and written about coming to terms with the immediate past. In fact, however, for all the hunts for collaborators, the people's courts and national courts (as Jordan points out in her chapter, one of the first things immediately after the war the British did in their zone of occupation was to abolish the people's court; it will always be baffling that East-Central European politicians so readily employed similar or identical terminology and procedures to the Nazis'), for all the welcomings of heroes, the politicians, and that means predominantly the Communists, were practically only interested in the immediate past if it served their empire-building. Real and alleged collaborators with the Germans could be useful anyway, since they were blackmailable. If an alleged collaborator was a member of the old political élite, their collaboration could be

conference on the Crimes of Communism in Prague in 1991 in a bound volume of photocopies, the volume is marked 'for internal use only'. Most of the material in the volume, for example, the ministerial edict explaining why the corpses of those killed in detention should no longer be handed over to the next of kin for burial (because their funerals are exploited by enemies of the state) is, of course, no longer classified. [Editor not given] *Stálá mezinárodní konference o zločinech komunistů. Sborník přednášek a dokumentů. 5.-6. října 1991 Praha-Dlabačov*, Prague, 1991, pp. 94-95.

6 George Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945-1992*, Oxford and Cambridge, MA, 1993, p. 60. Schöpflin confuses pre-condition with process when he suggests that the impact of war was a fourth stage to Seton-Watson's three stages in the creation of a people's democracy. Péter accepts Seton-Watson's clear and unsurpassable analysis. For the reader of this Introduction, however, I mention that the three stages were, first, the formation of 'the genuine coalition', friendly to the USSR; under this coalition 'there was little political censorship except on one subject — the USSR. Not only might Soviet policy not be criticised, but it was hardly possible to write anything about any aspect of Russia which did not coincide with the official Soviet line'; the second stage is 'the bogus coalition', which in Poland was in place from the 'liberation' onwards. Koloski's chapter describes the efforts of Bolesław Drobner not to accept this bogusness. The 'third stage is the "monolithic" regime', involving 'the fusion of the well-purged social democrats with the communists'. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, London, 1950, pp. 169-71.

7 Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War. Diplomacy, Warfare, and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945*, New York, 1979, p. 59.

‘proved’ and the person involved disposed of on the gallows or behind bars. Nowhere in the emergent Eastern Bloc, with the exception, for a while, of eastern Germany (where there were about 45,000 trials of Nazis), was there anything comparable to the moral purging process that began with the Nuremberg Trials (though only 5,025 people were tried for war-crimes at Nuremberg). Nothing was done about the endemic antisemitism of the region, which had been dealt with in western Germany systematically in the end by the ‘philosemitism’ Wistrich describes. The Poles, the Hungarians, the Slovaks, one could say, did not institute the death camps, but simply saying that overlooks the chief point, the need for a concentrated effort to eliminate the bacteria that allowed the camps to be conceived in the first place. When Jewish Communists had served their purpose during the second half of the 1940s, at least their more prominent representatives were disposed of in purges and show-trials in the 1950s. Eastern Bloc caricatures of Dean Acheson bore a striking resemblance to illustrations from the Nazi propaganda press. The Communists gave their antisemitic policy a new name, ‘anti-Zionism’.

The fate of the approximately six million Jews murdered by the Germans by means of the combination of modern technology with the encouragement of savagery in would-be normal human beings — and the aid of hundreds of academics and private-sector scientists — had begun to have an impact on non-Jewish populations long before the end of the war. Local police and gendarme forces, of course, helped the Germans in, say, Poland and Bohemia, and in Poland large numbers of civilians helped hunt down Jews. In whatever the country, even those who found the killing and deportation of Jews repugnant witnessed it, saw Jews killed in front of them, heard and saw neighbours roughly removed from their flats, and saw the files of Jews with suitcases being marched to assembly points before they were put on trains; at railway stations people saw the cattle-trucks full of people (and, indeed, sometimes risked their lives trying to help them with food or water). They witnessed all this long before the ravages of defeat or liberation. Responses were, naturally, various. Many ‘did very well’ out of the ‘aryanization’ of businesses and factories, and out of looting the flats or houses of Jews. What is clear not only from records published in the aftermath of war, but also from *belles-lettres* published during the occupations, is that perhaps the commonest reaction was alarm. I quote Mazower: ‘In response to the horrors of occupation, most people living under Nazi control had retreated into a private world and tried to ignore everything that did not directly concern them. With traditional moral norms apparently thrown to the wind, the unusual cruelty of the Germans towards the Jews created a more general alarm among non-Jews.’⁸ Violence against the Jews, but also against other neighbours who had the wrong politics or were involved in underground resistance easily led to the struthiousness illiberal politicians find particularly useful. Certainly one agrees with Gross’s suggestion that ‘the unwelcome familiarity with the violence unleashed under World War II regimes of occupation made the methods of Communist *Machtergreifung* in the subsequent period more acceptable than they would have been otherwise’.⁹ On the other hand, one also agrees with Schöpflin’s view, at least as far as the less struthious are concerned, that the population was ‘radicalized by war’, and ‘expected that a new political order, based on a more equal distribution of power, would be created’.¹⁰

The loss of life and destruction of material was so immense before (and during) liberation (or defeat) that it appeared to large numbers, in the East and West, that

8 Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century*, Harmondsworth, 1998, p. 176.

9 Jan Gross, ‘War as Revolution’ in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, Boulder, CO, 1997, p. 24.

10 Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 60.

something radically new, optimistic, humane was necessary. The right wing had caused the war and so its pole, the left, had enormous appeal. (That in most of Central Europe they replaced one messianic utopianism with another did not appear egregious; the belief in sympathetic magic had deep roots in the European consciousness.) The numbers are approximate, and were even more approximate at the time, but the figure for the Soviet dead served to encourage faith in Stalin's contention that the USSR had set out to be the saviour of Europe (a view supported by much older national mythologies of the 'last bastion of Christianity' standing against the Mongols or Tatars). As McCauley reminds us, Soviet losses represented roughly half of all fatalities during the war: approximately nine million military personnel and over twenty-seven million civilians died. On top of that the Soviets lost '70,000 villages, 65,000 kilometres of railway track, half of all the railway bridges in occupied territory and over half of urban living space'.¹¹ Whatever the rules of censorship, it is then unremarkable that grateful, mysticizing paeans to the Red Army were sung in liberated territories even by those whose religious or political views were opposed to Communism (see Pynsent's chapter).

In May 1945, most German cities with any industry (and some with virtually none, like Dresden) were flat, but it was not this devastation, or the approximately 5.5 million dead, that made the greatest impression on Germany, but the millions of Germans moving from the former eastern provinces, now parts of the USSR or Poland, and from Central and East European countries from which the government had decreed the expulsion of German minorities. For many Germans coming west from the new Poland between 1944 and 1948, this was the second time they had to be moved over a few years. Following the German-Soviet Pact hundreds of thousands of Germans (*Volksdeutsche*) had been moved from the Baltic States, Bessarabia, northern Bukovina and Soviet eastern Poland, mainly to German-occupied Poland.¹² What these expelled and refugee Germans were called depended on which zone they were settled in. In the Soviet zone they were *Umsiedler*, 're-settlers' (so too, the expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia was labelled *Umsiedlung*); in the Western zones they were *Heimatvertriebene*, 'people driven out of their homes'. The eastern term suggests the participants' acquiescence and the German authorities' approval, or at least agreement. The western term, however, sounds almost like a Nazi word, has nationalist connotations, and certainly implies injustice. I have written that the Nuremberg Trials began a process of purging, but that purging concerned attitudes towards Jews; it took much longer in West Germany to expunge the Nazi way of thinking. Everyone who survived German concentration camps knew the full meaning of the word *Ausländer*, but well into the 1970s small-ads for flats in German newspapers normally included the statement 'Keine Ausländer' (no foreigners), where the word really did mean anyone who was not German.¹³ The West German 'economic miracle' relied to a great degree on *Heimatvertriebene*, more so indeed than on the mythicized *Gastarbeiter*.

Of all the non-German Central European countries, Poland suffered the greatest devastation and disruption. Even after post-war repatriations and expulsions, the February 1946 census demonstrated that the population of Poland had depleted to about two-thirds of the 1939 population.¹⁴ Schöpflin records that, thanks to the Soviets, as well as the Germans, 'the whole of the interwar aristocracy was scattered; one-third of the intelligentsia perished; of the 1.2 million people living in Warsaw in 1939, 800,000 were

11 Martin McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War, 1941–1949*, 2nd edn, Harlow and New York, 1995, p.32.

12 See, for example, Mazower, *Dark Continent*, pp. 164–65, 168, 220–22.

13 I do not forget the sign commonly outside British lodging houses in the 1940s and 1950s, 'No Irish Please'.

14 Norman Davies, *God's Playground: A History of Poland*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1981, II, p. 487.

killed in the fighting that year and the uprisings of 1943 and 1944'.¹⁵ International horror was roused by the razing of the Czech village Lidice — and one might cynically comment that this horror may have been roused because from the Allies' viewpoint, Czech resistance to the Germans was at best sporadic. In Poland, however, the razing of Lidice or Leżáky was, in Norman Davies's words, 'repeated in hundreds of Polish villages. An incomplete post-war count put their number at 299.' Among those included in Davies's selection are villages like Lipniak-Majorat (370 dead) and Borów (232 dead).¹⁶ That is the background to the 're-evaluation of the intellectuals' that Trepte considers in his chapter. Furthermore, at the end of the war, Poles moved *en masse* from the east again, but also from Warsaw and elsewhere in Central Poland, to colonize the 'Recovered Territories'. The thorough and somewhat chaotic conversion of Breslau into Wrocław constituted an extraordinary piece of demographic and party-political engineering;¹⁷ the colonizing of the Sudetenland was much more chaotic, and violent. Indeed, the behaviour of the Communists there, and the Communist attempts to make political mileage out of it, constituted a serious factor in the rapidly declining popularity of the Party in 1947.

Economically, the position is not all what some might expect. The fact that, up to 1944, in general our region saw considerable economic advance played neatly into the hands of the Marxist-Leninists, who understood Fascism as a quintessentially capitalist phenomenon. Capitalist society was in decay as the Depression had demonstrated, and Fascism was part of the apocalypse converting decay into annihilation. This actually posed a serious ideological problem for the Czechoslovak Communists, for if any definable group in Protectorate society could be labelled collaborators with the Germans it was the industrial working class. And as Gross points out, although Poland had an almost fabulously extensive underground resistance network, it is important that the resistance had continually to admonish workers that they should not volunteer for work in German factories, chiefly in the Reich. Gross notes a 50 per cent increase in coal production in Poland and in the Protectorate between 1939 and 1944, a 60 per cent increase in oil production and a doubling of gas production in Poland. In Hungary the years 1938–44 marked an industrial boom, with the two years 1938–40 showing a larger growth in manufactured output than in the previous two decades. Similar figures, though not quite so dramatic, apply to Slovakia, where industrial growth was far faster than in the Protectorate.¹⁸ And indeed, the vision of the affluent world of the Slovak puppet state vied with the glory of the 1944 Slovak National Uprising in Slovak national mythology for at least three decades after the war. Attempts after 1989 to regenerate the myth of the affluent state, supported often by ex-Communists, ultimately failed, though the proponents' rhetoric perhaps had some influence on the move towards the splitting of Czechoslovakia politically, not just orthographically.

The Uprising and consequent German occupation put an end to industrial development in Slovakia and restarted the deportation of Jews. 1944 was even more disastrous for Hungary. Hungary had been a place of refuge, of reasonable security, for Jews from Slovakia and elsewhere, although Jews without Hungarian citizenship, not counting neutral countries' citizens, were not protected. All Jews in the provinces were deported. Admiral Horthy had tried to sue for a separate peace with the West; Stalin would have nothing of it, and the particularly vicious Arrow Cross Fascist regime that replaced Horthy's was zealously antisemitic. Normally, Hungarian Jews went straight from the deportation trains

15 Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 60.

16 Ibid., p. 455.

17 See Pádraic Kenney, 'Polish Workers and Stalinist Transformation' in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes*, pp. 136–66.

18 Gross, 'War as Revolution', p. 20.

to the gas chambers or, indeed, the crematoria. Budapest Jews were put into a ghetto. During the devastating two-month siege of Buda by the Red Army, the Arrow Cross set about raiding the ghetto, taking Jews to the Danube and shooting them; the Arrow Cross massacres actually shocked the *Wehrmacht*.¹⁹ As an Axis state Hungary had to pay reparations to the USSR. Soviet dismantling of industrial plant simply added to the destruction already incurred by land-battles with the Soviets and the Allied bombing. The Soviets were eventually persuaded not to levy reparations on Slovakia, but that did not mean that factories were not dismantled in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the Sudeten areas. Apart from arms factories and north Bohemian industrial plant, the Bohemian Lands suffered little from bombing.²⁰

Invasion and liberation by the Red Army initially brought more chaos and more destruction. In his chapter, McCauley writes of the dismantling of plant in eastern Germany, the subsequent setting up of the exploitative SAGs, Soviet limited companies, and touches on the export of German forced labour to the USSR. Both he and Pritchard write also of the mass raping of German women. *Davai chasy* (Give me your watch) became something like a nickname for Soviet soldiers all over Central Europe. This quasi-joke, however, actually represented the repressed (and suppressed) trauma of the uncontrolled raping and looting indulged in by both officers and men. The memory of this lasted long enough for many parents to try to protect their daughters from leaving their houses or flats during the first days of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In eastern Germany Soviet raping continued unchecked until mid-1946.²¹ General Patton apparently considered that 'Soviet officers behaved like recently civilized Mongolian bandits' and the British were equally shocked; British troops sometimes had 'fracas' with Soviet troops over the latter's 'maltreatment of German civilians, especially women'.²² The German Communist Party (KPD), while it still existed in the Soviet zone, increased its unpopularity by propaganda that denied Soviet rape and pillage: 'The scars left upon German civilians by their first encounter with Red Army soldiers simply could not be healed by the contention that Germans were eyewitnesses to the "chivalrous behaviour of the Red Army toward the peaceful population of the vanquished country.'" ²³ It is said that hardly a woman in Danzig was not raped by a Soviet soldier; that is also said of the small town of Modra near Bratislava. In eastern Germany more than elsewhere in the emergent

19 Mazower, *Dark Continent*, p. 175.

20 Prague was bombed by the Americans and the greatest damage was the destruction of the fourteenth-century Emaus Monastery.

21 Wilfried Loth, 'Stalin's Plans for Post-War Germany' in Francesca Gorí and Silvio Pons (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53*, Basingstoke and London, 1996, p. 32. When an attempt was made by the SMAD to stop raping, and looting, the official report of the activities of the SMAD command notes that 'a total of 120,268 officers and enlisted men were apprehended and detained for disorderly conduct' (in 1946). See Alexei Filitov, 'The Soviet Administrators and Their German "Friends"' in Naimark and Gibianskii (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes*, p. 121.

22 McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. 60.

23 David Pike, *The Politics of Culture in Soviet-occupied Germany, 1945–1949*, Stanford, CA, 1992, p. 29. Martin Gilbert records one not untypical example: 'Countess Maria von Maltzan, who had been active in the German resistance to Hitler, and had personally saved the lives of dozens of Jews during the war, later described how Soviet soldiers raped a fourteen-year-old Jewish girl whom the Countess herself had earlier saved from deportation and brought up as her own daughter. "She screamed for weeks on end, every night. I had to give her the strongest sleeping pills I could find to try to calm her down." Shortly afterwards, because the girl was Polish-born, the Soviet authorities took her back to Poland.' Gilbert, *Descent into Barbarism: A History of the Twentieth Century, 1934–1951*, London, 1998, p. 638.

Bloc, it was dangerous to report rape by a Soviet. The likely result of reporting it was a charge of anti-Soviet propaganda, which was punishable with a long prison sentence. By 1948 or 1949, Soviet rape had become a subject only to be whispered about.

The behaviour of the Red Army seemed to reinforce the moral decrepitude Nazism or German occupation had engendered. Respect for the individual human life and respect for property were both severely impaired in the broad masses by the German treatment chiefly of Jews, but also of enemies of the German state. At some time between 1933 and 1938 the rule of law had been eroded severely in all Central Europe (not that it had been particularly effective in Central Europe anywhere but in Weimar Germany and pre-Munich Czechoslovakia). German occupation (more even than Nazi power in Germany itself) had removed established moral and social hierarchies. As Schöpflin emphasizes with acuity, the Germans had done most of the Communists' work for them in destabilizing values. If 1945–49 was an age of transition, that transition was from one 'mere oppugnancy' to another. Shakespeare's political analyses have an eerie quality: 'O! when degree is shaken,/Which is the ladder to all high designs,/The enterprise is sick. How could communities,/Degrees in schools, and brotherhoods and cities,/Peaceful commerce from dividable shores,/The primogenitive and due of birth,/Prerogative of age, crowns, sceptres, laurels,/But by degree, stand in authentic place?/Take but degree away, untune that string/And, hark! What discord follows; each thing meets/In mere oppugnancy' (*Ulysses in Troilus and Cressida*, 1, iii). The populations of Central Europe could very soon see that the Gestapo had been replaced by the NKVD (particularly active in eastern Germany and Poland immediately after liberation/occupation) and soon by the local state security forces (secret police). Czechoslovakia was particularly well prepared, since its StB had been formed in 1938. The same word was used to describe the Party dailies as operatives of these security services, 'organs.' The changes in language, particularly the politicization of lexemes and phrases, are traced in detail by Dickins, Sherwood and Short in their chapters. The role of linguistic appropriation and expropriation in the imposition of totalitarian ideology is also essential to the themes of Chew's and Beasley-Murray's chapters.

Stalin's employment of Panslavism as a rallying call during the war, and for a period afterwards, constituted another form of appropriation. Papoušek informs us in his chapter that the Slav idea had retained its potency at least among Czech immigrants in America. The cultural level of these immigrants was low and their Slavism reflected the Slavism that was actually still alive in Bohemia among minor poets and, to a degree, in Masaryk's creation of the Slav Institute. The ideological usefulness of Panslavism to Stalin was twofold. First, it might serve as a nationalism containing a strong element of socialist internationalism which could be appealing not only to workers but also to the bourgeoisie. Secondly, it constituted a disguised form of imperialist Slavophilism that might be fruitful as a propaganda aid to support Soviet domination of East Central Europe. Two countries in the Soviet sphere of influence in Central Europe posed a problem. The Poles had never been keen Panslavs: the Poles were too anti-Russian for that. The second problem was the Hungarians, who not only were not Slavs, but for whom Russia's intervention on the side of the Habsburgs during the Hungarian war of independence of 1848–49 had a mythic place in the national consciousness. The Hungarians, however, as an Axis power, represented an enemy of the Slavs as inveterate as the Germans (a point made by Edvard Beneš repeatedly in his Paris propaganda during the First World War). In fact the Hungarians would be able to become honorary members of the Slav fold, like the Finns (still considered a potential people's democracy at the 1947 Cominform assembly), who eventually became honorary members of the Scandinavian fold. On 23 and 24 February 1944, the twenty-sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Red Army, the Panslav Committee in Moscow organized a militant Panslav military conference. A third country

was the problem of this conference: Bulgaria, not only an Axis power, but one that did not have even the smallest 'national' contingent in the Red Army. The conference was broadcast and so the Bulgarians could be urged to unblot their escutcheon. The Slovenes were represented by Ante Štornik, a *Wehrmacht* soldier who had gone over to the other side; the Slovak representative, Michal Petro, had also gone over to the other side in the Ukraine, where he had fought as a partisan before joining Ludvík Svoboda's army in the USSR.²⁴ Each of the three main Allied Armies are toasted; as well as the sequence of the toast the epithets manifest their degree of importance: 'Long live the victorious Red Army — the pride and glory of all Slav nations!'; 'Long live the glorious American soldiers!'; 'Long live the wonderful soldiers of Great Britain!'²⁵ In the conference's address to Stalin the anonymous author proclaims the Panslav nationalist foundations of the defensive war: 'The Germans, our ancient enemies, have been trying to humiliate the Slavs [...]. All German politics has always been directed at a single goal: to split the Slavs in order subsequently to humble and then destroy each Slav nation one after the other.'²⁶ Something of the hypocrisy of the conference is particularly evident in the address of the Sub-Carpathian Ruthene representative, Private Ivan Turjanica (or Turianitsa), whom Bombíková mentions in her chapter, a chapter that also touches on the 'new' Panslavism. At the end of his address, Turjanica calls 'Long live free Czechoslovakia!'²⁷ A few months later he was to lead his region's secession from Czechoslovakia. General Zygmunt Berling, deputy commander in chief of the Polish Army in the USSR, a man Latawski deals with in his chapter, alludes to the Soviet Union's Polish problem, indeed prefigures in his words the Polish civil war that 'was imported from Russia':²⁸ 'The London *émigré* government, led by its furious hatred of the Soviet Union, has the temerity to try to ruin the great liberation work that is coming into being inside Poland itself. Polish democracy has nothing in common with the invective of the London *émigré* government.'²⁹ The Soviet denial of guilt for the Katyn massacre and the fact that Berling, who had himself previously served with Anders's Army (he attacks Anders here), was leading an army whose officers were usually Russians or Soviet Poles and whose men were formerly POWs of the Soviets, once more indicates something of the brutalization that attended this war. Latawski's chapter provides new evidence of the extent to which Soviet officers continued to run the 'national' army in the post-war years.

Milovan Djilas reports on the link between Stalin's Panslavism in 1944 and the imposition of sovietoid socialist systems in Central and South-East Europe. Stalin associates his determination with the old rule that whoever occupies a territory militarily imposes his own social system with his belief that if 'the Slavs keep united and maintain solidarity, no one in the future will be able to move a finger. Not even a finger!'³⁰ While

24 Petro's statement on the Slovaks as heirs of the bandit Juraj Jánošík will be of interest to students of nationalism: 'Here on fraternal Ukrainian soil we fought in Jánošík fashion against the German bandits and Hungarian brigands.' *Slovanští vojáci vpřed, k vítězství. Soubor projevů na shromáždění slovanských vojáků 23.–24. února 1944*, Moscow, 1944, pp. 44–45.

25 Ibid., p. 14.

26 Ibid., p. 11.

27 Ibid., p. 54. Mastny considers that the change in Turjanica's behaviour resulted from 'a sudden decision rather than premeditation'. On 26 October he was still praising the prospects of the Subcarpathian Ukraine within Czechoslovakia; he started being a separatist on 29 October. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 228.

28 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, p. 169.

29 *Slovanští vojáci, vpřed*, pp. 22–23.

30 Quoted by McCauley, *The Origins of the Cold War*, p. 119. François Fejtö points out that the first expression of Stalinist Panslavism came just two months after the German invasion of the USSR when the Soviet Union of Writers assembled a meeting to demonstrate the 'fraternal

Stalin was guiding military Panslavism in Moscow, Edvard Beneš, first in America and then in London, was also devising his Slav ideology; he, too, linked his Slavism with the notion of a post-war revolution that resulted in people's democracies. The irony of this is only fully clear when one bears in mind that, whatever appearances were, Beneš remained anti-Communist till the end. Igor Lukes's compassionate assessment of Beneš's role in the circumstances surrounding the Munich Agreement considers the Soviet attitude to Munich. Although Beneš had hoped to gain some support from Moscow, the Soviet legation in Prague showed little enthusiasm, and sent their telegram to Moscow too late. 'The Munich affair', writes Lukes, 'proved to be a godsend also for the Communist Party. The Czechoslovak Party had during the crisis managed to persuade Czechoslovak citizens that their security and that of the Soviet Union were intimately linked. 'During the crisis, Gottwald observed, anti-Communism had for the first time become unfashionable and unpatriotic.'³¹ It became an essential element in the Communist version of the Munich myth that the Soviet Union had been the only country to stand by Czechoslovakia in September 1938. The Czechs, and a large number of the Slovaks, were pleased to believe this, since their previous faith in the West had encountered only betrayal.³²

In 1939 the socialist Beneš is already writing of the need 'to transform the present political European democracy into a social and economic democracy'.³³ He understands such a social and economic democracy, first, to constitute the result of this war that will complete the revolution started at the end of the First War, and, secondly, to be the only weapon Europe will have against Communism. He also constantly speaks of this as a 'new' or 'new type of democracy', the terms often used by the Soviets and their supporters to mean 'people's democracy'. In his *Úvahy o slovanství* (Essays on Slavness, London, early 1945), he develops that, and appears sincerely to believe that the Slavs could unite in something like the British Commonwealth; his union will be based on ethnic affinity, not race, because all Slav nations are of mixed blood. To secure future peace, all Slav states must ensure that only Slavs inhabit them. The new Slavism will mean that there will be no minorities in Slav states, for since all Slav nations are and will be equal and united, the term 'minority' can have no meaning. Hitler had united the Slavs, 'with the exception of Bulgaria and a small proportion of the Croats and Slovaks.' The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, while 'following a people's democratic anti-Nazi policy, have been simultaneously carrying out a Slav policy.'³⁴ What had arisen was 'a democratic form of Slav nations',³⁵ a spirit of 'a new, people's democratic Slavness' that was an 'anti-Fascist

union of the Slav peoples against Fascism'. In connection with this and the enthusiasm with which especially Yugoslavs and Czechoslovaks had taken up the Panslav idea, he writes 'In 1945 and 1946 the Czech, Slovak, Polish and Yugoslav Communists were the most nationalist of the nationalists.' Fejtö, *Histoire des démocraties populaires*, Paris, 1952, p. 127.

31 Igor Lukes, *Czechoslovakia between Stalin and Hitler: The Diplomacy of Edvard Beneš in the 1930s*, New York and Oxford, 1996, p. 259. In his analysis Lukes is in fact arguing, persuasively, against Mastny's view that, at the time of Munich, 'the Russians were very much the losers' (*Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 22). Altogether, Mastny is no friend of Beneš; at one point, for example, he writes of Beneš's 'obsequious protestation of good will' to Stalin, *ibid.*, p. 229.

32 The Soviets and British acted equally dishonourably as far as one group of victims was concerned, the Social Democrat Germans of the Sudetenland. Lukes mentions only the Soviets, but both countries refused them visas. On the British, see Gilbert, *Descent into Barbarism*, p. 207.

33 Edvard Beneš, *Democracy Today and Tomorrow*, London, 1939, p. 16 and *passim*.

34 Edvard Beneš, *Úvahy o slovanství. Hlavní problémy slovanské politiky*, 2nd, unaltered, edn, Prague, 1947, p. 251.

35 *Ibid.*, p. 252.

and anti-Nazi, anti-Pangerman ideology',³⁶ which will 'necessarily' lead to 'a new, people's democratic and culturally entirely modern intercourse between all the Slav nations neighbouring' the Soviet Union, to 'cultural and political co-operation and the renewal [*sic*] of a new, people's democratic Slavness'.³⁷ Beneš combines this Communist-sounding lexis with statements of a Romantic (Palackýan) belief in the natural democracy of the Slavs, and in Slav Reciprocity, with the mytheme that foreigners' attacks on the Slavs always began with an attack on Prague. He tries to persuade himself and his readership that 'Russian messianism towards Europe was a great delusion; Slavophil romanticism has been definitively overcome'; 'the new Communist messianism would certainly become an obstacle to any future Slavness and realist Slav politics'. He does wonder whether, after the war, the USSR might not return to its 'purely Communist doctrine', and whether 'its wartime Slavness is only a mere tactic'. Since, however, all previous Slav messianisms had proved flawed (Kollár's, the Poles', the Slavophiles'), evidently Communist messianism, that is 'the Soviet Union *swallowing up* Slav states and *communizing Slav nations* in accordance with the Soviet model', would also fail.³⁸

Clearly Beneš understands 'people's democracy' differently from the Soviets. Equally clearly, that explains how his niece, Hana Klenková, can propagate the notion that the Communists' concept was very much Beneš's. I have no evidence that anyone outside Czechoslovakia thought of it as his concept. No doubt, however, Beneš's use of the term (more frequently still after the war) helped delude some Czechs and Slovaks for a while. After all, during the war, they had, according to the nationalist Prague Uprising leader, Albert Pražák, had 'a faith in Beneš that resembled religious faith in the Saviour'.³⁹ The term and concept seem to be associated in the West with the Bulgarian leader of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov.⁴⁰ A Comintern pamphlet from October 1936 outlining the Soviet approach to Spain and the 'anti-Fascist' struggle altogether described this 'democracy of a new type'.⁴¹ The new type of democracy constituted essentially Seton-Watson's first two stages, where, theoretically at least, a country could have its own form of socialism; the 'people's democracy' was according to Di Biagio the third stage.⁴² Gerhard Wettig, however, maintains that Stalin had invented the term 'people's democracy' as a 'socio-political order which allegedly provided a connecting link between Western and Soviet "forms of democracy"'.⁴³ From the late summer of 1946 onwards, Ulbricht set up Czechoslovakia as a model for German political development, trying to convince his audience that the Czechoslovak 'national, antifascist, and democratic' resolution was not Soviet 'democracy' and that people's democracies did not constitute dictatorships. The German party line was that a people's democracy was 'midway' between the 'bourgeois-capitalist' and the 'socialist'.⁴⁴ For the east Germans the Sorbs (see Schurmann's chapter) were essentially an irritant, but an irritant that could be put to good

36 Ibid., p. 258.

37 Ibid., pp. 264–65.

38 Ibid., pp. 278, 282–83, 265, 268.

39 Albert Pražák, 'Edvard Beneš 1919 a 1945' in Josef Kuchynka (ed.), *President Budovatel. Příručka pro oslavy 28. května narozenin Dr. Ed. Beneše*, Třebechovice, 1947, p. 5.

40 See, for example, *Brockhaus-Enzyklopädie*, Mannheim, 1994, p. 413.

41 See Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century 1914–1991*, London, 1994, pp. 162–63.

42 See Anna Di Biagio, 'The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform, June–September 1947' in Gori and Pons (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, p. 211.

43 Gerhard Wettig, 'The Soviet Union and Germany in the Late Stalin Period, 1950–3' in *ibid.*, p. 357.

44 Pike, *The Politics of Culture*, pp. 61–62.

use once it was certain that 'popular democracy' would win, at least in the Soviet zone of occupation. Settling the 'Sorb question' would constitute an anti-Fascist act, and could be seen as the east German contribution to Moscow's temporarily official Panslav line.

Biber's chapter deals with another small Slav nation, though at least twenty times larger than the Sorbs, the Slovenes. British policy towards the Slovenes and particularly the Carinthian frontier question, Biber suggests, was duplicitous. Britain was exercised by the possibility of 'Slav hegemony' in South-East Europe,⁴⁵ a Slav threat to their strategic interests in the Mediterranean. In this case, the Yugoslav influence in Greece worried the British, but Stalin had also to be persuaded that he could not have Libya, and for a time, he seems also to have been interested in Cyprus.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the British soon had some knowledge of what happened to the Yugoslavs they 'repatriated' from their zone of occupation in Austria. Slovene and Croatian partisans earned few democratic credentials in the take-over of Venezia Giulia, which was, as Valdevit writes, 'accompanied by acts of intimidation and persecution against the Italians and non-Communist political parties. Thousands were deported and some of these immediately executed and thrown into Carsian pits (*foibe*).'⁴⁷ At the latest from 1943 onwards, Washington and London had few illusions about Communist methods; some politicians believed, or seemed to believe, like Beneš, that the war was making Stalin change (even at the Panslav military conference, major addresses were made by a Serbian and a Polish priest). During the war, however, Communist brutality seemed infinitely more humane than German and, moreover, the western Allies needed the Soviets.

That does not mean that the Cold War might not be said to have started before the end of the hot war. Conventional wisdom is that it started with Stalin's refusal to allow the Central Europeans to participate in the Marshall Plan, with the setting up of Cominform or with the Berlin Blockade. Mastny sees 'an air of the Cold War' in Stalin's ordering his troops to take Berlin.⁴⁸ It could certainly be said to have begun immediately the Red Army began liberating eastern Europe in 1944. It must be remarked, however, that, at least at this stage, the USA and Britain were not particularly interested in Bulgaria and Romania. Gaddis's view is simple and persuasive. Stalin had been suspicious of everything Roosevelt and Churchill said and did and 'neither American nor British sources reveal anything approaching such deep and abiding suspicion on the Anglo-American side'. It is doubtful, Gaddis maintains, that the Cold War really did begin only with peace in Europe. 'For it was Stalin's disposition to wage cold wars: he had done so in one form or another throughout his life.' Asking whether or not Stalin sought the Cold War is, Gaddis writes 'a little like asking: "does a fish seek water?"' Suspicion, distrust, and an abiding cynicism were not only his preferred but his necessary environment.⁴⁹

Except in western Germany and non-Soviet Austria, this suspicion and the concomitant fear of arousing suspicion pervaded Central European life ever more thoroughly between 1945–49. Suspicion, combined with the moral brutalization inspired by war (and often liberation) and with an often vicious hatred of the Germans. Beneš and Stalin tried to take the two Germanies approach, Beneš distinguishing between the Nazis and those who made the nation of *Dichter und Denker*, Stalin at least claiming that there was the bourgeoisie

45 R. Craig Nation, 'A Balkan Union? Southeastern Europe in Soviet Security Policy, 1944–8' in Cori and Pons (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, pp. 129–30.

46 Aleksei M. Filitov, 'Problems of Post-War Construction in Soviet Foreign Policy Conceptions during World War II' in *ibid.*, p. 5.

47 Giampaolo Valdevit, 'The Search for Symmetry: A Tentative View of Trieste, the Soviet Union and the Cold War' in *ibid.*, p. 397.

48 Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 264.

49 John Lewis Gaddis, *We Know Now: Rethinking Cold War History*, Oxford, 1997, pp. 22–25.

who had fired Nazism but also the Germany of the workers. Aczel mentions in his chapter Thomas Mann's rejection of the two Germanies notion, but in the end, in practice, so did Beneš and Stalin. In the latter's case, with, for example, his reparations demands (in the end knocked down by the Americans, but also by the British, who could not afford to feed and blanket their expensive zone of occupation), Beneš with fulfilling his wartime determination to expel all Germans. (He also explicitly held all Germans responsible for the razing of Lidice.) Those who attempted to remain decent, mainly politicians, against the suspicion, brutality and anti-German racism that accompanied the new democracy either escaped (for example, Mikołajczyk from Poland or Koželuhová from Czechoslovakia), or were confined like Cardinals Mindszenty and Beran, or soon killed like Horáková.

In western Central Europe culture took on as important a role as in the east, except that in the West the Gruppe 47 or the Vienna Group (which could only surface publicly after the Soviet withdrawal of 1955) did, indeed, try to become a critical conscience of the nation (among the Germans more than the Austrians), and, in Germany, the writings of such as Goes and Borchert, before Grass and the others came on the scene, created something like a literature of expiation. Except in the case of the Shoah — and here one thinks of the Polish Nałkowska or the Czech Bor — in East-Central Europe one cannot speak of writers as representing conscience much before the 1960s, when, it was a matter of expiation for what was euphemistically called the 'errors of the era of the cult of personality'. War novels, of course, abounded, but the heroes were a partisan or heroic young Red Army officer or a *politruk*.

Still, 1945–49 was the period which saw the introduction or imposition of Socialist Realism, although this was a complex matter. On the one hand, in the one country of our region, Czechoslovakia, where a sizeable Communist Party obtained almost unhindered throughout the inter-war period, there were attempts at socialist Realism (with a small *s*, since Socialist Realism with a big *S* could only exist in a socialist society). In Poland, there were also novels which at least looked Socialist Realist from the late 1930s, too. Some labelled their works Socialist Realist in the immediate post-war years out of fear or obsequiousness; others botched up attempts at being Socialist Realist. Socialist Realism remained a literary bogeyman throughout the Communist period, but, so far as it existed at all, it was not a dominant trend in the literature of Central Europe for more than three to five years. Of course there were visible and derided attempts to re-impose Socialist Realism in the Brezhnev era. By the end of the 1950s a new or renovated term, 'socialist art', emerged, but that could soon be applied to anything, just to keep the cultural section of the Central Committee happy.

The idea of Socialist Realism also, however, embodied the creation of new cultural or cultural political models. Szegedy-Maszák writes of that in his chapter. Bauer writes of the Fučík cult and of the conversion of the chiefly nineteenth-century 'bourgeois' Realist novelist Jirásek into a proponent of a Marxist nationalist interpretation of history. True people's culture could only come into being once the Communist Party had taken over completely, for the word 'people's' or 'popular', as in 'people's democracy', means only 'of and for the working class/peasants'. And determining what working class meant lay in the hands of the Party, which demanded class consciousness; naturally, that in turn involved ardent affection for the Soviet Union.

What Socialist Realism had to do was explain why it was right, humane, historically necessary for the Communist Party to rule, and to demonstrate to the readers how they could recognize in themselves, and thus rid themselves of, residual bourgeois values. Socialist Realism was not monolithic; sentimentalized lyric verse and historical novels could serve the cause as well. Nevertheless one may speak of two basic types. The first

type (Tatarka's *Prvý a druhý úder* [First and Second Blow], mentioned by Hayes in her chapter, fits this category) has a stock pattern that more or less corresponds to that of a medieval legend of a saint. The *vita* tends to have a tripartite structure: (i) saint, pre-conversion often living a life of debauchery; (ii) converted, saint lives saintly life, working miracles or not, and then is martyred or dies naturally, giving her or his ghost up to God; (iii) miracles take place after the death of the saint. In the Socialist Realist novel: (i) a woman or man, usually working-class, is suffering from difficult residual bourgeois values (for example, does not understand solidarity and therefore thieves or clocks in late); (ii) converted by a fellow-worker to the faith of socialism; this person may die on a site as a result of the deeds of former collaborators with Germans or of some other class-unconscious villain, or may simply finish the job, as Stakhanovite, and become local Party secretary; (iii) the dam or iron-foundry, now completed, is an embodiment of the happy morrows of socialism, or, say, fields now produce because socialism has irrigated them, or peasants now have running water or tractors — materialist 'posthumous' miracles.

The second basic type is a work of political explication centred on some would-be lively, would-be heroic tale. One of the novels Příbáňová discusses, Řezáč's *Nástup* (Falling-in) constitutes an almost disturbing example of this. Except for the odd Communist who has returned from a concentration camp, all Germans are armed, and all either are or aid and abet *Werwolf*-like bandits. (Pritchard mentions the *Wehrwolf* mythology, and in his camp memoirs Jiří Beneš explains the origins of the 'organization'.) They are vicious to man and beast, and so when the Communist farm-labourer is given a small German farm, and the German family is justly (*sic*) evicted, the Germans poison his cattle. The whole little town rejoices — or rather the newly arrived Czechs rejoice — when the Soviets give them one of the factories there. This is to explain reparations and looting. All Czechs, even though they do not know Russian, instinctively understand it, for they recognize it as a version of their language. Czech women find Soviet soldiers frightfully attractive (an explanation of the raping), and Soviet lorries driven by Soviet soldiers take off the first German expellees. All those Czechs who turn out to have come to the Sudetenland just for material gain have bourgeois origins or connections. Only such Czechs ill-treat Germans (an explanation of appalling Czech behaviour towards the Germans). One such Czech had been released from Mauthausen early, the suspicion being that he had agreed to work for the Gestapo. As far as camps are concerned, the Communist functionary hero justifies the re-opening of German slave-labour camps for Czechoslovak use. True worker Communists are, of course, honest and brave, and know how to organize things, as well as how to convert a good nationalist petty bourgeois (in this case a postmaster). And so one could go on; it is a long novel. *Nástup* may be said to work as a justification for suspicion, brutality and hatred of the Germans. People's culture justifies people's democracy, more mere oppugnancy.

The period of transition in Central Europe prepared the way for a new Communist nationalism. While attacking 'bourgeois nationalism' and the 'nationalism' of the Fascists, the regimes that gradually established themselves in the emergent Eastern Bloc after 1945 re-invented 'patriotism'. This 'patriotism' was normally based on a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of nineteenth-century nationalist movements. The common people had been the heroes of the National Revivals and those among the Revivalists who had not been common were redesignated as proto-socialists or were defamed as cosmopolitans (or disappeared from cultural history altogether). To be ill-disposed towards the Communist Party was to be unpatriotic. The Communists as the embodiment of all working-class ideals also embodied the patriotic ideals of the past. 'National' history became the history of the inevitable development of an ethnic group towards its complete realization in socialism. The effects of this Party-inspired encouragement of old nationalist prejudices are still evident today, even in apparently liberal politicians' speeches.

Studying the relationship between power and culture in the 1945–48/49 period of transition helps us understand the post-1989 transition from socialism to the market economy. The preconditions for the present transition — or transformation, as it is normally labelled in former Eastern Bloc countries — were as different as the preconditions in 1945. In different ways and at different paces, Poland and Hungary had begun transforming before the collapse of Communism. The seeds of the ‘Velvet Divorce’ in Czechoslovakia were sown by the Third Prague Agreement (mentioned in Bombíková’s chapter) rather than by the wartime Slovak Fascist state. The lustrations in Czechoslovakia often resembled the national courts at the end of the war. Active collaboration with the Communists in general was often far more widely spread than collaboration in Nazi or Fascist times, most clearly so in the GDR. Passive implication in the regime was almost inevitable, unless one had covert privileges and could eat only Western food, use only Western paper and so forth. On the other hand, even in the GDR, by the 1980s resistance against the regime became ever stronger amongst young people. Among the resistance movements run by the not-so-young, the Poles had *Solidarność*, the Czechs (with a small number of Slovaks) Charter 77. Whatever the impact of Western television, Western consumer luxury and so forth, the real spark for change came, as in 1945, from the Soviet Union, from Gorbachev’s *perestroika*. The flight of East Germans through Hungary to Austria or through the West German embassy in Prague provided the first impulse to the fall of the Berlin Wall that in turn marked the beginning of the rapid collapse of Communism in Central Europe.

The Second World War brutalized Central Europe. Over the years brutality diminished until 1989; 1989 knocked down the Iron Curtain, finally destroyed ‘people’s culture’ — and gave the ex-Bloc certain knowledge of the imperfectibility of man.

2 'East of the Elbe': The Communist Take-over and the Past

LÁSZLÓ PÉTER

Introduction

The spectacular collapse of Communism all over the eastern half of Europe between 1989 and 1991 was probably the most rapid and least expected major event to take place on the continent in modern times. The full significance of this change for the whole of Europe is still indiscernible. How will it affect, for example, the future of the nation-state? The trends are contradictory: the collapse of Communism marked the dissolution of Russia's two empires — the first, the East European, in 1989, then, in 1991, the Soviet Union itself. In the wake of these events former independent nation-states were restored and new states created. Disintegration in the East coincided with a revived attempt in the West, after years spent in the doldrums, at the economic and political integration of nation-states. In fact, the Soviet Union was dissolved and the Maastricht Treaty signed in the same year — indeed in the same month towards the end of 1991.

Further, how should we understand the half-century from 1945 (or the seventy years from 1917) in which Europe was divided? Were these the years of dislocation after which Europe returned to its normal course? Moreover, is there a coherent explanation for the disjunction that isolated the two halves of Europe from each other after the Second World War? It is this last question that will be my concern.

On 25 April 1945 an advance unit of the Red Army reached Torgau, on the Elbe, which had already been taken by soldiers from the American Ninth Army. It was purely a coincidence that Russian and American soldiers should come face to face for the first time by this river. Yet what appears to be a coincidental encounter may also have been emblematic of something significant: ever since the Enlightenment the Elbe has been regarded by historians as the border that culturally divides Europe into a 'Western' and an 'Eastern' half.¹ After Germany's surrender the eastern half of the continent remained under permanent Soviet occupation and, as Winston Churchill predicted in his Fulton speech a year later, an iron curtain fell across Europe. Within a few years and with the support of the Soviet Union, Moscow-trained Communists seized power in most countries of the region. For over forty years Europe was divided between liberal democracies and Communist single-party states.

The Soviet Presence

At first sight it looks easy to explain why the Communists could achieve complete power in so many European countries so quickly. There were very few Communists in the countries liberated by the Red Army. With the exception of Yugoslavia and

1 As Larry Wolff argued 'it was the intellectual work of the Enlightenment to bring about that modern reorientation of the Continent which produced Western Europe and Eastern Europe.' These are 'complementary concepts, defining each other by opposition and adjacency'. The new 'Philosophic Geography', he notes, replaced the earlier conceptual division of Europe between the South and the North, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, Stanford, 1994, pp. 4–6. As the author did not set out to review the historiography of the modern periods, the Elbe does not figure in his colourful account of the concept's genesis.

Czechoslovakia they were tiny illegal groups joined by *émigré* leaders from Moscow after liberation. At that time France alone may have had more Communists than all the east European countries taken together. Yet the latter went Communist and France did not: in France and elsewhere in the West support for the Communist Party gradually declined while in the eastern half of Europe it rose spectacularly. Take for instance Poland. 'In 1942-3, membership of the PPR [the Polish Workers' Party] could be counted in hundreds', writes Norman Davies; 'in 1944 to 1948, it rose from 8,000 to 1 million'.² Mátyás Rákosi, Hungary's Communist leader, admitted that back in November 1944 he had started with only 800 men.³ But Communist Party membership swelled to 30,000 in February 1945, then to 150,000 by May and half a million by the time of the elections held in November. Conversion to the Communist social ideal on such a scale could not explain this incredible growth. It is plausible to assume that the Communists, with Soviet backing, coerced the population into submission. From this one can infer, and common sense strongly suggests, that the Soviet presence explains not just the rapid rise of Communist support in a hitherto largely anti-Communist population, but even the take-overs themselves.

The Communists did not merely take power: they destroyed established European institutions like the market system, private property, the rule of law; they undermined their countries' independence, abolished personal, civil and political rights, destroyed the autonomy of Churches and cultural values and imposed on the population the unwanted socialist police state. Is it not obvious that they could carry off all this only with unrelenting Soviet support? Occam's razor, the principle that the fewest possible assumptions should be made in explaining a thing, also suggests that it would be a mistake to look for further causes when we already have one in hand. Or, as a political theorist reading an essay of mine some years ago observed: 'Soviet occupation was the first-order reason, everything else is at best second-order.'⁴ Counterfactual arguments also seem to support this view. Few people would doubt that, had the Western powers' and the Soviet armies met at the Vistula and the Dniester rather than at the Elbe, the post-war European political settlement would have looked very different from what it turned out to be.⁵

History is, unavoidably, written backwards. We know the outcome of events, in our case the introduction of the Communist system east of the Elbe which, because we can explain it by Soviet pressure, begins to seem inevitable. Accordingly, the Soviet leaders, notably Stalin, prepared and carried out a plan to convert the independent countries of Eastern

2 Martin McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe 1944-1949*, London, 1977, p. 47; see also Susanne S. Lotarski's figures in 'The Communist Takeover in Poland' in Thomas T. Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, New Haven, CT, 1975, p. 347.

3 Others estimate that there might have been about 3,000 Communists, most of them inactive. The largest active group led by Pál Demény was, however, arrested by Péter Gábor's secret police (the ÁVO, later ÁVH) on Rákosi's orders in February 1945. Pál Demény and Ervin Gyertyán, *Az első koncepciók per*, Budapest, 1989, pp. 133ff.

4 Anthony Jasay's comment in a letter on my 'Miért éppen az Elbánál hasadt szét Európa?', in Miklós Tóth (ed.), *Önarcképünk sorsunk tükrében 1945-1949*, Munich, 1984.

5 General Patton's Third Army reached Bohemia but the Russians liberated Prague. See Vojtech Mastny's account, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, New York, 1979, pp. 273f. Exceptionally, the Soviet army did not stay in Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless the Soviet had reminded the Czech politicians in May 1946, just before general elections were held, of its military presence in the region. On the incidence see Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918-1948*, Princeton, NJ, 1973, p. 403. And see also Malcolm Mackintosh's (unconvincing) denial that even if the Western powers' armies had pushed further east 'Eastern Europe could have been saved', in Hammond, (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, p. 242.

Europe into Communist satellite states. This is, however, an unjustified procedure. What, in fact, we have so far established is only that Soviet presence was a necessary condition of the outcome. We have not demonstrated that it was, on its own, a sufficient cause of what happened. We have not enquired whether other conditions existed that were likewise necessary to bring about the same outcome. Yet on what grounds should we rule out in advance the idea that had some other conditions obtained the post-war history of Europe might easily have been different? In most cases in history it is impossible to account for all the causes that are sufficient together to explain an outcome. Moreover, fashionable literary theorists counsel historians (and some practitioners accept their advice) that they should abandon the search for causes altogether. Perhaps they should not be much occupied with causes of discrete events and should rather place their accounts in wider social and cultural settings. Yet an historian cannot entirely dispense with the search for causes as the siren voice of 'postmodernist' celebrities would entice him to do. If historians are to explain events at all, they have to face the question 'why?'.

It is unlikely that we shall ever have a satisfactory explanation for the Communists' easy victory in attaining complete power after 1945. When we reflect on the matter it becomes clear, however, that Soviet pressure is not sufficient to explain the take-overs. This is not just because historians eschew monocausal explanations but because it would amount to reductionism if an account of the take-overs neglected a variety of other conditions that patently had a strong bearing on the Communists' success.

Western Diplomacy

The behaviour of the Western powers is an obvious component. Why should we leave out from the account of the Communist take-overs the failure of Western diplomacy to translate its strategic superiority into political results? It appears, as Rieber has argued, that in 1944 neither the Western powers nor Russia had clear policy aims as regards the internal arrangements of the liberated countries.⁶ Even a year later the Russians behaved in occupied territories as if they assumed their time was limited.⁷ The 'percentage agreements' about spheres of influence were 'dangerously indefinite and elastic'.⁸ Their context was security rather than the countries' internal social systems. The Yalta Conference in February 1945 has become the historic symbol of Europe's post-war division, but it is simply not true that the Big Three 'carved up' Europe at Yalta, as is popularly held.⁹ What is true, however, is that the American and British leaders agreed to policies at Yalta (for instance, about holding general elections) that depended merely on promises by Stalin which he was afterwards allowed to ignore. Neither Roosevelt nor Churchill was at his best at the Conference. After the war, in every conflict with his Western partners Stalin went as far as he could without antagonizing them. He was a cautious opportunist rather than a reckless gambler. His appetite grew only when he saw what the Western powers

6 Alfred Rieber, 'Soviet Plans for Post-War East-Central Europe' in Eszter Andor et al. (eds), *CEU History Department Yearbook 1997–1998*, Budapest, 1999, pp. 75–76 and 86–88; Norman Davies quotes Stalin's dictum in 1944 that 'introducing Communism to Poland was like putting a saddle on a cow', *God's Playground, A History of Poland*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1981, II, pp. 574 and 553.

7 Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, 2nd edn., London, 1952, pp. 231–32; Martin McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 42; Vojtech Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 217.

8 Ibid., pp. 211–12. On American opposition to a system based on 'sphere of influence' and conflicts over this with Britain, see Lloyd C. Gardner, *Spheres of Influence. The Partition of Europe, from Munich to Yalta*, London, 1993, esp. ch. 7.

9 See V. Mastny, *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, pp. 244–53.

were prepared to tolerate and when his prospects improved.¹⁰ Undoubtedly, the continued American military presence in Western Europe and the exclusion of the Communists from the governments in France and Italy in the spring of 1947, both feeding on Russian suspicion and insecurity, also affected Stalin's calculations. At any rate, Western politicians' hands had been tied by public opinion, woken up to the facts of Soviet expansion only by the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948.

Local Conditions

The transition to Communist rule was shaped by local conditions in 1945. In general, the population in most places saw the Russians as conquerors rather than liberators.¹¹ The looting, pillage, murder and the gang-rapes by the Red Army aroused fear and foreboding. The bulk of the population remained anti-Communist and afraid that an 'alien system' would be imposed on it, and, where it could, resisted the growing power of the Communist parties.¹² Politicians who actively opposed the Communists were brutally persecuted and the rest were intimidated into silence. Also, the brutalities, the devastations and the general misery inflicted on the population by the protracted war, the destruction of the pre-war élites and the pauperization of the middle classes engendered lethargy. This undoubtedly had a strong bearing on events. But so did the fresh post-war optimism and aggressive, radical currents within the intelligentsia. The revulsion at Fascist barbarism and the horrors of war turned many educated young people to the utopian ideal of a classless society based on social justice rather than 'class exploitation'. They repudiated the pre-war social order, felt that the 'age of private property' was over and flocked to left-wing populist and socialist parties in order to build a 'people's democracy' which promised 'nationalizations', the 'raising of the common people', general welfare and a bright future.¹³ It should not be forgotten that, strictly speaking, 'people's democracy' was not a Russian import and was not even invented by a Communist.¹⁴ Nevertheless, it was all grist to the Communist mill. This misnomer with its uncertain and periodically shifting uses turned out to be one of the most successful confidence-tricks of the century.¹⁵ It lured

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- 10 Ibid.; Elisabeth Barker, in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 212–17; Gardner, *Spheres of Influence*, pp. 227–37 and ch. 9.
 - 11 Although in Czechoslovakia the non-Communist political élite was pro-Russian.
 - 12 Resistance was strong in Poland, a unique case, where in the countryside civil war broke out and lasted for the best part of three years, Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 560–61.
 - 13 There is general agreement in the literature on the ascendancy of left-wing, socialist ideas throughout the region in 1945. See Hugh Seton-Watson in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 225; on 'popular radicalism' after the War see George Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe 1945–1992*, Oxford, 1993, pp. 68–70; Lonnie R. Johnson, *Central Europe*, Oxford, 1996, p. 237. The Hungarian CP launched its first recruitment drive only in September 1945, by which time without any particular effort membership had already reached 350,000 to 400,000, to overtake the Social Democrats particularly in the share of support among civil servants. György Gyarmati, 'A közigazgatás újjászervezése az "ideiglenesség" korszakában', *Történelmi Szemle*, 1996, 1, pp. 88–90.
 - 14 'People's democracy' was probably coined by Edvard Beneš (see Robert Pynsent's Introduction). Hugh Seton-Watson's 'Popular Democracy' may be a better translation but that form did not gain general currency: Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, p. 167. He pointed out that the term was a tautology; any West European liberal would agree. In Eastern Europe 'the people' were, however, not meant to include aristocrats, Jewish bankers, German farmers, kulaks or even plain 'reactionaries'.
 - 15 'People's democracy' sometimes meant the combination of democracy and socialism, or the rule of the workers and the peasants, or the transition from capitalism to socialism, or the dictatorship of the proletariat without the Soviet form. See comments by Doreen Warriner,

idealists and the merely gullible into supporting or at least being sympathetic to the confiscatory policies of the new provisional governments set up by Communists and non-Communists in the wake of Red Army victories. All in all, there were intimidators and intimidated. The silent majority was intimidated and the active anti-Communists persecuted not by Soviet outsiders or the Red Army but by a substantial minority, the indigenous Left, throughout the region.

The Presence of the Past

Social behaviour changes slowly in all times. It is not a rhetorical question to ask to what extent the past, the inherited institutions, social conflicts and transmitted attitudes and expectations affected the process of the Communist take-overs east of the Elbe. Partly perhaps because one is looking for it, one finds much that sheds light on why the Communists, aided by a substantial number of non-Communists, could attain full power swiftly. Only a select number of inherited social characteristics that, arguably, had some bearing on the outcome can be summarized here.¹⁶ It is not easy, however, to describe these characteristics in a general form. Whereas the take-overs produced by and large a uniform social order east of the Elbe,¹⁷ in the past the social arrangements among the countries of Russia's new East European empire had been considerably diverse. Nor is it helpful to treat 'Central Europe' and the 'Balkans' as separate regions or sub-regions, because the distinguishable structural features of social life overlap to such a great extent in most parts of Europe that any clear regional division hinders nearly as much as helps analysis.¹⁸

National Conflicts

When we list the characteristics that assisted the Communist take-overs, we may find that the national conflicts, normally intractable anywhere, were a prominent factor that contributed to the outcome. Ever since the birth of modern nationalism the countries east of the Elbe have been the hottest zone in Europe. While in Western Europe nationalism was by and large confined to the periphery of politics,¹⁹ further east rival national movements competed for territory and power, and national issues dominated politics. As is well known, political parties were formed to a large extent by reference to national rather than social questions in the Habsburg Monarchy, in inter-war Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and elsewhere. It is a commonplace that the two great wars of the twentieth century originated in this part of Europe. And nationalism is still a powerful force; it played a major part as much in the terminal decline and collapse of the Communist system as in the take-overs after the Second World War.

Revolution in Eastern Europe, London, 1950, pp. 38–46 and 54; and by Hammond in his *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 24–25. The shifting conceptions of people's democracy have been analysed by Paul G. Lewis, *Central Europe since 1945*, London, 1994, pp. 68–75.

16 Norman Davies on an ingenious map set out a large number of east–west fault lines in Europe, *Europe: A History*, Oxford, 1996, p. 18.

17 Stalinist uniformity imposed by coercion was never complete and after the dictator's death diversity among Russia's satellites became increasingly apparent, see, for instance, J. F. Brown, *The New Eastern Europe*, New York, 1966, esp. ch. 8.

18 See László Péter, 'Central Europe and its Reading into the Past', *European Review of History*, 6, 1999, 1, pp. 101–11.

19 See John Plamenatz, 'Two Types of Nationalism' in E. Kamenka (ed.) *Nationalism*, London, 1976, pp. 22–36 and cf. László Péter, 'Uses of "States", "Nation" and "National Minority"' in Péter Tusor (ed.), *R. Várkonyi Ágnes Emlékkönyv*, Budapest, 1998, p. 576.

The states occupied by the Red Army were, without exception, young; they were created either in the late nineteenth century or in the twentieth, and territorial conflicts among them were endemic. They all had border disputes with their neighbours and were bleeding in 1945 from the loss of territories, temporary or otherwise, severed either during the war or after.²⁰ As we all know, the largest, most important of these countries, Poland, was actually, so to speak, put on wheels and moved hundreds of kilometres westwards.²¹ Because of their conflicts there was little chance for the occupied countries' politicians to co-operate with each other to escape their fates; rather they were vying with each other for Russian favours, which made them still more dependent on Stalin's good-will.²²

All the new states contained (mostly large) national minorities, and governments habitually did much to reduce their size even in the best of times. The war provided the opportunity, however, for carrying out ethnic cleansing. In divided Poland both the German and the Soviet authorities instituted brutal policies of the mass murder of Poles.²³ In the Shoah the Nazis systematically murdered six million Jews. After the defeat of Hitler's army Soviet policy aimed to expel all Germans from Eastern Europe. The deportation of some eleven million ethnic Germans mostly to what became West Germany²⁴ was a popular measure among all the politicians of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Indeed, non-Communists frequently showed more zeal in getting rid of their German minorities than Communists.²⁵ The expulsion of German farmers, who were forced to leave their well-equipped farmsteads without compensation, however, enormously increased the patronage power of the Communists. The Polish CP consolidated its position by distributing German property from the acquired new western territories,²⁶ the Czechoslovak Communists by handing out the property of the expelled

20 See C. A. Macartney, *National States and National Minorities*, London, 1934, also his unexceptionable summary of border conflicts in *Problems of the Danube Basin*, Cambridge, 1942, esp. pp. 1–8; C. A. Macartney and A. W. Palmer's *Independent Eastern Europe*, London, 1962, esp. pp. 450–52 ('Conclusion'). For a full account of the national movements in the modern world and their conflicts see the works of G. H. N. Seton-Watson, esp. *Nations and States* (London, 1977), also *Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918–1941* (London, 1962 esp. chs. 7 and 8), *The 'Sick Heart' of Modern Europe*, Seattle, WA, 1975 (three lectures forming a thoughtful essay on the subject).

21 Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 489–91, and in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 39–40.

22 For example, Stalin skilfully used the Hungarian–Romanian conflict over Transylvania to put pressure on the political leaders of both countries. Soviet endorsement of all Polish claims to the western territories (which the Western powers refused to do) made any post-war Polish government dependent on Soviet good-will; see Susanne S. Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', pp. 342–45. Polish–Lithuanian conflict over Vilnius paved the way to the Soviet occupation of Lithuania in 1940; see Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 518–19, 443.

23 Ibid., pp. 444–63.

24 Estimates vary between ten and thirteen million Germans who escaped or were expelled from the countries of Eastern Europe; see Hans W. Schoenberg's article in Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 370–74; Johnson, *Central Europe*, pp. 233–34.

25 Ludvík Němec argued that in the spring of 1945 'the mood of the country' was more radical as regards the expulsion of the Germans and Hungarians than the Communists' plans, Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 418 and 397–98. In Hungary the National Peasant Party, supported by most of the Smallholders', headed the campaign to expel the *Ungarndeutsche*, Mihály Korom, 'Az Atlanti Chartától a potsdami kollektiv büntetésig', *Századok*, 1998, 3, pp. 563–64 and 570.

26 Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 562–68; Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', p. 363.

Sudeten Germans,²⁷ and the Hungarian CP used the deported Germans' property in like manner.²⁸ But Hungary was also at the receiving end: it had to absorb co-nationals expelled from the Voivodina by Yugoslavia and, more significantly, from Romania and Czechoslovakia.²⁹ President Beneš planned to transfer over 700,000 Hungarians from southern and eastern Slovakia, partly as an exchange for Hungary's Slovak minority and, as few Slovaks lived there, partly to settle them in place of expelled Germans.³⁰ In the end only 74,000 Hungarians (mostly farmers) were forced to leave Slovakia.³¹ They were replaced by 73,000 (landless and mostly Hungarian-speaking, but willing) Slovaks from Hungary.³²

'At the end of the eighteenth century', observes Johnson, 'three-fourths of Europe's 1.5 million Jews lived east of the Elbe River'.³³ Their social integration was unaccomplished in most East European countries during the nineteenth century. Antisemitism remained widespread in the whole region. The annihilation of most of the Jews in the Shoah³⁴ had a shattering effect on those who survived it. Yet some of them, rather than moving to the West or to Israel, returned to their homelands.³⁵ Those who returned expected to live in a tolerant people's democracy and were mostly sympathetic to the post-war regime. Some enrolled into the police to seek out their persecutors for punishment. The natural political home of a young educated Jew (unless he came from a well-known, rich family) was the Communist Party, whose egalitarian socialist ideology, which emphatically rejected all religious discrimination, seemed to offer the best available remedy against racial barbarism. Socialism held out the promise of integration into the national society.³⁶ In general, national (religious) minorities were heavily over-represented in the Communist

27 See Seton-Watson in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 229; Ludvík Němec's article in Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 416–27.

28 The Soviet government, through the Allied Control Commission put pressure on the Hungarian government to expel 450,000–500,000 Germans. In the end 163,000 Germans were deported to Germany by the authorities; many also escaped from Hungary and yet others were taken by the Red Army as POWs to the Soviet Union. See Korom, 'Az Atlanti Chartától...', pp. 553–83; Lóránt Tilkovszky, *Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon a 20. században*, Budapest, 1998, pp. 126–41.

29 See Tamás Stark, *Magyarország második világháborús embervesztesége*, Budapest, 1989, pp. 63–78.

30 President Beneš insisted that Hungarians should be treated like the Germans and, in order to make room for the Hungarians of Slovakia in Hungary, he received help from the Soviets, which put pressure on the Hungarian government to expel nearly half a million Germans (over double the number the Hungarians wanted).

31 In addition to the 31,000 Hungarians who were expelled and the 44,000 who were deported to Bohemia.

32 Korom, 'Az Atlanti Chartától...', pp. 561–62, 568–571; Károly Kocsis, 'Telepítés és etnikum', *Historia*, 1998, 2. pp. 19–22; see Mamatey and Luža, (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 422–25.

33 Johnson, *Central Europe*, p. 143.

34 Randolph L. Braham, the leading scholar on the subject, estimated the total loss of Hungarian Jewry, predicated on the country's 1944 borders, as over 564,000, *The Politics of Genocide: The Holocaust in Hungary*, 2 vols, New York, 1981, II, p. 1144. Stark, by using an improved method, estimated that around 390,000 Jews died during the war, *Magyarország második világháborús...*, pp. 23–46.

35 'At the end of 1945', wrote Braham, 'there were 255,500 Jews in the territories controlled by Hungary in 1944, of whom 190,000 lived in the Trianon part of the country — including 144,000 in Budapest, still by far the largest Jewish community in postwar Europe (excluding the USSR)', *The Politics of Genocide*, II, p. 1143.

36 See Péter Hanák's autobiography, *Ragaszkodás az utópiához*, Budapest, 1993, pp. 30f.

parties before and even after their taking power. In Transylvania in 1945 the Communists were largely Hungarian.³⁷ In Hungary a disproportionately high number of Slovaks worked in the Party and the leadership in Stalin's years was largely of Jewish origin in Poland and Hungary.³⁸

The Land Question

The land question was another factor that induced the swift Communist take-overs. Nowhere did the land question exist west of the Elbe. On its eastern side society remained overwhelmingly rural. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the bulk of the population worked as serfs tied to the land.³⁹ *Leibeigenschaft* showed a great variety: in Brandenburg, Prussia, Austria and Bohemia the position of the serfs was well regulated and became contractual. In Poland and Hungary, serfdom was harsher and less regulated. Prussia emancipated its serfs after 1806; the Austrian Empire followed in 1848. In contrast to Russia, peasant ownership of land and the market economy were firmly established in East Central Europe. In contrast to Western Europe, however, the rural economy was largely based on subsistence farming. Land was undercapitalized, extensively cultivated, 'overpopulated' and, handicapped by the system of partible inheritance, poverty-stricken.⁴⁰ Land hunger created the demand to distribute the large estates of the aristocracy and others among poor peasants. Generations of Polish, Hungarian, Romanian and Croat writers, the 'Populists', and politicians espoused the idea of land reform. In the inter-war years they were successful in some countries, but this did not (and could not) abate the land question.⁴¹

In 1945 all the occupied countries were still either predominantly rural or faced a land question and carried out land reforms.⁴² The Communists, nationalists and populists, happily marching abreast, energetically confiscated the land from the 'rich' and parcelled it out among the poor. In so doing the Communists killed many birds with one stone. They carried out a popular measure; they dispossessed the landowners — an independent social force; they confiscated the property of unwanted 'aliens', as we have already seen; and they set limits to the private holdings of agricultural land. Above all, the Communists acquired a power of patronage of enormous size⁴³ and created a new class of dependent tenants (rather than independent farmers) who were later easily pushed into the

37 See on this point Schöpflin, *Politics in Eastern Europe*, p. 68.

38 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, p. 317.

39 Martyn Rady found the absence of the institutions of local self-government for the 'East Elbian peasantry' the critical factor that distinguished serfdom from the farming communities of western Europe: see Rady, 'Core and Periphery: Eastern Europe' in Mary Fulbrook (ed.), *National Histories and European History*, London, 1993, pp. 168–72.

40 See Doreen Warriner, *Economics of Peasant Farming*, London, 1964, esp. the introduction to the second edition, pp. xi–xii; idem, *Contrasts in Emerging Societies*, London, 1965.

41 See, for example, Davies on Poland, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 411ff.

42 Warriner, *Revolution in Eastern Europe*, a sympathetic account of the land reforms, see esp. ch. 7, and statistics on p. 136. Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, pp. 265–67. In Poland 216,000 landless families were given land and 572,000 families were given additional plots. In Hungary 642,000 families and in Czechoslovakia 122,000 families received land, Iván T. Berend and György Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries*, New York, 1974, pp. 343–44.

43 The Czechoslovak election results revealed that the distribution of the Sudeten Germans' superbly equipped farms and of the dispossessed Hungarian landowners property enhanced the position of the CP; on Poland see Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', pp. 344 and 363ff., and Davies, *God's Playground*, II, p. 559.

collectives.⁴⁴ The distribution of land was a most popular measure particularly on the non-Communist left, which through this 'common cause' was tied closely to the Communist Party.⁴⁵

Economy and the State

In modern times the state east of the Elbe was an active, and frequently the dominant, player in the economy. The government did not merely, as elsewhere, regulate the economy, build its infrastructure and redistribute wealth through taxation; it was a principal entrepreneur. Take, for example, Poland, where the large banks and nearly half of industry was in state ownership in the inter-war years. In Hungary at the end of the nineteenth century the state itself was the richest landowner⁴⁶ and miner, the largest creditor, debtor, industrialist, customer and consumer. It possessed monopolies (tobacco, alcohol distilling); ministers set up factories which produced steel, machinery and sugar, and they ran wine cellars, poultry-, bee- and silk-farms, experimental stations, credit banks and co-operatives.

The weakness of urban life and of the independent middle-classes was probably at the root of this development. Towns appeared late, and were fewer and smaller to the east of the Elbe than to the west. The burghers were socially isolated, ethnically frequently different⁴⁷ and politically ineffective in societies where the ascendancy of the landowning nobility was the norm. Modern industry, which appeared east of the Elbe in the nineteenth century, did not create politically strong social groups. The pattern of industrialization was varied in Europe. In the West the growth of the factory system accompanied the emergence of an independent industrial bourgeoisie. In Eastern Europe cottage industry dominated and, apart from in a few areas, for example, in north Bohemia, only a handful of artisans became factory-owners in East Central Europe. In Russia trade and manufacture were controlled by the Muscovite state. Gerschenkron convincingly argues that in the advanced West European countries the factory provided the sources of capital supply. In Germany, Austria and Bohemia it was primarily the banks which produced the capital; the factories played second fiddle. In Hungary, in the Polish territories, in Russia and in the Balkans, the primary driving force was the state, followed by the banks, the factories coming a poor third.⁴⁸ By and large east of the Elbe industry, where it developed, was lopsided: a sea of artisans produced a small part of the industrial output while a few very large firms manufactured the bulk. Many of these firms were an early variety of managerial enterprise, financed by foreign capital, controlled by banks and dependent on the government.⁴⁹ The few factory-owners were frequently social outsiders. Nowhere east of

44 As regards Czechoslovakia, see Jan M. Michal's comments in Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 441–42.

45 In Hungary the big push by the Communists against their political opponents was launched in 1946 with the slogan: 'We are not giving back land!'

46 This had been so for centuries: 'The Crown, not the Esterházy family, was by far the largest landlord in Hungary', writes P. G. M. Dickson, *Finance and Government under Maria Theresia 1740–1780*, 2 vols, Oxford, 1987, I, pp. 109–10.

47 For instance, in Bohemia, Moravia, Poland and Hungary most of the towns were established by German settlers in the Middle Ages.

48 A. Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge, MA, 1966, pp. 5–30 and 353–56; and see critical comments on Gerschenkron's model by Iván T. Berend and György Ránki in their *Economic Development in East-Central Europe*, pp. 81–92.

49 See I. T. Berend, 'Ways and Peculiarities of Enterprise Development in Twentieth-Century Hungarian Industry' in *Acta Historica* (Budapest), 20, 1974, esp. pp. 364, 369–73.

the Elbe did the industrial and business classes acquire the political muscle they undoubtedly possessed in the West.⁵⁰

The overbearing presence of the state in the economy and society had its antecedents in the autocratic political system of earlier times. The monarchs possessed energetic revenue-collecting machineries, required for military efficiency, without many constitutional constraints. The nobility possessed entrenched rights but exercised power, if at all, only locally. The Austrian, Prussian and Russian monarchs, interlocked in rivalry, pursued cameralist policies to strengthen the state in order to maintain, nay, augment Great Power status as well as promoting the 'general good'.⁵¹ The intelligentsia, smitten by the French Enlightenment, yet sceptical of the capacity of social forces to generate the requisite change, placed their hopes in the state: the state itself ought to accomplish all that was accomplished in Western Europe largely by social forces. Christian Wolff and other popularizers of English and French ideas converted the *philosophes'* concept of civil society to the theory of a fully rational absolute state.⁵² The liberals in the nineteenth century rejected that theory: they were constitutionalists. Yet again, they believed that reforms ought to be imposed on an unwilling, unenlightened population; society was reactionary and the state was progressive. These ideas of the intelligentsia gradually permeated officialdom and transformed the state machinery into an active instrument of economic and social change.

Étatisme and Authoritarianism

Through a meteoric rise of the state bureaucracy in the eastern half of the continent, an ever larger part of the middle classes became dependent for their livelihood on governments that possessed wide discretionary powers. The *étatiste* machinery operated increasingly through ministerial decrees rather than through statute laws. Not only socialists and nationalists, but even most of the liberals, idolized the state, believed in social progress attained by regulation 'from above'.⁵³ Even in the German Empire, where economic *étatisme* did not make much headway and where strong independent urban business classes developed, the population preserved deferential attitudes towards the *Obrigkeitsstaat*. Hans-Ulrich Wehler calls the subservience of the *Untertan* in Wilhelmine

50 For Hungary see László Péter, 'The Aristocracy, the Gentry and their Parliamentary Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Hungary', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 70, 1992, 1, esp. pp. 77–78. Industry was strong in Bohemia but Slovakia remained rural before 1945; see Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 210f.

51 See William H. McNeill, *Europe's Steppe Frontier 1500–1800*, Chicago, IL, 1964, chs. 4 and 5; H. M. Scott (ed.), *Enlightened Absolutism*, pp. 1–35, 147f and R. J. W. Evans, in *ibid.*, pp. 190ff.

52 Hanns-Martin Bachmann, *Die naturrechtliche Staatslehre Christian Wolffs*, Berlin, 1977, ch 5; Christoph Link, 'Die Staatstheorie Christian Wolffs' in Werner Schneiders, *Christian Wolff 1679–1754*, Hamburg, 1983, pp. 171–92. On the tarnished concept of 'Enlightened absolutism' see Peter Gay's comments in his *The Enlightenment: An Interpretation*, 2 vols, London, 1973, II, pp. 452, 483–501 and 682–83. The ideas of the *philosophes* and of the Austrian *Aufklärung* are contrasted by Derek Beales, 'Christians and "philosophes": The Case of the Austrian Enlightenment' in Beales et al. (eds), *History, Society and the Churches: Essays in Honour of Owen Chadwick*, Cambridge, 1985, pp. 169–94; Scott (ed.), *Enlightened Absolutism*, pp. 19, 147 and 226.

53 In the nineteenth century liberals east of the Elbe argued that because society was 'inactive' the state had to intervene more than in more advanced countries. Intervention was, however, to be only temporary. In fact, what the government once took over it hardly ever handed back to the private sector. (The pendulum started to move back only in the last two decades of the twentieth century.)

Germany the *ostelbische Mentalität*, inherited from the old Prussia, a mentality uncharacteristic of the population in the empire's western parts.⁵⁴

Elsewhere in the region, where the swelling of the *étatiste* state was combined with the lack of liberal safeguards based on the institutions of the *Rechtsstaat*, the emergence of over-sized government meant that the livelihood of a large part of the middle classes became dependent on the administrative state machinery. The chances of independent social centres of power to provide effective countervailing forces to the government were reduced; the political influence of the nobility declined faster than the independent urban middle classes developed political muscle.

The First World War and the Depression further strengthened *étatiste* attitudes and expectations. Now the hypertrophy of the state machinery eroded the great achievement of the nineteenth century, the transition to the competitive market system in the countries of East Central Europe. Control over the population increased under the influence of state corporatism. Social groups were boxed into organizations under ministerial tutelage. The (arbitrary) government began to manage the economy. The state that had succeeded to an increasing extent in cutting loose from social control acquired its own momentum for further unchecked growth.

The governments' control of the economy once more expanded during the Second World War.⁵⁵ By 1945, massive state intervention in social relations (and even the public ownership of enterprises) had a long, respectable tradition in the region. Moreover, radical ideas within the intelligentsia gained ground during the war. Not surprisingly, nationalization of the banks and industry was popular in 1945. A part of industry was already under government management: the property of Jews who had perished in the Shoah was taken over by the state and former German property was confiscated. In the defeated countries it became Soviet property. Significantly, the nationalization of banks and industries still in private hands in 1945 had largely gone through well before the Communists attained full power.⁵⁶ For socialism was the buzzword on the left, and even in the centre, in most countries after the war, on both sides of the Elbe. In Western Europe state intervention extended because of the emergence of the social question in politics and also because of the two World Wars. After 1945, nationalization was carried out where private ownership was not thought to be viable; the owners were compensated, after proper public debate, and by parliament-made law. East of the Elbe the motives were political; compensation was not paid; property was confiscated at short notice by government decree rather than by parliament-made law and without any public debate. All in all, state intervention expanded in Western Europe after liberal legal safeguards against the abuse of

54 The author emphasizes that the servility of the *Untertan*, the product of repressive measures, combined with systems of reward, was a leftover from Prussia, Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871–1918*, Göttingen, 1973, pp. 133–35.

55 See E. A. Radice, 'Economic Developments in Eastern Europe under German Hegemony' in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 3–21; György Lengyel (ed.), *Hungarian Economy and Society during World War II*, New York, 1993. The number of people in public employment nearly doubled in Hungary between 1938 and 1945, Mária M. Kovács, 'Közalkalmazottak, 1938–1949', *Valóság* (Budapest), 1982, 9, p. 45.

56 Luža in Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, p. 402; Michal in *ibid*, pp. 438–45; E. A. Radice in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 19–20; Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', p. 366; Davies, *God's Playground*, II, p. 570. A survey, carried out at Columbia University in 1957 among Hungarians who had fled their country after the 1956 revolution, revealed that most interviewees wished to preserve the land reform and the nationalization of the banks and large-scale industry, György Csepeli et al. in György Litván (ed.), *1956-os Intézet, Évkönyv VI. 1998*, Budapest, 1998, p. 271.

government power had been put firmly in place. In sharp contrast, the domineering state-machinery east of the Elbe largely lacked such safeguards.

Rule by Decree

Public power was predicated on different principles in different parts of Europe. In the legal systems east of the Rhine wherever statute law did not expressly protect the individual or the social group the state authorities could act at their own discretion (*freie Verwaltung*) and the government had the right to issue orders, nay more, enact decrees on its own authority in matters that interfered with the subject.⁵⁷ This was the autocratic principle of law which did not characterize either the English or the French legal systems, in which the presumption of the law was on the side of the individual rather than the state authorities.⁵⁸ In conflicts with the state authorities, the onus rested on the official to demonstrate that his action was authorized by parliament-made law.

German and Austrian liberals mitigated the effects of the autocratic principle through the institutions of the *Rechtsstaat*: detailed statutory provisions, which were regularly enforced by administrative courts, restricted the orbit within which the executive branch of government could enact decrees. *Rechtsstaat* principles, however, obtained only to a limited degree east of the Elbe. In Hungary, for instance, the liberal principles of equality before the law, private property, contract and personal rights were secure. On the other hand, the law did not protect civil rights and the discretionary powers of the police authorities remained wide in matters of association, public assembly, the right to strike and in a host of other civil matters in which the law-courts had no competence.⁵⁹ Further east, however, in Russia and in large parts of the Balkans, the principle of the rule of law itself was wanting in a society hardly touched by Western liberalism (lawlessness in Russia was acute).

In twentieth-century East Central Europe the government's free hand to rule by decree, largely bypassing parliament, increased spectacularly. The discretionary powers of officialdom widened. The overriding duty of the subordinate official, unprotected by civil-service regulations, was to carry out the instructions of his superiors. The form of 'democracy', established in 1944–45 everywhere in the wake of Red Army victories, was rule by decree. Some decrees were, well after their implementation, rubber-stamped by appointed or elected assemblies. 'Provisional' coalition governments, in a great hurry, remoulded society by ordinance on the basis of agreements between Communist and non-Communist champions of social reform.⁶⁰ Poland had rule by decree in its pure form from the days of the 'Lublin Committee', set up in July 1944, until January 1947 (through two

57 See Georg Jellinek, *Gesetz und Verordnung*, Freiburg, 1887, pp. 255–56. Jellinek discusses the right in the context of the distinction between formal and substantive law: *ibid.*, part 2, section 2, ch. 1, pp. 226ff.

58 This was common ground among West European natural-law school philosophers. Locke's individuals, by putting themselves under government, gave up only some specific rights. The eighteenth-century French *philosophes* followed Locke. The principle went into the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen: 'All that is not forbidden by law cannot be prevented, and no one can be forced to do what the law does not prescribe'; see E. K. Bramstead and K. J. Melhuish (eds), *Western Liberalism*, London, 1978, p. 228. This was the presumption of the law on which justice was administered in the liberal states of Western Europe in the nineteenth century.

59 See László Péter, 'The Autocratic Principle of the Law and Civil Rights in Nineteenth-Century Hungary' in Andor et al. (eds), *CEU History Department Yearbook 1997–1998*, pp. 11–34.

60 The wholesale reorganization of the structure of economy is summarized by Berend and Ránki, *Economic Development in East-Central Europe*, ch. 14.

successive reorganizations of the government), when after several postponements general elections were finally held.⁶¹ The 'provisional' coalition government carried out 'a series of popularly supported reform programs'.⁶² The government seized and distributed the land of the aristocracy, expelled millions of Germans, nationalized the banks, commerce and industry⁶³ and severely restricted individual rights, all by ordinance and well before the Communists had attained monopoly of power.⁶⁴

The Czechoslovak government, formed in April 1945 with a non-Communist majority, ruled by presidential decree; Beneš began issuing presidential decrees from exile in London. The Provisional National Assembly, which itself was set up by presidential decree with members delegated by the parties, approved in February 1946 'unanimously and without discussion, the ninety-eight presidential decrees issued from May to October 1945, many of which affected the fundamental structure of the Czechoslovak state and society'.⁶⁵ As in Poland, the provisional government expelled Germans (also some Hungarians), redistributed land, nationalized the banks and large-scale industry,⁶⁶ without public debate, by ordinance. And, even more than in Poland, the policy was popular.

Wholesale social reform was also popular in Hungary, where the tenacity of the autocratic principle of law, combined with the rapid erosion of the *Rechtsstaat* principles, likewise produced a system of rule by decree. The provisional government took the land of the aristocracy and the Churches and parcelled it out among the poor.⁶⁷ As 'peasants' were allowed to own more land than the 'gentry', the officials decided who did, or did not, belong to the 'gentry' and paid little attention to the limits set to expropriation by the decree. As in Czechoslovakia, the government set up People's Courts to punish war criminals and the 'enemies of the people', and tribunals for the political screening (extensive purges) of civil servants.⁶⁸ The government continued issuing decrees without statutory authorization until the general elections, held in November 1945, produced a parliament with not more than 17 per cent Communists.⁶⁹ The new coalition government, with a robust non-Communist majority in parliament, however, doubled up on the ministry's already bloated discretionary powers (by breaking a fundamental Central European legal taboo) in passing Law XI 1945 on the provisional regulation of state

61 Davies, *God's Playground*, II, p. 559–69; Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', esp. pp. 364–67.

62 Ibid., p. 364; Seton-Watson pointed out that Stanisław Mikołajczyk and his associates also 'stood for radical reforms', *The East European Revolution*, p. 177.

63 By the end of 1946, 91.2 per cent of industrial production was in the state sector, Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', p. 366.

64 Lotarski observed: 'The bitter resistance to the Communist regime was essentially nationalist rather than anti-socialist in nature', *ibid.*, p. 366–67.

65 Luža in Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, p. 397.

66 As Radomir Luža observes, 'Czechoslovakia was the second state after the USSR to nationalize its industry and banks', *ibid.*, p. 402, n. 38.

67 600/1945 Minister President's decree of 18 March 1945, re-enacted by the (unelected) Provisional National Assembly as Law VI 1945 only six months later. In general, measures were introduced by ordinance, some of which were approved after the fact by the Assembly.

68 The decrees that set up the People's Courts and the tribunals to 'verify' civil servants were issued in January and February 1945. A much larger number of officials lost their jobs in 1946 through the system of 'B lists' than through 'verification'; compare Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, p. 194. The system of 'B lists' and the 'verification' procedures of state employees were not new institutions. The Horthy regime introduced them to get rid of politically unreliable officials in the 1920s; see Tibor Hajdu, 'Az értelmiség számszerű gyarapodásának következményei...', *Valóság*, 1980, 7, p. 31.

69 Seventy seats out of the 409-member house.

power. Article 15 of the Law gave blanket authorization to the government to enact decrees that contravened statute law.⁷⁰ State ownership of the economy was extended at a steady pace by decree. First the mines (in December 1945), then the largest industrial factories and the banks were taken into state management, followed by the rest of industry, commerce and services.⁷¹ The decree enacted by the anti-Communist Smallholder Minister President Ferenc Nagy on the punishment of profiteering⁷² was so loosely framed that after the take-over the Communists could use it for years in 'liquidating' kulaks.

Political Scuffles

Not surprisingly the political divide in the people's democracies before the take-over did not develop around social reforms (on which Communists and non-Communists were not sharply divided), but on questions concerning the distribution of the levers of power. Political tension, fed on insecurity, fear and suspicion between Communists and their opponents, was palpable throughout the region after the war. The issues concerned permission to form parties; exclusion from the (self-appointed) ruling coalition; the distribution of ministerial, judicial and other posts (also perks and assets like the possession of cinemas) among the parties. They were a matter of driving the 'Fascists', the 'enemies of the people' or just plain 'reactionaries' out of public life. The political screening (and purge) of the civil service fuelled the tension.

A major source of conflict between the parties was the behaviour of the Communist-controlled police. Not subject to the safeguards of the *Rechtsstaat*, the security police roamed freely in the service of the Communist cause (the apogee of the growth of arbitrary state authority east of the Elbe). The police detained, deported and sometimes murdered political rivals of the Communists, exposed conspiracies based on trumped-up charges, disrupted political meetings, beat up people for 'swearing at democracy'.⁷³ Intimidation was systematic. 'In a democracy', observed the Social Democrat Anna Kéthly, in an encounter with Rákosi, 'if the bell rings early in the morning, you are certain that it could only be the milkman'.⁷⁴ She was not quite sure, since, in the past, democracy in her country had been only a minority taste, an aspiration at best. Clearly, representative government, where it existed east of the Elbe, worked differently from the way it did in West European parliamentary democracies.

Representative Government

The point about representative democracy is that at general elections the citizen can throw out the rascals and put in a new government (as he or she can on both sides of the Elbe today). The fundamental tenet of the parliamentary system is that parliament is supreme. In

70 The government was empowered by statute to exercise this autocratic power from 14 December to 1 March 1946 (earlier decrees had been issued on the strength of authorization by the unelected Provisional National Assembly). Parliament, however, obligingly regularly renewed the licence (see Laws XVI, XXVIII 1946 and XVI, XXVI 1947 and so on) which excluded the only sixteen new laws and constitutional laws. The government had to present the decrees to parliament (in the first instance the government submitted a list of 142 decrees on 26 February 1946).

71 The Minister President's decree established state control over the largest industrial plants in November 1946 and over the banks in May 1947.

72 8800/1946 ME rendelet, *Magyar Közlöny*, 28 July 1946.

73 For police brutality in the immediately post-war period, see Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, pp. 172f, 187–88, 192–98, *et passim*; Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 560f.

74 Mátyás Rákosi, *A népi demokrácia*, Budapest, 1946, p. 24.

nineteenth-century Western Europe, government became parliamentary: the 'ultimate controlling power'⁷⁵ could be said to have resided in the electorate which determined the political colour of parliament to which the government was politically (primarily) responsible. About half a dozen countries gained a parliamentary system before 1918.⁷⁶ In the eastern half of the continent political institutions developed differently. In the nineteenth century governments were appointed first; elections were held afterwards. Some countries, such as Poland and Hungary, had a long parliamentary tradition, but the monarch (later the president), the ministry and sometimes the army counterbalanced parliament's rights. Parties did not alternate in office and the majority principle did not prevail east of the Elbe. Governments in power invariably returned to office after elections. In 1905, in what was probably a unique event in the region's history, a government in Hungary lost the election. This led to a major constitutional crisis between parliament and Emperor-King Francis Joseph, from which the monarch emerged the winner. He appointed the new ministers largely on his own terms and forced them into resignation at the first opportunity. In 1918 Czechoslovakia was established on liberal democratic principles and civil rights were more secure there than anywhere else in the region. Yet the system could not become parliamentary because the German, Hungarian and even some of the Slovak politicians' loyalty to the new state was doubtful. Parliamentary democracy is based on the majority principle, which could not obtain because the Czechs formed a minority within the state. The permanent committee of the Czech parties, the *Pětka*, appropriated many of the political functions of parliament and the opposition never attained office.⁷⁷

Parliaments did not fare better in 1945 east of the Elbe. After liberation, free elections were not held in Poland. Elections were repeatedly postponed until well after the CP had consolidated its position as the dominant force in the country. The general election of January 1947 was sham.⁷⁸ In contrast, the Czechoslovak elections held in May 1946 were free and orderly (although only parties of the National Front were permitted to run). These were held, however, only after the Communists, exploiting presidential decrees, had fattened their ranks and popular support by the confiscation of lands and nationalizations on a massive scale. The Communist Party became the largest party in parliament, with 38 per cent of the vote. And yet power did not, as elsewhere, gradually slide into Communist hands; it had to be grabbed in a *coup d'état*. Paradoxically, perhaps, the *Rechtsstaat* tradition, stronger in Bohemia than elsewhere in the region, made the break in institutional

75 John Stuart Mill, *Representative Government* [1861], ch. 5. He insisted that an ultimate source of authority had to exist in any political system. For there was a balance in every constitution but there was no balanced constitution as a stable form of government.

76 Britain was the pace-setter. The Crown lost the power to determine the composition of Melbourne's second cabinet in 1835. See Norman Gash, *Reaction and Reconstruction in English Politics 1832–1852*, Oxford, 1965, pp. 13–15. From this time onwards the cabinet's responsibility towards the Commons was decisive. Belgium was the first country on the continent that emulated Britain in 1847, followed by Switzerland with its *sui generis* federal constitution in the same year. Parliamentary government was established in Holland in 1868, in France in 1876, in Norway in 1884, Denmark in 1901 and Sweden in 1905 (or 1917?). In the inter-war years two newly independent countries, Ireland and Finland, joined the group; the system expanded more rapidly in the second half of the twentieth century.

77 Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, particularly Václav L. Beneš, 'Czechoslovak Democracy...' in *ibid.*, pp. 97–98 and V. S. Mamatey, 'The Development...' in *ibid.*, pp. 108–10 and *passim*.

78 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, pp. 176–78; Lotarski, 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', pp. 350–54; Davies, *God's Playground*, II, p. 568f.

continuity in Prague unavoidable.⁷⁹ Although the opposite is frequently argued, the Hungarian elections of November 1945, in which the Communists received 17 per cent of the vote, were not free. The voting itself was free but only 'democratic' parties were allowed to participate. Moreover, Marshal Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission, permitted the holding of the elections on the strict condition that irrespective of the results the four-party coalition government was to be maintained. And so it was, notwithstanding the fact that the Smallholders' Party, with 57 per cent of the aggregate vote, gained an absolute majority.⁸⁰

In sum, parliamentary government was not established in the eastern half of the continent before 1945. The single exception was Finland, where an insecure liberal democracy emerged in the inter-war years. Some of the countries east of the Elbe, but for the Soviet presence, would have made the transition after the Second World War. There was again a single exception: Austria. In the rest of the region Soviet obstruction towards the transition turned out to be a walk-over, partly because of the overwhelming dominance of the executive branch over the legislative and the judiciary everywhere. It would amount to an absurd denial of continuity in history to blame primarily the Communists for this imbalance. Past and present at every turn in history form an uncomfortable fusion, which a further point may illustrate.

It is generally taken for granted that behind the advancing Soviet army everywhere new states were established. Indeed, with the exception of Romania (and perhaps Bulgaria), institutional continuity was ruptured when the governments under German occupation were replaced by the 'provisional' national governments formed on liberated territories. The change of legitimacy was by reference to the 'democratic' or national will of the people (rather than to Soviet recognition). Central government was everywhere supplemented by local national councils, which carried into effect the first measures. Interestingly, however, the existence of the 'national committees' or 'national councils' was in most countries short-lived.⁸¹ The old administrative system was restored with a few changes. And central governments likewise began to work through the old ministries. The avowed aim of the party leaders was not the creation of a new but the 'democratization' of the old state machinery. By that they did not even mean democratic reform of one kind or another. Democratization meant the purging of the civil service and its replenishment with new officials nominated by the 'democratic' parties.⁸² That was why the sharing-out of civil service posts among the parties became an all-important political issue.

The Take-over

In the preceding sections of this chapter some of the social characteristics have been considered that helped the Communists to achieve a monopoly of power largely through a

79 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, pp. 182–83; Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 403–15.

80 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, p. 193; George Schöpflin, 'Hungary' in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 98–99.

81 Lotarski argues that in Poland 'the councils played an important role in the struggle for power', 'The Communist Takeover in Poland', p. 363. Mastny, on the other hand, argues that the Lublin regime 'soon decided to run Poland by using the old system of administration rather than the newly established local councils', *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, p. 217.

82 The Hungarian Communist leaders had very clear ideas on 'democratization' by February 1945, see György Gyarmati, 'A közigazgatás újjászervezése az "ideiglenesség" korszakában', *Történelmi Szemle*, 1996, 1, pp. 76–88 esp. 84, n. 62. Rákosi declared in January 1946: 'We have inherited the existing apparatus of state from the reactionaries', Rákosi, *A népi demokrácia*, p. 11.

political process. This is not to deny that institutions and attitudes could also be found in the region which hampered the Communists' objectives, such as the rule of law, the market, liberal tolerance, the value of individual freedom, or parliamentary and even democratic traditions. (This was why, once Soviet power collapsed, at least some of these countries could, in a very short time, establish liberal democracies.) Also, the characteristics that helped the take-overs could be found elsewhere in Europe (in countries that were spared Communism). Again, the characteristics that have been listed did not all appear in all the countries that turned Communist. But a sufficient number could be found in all of them to have a multiplying effect. In feeding on each other they helped the process towards the one-party state. Some of the characteristics, such as the authoritarian tradition, the discretionary authority of state officials, the weakness of civic culture, were instrumental in the take-over as well as in the maintenance of the new order. Other features, such as land reform, national conflicts, border disputes, the deportation of the Germans and the consequences of the Shoah (attitudes to property and to politics) were circumstances that paved the way for the take-overs.

The take-over scenario was far from uniform in the region; nevertheless there was a pattern in the Communist seizure of power. Hugh Seton-Watson's classic account — written half a century ago — distinguished three phases.⁸³ First, the Communists formed genuine coalitions with the other democratic parties in a 'Patriotic' or 'National Front' in which they held a minority of the ministerial posts and seats in parliament. They insisted, however, with Soviet help, on holding the Ministry of the Interior and controlling much of the police. In the second phase, which Seton-Watson termed 'bogus coalition', the Communists attained a dominant position not by winning at elections but by forcing co-operation and merger on other 'left-wing' (socialist and peasant) parties which they had successfully infiltrated. Also, they engineered crises by fiercely attacking some of their 'right-wing', that is, more independent-minded, partners by staging 'mass demonstrations' and public disorder combined with massive police action and conspiracy trials on trumped-up charges in order to eliminate one group after another ('salami tactics').⁸⁴ Non-Communist leaders were imprisoned or forced into exile. Notably, Moscow-trained Communists had always had the upper hand over the 'home-grown' variety on whom at some stage brutal show-downs were inflicted to keep them in their place. At every turn in the transformation, Stalin's local disciples received help from the Soviet legation or the Allied Control Commission, or even directly from the Red Army.⁸⁵ In the last phase the

83 Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, pp. 169–71; Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 22–29, and Mackintosh in *ibid.*, pp. 237–43. Geoffrey Swain and Nigel Swain 'challenged' Seton-Watson's three-phase thesis which they largely misunderstood, *Eastern Europe since 1945*, London 1993, pp. 7–8.

84 Rákosi's admission in 1952, see William Juhász, *Hungarian Social Science Reader, 1945–1963*, New York, 1965, pp. 150–51; Schöpflin in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 98. On the combination of mass demonstrations and police terror see Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 411, 473; Péter Kende in Litván (ed.), *1956 Intézet, Évkönyv VI. 1998*, p. 190. The memoirs of a leading 'people's judge' well illuminates the farcical procedures of the People's Courts in Hungary: Akos Major, *Népbíráskodás, forradalmi törvényesség*, Budapest, 1988. Rákosi destroyed the Smallholder leadership by staging a 'conspiracy against the Republic' show-trial, see István Csicsery-Rónay and Géza Cserenyey, *Koncepciók per a Független Kisgazdapárt szétzúzására 1947*, Budapest, 1998.

85 See Mackintosh in Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 239f; the author draws deterministic conclusions from the (indisputable) premise that Stalin controlled the local Communist Parties, pp. 242–43; Davies, *God's Playground*, II, pp. 558f; Margit Földes, *A szövetséges ellenőrző bizottság Magyarországon*, Budapest, 1995, pp. 94–6. Péter Kende compared the Czechoslovak and the Hungarian transition toward one-party rule. The time-

transition to one-party rule was completed by the abandonment of the bogus coalition, after which only non-competitive acclamatory elections were held.

The three-phase pattern did not apply to Yugoslavia and Albania, countries where Communist rule grew out of the barrel of the gun, so to speak (nor to Greece, where an anti-Communist regime suppressed the Communist guerillas). Also, as Seton-Watson points out, the first phase was missing from the Polish and the second phase (largely) from the Czechoslovak transition. Because in Poland the government was controlled from the start by the Soviets, Norman Davies thinks it quite out of place to talk of a Communist take-over.⁸⁶

If that is so, the point applies even more to the territory of what later became East Germany, where for some time the military ruled directly. The leaping of Czechoslovakia from the first phase to the third throws some light on why that transition has been widely regarded as a coup.⁸⁷ In Hungary the transition from genuine to bogus coalition (the slicing of the salami) created protracted tension. In 1946 politics polarized: the right-wing of the Smallholders and the 'reactionaries' vested all their hopes in the coming of the Americans⁸⁸ while the Communists brought forward their timetable.⁸⁹ A vital, yet generally neglected, ingredient of the salami tactics was the firm support that the Communists secured, whenever they attacked the Smallholders, from both wings of the reformist intelligentsia, the Populists and the ('bourgeois') Radicals, as well as from the Social Democrats. In Romania and Bulgaria the time-span of the first two phases was shorter than in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. By the end of 1948, however, every country considered so far had completed the transformation. All in all, underneath the considerable diversity in detail it is not difficult to detect the common pattern in the transition to the Communist one-party state.

The Exceptions

Exceptions frequently shed light on the nature of the cases that do not deviate from the common pattern. Apart from Greece, where the Communists were suppressed by force, in two other countries Communist power was successfully resisted politically. We must ask why neither Austria nor Finland ended up in the Communist camp. They had a start in early 1945 rather similar to those countries that did turn Communist. Both Austria and Finland were defeated countries, partly occupied by the Red Army.⁹⁰ They were both placed under the authority of Soviet-dominated Allied Control Commissions and had to pay war reparations which gave economic leverage to the Soviets.⁹¹ In one of them, Austria, the Provisional Government was picked by the occupiers themselves; there was initially a substantial Communist presence in the government of both countries and the

table, he argued, was largely set by local Communist leaders, in Litván (ed.), *1956 Intézet Évkönyv VI. 1998*, p. 189.

86 See Davies in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 53 and Davies, *God's Playground*, II, p. 575.

87 'A bloodless coup' concluded Mamatey, p. 473 and Luža, p. 409, in their *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*.

88 Imre Kovács, leader of the National Peasant Party, ruefully recalled years later that politicians had been immature and failed to understand that a position for Hungary comparable to Finland's should have been the realistic objective, Miklós Tóth (ed.), *Önarcképünk sorsunk...*, p. 54.

89 Kende in Litván (ed.), *Évkönyv VI. 1998*, p. 189.

90 The Red Army was raping and looting in Austria, as elsewhere.

91 Formally Austria was, after haggling among the Powers, exempted from war reparations. But 'German property' was seized in the Soviet zone of occupation.

Communists, as elsewhere, did their best to increase their power. Yet they failed abysmally against their opponents. Austrian and Finnish resistance was assisted by good luck: their countries were under only partial Russian occupation. But that fact on its own cannot explain the outcome. Czechoslovakia, which had been spared entirely of the presence of Soviet troops on its territory since November 1945, nevertheless turned Communist. It would be absurd to regard it as quite an unrelated coincidence that neither Austria nor Finland bore in 1945 the structural weaknesses with which the countries that were about to turn Communist were afflicted.

Austria did not have serious national conflict with any of her neighbours: her borders were securely established.⁹² Nor did the country have unwanted national minorities to expel; the Slovenes in the south were not keen on going. Nor were there rural paupers hungry for the redistribution of land. After the Nazi barbarities very few Jews returned to Vienna.⁹³ Highly industrialized Austria had a well-disciplined SDP that firmly held the allegiance of the working classes. Although Austria in the past never had a parliamentary system of government, the authoritarian political background was mitigated by a brisk tradition of *Rechtsstaat* principles which both the Left and the Right respected. The political veteran Karl Renner was asked by the Russians to form the Provisional Government in the Soviet zone, a government which included Communists who now acquired the Ministry of the Interior 'with all its control of the internal security forces'.⁹⁴ Not unexpectedly, the Western powers were suspicious of the intentions of the Provisional Government, whose authority, on Soviet insistence, was then extended to the whole territory of the country.⁹⁵

Yet after all these antecedents a proper parliamentary system was established in Austria. At the elections, held in November 1945, the Communists received 5.5 per cent of the vote.⁹⁶ They stayed in the reorganized coalition government but lost the Interior Ministry. The Communists became politically isolated. Their mass demonstrations could not break the phalanxes of the strong, well-organized and united Social Democrats. After the 1949 elections, in which the Communists did not improve on their support, with Soviet assistance, they provoked mass strikes and riots in 1950 which failed and ended Communist influence altogether.⁹⁷ Yet the Red Army still occupied a large part of Austria. Finally, the Soviets, more interested in security than in spreading Communism, accepted what had been all along on offer by the moderate Austrian politicians: neutrality between East and West. In 1955 the State Treaty was signed; the Red Army withdrew from the country and Austria kept the bargain. One may ask how long a Hungarian government could have staved off public pressure to move Hungary into the Western alliance once the Red Army had departed.⁹⁸

The example of Finland, formerly a part of the Russian Empire, is even more instructive than that of Austria. After a short civil war between Reds and Whites in 1918, Finland established stable government, based firmly on the rule of law, under which it developed a

92 The South Tyrol question was partly a border conflict but Austria and Italy found a *modus vivendi* and after protracted negotiations reached an agreement in September 1946. See Anthony Evelin Alcock, *The History of the South Tyrol Question*, Geneva, 1970, pp. 110–47.

93 See Robert S. Wistrich's chapter in this volume.

94 William B. Bader, *Austria Between East and West 1945–1955*, Stanford, CA, 1966, p. 23.

95 Ibid., pp. 25, 38, 58.

96 Ibid., pp. 45f; Schoenberg, 'The Partition of Germany...', in Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 379–81.

97 Bader, *Austria between East and West*, ch. 8.

98 See note 88 above and compare Elisabeth Barker's view that the Russians were inclined to treat Hungary like Austria: McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 216.

liberal democratic regime that resisted right-wing coups.⁹⁹ The Finns lost the Winter War with the USSR in 1940 and were forced to cede Karelia and Vyborg, after which they joined the Axis and were defeated once more in 1944. Now the Red Army was stationed in Porkkala near Helsinki, the country was burdened with heavy war reparations¹⁰⁰ and its government was placed under the authority of the Allied Control Commission. It showed Finland's importance to the Soviets that a leading Stalinist, Andrei Zhdanov, was sent to chair the ACC. Under his pressure the Communists were edging towards power by holding six government posts, including that of minister of the interior. That position was the outcome of the general elections of March 1945 in which the Communists, by holding 25 per cent of the seats, became the strongest force in parliament.¹⁰¹

Yet they did not make it. Finland accepted the loss of territory to Russia and, like Austria, it had neither national conflicts with neighbours nor unwanted minorities to get rid of. There was no Jewish question. Nor were there rural paupers, although huge numbers of refugees from Karelia had to be resettled.¹⁰² The critical factor was the ability of the political élite to preserve continuity of the government at the end of the war. The ACC and the Finnish Communists faced the rule of law and the democratic process. When Zhdanov demanded energetic measures to punish war criminals, the government did not issue ordinances. Instead of using discretionary powers, as the Hungarian or the Czechoslovak government did, the Finnish government turned to parliament, which after proper debate passed laws that were administered by independent (rather than party-appointed) judges. The issue of war criminals could not be used for intimidation.¹⁰³ Nor could the interior ministry be used for party purposes to great effect. The Communist Yrjö Leino became rather isolated in his own ministry when he started to tinker with police appointments and he received a bad press.¹⁰⁴ When the Finnish Communists began to use the methods of mass demonstrations combined with police intimidation, which were so effective elsewhere, they soon collided with institutional obstacles like the rule of law, civil service regulations, the free press and so on; their popularity began to ebb and they soon found themselves out of government. On the other hand Finnish politicians lent over backwards to meet Soviet security needs. They signed a friendship treaty with Russia which was similar to what Hungary and Romania had to sign.¹⁰⁵ Finland's lucky escape heavily underlines the point that whether or not a particular country became a people's democracy after 1945 depended as much on inherited institutions and attitudes as on a Soviet presence.

99 D. G. Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century*, London, 1979, p. 97.

100 Ibid., pp. 148–149, Anthony Upton in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 133.

101 Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century*, p. 164; Upton, 'Finland', in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, pp. 136–37.

102 Alfred J. Rieber, concluding his study, based on Soviet sources, writes, 'The isolation of the Finnish Communist Party by 1948 was largely the result of its internal weakness and of the resilience of its opponents rather than the exigencies of international politics or the political errors of Soviet foreign policy.' *Zhdanov in Finland*, Pittsburgh, PA, 1995, pp. 66 and 23f.; see also Kirby, *Finland in the Twentieth Century*, p. 170.

103 Ibid., p. 156; Upton in McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe*, p. 138.

104 He was eventually brought down by a parliamentary vote of no confidence in 1948 for an illegal measure he had been responsible for in 1945, *ibid.*, pp. 146–47.

105 Ibid., pp. 144–46. Finland, not unlike Austria, was prepared to renounce the possibility of joining a Western Bloc. See also Kevin Devlin in Hammond (ed.), *The Anatomy of Communist Takeovers*, pp. 438–40.

Quisling Regimes and Satellites

Undoubtedly the Soviets, by using brute force, might have imposed their social system on Austria or Finland. That course, however, would have produced a Quisling regime rather than a people's democracy. The distinction is real: it is between a puppet regime and a satellite. During the war in Nazi-occupied Europe there were other regimes similar to that of Norway, which provided the name.¹⁰⁶ Emil Hácha's presidency of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia after March 1939, Ferenc Szálasi's in Hungary, Marshal Pétain's Vichy regime (perhaps) and Karmal's government, following the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, could be regarded, although not to the same degree, as examples of Quisling types. They were puppet governments with native personnel acting under continuous direct control by an occupying power. Satellites, in contrast, move in their own orbit, so to speak. Their subordination to the larger dominant power is political rather than military (like Jozef Tiso's wartime 'Slovak Republic').

What has been argued as regards Austria and Finland applies *a fortiori* to the liberal democracies of Western Europe, and beyond. Had the Red Army occupied a country like Holland, which did not have the conflicts and mentalities that we find in countries further east, it is difficult to see how the Dutch Communists could have imposed on Dutch society a one-party state (even if that was what they had wanted). A Quisling regime, based solely on tanks, could, of course, be implanted and maintained for a while anywhere, but not a Soviet satellite, which required a political process. Military might on its own could not have generated a political process to create a people's democracy. We can now affirm what has earlier been only conjecture: the presence of the Red Army in the region was a necessary but not sufficient condition of the outcome. That required an internal course for which the inherited institutions and attitudes, presently set out, were indispensable. There is a strong case for suggesting that some deeply rooted differences of social structure between the two sides of the Elbe sustained a (partly) hidden fault-line along which Stalin could rip Europe apart.¹⁰⁷

The Transition and Culture

The people's democracies were satellites in which the Communists took power through a political discourse in which they claimed the intellectual high ground. Indeed, after the Second World War, the explanatory powers of Marxist teleology overwhelmed the intelligentsia almost everywhere. And educated people on a pathetically massive scale fell for the ruse. Culture played a critical role in the transition and it is easy to see why this had to be so. The Communist take-over was legitimized by Marxist historicism: social progress, predetermined, driven by history's inexorable tides. An ever-growing number of educated people, mesmerized by the crude axiology of human progress from feudalism through capitalism into socialism, accepted the inevitable triumph of a Marxist 'classless society' through revolution. And their conviction was reinforced by their dim perception that even in Western Europe fear (or hope) pervaded the intelligentsia that a similar fate would eventually befall their societies. Indeed, only 1956 in Poland and Hungary finally shattered this Orwellian nightmare in the West.

106 On 1 February, 1942 the German Commisar appointed Vidkun Quisling Minister President of Norway. His regime lacked political support and was disowned by the Norwegian government in London.

107 An appropriate metaphor for the Elbe border, 'fault-line', is defined by Matthew Parris as 'a subterranean weakness or crack in the rock foundation, which, though hidden by the soft terrain above, is likely to prove the line along which the whole thing breaks or folds under stress', *The Times*, 12 June 1999.

The claim, however, that a socialist revolution took place after the war was in conflict with what most people actually experienced at the time. Substitutes were at a premium; the most obvious being culture which, like any other form of private property, had to be taken into state ownership.¹⁰⁸ The Communist monopoly of political power was complemented by the monopoly of thought, art and learning. The media, education and culture focused on the class struggles of the past — clearly a substitute for the absent social revolution in the present. Moreover, as class conflicts rarely produced spectacular events and largely lacked mass appeal, they, in turn, were substituted by what could be dressed up as ‘national uprisings’ (which the cultural gurus of the regimes could find in abundance). The two kinds of substitutes, lumped together, formed the ‘revolutionary progressive inheritance’.¹⁰⁹ The ministries of education and culture in the satellites set up a large literary establishment and film industry whose task was to cultivate the progressive inheritance. In Hungary the Rákóczi rebellion (against Habsburg rule) was presented as a progressive movement towards ‘bourgeois’ society, Kossuth’s 1848–49 war of independence as a ‘bourgeois revolution’ and the collapse in 1918 as a ‘bourgeois democratic’ revolution. In the Bohemian Lands, the fifteenth-century Hussite Wars became the forerunner of the ‘socialist revolution’. In Slovak literary works, at least by the 1960s, as Robert Pynsent has noted, the anti-German Slovak National Uprising of September 1944 ‘legitimized the Communist regime [...] not only in Slovakia but in the whole of Czechoslovakia’.¹¹⁰ Very similar cultural substitutes were deployed by the regimes elsewhere in the region. The Communists inherited and used for their own purposes the attitudes associated with ‘national literature’ which were didactic, insular and implicitly authoritarian. How the sudden influx of the Marxist code of the new culture was naturalized and mixed with the vocabulary of the traditional national culture in the people’s democracies is one of the themes that the contributors to this volume explore.

108 See Lóránt Czigány, ‘Lépéskényszer: az irodalom államosítása...’ in Tóth (ed.), *Önarcképünk...*, pp. 131–84.

109 The Czech, Polish and Hungarian official ideology had abandoned the most anachronistic parts of this outlook after the first major crisis of the satellites in the mid-1950s. In Hungary the ideologue Erik Molnár rejected Rákosi’s ‘nationalism’, see L. Péter, ‘New Approaches to Modern Hungarian History’, *Ungarn Jahrbuch*, 1972, pp. 161–71.

110 See Robert B. Pynsent, *Conceptions of Enemy*, Cambridge, 1988, p. 69.

3 Austria and the 'Jewish Question', 1945–50

ROBERT S. WISTRICH

The immediate aftermath of the Shoah was to prove a decisive formative period in shaping the troubled relations between Austrians and Jews for the next fifty years. The deportations and the mass murder of Austrian Jewry during the Second World War had reduced to ruin one of the richest, most vibrant and culturally creative Jewish communities on the European continent. Despite the massive scale of the destruction, the Shoah did not, however, bring antisemitism to an end in Austria, nor did it eliminate the 'Jewish Question'.

True, Austria was spared the kind of pogroms that disfigured Poland between 1945 and 1947, when approximately 1,500 Jews were murdered. But levels of hostility to Jews remained remarkably high and were reflected in a public discourse and *praxis* that (with regard to Jews) belied the self-proclaimed democratic norms of the new Austria that had emerged after 1945.

The Jews of post-Shoah Austria were no more than a pale shadow of the great Jewish community numbering 2.25 million which had still inhabited the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire on the eve of the First World War. At that time 175,000 Jews had been living in the imperial capital of Vienna (9 per cent of the total population) and they were a driving force both of modern capitalism and Austrian social democracy. The Jews of Vienna dominated cultural life in the city, providing a brilliant galaxy of talent in the arts and sciences, which would help to shape the contours of twentieth-century culture.¹

The Jewish presence was also heavily felt in the professions. Most city lawyers and doctors were Jews and this situation would continue until the *Anschluss* in 1938. Jews also dominated journalism (especially the liberal and socialist press) and were disproportionately represented in commerce, banking and entrepreneurial capitalism.² This preponderance had not even been changed (let alone reversed) by the antisemitic Christian-Social administration of the city of Vienna after 1897.³ Antisemitism in Vienna was indeed stronger than in any other Central or West European city, but as the city's moderately antisemitic mayor, Karl Lueger, fully realized, Jews were also an indispensable element in the life of the metropolis.⁴

Following the collapse of the multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1918 and the post-war peace treaties, Austria suffered a massive loss of territory, population and 'national' self-confidence. The Jewish community was reduced to a tenth of its former size and overwhelmingly concentrated in Vienna. In 1923 the Jewish population peaked there at 201,513 (10.8 per cent of the total population), which made Vienna the third largest Jewish city in Europe — after Warsaw and Budapest. Antisemitism had been exacerbated by a massive influx of Galician Jewish refugees during the First World War and in the

1 See Robert S. Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph*, Oxford, 1989; William O. McCagg, *A History of Habsburg Jews, 1670–1918*, Bloomington, IN, 1989; and Steven Beller, *Vienna and the Jews, 1867–1938: A Cultural History*, Cambridge, 1989.

2 See Robert S. Wistrich, *Socialism and the Jews. The Dilemmas of Assimilation in Germany and Austria-Hungary*, London and Toronto, 1982.

3 Wistrich, *The Jews of Vienna*, pp. 220–37.

4 On Lueger, see John Boyer, *Political Radicalism in Late Imperial Vienna: Origins of the Christian Social Movement, 1848–1897*, Chicago, IL and London, 1981, and Richard S. Geehr, *Karl Lueger: Mayor of Fin de Siècle Vienna*, Detroit, MI, 1990.

early 1920s, by the loss of empire, post-war inflation, high unemployment and the endemic status-anxiety of the Viennese 'little man' (*kleiner Mann*). It could be found in virtually all social classes, age-groups and political parties⁵ — especially in the ruling Catholic-conservative Christian Social Party and the more virulently racist Greater German People's Party (*Grossdeutsche Volkspartei*) which favoured union with Germany.⁶ Its strongest single constituency was among German nationalist university students who by the late 1920s had also become the avant-garde of the growing Nazi movement in Austria. The 'inviolable territory' of the universities (where police could not enter) transformed them into 'Brown Houses' with open season on Jewish students, long before the *Anschluss*.⁷ In the Austrian countryside, too, antisemitism was strong — fuelled by time-honoured religious prejudice, hide-bound provincialism and resentment against 'Red Vienna' (identified with Jews) as well as by German nationalist propaganda.⁸

The brief interlude of 'clerico-Fascist' dictatorship in Austria under the Christian Social Chancellors Dollfuß and Schuschnigg (between 1934 and 1938) had mixed results for the Jews. In comparison with Nazi Germany, Jews were protected from physical assaults, from open slander and insult or efforts systematically to impoverish them. Neither Dollfuß (who was assassinated by Austrian Nazis in July 1934) nor Schuschnigg had any sympathy for National Socialism. Both sought to preserve Austrian independence and to this end they imprisoned Nazis as well as Social Democrats and Communists. But their authoritarian Christian state ideology did bring with it a quiet discrimination against Jews and the first erosion of Jewish emancipation in seventy years for the 191,000 Jews still living in Austria in 1934.

With the *Anschluss* of March 1938, the destruction of Austrian Jewry began in earnest as the accumulated social and political discontent of the indigenous population exploded with elemental force. As the historian Gerhard Botz has put it, 'The attacks consisted mostly of symbolic acts and historic rituals aimed at the destruction of a sense of identity — humiliations, abuse and arrests — but there were also physical attacks, beatings, murders and also robberies on a mass scale. It was as if medieval pogroms had reappeared in modern dress.'⁹

5 On inter-war Austrian antisemitism, see Bruce Pauley, *From Prejudice to Destruction. A History of Austrian Antisemitism*, Chapel Hill, NC and London, 1992.

6 The goal of *Anschluss* with Germany had been blocked by the Western Allies in 1918 despite its popularity in Austria, especially among Social Democrats - including the Chancellor Karl Renner and his (Jewish-born) Foreign Minister, Otto Bauer. The first Austrian Republic, founded in 1918, was originally called *Deutsch-Österreich* (German Austria). The *Grossdeutsche Volkspartei* favoured *Anschluss* for racist, imperialist and Slavophobic reasons, in accordance with the Austrian pan-German tradition of Georg von Schoenerer before 1918. Schoenerer had also been Austria's most virulent political and ideologist antisemite since the early 1880s.

7 See Bruce F. Pauley, 'Political Antisemitism in the Interwar Period' in I. Oxaal, M. Pollak and G. Botz (eds), *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, London and New York, 1987.

8 Benno Weiser Varon, *Professions of a Lucky Jew*, New York, 1992, p. 30: 'The Austrian peasant, the Styrian mountaineer, the yodelling Tyrolean were hopelessly prejudiced.' The author, a native of Austria, notes that in places like Salzburg, the more money they made from Jewish tourists, the more antisemitic the hotel owners, restaurateurs, waiters, porters, bellboys and chambermaids seemed to become. 'Your servant, Mr Cohen', in season, became 'Heil Hitler!' off season.

9 Gerhard Botz 'The Dynamics of Persecution in Austria, 1938-45' in Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), *Austrians and Jews in the Twentieth Century. From Franz Joseph to Waldheim*, London, 1992, p. 202.

The pogrom-like atmosphere was accompanied by a swift, large-scale 'aryanization' of Jewish property (that is, the economic expropriation of Viennese Jews, mostly without compensation) including well-known Jewish businesses and large department stores.¹⁰ Nearly 70,000 Jewish dwellings were seized, partly as a way to alleviate the housing shortage in Vienna and partly to reward 'citizens' and party comrades who had served the Nazi movement in deserving ways.¹¹ The enforced exodus of Jews proceeded apace and by November 1939, 126,445 Jews had 'emigrated' from Austria (to the United Kingdom, the USA, Shanghai, Palestine and other destinations) — altogether about two-thirds of Austrian Jewry. This was a 'tribute' to the brutality of Viennese antisemitism — far more radical than anything hitherto seen in the 'Old Reich', that is, Nazi Germany before the *Anschluß*.¹² During the war years, the remaining third of Austrian Jews would be deported to death camps in Poland, where approximately 65,000 would meet their deaths.

The Austrian 'contribution' to the Shoah was, however, far greater than these figures might suggest. Not only was indigenous Jew-hatred in pre-1939 Austria greater than in Germany, but Austrians were disproportionately involved in planning and implementing the 'Final Solution'.¹³ Apart from Adolf Hitler himself (the Austrian-born architect of the Shoah) there was Adolf Eichmann, who was in charge of Jewish deportations from the Reich and most of occupied Europe; there was Odilo Globocnik (formerly Gauleiter of Vienna) who supervised all the death camps in Poland; Ernst Kaltenbrunner from Linz, who succeeded Heydrich as head of the Reich Head Security Office and effectively co-ordinated the bureaucracy of the 'Final Solution'; Seyss-Inquart, Reich Commissioner of the Netherlands and responsible for the deportations of Dutch Jews;¹⁴ not to mention the fact that 40 per cent of the personnel and most of the commandants of the death camps at Belzec, Sobibor and Treblinka were Austrians or that 80 per cent of Eichmann's staff were recruited from among his Austrian compatriots.¹⁵ Simon Wiesenthal was not greatly exaggerating when in a memorandum of 12 October 1966 sent to the Conservative Austrian Chancellor, Josef Klaus, he asserted: 'The Austrians who were participants in the crimes of National Socialism bear the responsibility for at least three million murdered

10 Ibid, pp 202–06. See also Kurt Schmid and Robert Streibel, *Der Pogrom 1938*, Vienna, 1990, and especially Herbert Rosenkranz, *Verfolgung and Selbstbehauptung: Die Juden in Österreich 1938–1945*, Vienna, 1978, for the most detailed account.

11 Gerhard Botz, 'National Socialist Vienna: Anti-Semitism as a Housing Policy' in Robert S. Wistrich (ed.), *European Antisemitism, 1890–1945*, *The Wiener Library Bulletin*, 29, 1976, 39–40, pp. 47–55

12 See Botz, 'The Dynamics of Persecution in Austria', p. 215, who stresses that 'from 1938 onwards Austria and Vienna were often a step ahead of Germany in the persecution of the Jews. In Vienna, in particular, comparable measures were applied earlier than in Germany, and they could also count on broader support among the non-Jewish population. Here the organisational instruments and procedures could be developed which would later be applied by Eichmann in the Final Solution'.

13 Pauley, *From Prejudice to Destruction*, p. 491. See also Joachim Riedl, 'Geht doch in die Donau. Über den Österreichischen Anteil am Holocaust' in J. Riedl (ed.), *Versunkene Welt*, Vienna, 1984, pp. 165–70.

14 For more information on these and other individuals see Robert Wistrich, *Who's Who in Nazi Germany*, 2nd edn, London, 1995.

15 See Gitta Sereny, *Into That Darkness: From Mercy Killing to Mass Murder* [1974], London, 1991, for a revealing portrait of the Austrian-born Franz Stangl, who commanded Treblinka where at least 900,000 Jews were murdered.

Jews.’¹⁶ Austrian Jews, it must be remembered, unlike their German co-religionists, had suffered the devastating consequences of Nazi rule in one fell swoop, leaving them in total disarray after 1938. Nevertheless, despite the rapidly shrinking Jewish population they participated on a quite remarkable scale in the Austrian resistance, especially in the clandestine activities of the outlawed Socialist and Communist parties. They were also active in the Allied armies fighting the Germans and played a conspicuous role in the Belgian and French resistance.¹⁷

However, at the end of 1945 there were at most some 4,000 members of the Jewish religious community who had somehow survived and were scratching out a living in a ruined Austria — itself hungry, despondent, confused and now under Allied occupation. (The figure 4,000 relates to those registered to the Israelitische Kultusgemeinde [IKG]; clearly there were non-affiliated Jews [who did not pay the *Steuer*] outside the Kultusgemeinde — we do not know how many.) The British Labour MP Richard Crossman, who visited Austria in February 1946 as a member of the Anglo-American Commission for Palestine, was profoundly depressed by what he observed. He described the Jewish communal leaders whom he met as ‘shrill and pathetic, self-assertive and broken’; he noted their conviction that there was no future for Jews in Austria and that emigration to Palestine was the only solution for Jewry. They told him that antisemitism (despite the Shoah) was as strong as ever; hence they advised against encouraging any Jews who had been driven out in 1938 to consider a return to Austria.

This pessimistic assessment was confirmed for Crossman by what he heard from Austria’s first post-war President, the veteran Socialist leader Karl Renner (who would remain in office until his death in 1950). Renner emphasized that there was no room for Jewish businessmen in Austria and he did not think that ‘Austria in its present mood would allow Jews once again to build up these family monopolies. Certainly we would not allow a new Jewish community to come in from Eastern Europe and establish itself here when our own people need work.’¹⁸ Renner’s manifest lack of sympathy for Jews was echoed by his fellow Social Democrat and Minister of the Interior (he held the position until 1959), Oskar Helmer, who complained to Crossman about the American policy of giving special accommodation and rations to unemployed *Ostjuden* in the American zone of occupation ‘while hard-working Austrians starved’, a policy, he insisted, that caused justified Austrian resentment and antisemitism.¹⁹ The comments that Crossman heard from the aged Bishop of Vienna were scarcely more encouraging. He apparently blamed antisemitism on the behaviour of the Jewish community and on an alleged Jewish collaboration with the Gestapo.²⁰ He assured his British visitor that the Roman Catholic Church did not fight Jews *per se* but only the ‘Jewish spirit of materialism’; he conceded that to drive out the

16 A copy of the memorandum can be found in the Documentation Centre of the Bund Jüdischer Verfolgter des Naziregimes, Vienna. Quoted by Botz, ‘The Dynamics of Persecution in Austria’, p. 213.

17 See Jonny Moser, ‘Die Juden Österreichs und der Widerstand gegen das NS-Regime’, *DÖW Jahrbuch*, 1993, p. 103 (*DÖW* = *Dokumentation des Österreichischen Widerstandes*). Also Tilly Spiegel, *Österreicher in der belgischen und französischen Résistance*, Vienna, 1969.

18 Richard Crossman, *Palestine Mission: A Personal Record* [1947], New York, 1977, p. 92.

19 *Ibid.*, p. 91. Helmer’s crass insensitivity to Jewish suffering between 1938 and 1945 came out in many of his comments in cabinet meetings that had a bearing on the ‘Jewish Question’. See Robert Knight (ed.), *Ich bin dafür, die Sache in die Länge zu ziehen: Die Wortprotokolle der österreichischen Bundesregierung von 1945 bis 1952 über die Entschädigung der Juden*, Vienna, 1988. Knight chose as the title of his collection of Austrian cabinet documents a statement made by Helmer in 1948 proposing that the government drag out for as long as possible negotiations with Jewish organizations about restitution.

20 Crossman, *Palestine Mission*, p. 93.

Jews would be 'un-Christian', but stressed that Austrian Catholicism would neither lift a hand to destroy nor to assist the Jewish community. The Church could aid only Jews who acknowledged Christianity.

On the basis of such unsympathetic testimony, Crossman concluded in 1947 that the shrunken Jewish community of Vienna would have either to assimilate totally (as urged by the Conservative Chancellor Figl) or to leave. There could be no room for Jewish communities with their own schools or separate organizations, let alone a thriving Jewish culture (in Yiddish) or a distinctively Jewish way of life. Nor was there any demographic prospect for a revival of Jewry as had occurred after 1918, for the surviving remnants were old people whose relatives had either permanently emigrated or been killed. Indeed, in 1945, Vienna seemed to resemble a phantom city or house of the dead (*Totenhaus*) for the 2,000 Jews who had survived as 'U-Boote' (that is, in hiding) in 'protected' mixed marriages or as *Mischlinge* (offspring of mixed parentage); another 1,727 Jews had returned as concentration-camp or death-camp survivors and a much smaller number had trickled back from abroad. By the end of 1949 the numbers had risen to 8,038 Austrian Jews officially registered with the IKG (to which one can add a few thousand who may have returned without registering) — split between a growing number of returnees and approximately one quarter who had survived the Third Reich.²¹ During the past fifty years, however, this number has scarcely increased, amounting to today about 12,000 Jews, still overwhelmingly concentrated in Vienna. This is indeed the single most important legacy of the Shoah, for it fulfilled in the most macabre fashion the prophecy of the Austrian writer Hugo Bettauer, who in 1922 had written a Futurist novel about the 'city without Jews'.²²

The Shoah destroyed the historic continuity of Austrian Jewry which, though predominantly German in language and culture, had fused together Bohemian, Moravian, Hungarian and Galician Jews with their Viennese-born co-religionists in a uniquely colourful and innovative multi-cultural 'melting-pot'.²³ This diversified Austrian Jewry had been significantly different from its German co-religionists — more pluralistic, loyal to a supra-national concept of 'Austrianness' (*Österreichertum*) and more willing to embrace a sense of Jewish peoplehood. Large sections of pre-1918 Austrian Jewry had been primarily Jewish in their self-definition rather than German, Czech, Austrian or anything else.²⁴ Religious traditionalism was stronger than in Germany (as was support for Zionism) and Reform Judaism in Austria did not strike any deep roots. However, under the first Austrian Republic (1918–1938), the similarities with German Jewry became more apparent as both communities had to face the same problems of inflation, depression, rising antisemitism and Nazism in the framework of what had now become a decaying nation-state. Moreover, after 1918 Galician Jews in Austria were perceived for the first time as 'foreigners' and tensions between them and the assimilated Viennese Jews had increased.

21 'Statistik der bei der IKG Wien registrierten Glaubensjuden', Archive of the *Israelitische Kultusgemeinde*, Vienna, file Berichte und Protokolle, 1948–1956. See also Friederike Wilder-Okladek, *The Return Movement of Jews to Austria after the Second World War*, The Hague, 1969. Over 1,000 Jews returned from Shanghai (not without considerable obstruction from the Austrian authorities), over 700 from Palestine and 600 from Britain.

22 Hugo Bettauer, *Die Stadt ohne Juden*, Vienna, 1922. Bettauer had imagined a future expulsion of the Jews after an antisemitic victory in Vienna but also assumed that they would be invited back, following what he believed would be an inevitable economic breakdown and collapse. Bettauer was assassinated by fanatical antisemites a few years later.

23 Robert S. Wistrich, 'The Modernisation of Viennese Jewry: The Impact of German Culture in a Multi-Ethnic State' in Jacob Katz (ed.), *Toward Modernity: The European Model*, New Brunswick, NJ, 1987, pp. 43–70; Marsha L. Rozenblit, 'The Jews of Germany and Austria: A Comparative Perspective' in Wistrich (ed.), *Austrians and Jews*, pp. 1–18.

24 Rozenblit, *ibid.*, p. 7.

This tension did not altogether disappear after 1945 but the context had once again changed. In the immediate post-war years, the leadership of the ageing and decimated IKG had passed to very assimilated, secular left-wing Jews who had little interest in the religious needs of the community. They were 'Austrian patriots' ready to work to reconstruct a 'new Austria', looking in particular to the Communists (KPÖ) and the Social Democrats (SPÖ) to protect their rights as survivors and to fight against any resurgence of neo-Fascism or antisemitism. In the first democratic elections after the war, a Communist journalist, David Brill, was appointed as president of the IKG and the Communist list Jüdische Einigkeit won 65 per cent of the vote — a result that would have been unthinkable in the 1920s or 1930s. Until its dissolution by the Nazis, Kultusgemeinde politics had been dominated by the struggle between the liberal, 'integrationist' Union (originally the Austrian Israelite Union) and the Zionists, with the latter finally emerging victorious in 1932.²⁵ At that time the Socialist list was weak and the Communists played no role in communal elections. (In municipal and national elections during the First Republic, a majority of Viennese Jews voted for the SPÖ but the Kultusgemeinde elections were not at all representative of the general political orientation of Jews in Vienna.)

After 1945 this had changed dramatically. The Union had been obliterated by the Shoah along with the emancipated, liberal-assimilationist aspirations and hopes of Viennese bourgeois Jews that it had once embodied. It was now the Communists and above all the Social Democrats who held high the banner of assimilation.²⁶ But Communist influence waned as a result of the Cold War, the negative impact of the Soviet occupation of Austria and the pressures of the American Jewish Distribution Committee (AJDC), on whom the Vienna Kultusgemeinde was at first financially dependent for more than half its budget. The Soviet invasion of Hungary (1956) and occupation of Czechoslovakia (1968) destroyed any remaining credibility of the Communists in the community. Between 1952 and 1981, the Bund Werktätiger Juden (Alliance of Working Jews), closely connected with the SPÖ, came to dominate Jewish communal elections. Among the various opposition factions, the Zionists were prominent until the early 1970s but never achieved anything approaching their high-water mark in the 1930s during the rise of Nazism. There had, however, been intensive Zionist activity in Austria between 1945 and 1948 among the more than 100,000 East European Jews who passed through the country on their way to Palestine, the USA and other destinations. Many were concentration-camp or death-camp survivors, while some had lived in hiding or fought with the partisans against the Germans. These foreign Jews did not participate in communal life and Austria was for them essentially a *Transitland*. They despised the 'Yekkes' (German-speaking Jews) as much the latter looked down on them as uncouth, Yiddish-speaking and saw them as provoking antisemitism among non-Jews. As had happened in Austria after the First World War, the divisions between Westernized Jews and the *Ostjuden* continued, though they were probably less acute than similar divisions in Germany after 1945.²⁷

The East European Jews, four-fifths of them from Poland (but others from Hungary, Romania and the Bohemian Lands), who crossed the Austrian border after 1945 were fleeing pogroms, impoverishment and the imminent Communist take-over in their

25 See Harriet Pass Freidenreich, *Jewish Politics in Vienna, 1918–1938*, Bloomington, IN, 1991, who provides a detailed analysis of the communal election results. For her account of the Jewish Liberals in the inter-war period, see pp. 23–47.

26 The Israeli newspaper *Davar*, 24 January 1955, complained that 'the assimilation in Austria is redder and redder'. Traditionally, the Socialist orientation in Austria had tended to be anti-Zionist.

27 See Michael Brenner, *After the Holocaust. Rebuilding Jewish Lives in Post-war Germany*, Princeton, NJ, 1998.

countries. The DP camps in Austria (as in Germany) soon turned into recruiting grounds for smuggling Jews illegally into what was then still a British-controlled Palestine. The American zone of occupation in Austria (as in Germany) was noticeably more favourable for this activity than the DP camps under British jurisdiction and American military authorities generally turned a blind eye to the East European Jewish *Bricha* (flight). The problem of Jewish DPs played a significant role in reviving Austrian antisemitism after the war and certainly contributed something to blurring any residual Austrian sense of sharing in Nazi guilt for the Shoah. There was, for example, resentment that Jewish refugees in the American zone were receiving special accommodation and better rations (at a time of food shortages) than many Austrians.²⁸ Jews, it was claimed, engaged in black-market activities (*Schleichhandel*) and were responsible for spreading venereal disease.²⁹ The Socialist *Arbeiterzeitung* deplored the influx of 'hordes of illicit foreign traders and desperadoes', a motley crowd of 'unwelcome guests' and 'wretched, unemployed and over-excitable Jews whose presence inevitably promoted antisemitic whisperings' and if unchecked would provoke a Fascist backlash.³⁰ Both Austrian press reports and archival sources reveal that Jewish DPs were all too often considered cheeky, provocative, undisciplined and they were frequently accused of petty crime such as stealing milk, fruit and vegetables. There were growing calls to expel these foreigners, 'parasites' and *Volksschädlinge* (a Nazi term: 'nation-pests') from the Tyrol and Vorarlberg. In these Alpine areas the Jews represented only about 1 per cent of the 65,000 DPs after the war, but they were singled out by Marincovic, an antisemitic deputy, for allegedly causing the bad food and housing situation. In the years between 1945 and 1948, though the Jewish DPs averaged at any one time no more than 10 per cent of the more than 500,000 displaced persons, the focus was on them and their numbers were often grossly exaggerated.

In Salzburg, Bad Ischl and Badgastein the presence of Jewish DPs was blamed for the decline of tourism. It was also said that they were a burden on taxpayers, though their upkeep was in fact paid for by the US military government and American Jewish organizations, not the Austrian authorities. Popular hostility was rife, leading to clashes in Trofaiach, Judenberg, Kapferburg, Admont and Gnadenwald. Austrian police had to put down a riot outside a hostel for Jewish refugees at Bad Ischl.³¹ There were synagogue daubings in Graz and an outcry against the black-market dealings of Jewish DPs in the Salzburg region.

American surveys taken in 1947–48 of the state of opinion in Vienna, Salzburg and Linz provide a grim picture of Austrian opinion, no doubt exacerbated by the DP question. Nearly a quarter of the Viennese thought Jews had got what they deserved under the Nazis, about 40 per cent of the population in all three cities thought the Jewish character was responsible for antisemitism; 43 per cent of Salzburger, 34 per cent of the Viennese and

28 Thomas Albrich, *Exodus durch Österreich. Die jüdischen Flüchtlinge 1945–1948*, Innsbruck, 1987, p. 93. Albrich observes that the British military authorities often sympathized more with the Austrian population than with the Jews. The British war against 'illegal' Jewish immigration from Europe to Palestine probably contributed to such a bias.

29 *Salzburger Nachrichten*, 10 July 1946.

30 *Arbeiterzeitung*, 21 August 1946.

31 For these and similar incidents, see Thomas Albrich, "'Es gibt keine jüdische Frage". Zur Aufrechterhaltung des österreichischen Opfermysthos' in Rolf Steiniger (ed.), *Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust. Europa-USA-Israel*, Vienna, 1994, pp. 147–66. Also Jonny Moser, 'Via Österreich in die Freiheit. Der Transit jüdischer Flüchtlinge seit 1945'. *Das jüdische Echo*, 39, 1990, 1 (October), pp. 69–73. At Bad Ischl (in the American zone) the slogan of the demonstrators, led by Communist agitators, was that 'the Jews are getting fat'. The American military authorities arrested the ringleaders but had to reduce their sentences as a result of protests across the political spectrum in Austria.

47 per cent of the Linzers believed Jews had it too good in the DP camps and that they were 'profiteers' (*Nutznießler*) living at the expense of the indigenous population. A year earlier, another American survey had shown that about 50 per cent of the inhabitants polled in Linz, Salzburg and Vienna thought the Nazis had gone too far with the Jews but 'something had to be done to place limits on them'. A similar percentage opposed the return of Jews to Austria against only 28 per cent who favoured it. These Austrian responses are not notably different from those recorded in Bavaria, Hesse and Baden-Württemberg, where antisemitic sentiments in 1947 appear if anything to have been even higher.³² Indeed, Rabbi Philip Bernstein, Jewish adviser to the American military government in Germany, stated in May 1947 that if the Americans were to withdraw, there would be a pogrom. As in Austria, there was a powerful resentment against the alien influx (*Überfremdung*). It should be remembered that there were over 200,000 Jewish DPs in Germany at the end of 1946, mainly from Poland. Moreover, there was in Germany the same identification of Jews with illicit black marketeering, parasitism and criminality as existed in post-war Austria.

The backlash among Germans and Austrians was particularly strong in rural areas where there had traditionally been very few Jews.³³ The local population in Bavaria (where 93 per cent of the Jewish population were DPs) or in the Alpine regions of Austria could not fathom why they should host foreign Jews for whom the American military government demanded special treatment.³⁴ In the Salzburg region (also in the American zone) in 1947 there were some 30,000 foreigners from over forty nations, including about 14,000 Jews. This was an unprecedentedly high figure for an area that had fewer than 300 Jewish inhabitants at any given time between 1867 and 1934. True, this had not prevented Salzburg from being a hotbed of pan-German racism and antisemitism long before the Nazi period. But precisely this *deutschnational* tradition sharpened the backlash against the Jewish DPs, who were allegedly exploiting the misery of the local population.³⁵ At the same time it is important to note that the immediately post-war antisemitism in Austria (and Germany) was not as lethal as in neighbouring Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Romania. There were some antisemitic incidents but no pogroms. Of course, had there been no Allied occupation, the story might well have been very different. Prejudice was high, with half of all Germans polled in 1952 disclaiming any responsibility for the wrongs done to Jews, opposing restitution and blaming Jewish characteristics for antisemitism. At the level of popular prejudice no major difference was discernible between Germany and Austria in the early post-war years.

But Allied attitudes to the two countries were significantly different and played a formative role in shaping the respective positions of Germans and Austrians towards the legacy of the Shoah. The Germans knew that their behaviour towards the Jews was seen as a test of their maturity and their democratic credentials by the Western Allies. They had

32 Constantin Goschler, 'The Attitude Towards Jews in Bavaria after the Second World War', *Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook* (hereafter *LBIYB*), 26, 1991, pp. 443–60.

33 Wilder-Okladek, *The Return Movement*, pp. 40–41.

34 See Frank Stern, *The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge. Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany*, Oxford and New York, 1992, p. 61. See also his article 'The Historic Triangle: Occupiers, Germans and Jews in Postwar Germany', *Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte*, 19, 1990, pp. 47–76.

35 Even in 1948, there were still 4,473 Jewish DPs in the Salzburg region and another 4,500 registered in the city itself, though the numbers rapidly diminished with the foundation of Israel. See Marko Feingold (ed.), *Ein ewiges Dennoch. 125 Jahre Juden in Salzburg*, Vienna, 1993, and especially the contribution of Helga Embacher, 'Neubeginn ohne Illusionen', pp. 285–336.

experienced pressure from Washington and from American Jewish organizations which made clear the link between German–Jewish relations and the moral legitimacy of the new Germany in the post-war world. Some degree of 'philosemitism' was required if Germany were to regain its political sovereignty and that undoubtedly played a part in the positive German decision on restitution (*Wiedergutmachung*) to Israel and world Jewry. A combination of political prudence, moral scruples and a healthy respect for Jewish influence in America marked Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's attitude on these issues and this proved decisively important. So, too, was the principled position of the Chairman of the SPD (German Social Democratic Party), Kurt Schumacher, who demanded the payment of restitution to the Jews as early as 1946. He repeatedly referred in speeches and interviews to Nazi guilt with regard to the Jews.³⁶ Without the firm support of the Socialist opposition for *Wiedergutmachung*, Adenauer could never have pushed through the historic legislation in 1952 against the resistance in his own Christian Democrat Party and among a majority of the German population.

In Austria, however, there was no political parallel to the efforts of Adenauer and Schumacher, nor was any comparable Allied pressure insisting that its attitude to the Jews be a 'touchstone' of progress toward democracy. Philosemitism never became integrated into Austrian domestic and foreign policy (as it did in Germany) as part of its effort to achieve sovereignty and integration into the West.³⁷ Thus the gulf between Germany and Austria was visible more at the level of political élites than it was in public opinion. In Germany as much as Austria, there was a strong desire to forget Nazism, to deny any guilt for the Shoah, to reject the premisses of de-Nazification and even to believe in the myth of 'Jewish power'.³⁸ But for West German political culture after 1949, a positive attitude to Jews had become an essential element of international respectability, a kind of collective *Persilschein* (clean bill of health) for the new German state.³⁹ This official, state-ordained philosemitism did not prevent many Germans (like the Austrians) from brushing over Jewish concerns and sensitivities, disclaiming personal responsibility and limiting their empathy to their own POWs, refugees and deportees. In Austria, however, there were no countervailing pressures (internal or external) either for restitution or for developing a more positive image of Jews after 1945.

The consequences of this situation were manifold and often contradictory. After 1945, antisemitism in Austria, as in Germany, could no longer be expressed too publicly or openly. Cabinet ministers understood that displays of anti-Jewish prejudice would be negatively perceived by international public opinion after the Shoah and adversely affect their standing with the occupying Allied powers. Though Austria did not (in contrast to Germany) have to prove its democratic fitness by developing special relations with the Jews or Israel, it did out of self-interest vehemently deny the existence of Austrian antisemitism or else downplay its importance.⁴⁰ Thus, the Socialist mayor of Vienna, Theodor Körner, ridiculed in February 1947 'the fairy-tale of antisemitism' in his city,

36 See Shlomo Shafir, 'Kurt Schumacher und die Juden: Als erster deutscher Politiker bekannte er sich zur Wiedergutmachung', *Tribün*, 112, 1989, pp. 128–38. On the seminal importance of Schumacher's role on these issues, see the important study by Jeffrey Herf, *Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanies*, Cambridge, MA, 1997, pp. 239–60.

37 Stern, *The Whitewashing*, p. xxi

38 Ibid., pp. 121–25. A survey of opinion in the American zone of Germany in 1945–46 showed that 44 per cent of Germans felt no responsibility for Nazi war crimes and a similar percentage felt that National Socialism was a good idea, if poorly implemented.

39 Ibid., p. 385.

40 Helga Embacher, *Neubeginn ohne Illusionen. Juden in Österreich*, Vienna, 1995, p. 77.

calling it 'totally alien to the Viennese'.⁴¹ Sharply criticizing unfriendly reports in the foreign (especially the American) press, he claimed (in opposition to known historical facts), that 'Vienna had never witnessed antisemitic outrages of the kind found in other countries [...], for the Viennese is a cosmopolitan and thus from the word go not an antisemite'.⁴² In a letter to the World Jewish Congress in April 1947 Körner stressed that the Austrian Socialist Party in particular stood up firmly as the best guarantee against the revival of antisemitism in the future. He evoked its former leaders Victor Adler and Otto Bauer and other prominent Jewish names in the pre-war Socialist leadership like Robert Danneberg, Wilhelm Ellenbogen, Julius Tandler, Hugo Breitner and Julius Deutsch.⁴³ He did not however mention that the post-1945 Socialist leadership was not at all interested in inviting veteran Austro-Marxist Jews in emigration to return to Austria.

The conservative Austrian Chancellor, Leopold Figl, like Körner, also categorically denied that Austrians were antisemitic and in June 1947 he prematurely and naively suggested that sympathy with the persecuted Jews had eradicated antisemitism in Austria. 'I don't think this question will ever acquire even the slightest significance.'⁴⁴ Figl (who was himself in a concentration camp for several years) evidently believed that there was a simple answer to Nazism and the Shoah, namely to restore all Austrians to 'their former rights without distinction'. Figl's refrain was that since all Austrians had suffered, there could be no grounds for differentiation on the basis of race or religion. The law should be applied 'even-handedly to everyone who returns from the camps and prisons'. In one of the rare public statements ever made in welcoming back returnees to Austria, Figl had declared: 'They are Austrians like all of us. The Jews, too, of course. If the Jews who emigrated return, they will be just as welcome as all other Austrians. They have the same right to be reinstated to their former rights as all the others.' Superficially, this statement strikes an unimpeachable universalist note.⁴⁵ Figl spoke in the name of equality before the law but at the same time he was also rejecting any notion of 'special treatment' for the Jews after the Shoah. This was depicted as 'racism in reverse' by Figl and other members of the government. It was to be an argument widely used by all political parties in Austria in resisting Jewish demands for moral and material restitution after 1945.

As we have already seen, in the cabinet discussions over Jewish DPs in Austria the fact that Jews were being given 'privileged status' by the American authorities with regard to food and accommodation was blamed for fuelling popular antisemitism. Austrian politicians, of the Right and Left, did not, however, see it as their task to influence or counteract the antisemitic opinions of the population. Nor did they see fit to express any remorse about the fate of the Jews or choose to confront unpalatable facts about the Austrian role in the Shoah.⁴⁶ Significantly, when a prominent politician like Leopold Kunschak (a leading figure in the pre-war Christian Social party) made antisemitic

41 *Wiener Zeitung*, 9 February 1947, p. 3. Körner even asserted that 'not one of the horror stories is true'.

42 *Ibid.*

43 Embacher, *Neubeginn ohne Illusionen*, p. 144.

44 See Robert Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy in Postwar Austria 1945–1953', *LBIYB*, 36, 1991, pp. 413–42, and the original German-language protocols of cabinet meetings, *Ich bin dafür*, p. 58. In one such meeting on 8 January 1952, Figl showed a breathtaking ignorance and casual callousness about the fate of Austrian Jews, remarking that relatively few were killed and 'most of them really did get over the border'.

45 Quoted from *Wiener Zeitung*, 20 February 1946. See also Robert Knight, "'Neutrality" Not Sympathy: Jews in Post-war Austria' in Wistrich (ed.), *Austrians and Jews*, p. 223.

46 See Oliver Rathkolb, 'Zur Kontinuität antisemitischer und rassistischer Vorurteile in Österreich 1945/1950', *Zeitgeschichte*, 16, 1989, 5 (February), pp. 167–79.

speeches against the acceptance of Polish-Jewish refugees in Austria, it did not adversely affect his political career. In a speech on 16 April 1946 he had declared: 'The Polish Jews should not come to Austria; we Austrians don't need the others either! [...] Austrian industry should not fall into Jewish hands.'⁴⁷ Kunschak had been a radical Catholic populist and antisemite long before 1938 and he had also been interned for seven years in a concentration camp as an anti-Nazi. He was, indeed, one of the founders of the Second Republic in 1945 and was even elected president of its National Assembly. Chancellor Figl excused him by saying that Kunschak was an economic, not a racial, antisemite, as if this somehow made his remarks acceptable.

In the 1945–50 period it was already becoming evident that despite official lip-service to democratic ideals, there was no real Austrian willingness to confront the antisemitism of the man in the street, to acknowledge Austria's own share in Nazi guilt or to encourage the Jews to return, let alone to pay restitution. On the contrary, the Austrian authorities often obstructed the return of Austrian Jews from abroad and refused them the status accorded to political victims of the Nazis. Moreover, they resisted Jewish claims to restore to their original owners property, homes and businesses which had been 'aryanized'. Survivors often found themselves greeted with indifference, hostility and bureaucratic obtuseness.⁴⁸ By contrast, great efforts were made to integrate the former Nazis, the bulk of whom were amnestied in 1948 and who represented hundreds of thousands of potential voters for the major political parties. The Austrian Socialist Party (no less than its conservative rivals) was corrupted by this 'electoralism', renouncing any ethical principle in its bid for ex-Nazi votes. After 1949 they represented a sizeable part of the electorate — about one million voters in a population of seven million.

The SPÖ had itself moved to the right after 1945, having decisively broken with its pre-war Austro-Marxist legacy. Its dominant figures were the Party Chairman, Adolf Schärf, the Minister of the Interior, Oskar Helmer and the President of the Republic, Karl Renner. When it came to matters concerning the 'Jewish Question', Helmer was the most influential of all the Socialist ministers. He blamed the old party leadership under Otto Bauer for the fiasco of the February 1934 workers' rising and the resulting collapse of democracy in the First Republic. The radical line of Austro-Marxism, which he attributed to the preponderant role of Jewish intellectuals in the pre-war party, had in his opinion provoked the class enemy and dangerously strengthened Fascist tendencies in the Austrian middle classes. According to Helmer, the SPÖ before 1934 had been burdened by Jews (*jüdisch belastet*), who had simply been too numerous in the party leadership.⁴⁹ This explains why (together with Schärf) he sought to dissuade Socialist functionaries of Jewish origin, like Deutsch, Ellenbogen, Breitner, Julius Braunthal or Otto Leichter, from returning after 1945.⁵⁰ The post-war Socialist leaders did not want to be saddled with a new 'Jewish Question'.⁵¹ They were well aware that ever since the defeat of 1934 anti-intellectual and antisemitic sentiments had made headway in the rank and file of the

47 Ibid., p. 168. See also Richard Mitten, 'Die "Judenfrage" in Nachkriegsösterreich: Probleme der Forschung', *Zeitgeschichte*, 19, 1992, 11–12 (November–December), pp. 356–67.

48 See Ruth Beckermann, *Unzugehörig: Österreicher und Juden nach 1945*, Vienna, 1989, for an account of this antisemitic atmosphere and the experience of growing up as a Jew or Jewess in post-war Vienna confronted by hostility and social isolation.

49 Wilhelm Svoboda, 'Politiker, Antisemit, Populist. Oskar Helmer und die Zweite Republik', *Das jüdische Echo*, 39, 1990, 1 (October), pp. 42–51.

50 Ibid., p. 43. See also J. Braunthal, *The Tragedy of Austria*, London, 1948, pp. 60.

51 Robert Schwartz, 'Antisemitism and Socialism in Austria 1918–62' in Josef Fraenkel (ed.), *The Jews of Austria*, London, 1967, pp. 445–66.

socialist workers' movement.⁵² Rather than fight against these trends, populists like Helmer nurtured or played on them, making antisemitically tinged remarks whenever it seemed expedient.⁵³ In a cabinet meeting on 9 November 1948, Helmer echoed the common prejudice of many Austrians that Jews had too much influence in business and finance, that they engaged in dishonest practices and were 'allergic' to manual labour. Though there were only a few thousand native-born Jews left in Austria after the Shoah, he declared that 'everywhere I can see only Jewish expansion, among the doctors and in commerce — especially in Vienna'.⁵⁴ He pointedly stated that the Jews, too, would have 'to earn their living like everyone else in Austria'.⁵⁵ Moreover, he added, since the English began fighting the Jews, the 'atrocities of the Jews in the Palestine war have had an effect' — one that would help the Austrian government, so he believed, further procrastinate in the negotiations over restitution. The Jews, Helmer concluded, would understand, when they 'realize that a lot of people are opposed to them'.⁵⁶ At the same time he echoed the views of conservative ministers that there could be no 'special treatment' for Jews; the Nazis, too, he reminded his colleagues, had everything taken away from them in 1945. After all, he observed, Nazi academics now found themselves working on building sites.

Karl Renner also seemed to show considerably more sympathy for the Nazis than for the suffering Jewish victims of the Shoah — especially for the smaller fry who were ready to declare loyalty to the Austrian state. Even before de-Nazification had begun, he warned his cabinet colleagues against 'doing the same as the Nazis did' — namely taking revenge on those who had simply followed orders, with no idea that they were supporting a war of aggression. In a speech before officials of the new Austrian Administration on 30 April 1945, he expressed the hope that the little Nazis 'can all go peacefully back to their normal life and that they will be able to carry on quietly in their jobs'.⁵⁷ It was not right, so Renner believed, to confiscate their property. At the same time Renner, with the help of a vague, generalized definition of 'victims', effectively played down Jewish persecution and opposed making a special law for the Jews which would neglect almost half the population — namely the Socialists whose property and assets as an organization had been confiscated by the 'clerico-Fascist' state in 1934. Renner's comparison implied that the repression of the labour movement by 'Austro-Fascism' was somehow analogous to the mass murder of Jews by the Nazis. Worse still, it suggested that those who had been persecuted for 'political' reasons deserved priority over those who had suffered for merely 'racial' reasons. Both these assumptions survived intact among most Social Democrats well into the Kreisky era.

Renner's indifference to Jewish suffering between 1938 and 1945 probably reflected his opportunism and latent German nationalism (he had welcomed Hitler's *Anschluß*) more than antisemitism *per se*.⁵⁸ This was not the case with Helmer, who showed extreme coldness to Otto Leichter on his return to Vienna, never bothering to express condolences about his wife Käthe (a militant Jewish Socialist leader in her own right) who had been murdered in a concentration camp. Helmer made it plain to Leichter that *émigré* Jews would not be made welcome in Vienna. He also told Rosa Jochmann, a Socialist leader

52 Ibid., pp. 450–53.

53 Wilhelm Svoboda, *Die Partei, Die Republik und der Mann mit den vielen Gesichtern: Oskar Helmer und Österreich II. Eine Korrektur*, Vienna, 1993.

54 Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy' (see note 44 above), p. 435.

55 Ibid., p. 437.

56 Ibid.

57 Knight, *Ich bin dafür* (see note 19 above), p. 80.

58 Anton Pelinka, 'Karl Renner – A Man for All Seasons', *Austrian History Yearbook*, 23, 1992, pp. 111–19.

who had been in Ravensbrück, to stop talking about her experiences in the concentration camps as this would put voters off.⁵⁹ Helmer's desire to win over the anti-clerical pro-Nazi voters in the bourgeois camp and thereby to weaken the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP — the post-war successor to the pre-war Christian Socials) was clearly a factor in his attitude. He made a point of cultivating the war veterans and behind the scenes he also contributed to the establishment of a third party in 1949, the League of Independents (Verband der Unabhängigen, VdU) which represented the ex-Nazis, German nationalists and some liberal malcontents. Its top officials had for the most part been members of the NSDAP and a few of them had even served short prison sentences after 1945. The chairman of this newly established political grouping, Herbert Kraus, called for compensation for the ex-Nazis, the abolition of de-Nazification laws and the rapid integration of the '*ehemalige*' (that is, former members of the NSDAP) in Austrian society.⁶⁰ He vigorously defended the rights of the 'aryanizers', of fallen and wounded *Wehrmacht* soldiers and even members of the SS who had 'heroically' defended Austria in what was allegedly a preventive and defensive war. The VdU stigmatized the de-Nazification law as if it were comparable to Nazi terror and injustice between 1938 and 1945.⁶¹ Allied internment camps were depicted (grotesquely) as if they were concentration camps. In other words the ex-Nazis were being martyred. In the March 1949 elections the VdU won fifteen seats in the Austrian parliament and, shortly after, pension rights for ex-Nazi civil servants were restored.

Incredibly enough, influential voices were heard that echoed the views of the VdU, calling for the amnesty of war criminals. The Archbishop of Salzburg, Andreas Rohrer, warned that the anti-Nazi legislation was too harsh and would only create martyrs.⁶² Since 1945, Karl Renner had spoken out against ostracizing the Nazis and in 1948 Helmer had argued that they had indeed suffered enough — a position endorsed by Chancellor Figl.⁶³ Conservatives and Socialists were already competing to win votes from the German national camp and former Nazis. This was a domestic situation that did not exist in post-war Germany. Moreover, it was one that was tacitly accepted by the Western Allies once the onset of the Cold War and fear of Soviet intentions in Austria became paramount, freezing any pressure for further de-Nazification. The Jewish community was far too small, fractured, lacking in leadership and devoid of economic, political or cultural influence to affect the new balance of forces. By the early 1950s they found themselves cold-shouldered as the *ehemalige* were integrated into positions of administrative, judicial, economic and executive power. In contrast to Germany, there was no countervailing 'philosemitic' discourse, no official vocabulary of 'reconciliation' or 'restitution', no concept, as Adenauer once put it, that 'there had to be recompense if we wished once more to gain respect and standing among the world's nations'.⁶⁴ What were the deeper reasons

59 Svoboda, 'Politiker, Antisemit, Populist', pp. 47ff.

60 See Feingold (ed.), *Ein ewiges Dennoch*, pp. 344–49. Kraus targeted the so-called '*NS-Gesetz*', the ostensibly draconian de-Nazification law which 'ostracized' the Nazis and could take away their property or apartments. Originally, the law distinguished between 42,000 incriminated Nazis (*belasteten*) and about 500,000 'less incriminated' (*minderbelasteten*) persons, who were amnestied and re-enfranchized after 1948. See also Brigitte Bailer, 'Gleiches Recht für alle? Die Behandlung von Opfern und Tätern des Nationalsozialismus durch die Republik Österreich' in Steiniger (ed.), *Der Umgang mit dem Holocaust*, pp. 183–97.

61 Knight, *Ich bin dafür*, pp. 50ff.

62 See the chapter by Gert Kerschbaumer in Feingold (ed.), *Ein ewiges Dennoch*, p. 339.

63 Knight, *Ich bin dafür*, p. 197.

64 *Deutschland-Berichte*, 1/2, January 1966. On the German case, see Frank Stern, 'Philosemitism: The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge in West Germany, 1945–1952', *Holocaust and Genocide Studies*, 4, 1989, 4, pp. 463–77. Also Michael Wolffsohn, *Ewige Schuld? 40 Jahre Deutsch-Jüdisch – Israelische Beziehungen*, Munich, 1988. While

for this Austrian intransigence over the issue of *Wiedergutmachung* and compensation for Jewish survivors and victims of the Shoah? Why were the negotiations so protracted, the results so paltry and the bad feeling so persistent? Furthermore, what was the connection between these material issues and the legacy of the Shoah in Austria?

The history of the restitution negotiation cannot be recounted here except in so far as it directly affected post-war Austria's attitude to the Jews and its own Nazi past.⁶⁵ But at the root of Austria's official post-1945 position on compensation for Jews lay the assumption that it had been the 'first victim' of Nazism — a claim that had been enshrined in the 1943 Moscow declaration of the Allies. This was something like a founding document in Austrian eyes for its post-war juridical independence and a powerful incentive for its forswearing of all political and ideological ties to Germany. A revealing personal account of this Austrian distancing from Germany can be found in the reminiscences of George Clare, born into a Viennese Jewish family (that had fled from Austria in 1938), who was a British officer stationed in Berlin in 1947. He visited Vienna in that year and was struck by Austrians' determination to differentiate themselves from the Germans at all costs. The Hitler years had suddenly disappeared as if into a black hole. Tyrolean and Styrian peasant hats now sprouted everywhere in place of the brown or black caps of the SA and SS. Instead of *Hochdeutsch* one heard only the inimitable Viennese dialect. *Weg vom Reich* (Away from the Reich!) had replaced the old Nazi cry of *Heim ins Reich* (Back home into the Reich!), so popular at the time of the *Anschluß*. Clare detested the 'inexhaustible self-pity in defeat' of both the Germans and Austrians now posing as a nation of victims rather than executioners bearing the mark of Cain. But he acknowledged that the Germans were slowly becoming aware of their responsibility for their national past. Not so the Austrians, who were busy filling the hollow void of 1945 with an inflated local patriotism that disclaimed all connection with things German and pretended to a lamb-like innocence concerning the Third Reich.⁶⁶ Clare also noted that in Austria (unlike Germany) the Allies restricted themselves to a purely supervisory role and de-Nazification did not figure so prominently in their policy.⁶⁷

The Western Allies not only tended to accept the proposition that the Austrians had been raped by Hitler but by early 1947 they were rapidly losing interest in de-Nazification as a policy goal.⁶⁸ The onset of the Cold War and its accompanying viscerally anti-Communist

Adenauer's record on restitution was very creditable, this was not the case with the pursuit of Nazi criminals in the post-war German law courts during the years of his holding office.

65 The subject was covered in 1967 by Gustav Jelinek, 'Die Geschichte der österreichischen Wiedergutmachung' in Fraenkel (ed.), *The Jews of Austria*, pp. 395–426, and more recently by Albert Sternfeld, *Betrifft: Österreich*, Vienna, 1990, and Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy', pp. 413–42. See also Brigitte Bailer, *Wiedergutmachung Kein Thema. Österreich und die Opfer des Nationalsozialismus*, Vienna, 1993. After nine years of negotiation, the Austrian government settled in 1962 on \$22 million for Jewish survivors. This did not cover loss of income, promotion prospects, educational opportunities, or illnesses induced by the persecutors — let alone compensation for the 65,000 Jewish lives that were extinguished. It compares unfavourably with the \$822 million agreed to by the West Germans, not counting the \$52 billion Bonn had given to Israel by 1990. See Bruce Pauley, 'Austria' in D. Wyman (ed.), *The World Reacts to the Holocaust*, Baltimore, MD and London, 1996, pp. 496–97.

66 George Clare, *Berlin Days 1946–1947*, London, 1989, p. 210, and his contribution 'Last Waltz in Vienna: A Postscript' in Oxaal, Pollak and Botz (eds), *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, p. 235.

67 On de-Nazification in Austria, see Sebastian Meissl, Klaus-Dieter Mulley and Oliver Rathkolb (eds), *Verdrängte Schuld, Verfehlte Sühne. Entnazifizierung in Österreich 1945–1955*, Vienna, 1986.

68 Pauley, 'Austria', p. 497–98.

ideology meant, too, that the issue of compensation for Jewish victims began to be pushed into the background. The Allies believed it would be counterproductive to dwell on Austria's Nazi and antisemitic past at a time when Soviet Communism was rapidly engulfing neighbouring countries in East Central Europe. This in turn enabled the Austrians to use their geopolitical position as a Western bulwark against the USSR to reject any claims arising from their complicity in Nazi policy.⁶⁹ Moreover, in order to resist Soviet claims on German property in Austria, it was vital to the Austrians to emphasize the general coercion of the *Anschluß*.⁷⁰ Since neither America nor Great Britain wanted to offer ammunition to the Soviets on this issue they went along with Austrian arguments. Some Austrian foreign ministry bureaucrats were none the less concerned that the Jews might mobilize international opinion against Austria. A memo from the State Chancellery for Foreign Affairs, in 1945, commented:

The Jews play a big role in world foreign policy, firstly because they control a large part of the press through which they exert their influence on world public opinion, and secondly because they have managed to induce the governments of other countries to champion their claims. In this the Jews have succeeded more easily as international finance capital is largely in Jewish hands. Among pro-Jewish governments are, above all, the British and American governments [...]. It is not for nothing that Jewry has been described as the fifth world power against whose opposition Hitlerite Germany was destroyed.⁷¹

Since the Austrian government required Allied support for the State Treaty, these officials advised that Jewry be formally placated on the international front. At the same time government ministers in private discussions clearly resented any American or Jewish pressures on restitution matters as an 'outrageous' intervention in internal Austrian affairs and an unacceptable *Diktat* from abroad.

From the late 1940s, negotiations with the Austrian government had in practice been conducted by international Jewish organizations (particularly the World Jewish Congress, WJC) on behalf of Austrian Jewry. Since the protracted dealings revolved around such emotive issues as money and blood, the revival of antisemitic stereotypes about greedy (and vengeful) Jews were not slow to emerge. Complaints by WJC officials about the delays over *Wiedergutmachung* were responded to in Austria with warnings about the dangers of reviving 'open antisemitism and anti-Americanism'.⁷² On the American Jewish side there were some calls at the end of 1953 for an economic boycott of Austria; at the same time the press and some politicians in Austria began to raise the bogey of *das Weltjudentum*. These recriminations coincided with the beginning of negotiations in June 1953 over the issue of 'heirless property' (*das erblose Vermögen*) — a process into which Austria had only grudgingly entered under British and American pressure. The Austrians made it plain, however, throughout these and later negotiations that they were not engaged in *Wiedergutmachung* but only in 'aid for the politically persecuted', in humanitarian 'relief' or 'donations of honour' of a charitable character.⁷³ They were discharging a 'moral' but not a legal responsibility to aid those who had suffered. There was no question

69 Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy', p. 427.

70 Ibid., p. 424.

71 Quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 421–22.

72 Embacher, *Neubeginn ohne Illusionen* (see note 40 above), p. 148. One is struck by the similarities between the recriminations in the early 1950s and the Waldheim Affair of the mid-1980s, though the latter was clearly much more political in character.

73 Jelinek, 'Die Geschichte der österreichischen Wiedergutmachung', p. 415.

of admitting Austrian responsibility for crimes that they persisted in claiming they had not committed.⁷⁴

The post-war Austrians in their great majority clearly defined themselves as the victims of German Nazi rule between 1938 and 1945.⁷⁵ Had they not suffered bombing raids, hunger, destruction of life, POWs in Russian captivity, numerous war-widows and all the other ravages of war? Even though they honoured the fallen Austrian soldiers of the *Wehrmacht* with war memorials as ‘defenders of the fatherland’ who had ‘fulfilled their duty’ and still spoke of the ‘lost war’, most Austrians clung to their constructed image as victims of Nazi Germany, without even perceiving the anomaly.

Between 1945 and 1966, Austria was governed by a Grand Coalition of the ÖVP and the Socialists — a situation which had no parallel in Germany and contributed much both to national and political stability. But with regard to the ‘Jewish Question’ one can also clearly see the deadening effect of the Grand Coalition in encouraging a cosy, expedient consensus based on the *Lebenslüge* (life-lie) of Austrian victimhood. Both main parties had developed a vested interest in repressing the history of antisemitism in Austria, the Austrian role in Nazism and the fate of the Jews, whose presence whether as DPs, survivors or returning refugees remained a potential embarrassment. Under the mantle of ‘equal treatment’ and opposition to ‘privilege’, conservative and Socialist ministers in effect equated the victims with their persecutors. Thus the interior minister, Oskar Helmer, rejected, for example, giving even a modest financial advance to the needy Vienna Kultusgemeinde because in his view a separate Jewish community would perpetuate ‘distinctions’ that had to be avoided. After disturbances at a concentration-camp ceremony, the same Socialist interior minister declared in May 1949 that ‘a concentration camp survivor should not be treated with kid gloves if he breaks the law’.⁷⁶ Such examples can be multiplied in post-war Austria. It now appeared that returning *Wehrmacht* soldiers and ‘homecomers’ (*Heimkehrer*) from the Soviet Union were genuine martyrs but Jews who survived the Shoah had to step to the back of the queue. As Robert Knight has acutely put it, Jews were potentially subversive for the new Austria because they were ‘rivals’ who had ‘a better claim to victimhood, and [were] furthermore victims of the non-Jewish Austrian population itself’.⁷⁷

Jewish claims for compensation and restitution were often portrayed in the Austrian press as threatening and fraudulent. Their experiences during the Shoah were trivialized by being presented as similar to those of non-Jews under the so-called Austro-Fascist regime or even compared to the tribulations of ex-Nazis after the war. The deep-seated, genuine resentment of Socialists at their repression under the authoritarian *Ständestaat* and the legacy of Catholic antisemitism among Austrian conservatives seem to have exhausted the capacity of either political camp to feel any compassion for the Jewish victims of the Nazis.

Regular acquittals at war crimes trials and the hostile atmosphere in which they were enveloped was another important consequence of the Austrian political and educational failure to fight Jew-hatred without compromise.⁷⁸ The prosecutions of war criminals

74 Ernst Kolb (later ÖVP Minister of Trade) explained as early as 1946: ‘Österreich habe nichts gutzumachen, weil es nichts verbrochen habe’ (Austria has nothing to recompense because it has committed no crime). See Knight, *Ich bin dafür*, p. 44.

75 A. Pelinka, *Windstille. Klagen über Österreich*, Vienna and Munich, 1985, p. 36.

76 Knight “‘Neutrality’ not Sympathy” (see note 45 above), pp. 222–23.

77 Ibid., p. 226.

78 See, for example, Feingold (ed.), *Ein ewiges Dennoch*, pp. 372–73, for the scandalous atmosphere of antisemitism at the trial of the Maurer brothers in Salzburg (in 1966), acquitted

(unlike in Germany) were woefully understaffed; the judicial system was unable to cope and the presence of so many former Nazis on juries hardly ensured justice. But most Austrians in any case wanted an end to these court cases. There was a general desire to play down the magnitude of Nazi crimes, to heal old wounds and to wipe the slate clean. Hence the single-minded pursuit of Nazi war-criminals by Simon Wiesenthal, working in almost complete isolation out of a small office in Vienna, was almost bound to arouse intense antagonism in Austria during the 1960s and 1970s. At that time he reminded Austrians of everything they wanted to forget.⁷⁹

For Jews in Austria, lacking representation in parliament, in the state or in municipal bodies, let alone in the political parties or government, the struggle for legitimacy and acceptance was inevitably an uphill endeavour.⁸⁰ Attempts to recover their 'aryanized' apartments, houses and businesses were usually rebuffed, since the authorities felt that any concessions might undermine their own official claim that Austria was the 'first victim' of the Nazis. Nor was the Jewish community aided by the fact that Israel, driven by its own reasons of state, did not pressure Austria for *Wiedergutmachung* or contest the official Austrian position in the 1950s and 1960s.⁸¹

Jewish communal leaders were therefore caught in a bind, since their own well-being essentially depended on good connections with the authorities. Yet successive chancellors like Figl and Julius Raab or the foreign minister, Karl Gruber (who had all been 'politically persecuted' before 1945), invariably trivialized the Shoah by comparing it to their own relatively benign experiences under detention.⁸²

In the 1960s, a similar insensitivity was shown by other leading Austrian politicians such as Alfons Gorbach (who was also elected Federal Chancellor) and labour leader Franz Olah (who slid into openly antisemitic statements in the 1966 electoral campaign); and it would be repeated by Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s as well as by Kurt Waldheim in the 1980s.⁸³ The members of the Kultusgemeinde were well aware that they were being cold-shouldered and regarded with suspicion, whether they were survivors or returning *émigrés*. They had long since discovered that in post-war Austria '*nur rassistisch verfolgt*' (persecuted only for racial reasons) was a category that excluded one from important networks like the KZ Verband (the Concentration Camp Association); for example, there was no memorial in the Mauthausen concentration camp for Jewish victims, although they were the largest single group.⁸⁴ Similarly, when Jews returned from Soviet captivity they were either ignored or told they had no right to special treatment, while Austrian soldiers who had served in the *Wehrmacht* on the Russian Front were received back home with music, flowers and speeches which honoured their 'sacrifice' in the fight against Bolshevism.

It was as part of this same pattern of discrimination under the cover of 'equal treatment' that the Austrian government permitted some 'aryanizers' to regain their property (lost under de-Nazification) before Austrian Jews were compensated. Similarly, the government restricted Jewish rights of inheritance from 'heirless property', but used the funds raised from the sale of such property, which had been overwhelmingly Jewish, to compensate

of the murder of Jews in Stanislawów. On this topic, see Simon Wiesenthal, *Justice Not Vengeance*, London, 1989.

79 Hella Pick, *Simon Wiesenthal. A Life in Search of Justice*, London, 1996, p. 61.

80 Embacher, *Neubeginn ohne Illusionen*, pp. 134–35.

81 For an account of Austrian–Israeli relations that also deals with these issues, see Helga Embacher and Margit Reiter, *Gratwanderungen. Die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und Israel im Schatten der Vergangenheit*, Vienna, 1998.

82 Knight, *Ich bin dafür*, p. 58.

83 I. Hacker, 'Mit meinen Augen', *Die Gemeinde*, 1 February 1984, p. 22.

84 Embacher, *Neubeginn ohne Illusionen*, p. 115.

political victims of National Socialism.⁸⁵ At the same time the authorities did not properly ensure that sequestered Jewish wealth was returned to its original owners or that former 'aryanizers' would be obliged to restore buildings, apartments, businesses and valuables to their lawful proprietors. Above all, the Austrian government saw no need to express any feelings of guilt or contrition in any of its discussions with Jewish leaders over restitution.⁸⁶ True, in the 1960s there were some further modest payments and settlement of claims, mainly over real estate, but the haggling had been drawn out for so long and the final results were so meagre that there was little if any cathartic or educational value in the exercise.

Worse still, repression of the Nazi past had made the struggle against antisemitic prejudice more difficult. Although after 1945 antisemitism was officially taboo in Austria (as in Germany), it had never, as we have seen, actually disappeared. Though it was no longer a state doctrine, a party political programme or a plausible response to social and economic competition with Jews (in 1945 Viennese Jews were after all a mere 0.1 per cent of the population), its grip on the popular imagination remained alive. Compared to the inter-war period, when Jews represented 10 per cent of Vienna's population, this was almost an 'antisemitism without Jews'.⁸⁷ With the loss of its political function as a demagogic weapon in social struggles (as a result of the Shoah) it had also become — according to Bernd Marin — an 'antisemitism without antisemites'.⁸⁸ This theory has its weaknesses, especially in the light of the Waldheim Affair (which emerged just after it had been formulated) but it does highlight a striking ambiguity in most varieties of post-Shoah antisemitism, namely the refusal of so many contemporary antisemites to acknowledge their secret vice. In the case of Austria, this masquerade is connected with the deeper problem that its new post-war national identity was partly constructed around the denial of any complicity in the Shoah. This collective amnesia that had marked the first twenty-five years of the Second Republic was the *Lebenslüge* that was deemed necessary to achieve legitimacy in their own eyes.⁸⁹

The Jews had to be blacked out from the Austrian myth of victimhood which focused on what 'others' had done to 'us Austrians' (for example, the Germans, the Russians, the Western Allies and World Jewry) and not on what 'we Austrians' did to 'others' — particularly (though not exclusively) Jews. This collective repression was transparent in the encounter with the DPs between 1945 and 1950. The prevailing image of the Jewish DP did not arouse compassion for the survivors of the Shoah but was instead elided into older xenophobic stereotypes of the 'parasitic', 'criminal', 'provocative' and 'greasy' foreign Jew feeding off the fat of the land.⁹⁰ Then, in the 1950s the issue of restitution raised the spectre of a powerful, international Jewry threatening Austria, particularly in an alliance with the United States — an image that would revive with even greater force

85 Knight, 'Restitution and Legitimacy', p. 435.

86 Jelinek, 'Die Geschichte der österreichischen Wiedergutmachung', p. 404, makes this point about Chancellor Julius Raab in the 1950s during the negotiations with Jewish organizations. The negative contrast with the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, hardly needs emphasizing.

87 For the notion of 'antisemitism without antisemites', see B. Marin, *Antisemitismus in Österreich. Sozialhistorische und soziologische Studien*, Innsbruck, 1983, and also his article 'Antisemitism Before and After the Holocaust' in Oxaal, Pollak and Botz (eds), *Jews, Antisemitism and Culture in Vienna*, pp. 216–23.

88 Ibid., p. 226.

89 Gerhard Botz, "'Infelix Austria". Lebenslüge und nationale Identität in Österreich heute', *Das jüdische Echo*, 39, 1990, 1 (October), pp. 116–20.

90 Albrich, *Exodus durch Österreich* (see note 28 above).

during the Waldheim Affair.⁹¹ During the first decade in post-Shoah Austria the roles of perpetrator and victim were already being equalized and in subsequent years they would even be reversed.

91 See Richard Mitten, *The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice. The Waldheim Phenomenon in Austria*, Boulder, CO, 1992, pp. 208ff, on the World Jewish Congress as the focus of an antisemitic *Feindbild* (image of the enemy), standing at the head of an international campaign against Waldheim and Austria.

4 Jews and Poles on the Barricades of Warsaw: Two Polish Plays on the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising

HALINA FILIPOWICZ

I

‘There are two topics that one still cannot discuss without becoming caught up in complications: Polish–Jewish relations and the 1944 Warsaw uprising’, remarked Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert during a discussion held on 13 March 1997 at the Mały Theatre in Warsaw.¹ The discussion, which took place during the launch of an expanded edition of Tomasz Łubieński’s *Bić się czy nie bić* (To Fight or Not to Fight, 1996), raised fundamental questions about cultural mechanisms that generate mistaken assumptions and reinforce misrepresentation. It promoted an exploration of the relation of cultural mythology to national identity and patriotic morality. Above all, it made clear that the Warsaw uprising of 1944 continues to be a focus of lively debate.

The discussion, however, revealed predictable blind spots.² Except for a brief comment by Małgorzata Szpakowska, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of 1943 went virtually unmentioned. The participants spoke only of ‘our uprisings’,³ even though the dilemma embodied in the title of Łubieński’s book resonates also in the writing about the ghetto uprising. The omission of this uprising from the discussion of culturally dominant assumptions about tragic heroism reinforced the stereotype — ‘everyone knows that Jews didn’t fight’ — and thus promoted the othering of the Shoah. It also revealed contradictions in the cultural construct of the Polish experience of history. In this chapter, my primary conceptual concern is the extent to which culture gives shelter to naive illusions of acceptance that translate into repressive social practices.

I examine here the cultural contradictions that place extraordinary pressures on attempts to represent the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in Polish drama. In discussing Stefania Zahorska’s *Smocza 13* (13 Smocza Street, 1944) and Stefan Otwinowski’s *Wielkanoc* (Easter, 1946),⁴ I consider representations of the ghetto uprising of 1943 as the site where the vexed problem of Polish–Jewish relations and the tropes of the Polish insurgent tradition intersect, and thus compound their attendant complications. I analyse the slippage

I am grateful to Jadwiga Maurer for encouragement and advice, and to Alvin Goldfarb, Anna Małecka, Robert Skloot and Anna Zacharska for generous help in my research for this chapter.

- 1 Andrzej Krzysztof Kunert, ‘Rozmowy: Bitwy i koszty’, *Dialog*, 8, 1997, p. 88. For the 1944 uprising in literature and historiography, see Zygmunt Mańkowski and Jerzy Świąch (eds), *Powstanie Warszawskie w historiografii i literaturze 1944–1994*, Lublin, 1996.
- 2 In as early as 1947, the poet Julian Przyboś observed that the ‘Warsaw Uprising has eclipsed [...] the resistance of the Warsaw ghetto’. Julian Przyboś, ‘Hańba antysemityzmu’ in Jerzy Andrzejewski et al., *Martwa fala: Zbiór artykułów o antysemityzmie*, Warsaw, 1947, p. 61.
- 3 Maria Janion, ‘Rozmowy: Bitwy i koszty’, *Dialog*, 8, 1997, p. 83.
- 4 The dates refer to the first publication. *Smocza 13* has never been staged in Poland or abroad (an anonymous translation into English does exist in the archives of the Association of Polish Theatre Artists Abroad in London). *Wielkanoc* had its first night in Łódź on 1 October 1946; another production opened in Cracow on 4 December. Since 1946, the play has not been performed.

of cultural spaces, of 'insides' and 'outsides', in Zahorska's and Otwinowski's plays. In pursuing these concerns, I focus on the ghetto wall as a paradigm of liminality. 'And what is liminality' — 'the space that both separates and joins spaces: the essence of in-betweenness?'⁵ In this chapter, then, I take into account an elaborately interlocking system of ambiguities that is built into the concepts of 'inside', 'outside' and 'becoming one' as they are negotiated in *Smocza 13* and *Wielkanoc*.

The two plays are among the earliest attempts in any language to represent the Shoah on stage.⁶ Ready in draft by the autumn of 1943, they can be seen as endeavours to enact a theatrical rite of remembrance only months after the ghetto uprising (19 April–10 May) had been crushed.⁷ This immediately raises the issue of historical accuracy in Shoah writing. Zahorska and Otwinowski do not falsify, sensationalize or trivialize historical record, but they do put the past to their own purposes. They draw on a concept of history not only as fact but also as time and as myth. Does this diminish the 'intellectual validity' of *Smocza 13* and *Wielkanoc* as Shoah drama?⁸ In more general terms, does a play which fails the test of historical accuracy somehow betray the Shoah?

No other historical event of the twentieth century has forced upon artists a moral obligation of the kind that the Shoah has. Critics like Lawrence L. Langer have provided a theoretical foundation for the radical questioning of the adequacy of art in the face of the Shoah. As Langer puts it, 'How should art — how *can* art — represent the inexpressibly inhuman suffering of the victims, without doing an injustice to that suffering?'⁹ Historical accuracy seems to be at odds with aesthetic pleasure. But what is the 'authentic' historical record of the Shoah? 'Does history lie in the details of train schedules and the calorie count of the ghetto diet? Or is it the shape of the Holocaust experience, brimming with atrocity and unexplainable mystery?'¹⁰ Our knowledge and understanding of facts, moreover, depend on their representation — by participants, by witnesses, and ultimately by historians.¹¹

5 Richard Schechner, *Between Theater and Anthropology*, Philadelphia, PA, 1985, p. 295.

6 Between 1943 and 1949 approximately a dozen plays were written about the systematic mass murder of the Jews (see Alvin Goldfarb, 'Select Bibliography of Holocaust Plays, 1933–1997' in Claude Schumacher [ed.], *Staging the Holocaust: The Shoah in Drama and Performance*, Cambridge, 1998, pp. 298–334). Four deal with the Warsaw ghetto uprising: Morton Wishengrad's *The Battle of the Warsaw Ghetto* (1943), H. Leivick's *Miracle of the Warsaw Ghetto* (1944), and Zahorska's and Otwinowski's plays. A discussion of Wishengrad's play can be found in Alvin Goldfarb, 'The Holocaust on the Air: The Radio Plays of the Writers' War Board', *The Journal of American Drama and Theatre*, 2, 1996, pp. 48–58.

7 For accounts of the ghetto uprising, see especially Reuben Ainsztein, *The Warsaw Ghetto Revolt*, New York, 1979, and Israel Gutman, *Resistance: The Warsaw Ghetto Uprising*, Boston, MA, 1994.

8 See Edward R. Isser, *Stages of Annihilation: Theatrical Representations of the Holocaust*, Madison, NJ, 1997, p. 14.

9 Lawrence L. Langer, *The Holocaust and the Literary Imagination*, New Haven, CT, 1975, p. 1; Langer's italics.

10 Robert Skloot's review of Isser's *Stages of Annihilation* (see note 8), in *Shofar: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Jewish Studies*, 4, 1999, p. 141.

11 This idea underlies the conceptual framework of James E. Young's *Writing and Rewriting the Holocaust: Narrative and the Consequences of Interpretation*, Bloomington, IN, 1990. Michael André Bernstein pushes this argument further, pointing out that 'one of the most pervasive myths of our era, a myth perhaps even partially arising out of our collective response to the horrors of the concentration camps, is the absolute authority given to first-person testimony. Such narratives [...] are habitually regarded as though they were completely unmediated, as though language, gesture, and imagery could become transparent if the experience being expressed is sufficiently horrific'. Michael André Bernstein, *Foregone Conclusions: Against*

Representing the Shoah on stage is fraught with additional problems which are different from those presented by fiction, poetry, or film because theatre has an immediacy which the other forms lack. No other representation of the Shoah raises the issue of aestheticized violence more persistently than the dramatic. Performative enactments of the Shoah can be seen as opening the question of the relation between disinterested contemplation and what Barbara Johnson calls 'the dynamics of connectedness'.¹² They present us, directly, with 'horrible images, painful truths, excruciating losses. Do we just sit back and watch? What is the nature of our pleasure in contemplating trauma?'¹³

On the one hand, there is something ethically disturbing about putting the Shoah on theatrical display.¹⁴ On the other hand, if the reality of Shoah suffering constitutes something like an 'ultimate limit', where words fail to do justice to that suffering, then theatre, which can 'show' silence, is uniquely qualified to give 'voice' to the ineffability of the Shoah and thus to transmit historical memory. As Heiner Müller has observed, 'the basic thing in theatre is silence. Theater can work without words, but it cannot work without silence'.¹⁵ Thus, while the corporeality of theatre may weigh drama down and eventually lock its potential in the minute details of everyday reality, it is also possible that in performative enactments one can say 'in things' what cannot be said in words. While the other art forms allow a stable distance between object and audience and hence a greater possibility for emotional detachment, in theatre everything conspires, so to speak, to resist withdrawal from involvement. A performance, like a ritual, makes the past come alive, again and again. And like a ritual, it turns the past into a palpable part of the present, of the here and now in which we live.

II

Though the Shoah has been an enduring theme of Polish fiction and poetry,¹⁶ it has only sporadically been a theme of Polish drama. In the cultural territory defined by the events of 1944–49 in Poland, *Smocza 13* and *Wielkanoc* stand out as the only plays on the annihilation of the Jews.¹⁷ In dealing with the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, both treat a topic which subsequent Polish playwrights have rarely addressed.¹⁸ Critics have written little about *Smocza 13* and *Wielkanoc*, ostensibly on the grounds that they are concerned only

Apocalyptic History, Berkeley, CA, 1994, p. 47. For a different view, see Henryk Grynberg, 'Holocaust w literaturze polskiej' in his *Prawda nieartystyczna*, Warsaw, 1994, pp. 139–79.

12 Barbara Johnson, "'Aesthetic" and "Rapport" in Toni Morrison's *Sula*', *Textual Practice*, 7, 1993, p. 170.

13 Ibid., p. 171.

14 On this issue, see Vivian M. Patraka, *Spectacular Suffering: Theatre, Fascism, and the Holocaust*, Bloomington, IN, 1999.

15 Arthur Holmberg, 'A Conversation with Robert Wilson and Heiner Müller', *Modern Drama*, 31, 1988, p. 458.

16 For critical surveys, see Natan Gross, *Poeci i Szoa: Obraz Zagłady Żydów w poezji polskiej*, Sosnowiec, 1993; Irena Maciejewska's Introduction to the volume edited by her, *Męczeństwo i zagłada Żydów w zapisach literatury polskiej*, Warsaw, 1988, pp. 5–33; Józef Wróbel, *Tematy żydowskie w prozie polskiej 1939–1987*, Cracow, 1991.

17 Jerzy Zawieyski's *Mąż doskonały* (1945), which draws on the story of Job, has been said to concern the Shoah (see Maciejewska, Introduction to *Męczeństwo i zagłada Żydów*, p. 33). Because the play is allegorical, however, one cannot be certain whether it represents the Shoah or the 1944 Warsaw Uprising.

18 Hanna Krall's *Zdążyć przed Panem Bogiem* (1980) and Jacek S. Buras's *Gwiazda za murem* (1988) are the only other plays on the topic. Krall's drama was based on her interviews with one of the leaders of the ghetto uprising, Marek Edelman. It was translated into English as *To Steal a March on God* by Jadwiga Kosicka (Amsterdam, 1996).

with literary excellence.¹⁹ They have taken little account of the extent to which these plays perform a crucial intervention in Polish discourse about the Shoah.²⁰

Smocza 13 was written and published in London, *Wielkanoc* in Poland. They offer two perspectives on the ghetto uprising: one by a Polish-Jewish female writer who had arrived in England in 1940 as a refugee, the other by a non-Jewish male writer who spent the war in Poland. Whereas Otwinowski writes as an 'insider', Zahorska is doubly removed from her subject matter, both as a refugee and as an assimilated Jewess. To be sure, the role of the 'wailing woman', a strongly inscribed cultural position, is available to her.²¹ At the same time, precisely because of her 'outsideness', Zahorska's rendering of the story of the ghetto uprising might seem less 'accurate' and hence less reliable. While *Wielkanoc* is explicitly based on eye-witness testimony, *Smocza 13* is not.²²

Wielkanoc and *Smocza 13* cover much common ground: the ambivalent and often uneasy relations between Jews and Poles; the determination of the ghetto insurgents. Both fail to portray Germans, who are thus rendered invisible.²³ Both succeed in capturing a mood of feverish expectation and heightened awareness as the Nazi terror intensifies. *Wielkanoc* is strongest in its depiction of a variety of character types, including philosemitic and antisemitic Poles. It leaves us with an image of compassionate behaviour and positive action under abominable circumstances, but it does so through a clichéd love plot, colourful simplifications and verbose explanations. While *Wielkanoc* relies on possibly over-conventional dramatic devices, Zahorska's austere play dispenses almost entirely with a sequential plot. The effectiveness of *Smocza 13* depends as much on the abrupt shifts of action as on the sparing use of language. Zahorska creates a seemingly random dialogue of truncated sentences and contradictory phrases which anticipates experimental drama of the 1950s and 1960s. In short, her play breaks out of the established mould. Even on the stylistic level, Zahorska's play forces the audience out of comfortable assumptions that they can understand. This play undermines such arrogance.

Smocza 13 tells the Jewish side of the story of the ghetto uprising, *Wielkanoc*, the non-Jewish side. *Smocza 13* focuses on the common people; *Wielkanoc* presents characters drawn from the intellectual élite. In *Smocza 13*, the suffering and violence are so thoroughly woven into the fabric of the text that they mark even the quietest moments; in *Wielkanoc*, in spite of some inconvenience, characters seem to go about their daily business unaffected by the war. *Smocza 13* allows the audience to become involved in the precarious routine of the struggle for survival in the Warsaw ghetto; the underground resistance seems peripheral to the action. In contrast, *Wielkanoc* brings into focus the resistance that took place in provincial ghettos. It does so from outside: the non-Jewish Polish community in a small town near Warsaw. Though the entire action takes place

19 See, for example, Maciejewska's Introduction to *Męczeństwo i zagłada Żydów*, p. 33, and Andrzej Wanat, "'Czy piekło nadaje się do eksploatacji?'" *Teatr*, 3, 1990, p. 10. Wanat claims that neither play can be called even artistically competent.

20 *Wielkanoc* was briefly discussed in a debate on Polish antisemitism, published in the weekly *Odrodzenie* over several months in 1945 and 1946. See Tadeusz Breza, 'Wielkanoc Stefana Otwinowskiego', *Odrodzenie*, 19, 1946, p. 10.

21 According to Lidia Ciołkosz, Zahorska wrote *Smocza 13* as an expression of her pain at Samuel Zygelboim's suicide in London on 12 May 1943. By his suicide he sought to draw the Western public's attention to the plight of the Jews. See Maja Elżbieta Cybulska, *Potwierdzone istnienie: Archiwum Stefani Zahorskiej*, London, 1988, p. 124.

22 In his Preface, Otwinowski explains: 'The liquidation of the Warsaw ghetto was my most devastating experience during the war'. Stefan Otwinowski, *Wielkanoc: Dramat w trzech aktach z prologiem*, Cracow, 1946, p. 17.

23 The only exception is the brief appearance of unindividualized German soldiers in the Prologue to *Smocza 13*.

outside ghetto walls, it repeatedly points us towards an off-stage reality, towards events in the local ghetto and in the Warsaw ghetto. These events are withheld from our eyes but not from our awareness. Through the conventional devices of eye-witness accounts, second-hand reports, and stage effects, a continuous flow of information comes from both ghettos.

The essential difference between Otwinowski's and Zahorska's plays is evident in their titles. Otwinowski highlights the date of a Christian feast, Zahorska, a street in the Warsaw ghetto. In April 1943, the celebration of Holy Week did indeed coincide with the outbreak of the ghetto uprising.²⁴ Otwinowski seizes the liminal moment of the Resurrection to draw on metaphors of awakening and rebirth and thus to imagine a new world order in an unspecified future. While Otwinowski emphasizes time, Zahorska focuses on place. The block of flats at 13 Smocza Street serves as a centre of political activity in the ghetto. However, we become only gradually aware that the daily routine we see on stage is a palimpsest of the underground resistance. In Act 1, for example, we wonder why Basia seems to steal Mrs Rotman's coal hod only to return it a few scenes later. One might even conclude that Zahorska's drama of vague premonitions and fearful expectation is not about the ghetto resistance at all, but about psychological responses to impending doom. In Act 2, we discover that Basia is involved in a clandestine organization and that she uses the hod to transport an illegal radio. By Act 3, we realize that while we have focused our attention on the prosaic, 'unheroic' details of daily life in an overcrowded flat, we have been witnesses to preparations for the uprising.

As the scenes with the coal hod suggest, Zahorska's play disturbs any schematic opposition of fighters and non-fighters, militancy and everyday life. On the one hand, the underground activities are not represented as inherently heroic and hence superior to the struggle for survival; they are inseparable from the everyday. On the other hand, everyone, even those who do not have the courage to take up arms, is implicated in the resistance by the very fact of living in a building that houses an illegal printing press. Is it possible, then, that heroism is neither romantic nor particularly manly, and that it is simply banal, unpredictable, and unconnected to ideology?

In the public discussion of Łubieński's *Bić się czy nie bić*, Szpakowska insisted that 'a decision to start an insurrection can be justified only in two situations'. First, when there is at least a reasonable chance of winning, and all the risks have been carefully weighed up. That is, when 'an insurrection may fail, but is not doomed from the beginning'. Secondly, when 'everything has been lost, and it does not matter one way or the other; then one can afford to make a tragic gesture'.²⁵ For Szpakowska, the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising was just such a gesture. It is evident, however, that she meant the word 'tragic' in its colloquial sense. Indeed, from the perspective of 'normal' times, the ghetto uprising might seem to have been an action of suicidal despair. For Zahorska and Otwinowski, however, the uprising is not an act of self-destruction whose terms are dictated by the victimizer, but the only way for the victims to control what is still theirs: the terms of their death.²⁶ To the ghetto insurgents, *pace* Szpakowska, it does 'matter one way or the other'. It matters how

24 Moreover, Holy Week coincided with Passover. The fact that the play refers only to Easter, and not to Passover, emphasizes that its perspective is Christian.

25 Małgorzata Szpakowska, 'Rozmowy: Bitwy i koszty', *Dialog*, 8, 1997, p. 88.

26 One remembers Przyboś's statement that the Nazis attempted 'to erase not only ethics, reason, and law, but also the last vestiges of humanness [...]. They sought to render the death of the murdered Jews meaningless. They sought to deny its proper name'. Julian Przyboś, untitled piece reprinted in Maciejewska's anthology, *Męczeństwo i zagłada Żydów*, p. 38.

they will die. In emphasizing the choice the characters can make, *Smocza 13* and *Wielkanoc* foreground the tragic heroism of ghetto resistance.²⁷

In both plays, characters are caught in a moment when they must perform deeds with enormous ethical implications. The seemingly straightforward action of *Smocza 13* advances through a series of discontinuous scenes in which the ghetto-dwellers have to deal with the intimation of impending annihilation. They respond with conflicting emotions: denial, hope, fear, despair, resignation. Some cling to an illusion that they might purchase a deferral of doom and thus preserve their lives if they sacrifice one of their own. Others attempt to transcend suffering and to summon Jewish messianic hope as a source of strength. Birenzweig articulates the passive submission of most when he insists that 'Jews have to accept everything'.²⁸ Basia contradicts him: 'That's not true! One can die without being debased'.²⁹ Later, Mały echoes her words: 'It's not a question of whether they'll die but how they'll die'.³⁰ In the final moments of Act 3, as the rounding-up for a deportation continues off-stage, many characters become reluctant resisters. They barricade themselves in the flat even though they have only one revolver between them. They are defenceless, but not powerless. They assert their power by controlling the way they will die: on the degrading terms imposed by the Germans, or on their own terms.

Zahorska's play, however, has a twist in the Epilogue. Thus far, the concept of heroism has been subject to continuing negotiation, and connections between 'heroic' and 'unheroic' identities have been made and remade. The Epilogue erases civilian/non-civilian and male/female alliances and recovers a romanticized lost world of virile military heroism. On the barricade that the civilians have built we see only a group of male insurgents who identify themselves as soldiers of the Jewish Combat Organization. They seek in a concerted military action an honourable alternative to a life lived in subjugation and despair. The uprising is in its final stage; the ghetto is burning. When the Germans close in on the insurgents, their commander orders a retreat. The chances of breaking through the enemy line are slim, but laying down their arms is out of the question for the ghetto fighters.

What is true of the insurgents in the epilogue of *Smocza 13* is also true of Samuel Freud in *Wielkanoc* — with a difference. On the eve of the uprising, he is offered an opportunity to escape from the ghetto in his hometown, but he chooses to remain there. For him, there are things that matter more than merely staying alive: his honour and his reputation in the eyes of history. When the deportation of the ghetto begins, he leads a charge against the enemy. In *Wielkanoc*, as in *Smocza 13*, the uprising returns the underground resistance to the traditional chivalric paradigm of meeting the enemy in battle.³¹

In *Wielkanoc*, many of the Jewish insurgents break out and eventually join Polish partisans in a surrounding forest. Samuel, however, dies when he confronts his attackers in hand-to-hand combat. Thus, he dies what was considered in the chivalric ethos a beautiful

27 Skloot points out, 'the issue at the heart of the Holocaust experience [is] the nature and possibility of choice' (Robert Skloot, *The Darkness We Carry: The Drama of the Holocaust*, Madison, WI, 1988, p. 19). Elsewhere he observes that Shoah plays 'remind us that there are choices to be made' even in circumstances of extreme physical degradation and spiritual doubt (Introduction to his anthology, *The Theatre of the Holocaust: Four Plays*, Madison, WI, 1982, p. 37; Skloot's italics).

28 Stefania Zahorska, *Smocza 13: Dramat w 3 aktach*, London, 1945, p. 14.

29 Ibid.

30 Ibid., p. 37.

31 In Polish cultural mythology, clandestine activity has always presented a moral problem because of its vulnerability to manipulation. See Maria Janion, *Życie pośmiertne Konrada Wallenroda*, Warsaw, 1990.

death rather than, to use Gliksman's phrase in *Smocza 13*, 'a debased death'.³² In keeping with the chivalric ethos, Samuel's death in battle is constructed as the necessary culmination of his heroism and as a permanent moral victory. It is tacitly fundamental to his heroism that he dies to demonstrate the sincerity of his commitment. His death provides the grounds for imagining a transcendent version of heroic identity, free from the contaminating influence of the life of a hero who has survived. Without the badge of death, Samuel's glory would be lessened.

Otwinowski's play, moreover, broaches the issue of ethical choice confronting a non-Jewish character. Stanisław Łaski, a young Warsaw intellectual, leaves the city when the fighting in the ghetto begins; the news of German atrocities is weighing him down. He seeks psychological shelter in the home of his uncle, Przypkowski, who lives in a small town near Warsaw. Just as Stanisław and his uncle sit down to celebrate Easter, Samuel's sister, Ewa, arrives to seek help. Stanisław has an opportunity to put his high-minded ideals into practice, but he refuses to become involved. A moment before, in the initial nervous confrontation between Ewa and the characters around Przypkowski, including his antisemitic housekeeper, the boundary between the 'inside' (the ghetto) and the 'outside' (non-Jewish society) is clear-cut and presumably uncrossable. And yet Stanisław eventually crosses this boundary. He ventures beyond the dominant cultural narrative which would cast him at best as a silent, if supportive, witness. He plucks up his courage and offers Ewa his Warsaw flat as a refuge.

Stanisław's choice is, however, not entirely voluntary. He is shamed into making his decision by the antisemitic Siciński who has volunteered to help Ewa. Moreover, Otwinowski romanticizes Stanisław's motive. Stanisław realizes that Ewa's and his mutual attraction is love. This realization hastens his choice. In Act 3, all the pieces of this carefully engineered play come together. The cast of characters in this act comprises Ewa, Stanisław, the janitor and the pharmacist Twardowski. Figuratively speaking, a man embraces a woman; a non-Jew embraces a Jew; a working-class man embraces an intellectual; the old embrace the young; the order puts us at ease.

This order is to a large extent predicated on a particular construction of Ewa and Samuel and their mother. They are the only Jews we see on stage. We know from the extended Prologue set in 1938 that they are likeable people, fully acculturated into the Polish sociosymbolic order; their qualities make them ideal good neighbours. At a moment in history when antisemitism is intensifying, Mrs Freud insists that a nation is not a 'race', but a community of people living in the same place. She answers antisemitic notions by asserting that although she is a Jew, her nation is Poland.³³ Five years later, Przypkowski challenges the presumptions of Siciński's antisemitic discourse which objectifies Jews as 'the Jewish question' and Poland's 'major internal problem'.³⁴ Przypkowski argues: '[Ewa Freud is] a smart and pleasant woman. Her whole family is like that. [...] A respectable family. They've always been nice to me. [...] They're not Poland's internal problem, but simply my closest neighbours. They're not Jews, but people like us.'³⁵

In other words, he locates the grounds for acceptance not in some abstract realm of liberal 'tolerance', but in the constitution of a person's own identity: the Freuds are 'people like us'. At the same time, he offers a representation of the Freuds that, while calling into question Siciński's dehumanizing discourse, none the less enforces its own repressive

32 Zahorska, *Smocza 13*, p. 33. For a discussion of Polish representations of heroic death, see Antonina Lubaszewska, 'Egzekucja i zdrowa śmierć: Polska topika bohaterskiej śmierci', *Ruch Literacki*, 3, 1991, pp. 187–97.

33 Otwinowski, *Wielkanoc*, p. 29.

34 Ibid., p. 45.

35 Ibid., p. 49.

mode of expression. That is, the Freuds deserve respect and compassion not as Jews but as acculturated Poles. Thus, Przykowski constructs the acceptance of Jews on a foundation that leaves dominant assumptions intact.

While *Smocza 13* does not shy away from representing Jews with whom audiences may not necessarily sympathize, *Wielkanoc* focuses on a Jewish family that is different from Polish families, yet made acceptable to the Polish characters (including the antisemites) and, presumably, to Polish audiences. The construction of the Freuds' identity raises questions about the mechanisms that liberal ideology uses to make acceptable those whom it identifies as different. The Freuds' identity pivots on a notion of acceptance that recasts the unfamiliar in familiar terms, terms with which one can safely identify. The other becomes like, so that one's own subjectivity is not threatened. This familiarizing of the unfamiliar is a conservative gesture, one that is more fully constructed in the scene which wraps the ghetto uprising in enactments of Polish cultural mythology.

III

Wielkanoc begins in 1938, prior to the construction of an 'inside' and an 'outside', while *Smocza 13* opens in that rift of 'inside' and 'outside'. The 'inside' and the 'outside' are, most apparently, the space of the Jewish people inside the boundaries of the ghetto and the space outside those boundaries reserved for non-Jews. Clearly, however, there is more than one 'inside' or 'outside' in these plays. The literal 'inside' of the ghetto and the literal 'outside' of the non-ghetto are implicitly far more complex than geographical boundaries.

In *Wielkanoc*, the lines of inclusion and exclusion are drawn less sharply than in *Smocza 13*, so that it is possible for Poles like the self-proclaimed eccentric Twardowski to become partners in a common struggle, not merely passive observers. To become partners predicates a notion of partnership on the spaces of 'inside' and 'outside' that are neither singular nor exclusive. The key to this configuration is Twardowski's enigmatic mission which takes him across the boundaries between the ghetto and the non-ghetto and between Warsaw and non-Warsaw. In the play's questioning of the opposition of 'inside' and 'outside', a paradigm of nomadic sensibility which Twardowski represents is more important than his specific role in the underground resistance. Rosi Braidotti employs nomadism to describe 'the subject who has relinquished all idea, desire or nostalgia for fixity. This figuration expresses the desire for an identity made of transitions, successive shifts, and coordinated changes, without and against essential unity'.³⁶ In a passage which could appear to have been written according to what Braidotti would call a 'nomadic aesthetics', Twardowski articulates the non-static, migratory nature of his activism:

STANISŁAW:	Where should we look for you in case we need you?
TWARDOWSKI:	For the time being, I live in Borderlands.
EWA:	Is that on the Otwock line?
TWARDOWSKI:	No, it's on the moveable line. Between one forest and another. Sometimes between Warsaw and the woods. ³⁷

Twardowski's Borderlands are actual as well as broadly metaphorical. He drives a wedge into the dyadic vision of 'inside' and 'outside', and thus, one might say, claims the border as a trope of identity.

This conversation takes place after some 6,000 Jewish insurgents, according to Twardowski's report, have broken out of the ghettos to join Polish partisans in the woods.

36 Rosi Braidotti, *Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary Feminist Theory*, New York, 1994, p. 22.

37 Otwinowski, *Wielkanoc*, p. 88.

Hence, figuratively speaking, Twardowski is living perpetually at a crossroads where Polish and Jewish cultures meet, a place defined by nomadic restlessness. Foregrounding the necessity of exchange, which presumes the presence of another, he offers a vision of community in which connections between self and others are continuously made and remade and in which identity never hardens into essence. When he speaks of his enigmatic travelling, he helps direct attention to the role betweenness can play in the relations between non-Jews and Jews. *Wielkanoc* suggests that this cross-cultural travelling can be enormously productive.

At the same time, however, *Wielkanoc* iterates and reiterates a 'becoming one' that is postulated as virtually always already existing. It opens by citing a past of integral bonds between the Jewish people and Polish land. This relation is, clearly, both 'naturally' (the reference is to being born in Poland) and historically prior to the Germans' construction of 'inside' and 'outside'. The play makes it possible to recover a version of community based on 'becoming one'. But this possibility is enacted in a deceptively sympathetic environment where the terms of acceptance are tantamount to erasure of difference. In its modulations between the Freuds' acculturation and Twardowski's nomadism, the play creates a dialectic of perpetuated repression that masquerades as acceptance.

In *Smocza 13*, the boundaries of the 'inside' and the 'outside' seem rigid. Regina Feigenblatt, a Jew who has been deported from a provincial town, identifies the Warsaw ghetto with Warsaw: 'This is only my second day in Warsaw. I've never been to Warsaw before.' The professor's wife corrects her curtly: 'You're not in Warsaw; you're in Smocza Street.'³⁸ Likewise, Basia speaks of her anticipated escape from the ghetto as if it were a trip to another city: 'We're going to Warsaw.'³⁹ In other words, the suffering puts the ghetto outside ordinary human experience. This defamiliarizing sense of psychological distance brings about the dichotomy of the ghetto and the non-ghetto in the play.⁴⁰

The opposition of 'inside' and 'outside' that dominates Act 1 is reinforced in Act 2 with the arrival of Andrzej, a liaison between the ghetto resistance and an unspecified left-wing organization on the other side of the wall. The ghetto conspirators want arms; he brings them spare parts for their radio and printing press as well as some underground publications. He argues that publishing is important because 'it's necessary to prepare the people not only for a struggle against the Germans, but also for a social struggle'.⁴¹ Eventually, however, he concedes that he has been sent merely to convey empty phrases of solidarity. The divide between the Jewish underground and Andrzej's organization thus leads back to the topological divide along the wall between the ghetto and the non-ghetto. In contrast to *Wielkanoc*, Zahorska's play problematizes the notion of how fully, even if invisibly, the Jews had always been integrated into the fabric of Polish life. In *Smocza 13*, the ghetto is something like a black hole in Polish reality, and the elegiac tone of the evocation of 'inside' is unmistakable. The play frames itself as a representation of the passing of the Polish-Jewish community.

There is more, however, to Zahorska's configuration of 'inside' and 'outside'. Kluger, one of the ghetto conspirators, insists that the ghetto resistance is 'part of Poland's

38 Zahorska, *Smocza 13*, p. 19.

39 Ibid., p. 43

40 This may appear obvious if one does not see it in its Polish context. Compare, for example, Maciejewska's assertion that the 'Warsaw ghetto was part of the city; its plight was part of the plight of Warsaw'. Irena Maciejewska, 'Getto warszawskie w literaturze polskiej' in Michał Głowiński and Janusz Sławiński (eds), *Literatura wobec wojny i okupacji*, Wrocław, 1976, p. 136.

41 Zahorska, *Smocza 13*, p. 36.

underground movement'.⁴² At the same time, Kluger and his fellow conspirator, Szloma, declare their own wish to enter, as it were, more fully into the larger scheme of things. Both are Socialists who associate the ghetto resistance with an international struggle aimed at the removal of pre-war social injustice and political oppression. Szloma urges his colleagues: 'We've got to stir the conscience of the whole world! We've got to scream that what's going on here is an atrocity such as has never taken place before. After all, there are democratic countries in the world; there are socialists, workers! They won't let us perish like this!'⁴³ They do. The ghetto fighters rise against the Germans while those on the outside look on.

Kluger and Szloma are both more outspoken than the other members of the resistance group; moreover, Kluger is in command when the uprising begins. Hence it is tempting to see Kluger and Szloma as the play's *raisonneurs* whose political rhetoric is to serve as a yardstick against which the actions of others are to be measured. On the barricade, however, all the insurgents stand united regardless of their ideological positions, Socialists and 'Jewish mystics' alike.⁴⁴ For Gliksman, one of the 'mystics', the inevitable defeat of the uprising represents 'the end'. Kluger corrects him: 'No, it's not the end'.⁴⁵ If the Shoah is a symptom of a profound malaise of our civilization, then, as Kluger suggests in his final speech, the ghetto uprising is the turning point in modern history. He challenges the 'outside' to meet the moral standard set by the ghetto fighters and to take up their struggle. The 'outside' here is clearly not only non-Jewish Polish society.

IV

In Zahorska's play, the ghetto uprising is doomed from the beginning. It is presented, however, as a denial of 'debased death' and a constitution of heroic death that will be not only a permanent reminder to the rest of the world, but also the starting point of a new history. The play's left-wing framework comprises a reconceptualization of the uprising as an empowering investment in the future rather than as a sacrificial offering.⁴⁶ The conclusion calls for a commitment from the 'outside' to a dual emancipation: political freedom and social justice. Gliksman, however, has the last word. He asks those on the 'outside': 'Can you hear us? Can you hear us?'⁴⁷ Thus, the play leaves disturbingly open-ended the question whether the story of the ghetto uprising is powerful enough to effect a transformation of the kind that Kluger has in mind.

Wielkanoc does not end by denouncing the twentieth century's failure to achieve its lofty goals. It reminds us instead that high hopes and shattered dreams are not the property of our age alone. The play abounds in references to visions that had failed. It draws on a progressive construction of the Polish Reformation and the Polish Enlightenment, repeatedly invoking a major project of the Polish Reformation, the Raków Academy (1602–38) known as the Polish Athens, and the Kołłątaj Smithy (1788–92), a group of

42 Ibid., p. 38.

43 Ibid., pp. 35–36.

44 Ibid., p. 32.

45 Ibid., p. 71.

46 This left-wing framework does not seek to endorse the Soviet system. In the story of Regina Feigenblatt's husband, who died on the way to a Soviet labour camp, Zahorska makes the Nazi terror indistinguishable from the Stalinist. This most likely precluded the possibility of the play being staged in Soviet-controlled Poland. Otwinowski's *Wielkanoc*, for all its talk about progress and the international proletariat, does not mention the Soviet Union. *Wielkanoc* is forcefully polonocentric in that it represents the progressive agenda of the Polish Reformation and Enlightenment as a model for the future.

47 Zahorska, *Smocza 13*, p. 71.

reformist politicians in Warsaw.⁴⁸ These projects ended in defeat. *Wielkanoc* suggests that our age can do better. Samuel was killed, but Twardowski has recovered his unfinished study of the Polish Reformation and the Kołłątaj Smithy. As the play draws to a close, Twardowski hands the manuscript over to Stanisław, charging him with the task of completing Samuel's work.⁴⁹ The Shoah is history run amok, but survivors can undertake a restorative project of progressive, rationalist thought.

In contrast to *Smocza 13*, *Wielkanoc* is among the most optimistic of Shoah dramas. *Smocza 13* leaves us with Gliksman's disturbing question emphasizing uncertainty about the future; in *Wielkanoc*, the leading characters see themselves labouring at the edges of the future. Quite apart from the reiterated information about ghetto fighters joining Polish partisans in the woods, Otwinowski places the stories of Samuel and Stanisław within a master narrative: the story of inexorable progress towards a better future. In such a narrative, the answer is already known. *Wielkanoc*, then, is a play that looks forward, to a time when the amalgamated agendas of the Raków Academy and the Kołłątaj Smithy will be completed.

Given that *Wielkanoc* takes place entirely outside the ghetto,⁵⁰ one could say that the play has no need for the inside because the uprising is represented as a military manoeuvre aimed at escape from confinement. In its circumvention of the inside, *Wielkanoc* spares the audience awkward or unsettling confrontations. It elides the incompatible in 'the frame of [...] *what can be seen*', as Teresa de Lauretis has argued in a related context.⁵¹ Providing an outside image of the Jewish community, one that leaves the audience's dominant subjectivity intact, the play demands acceptance of what it only claims rhetorically to have presented. One could argue that the neutralizing disparity between what can be seen and what cannot makes us aware how ill-defined notions of acceptance often are. The theatrical technique of circumventing the inside, however, also sets the stage for clothing the ghetto uprising in the attire of Polish cultural mythology.

We see no actual violence; as in Greek tragedy, violence is recounted by the characters on stage. The uprising is also represented by stage effects like gunfire or the glow of the burning ghetto. The scene opens with the sound of 'Warszawianka' (The Song of Warsaw, 1831), the song of the 1830–31 Polish Uprising against Russia. Originally written in French by Casimir Delavigne, with music by Karol Kurpiński, 'Warszawianka' urges Poles to rise and break the shackles of foreign oppression in a decisive move that will bring either victory or death. This scene closes with a story of Samuel's death told by the chorus of the (non-Jewish) townspeople. Samuel fought to the last, and was killed outside the ghetto, at the foot of a monument to Tadeusz Kościuszko, the leader of the anti-Russian insurrection of 1794.

48 I call this particular construction 'progressive' in the sense of its dynamic conception of historical time. I realize, however, that the actual Kołłątaj Smithy was distinguished not so much by its progressive view of historical time (which was, after all, quite common at the time), but by its approach to political change.

49 Stanisław's last name, we will remember, is Łaski. Thus Otwinowski links him, somewhat schematically, with a leading figure of the Polish Reformation, Jan Łaski.

50 The perspective from outside characterizes most Polish literature on the ghetto uprising. Maciejewska argues that this perspective is 'intentionally ambivalent' in that 'it shows, on the one hand, the tragedy of the Jews and, on the other hand, the [Polish community's] inability to help them effectively'. She suggests, moreover, that the perspective from outside is a literary device representing Polish indifference and complicity as well as Polish helplessness. See her Introduction to *Męczeństwo i zagłada Żydów*, pp. 23–24.

51 Teresa de Lauretis, 'Sexual Indifference and Lesbian Representation' in Sue-Ellen Case (ed.), *Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre*, Baltimore, MD, 1990, p. 33; de Lauretis's italics.

This particular construction of the ghetto uprising affects the production of meaning at the basic levels of aural recognition and association. 'Warszawianka' may suggest that the Jewish insurgents are heirs to the Cadet Corps in Warsaw who, on 29 November 1830, took up arms against the Russians. But the spiritual patron of the ghetto insurgents is Kościuszko, whose monument functions as the axiological centre of the play's spatial configuration. Throughout his 'afterlife', Kościuszko has been said to incarnate all that is 'natural', 'timeless', and 'self-evident' in Polish culture. With the figure of Kościuszko and the 'Warszawianka' song, Otwinowski puts the Warsaw ghetto uprising of 1943 into the timeless realm of myth.

One could argue that this myth-making is subverted in the context of the virtually explicit suggestion inherent in the play's title. During the Holy Week of 1794, Kościuszko was in the south of Poland, where he had defeated the Russians in the Battle of Racławice. Meanwhile, a patriotic conspiracy of artisans and shopkeepers was afoot in Warsaw. It was led by the shoemaker Jan Kiliński. On Maundy Thursday, 17 April 1794, Kiliński resolved to drive the Russian garrison out of the city. By Easter Sunday, Warsaw was liberated. In Otwinowski's play, Kiliński is absent. The play thus interrupts the normative narrative of the Kiliński revolt to allow Kościuszko to take Kiliński's place. Omnipresent though unseen, Kościuszko directs the action on stage and off. Someone unfamiliar with Polish history is likely to conclude that the Warsaw revolt of 1794 was in fact led by Kościuszko.

At issue here are not only time (Holy Week) and place (Warsaw), but also class. For Otwinowski, Kiliński's revolt in Warsaw during Holy Week is a godsend — even without Kiliński — because it was fought by the common people. This enables him to construct a syllogism which directs the audience to look beyond mere chronology and to seek a sense of mythologized sociology. The revolt, which was fought in Warsaw during Holy Week, 1794, was plebeian; therefore the ghetto uprisings, which began during the Holy Week of 1943 in Warsaw and in provincial towns, are plebeian as well. Or, as Stanisław declares in his closing speech, 'The Jewish people have embraced the Kościuszko tradition'.⁵² Doubly encoded as a struggle of the common people for a free and democratic Poland, the ghetto uprisings are thus appropriated by the left-wing insurgent vision.

I cannot leave this appropriation without specifying the circumstances of Samuel's death. Pursued by German soldiers, he is cornered in a space between the Kościuszko monument and an old well where, according to legend, a group of drunken Poles had drowned a Hasidic Jew. Samuel, then, finds himself in the border area between Polish antisemitism and Polish democratic patriotism. He refuses to surrender and jumps into the well and drowns. In Stanisław's interpretation, 'The Jews were dying while destroying the centuries-old legend of their subjugation. There is a well in town. The leader of the insurrection turned the well first into a bunker for his defence, then into a monument of his

52 Otwinowski, *Wielkanoc*, p. 91. One could speculate that Otwinowski chose Kościuszko over Kiliński because Kościuszko, through Berek Joselewicz's cavalry division which fought in the insurrection of 1794, has been associated with the notion of a patriotic alliance between Poles and Jews (see Reuben Ainsztein, *Jewish Resistance in Nazi-Occupied Eastern Europe with a Historical Survey of the Jew as Fighter and Soldier in the Diaspora*, New York, 1974, pp. 112–14). *Wielkanoc*, however, says nothing about Joselewicz. It is possible, then, that Kościuszko was made patron of the ghetto uprising simply because of his pre-eminence in Polish cultural mythology. The invisible Kościuszko is also present, though briefly, in *Smocza 13*. We learn that the Professor's last research project had dealt with Kościuszko's rebellion. That is the only reference to Kościuszko in the play. Perhaps it is mere coincidence that this reference is there at all. But there is also the possibility that Zahorska was indicating the temptation to draw a facile parallel with the Polish insurgent tradition in order to distance herself from it.

everlasting glory'.⁵³ Through Samuel's blood, the site of an antisemitic attack has become a marker of Jewish heroism. But this marker is presided over by an earlier monument, the monument to Kościuszko and his democratic project in the service of Poland's liberation. Stanisław's conclusion ('The Jewish people have embraced the Kościuszko tradition') now has a different resonance. In the blind spots that separate the well from the monument, the play thematizes a transgressive, empowered subjectivity of the Jewish insurgents, which had been legitimized by Kościuszko's spiritual sponsorship. Empowered by the example of Kościuszko, the Jews rose against the foreign invaders and thus dismantled the stereotype of the cowardly, submissive Jew. From Stanisław's point of view, 'the Jewish people have embraced the Kościuszko tradition', that is, they have become fully assimilated into Polish culture.

Thus, *Wielkanoc* once again enforces a repressive mode of expression. Ironically, its progressive agenda mingles with repressive ideological currents. The play diminishes the Jewishness of the ghetto uprising and foregrounds its commonness in the double sense of class (the common people) and a shared store of cultural images (the Kościuszko tradition). In other words, *Wielkanoc* avoids the problem of difference and throws the insurrections of 1794, 1830–31 and 1943 into the same pot. This may be an example of what Skloot, drawing on Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi's study, calls 'the problem of the "diminishing analogy"'.⁵⁴ Ezrahi writes that 'Even the most vivid presentation of concrete detail and specificity, the most palpable reconstruction of Holocaust reality, is blunted by the fact that there is no analogue in human experience'.⁵⁵ But this is exactly what Otwinowski fails to acknowledge with his play. He insists on finding an analogue, not for the Shoah, but for the heroism of the ghetto insurgents. *Wielkanoc* therefore makes acceptance of others easy because it represents them in terms that reinforce the Polish model. Hence it is not surprising that the play ends with a tribute to Warsaw, the traditional centre of Polish heroic mythology. In the world of Otwinowski's play, ghetto resistance, subsumed under the paradigm of the 1794 rebellion in Warsaw, confirms the essentialist concept of Warsaw as the heroic city.

The slippages of Otwinowski's play (the slippages between the cross-cultural travelling of Twardowski and the insistent inscription of the ghetto uprising into the Polish insurgent vision) can be seen as a symptom of ideological indecisiveness. In 1945 and 1946, during a period marked by Polish violence against Jews, however, *Wielkanoc*'s message of 'becoming one' was well suited to touch Polish audiences. The play had its first night three months after the pogrom in Kielce in July 1946. Another production soon followed, opening in December in Cracow, which had been the site of an attack on Jews in May 1945.

The play is a rite of hope that resists emotional frustration and intellectual uncertainty, a work that envisions a healing of the broken community of Jews and non-Jewish Poles. The audience can leave the theatre appreciating the small, if temporary, victory of the forces which affirm life over the horror of what seems to be meaningless death. Hope, solidarity, the value of achievement, a belief in order, in rationality, in human goodness, love, loyalty: the entire realm of the 'ideal' remains intact in Otwinowski's play. In Zahorska's play, all this is put in doubt. What is left are a little hope and solidarity.

53 Otwinowski, *Wielkanoc*, p. 91.

54 Skloot, Introduction to *The Theatre of the Holocaust*, p. 19.

55 Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, *By Words Alone: The Holocaust in Literature*, Chicago, IL, 1980, p. 3.

5 The Politicization of Mass Murder: Immediate Czech Reactions to the Shoah, 1945–49

DEREK PATON

Introduction

By the autumn of 1947, the number of book-form works of reportage and *belles-lettres* concerning Czechoslovaks' experience of concentration camps and Gestapo prisons had reached around 100, and they had a wide readership.¹ The most lasting of these, initially not only because of the Communist Party manipulation of the book into cult status, was the record of prison life and torture by Julius Fučík, *Reportáž psané na oprátce* (Reports Written in the Noose, 1945).² This naive work of an apparently charming, self-centred, courageous man utterly devoted to the Communist cause verges, in the end, on sentimentalizing popular literature. The Jews have no role to play here. Ideology has taken over personal suffering: Nazism and its roots are the enemy, not the Germans, and the only way to provide human beings with happiness is Communist-led socialism. In contrast to *Reportáž*, the second most lasting book to come from the period is a documentary written by two Jewish Czechs, Ota Kraus, who after the evacuation of Auschwitz was shipped to Buchenwald, and Erich Schön (who soon assumed the name of his wife's family, Kulka), *Továrna na smrt* (The Death Factory, 1946).³ Schön escaped with his son from the train taking him south from Auschwitz. This coolly written documentary, which supplies the names of the worst brutes in Auschwitz-Birkenau, maps of the Auschwitz complex and so forth, while dealing almost entirely with the Jews, has as its chief theme that just as the Germans murdered Jews, so they murdered others; apart from the badges on one's tunic, once one was in Birkenau, race-laws no longer functioned, although Kraus and Schön do tell us of SS guards punished, by death or being sent to die on the Eastern Front, for falling in love with Jewish or Gypsy women. *Továrna na smrt*, while remaining primarily a devastating account of the implementation of Nazi 'race theory', strives to put across a liberal humanist message. A gang of brutes had set about first turning other human beings into slaves, and then brutalizing them as well. Kraus and Schön are also proud to be Czechoslovak. On only two, very minor, occasions does the reader see a little left-wing political thinking here, but one notices that they use as mottoes for chapters (when they have mottoes) the words of liberals, or right-wing socialists, President Beneš and

1 Václav Běhounek, 'Naše vězenská literatura', *Kytice*, 2, 1947, 9, pp. 385–96. (In 1948 re-issued as an offprint, published at author's expense.) On the wide readership see p. 386. Běhounek's article was the only attempt to produce a literary critical survey of this literature for nearly fifty years.

2 For an account of the work, the cult and how it fitted in with the Czech 'martyr complex', see Robert B. Pynsent, *Questions of Identity. Czech and Slovak ideas of nationality and personality*, Budapest, London and New York, 1994, pp. 207–09.

3 An expanded version of *Továrna na smrt*, was published in 1950, with the additional testimonies of Bruno Baum and Viktor Lederer; the 1957 fifth edition was further expanded, as was the sixth edition of 1959. *Továrna na smrt* was translated into English, German (GDR), Hebrew, Hungarian, Roumanian and Russian. Schön, as Erich Kulka, defected to Israel in 1968, and from 1969 onwards worked in the Institute of Contemporary History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Fučík's *Reportáž* was translated into over seventy languages, many of these languages of the Soviet Union.

Ferdinand Peroutka, a leading Czech journalist. Kraus and Schön say virtually nothing about their own suffering; almost all we learn about them is that they worked as fitters in the Auschwitz complex and so had access to all the various camps and that since they had been initially arrested for political reasons, not on the basis of the race laws, they were protected from the gas chambers. *Továrna na smrt* was not 'positive' enough for the Communists ever to cultivate the authors. The fact that they were Jewish also spoke against them.

Továrna na smrt is not *belles-lettres*, but, in the end, Fučík's *Reportáž* is, even if it remains more or less on the level of an adventure story. One work, however, offered serious competition to Fučík's, a work of sophisticated (deceptively simple) *belles-lettres*, the collection of verse, *Vězeň za dráty* (Prisoner Behind the Wire, 1945), by Rajmund Habřina. Habřina was well over three years in Mauthausen, but his poems say nothing of his own suffering — with one exception, when he thinks of his little daughter at home, whom he has never seen. In his approach to concentration-camp life, Habřina manifests the same liberal humanism of Kraus and Schön. Similarly to them, he makes only one statement that could be interpreted as vaguely left-wing, when he or his *persona* looks forward to the day when everyone will have his or her own place in the sun and equal rations of bread. Habřina's book was far too compassionate to be to the liking of the Communists. It remains forgotten, however admired it was in the three years before the Communist take-over.

The treatment or non-treatment of the Jews in Czech literature (in the broadest sense of the term 'literature') in the period 1945–49 must be seen in two contexts: the political, ethnic and social circumstances of the Bohemian Lands in the period, and the history of the Czech literary Gentile's attitude to Czech Jews in the period from the turn of the century to the Munich Agreement or the German occupation of March, 1939. First, the Czechs had been wounded by the West's betrayal in 1938, which they saw as morally corrupt. Initially they blamed the French more than the British, but during and after the war they rightly blamed the British more than the French. Much to Churchill's disapproval, Beneš signed a pact with the Soviet Union during the war, a pact that was to form something of a model for other East European states after the war. This pact was, however it was intended, also an expression of Czechoslovak collusion in Stalin's new Panslavism. Furthermore, Stalin's Panslavism fell on fertile ground among the Czechs, where the Slavonic Institute had a significant political significance in the 1930s. Beneš was neither a Communist nor a fellow traveller, just a man starting a new game of power politics. He had, however, been fervently anti-German, one might say in a racist manner, at least ever since the beginning of the First World War. During and after the Second World War he did all he could to gain support from the public for his wartime decision to expel all Germans from Czechoslovak soil. He attributed the blame for the razing of the village of Lidice, one of the most 'traumatic' experiences of the war for the Czechs, to the whole German nation, not to the Nazis. He led his nation, naturally with the ardent help of the Communists, to looking east for their future. The formerly Czechoslovak Germans ('formerly', since they had had their nationality removed from them by presidential decree), had to be expelled, for they were considered nearly all pro-Nazi, and certainly they were an obstacle to the creation of a new Slav state that was needed to engineer the social and economic revolution Beneš and the Communists desired.

Who was or was not a German was decided primarily on the basis of declared 'nationality' in the 1930 census. This meant that Jews who had registered German nationality were deported again, having returned from the camps or having spent the war in hiding. In mid-1946, the decree was eventually amended, so that 'German' Jews were not included in the expulsion. This inhuman bureaucratic assessment of who was or was

not a German had its mob equivalent in the beating up and sometimes killing of German or Yiddish-speaking Jews on the streets of Prague. The expulsion of the Germans was generally well, and often brutally, organized. The resettlement of the German areas was not; it was almost entirely under Communist control, and was exploited by all manner of Communist and non-Communist profiteers and hooligans. The chaos engendered by this major piece of land-reform had to be apologized for (for example, by the Social Democrat philosopher Jiřina Popelová), since it threatened the popularity of the Communist Party. Other factors increased the general chaos, most of which were common to other parts of Central Europe: displaced persons; mass raping and plundering by the Red Army (though the Soviets started moving out of Czechoslovakia early, in November, 1945, the scars of the raping and plundering remained for decades); former prisoners returning from camps (in the case of the Jews, not to families, but often to a vacuum, their homes and belongings disappeared, or in the case of richer Jews, their property nationalized or on the verge of being nationalized); people's courts; retribution (one novelist trampled to death by a mob in Pilsen because suspected of having been an active collaborator, and so forth); newspapers asking Czechs to stop beating up Germans on the street because it did not look good to foreigners; broad popular support for the Communists until after the winter of 1946–47, and then an ever-growing fear of them in all sections of society; compared, however, to other countries in the region there was very little war damage to industry. But it was seen as a period where out of the chaos a dancing star would soon emerge. As elsewhere in Europe, the intelligentsia considered the end of the war not just the end of the Occupation and the end of Nazism, but the beginning of something entirely new. For the Czechs (and Slovaks) it was people's democracy, sometimes referred, and not only in Moscow, as 'new' democracy. More than a transition the early post-war years were seen as a time of immediate change. That applied also to literature; thus, for example, František Götz entitled a collection of literary critical essays, *Na předělu. Krise světa v zrcadle literatury a dnešní vývojové perspektivy* (On the Dividing Line. The World Crisis as Reflected in Literature and Today's Perspective on Developments, 1946), or Jiří Hájek entitles his collection of political essays, *Generace na rozhraní* (Generation on the Border-line, 1946).

The political and material chaos of the times affect the way in which Czech writers, Jewish and Gentile, treat the genocide of the Jews. And one remembers that the genocide of the Jews and Gypsies was thought to be just the beginning, that the intention had been thereafter to obliterate the small Slav nations.⁴ In other words, the mass murder of the Jews had been just the beginning of the plan to ensure that the master race could achieve its thousand-year empire of bliss. Secondly, and this may seem shocking today on the grounds that the gap between planned mass murder and unplanned death in war is morally insurmountable, given that the Czechs' new orientation towards the USSR, the number of deaths resulting from racial persecution seemed small compared with the number of Soviet citizens who died in war, as soldiers or civilian victims of the Germans. Nevertheless, the German persecution and murder of the Jews cured, brutal as that might seem, many Czechs of their antisemitism. Much Czech antisemitism had been intimately connected with the fact that the Czechs perceived the Jews as Germans or henchmen of the Germans. At the beginning of the twentieth century popular antisemitism (the blood libel, the fear of the alien or different) had been 'rationalized' by nationalists. Jews were nasty modernizers,

4 See, for example, Ota Kraus and Erich Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, Prague, 1946, p. 31. Elsewhere they inform us, on the basis of what they had gathered from a Slovak Jew interned in Auschwitz, Sylvia Friedmanová, who had worked as a slave assistant in the sterilization experiments conducted by Mengele and his team, that the Germans had intended sterilizing any number of European nations, pp. 96–98.

factory-owners spoiling the Slav countryside and thus turning picturesque peasants into ugly proletarians. Of course, the other aspect of racist stereotyping remained frequent in Czech culture, for example, the Jews as sexually perverted or salacious or not knowing romantic love: the Jews as entirely money-minded and so forth, and these stereotypes are clearly exploited even by major writers⁵ during the interwar years. During the First World War, in exile publications and after the war in the new republic the Jews were imagined to be spies for the Habsburgs, profiteers, and generally to have had cushy behind-the-lines jobs. After the war there was a pogrom in Holešov, for which no one was taken to court.⁶ At the same time, in the First Republic, Jews had senior positions in public life, as politicians, newspaper editors, industrialists, and in the cultural élite. While antisemitism remained endemic, even in the first years of the Second World War, Gentiles gave their names to Jewish writers so that they could publish their works and the hundredth anniversary of a major Jewish Czech writer, Julius Zeyer, in 1940 was turned into something like a national celebration amongst the intelligentsia. I am not suggesting that antisemitism disappeared after the war. The crassest example of antisemitism was the show-trial involving senior Communists in November 1952. The 1960s saw the first works of 'high' literature dealing with the Shoah for what it actually was. Not until after the fall of Communism, however, has anything like the German 'philosemitism' that Robert Wistrich writes about in this volume come into being.⁷ Jan Masaryk, who had always been an advocate of Jewry and who did consider the Jews as a special group that needed care in the post-war period, said in a wartime broadcast on the BBC's Czechoslovak service, 'It is true that every nation can be judged by how it behaves towards the Jews, and we have behaved decently.' He continued, however, presumably ignorant of the full extent of what was going on:

It is also true that some Jews did not behave properly. They used to go to Prague's cafes and chatter away in German, even after 1933. But they have learned their lesson; after the war it will be hard to find a Czechoslovak Jew who would repeat that mistake. But, of course, I also knew many, very many, decent, proper, loyal, modest Jews, legionaries and members of Sokol, and they belonged among us, as our people. Many of them are in our army in England and in Russia.⁸

Even given his fragmentary knowledge of what was actually taking place in German-occupied Europe in 1943, Masaryk's 'they have learned their lesson' sounds repugantly flippant. By 1933, he does not mean only Hitler's coming to power, but also the immediate flood of refugees, Jews and non-Jewish political opponents that came to Czechoslovakia in the mid-1930s, which was then swelled after the *Anschluss* by Jews and Viennese Czechs who had not 'returned' in the first two years after the establishment of Czechoslovakia.

5 See, for example, Robert B. Pynsent, 'Český ženský antisemitismus v první polovici dvacátého století' in Dobrava Moldanová (ed.), *Žena-jazyk-literatura*, Ústí nad Labem, 1996, pp. 102–07.

6 For a serious account of this pogrom and its aftermath, though unfortunately journalistic, see Inna Mirovská, *Den pěti světél. Svědectví o posledním protižidovském pogromu na Moravě*, Prague, 1998.

7 For antisemitism in the 'period of transition', see Helena Krejčová, 'Český a slovenský antisemitismus 1945–1948' in Karel Jech (ed.), *Stránkami soudobých dějin. Sborník statí k pětadesátinám historika Karla Kaplana*, Prague, 1993, pp. 158–72. See also Kurt Wehle, 'The Jews in Bohemia and Moravia: 1945–1948' in Avigdor Dagan et al. (eds), *The Jews of Czechoslovakia*, 3 vols, New York, 1968–81, III, pp. 449–95, and Petr Brod, 'Židé v poválečném Československu' in Václav Veber (ed.), *Židé v novodobých dějinách*, Prague, 1997, pp. 147–62.

8 Jan Masaryk, 'Rudá armáda ve Smolensku — Židovský nový rok 5704 — Slovo k antisemitům', 29 September 1943, in his *Volá Londýn*, 5th edn, Prague, 1948, p. 263.

After the implementation of the Munich Agreement, the numbers swelled further, but so did emigration. Franz Kafka's friend, the Gentile Milena Jesenská, was the most vociferous propagator of these refugees' rights. She died in Ravensbrück.⁹

Dawidowicz has suggested that 'In modern times, Jews came to believe [...] in the moral force of their history, in the compelling power which the history of Jewish sufferings and martyrdoms could exercise on non-Jews and thereby purge them of their Jew-hatred.'¹⁰ In very general terms the Czechs seem to have been purged, at least for the transition period, but their 'martyrdom' had to compete with the 'martyrdom' of the Slavs including the Czechs, and of the Communists, including students. On no account can one say that they had to compete in all the books written by Czechs. Jiří Roubal's work on the trial of the commandant of the Small Fortress in Theresienstadt is a case in point. For all the Czech patriotism, indeed nationalism, of the book, in his selection of atrocities Roubal puts his chief emphasis on the suffering of the Jews. Still, Czechoslovakia was a highly politicized society, and suffering was eminently politicizable for use in propaganda. Suffering, however various the degrees, was the Czechs' common experience. Bluntly, the suffering of the Jews was in the immediate post-war days not useful for party politics, except insofar as a Jew exploited that suffering to some party end. At this stage, Communists actually made virtually no use of their Jewish comrades' suffering except insofar they could demonstrate that a given Jew had gone to his or her death thinking of the Communist cause. For example, in an anthology of letters sent on or just before execution or slow death in a concentration camp, edited by a poet who would soon be condemned as a bourgeois decadent with a pernicious influence on youth, František Halas, Kurt Beer remarks in his letter: 'I never feel lonely. I have never been so conscious of my membership of and commitment to our great family.'¹¹ It goes without saying that the family is the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia.

One aspect of the politicization of suffering that was common to all political parties, was its anti-German nature. And here even the hardest-line Communist internationalist could speak of the German as the age-old enemy of the Czechs or the Slavs. The nationalist literary historian and leader of the Prague May Uprising, Albert Pražák, went so far as to write of the expulsion of the Germans as the fulfilment of the political programme given to the Czechs by an early fourteenth-century teutonophobic loather of Western institutions like the hereditary peerage, chivalry and tournaments.¹² Kraus and Schön quote from an early tenth-century Old Bulgarian author. One section of this quotation runs as follows: 'And these saints were taken by the mercenaries, barbarian people, for they were Germans, who are by nature savage, and now, on orders, they became even crueller, leading them [the saints] out of the city and, having stripped them, dragged them along naked.'¹³ Roubal goes further back: 'The German nation has inherited all those characteristics of the

9 On Czechoslovakia as a refuge, see Jiří Veselý et al. (eds), *Azyl v Československu 1933–1938*, Prague, 1983. Given the date of publication one should be slightly wary of using this volume because of omissions. None the less, it is a useful compendium, particularly for its bibliographical information.

10 Lucy S. Dawidowicz, *The Holocaust and the Historians*, London and Cambridge, MA, 1981, p. 126.

11 František Halas (ed., author of foreword), *Poslední dopisy*, Prague, 1946, p. 41.

12 See Robert B. Pynsent, 'Die Dalimil-Chronik als polymythischer Text (Dalimil-Fichte-Havel)' in E. Behring, L. Richter and W. F. Schwarz (eds), *Geschichtliche Mythen in den Literaturen und Kulturen Ostmittel- und Südosteuropas*, Stuttgart, 1999, pp. 199–232 (210).

13 Kraus and Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, p. 9.

barbarian that Julius Caesar knew.'¹⁴ Similarly, Vokolek portrays the Germans as sacrificing to Woden in his long, grotesque, almost Baroque poem on the war.¹⁵ It was by 1946 a cliché of concentration camp literature to mention Dante's *Inferno*, usually stating that even Dante's imagination was not vivid enough to envisage a death-camp or that the inscription over the entrance to Dante's Hell was the real meaning of 'Arbeit, macht frei'. So too it was a cliché of anti-German passion to write of the Nazis' inspiration from Nietzsche, and of the SS as supermen. It depended on the education of the author whether or not it was admitted that the Nazis perverted Nietzsche grossly. This cliché is important from the point of view of cultural history since Nietzsche remained a *bête noire* of the Czechoslovak Communists throughout their rule.¹⁶ The journalist Roubal writes that 'Only people without true awareness of their humanity and fanaticized by Nitsche's [*sic*] philosophy of the superman supported by the Germanic political faith, that is Nazism, could imagine setting up the horrifying death-camps.'¹⁷ Habřina, who had published his first essay on Nietzsche's thought in 1935, after the war wrote a work on the Nazis' perversion of Nietzsche, *Nadčlověk a nadnárod* (Superman and Supernation, 1946), in which, for example, he maintains that the Nazi hero 'is a hero of *Blut und Boden*: the body is everything, the spirit only instinct. He is hard and ruthless and the Nietzschean command, "Become hard", has been so inculcated into him, that it has entered his bloodstream.'¹⁸ In his Mauthausen poems (which Habřina wrote in his head, and recited in the evenings to fellow Czech, and towards the end Slovak, prisoners; he wrote them down on paper only after the liberation of the camp), he writes a piece addressed to Sebastian Kneipp. Kneipp was the deviser of vigorous water therapy to cure obese bourgeois. Habřina calls the poem 'Vodoléčba' (Hydropathy); it concerns the German practice of drowning prisoners in sealed 'shower-rooms' because it was cheaper than using gas;¹⁹ he calls the man who invented concentration camp hydropathy 'your [Kneipp's] chosen superman'.²⁰ In a poem addressed to Christ, Habřina writes that the 'superman with a skull', that is the SS, would drive Him against the electrified fence, drown Him in a barrel (which normally means a barrel of excrement, not water) and drive Him into the gas chamber.²¹ In the fourth cycle of his 'Buchenwald canti', Alois Čáp embodies German designs and deeds in the voice of 'V'; that is 'Will', and the self-evident connotation is the would-be Nietzschean *Wille zur Macht*. Thus, Will speaks of destroying everything and building new temples on the ruins, of having already removed the foundations of nations, and killed the old gods; immortality is now ripe, built on blood and lies.²² The lying is important, for the image of the deceitful German goes back to the beginnings of the vernacular tradition in Czech literature. German deceit makes for a refrain in Kraus and Schön, and in Roubal. The sheer arrogance of the Germans makes for a similar refrain. Because Čáp employs a liturgical lexis and imagery, and writes of pride as a source of all other sins,²³ the Germans implicitly became the embodiment of Lucifer, and thus in the end

14 Jiří Roubal, *Terezín zůstane věčným svědectvím. Pind'a – Jöckel se odpovídá spravedlnosti*, Prague, 1947, p. 7.

15 Vladimír Vokolek, *Národ na dlažbě*, Prague, 1945, p. 20.

16 I think one may say that, for similar reasons, Nietzsche was not fully 're-habilitated' in Western Europe until the 1960s.

17 Roubal, *Terezín zůstane...*, p. 9.

18 Rajmund Habřina, *Nadčlověk a nadnárod. Kapitoly jan časové?*, Brno, 1946, p. 37.

19 He mentions this in *ibid.*

20 Rajmund Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty K. L. Mauthausen*, 3rd edn, Brno, 1947, p. 42.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 64.

22 See Alois Čáp, *Sestoupilo mezi nás neuvěřitelné slovo*, Přerov, 1946, pp. 19, 29 and 37.

23 *Ibid.*, p. 21.

of Antichrist (this again in Čáp, but also in Vokolek). That is a grand version of a natural epithets 'diabolical', 'infernal', 'satan-like' lent to the acts of camp commandants and their henchmen. In the camps, only the dead are not victims of the arrogance of the 'stupid Teuts'.²⁴ All this has to be set against the fact that, since the Enlightenment, the Germans had been regarded as the supreme *Kulturträger* of Central Europe. Hence, for example, Šelepa's lines, 'May your poets, Germany,/fall silent with shame on their cheeks.'²⁵

One may also associate this with the inexpressibility of the horror of the camps. And this oft-repeated notion of inexpressibility may in turn be associated with the brutalization of normal human responses. Adorno's melodramatic words were prefigured more convincingly by the emotions of the camp survivors. Kraus and Schön's statement is representative: 'no writer, of prose or poetry, will ever be found who could express the thoughts and feelings of the prisoners who knew they had to die in Birkenau, Birkenau where all life lay in the shadow of the chimneys'.²⁶ They are aware of their own inadequacy also, and suggest that it might be attributed to inurement: 'We are incapable of expressing the feelings of fear, terror, despair, mental torment of individuals whose death sentence had been aggravated by living in Birkenau. Perhaps that is because we lived in that environment for too long.'²⁷ They do explain, however, that 'in an extermination camp like Birkenau, human emotion became entirely extinct' and that all 'who live there for some while became callous and insensitive — and one could expect an unusual deed only from a child'.²⁸ Habřina does endeavour to express the well-nigh cataleptic insensitivity of concentration camp prisoners, though, in the afterword to the third edition it looks as if he feels he needs to defend that because critics have noted his lack of subjectivity. This lack, he writes, 'is the result of a long process of depersonalization, and the eventual state of depersonalizedness'.²⁹ In his 'Všední balada o musulmanovi' (An Everyday Ballad of a *musulman*)³⁰ Habřina describes a man who had hitherto survived by dreaming of home; he was in charge in that dream, where in life he was someone else's machine. In the end, however hungry, he cannot even eat his beet soup, and drops his spoon. Habřina describes the man's loss of his dream thus:

Když hvězdy v rakve sesuly se,
ranami st'aty ve stíny,
má hvězda štítem chránila mne,
můj domov, sen můj jediný.

Když na stavbách zlých faraonů
mne kápo kyjem štal a bil,
zaťal jsem rty jen, k snu se modle,
by sílu vléval do mých žil.

Až sražen hladem, cítím náhle,
že hlava nějak lehká je,
že z hrudi zvolna odkapává
po kapce kapka naděje.³¹

24 Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty*, p. 48.

25 Karel Šelepa, *Lidice Osvětim Dachov. Tři balady*, Prague, 1945, p. 16.

26 Kraus and Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, p. 217.

27 Ibid., p. 79.

28 Ibid., p. 128.

29 Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty*, p. 100.

30 In concentration-camp slang a *musulman* was a prisoner whom hunger, despair, depression had driven into a state of utter apathy, and thus inability to work.

31 Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty*, p. 16.

(When the stars have collapsed into coffins,/cut off by flows into the shadows,/my star protected me like a shield,/my home, my only dream.//When on the evil pharaohs' building sites/the *kapo* drove me, beat me with his cudgel,/I just gritted my teeth, praying to my dream/to pour strength into my veins.//Until, knocked down by hunger, I suddenly feel/that my head is somehow light,/that drip by drip from my chest/is slowly dripping hope.)

Elsewhere Habřina writes of prisoners' eyes turning into 'fractured glazed light', and themselves becoming 'fish people' waiting for a death devoid of the compassion of those around.³² What Habřina attempts, and usually succeeds in achieving, is a psychology-based dignified portrayal of emptiness, dehumanization. So the doctor, Míla Janů, writing her last letter from Ravensbrück, writes of almost becoming what the Germans wanted her to become, 'a robot, without feeling, without conscience'. Her cool description of her approaching death is evocative of the atmosphere Habřina portrays in his poems:

What is death for me? Perhaps I shall fall asleep; someone will come and register one corpse; the usual undressing will follow, the carrying away; perhaps someone will come to have a look; then I shall wait in the mortuary, wait for the last time...Then they will take me through the gate to the crematorium and burn me up. Perhaps it will be roll-call and the flames will shoot up high. That will catch people's attention and there will be something new to talk about.³³

The wound Germany had inflicted on individuals had actually been inflicted on the whole of European civilization, maintains Habřina in his afterword, and those individuals sometimes forgot they were more than individuals:

those who suffered as individuals sometimes came close to the danger of forgetting that in the crowds of thousands a Human Being was suffering. And that what was suffering in that human being was above all everything great and beautiful, everything *human* that generations, ages had created from Antiquity to the twentieth century. It was anyway the greatest crime of Nazism that cynically, pervertedly, laughingly and angrily it desecrated, trampled under foot this very European humanity.³⁴

The art historian and literary critic, František Kovárna, also considers that the chief target of the German's assault was European civilization. He goes further, however, somewhat hysterically, and declares that by their actions they had definitively proved that they were not Europeans, and now they deserve to be expelled from Europe.³⁵ Vladimír Sís in his Introduction to Roubal's book on Theresienstadt is not hysterical, considers that the Germans must experience contrition before they can be re-admitted to humanity: 'Before the German nation itself recognizes its profound moral degeneration, before it becomes horrified by the crimes committed in its name by these monstrous Jöckels, there is no hope for its renewal and its return to democracy and humanity.'³⁶

Not even a Communist would have denied in the years 1945–48 that German inhumanity had been experienced by the Jews more than by the Soviets, whatever figures might appear to say. Still the Communists had their own in effect equally inhuman interpretation of it, that German extreme antisemitism was simply an excrescence of decaying, degenerate capitalist society. Like the nationalists, Panslav or not, the Communists, at least in the period, avoided the issue of Gentile complicity (that would be thinking on the basis of a false superstructure; one may only think in terms of the class struggle). What Gross writes

32 'Světla na čelech', *ibid.*, p. 82.

33 Halas (ed.), *Poslední dopisy*, p. 74.

34 Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty*, pp. 101–02.

35 František Kovárna, *Listy mrtvému příteli*, Prague, 1946, p. 50.

36 Roubal, *Terezín zůstane...*, p. 8.

about Poland might be applied to the Bohemian Lands, although the Jewish population was broadly distributed amongst the rest of the populace in the Bohemian Lands, where significant ghetto-like concentrations were still normal in large parts of Poland:

The Holocaust [...] was not confined to the pitch dark interiors of gas chambers and covered vans. It took place in full daylight, and was witnessed by millions of Poles who — and this will be a very minimalist interpretation — by and large did little to interfere with it. [...] What happens to people who passively witness the brutal murder of their fellow citizens?³⁷

I cannot answer that question; on the other hand, there is little doubt that German persecution as a whole produced many more Communists than it destroyed. A particularly repellent irony arose from that: the perception of Wall Street as a far greater enemy than Hitler, whereby, especially in early post-war propaganda, the capitalist West also potentially posed a Fascist threat. Neither Nazis nor Communists were particularly fond of intellectuals, but from the mid-1940s to the late 1950s, Communists and intellectuals generally colluded. (I do not forget the intellectuals who ended up in exile or Communist prisons, but that is covered by other chapters in this volume.) There is little doubt that the Germans had picked on Czech intellectuals during the war, and particularly after the assassination of Heydrich. The clearest example of this was the execution of the best Czech fiction writer of the interwar period (who had been ejected from the Communist Party in 1929), Vladislav Vančura. Almost as important was the execution, in the same series of reprisals, of the political writer, feminist pillar of the Masarykian establishment, F. F. Plamínková, who had an immense reputation in the international women's movement. The Social Democrat chairman of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Nuremberg Trials, General Bohuslav Ečer, cites Hans Frank, the governor of Poland, who had claimed that Konstantin von Neurath had the following plans for the Protectorate; 'the intellectuals were to be "taken care of"; for the time being the remainder of the population was to be germanized rather than deported or liquidated, since there were not enough Germans to colonize Bohemia-Moravia'.³⁸ The physical experience of the Germans' intention to suppress intellectual life began before the reprisals for the assassination chiefly in the repercussions of the patriotic demonstration in Prague on 28 October 1939, when the Germans fired into the crowd, and two demonstrators were killed, a labourer and the medical student Jan Opletal; the memorial gathering for Opletal on 15 November turned into another mass anti-German demonstration. On the night of 16 and early morning of 17 November, the Germans raided student halls of residence in Prague and Brno, as a result of which nine student-union officers were executed without trial in the Ruzyně barracks outside Prague, and about 1,060 other students sent to concentration camps. One of these students, actually a graduate activist, Jiří Hájek, who had been in Sachsenhausen, was a Communist who exploited his own experience after the war and declared that young people had been the chief targets of Hitler's persecution. The following statement amounts to what would now be called 'Holocaust denial': '[once the German occupation had begun in March 1939] it became every clearer where German Fascism — which Czech "patriotic" reactionaries so frequently invoked — was primarily aiming its attack: it would be our country, essentially Czech youth who, in the event that the German Fascist plan

37 Jan Gross, 'War as Revolution' in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii (eds), *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, Boulder, CO, 1997, p. 30.

38 Bohuslav Ečer, *Norimberský soud*, Prague, 1946, p. 342.

should succeed, would become its first victim'.³⁹ A few pages later he continues, in his usual cumbersome style:

It was the young people who bore the heaviest burden in the German occupation [...] they directed the first great assault of their ferocious hatred against Czech students, and then, again and again, they struck innumerable groups of young people in the underground Resistance [...]. This generation has had its horizon broadened [*sic*] by the terrible experience of Gestapo torture chambers, concentration camps, prisons and places of execution.⁴⁰

This broadening of their horizons means, when uttered by a Marxist-Leninist, realizing the truth of dialectical materialism, the course and the eventual outcome of the class struggle. In the whole book, Hájek does not mention once the genocide of the Jews. In his Foreword to *Poslední dopisy*, Halas also confines himself to Nazism's meaning for the happy future. He condemns all those who have not been either Communists or in the resistance movement, or both, the 'empty, putrescent hearts of those complacent accepters of the given circumstances', who had decided 'prudently to sit it out, concealing their cowardice behind loud-mouthedness or whispered views'.⁴¹ The words of the dead authors of the letters will help preserve the memory of Nazism, be a warning to the future, however much more conciliatory that future might be in comparison with now. Most important, however, these dead men and women 'had caught sight of [...] the springboard for an historic leap, had witnessed moments when it would be possible to change things for centuries to come':⁴² in other words, in their encounter with the full brutality of Nazism, their faith in Communism had been strengthened. Indeed, it is clear from a great many of these letters that faith in Stalin, Gottwald and the cause fortified them, gave them the sort of strength Christian belief gave others. They were, they imagined, not dying as a witness to God whom they would meet in Heaven, but dying for a better, socialist world after the defeat of the Fascist class enemy. These were Communists with a 'natural' sense of self-sacrifice, 'far from playing any games of martyrdom'. Before their executions, 'the cause of the class, the nation, and humankind [...] replaced the will to live with the will to sacrifice themselves'.⁴³ The medical student, František Jirásek, for example, declares, 'My faith in the USSR and the infallibility of Leninism keeps me in a good mood here.'⁴⁴ Frequently, these brave men and women link their belief in glorious socialist morrows with patriotic sentiments. The miner, Josef Matušek, for example, writes: 'It seems that I must pay a tax for my love of the working classes and my nation — my head [...]. Dear Czech nation, Daddy Joseph [that is: Joe Stalin]! In the end we shall be victorious.'⁴⁵ That there is no mention of the Jews in this anthology is less disconcerting than in the case of the Hájek book. *Poslední dopisy* does not pretend to be anything else but propaganda to legitimate Communist rule on the (spurious) grounds that only Communists had genuinely sacrificed themselves for the nation.

The second group of contenders for the title of greatest victim of the Germans are the Slavs. And here we enter the murky borderlands between self-pity and self-heroization. Again I start with Ečer. He has so to speak appropriated the Shoah in the following, by not mentioning the Jews of Poland, the Baltic states, White Russia, the Ukraine:

39 Jiří Hájek, *Generace na rozhraní*, Prague, 1946, p. 107.

40 Ibid., pp. 113–14.

41 Halas (ed.), *Poslední dopisy*, p. 5.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., pp. 5–6.

44 Ibid., p. 17.

45 Ibid., p. 21.

In its judgement the court adds that the worst crimes were committed against the civilian populations of the Soviet Union and Poland. It then describes these crimes in greater detail, and the commands and speeches of Nazi leaders that preceded the crimes and stimulated them. For us as citizens of a Slav state these parts of the judgement are particularly instructive. The Nuremberg court went to the root of the crimes committed against the Slav nations and its judgement reveals, confirms the historical fact that the chief target of the German attack was the Slavs.⁴⁶

Slav feeling need not necessarily be linked with victimhood. In Habřina we encounter Panslav sentiments which seem to form part of his mental survival kit in Mauthausen. In the first example, he expresses love for the Soviets as the coming liberators of his country and associates that with a Hussite warrior hymn: 'you, my native brothers, brothers from the Vltava,/where a new battle-mace is being forged in the workshops of anger,/where the waiting land is prepared/for the call of the chorale "Ye Warriors of God",/you from the Dnieper, the Volga, from spreading Rus',/where gigantic wings smother the nightmare enemy'.⁴⁷ The second occurrence suggests Slav unity (there is no Stalinist undertone, though): 'from the Volga to the plains/where the Vltava is on guard,/from the Vistula to the towers of Ljubljana, there lies our home.// We are coming, we are coming, oh, home,/to avenge our great dead.'⁴⁸ Kraus and Schön and Roubal write of the Germans' especially cruel treatment of Russians in concentration camps. The Slavs come off pretty well in Kraus and Schön's assessment of capacity to endure concentration-camp life (and the Russians are the most successful escapers, too). Nevertheless, in the following we see that actually, the less pampered a society a group comes from the greater their endurance will be (we remember that the Hungarian Jews in the Auschwitz complex were from provincial Hungary, not rich Budapest). I do not, however, think for one moment that the authors are maintaining that the West is decadent:

The Dutch had the least staying power; a few days after arrival they contracted stomach and intestine diseases from which they never recovered.

Other west European prisoners, the French and Belgians, found it difficult to endure camp.

Greeks and Italians did not last long either.

Russians, Poles and Hungarians held out the best.

Czechs and Slovaks came somewhere in the middle.⁴⁹

I do not wish to desecrate the memory of the Czechs and Slovaks who perished in the Auschwitz complex; the reader cannot but notice, however, that the Czechoslovaks were in the middle, not quite Western, not quite Eastern, the bridge that President Beneš so desired them to be. On the Czechs in Birkenau, Kraus and Schön manifest their national pride when they state that (there is no Slav Reciprocity here): 'The Czechs were neither insensitive nor ruthless enough to obtain any position of prison authority. The Poles called them *Pepíks*. But the Czechs gained respect through their specialist expertise [...] We never saw a Czech hitting or bullying a prisoner.'⁵⁰ One cannot but be reminded of Jiří Beneš's depiction of Czech prisoners in the Mittelbau concentration camp, and then just after they enter the part of Germany liberated by the Russians. In his account the worst looters were Polish and Hungarian Jewish women; the Hungarians claimed to be Czechoslovaks, but were either non-Slovak, especially Hungarians from eastern Slovakia, or from Hungary. Those who turn out to be from Hungary are set to work by the Soviets

46 Ečer, *Norimberský soud*, pp. 341–42.

47 Habřina, *Vězeň za dráty*, p. 45.

48 Ibid., p. 90.

49 Kraus and Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, pp. 184–85.

50 Ibid., p. 208.

digging beet. Beneš does not comment on that. Furthermore, 'all acknowledged, Germans, Poles, French, Yugoslavs and above all, primarily Russians, that the Czechs behaved most decently'.⁵¹ It is telling that one reviewer of Beneš's memoir, Arnošt Bláha, particularly picked on the behaviour of these Polish and Hungarian Jews; he also noted with satisfaction that the Italians and French were 'the least resistant physically and morally'.⁵²

Of course, I accept that the dominant mode of thinking after six years' German occupation will mean that 'we Czechs' and 'our sufferings' will be at the centre of Czech literary attention in the immediate aftermath of the liberation. And of course, I accept that many writers included Jewish Czechs among the Czechs as fellow victims, fellow citizens in an unbiased, liberal manner. But still, in general, the special nature of the Jewish lot is grossly underplayed. Sometimes, even when it is the last thing the writer intends, prejudice emerges. For example, in Šelepa's long Dachau poem, we read: 'the Germanic devil tries/to bow your heads into the dust//the way that wretched Jew had to fall to the ground and kiss it/rise and fall again.'⁵³ It leaves a nasty taste in one's mouth when Ečer writes, concerning the numbers of people murdered in the Auschwitz complex when Höss was commandant, that the majority consisted of 'Jews, but, as is well known, there were also members of other nations, many of whom were Czechs'.⁵⁴ That is not the same as Kraus and Schön's special liking for Czech Jews. Ečer was an educated man; Roubal was less educated, but expresses the same thing as Ečer, albeit about the Theresienstadt Small Fortress rather than Auschwitz, in a decent way. He is writing of the commandant Jöckel; 'his unheard of cruelty, sadism and mortal loathing of everything Czech and Slavonic, but chiefly his race hatred of the Jews';⁵⁵ Roubal makes no comment on the fact that Jöckel's two most brutal henchmen, 'for whom the prisoners and particularly the Jews were not human at all',⁵⁶ had one a Slovak, Rojko, the other a Czech name, Soukup. He does not need to point that out to the Czech reader. Habřina is perhaps the strongest in his condemnation of the Germans for the mass murder of the Jews and for the war, since he will not accept that it was the responsibility of the Nazi leadership and their 'law'-enforcement agencies;

The Germans wanted the First World War and, illogically, attributed their defeat to the Jews. They also wanted the Second World War, which was only a continuation of the First. In a rising wave of chauvinism and antisemitism they swept away the Jews and prepared the war [...] And these things were not a matter only of a certain social class or a small stratum of the nation; on the contrary, it was a war of the nazified masses, a war of the whole nation.⁵⁷

Habřina continues: 'And that is why President Beneš is right when he says that the whole German nation is responsible for the concentration camps. And Thomas Mann fearlessly faces his nation and accuses it [, argues that] it is impossible to expect the nations of [...] the world to draw a dividing line between the Nazis and the German people.'⁵⁸ Habřina, of course, favours the expulsion of the Germans from Czechoslovakia. The spirit of vengeance had been a minor motif of his Mauthausen verse anyway, in the image of the circling raven, and as the whisper under the breath of prisoners, the spirit of vengeance here as an upholder of morale. Šelepa also writes in the Lidice poem: 'away

51 Jiří Beneš, *V německém zajetí*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 292.

52 Arnošt Bláha review in *Sociologická revue*, 12, 1946, 2–3, p. 115.

53 Šelepa, *Lidice Osvětim Dachov*, pp. 51–52.

54 Ečer, *Norimberský soud*, p. 340.

55 Roubal, *Terezín zůstane...*, p. 21.

56 Ibid., p. 23.

57 Habřina, *Nadčlověk a nadnárod*, p. 51.

58 Ibid., p. 52.

with all who are not at home here, /who have intruded,/who are now nailing my country/on their arrogant swastika-cross'.⁵⁹

The different emotional currents at play in Czech reactions to the Shoah may be seen in the brief series of obituaries for the sociologist Bruno Zwicker that appeared in the *Sociologická revue*. Zwicker had been interned first in Brno, and then, 22 March 1942, taken to that Theresienstadt ghetto, where he worked as a schoolmaster. On 28 September, 1944, he was deported to Auschwitz where he was immediately sent to the gas chamber; he was murdered on the night of 29–30 September. It is difficult to tell whether the tribute by Miloš Trapl exhibits the author's desire to accept a Jew as a Czech or the view common in Czech writing, especially from the second decade of the twentieth century onwards, that there was no reason why a Jew, if he assimilated, could not be a good Czech. In either case, Trapl's words are politicized:

He came from a Jewish family in Moravia. The family had never grown rich from commerce and it was perhaps for that reason that he fused almost completely with the surrounding Czechs: the family spoke Czech and felt Czech. For our friend assimilation was not a problem, but a matter of course. He did not only want to be a true Czech, but he always identified himself with all the nation's endeavours and suffered when something went wrong for the nation. He was a true Czech.⁶⁰

Antonín Obrdlík's tribute to Zwicker not only sounds a little cold, but, even more than Trapl, he appears to be appropriating the Shoah for the Czech cause: 'And so the poor fellow, after the long Calvary of his suffering, which led from Theresienstadt to Auschwitz, found redemption and peace in the gas chamber. [...] He was a devoted cultivator of scholarly truths and at the moment of his death died as a member of the young Czech intelligentsia on the barricade of the spirit.'⁶¹ That is semantically and emotionally different from, say, E. F. Burian's words in his preface to *Továrna na smrt*, though one can certainly also label Burian's words 'politicized':

You [reader] will be addressed [in this book] by those who laid down their lives for your freedom. For a better future for your children. [...] Do not be horrified by the faces of the dead who speak to you here. They are you; these dead are part of you, pieces of the body of your country [...].

Do not torment yourself, but harden your heart and swear that you will never, never allow such a sacrifice to be repeated.⁶²

Burian himself had been in the camps, in Dachau and Neuengamme, where Kraus had become his friend. Burian's words must be understood as an interpretation, and indeed his interpretation approaches that implicit in the term 'holocaust'. The trouble is that, at least on the surface, it forgets the German element, the fact that the Jews (and Gypsies and homosexuals) were primarily sacrificed to the Nazi ideal of racial purity. One further point, which does not make various Czech 'patriotic' writers' words less disturbing, but which does make me wary of declaring that there was a more or less general Czech or Czechoslovak appropriation of the Shoah, is the importance Kraus and Schön lend to murdered Jews' Czechness. Twice they write in their memoir that Czech Jews on entering the gas chamber sang the Czechoslovak national anthem (both the Czech and Slovak parts), and only then a Hebrew song.⁶³ Similarly, Polish Jews, like Polish Gentiles, called out 'Long Live Poland' before they were executed, and Russian prisoners, like the Czech,

59 Šelepa, *Lidice Osvětim Dachov*, p. 10.

60 'In memoriam našich spolupracovníků', *Sociologická revue*, 12, 1946, 2–3, pp. 19–20.

61 Ibid., pp. 22–23.

62 Kraus and Schön, *Továrna na smrt*, p. 7.

63 Ibid., pp. 146 and 158.

never accepted posts of authority like *kapo* or *Blockältester*. Kraus and Schön are, however, not afraid of touching on taboos, female and, chiefly, male homosexuality in the camps, but more than that, the Jewish persecution of the Jews there. Kraus and Schön had clearly never lost their sense of shock at that, but they do endeavour to write with understanding. I first take one example, where understanding is not evident, but an example which incidentally serves to demonstrate their journalist style, too. We might also note the influence of the West here: 'Polish Jews, particularly those who had come from France, soon adopted Nazi ways. They also proved themselves competent collaborators of their persecutors. It seems incredible that these Jews tormented and beat to death subordinate defenceless Jewish prisoners, but it is true!'⁶⁴ Kraus and Schön do have some explanation:

In the first half of 1943 some Jews actually became *Blockälteste*, with the result that even 'racially pure' German prisoners were subordinate to them. Jews also became *kapos*, whose orders had to be obeyed by the Germans, too. The SS rejected all protests against this.

Entrusting prison posts to Jews was a component of the sophisticated policy of the camp command. It put mainly old prisoners more at ease, and it gave the others the impression that they were out of danger.

A few cases of the 'aryanization' of Jews also occurred in Birkenau. A few Germans of mixed race were honoured with the privilege of wearing a red triangle — the badge of political prisoners. Overnight these formally mixed-race Germans became arrogant, coarse lackeys of the Nazis. Jews bore the brunt of their changed behaviour.⁶⁵

Kraus and Schön sound a little too like Communists in part of their assessment of why prisoners persecuted members of their own *ethnie*, and not only Jews (I wonder whether the Czechs are included):

Prisoners of all nationalities indulged in brutality: Nazism affected everyone.

In the conditions obtaining at the time, it stood to reason that German *kapos* and *Blockälteste* tormented and beat to death members of other nations, especially Jews, in order to prove their Germanness. By their enthusiasm they hoped to win acceptance in the Nazi national community. But why did Poles torment and kill Poles, French Jews French Jews, and Polish Jews Polish Jews?

The chief reason for the psychosis of crazed destruction and mutual hatred were as follows: hunger, a lack of political education and awareness, and the poison of Nazism.⁶⁶

Roubal does not write about such things, partly because of the nature of his book, the report of a trial, rather than the report of survivors. For the same reason, he concentrates more on the Jewishness of the victims than Kraus and Schön, whose main aim is to demonstrate the base criminal horror of the whole system. Roubal's book also concentrates on the crimes of the commandant Jöckel himself; without showing the slightest lack of compassion for Gentile prisoners, Roubal's compassion lies chiefly with the Jews. His book is also angrier than Kraus and Schön's. Before I come to two typical instances of the horror of the Small Fortress, I record the story of an airman like Douglas Bader, not only because it constitutes an exceptional case, but also because it appears to manifest something of the old Czech sense of inferiority. A hero like this could not possibly have a simple Czech name: 'A British airman, Jan Bláha, was also imprisoned in the Theresienstadt Small Fortress; he had lost both legs. His name was probably false, for he was a very intelligent man and the rumour spread that by origin he was a noble from the

64 Ibid., p. 209.

65 Ibid., p. 108.

66 Ibid., pp. 38–39.

Lobkowicz family.⁶⁷ Bláha is kept in a cell away from the rest of the prisoners and was eventually beaten to death by Rojko. Roubal gives as an example of the savagery of Theresienstadt the fate of deportees sent to Theresienstadt in January 1945 from Auschwitz as it was being evacuated. Three hundred and eighty-seven prisoners arrived on the train, 80 per cent of whom are Jews. Seventeen of them were beaten to death by Jöckel's men before they entered the Theresienstadt camp gates. At the end of the war, four months later, only thirty of the original 387 had survived, and only eight of these left the camp alive, including a twelve-year-old boy, Roman Kowalski, who had been in concentration camps since the age of six. I give my two examples of particular brutality towards the Jews as demonstrations of what the Czech Communist leadership knew when they began their campaign against the Jews five years later. First, an event concerning a Jewish couple, who, in 1942, were moved from the Theresienstadt to the Small Fortress; they had been moved, 'only because the wife was pregnant and, by decree, at that time Jews were not permitted to have children. In the most brutal manner, the accused [Jöckel] beat the woman with a stick until he managed to make her abort her child, and then he left her lying there to die in terrible agony. Her husband was beaten to death by guards that same evening.'⁶⁸

My second example also depicts mass humiliation, quite apart from the brutality any reader of Czech literary accounts of the Shoah from the immediate post-war period expects of the Germans:

On Sundays it often happened that Jöckel became bored, and the other guards were in a similar state of mind; then he ordered a number of Jews be paraded in the courtyard. They all had to take up pitchforks, stand opposite each other in two groups and then stab each other until their opponents were lying wounded on the ground. On one of these Sundays three victors were hanged because they had killed their three opponents. The hanging had to be carried 'out by a Jewish doctor, who later went mad as a result of his Theresienstadt experiences.⁶⁹

The Communist interpretation of the persecution of the Jews is embodied in Jiří Weil's novel, *Život s hvězdou* (Life with the Star, 1949). Here a Jew manages, like Weil himself, to escape deportation by going into hiding. After depicting the humiliation of everyday life for his hero as a Jew, Weil has his hero find some spiritual help among a group of Communist workers. Solidarity with the workers saves the hero from surrendering himself to concentration-camp death, or helps him escape it as a result of his political consciousness. The Communists subsequently banned this novel, as too degenerately subjectivist. Elsewhere, Weil also discussed the function of private firms in concentration camps and in the slave-labour system as a whole. From time to time, Kraus and Schön devote space to the 'private employees' who work in the camps and who are not permitted to reveal anything they see there to anyone, on pain of death or severe punishment. The prisoners use them as postmen, and the 'private employees' sometimes manage to bring in provisions. If they are caught communicating with prisoners, let alone bearing mail for them, they are normally killed. These men are Germans, Poles and Czechs, normally slave-labourers working for firms outside the camp perimeters. Weil is concerned with one of the firms most closely associated with slave-labour, a firm which took over numerous Czechoslovak enterprises in both the Sudetenland and the Protectorate. This firm was I. G. Farben, which, especially through its taking over of the Prague-based Aussiger Verein,

67 Roubal, *Terezín zůstane...*, p. 89.

68 Ibid., p. 31.

69 Ibid., p. 70.

was particularly powerful.⁷⁰ In the leading article of the last number of *Literární noviny* for 1948, Weil reported on an intellectuals' congress in Wrocław. Here a Jew who had had a very unpleasant war blames the camps on the capitalist greed of I. G. Farben and, indirectly, by association, on the Americans. With this quotation I come back to the beginning of my chapter, and give my final example of the appropriation of the Shoah, this time in the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist vein:

It was no accident that Wrocław was chosen. Wrocław shows what war means. To what destruction it leads, for though it may sound strange, there are still nations that have not experienced war in its true form, thus do not know what war looks like. This is particularly true of the Americans. It is sad that a few years after the bloodiest war in the history of the world it was necessary to [...] warn the world of the danger of a new war. It is sad that, after all the mass murder and all the destruction of property and culture, after Buchenwald, Belsen, Majdanek and Auschwitz, intellectuals have to charge their governments not to perpetrate a madness that could lead to the annihilation of civilization. [...] And there was yet another circumstance, the most serious: the I. G. Farben trust was linked with international trusts in Europe and America, and these trusts shared I. G. Farben's profits. And what is even more astonishing is that the I. G. Farben trust still exists after the war, although led by Americans. [...] The Wrocław congress demonstrated that intellectuals cannot shut their eyes to similar facts, that they must look for the causes of war and human suffering where they really are, in capitalist trusts which are preparing for another war.⁷¹

70 For an account of the German industrial occupation of central and south-eastern Europe, see Anthony McElligot, 'Reforging Mitteleuropa in the Crucible of War' in Peter Stirk (ed.), *Mitteleuropa. History and Prospects*, Edinburgh, 1994, pp. 129–59.

71 Jiří Weil, 'Vratislavský sjezd', *Literární noviny*, 17, 1948, 9–10, p. 121.

6 'Old Wine in a New Bottle': The Jews as Perceived in Post-war Communist Poland, 1945–47

JOANNA MICHLIC

Introduction

In recent years it has been widely recognized that national myths constitute one of the fundamental driving forces of modern society and that in fact they are an important part of national identity and nationalism.¹ Yet little work has been done on the impact of national myths on interethnic relations, as indicated by Anthony D. Smith, in his study *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*: 'in the intellectual and popular uses, and limits of [myths, memories and symbols] we must search for more adequate answers to the variations of interethnic relations and the invocation of nationalism as the ultimate political and territorial solution to ethnic relations in mixed areas'.²

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the impact of national myths, especially the myth of the 'Threatening Other' in Poland in the years immediately after the Second World War. I will chiefly examine the mythologized image of the Jew among the political élites in government and in opposition, and in society as a whole.

My main argument is that, in order to understand how the Jewish ethnic minority was perceived in post-war Communist Poland we have to take into account the dominant concepts of the Jews in pre-war Poland, mainly the myth of the Jew as the greatest political, economic and cultural enemy of the Polish nation. This myth, developed and advocated within the integral nationalist camp, proved to have a considerable impact on the perceptions of realities among a large segment of Polish society in both the pre-war and post-war periods. The years between 1945 and 1947 provide an insight into how the myth continued to exert influence on society and how the new Communist regime began to exploit the myth for its own political ends. Before examining the period 1945–47, I first briefly discuss the myth of the Jew as the enemy of the Polish nation.

The Myth of the Jew as the Enemy of the Polish Nation: A Survey

During the last three decades of the nineteenth century, a new type of literature regarding the Jewish ethnic minority emerged among the Polish lower middle class. This literature, consisting of articles in the press, political pamphlets and novels, was chiefly engaged in polemics with the so-called Positivist camp that promoted equal rights for Jews.³

1 See Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford, 1986, pp. 6–7; George Schöpflin: 'The Functions of Myth and A Taxonomy of Myths' in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin (eds), *Myths and Nationhood*, London, 1997, pp. 19–35.

2 Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge, 1995, p. 80.

3 On the discourse between the Positivists and their opponents see, for example, K. Stepnik, 'Powiesc antysemiticka w ostatnich latach Kongresowki', *Krytyka*, 39, 1992, pp. 82–83. A good example of the anti-Positivist work is J. Jelenski, *Żydzi, Niemcy i My*, Warsaw, 1880, where the author strongly criticizes a leading Polish writer, Aleksander Glowacki (Bolesław Prus), for supporting Jewish emancipation. Characteristically, Jelenski perceived himself as a member of a small minority that was able to recognize the true danger facing the development of the Polish nation. He was one of the first writers who indicated that, in the best interest of Poland, the

The main arguments presented in these writings were the following: first, that the Jews are not suited to integration into the Polish nation since they are alien culturally and ethnically and, furthermore, they are a much older and more powerful people than the Poles. Secondly, among ethnic groups the Jews constitute a special case, one that has had in the past and could have in the future a disastrous impact on the Polish state, nation and national culture; that, in fact, they are permanently engaged in the process of a Judaization (*zażydzenie*) of the Polish universe, its territory, politics, economy, language, religion and traditions; that the Jews are also traitors of Polish national causes since they frequently represent foreign interests, especially those of other Polish enemies, the Germans and the Russians; that Poland is an innocent, a suffering victim of the Jewish invasion; that all the misfortunes that have befallen her including the partitions of the Polish state (1772, 1792, 1795) were caused by this alien minority; finally, that Poles should defend themselves in a much more organized and effective way in order to show the Jews that ethnic Poles are the true and only owners of Polish territory; that the Jews are not suited to residing among the Poles but should look for a homeland elsewhere.

The myth of the Jew as the greatest enemy of the Polish nation has its roots in the sense of national, economic and cultural inadequacy strongly felt by the Polish middle classes and the impoverished intelligentsia.⁴ The myth's main early propagators, Teodor Jeske-Choinski (1854–1920), Jan Jelenski (1845–1909) and Andrzej Jan Niemojewski (1864–1921) enjoyed considerable popularity and their works were reprinted many times, before and after Poland regained its independence in 1918.⁵

At the same time, the myth entered the realm of Polish politics. In fact, the National Democrats (*Endecja*) the main representatives of Polish integral nationalism employed it as one of the core elements of their ideology.⁶ Furthermore, this system of beliefs advocated by the *Endecja* and its off-shoot radical organizations was also spread in various forms and to a varying degree among the conservative, monarchist and peasant parties and among large parts of the Polish Catholic Church. The only main political groups to reject this were the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) and Józef Piłsudski's camp, the so-called *Sanacja*. However, in the case of the latter, after the death of Piłsudski in

Jews should first be isolated from the Poles and then disappear/emigrate from all Polish territories.

- 4 Krystyna Kersten states: 'In Poland's circumstances Jews were perceived less as bearers of metaphysical evil than as an ethnic, religious and cultural minority posing a threat to a "young nation [...] only forming its character" — to the underdeveloped Polish middle class, to the inefficient bourgeoisie, to the pauperized intelligentsia', Krystyna Kersten, 'The "Jewish Communism" Stereotype (The Polish Case)', in A. Gerrits and N. Adler (eds), *Vampires Unstaked: National Images, Stereotypes and Myths in East Central Europe*, Amsterdam and Oxford, 1995. Roman Dmowski elaborated the concept of the young Polish nation struggling with the mature Jewish nation in one of his most popular works *Mysli nowoczesnego Polaka*, 2nd edn, Lemberg, 1994.
- 5 This literature includes a vast number of works for example, T. Jeske-Choinski, *Program i metoda Żydowa*, Warsaw; T. Jeske-Choinski, *Poznaj Żyda*, 2nd edn, Warsaw, 1912; T. Jeske-Choinski, *Mocarstwo podziemne*, 5th edn, Warsaw, 1927; J. Jelenski, *Zydzi, Niemcy i My*, Warsaw, 1880; J. Jelenski, *Wrogom własnej ojczyzny*, Warsaw, 1906; A. Niemojewski, *Skład i pochod armii piątego zaboru*, Warsaw, 1911; A. Niemojewski, *Dusza żydowska w zwierciadle Talmudu*, 2nd edn, Warsaw, 1914.
- 6 Andrzej Friszke, in a short article 'Pytania o polski nacjonalizm', *Wież*, 11, pp. 74–85, summarizes the problem of the heritage of anti-Jewish thought in the camp of the National Democrats. See also S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny. Geneza i działalność*, Warsaw, 1985, pp. 112–13 and B. Grott, *Nacjonalizm Chrzescijanski. Mysl spoleczno-panstwowa formacji narodo-katolickiej w Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej*, Cracow, 1991, pp. 255–60.

1935 the mythologized image of the Jew began to influence its policies towards the Jewish minority.⁷

From its emergence and until the end of the Second Republic, the integral nationalist camp used the myth with greater or lesser success as a catalyst for social mobilization and national coherence. This use of the myth was especially intensified at times of social, political and economic crisis, for example, during the formative years 1918–1920, then between 1929 and 1931, and between 1936 and 1939.

Furthermore, the myth was supposed to fulfil another function, namely that of asserting legitimacy and authority, and discrediting political rivals. For example, in the *Endecja* press, Józef Piłsudski was frequently portrayed as a politician favoured by the enemies of Poland: the Jews together with the Germans and the Ukrainians.⁸ In the early 1930s, the ruling *Sanacja* was often accused of representing the Jewish interest above that of Poles,⁹ while the PPS was simply labelled Jewish.¹⁰

Belief in the Jew who nursed a particular hatred for Poland clearly qualified the perception of antisemitism. Thus, within the integral nationalist camp, antisemitism was defined and understood as a form of national self-defence against the danger of *Judeopolonia*.¹¹ As early as 1902, Roman Dmowski, the leader of the *Endecja*, demanded that an apparatus of professional antisemitism should be established.¹² The myth also exerted great influence on the policies and practices of the ethnic nationalization of the Polish nation-state, a project that received wide support among political élites and the masses, especially in the second half of the 1930s. What the project set out for the Jewish ethnic minority was emigration.¹³ This idea continued to dominate integral nationalist circles during the Second World War. The general conviction that the presence of the Jews would be harmful to the future Polish nation-state was also shared by some political and social groups who were actively engaged in helping the Jews during the Shoah.¹⁴

7 Y. Gutman, 'Polish Antisemitism between the Wars. An Overview' in Y. Gutmann, E. Mendelsohn, J. Reinharz and C. Shmeruk (eds), *The Jews of Poland Between Two World Wars*, Hanover and London, 1989, pp. 103 and 106.

8 *Mysl Narodowa* and *Gazeta Warszawska* often presented such an image of Józef Piłsudski. For excerpts from these newspapers see, for example, A. Domoslawski, 'Biale orly, szare sepy', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 14–15 March 1998.

9 J. Tomaszewski, 'Dokumenty o zaburzeniach antysemitickich na Uniwersytecie Warszawskim na jesieni 1931 r.', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, 2, 1997, p. 77.

10 S. Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, pp. 112–13.

11 On the subject of definition and understanding of antisemitism by the Polish integral national/nationalist camp see W. Mich, *Obcy w polskim domu. Nacjonalistyczne koncepcje rozwiązania problemu mniejszości narodowych 1918–1939*, Lublin, 1994, pp. 18–25.

12 See Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny*, p. 112.

13 On the whole, the only substantial difference between the various political groups that supported the project of ethnic nationalization was that of tactics, not of ideology. In the cases of other minorities, this project advocated the forced assimilation of Slav minorities and the marginalization of the German ethnic group. See Mich, *Obcy w polskim domu*, pp. 18–25; R. Brubaker, 'Nationalizing States in the Old "New Europe" — and the New', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2, 1996.

14 See, for example, wartime articles by Żofia Kossak-Szczucka, the founding leader of the Catholic Front for the Rebirth of Poland (Front Odrodzenia Polski, FOP) and the Relief Council for the Jews, the *Zegota*. Ż. Kossak-Szczucka, 'Komu pomagamy?', *Prawda*, August–September 1943, and an unpublished programme of the FOP written by Witold Bienkowski in K. Przybysz (ed.), *Wizje Polski. Programy polityczne lat wojny i okupacji 1939–1944*, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 135–49.

Throughout the inter-war period, the myth proved to be a versatile phenomenon consisting of elements that not only overlapped but contradicted each other.¹⁵ Its main repeated components or sub-myths were the following, familiar from other nations' nationalism: that the Jews were the greatest enemy of the Polish religion; that the Jews were behind Freemasonry which desired to rule the Polish state; that the Jews were the exponents of international finance, which damaged the Polish economy; that the Jews were moral degenerates who had a demoralizing effect on Polish culture and people, and that the Jews were inventors and propagators of free thinking, liberalism, socialism, Communism and Bolshevism — ideologies alien and deleterious to the Polish national cause.

Judaeo-Communism and Judaeo-Bolshevism were the loudest and the most commonly employed parts of the myth of the Jews as the enemy of Poland.¹⁶ Linking the Jews to the anti-national forces of Communism and Bolshevism took place on a grand scale. Even before the Polish–Russian war of 1920 started, a substantial bulk of literature had emerged that portrayed Bolshevism as a Jewish conspiracy aimed at oppressing the Russian people.¹⁷ In 1936, the Committee of the Press of the Young (Komitet Prasy Młodych) represented by fifteen different ultra-nationalist, conservative and Catholic newspapers, was set up in order to fight Communism and to promote exclusivist integral nationalism.¹⁸ One of the main messages disseminated by this press was a warning against Judaeo-Bolshevism. Characteristically, the Catholic monthly *Pro Christo*, directed at the intelligentsia, published, along with articles on Judaeo-Communism, articles on ritual murder explaining that such a ritual was practised among the Jews — including those in contemporary Poland.¹⁹

In summary, at the end of the Second Republic the myth of the Jew as a source of threat was a well-established part of thinking among a large section of society. Among the many political and social functions the myth fulfilled was, above all, a sense of a reasserted positive image of Poland: if it were not for the Jews, Poles would be a great and prosperous people. It also encouraged the belief that Poland was a victim mistreated by others throughout history. These two perceptions became central to the Polish experience immediately after the Second World War.

The Communist Take-over in Poland and the Jewish Ethnic Minority

The immediate post-war years constituted one of the most dramatic chapters in modern Polish history. With the help of the Red Army, the Communists succeeded in consolidating power in their hands and were not prepared to share it, not even with the legal political opposition which they were finally to crush in 1947.²⁰ This had already been declared by

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- 15 According to George Schöpfli, the latter fact is immaterial to the existence of a myth since its different components/sub-myths receive different emphases at different times to cope with different challenges. Schöpfli, 'The Functions of Myth...', p. 35.
 - 16 According to Krystyna Kersten: 'Jews and Communism merged into the single category of enemies of God, Nation and Motherland, all the more baleful for being both within and without, overt and hidden, lying in ambush', Kersten, 'The "Jewish Communism" Stereotype'.
 - 17 I. Kaminska-Szmaj, *Judzi, Zohyzda, ze czci odziera. Język propagandy politycznej w prasie 1919–1923*, Wrocław, 1994, pp. 143–49.
 - 18 Rudnicki, *Obóz Narodow-Radykalny*, pp. 300–03.
 - 19 Wojciech Zajety's article 'Mord rytualny u Żydów', *Pro Christo*, 3, 1927, pp. 224–27, is typical of this genre. The author writes: 'ritual murder has survived among this outrageous nation until today [...] there were attempts at ritual murder in Wagrowiec in 1922 and Dobrzyn in 1926'. He supports his stance with two allegedly scientific works by Pranajtis and Brant.
 - 20 Andrzej Paczkowski, *Zdobycie władzy. 1945–1947*, Warsaw, 1993, p.80; A. Friszke, *Opozycja polityczna w PRL 1945–1980*, London, 1994, pp. 23–36.

the First Secretary of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR), Władysław Gomułka (1905–82), in June 1945: 'Once we have taken power, we will never give it up'.²¹ Thus, despite the wishes of the majority of society, Poland rapidly moved into the sphere of influence of the Soviet Bloc.²²

For many Poles in both legal and illegal opposition and among the masses, the Communist take-over was identified with the rule of Judaeo-Communism, the myth that had already been strengthened during the Soviet occupation of the Eastern Provinces that began in September 1939.²³ The fact that a group of Jews held prominent positions within the Central Committee of the PPR, the government, the army and the security apparatus reinforced the perception that 'we' Poles were being governed by 'them', the Jews.²⁴ Therefore, in anti-Communist propaganda, the names of prominent Jewish Communists were put in their plural forms in order to stress the enormity of the Jewish take-over.²⁵ A good example of this linguistic manipulation can be found in the later statement of an *émigré* intellectual based in London, Andrzej Lobodowski: 'if Poland had regained its independence, everything would have developed differently [...]. But Poland has not regained its independence and the fact that among the Communist élite there were as many Mincs, Bermans, Katz-Suchys, Rozanskis and Fejgs had to bode evil upon the future'.²⁶

In presenting the Jews as a collectivity ruling Poland, the mythopoeists ignored the fact that a substantial majority of the Jewish survivors of the Shoah did not actively participate in the Communist regime and that the Jews who did were, to use the popular term, mostly 'non-Jewish Jews' to whom their ethnic identity was of no significance.²⁷ Furthermore, they failed to recognize that the size of the Jewish community had been reduced to a mere 1 per cent of the entire population, compared with 10 per cent in pre-war Poland, and that among the victims of the secret police were also Jews and persons of Jewish origin.²⁸ Thus, in a sense, the extent of the myth of the Jew as the enemy of Poland in the early post-war years already confirmed the aptness of Aleksander Hertz's pre-war thesis that mythologization of the 'other' as the enemy can continue regardless of the real position of

21 Władysław Gomułka made this statement during the political meeting of the Provisional Government of National Unity (Tymczasowy Rząd Jedności Narodowej) in which the PPR was the Soviet-sponsored body. *Archives of the Worker's Movement*, vol. 9, p. 110, quoted by Paczkowski, *Zdobycie Władzy*, p. 5.

22 Krystyna Kersten, *Miedzy wyzwaniem a zniewolzeniem: Polska 1944–1956*, London, 1993, pp. 5–27.

23 Kersten, 'The "Jewish Communism" Stereotype'; Michael C. Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead: Poland and the Memory of the Holocaust*, New York, 1997, p. 50.

24 On the subject of the participation of the Jews in the Communist regime see, for example, J. Schatz, *The Generation: The Rise and Fall of the Jewish Communists of Poland*, Berkeley, CA, 1991, and Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi. Komunizm Anatomia polprawd 1939–68*, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 76–88.

25 Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 206

26 A. Lobodowski, quoted in the article by Barbara Toporska, 'Wybieram watek najmniej popularny' *Wiadomosci*, 47, 1970. The article was reprinted in J. Mackiewicz and B. Toporska (eds), *Droga Pani*, London, 1984, p. 121.

27 The sociologist Percy Cohen names this type of Jewish Communist 'Jewish Radical', as opposed to the Radical Jew who together with his/her membership of the Communist Party was a declared member of a Jewish organization. Percy S. Cohen, *Jewish Radicals and Radical Jews*, London, New York and Toronto, 1980, pp. 85–88.

28 Schatz, *The Generation*, pp. 224–25.

the mythologized subject.²⁹ In the 1950s and 1960s this phenomenon was to become even more clearly visible since the myth continued to be potent among the population and the members of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR), despite the continuous gradual reduction of the number of Jews in the army, the PZPR and the state apparatus.³⁰

In the early post-war years, the radical integral nationalists emphasized that Judaeopolonia had actually already come into being and that true Poles could not support such an anti-national regime.³¹ Jews who held prominent positions in the administration, the army and the security apparatus were perceived, according to the pre-war pattern, as the servants of foreign interests, namely those of the Soviet Union.³² At the same time, it was believed that ethnic Poles who joined or supported the Communists were simply puppets in the hands of the cunning Jews, since they came from a disadvantaged background and thus were unaware of the 'true' political reality. Even the ethnic Polish members of the Central Committee of the PPR were portrayed as having no power in decision-making.³³ Furthermore, the secret security service responsible for the terror, arrests and political murders was perceived as entirely Jewish. Subsequently, during the 1950s, all Stalinist crimes of 1949–55 were to be ascribed to the Jews alone. Stalinism was to become synonymous with Judaeo-Stalinism, and ethnic Poles who participated in Stalinist crimes were to become dissociated from it. Such a position was held by the Polish National Communists throughout the 1950s and 1960s and is still advocated to this day by some political parties that identify themselves as the followers of the *Endecja*.³⁴

Consequently, in some circles in 1947 the Jews were perceived as responsible for deaths on both sides during the struggle for power between 1945 and 1947. In other words, they were to blame for the civil war. An expression of such a belief can be found in the illegal leaflet signed by 'The Committee against Jewish Influence', circulated in Bydgoszcz in October 1947:

Disgrace! Disgrace! A handful of degenerate Jews have taken over the state and are ruling millions of stupid Slavs [...]. Forty-five thousand Poles from the Home Army (AK), the National Armed Forces (NSZ) and Freedom and Independence (WiN) have been shot or hanged and thirty thousand Poles from the PPR and the Secret Police (UB) have been killed between 1946 and 1947. This is the result of the bloody regime of the Jewish clique; Jews are our mortal enemy. Bydgoszcz, 8 October 47.³⁵

It is clear that this type of anti-Jewish propaganda was supposed to serve the purpose of encouraging national coherence and mobilizing the Polish community to take action against the Jewish enemy. Within this perception the Jews were chiefly identified as a collective that constituted a distinctive political and biological threat to the nation.

29 This argument was put forward by Aleksander Hertz in the article 'Swoi przeciw obcym', *Wiedza i Życie*, 6, 1936, reprinted in J. Garewicz (ed.), *Aleksander Hertz Socjologia nieprzedawniona. Wybor publicystyki*, Warsaw, 1990, p. 159.

30 P. Machcewicz, *Polski rok 1956*, Warsaw, 1993, pp. 216–31, and T. Pioro, 'Czystki w wojsku polskim 1967–1968', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, 2, 1997, pp. 60–61.

31 This was advocated by the radical right-wing nationalist philosopher and historian Feliks Koneczny as early as 1945. See J. Giertych, *Polski Obóz Narodowy*, 5th edn, Warsaw, 1990.

32 Schatz, *The Generation*, p. 225.

33 Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, Komunizm*, pp. 78–80.

34 Giertych, *Polski Obóz Narodowy*, pp. 33–35.

35 'Bulletin of the Ministry of Public Security no. 17, 1947', *Biuletyny Informacyjne Ministerstwa Bezpieczeństwa Publicznego 1947. Źródła do historii Polski XX wieku — ze zbiorów Centralnego Archiwum Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych, Seria C*, vol. 1, Warsaw, 1993, pp. 182–83.

The perception of the Jews by the state apparatus and members of the Polish Workers' Party is a more complex matter. However, ambivalent paradoxical attitudes towards the Jewish ethnic minority are clearly evident on the part of the Communist regime during the period between 1945 and 1947.

On one hand, the Central Committee of the PPR presented itself as a party that was fully committed to fight antisemitism and guarantee the Jewish ethnic minority an equal status with the ethnic Poles.³⁶ On the other hand, the ethnic Poles within the party and the state apparatus, including the Ministry of Public Security, showed increasingly anti-Jewish attitudes towards their Jewish comrades. Samples of these attitudes can be found in the Bolesław Bierut Archives held in the Archives of New Documents (ANN).³⁷ They can be summarized by the simple slogan 'there are too many Jews among us and we do not want them'.³⁸ The notion of ethnic identification within the Communist regime seems central to an understanding of the ambivalence of Communist attitudes towards the Jews in the early post-war period.

Within the PPR, a clear discrepancy between ideology, on the one hand, and policies and practices, on the other, regarding the general problem of ethnicity, can be observed both before and after 1945. On one hand, the PPR declared its adherence to the principles of internationalism. On the other, the leading Communists Alfred Lampe, Bolesław Bierut and Władysław Gomułka declared that the PPR was committed to support the ethno-national model of the Polish state.³⁹ Thus, ironically, the chief goal of the pre-war integral nationalists was advocated by and attained under the Communist regime.⁴⁰

As early as 1945, the PPR's frequent emphasis on the concept of the one-nation state had raised concerns among the Jewish Section of the Polish Workers' Party. The documents of the Central Committee of the Jews reveal that the growing ethno-nationalization of the state was perceived by Communist Jews as a factor both in the increasing displacement of other ethnic minorities and in the increase in antisemitic violence.⁴¹ A lack of concern for the safety of Jews, silence in the face of anti-Jewish crimes and lenient treatment of the perpetrators of anti-Jewish violence were the typical responses of the new local political leaders. For example, many local PPR committees refused to take any action to prevent the first wave of anti-Jewish violence that spread all over Poland in 1945.⁴² In some cases, the

36 B. D. Weinryt, 'Poland' in P. Meyer et al. (eds), *The Jews in the Soviet Satellites*, Syracuse, NY, 1953, pp. 258–63.

37 I am grateful to Professor Andrzej Paczkowski for giving me access to a selection of Bierut's notes.

38 Jonathan Frankel discusses the general pattern of replacing the Jewish Communists by members of major (territorially based) nationalities during the period of Communist consolidation of power in his article, 'The Soviet Regime and Anti-Zionism' in E. Mendelsohn (ed.), *Essential Papers on Jews and the Left*, New York and London, 1997, pp. 449–51.

39 Such declarations were made in their New Year addresses in 1946 by both Bierut and Gomułka. Furthermore, PPR propaganda frequently used the term national to describe Communist activities; see Kersten, *Miedzy wyzwoleniem a zniewolzeniem*, p. 12.

40 T. Lepowski, *Uparte trwanie polskości. Nostalgia, spory, nadzieje, wartości*, London, 1989, pp. 31–32; Norman Davies, 'Polish National Mythologies' in Hosking and Schöpflin (eds), *Myths and Nationhood*, pp. 141–58; J. Jedlicki, 'Nationalism and State Formation' in Gerrits and Adler (eds), *Vampires Unstaked*, p. 130; Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead*, p. 43.

41 See the Archives of the Jewish Historical Institute, Section on Organization of the Central Committee of the Jews, 15, Minutes of the Committee of the Jewish Section of the PPR (spring–summer 1945). Short excerpts from the documents were published by Maciej Pisarski, 'W nowej Polsce', *Karta*, 18, 1996, p. 114.

42 D. Brus-Wegrowska, 'Ocalzni. Atmosfera pogromowa', *Karta*, 18, 1996, pp. 87–99; J. Andelson, 'W Polsce zwanej ludowa' in J. Tomaszewski (ed.), *Najnowsze dzieje Żydów w*

committees ignored or dismissed Jewish petitions for help to put an end to the anti-Jewish atmosphere.⁴³ In other cases, the local Communist governments discontinued investigations into murders of individual Jews despite the fact that there were sufficient testimonies by witnesses.⁴⁴ Moreover, the representatives of the state apparatus, the army and, especially, the militia, not only allowed anti-Jewish violence to take place but also participated in such events themselves.⁴⁵

Thus, it can be argued that the nationalization of Communism or the 'communization' of nationalism had already started within the new Communist ranks⁴⁶ and that the process of ethnic nationalization of the state was the driving force behind the Communist regime in the early post-war years.⁴⁷ Such developments were noticeable to foreign diplomats. William Mack, the political adviser to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces of Occupation in Austria wrote in February 1946: 'The Polish government may not be anti-semitic, but it is doing everything possible to get rid of its Jewish population (except that part which is Communist).'⁴⁸

The Kielce Pogrom of 4 July 1946

The early post-war years witnessed the worst anti-Jewish violence in the modern history of Polish-Jewish relations.⁴⁹ Moreover, the violence that occurred in Poland was the worst contemporary antisemitic violence in the whole of East Central Europe.⁵⁰ It is estimated that between 1,500 and 2,000 Jews were murdered between 1944 and 1947 in Poland, and that most of them died because of their Jewish origin rather than their political affiliation.

The Kielce pogrom was the worst such incident: ordinary civilians, together with soldiers and militiamen, murdered forty-two members of the Jewish community and injured more than 100. According to witnesses, the pogrom lasted over six hours and was conducted in an atmosphere of enthusiastic festiveness. The number of people who surrounded the building at 7 Planty Street on that day grew from an initial fifty in the morning to 15,000 by the afternoon. On the evidence of medical examinations and eye-witness testimonies, the pogrom cannot be described as anything but slaughter.⁵¹

Historical research on the Kielce pogrom has concentrated almost entirely on two aspects: the description of the event itself and the ensuing investigation into the forces that allegedly masterminded it.⁵² Indeed, the investigation constitutes the central theme of the

Polsce w zarysie (do 1950 roku), Warsaw, 1993, pp. 400–02; Alina Cała and Helena Datner-Spiwak, *Dzieje Żydów w Polsce 1944–1968. Teksty źródłowe*, Warsaw, 1997, pp. 16–18.

43 Brus-Wegrowska, 'Ocalzni', pp. 98–99.

44 Ibid., pp. 87–88.

45 Ibid., pp. 98–99.

46 E. Hankiss, *East European Alternatives*, Oxford, 1990, p. 212.

47 In late 1945 the PPR numbered 230,000 members, in the autumn of 1946 the membership had increased to 400,000 and in 1947 reached the figure of 800,000. Paczkowski, *Zdobycie Władzy*, p. 79.

48 FO 371/56534; Antony Polonsky, 'Documents from the British Foreign Office', *Soviet Jewish Affairs*, 10, 1, 1980, p. 56.

49 Steinlauf, *Bondage to the Dead*, p. 51; Cała and Datner-Spiwak, *Dzieje Żydów*, p. 15.

50 Kersten, *Polacy, Żydzi, Komunizm*, p. 135.

51 S. Meducki and Z. Wrona (eds), *Antyżydowskie wydarzenia Kieleckie 4 Lipca 1946 roku. Dokumenty i materiały*, Kielce, vol. 1, 1992, pp. 103–17.

52 See, for example, a discussion on the research on the Kielce pogrom, 'O stanie badań nad pogromem w Kielcach', *Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego*, 4, 1996, pp. 3–17.

historiography of the subject, and has come up with at least four different theories.⁵³ However, there is a body of opinion that states that the willingness on the part of the population to commit the murders is itself more significant than the issue of who was behind the pogrom. Such a view was expressed by Herling-Grudzinski: 'Whatever we may say about the Kielce pogrom being a deliberate provocation on the part of Public Security and the NKVD [...] we cannot neglect the speed with which the spark turned into wildfire. It was as if the earth itself had been waiting for that spark.'⁵⁴ This view is also held by a former member of the *Bund*, Marek Edelman, who rejects the idea of a plot and links the event to the psychological hatred of the 'other', to nationalism, and to the impact of Nazism:

National instincts, hatred, and the criminal mentality are deeply rooted in human nature [...]. There is no doubt that the Kielce pogrom was a post-Hitler phenomenon [...]. We have to understand that if a man is told that he is better than another, he then loses any interest in the other. This is particularly true in the Jewish case. As people used to say, three million Jews have been killed here in Poland, so there is no Jewish problem anymore. And so, if the survivors were also killed, it was right for them to have been killed, even good that they were killed. Psychological factors were present that allowed the incident to happen. Even if the incident had been a deliberately organized plot it would still have struck fertile soil. The Kielce incident did strike good soil. There were many reasons that the soil was good: Hitler's propaganda, materialism, jealousy and other reasons. There is no evidence that the incident was orchestrated by Polish Communists or the Russians. Probably it happened by sheer chance. Someone may have helped to aggravate it. It is likely that when the incident had already started and when the rumour had spread that the Jews had killed a Polish child, some Polish Communists or Russians might have aggravated the situation. But they could not have played a main part in it.⁵⁵

The Kielce pogrom was not the first case of violence experienced by the Jewish communities of the Kielce region. Eighteen Jews had been murdered in five attacks in April 1945, and thirteen others were killed the following June. And during the festival of Channukah in 1945 grenades were thrown into the building at 7 Planty Street.⁵⁶ In a sense, the events and aftermath of the pogrom can be interpreted as a sign of support for the ethnic nationalization of the state. Stanisław Ossowski, a leading post-war philosopher was the first to point out that there was a link between the Communist advocacy of the concept of the one-nation state and the growing intolerance and hatred towards 'others',

53 It is possible to differentiate the following four main theses: first, the pogrom was orchestrated by the illegal political opposition, the so-called reactionary forces of the underground. This stance, rejected on the whole by the Polish historiography, is for example supported by I. Gutman, *Hajehudim bepolin acharei milchamat haolam hasznija*, Jerusalem, 1985. The second theory, which maintains that the pogrom was prepared by the Soviet security forces, is supported by Michael Checinski, *Poland: Communism — Nationalism — Anti-semitism*, New York, 1982, and by Krystyna Kersten, 'Pogrom kielecki-znaki zapytania' in Wrzesinski (ed.), *Polska-Polacy-Mniejszosci Narodowe*. The third, asserting that the pogrom was a spontaneous event, is supported by J. Andelson, 'W Polsce zwanej udowa'. This stance is not favoured in Polish historiography. The fourth, suggesting that the pogrom was organized by the Zionists themselves in order to make the Jews emigrate from Poland, is supported by a pseudo-historical work by J. Orlicki, *Szkice z dziejow i stosunkow polsko-żydowskich 1918–1949*, Szczecin, 1983. Orlicki's work serves as an example of the portrayal of the Poles as the chief victims of the Kielce pogrom.

54 Gustaw Herling-Grudzinski, 'Dziennik pisany noca', *Kultura* (Paris), 9, 1991, 528, p. 16.

55 My interview with Marek Edelman on 29 March 1994.

56 Bożena Szajnok, *Pogrom Żydów w Kielcach 4 Lipca 1946*, 1992, pp. 25–28.

especially the Jews. In an article published in the left-wing *Kuźnica* in September 1946, he criticized the manipulation of nationalist resentments in the Communist press.⁵⁷

It is widely recognized that the direct cause of the Kielce pogrom was the accusation of ritual murder. The rumour that a nine-year-old boy, Henryk Blaszczyk, had escaped from Jewish captivity and that other Polish children had been killed by the Jews generated instant public interest. Moreover, it caused an atmosphere of vengeance directed at all Jews living in Kielce. The then twenty-seven-year old tailor, Mojzesz Cukier, an eye witness who lived at 7 Planty Street remembered that 'At about nine o'clock, on 4 July, crowds started to surround the building. I heard voices from the crowd: "You Jews have killed fourteen of our children! Mothers and fathers unite and kill all the Jews!"'⁵⁸

In pre-war Poland the ritual murder myth was pre-eminent among the peasants and the lower classes and a significant section of the Catholic Church. In fact, the Catholic Church was responsible for disseminating this belief in its various publications directed at different social groups before and after Poland regained its independence in 1918. According to these publications cases of ritual murder were alleged to have occurred in Poland throughout the first three decades of the twentieth century. However, it appears that the number of ritual murder accusations reached its peak in the early post-war period. This belief in ritual murder, propagated in the teaching of the Catholic Church in previous periods, had become a standard element of the way of thinking about Jews in a substantial segment of the Polish population.⁵⁹ One could also argue that the experiences of the war contributed to the intensification of this belief. After all, the war had generated a profound sense of insecurity and fear among many Poles which was only reinforced by the terror orchestrated by the new Communist regime. This sense of insecurity made the populace more prone to explanations based on superstition. The blood libel would then be one instance.

The superstition of ritual murder was to emerge during many attempts at inciting anti-Jewish pogroms and panics before and after the Kielce pogrom. In all cases Jews were presented as a physical threat to the Polish nation and particularly to its children. This suggests that the allegations of ritual murder used in the national context reinforced a belief in the Jewish enemy who murdered Catholic Poles and desired both world domination and Polish servitude. Material concerning public opinion at the time collected by the police reveals the extent of the belief in 'the Jewish enemy' threatening the real existence of the Polish nation. I give three examples of the anti-Jewish rumour and whispered propaganda published in the Bulletins of the Ministry of Public Security: (1) 'Rumours have spread in the Brzeski district that in Silesia a Christian child has been allegedly killed by two Jews in a ritual murder. Cracow, 31 March 47' (Bulletin 2, p. 30);⁶⁰ (2) 'Once again a nine-year-old girl has disappeared. It may be that the Jews from Rzeszow have eaten her and have now run away from the town in fear. Rzeszow, 7 July 47' (Bulletin 12, pp. 134–35); and (3) 'Jews have murdered Christian children in Łódź. The police have already discovered some corpses during a one-day search. Kielce, 20 September 47' (Bulletin 17, pp. 182–83).

Immediately after the pogrom the Communist regime and the political opposition released statements in which both sides accused each other of masterminding and carrying

57 Stanisław Ossowski, 'Na tle wydarzeń Kieleckich', *Kuźnica*, 38, 1946, pp. 123–25.

58 See Meducki and Wrona (eds), *Antyżydowskie Wydarzenia Kieleckie*, vol. 1, Kielce, 1990.

59 According to Alina Cała, the belief in ritual murder existed among peasants even in the 1970s. Among the sixty peasants she interviewed during her field-work, only twelve firmly rejected the concept of ritual murder. Alina Cała, *The Image of the Jew in Polish Folk Culture*, Jerusalem, 1995.

60 See footnote 35.

out the crime. A typical Communist pronouncement attributed the pogrom to Fascist elements, namely members of the National Armed Forces (NSZ). It also accused the Church of supporting the legal opposition and allowing itself to become an instrument directed against Poland, and at the same time asserted 'that the whole nation was indignant at the atrocities committed in Kielce'. One of the official appeals made to the people of Kielce by the six-party committee, which included representatives of the regional Trades Union Committee, the Labour Party, the Polish Socialist Party and the Polish Workers' National People's Council, ran as follows:

The incidents of 4 July in our town have been caused by irresponsible elements of society and have tarnished Poland's reputation. Our nation has always been famous for its tolerance. Irresponsible individuals exploited the crowd which gathered as a result of false and biased news spread by hired servants of the aristocracy [...].

In the name of the innocent blood shed on the paving stones of Kielce, our town, we appeal for calm and urge you to resist those elements of society who incite hatred, and who attempt deliberately to sabotage the rebuilding of Poland. Kielce 4 July 1946.⁶¹

Statements made by the opposition accused the Communist government of masterminding the pogrom in order to divert international attention from the results of the rigged Referendum of 30 June, and stressed the political nature of the incident.⁶²

A typical pronouncement by the illegal Freedom and Independence (WiN) organisation runs as follows:

This anti-Jewish pogrom was neither the first such event, nor an isolated incident. We should not deceive ourselves. It was neither the first nor the last incident in a chain of murders committed by Public Security officers. The Kielce pogrom is a classic example of provocation [...]. Although some of the perpetrators were charged and sentenced, that does not mean that the actions of plain-clothed security agents, and those members of the police and Public Security who murdered defenceless people, should be forgotten.

These are the facts which shed some light on the methods of the NKVD and the UB [secret police] and on the secret tactics of Bolshevism in Poland.

The Kielce incident should be considered as part of a broader issue: Communism — Jews — reactionary movements [...].

Among the small number of Jews in Poland, a majority of them, four out of five, are employed by [the Ministry of] Public Security [...]. Thus, the Warsaw government has created the perfect conditions for the spread of antisemitism and racism, which in turn has led to the West's hostile attitude towards Polish nationalism, and has finally given Moscow an excuse to provoke the Polish population and then to repress it.

The foregoing statements of the Communists and the opposition can be read as an expression of contemporary political conflicts. What both sides had in common, however, was that they saw the pogrom as chiefly a problem of the reputation of Poland in the Western world, and as a defamation of the country's good name. The Jewish issue was of only secondary importance. In the Communist statements, the word antisemitism had a hollow ring, and served merely as a useful tool to fight political opposition. While in opposition circles the word Jew chiefly meant a political enemy of Poland. Reading the eye-witness testimonies and special reports that were prepared for the members of the Politburo after the pogrom, one has the impression that a considerable proportion of the population was convinced that they and not the Jews were the real victims.

61 Archives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 750, Appeals, cited in Appendix to Szajnok, *Pogrom Żydów*.

62 *Honor i Ojczyzna* (Warsaw), 8 August 1946.

Workers of many large factories organized strikes in protest against the first twelve people sentenced at the trial of 11 July. For them, those who participated in the pogrom were patriots, not villains. Furthermore, during various meetings organized by the Communist representatives from Warsaw, the workers openly expressed their anti-Jewish feelings. For them, the Jews were the enemy, running the Polish state and oppressing the people.

The following two excerpts from documents in the former Archives of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party show the extent of such beliefs:

Report by Comrades Dolinski, Domagala, Krych and Fir regarding their business trip to Łódź between 11 and 13 July 1946.

Workers from the sewing factory (Niciarnia) and from the Schaibler and Grohman factories have organized a strike in protest against the sentences at the Kielce pogrom trial on Thursday 11 July [...]. Workers at the Schaibler factory from both shifts have also gone on strike. The first shift stopped work for half an hour and the second for forty-five minutes. The workers gave as their reason for striking the fact that they had been misrepresented as accepting the resolution against pogroms as published in *Głos Robotniczy* [The Voice of Workers]. According to the paper, all the workers have supported the resolution, whereas in reality it was only one department.

The following factories organized protest strikes on 12 July: Scheibler at Ksiezy Mlyn, the sewing departments of Dietzel, [...] Buhle, Cimerman, Kinderman, Warta, Tempo 'Rasik'. The strikes of 13 July took place in Wejrach — the ribbon factory, Hofnichter, Gampe i Albrecht, and Gutman [...].

The social situation in Łódź is serious. The strikes have moved swiftly from one factory to another and the women are very aggressive [...]. Women are calling for revenge if the death sentences of the Kielce trial are carried out [...]. They use arguments such as: 'A pregnant Jewess gets 60,000 złoty and I get nothing!! [...]. Why are there no Jews working here? The Jews are running Poland!'⁶³

and:

Report by Stefan Tomaszewski, the Head of the Warsaw Department of Communication, regarding his business trip to Deblin on 10 and 11 July 1946.

[...] The meeting lasted two hours and was very stormy. Comrade Chodkiewicz and I both made our statements. During the speeches people shouted back: 'Get rid of the Jews! It's a disgrace that they have come here to defend the Jews!' [...] 'The Jews have murdered thirteen Polish children and they are defending them!' 'Bierut would not have the guts to sentence them [the Jews] to death!' [...] Those shouting such words received a big round of applause from the workers. [...] People asked about the Eastern borders and shouted: 'Wilno [Vilnius] and Lwów [Lemberg] should be ours, why haven't the Soviets left them?' 'In Poland the Soviets drive tanks and terrorize us with their rifles! Is this Freedom?!?!' 'Why are so many Poles held in prisons and why are the military barracks full of those arrested?!'⁶⁴

Examples of the persistence of this myth of the Poles as the victims of a Jewish invasion can be found in leaflets and anonymous correspondence addressed to local Jewish communities after the Kielce pogrom. The following letter was sent anonymously to the Chairman of the Jewish Community in Włoszczow:

As I know you personally from our village I would have feelings of remorse if I did not warn you. Something bad might happen to your people. No one is going to forgive you for Kielce. Revenge is on its way since you have treated Poles badly. Nothing can help your people, not even Public Security officers. A terrible revenge against you is coming from the entire

63 Quoted in Andrzej Paczkowski, 'Raporty o Pogromie', *Puls*, 3, 1991, pp. 110–11.

64 Ibid., pp. 112–13.

country. you to leave for the Promised Land; otherwise there is going to be bloodshed in the spring. Kielce, 30 March 1947.⁶⁵

Despite the hopes and expectations of a considerable minority of ethnic Poles and a majority of Jews, the Shoah did not eradicate the myth of the Jew as the enemy of the Polish nation. The myth came to be used by both the nationalist and Communist camps, in different ways and to suit their different purposes. This chapter has attempted to show the ways such myths functioned both among the political élites and in society as a whole in the early post-war years. What the long-term consequences of the myth may have been on Polish political culture of the second half of the twentieth century is not yet clear.

65 Ibid., pp. 194–95.

7 Yugoslav and British Policy towards the Carinthian Question, 1941–45

DUŠAN BIBER

Introduction

Yugoslav and British policy towards the Carinthian question can be explained only in the wider context of Yugoslav war aims and long-term political strategy, in the framework of British policy towards the Soviet Union in general, and Yugoslavia and Austria in particular. A number of factors have to be taken into account: the problem of Yugoslavia's western borders, the Julian March (Venezia Giulia) and Trieste, as well as the delicate international position of Yugoslavia in 1944 and 1945.¹

The Yugoslav–Austrian Border and Slovene War Aims

In the Carinthian plebiscite of 1920 the majority of votes needed for the union of Carinthia and Yugoslavia was not even achieved in the first wave of voting in Zone A. However, a part of the Slovene public and some politicians still nurtured the illusion that, in the event of an *Anschluß*, the Carinthian problem might be reopened, since the plebiscite in 1920 had not concerned Greater Germany, the Third Reich, but only Austria. The Slovene emigrants from Carinthia were unsuccessful in their proposal to the premier Milan Stojadinović that his government should, after the *Anschluß*, request the annexation of Slovene Carinthia to Yugoslavia. The creation of Greater Germany was a signal for general alarm, and not only in Slovenia, where fears were expressed that this was only the first step towards the realization of the German bridge to the Adriatic. One of the responses was the campaign for the defence of the northern border in Slovenia, which was undertaken by Action Committees initiated by the Communist Party of Slovenia.² However, after the Hitler–Stalin Pact, no more traces of such public action by the Action Committees are to be found, presumably due to Comintern instructions.³ However, the border question, defence

This chapter, now slightly shortened and amended, was originally presented as a paper entitled 'Jugoslovenska in britanska politika o koroškem vprašanju 1941–1945' at the Third British–Yugoslav Round Table at Kupari near Dubrovnik, 19–21 September 1978, and was published in *Zgodovinski časopis*, 33, 1979, 1, pp. 127–43.

- 1 See my 'Mednarodni položaj Jugoslavije v zadnjem letu druge svetovne vojne' in Tone Ferenc et al. (eds), *Osvoboditev Slovenije, 1945*, Ljubljana, 1977, pp. 237–57, which provides the broader background to this subject.
- 2 See Dušan Biber, *Nacizem in Nemci v Jugoslaviji, 1933–1941*, Ljubljana, 1966, pp. 93–166. Compare Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), FO 371/22313, R 2116/137/3; FO 371/22317, R 2853/137/3.
- 3 On 1 June 1940 the Comintern gave, *inter alia*, the following advice: 'The development of a broad mass movement with the slogan of the independence of the nations of Yugoslavia and their right to national self-determination and mutual help against all tyranny. But no slogans about the defence of the borders.' A similar statement is to be found in the resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comintern of 15 September 1940: 'In fact, the Party is not putting out a slogan about the defence of the borders of the Yugoslav state as it is today'. It appears that with this the Executive Committee did not have in mind only the Soviet–German pact on borders and friendship. See Josip Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, 30 vols, Belgrade, 1978, v, Appendix 1 and 3 (in manuscript only).

against the advance of German imperialism and Fascism, greatly preoccupied various Slovene political circles, including those which later joined the Tripartite Pact.

The British government, following the initiative of the Yugoslav envoy and minister plenipotentiary to Moscow, Milan Gavrilović — hoping to influence the Croats (Slovenes were not mentioned), to prevent Yugoslavia from joining the Tripartite Pact and to push her into the war — sent an oral message, conveyed by Ronald Campbell, first to Prince Paul and later to General Dušan Simović, premier of the *coup d'état* government. The gist of this message was that the Yugoslav demands for a revision of the Yugoslav–Italian border would be benevolently supported by Great Britain at the peace talks. Thus it is clear that possible revision of the Austro-Yugoslav border was not mentioned, let alone considered at that time.⁴

In the opinion of the British Foreign Office, Miha Krek was not informed of this British action regarding a possible revision of the Yugoslav–Italian border.⁵ However, the first 'Memorandum on the Slovene Territorial Claims at the Moment of the Establishment of the New Boundaries of the Yugoslav State' was dated as early as 1 May 1941, in Jerusalem 'at the seat of the Royal Yugoslav Government'. Actually, this was the memorandum of the Slovene People's Party. According to Dragovan Šepič this had been hurriedly written by Krek, Alojzij Kuhar, Franc Snoj and Franc Gabrovšek. However, in view of the fact that it was written, printed and handed over in English (if the date is correctly stated) hardly two weeks after the Royal Yugoslav Government had fled the country via Athens, Crete and Egypt to Palestine, there appears to be some justification for the hypothesis that the subject had been thought and written about even before the German attack on Yugoslavia.⁶

In a letter to Anton Zakrajšek, dated Trinidad, 31 July 1941, Alojzij Kuhar also explained the necessity of action in the USA:

The world knows so little of the Slovenes. [...] The notion of the 'Slovene territory' and the 'Slovene nation' must be formulated still. We shall have to do it very quickly as long the war lasts. At the peace conference it would be too late. This is our great preparatory work. [...] The echo that the White House must get from the repetition of the main claim: the final and definitive reunion of Slovene territory, regardless of what the new democratic order in Europe may happen to be.⁷

The representatives of the Slovene Liberal Party, however, clearly indicated to British diplomats in Palestine that they did not fully agree with the 'new frontiers, which, they say, embrace districts not ethnically Slovene'. However, they are not particularly mentioned as opponents of the new borders with Austria, not even on the Hohe Tauern, but they did mention that the Isonzo river would be a 'more justifiable line' with Italy than the Tagliamento river.⁸

And while Kuhar, a Catholic priest and leading Slovene clerical politician, stressed such a maximal territorial programme for a 'United Slovenia', his brother, Lovro Kuhar, who was a well-known novelist writing under the pseudonym Prežihov Voranc and a close collaborator of Tito during his stay in Paris, wrote a pamphlet in 1942, entitled 'O slovenskih mejah' (On the Slovene Borders), published by the Agitprop (Agitation and

4 Elisabeth Barker, *British Policy in South-East Europe in the Second World War*, London, 1976, pp. 87–88; Dragovan Šepič, 'Velika Britanija i pitanje revizije jugoslavensko-talijanske granice 1941', *Zgodovinski časopis*, 30, 1976, 1–2, pp. 47–77; PRO, PREM 3/394/3, W.P.(42).B.

5 PRO, FO 371/30221, R 10174/162/92. See Šepič, 'Velika Britanija', p. 61.

6 Ibid., pp. 56–59.

7 PRO, FO 371/30219, R 8157/162/92.

8 Šepič, 'Velika Britanija', p. 58; PRO, FO 371/30240, R 7539/960/92.

Propaganda Commission) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia. Lovro Kuhar strongly opposed the 'historical borders' as an essentially imperialistic slogan. 'I do not want anything belonging to others — I will not give what is mine', concluded Lovro Kuhar. This slogan later became generally known through Tito's speech on the island of Vis on 12 September 1944. However, Lovro Kuhar did demand those territories which had been forcibly denationalized in the imperial era, including linguistic islands in Carinthia, Klagenfurt and Zeellfeld.⁹

In its communiqué of 1 December 1942, on the occasion of the first meeting of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front in Slovenia particularly stressed that the new Yugoslavia would be joined by 'a free and united Slovenia from Trst [Trieste] to Špilje [Spielfeld Strass], from Kolpa to Celovec [Klagenfurt]'.¹⁰

One gets an insight into the policy of the Communist Party of Slovenia at the time from a letter written by Edvard Kardelj to Tito, dated 14 December 1942:

The border question is probably of more immediate importance to us than it is even to the British Empire. There is a quite special Slovene sensitivity in this regard, which we have for a long time tried to avoid by general declarations of principle, but now this is becoming less and less possible. The Slovenes, who have been disunited for 1,000 years, feel that the time has now come for the old slogan of a 'United Slovenia' to become a reality, and therefore the masses keep asking: *within which borders?* Reactionary circles mostly use this very point to try to discredit our Party among the masses. At least half their slanders concern our Party's attitude towards the borders. They try to prove their assertion that our patriotism is only verbal, and that in fact we are selling out in the name of 'proletarian internationalism' parts of Slovene soil to the Germans and Italians.

Kardelj explains that during 'the national war of liberation [...] these questions must be put in the same way as they are put in the framework of capitalism', while 'in socialism, of course, the question of the state to which towns as language islands belong would be absolutely unimportant. [...] We have clearly accepted the demand for the annexation of the whole Slovene Littoral with Trieste as an autonomous city and Carinthia with Klagenfurt. Had we not stated this quite clearly at this time, we would have given ammunition to Mihailović's men, who make all sorts of demands in their illegal literature.'¹¹

Miha Krek was undertaking a systematic campaign in London, writing to various individuals, including the *Times* journalist Iverach McDonald. Dragovan Šepić thinks it likely that the Memorandum of the Royal Yugoslav Government in London, dated 27 December 1941, was the first of these official memoranda.¹² However, according to a minute taken in the Foreign Office, it appears that the Memorandum of the Slovene People's Party, which did not sign itself as such, was issued as an official government communiqué.¹³

Many of Krek's activities were prompted by a fear of possible secret transactions between Great Britain and Italy, on the model of the London Pact of 1915, aimed at dividing the Axis and drawing Italy away from the German side in the war. In vain he

9 See Fran Zwitter, 'Priprave Znanstvenega inštituta za reševanje mejnih vprašanj po vojni' in Ferenc et al. (eds), *Osvoboditev Slovenije 1945*, p. 261.

10 Edvard Kardelj and Boris Kridič, *Jesen 1942*, ed. Tone Ferenc et al., Ljubljana, 1963, pp. 433–90.

11 *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodnooslobodilačkom ratu naroda Jugoslavije* (hereafter *Zbornik*), part 2, vol. 7, no. 24, Belgrade, 1959, pp. 85–86.

12 Šepić, 'Velika Britanija', pp. 62–63, quoting from Yugoslav Diplomatic Archives. Reference in PRO is FO 371/33446, R 35/35/92. Sir Orme Sargent told the Yugoslav minister Ivan Subotić that the Foreign Office would not give any official reply.

13 PRO, FO 371/30240, R 7539/960/92, minute of 1 August 1941 on p. 279.

constantly begged the British Government to refute publicly the London Pact and give official support to at least some Slovene territorial demands.¹⁴

Shortly after that Memorandum Miha Krek wrote a letter to George Rendel, dated 10 January 1942, giving details of some of the Slovene territorial demands with regard to the northern border, but this time he no longer insisted on the Hohe Tauern, but stated: 'These demands of ours concerning Austria, or Germany, are based principally on the demands put forward already in 1919 by Yugoslavia at the Peace Conference.'¹⁵

George Rendel commented on 12 March 1942: 'From all accounts the systematic extermination of the Slovenes is proceeding steadily, and if the war has to go on for another two or three years it may be that when we come to make peace there will be no Slovenes left to whom to assign any particular area.'¹⁶ P. L. Rose, having acquainted himself with the opinion of Robert Laffan, minuted: 'wild and politically exaggerated are the Slovene claims'.

Laffan gave a critical and detailed analysis of the contents of Krek's letter in March 1942. He, of course, had no knowledge of the instructions given by Anton Korošec and Milan Stojadinović to the Slovene national minority in Carinthia to vote for the *Anschluß* and noted: 'The younger generation of Slovenes appears to have accepted Nazi ideas. The Slovene districts were prominent in the abortive Nazi revolt of 1934 and gave a vote for the Anschluss in 1938 even higher than that of the rest of Carinthia. [...] The frontier proposed [...] appears [...] not to be justified by any argument except that of archaeology.'¹⁷

Laffan actually even dissented from the opinion (his own?) expressed in the 'Memoranda on Frontiers of European Confederations and the Transfer of German Populations. Prepared by Foreign Research and Press Service, Balliol College, Oxford', dated 20 February 1942, in which no change of borders is proposed but the following statement is nevertheless made: 'Ethnographically, Yugoslavia might still lay claim to part of the [Klagenfurt] basin, and possibly a narrow strip along its southern edge might even prefer Yugoslav sovereignty. Economics and strategy, however, would require either no change or the annexation of the whole basin.'¹⁸

In another such analysis, which Laffan sent to Douglas Howard, head of the Southern Department in the Foreign Office on 13 May 1942, a pessimistic forecast is given: 'A diminishing remnant of these Slovenes has maintained a vigorous struggle for its corporate existence, but appears destined to extinction, unless wholly new relations arise between the reconstructed States of Austria and Yugoslavia.'¹⁹

In general, in all subsequent memoranda and analyses, the Yugoslav demands with regard to Austria, that is, Carinthia, were rejected, whether they came from the Royal Government in exile or from Marshal Tito. Instead, an exchange of the German minority in Slovenia and the Slovene minority in Austria was envisaged and economic reasons were

14 PRO, FO 371/33470, R 5976, 6386, 6161/178/92; FO 371/37630, R 2038/246/92; Šepič, 'Velika Britanija', p. 61; FO 371/30219, R 8179, 8287/160/92; FO 371/33446, R 1764, 2633/35/92. The Foreign Office merely confirmed on 12 May 1942 that it would 'not enter into any commitments affecting Yugoslav interests without first consulting the Yugoslav Government' (FO 371/33446, R 2864/35/92). In an aide-memoire to the Royal Yugoslav Embassy in London, dated 19 November 1942, Sir Orme Sargent pointed out that it was 'still our policy not to discuss or commit ourselves during the war on any of the territorial questions which would have to be considered and dealt with at the peace settlement' (FO 371/33446, R 7984/35/92).

15 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 391, R 2633/35/92.

16 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 1764/35/92.

17 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 1580/35/92.

18 PRO, FO 371/33148, R 6150/646/92.

19 PRO, FO 371/33498, R 3425/3425/92.

put forward for some border correction in favour of Austria in the Windische Büheln to the south of the River Mur.²⁰

In the spring of 1943 the conflicts between Serbian and Croatian ministers in the Royal Government in exile led Miha Krek to begin to doubt the possibility of the reconstruction of a common Yugoslav state. He mentioned a possible Slovene independent, neutral state. George Rendel noted Krek's thoughts on 4 March 1943: 'if Yugoslavia disintegrates, Slovenia might form a unit in some new politico-economic group based on, and forming the hinterland to, the ports of Trieste and Fiume. [...] One feature of the scheme would of course be the return to Slovenia of Slovene districts of Italy and Carinthia, and possibly allocation to the Slovenes of the whole of Istria.'²¹

And, while Miha Krek assured George Rendel at the end of May 1943 'that, in conditions of modern war, effective defence of Slovenia, even as part of larger unit, would in fact always prove impossible', and that the 'future of Slovenia could only be assured by political and economic and not by military means',²² a meeting of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia, held on 12 May 1943, stressed in a greeting to the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front that the whole of Slovene Carinthia was formally joining the struggle of the Slovene people for liberation and union in a free and united Slovenia. In the greetings sent to Tito, it was said that it was Tito himself who had given the people of Carinthia a new faith in the final victory and in union with the other parts of Slovenia in a new democratic Yugoslavia.²³

A Special Commission of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Front in Ljubljana began studying the question of the future borders at the end of 1941 and in early 1942. This Commission was composed of politicians, historians and geographers; no written evidence of its work has been preserved. At the beginning of October 1943 the initiative for further academic research on these questions was given, in agreement with Edvard Kardelj, by Fran Zwitter, later Director of the partisans' Scholarly Institute (Znanstveni inštitut), a unique institution among the resistance movements in Europe, and in Yugoslavia. His report *Problem bodočih slovenskih mej* (The Problem of the Future Slovene Borders), which was intended for internal discussion, defended the principle of the possible division of Carinthia on the basis of the more or less old ethnic frontier from the middle of the nineteenth century and rejected subjective criteria or a plebiscite. It envisaged the expulsion of the definitely German population in Slovenia, but not in Carinthia, a procedure which Rodoljub Čolaković had already announced earlier for the whole of Yugoslavia. Fran Zwitter also wrote two reports for the Allies on the Slovene minorities in Italy and Carinthia, giving the necessary information, but not defining territorial claims. As early as February 1944, the British Mission requested and received from Edvard Kardelj information about these minorities.

On the basis of the results of discussions held on 9 September 1944, Zwitter wrote a new report: *Meje Jugoslavije. A: Meje Slovenskega ozemlja*. (The Borders of Yugoslavia. A: The Borders of Slovene Territory). In the second half of 1944 this Institute produced about

20 PRO, FO 371/33446, R 2986/35/92; FO 371/37174, R 808/369/67 (1943); FO 371/48926, R 17242/2395/92 etc. It would be worth doing some research on whether these ideas were still retained at a later date.

21 PRO, FO 371/37630, R 2038/246/92. See also Dušan Biber, 'Federalna državnost Slovenije v zavezniških dokumentih do maja 1945' in B. Grafenauer et al. (eds), *Slovenci in država*, Ljubljana 1995, pp. 261–67.

22 PRO, FO 371/37630, R 4737/246/92.

23 Archives of the Institute for the History of the Labour Movement in Ljubljana (Inštitut za zgodovino delavskega gibanja), file 650 (AIZDG), now Archives of Slovenia (Arhiv Slovenije).

twenty reports, written by various authors, on border and minority questions. The territorial demands with regard to Austria which Yugoslavia submitted to the conference of deputy foreign ministers in London in 1947, were in essence, the same as those formulated in September 1944, where the demand was made for the annexation of the ethnic Slovene territories, with some minor corrections.²⁴

In mid-1944, the so-called 'Carinthian Declaration' was issued on behalf of the political, cultural and economic organisations of the Carinthian Slovenes, which demanded a natural border on the Hohe and Niedere Tauern and also the cession of Styria as war reparation, all with the aim of redirecting *Deutschtum* in Austria from a south-eastern imperialistic to a German central European orientation.²⁵ It is not clear who was actually the author of this declaration, whether and how it was treated and whether it was widely circulated and brought to the attention of the general public.

In a letter of 5 February 1944, written on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and of the Communist Party of Slovenia, Edvard Kardelj requested, among other things, that in the interest of the general struggle against Fascism there should be no discussion among the masses of the annexation of Slovene Carinthia, adding that it was wrong to talk of the Austrian national minority in Carinthia. Talks should be held with the leadership of the Austrian Anti-Fascist Movement about a common struggle against Hitler, but certainly not about the nationalities and border questions. Territorial claims on an imperialist Austria would, in any case, be greater than on a people's democratic Austria. It was the anti-Fascist and not solely the national element which should be stressed. Emphasis on the national element might separate the peasants from the workers, since the workers rather tended towards the Germans.²⁶

The secretary of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia, Dušan Pirjevec-Ahac, duly acknowledged the mistakes, but he explained that the Committee had only carried out the instructions given by the secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia. It had been no coincidence that there had been such strong emphasis on the idea that Slovene Carinthia belonged to Yugoslavia. It had been found that the masses in Carinthia were not yet ready for the battle, but that they were nevertheless in favour of annexation to Yugoslavia. They saw the Partisans in the same light as General Maister's fighters who had fought for the northern border of Slovenia (Yugoslavia) in 1919 and 1920.²⁷ Clear Party instructions were given to the effect that in the Committee's contacts with the Austrian Communist Party no discussion about the borders should be opened.²⁸

After the speech which Tito delivered on Vis on 12 September 1944, in which he also mentioned the liberation of 'our brothers' in Carinthia,²⁹ a propaganda campaign clearly pronounced that 'Klagenfurt, as the centre of the Carinthian part of Slovenia, belongs to

24 Zwitter, 'Priprave Znanstvenega inštituta', pp. 258–76. Perhaps these reports could be found in the WO files of 37. Military Mission in WO 202 in PRO.

25 Metod Mikuž, 'Trojna (dvojna) internacionalistična akcija CK KPS (CK KPJ) na Koroškem med NOB do konca 1943 dalje' (hereafter 'Trojna (dvojna)'), *Zgodovinski časopis*, 24, 1970, 3–4, p. 266; AIZDG, Archives of Slovenia, file 649. Mikuž does not mention the demand for the annexation of Styria. According to the historian Vlado Habjan, the writer of this resolution was Tone Čop in Vienna.

26 Mikuž, 'Trojna (dvojna)', pp. 254–57.

27 Ibid., p. 259.

28 AIZDG, f. 649. Provincial Committee of CP of Slovenia for Carinthia, 24 March 1944, Archives of Slovenia.

29 Josip Broz-Tito, *Vojna djela, I: 1941–1945*, Belgrade, 1961, pp. 278–79; idem, *Sabrana djela*, XXIII, pp. 111–14.

united Slovenia and to Federal Yugoslavia'; simultaneously relations with the Austrian Communist Party deteriorated considerably.³⁰ The Chief of the Allied Mission in Styria with the Fourth Operative Zone, the American Major Franklin Lindsay, reported on the local campaign of posters and meetings for the return of Slovene Carinthia. He suspected that the mobilization by the Partisans of 4,000–5,000 men a month, despite the fact that there were no weapons for them, was being undertaken with a view to Carinthia.³¹

Before the end of the war the Cuckold Mission reported on 28 April 1945: 'no exact statement has been made [...] all Koroško and Štajersko are rightly Slovene [...] almost certainly include Villach and Klagenfurt.'³² The British Major W. Pears made similar observations on 15 April 1945 at the Headquarters of the Slovene National Liberation Army.³³ Boris Kridič's statement in Črnomelj on 16 April 1945, on the occasion of the celebration of the signing of the Soviet–Yugoslav Friendship Treaty, that the fulfilment of the demands for the annexation of the Slovene Littoral with Trieste and Gorizia, and Carinthia with Klagenfurt, now that they were being guaranteed by Soviet support, certainly attracted attention.³⁴ Whether this was actually true or not, it was a disturbing dilemma in May 1945, probably not only for the British.

Yugoslav-British Co-operation in Attempts to Penetrate Austria

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia, on 15 July 1943 the Secretary Franc Leskošek-Luka informed the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia of the arrival of the British Mission to the Slovene headquarters. 'Should such officers happen to join you, welcome them, make all facilities available to them, but be careful in your statements to them. Let them have everything consistent with our line and the liberation struggle', he wrote.³⁵

According to all available evidence the first British officers apparently entered Carinthia, as did many partisans, through the Littoral Region and the Headquarters 9th Corps which was stationed there. Lieutenant-Colonel Peter Wilkinson and Major Alfgar Hesketh Prichard, who introduced himself to the Slovene Partisans as Cahusac, led the 'Clowder' mission. This SOE Mission tried to penetrate Austria and further into Central Europe.³⁶ Wilkinson wrote:

As far as the Slovenians' [*sic*] attitude to the Allies is concerned they have a blind (and almost pathological) admiration for the USSR (especially for the Soviet Army), a somewhat chilly respect for Great Britain (in particular for her democratic parliamentary institutions) and an indifference, almost amounting to contempt, for the Americans. [...] This Russian influence may prove significant if, after the war, there is a revival of Russian imperialism. For we should remember that Greater Slovenia stretches from Trieste in the West to Villach

30 Archives of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Slovenia (ACKZKS), Nr. 4418, Archives of Slovenia.

31 PRO, FO 371/44265, R 17554/8/92.

32 PRO, WO 202/318.

33 PRO, WO 202/309.

34 PRO, FO 371/48813, R 8002/6/92.

35 ACKZKS, Nr. 1295, Archives of Slovenia.

36 PRO, FO 371/44255, R 7125/8/92, Wilkinson's 'Memorandum on the Revolt in Slovenia' of 27 April 1944. See WO 202/212, Major Klugmann's minute of 26 September 1944; Peter Wilkinson, *Foreign Fields: The Story of an SOE Operative*, London and New York, 1997, pp. 167–72, 196–211.

and Klagenfurt in the North; and after Czechoslovakia, Slovenia offers Russia her most important gateway to the West.³⁷

Tito informed the Croatian headquarters of the arrival of Wilkinson as early as 18 November 1943, and on 1 January 1944 he gave him permission to send his men into Austria through Slovenia.³⁸ 'We understood that CLOWDER would use Partisans purely as a springboard for penetration Central Europe [...] We fear Pzns will object to being used as passive instruments for activities they do not rpt not control', Lieutenant-Colonel F. W. Deakin anticipated on 13 February 1944.³⁹ This proved to be correct, although, according to all available evidence, somewhat later, for example in a letter written by the Political Commissar Mitja Ribičič on 27 June 1944, addressed to Viktor Avbelj, Deputy Political Commissar at the HQ of the National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Slovenia: 'The problems with the English are increasing, because they are too interested in Austria. [...] It will be very difficult to control all those people, if the missions keep arriving. Cahusac by all means insists going to Austria. [...] To send him across today would cause his death. The boy is tall and clumsy and he will be in trouble in the very first inn he stays overnight.'⁴⁰

Actually, in his letter of 5 February 1944, Edvard Kardelj had particularly stressed that one of the tasks of the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia was to organize the broadest possible intelligence network in Austria, because such information would be needed also by the Allies.⁴¹

Thus Major William Jones could report, on 10 February 1944, that the Slovene HQ was prepared to co-operate and to 'push Partisan intelligence groups into ROME, VIENNA and any points you suggest. [...] Partisans have English-speaking personnel and operators who will tie into the present British intelligence network. Partisans will lend entire propaganda organization to penetrate AUSTRIA, GERMANY and ITALY.'⁴²

Wilkinson assessed the beginning of this co-operation as follows: 'Considering their possibilities, the information received from Austria by the Partisans is most disappointing — political waffle and Communist propaganda for the most part. In fairness it must be said that now they know what we want, the Partisans are trying to develop their organization to meet our requirements.'⁴³

In any case, on 12 February 1944 F. W. Deakin proposed, in connection with Jones's report among other things: 'To get in sets, and through SLOVENE Pzns develop their suggested network in co-operation with ISLD and OSS.'⁴⁴ The Slovene Partisan HQ issued an order that all possible assistance be given to the Clowder mission. However, all care should be taken to ensure that the mission was not exploited by enemy elements.⁴⁵ The same HQ issued an order to the HQ of the Carinthian Group, dated 23 June 1944, to the effect that the Allied intelligence centres should be given only military information and not

37 Ibid.

38 *Zbornik*, part 2, vol. 11, no. 52, p. 90, no. 173, 318; Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, XVII, p. 231, and *ibid.* XVIII, p. 135.

39 PRO, WO 202/361.

40 AIZDG, f. 16/III/6, Archives of Slovenia.

41 Belgrade, Arhiv Predsedništva CK SKJ (ACKSKJ), CK KPJ 1944/42, Archives of Yugoslavia.

42 PRO, WO 202/361.

43 PRO, FO 371/44255, R 7125/8/92, Wilkinson's 'Memorandum on the Revolt in Slovenia' of 27 April 1944.

44 PRO, WO 202/361.

45 *Zbornik*, part 6, vol. 10, no. 101, p. 206.

under any circumstances political information or statements. The HQ stressed that no outsider should have any insight into the partisans' intelligence service.⁴⁶

Franklin Lindsay estimated that the Allied missions with the HQ of the Fourth Operative Zone succeeded in collecting only 10 per cent of the potentially available information. Despite assurances to the contrary Lindsay was convinced that the partisans had regular contacts in towns such as Villach, Klagenfurt, Graz and Vienna at that time. And while the Partisans, supported by Lindsay, proposed that in order to cross the River Drava, the Allies should send all possible assistance and supplies by air; after Tito's speech on Vis the Foreign Office and the Political Committee at Balkan Air Force HQ took a negative attitude.⁴⁷ Hesketh Prichard nevertheless did succeed in crossing the River Drava in mid-October 1944.⁴⁸ But after 3 December 1944 his superiors lost all contact with him.⁴⁹

The British intention was primarily 'to form Austrian "resistance"' independently of the Partisans'. This proved impossible and the whole matter was postponed till the end of March 1945. The only possibility which was still open was the setting up of 'small clandestine groups with WT communication [...] a valuable source of intelligence'. The Allied Mission which tried to penetrate into the eastern Tyrol and south-west Carinthia was faced with a similar situation: 'we conclude that there is no further value in stimulating armed "resistance" inside AUSTRIA', they wrote, adding: 'In South Carinthia close relations have already been established with members of the Slovene minority and JANL units operating in the frontier districts.' All that was planned for the Clowder mission at that time were special assignments connected with the Allied occupation of Austria such as sending a group of Social Democrats to Graz. 'Contact with reliable Christian Social and Social Democratic elements in AUSTRIA' had, however, already been established at an earlier date.⁵⁰ The Allied efforts to organize a resistance movement in Austria were unsuccessful, noted the official history of the HQ for Special Operations at the AFHQ.⁵¹ 'As regards SLOVENE activity in AUSTRIA (CARINTHIA) we are avoiding any contact with SLOVENE Partisans in this area, and are giving them no supply by air except occasional non-warlike "comfort" stores on a small scale', it was stated on 21 March 1945.⁵²

Co-operation and Misunderstandings between the Communist Parties of Slovenia (Yugoslavia) and Austria

In the first year of the National War of Liberation, Tito took steps to set up contacts with Austrian Communists. From a dispatch sent by him to the Comintern on 29 April 1942, we learn that the Yugoslav Partisans were in a position to provide all the necessary forged documents and to send Austrian comrades to Austria, either with the help of partisan detachments or simply by regular trains.⁵³ It is not known if and what the Comintern replied to this suggestion. When Tito received news that the British were trying to organize

46 Ibid. vol. 14, no. 76, pp. 326–8.

47 PRO, FO 371/48811, R 5715/6/92; WO 202/309, See also Franklin Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night: With the OSS and Tito's Partisans in Wartime Yugoslavia*, Stanford, CA, 1993.

48 AIZDG, f. 16/III/6, Archives of Slovenia.

49 PRO, WO 204/1954. See also Wilkinson, *Foreign Fields*, pp. 196–206; Lindsay, *Beacons in the Night*, pp. 166–69; Thomas M. Barker, *Social Revolutionaries and Secret Agents: The Carinthian Slovene Partisans and Britain's Special Operations Executive*, New York, 1990, pp. 46–50.

50 Ibid.

51 PRO, WO 204/2030 B.

52 PRO, WO 204/2000.

53 ACKSKJ, CKKPJ-KI 1942/83, Archives of Yugoslavia; Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, x, p. 87.

a Socialist Party of some kind in Italy, he informed the Comintern in a despatch dated 2 December 1942 that he could organize illegal entry into Italy for some well-known Italian comrades. He considered it necessary that Ercoli (that is, Palmiro Togliatti) should by all means leave for Italy.⁵⁴ On 5 January 1944, Tito instructed Slovene HQ to give special attention to the question of smaller partisan units, which should infiltrate into Austria from Styria across the River Drava and establish contacts with Austrians. In the west contact should be established with Italian partisan units, mutual confidence developed and co-ordinated action taken.⁵⁵

By the end of 1943 first contacts had been established between Slovene and Austrian Communists. However, on 7 October 1942, Edvard Kardelj had reported to Tito about co-operation with the Austrian Communist Party. For a long time there were doubts in the Central and Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia about whether they were dealing with real members of the Austrian Communist Party or with 'agents provocateurs'. At the end of November 1943 the Slovene Communists had their first meeting with Andreas, the Secretary of the Provincial Committee of Austrian Communist Party. Following instructions from the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia it was agreed that the Austrian Communist Party would hand over its organizations in Slovene Carinthia. An agreement was reached that Klagenfurt indisputably belonged to Slovenia, while the position of Villach remained open to discussion. A Landeskommittät der Österreichischen Freiheitsfront für Kärnten (Provincial Committee of the Austrian Liberation Front for Carinthia) was to be set up for the Austrian minority. The Communist Party of Slovenia would support the establishment of independent Austrian partisan units. The first recruits should come from Villach, and a Contact Committee was to undertake the co-ordination of both parties' activities.⁵⁶

At the second meeting held on 20 January 1944, there were already difficulties with regard to these decisions, especially regarding the yielding of control over Austrian Communist Party organizations. Thus the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia proposed to the Party Central Committee that the question of competence in Carinthia should be cleared up with the Austrian Communist Party through the Comintern. But on 28 January 1944 German units attacked the HQ of the Provincial Committee of Slovenia for Carinthia and seized all the files. Again in his letter of 5 February 1944, Kardelj criticized the work of the Provincial Committee. They should refrain from giving lectures on the national question, but organize special independent Austrian partisan units, which should remain, nevertheless, for as long as possible, under the command of Slovene Partisan Headquarters until such time as an anti-Fascist movement could be developed in the rest of Austria. The political line of the Austrian Communist Party should be aimed towards the establishment of an independent people's democratic Austria, with close ties with the peoples of Yugoslavia and supported by the Soviet Union.

Without going into the interesting details of the meetings which followed, the disputes and mutual reproaches, I must mention the fact that Andreas was arrested at the beginning of May 1944.⁵⁷ However, on 6 May 1944 Kardelj sent a message to Leskošek-Luka,

54 ACSKJ, CKKPJ-KI 1942/290, Archives of Yugoslavia; Broz-Tito, *Sabrana djela*, XIII, p. 62.

55 Broz-Tito, *Vojna djela, I: 1941–1945*, p. 213; idem, *Sabrana djela*, XVIII, pp. 149–51.

56 Kardelj and Kridrič, *Jesen 1942*, p. 19; Arhiv Slovenije, AIZDG, f. 649, notes in German by an official of the Austrian Communist Party, Alois, no date. He states that Andreas is the code name of Konrad Pucher and suspects him as being in German service. Mikuž, 'Trojna (dvojna)', pp. 267–71.

57 Ibid. See also Metod Mikuž, *Pregled zgodovine narodnoosvobodilne borbe v Sloveniji* (hereafter *Pregled*), 5 vols, Ljubljana, 1973, IV, pp. 109, 110, 180, 666–68; Stephen Clissold, *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939–1973*, London, 1975, p. 30.

saying that the Comintern, and Koplenig in particular, were very much interested in the possibility of contacts with Austrians. It would be best to inform 'Grandfather' directly, particularly if it would be possible to establish contact with the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party for comrades who would come to Slovenia.⁵⁸

Franz Honner, a prominent member of the Central Committee of the Austrian Communist Party and two other 'comrades' arrived safely at the seat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and 'Grandfather' (the Comintern, at that time already officially disbanded) informed Kardelj on 30 June 1944, that Honner and his escort were to be given all support in carrying out their unspecified assignment. They then left for Slovenia, to the free territory in Bela Krajina.⁵⁹ The despatch from Moscow giving instructions stressed that the borders must not be a subject of controversy. 'The Austrian Communist Party is, in principle, for the union of the Slovene regions with a future Yugoslav state, that is, with Slovenia', Andrej (Aleš Bebler) wrote in a letter to Leskošek-Luka on 18 July 1944.⁶⁰

On 3 September 1944, Kardelj informed Tito of the conversation with Honner, whom Tito had already met in Zagreb in 1940: 'Grandfather informed him that we should occupy part of Austria instead of others. He also informed me that Grandfather had told him that the USSR would not give up Austria, because it will be a link between Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. In Austria itself there is still no serious movement.'⁶¹

At this time Churchill was suggesting an Allied landing in Istria and a breakthrough in the 'Ljubljana Gap'. 'It is indispensable that Trieste and Istria should be taken this year', Churchill wrote to General Wilson on 4 September 1944. In Churchill's minute to General Ismay on 9 September 1944, we read: 'The possibility of making an amphibious descent from Ancona or Venice — if we get it — upon Istria, holds a very high place in my thoughts, it is by this means we could widen our front of advance into Austria and Hungary, having the ports of Trieste and Fiume at our disposal.'⁶²

'Your task: to assist the development of partisan movement in Austria under the leadership of the Austrians themselves at all costs. The aim must be to encourage the development of a partisan movement all over Austria.' Those were the instructions issued by the Slovene Partisan HQ, dated 25 May 1944. As early as 16 January 1944, the Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of Slovenia for Carinthia had issued a Party directive that the Austrian national minority in Carinthia must be revolutionized and anti-Fascist work developed among the German soldiers, particularly among the Austrians.⁶³

However, the Austrian Battalion on the Free Slovene Territory in Bela Krajina, which was set up with the agreement of the Supreme Command of the National Liberation Army and the Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia, was not established until 24 November 1944. Honner agreed that the Austrians should join Yugoslav National Liberation Army units. The Austrians should be gathered in camps in Styria and Bela Krajina, while German POWs of Austrian origin were flown in from the Soviet Union. Many Slovene names can be found on the list of fighters in this Austrian Battalion.

The Avantgard Kampfgruppe Steiermark, with its commanding officer Ferdinand (code-name), had parachuted from Soviet aeroplanes onto the territory of Bela Krajina in Slovenia in June 1944. In October 1944 this unit crossed the River Drava but soon returned across the old Yugoslav–Austrian frontier in Styria. By April 1945 this unit had grown to

58 ACKSKJ, CK KPJ 1944/171, Archives of Yugoslavia. See also Mikuž, *Pregled*, IV, p. 565.

59 Ibid., pp. 265–68.

60 ACKZKS, number not registered, Archives of Slovenia.

61 ACKZKS, f. 69, Nr. 16345, Archives of Slovenia.

62 PRO, PREM 3/275/2.

63 AIZDG, f. 649, Archives of Slovenia.

500 men. The Austrian Battalion fought in Slovenia, however, mostly very close to the free territory.⁶⁴ In short, Soviets and British both recruited volunteers from among German POWs, using them in order to further their political aims in Austria. So did the Slovenes.

'Grandfather', or the already disbanded Comintern, gave instructions (at the beginning of February 1945) that the Party in Vienna should contact Honner through the communication channels of the Communist Party of Slovenia. It is not, however, known whether this was actually done. When the Yugoslav units withdrew from Carinthia, the greater part of the Austrian Battalion remained behind. Allegedly, the British gave this Battalion the status of Austrian Partisans.⁶⁵

Just before the end of the Second World War the high-ranking Slovene party official Dušan Pirjevec-Ahac was upset by a letter from an Austrian Communist Party official, particularly because of the sentence: 'we shall, also in the future [...] support [...] all efforts of the Communist Party of Slovenia, in so far as they conform to the line of the Third International'. In his reply Pirjevec-Ahac put one question only — whether the Austrian Communist Party was at least now, when the Red Army units were so close, capable of organizing at least one single partisan unit?⁶⁶

The British also tried to follow this aspect of the political and military problems in Slovenia. Among the members of the Soviet Military Mission which was flown in with British help, by glider, to Tito's headquarters only in February 1944, there were two 'well-known Austrian Communists'. They were presumed to have gone into Croatia.⁶⁷

Conclusion

At the end of this chapter I quote some British documents that help us understand the political situation of the time. In connection with Colonel Peter Moore's second long report from Slovenia, Sir Orme Sargent wrote, on 23 April 1945, to General Hollis *inter alia*: 'This report prompts the very cynical reflection that it would be not at all inconvenient if events should develop in such a way that Tito is temporarily held up by the opposition of the Ustashi and White Guard forces, round, say, Ljubljana and Zagreb, while the Allied forces from Italy are enabled to occupy Venezia Giulia and Carinthia in comparative tranquillity.'⁶⁸

In this report Moore had written the following: 'Britain is regarded with intense dislike and suspicion by the Partisan authorities, who fear we may oppose their territorial claims or try to force them to moderate their internal policy. This is however likely to pass with time.'⁶⁹

The British ambassador to Belgrade, Ralph Skrine Stevenson, telegraphed to London on 10 May 1945, reporting that fighting was still in progress in Slovenia, despite the fact that the Second World War had officially been over by the capitulation of the Third Reich: 'Yugoslav pretensions will be unbounded. They must be curbed now or we will see "national liberation committees" being set up not only in Italian territory far west of Isonzo but also well into Southern Austria.'⁷⁰ This was not an isolated opinion. In a Foreign

64 Mikuž, *Pregled*, IV, pp. 665–68; idem, 'Trojna (dvojna)', pp. 268–71; Dušan Plenča, *Medjunarodni odnosi Jugoslavije u toku drugog svjetskog rata*, Belgrade, 1962, pp. 360–62, wrongly dates the establishment of the Austrian Battalion at the end of January 1945.

65 ACKZKS, f. 69, no. 16345, Archives of Slovenia.

66 Ibid.

67 PRO, WO 204/2011.

68 PRO, FO 371/48812, R 7247/6/92.

69 PRO, FO 371/48813, R 8004/6/92.

70 PRO, FO 371/48814, R 8199/6/92.

Office minute of 14 March 1945 we read 'We certainly do not want to have the Yugoslavs occupying any part of Austria after the surrender [...] they would also spread Russian and Communist influence wherever they went'.⁷¹

'Let me know what you are doing in massing forces against this Muscovite tentacle, of which Tito is the crook', Churchill asked Field-Marshal Harold Alexander on 7 May 1945.⁷² 'Our troops reached Klagenfurt three hours before the Yugoslavs', General Sir Richard McCreery, the Eighth Army Commander, reported on 9 May 1945. Harold Macmillan's despatch reads: 'beat the Yugoslavs to Klagenfurt by three hours'.⁷³

These few quotations serve to illustrate the real atmosphere on the British side at the end of the Second World War. The course of events has already been briefly sketched in the official history on British foreign policy during the war.⁷⁴ British opposition to Yugoslav demands and Slovene national aspirations was, naturally, conditioned by the balance of power within the Allied camp at the time. However, this was not the primary consideration. In the *Handbook for Yugoslavia*, prepared by the Foreign Office Research Department, one paper, dated 20 January 1944 and entitled 'The Austro-Yugoslav Frontier', states categorically:

Since April 1941 [*sic*], Yugoslav leaders, including Marshal Tito, have demanded that Yugoslavia should be extended to include all the Slovene-speaking elements north of this frontier. [...] Such a demand is not justified by ethnic, economic or strategic considerations. It would entail the annexation to Yugoslavia of populations predominantly German and separated from the rest of Yugoslavia by high mountains.⁷⁵

The old ideal of a united Slovenia, formulated first in 1848, came true for only a few days after the last shot had been fired from partisan rifles.

71 PRO, FO 371/48811, R 5477/8/92.

72 PRO, FO 371/48814, R 8153/6/92.

73 PRO, FO 371/48813, R 8128/6/92.

74 Llewellyn Woodward, *British Foreign Policy in the Second World War*, 5 vols, London, 1971, III, pp. 367–69, 374. See also D. Biber, 'Britansko-jugoslovenski nespোরazumi okrog Koroške 1944–1945', *Zgodovinski časopis*, 32, 1978, 4, pp. 475–89.

75 PRO, FO 371/37174, R 808/369/67.

8 The Sorbian Movement in Lusatia, 1945–1948

PETER SCHURMANN

The Local and International Context

The post-Second World War Sorbian movement was led by the Domowina. This institution, the umbrella organization for Sorbian associations, was founded in 1912, banned in 1937, and renewed its activities in Crostwitz, near Bautzen, on 10 May 1945. The Domowina worked side by side with the Sorbian National Committee, founded in Prague on 9 May 1945, and the Slav Committee, founded in Bautzen in December 1945. These representative institutions shared the same goal, the preservation of the ethnic-national identity of the Sorbs, particularly their language and culture. In Saxony and Brandenburg, they supported the establishment of schools with Sorbian as the language of instruction, the involvement of Sorbs in local and supraregional government offices, the development of a broadly based Sorbian cultural and social life, the re-opening of a Sorbian printing-office, and the publication of newspapers, periodicals and educational material in Sorbian.

In the beginning, the boards of the National Committee and the Domowina believed the best way to preserve the Sorbian *ethnie* would be to make Lusatia a unified administrative region of Czechoslovakia. Their minimum goal was the creation of cultural autonomy within Germany, in particular the autonomous administration of cultural matters. To facilitate this the two regions inhabited by the Sorbs, Upper and Lower Lusatia, should be united. The activists involved derived the self-confidence to try to achieve the emancipation of the Sorbs chiefly from the defeat of Nazism and the social, economic and ethnic consequences of the war. The activists' goals were stimulated by both the presence of a Slav occupying power and the expressions of solidarity of pro-Sorb soldiers and politicians in other Slav lands, particularly Czechoslovakia.

After the Potsdam Conference, the leaders of the Sorbian movement had as their maximum goal the achievement of independence, resulting from the peace negotiations concerning Germany. International agreements like the Atlantic Charter (1941) and the United Nations Charter (1945) pointed to free cultural, economic and political development on the basis of democracy for all peoples liberated from Nazism and Fascism. That is what the representatives of Sorbian interests wanted for their people. Corresponding appeals were sent to the Paris peace conference in 1946.

Thanks to the intercession of Yugoslavia, at the beginning of 1947, the Sorbs harboured the hope that a settlement of the Sorb question would be arrived at during the negotiations on a German peace treaty at the foreign ministers' council in Moscow. Thus far the Domowina had not succeeded in introducing legal stipulations concerning the Sorbs into the new *Land* constitutions of Brandenburg and Saxony. The Domowina noted, at the end of 1946 and beginning of 1947, an increase in efforts to restore former systems in the Western zones of occupation, while the Socialist Unity Party (SED) and the Soviet occupation authorities were holding fast to the goal of German unity. In addition to this, rumours started spreading about an early end of the occupation. The Domowina and the National Committee considered the Sorb question 'unresolved.'¹ Anxious about the

Much of the material here is contained in my monograph, Peter Schurmann, *Die sorbische Bewegung 1945–1948 zwischen Selbstbehauptung und Anerkennung*, Bautzen, 1998.

1 Sorbisches Kulturarchiv, Bautzen (henceforth SKA), D II 1.6 A. p. 43/1.

continued existence of the Sorbian nationality, the two institutions sent separate memoranda to the Moscow foreign ministers' council. In the Domowina's view, one or more Slav states should guarantee the autonomy of a neutral Lusatia. The *Nationalrat* (the executive of the National Committee) insisted on the creation of a free Lusatia completely independent of Germany.

After the Moscow conference basic conditions improved for the Sorbs. With the support of the SED faction, the Domowina put before the Saxon parliament a bill guaranteeing the rights of the Sorbian population, which was passed unanimously by all parties on 23 March 1948. Henceforth the Domowina took the line that the Sorbian question should be discussed only inside the Soviet zone of occupation or Germany as a whole, not internationally. The fact that primarily the SED supported the efforts of the Domowina to settle the Sorbian question had a positive effect. In comparison with the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberal Democrats (LDPD), the SED manifested 'the greatest activity in policy concerning the Sorbs' in Saxony.²

The *Nationalrat*, however, maintained its position that the Sorbian question should be settled on an international level until the late summer of 1947. But in contrast to the Domowina, it did not exclude help from the Western occupation powers. The *Nationalrat*, and hence the National Committee, rejected any party-political orientation, let alone affiliation, such as fostered by the Domowina, which had a shared list with the SED in the first post-war elections in the Soviet zone in 1946. It did not want to base its work towards the freedom of the Sorbs in the German-dominated parties and administration. In 1945 and 1946 both the National Committee and the Domowina had sought support for Sorbian interests from the Soviet occupation authorities. After the Domowina representatives had left the *Nationalrat*, the remaining members manifested a detached, critical attitude to the Soviet Military Administration of Germany (SMAD). This attitude resulted from the fact that the Domowina had come under political pressure from the Soviets, probably with regard to Sorbian teachers' joining the SED. The representatives of the National Committee were evidently also afraid that any promotion of the Sorbs by the Soviet military authorities might have a negative impact on Sorb-German relations once the occupation was over.

Problems with Prague

In July 1945 the Domowina considered it the order of the day that Germans and Sorbs should settle all matters in Lusatia together. For the Domowina co-operation between Germans and Sorbs was a key element in the reforming not only of intellectual and cultural, but also of socio-economic and political life. This demanded that both sides informed each other about such matters. The Domowina sought contacts with municipal, district and *Land* administrations in Saxony and the Cottbus provincial council in Brandenburg. Since August 1945 the Domowina had been working side by side with the four permitted parties of the anti-Fascist bloc. Its activities were, however, limited in time — they lasted only weeks — and in space: the Bautzen district in Saxony. The possibilities of the Sorbs' lending political force to their ethnic demands remained restricted. This situation encouraged the Domowina's merging with the National Committee in Bautzen in September 1945, after the latter had moved its headquarters there from Prague. All cultural and political endeavours within and outwith the Soviet zone of occupation were to be managed through a new co-ordination centre. The *Nationalrat* had developed from this merger; it consisted of two members of each institution, including the two presidents, the

2 Heiko Kosel, 'Die Sorbenpolitik der SED, der CDU und der LDPD in Sachsen von 1945 bis 1949', master's dissertation, Berlin, 1994, p. 89.

schoolmaster Paweł Nedo from the Domowina and the priest Jan Cyž from the National Committee.

A branch remained in Prague, headed by the lawyer Jurij Cyž, but now the National Committee, through the *Nationalrat* in Bautzen, became actively involved in the socio-political affairs of Lusatia. From September 1945 onwards it was Jan Cyž in particular who lobbied the occupation authorities in Dresden and Berlin on behalf of the Sorbs' gaining equal rights of participation in regional and supraregional government administration. This was pertinent to the licensing and printing of a Sorbian press. The National Committee had come to terms with the political realities of Soviet occupation. The Prague Sorbs, however, who had for the most part spent their lives outside Germany, had only a superficial knowledge of the actual situation in Lusatia. The problems of post-war life in Saxony and Brandenburg were clearly alien to them. In addition to this, they increasingly ignored the agreements Jan Cyž and Paweł Nedo had come to in Bautzen. Furthermore, the Prague branch remained wedded to an internationally agreed solution to the Sorbian question right up to the time it was dissolved in February 1948, at the time of the Communist take-over.

Things were not easy in Bautzen either. Once the Domowina functionaries had left the *Nationalrat*, this body united only Roman Catholic Sorbs. Now it began to suffer political discrimination, and was labelled a centre of 'blackest reactionaries.'³ Supported by the Domowina, the political defamation and exclusion of all *Nationalrat* activists, including their sympathizers outside the Soviet zone, led to a serious reduction in the number of people upholding 'Sorbness'.

The Political Background to the Sorbian Movement

The extent of the demands of the Sorbian movement, and the manner in which it made them, depended greatly on the relations between the German majority and Sorbian minority in Lusatia. Misunderstanding and mistrust were mutual. Both the idea of ceding Lusatia to Czechoslovakia and the idea of an independent Sorbian state disquieted the German, and to a degree the Sorbian, population, especially in Lower Lusatia. Both ideas arose from the Sorbian leadership's, and not just its so-called right-wing, desire to secure the ethnic identity of the people. Three forms of experience led to the movement's activism.

(a) The Nazi regime had put the existence of the Sorbian *ethnie* into question. The Nazis intended to assimilate and permanently germanize these 'Wendish-speaking Germans' through integration into the 'National Socialist national community' and through the forbidding of the Sorbian language and manifestations of Sorbian culture. Sorbian and Slav place-names and local names of topographical features (fields, hills and so forth) were germanized, Sorbian books and printing presses confiscated and destroyed, Sorbian schoolteachers and clerics removed and put in German-speaking schools and parishes, and representatives of Sorbian cultural life were either forcibly isolated from their fellows or arrested.⁴

(b) In the first few weeks after the end of the war, the presence of starving DPs and the transit of tens of thousands of refugees from the erstwhile eastern areas of the Reich aggravated the already difficult social, economic, political, and ethnic situation. Impoverished Sorbs devastated by the raping and plundering and other gratuitous violence of the victors came to the Domowina to ask for help. During May and June, 1945, those

3 SKA, N IV. 17 B. p. 168.

4 Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Ippermann, *The Racial State: Germany 1933–1945*, Cambridge, 1991, pp. 131–35.

workers of the institution who were for the moment trying to establish local groups in the Bautzen and Kamenz districts used to be asked, 'When are the Czechs coming?'⁵

(c) On 17 May 1945 the SMAD in Bautzen gave its formal approval to the cultural activities of the Domowina, and, at the beginning of August, recognized it as the 'political, anti-Fascist, and cultural representative of all Wends'.⁶ This was in conflict with the principle propagated by the Communists (KPD) that the re-formation of Sorbian life could be the task only of established political parties. As a direct result of this, none of the bodies representing Sorbs' interests, neither the National Committee nor the Domowina, was officially recognized as a registered association. The attempt to form a Lusatian Peasants' and Workers' Party failed in March, 1946. This party had been intended to be a 'Christian, democratic, socialist party' that would represent 'the political and economic interests of the working people of Lusatia'.⁷ In contrast to, for example, the Kulturbund, it was not permitted to join with its own list in the Saxon local, district, and *Landtag* elections of 1946. This obstructed its work and led to a general sense of insecurity in the institution. At the same time the political parties, including the SED, had too much else to do to be able to support the Sorbs in the fostering of their language and culture. The leadership of the Sorbian movement was soon to be disappointed again. After partial success in organizing a Sorbian teachers' training institute, the authorities suddenly put a question-mark on the whole enterprise. Then obstructions were continually put in their way when they applied for a licence to publish a Sorbian newspaper. In Brandenburg circumstances were far worse than in Saxony: no political party or administrative office would have anything to do with Sorbian enterprises before 1947.

The Work of the Movement

The bodies representing Sorbs' interests were attempting to unite all Sorbs, whatever their confession or political allegiance. Normally the three institutions, the Domowina, the National Committee and the Slav Committee, worked together in their negotiations with German and occupation authorities. Thus the fact that the Sorbs gained recognition in the minority-rights legislation of 1947–48 resulted from the work of a united movement.

GDR historians normally depicted two hostile, independent camps in the post-war Sorbian movement, whereby the Domowina was normally labelled 'progressive' and the National Committee (or the *Nationalrat*) counted as 'reactionary'. This was a gross simplification. As Šořta writes, the 'official' status of the *Nationalrat* as scapegoat standing for everything reactionary prevented 'any thorough analysis of the sources or evaluation of the circumstances' of Sorbian nationalism and separatism.⁸ The following matters speak against a schematic bipartition of the postwar Sorbian movement:

(a) Both the Domowina and the *Nationalrat* had appealed to the Moscow foreign ministers' council for Lusatian political autonomy, even if separately. Both institutions thus opposed the line taken by the SED and the Soviets, who were striving for a united Germany, and the institutions' leaders, Nedo and Cyř, were fully aware that they were demanding a maximum that would eventually be negotiable. This radicalization was a

5 SKA, D II. 1. 1. A. p. 3.

6 'Politische, antifaschistische und kulturelle Vertretung des gesamten Wendentums', Central State Archive of Saxony, Dresden/SED District Party Archive (SäHStA/BPA) I/A/017/2.

7 SKA, D II. 1. 1. B. pp. 64–65.

8 Jan Šořta, 'Gedanken über die sorbische Geschichtsschreibung in "den 40er. Jahren"', *Lětopis, Zeitschrift für Sorabistik*, 39, 1992, 1, p. 46.

‘logical and consistent consequence of the helpless state of the Lusatian Sorbs’ who were ‘justifiably anxious about their continued existence as a nation’.⁹

(b) The accession of Lusatia to Czechoslovakia and the establishment of an autonomous Lusatia remained declarations of intent. Whatever the National Committee declared it wanted in June 1945 (shared economy, legislation and currency with Czechoslovakia after the liberation of Lusatia by the Czechoslovak Army), nothing of the sort ever came to pass. These aspects of Lusatian dreams were never discussed at the foreign ministers’ council or at any other similar meeting.

(c) The National Committee, like the Domowina and the Slav Committee, did attempt to make the future of the Sorbs a matter of international, particularly Slav, concern. Politicians and representatives of the military authorities of Czechoslovakia, France, Great Britain, Poland and Yugoslavia were consulted on the Sorbian question by the National Committee. This was in addition to consultations with the Soviet zone of occupation authorities at all levels, and with the military missions of Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia in Berlin. The National Committee pursued the elimination of the consequences of Nazi policies and the democratization of society. Among other things, this involved attempts to ensure the release of Sorbian prisoners of war, to obtain a licence for a Sorbian newspaper, to ensure Sorbs were represented in government offices. At no time were the activities of the National Committee reduced to nationalist or separatist demands. That explains why, at the beginning of 1947, the Soviet military authorities in Bautzen advised Jurij Rjenč to seek recognition of the *Nationalrat* by the SMAD in Berlin-Karlshorst.

The view of East German historians that the *Nationalrat* followed a bourgeois line, directed its policy towards the Czechoslovak bourgeoisie, who supported it only in the interests of power politics, is untenable. In fact, the *Nationalrat* (and the National Committee as a whole) received moral and material support from people representing the whole spectrum of Czechoslovak politics, from National Socials, members of the (Roman Catholic) People’s Party, from Social Democrats, and from Communists. The money handled by the Prague branch contributed to the financing of cultural work in Lusatia, enabled the publication of Sorbian periodicals in Czechoslovakia, and ensured the grammar-school and university education of young Sorbs. The millions of crowns put at the disposal of the Sorbs by the Ústřední Matice školská (Central Schooling Foundation) and the Společnost přátel Lužice (The Friends of Lusatia Society), and indeed some Prague ministries, were given freely and unconditionally. There was never any question of repayment. Nevertheless representatives of bodies of various political colours did successfully recruit Sorbs from Lusatia to work in Czechoslovakia, particularly in the frontier areas of North Bohemia. These Sorbian workers in North Bohemia were to help compensate for the loss of the vast majority of the local labour-force following the Czechoslovaks’ expulsion of Sudeten Germans. This was of considerable economic advantage to the Sorbian workers, but from the end of 1946 onwards the Domowina condemned the recruitment, and illegal border crossing, of Sorbs and appealed to them to return to Lusatia. There is no evidence that the *Nationalrat* changed course like the Domowina.

The Sorbs in Brandenburg

The development of Sorbian affairs in Brandenburg was notably different from that in Saxony. Neither the National Committee nor the Slav Committee were active as

9 Archive for Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR in the Federal Archive/Central Party Archive of the SED (SAPMO-BArch/ZPA), NL 36/741, p. 43.

institutions in Lower Lusatia, and the Domowina had no tradition there either. Until 1936 the only representative institution there was the Mašica Serbska (Sorbian Foundation) book-club, which supported the cause of Sorbian language and culture throughout Lower Lusatia. In August 1945, members of the Mašica Serbska who had been active before 1936 sent, with the support of the Domowina in Bautzen, a memorandum to the Soviet military authorities in Cottbus. In this memorandum they asked the Soviets to support the Sorbs of Lower Lusatia in their fostering of their language and culture. The military authorities, however, showed little interest. In February 1946, the Lower Lusatians tried to establish a Domowina section in Cottbus. The Soviet authorities did not recognize either the Cottbus Domowina or the Domowina board in Werben, near Cottbus, which had been elected in September 1946; they insisted that the activities of the Domowina in Lower Lusatia must be approved by the Brandenburg *Land* command in Potsdam. Furthermore, Brandenburg regional and supraregional administrations frequently turned down Sorbs' requests to attend to the Sorbian question. In as late as April 1948, Friedrich Ebert, chairman of the Brandenburg SED, together with close colleagues, expressed the view that 'no legislative measures in the *Land* of Brandenburg were necessary' as far as the Sorbs were concerned.¹⁰

The stubborn denial of the existence of a Sorbian question in Lower Lusatia on the part of the *Land* government and the SED leadership contributed to the radicalization of the Sorbian movement in Upper Lusatia — and in Prague. Likewise the Upper Lusatian or Prague demands for an autonomous Lusatia had unintended consequences for the Sorbs of Lower Lusatia. From the beginning of 1946 to the spring of 1947 the possibilities for the Sorbian movement in and around Cottbus were diminished. The military command forbade the formation of local Domowina groups and instructed the Cottbus leadership to transfer its documentation on membership to Bautzen. This made the organization of activities practically impossible.

In May 1947, Domowina representatives from Upper and Lower Lusatia, together with functionaries of the SED met in Werben to discuss co-operation and the means by which the Domowina could be supported. Nothing practical, however, came out of this meeting. The Germans continued to be uninterested. The situation was not helped by the fact that the Domowina had anyway been concentrating its efforts on the Saxon Sorbs. Not until the end of March 1948 and the law protecting the rights of the Sorbian population, a law which was an important step towards the recognition of the Domowina, did the Bautzen headquarters begin consistently supporting the efforts of the Lower Lusatian Sorbs for the preservation of their language and culture. Now the Upper and Lower Lusatians began to lobby for the extension of the application of the 'Sorb Law' to cover Brandenburg. At the end of October 1948, the *Land* secretariat of the SED in Potsdam declared itself willing to approve the cultural work of the Domowina in Lower Lusatia. In January 1949, the Brandenburg SED agreed to the establishment of a secretariat of the Domowina in Cottbus.

Conclusion

The passing of the 'Sorb Law' by the Saxon *Landtag* in March 1948 and the legislation of the Domowina by the Brandenburg government in January 1949 marked a new direction in post-war policy concerning the Sorbs. They provided a better framework within which the Sorbs could press for equal rights with the Germans. They did not, however, come about as a result of the selfless generosity of the Germans, but of the perseverance of both the Saxon and the Brandenburg Sorbs in pursuing the interests of ethnic survival.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 82.

9 How Soviet Was the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany, 1945–49?

MARTIN MCCAULEY

Germany's total military defeat in May 1945, the consequence of the Allied demand for unconditional surrender, meant that there was no legitimate successor government. The German generals signed the documents of surrender and thereby the Third Reich was laid to rest. It was now the task of the Allies to appoint a new, democratic German government. Therein lay the problem. The Soviet understanding of democracy was Marxist-Leninist with a ruling Communist Party acting in the name of the proletariat. This perception of democracy saw the working class as the ruling class; other classes were to acknowledge its hegemony. The Western allies, the USA, Britain and France, understood democracy differently. They acknowledged as legitimate all views which accepted that the will of the electoral or parliamentary majority should prevail. There were, of course, limits. If there had been all-German elections in 1945 and the Nazis had won, the will of the majority of the electorate would have been ignored. The occupying powers agreed that all views which flowed from the ideology of National Socialism were illegitimate. A major task for the powers would be the re-education of the Germans. They were to be weaned away from totalitarian ideology to democracy. The occupying powers had the right to administer their zones (sectors in Berlin) as they thought fit. This implied that each power could define what constituted Fascist, anti-democratic behaviour and was required to act against it. Germany was to be ruled as a single state with the Allies meeting periodically in Berlin to agree all-German policy.

The Red Army defeat of the *Wehrmacht* was a stupendous achievement, crowned by the taking of Berlin and the hoisting of the red flag over the Reichstag. The Soviets had won but they were only military victors. Who would win the inevitable political conflict which would commence after hostilities? Would the Red Army impose a red, Stalinist dictatorship or would Moscow settle for something else? In 1945, no one knew, least of all in Moscow. Did Stalin have a master plan for Germany or did he make policy pragmatically, seeking advantage wherever it could be found? Is it possible to speak of a consistent Soviet policy, one which gradually unfolds or was policy often contradictory and self-defeating? Since the state that the Soviets eventually brought into being, the German Democratic Republic, and the Soviet Union itself, both collapsed in 1990–91 it is tempting to conclude that it was a case of the blind leading the blind. However, neither state was predetermined to fail. The fact that they both passed away was due to the form of government which evolved. It was effective during the construction of the state but was unable to adjust to the demands of the modern world economy. The Soviet model crystallized during the 1930s and was apparently confirmed as viable by the defeat of Germany. This was the model which was offered to the East Germans and the ruling Communist Party, the SED (Socialist Unity Party of Germany), transformed it into a highly effective instrument for running the GDR. The reasons for the failure of the GDR and the Soviet Union are remarkably similar. In each case a ruling party, backed up by an effective political police force, blindly ignored the economic revolution which was taking place beyond its frontiers. The old men in charge did not want to hear bad news. When Gorbachev, in the Soviet Union, and Krenz, in the GDR, attempted to change course the whole edifice collapsed. Should one deduce from this debacle that the reasons for the collapse of the GDR were to be found in Moscow or were the rulers in East Berlin the

architects of their own demise? How much autonomy did the East German Communists have in fashioning their own state? Would SED leaders, had they not been Ulbricht and Honecker, have produced a different society? What about German political culture? Did the legacy of the authoritarian Nazi state produce almost inevitably the authoritarian Communist state? These are some of the questions to be considered in this chapter. An attempt will be made to assess to what extent East Germany was the result of Soviet or German tradition.

Stalin: Man and Statesman

In the twentieth century, Germany was always the most important country in Europe from a Russian or Soviet point of view. The German attack on imperial Russia in 1914 so weakened the ruling class that the February Revolution dispensed with the Romanov dynasty. Shortly afterwards the October Revolution brought Lenin and the Bolsheviks to power. German intervention had changed Soviet history. Buoyed up by victory the Bolsheviks expected revolution in Germany and the headquarters of the international Communist movement to move to Berlin. In other words, they expected Germans to lead the world. The Moscow comrades were bitterly disappointed when the flames of revolution died down in Germany and they were left alone in the world. The rise of Hitler appeared to offer great opportunities and the German Communists were instructed to work with the Nazis against the German Social Democrats. Again the Russians miscalculated. This was compounded by the Nazi–Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939 which almost proved fatal for the Soviet Union. In 1945 Stalin was offered another chance to rethink his German policy. What were his policy options? There were six: (1) a socialist Germany which was friendly towards Moscow; (2) a socialist Germany ruled by a Communist Party loyal to Moscow; (3) a dismembered, truncated capitalist Germany which had limited political and economic potential; (4) long-term occupation of Germany by the victorious powers: this could also involve transferring German territory to its neighbours; (5) a united, neutral Germany; (6) a divided Germany with the Communists running their own state.¹

Before examining these options it is worth looking at Stalin as a person and as a politician. Stalin did not speak German and never set foot on German soil. He did, however, visit a German-speaking country, Austria. He was a voracious reader and possessed a remarkable memory. Just how *au fait* he was with German affairs is illustrated by the following two stories, related to the author in June 1991 by Vladimir Semenov, one of Russia's leading German specialists, who first served in the Soviet embassy in Berlin in 1940 and later became ambassador in East Berlin. Stalin sent for Semenov in late 1945 and asked him if there were military factories in Berlin-Zehlendorf, a well-heeled suburb. Stalin walked around the room and then fixed his gaze upon Semenov who had been invited to sit down. Semenov confidently answered in the negative whereupon Stalin began to swear. This made Semenov nervous and he began to fear the worst. To his great relief, Stalin then stated that an official had informed him that there were military enterprises in Zehlendorf. Semenov again assured Stalin that this was incorrect and then demonstrated his detailed knowledge of Berlin. Stalin accepted his opinion. On another occasion Stalin asked Semenov's opinion of a matter concerning Germany. After he had presented his analysis there was silence. Then Stalin pointed out that on such and such a date he had arrived at quite a different analysis of roughly the same problem. Why had he

¹ This draws on the penetrating study by Hannes Adomeit, *Imperial Overstretch: Germany in Soviet Policy from Stalin to Gorbachev*, Baden-Baden, 1998, pp. 60–87. This volume makes extensive use of Soviet archival material.

changed his mind? Semenov calmly presented his reasons. Thus Stalin had a retentive memory and a mass of information on Germany.

Stalin was the chief decision maker on Germany but he was dependent on his sources of information, which was channelled into his personal chancellery and assessed there.² Stalin did not rely on any one source and ensured that he had several strands of information. However, it is known that his subordinates tailored their assessments to conform to his perceived viewpoints. The war weakened Stalin physically and a slow decline in his health set in. This led to intense rivalry among various interest groups around Stalin. The master of the Kremlin was a past master at playing one off against the other but at times became caught in his own trap. He made many crucial policy mistakes between the end of the war and his death in 1953. He mishandled relations with the Yugoslav Communist leader, Tito, eventually drumming him out of the Communist movement in 1948. He appears to have believed that Tito would buckle and that he could dictate terms to the Yugoslavs. Was he fully apprised of the fact that Tito was a loyal Stalinist and wished to reach an agreement with him? Was he misled about Tito's intentions? Another example is the Berlin Blockade. He could have reached a solution which benefited the Soviet Union but provoked a confrontation he could not win since he was not willing to use force. His advisers in Berlin had not envisaged an airlift and even during it predicted it would fail.³ His actions ensured that the Americans, after the Blockade was lifted in May 1949, could never envisage abandoning West Berlin. The Blockade also ensured the coming into existence of a West German state and the formation of NATO. Further it allowed many American politicians to argue that Moscow was bent on an expansionist policy and this prepared the ground for the American commitment to stay in Western Europe, expressed in the NATO treaty. The Berlin Blockade was arguably the most disastrous piece of Soviet decision-making after 1945. Another strange episode was the Leningrad Affair which began to gather momentum after the death of Andrei Zhdanov in June 1948. It eventually resulted in the execution of many leading Leningrad Party and government officials. The most bizarre case, however, was the Doctors' Plot in 1952. Supposedly a group of Zionist doctors had been killing leading officials, including Zhdanov, and plotting to eliminate others. After Stalin's death it was revealed that the whole thing had been fabricated.

It is tempting to conclude that Stalin's grasp begins to slip in 1948 and goes downhill thereafter. If this was so, what were the consequences for East Germany? It is worth mentioning that the Russians sent their best soldiers and officials to East Germany but this did not guarantee that the policy followed was in the best interests of the Soviet Union. The archives reveal that Moscow was well informed about events not only in the east but also in West Germany. They had good sources of intelligence and were skilled at penetrating Western governments, including the American. A major problem was the evaluation of the material gathered. Only a small group had access to it; Stalin was the ultimate decision-maker, but not all material was forwarded to him. There seems to have been concern, at times, not to provide him with information which might reflect poorly on those sending it.⁴ If he were not in good health or were concerned about other matters, no decision would be taken. The exception to this appears to have been nuclear espionage. The importance of the matter ensured prompt action. One of the reasons for this, however, was that Beria was in charge of the project and hence had access to all incoming material.

2 N. E. Rosenfeldt, *Knowledge and Power: The Role of Stalin's Secret Chancellery in the Soviet System of Government*, Copenhagen, 1978, is the most informative source.

3 D. E. Murphy, S. A. Kondrashev and G. Bailey, *Battleground Berlin: CIA vs KGB in the Cold War*, New Haven, CT and London, 1997, provides examples.

4 Ibid., p. 57.

Soviet Policy

Various hypotheses about goals can be tested in an effort to arrive at an understanding of Soviet policy, and of the six options theoretically open to them in Germany.

(1) A socialist Germany which was friendly towards Moscow: the omens for a socialist Germany in 1945 were good. National Socialism, understood by Moscow as an extreme form of finance capitalism, had discredited capitalist solutions to Germany's economic and social order. The road was open for a new beginning and the large, skilled working class was in a prime position to take advantage of the disarray of the German bourgeoisie. Soviet control of part of Germany would be used to promote socialist goals on a all-German level. The collapse of Nazi Germany was immediately followed by the emergence of socialist groups and youth movements. There was a widespread understanding that one of the reasons for the rise of National Socialism had been the conflict between Social Democrats and Communists to gain the allegiance of the working class. In the future, unity on the left would block the re-emergence of a Fascist threat.

The Russians legalized anti-Fascist political parties in their zone in June 1945 and these parties were permitted to act not only in the Soviet zone but in the whole of Germany. They were under the supervision of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD). This took the Western allies by surprise and they reluctantly permitted political activity later in their zones but only, initially, at the local level. Instead of a new united party of the left, the Soviets promoted the re-emergence of the traditional German parties. These included the Communist Party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD). Simultaneously the Soviets forced all Socialist and Communist movements, youth organizations, anti-Fascist groups and all other spontaneously organized formations to dissolve. One example was Hermann Brill, a Social Democrat and a survivor of the Buchenwald concentration camp, and provisional minister-president of Thuringia for a few weeks in the summer of 1945. He strove valiantly to establish a Bund Deutscher Sozialisten (Association of German Socialists) but to no avail.⁵ Trade unions, youth movements and other social organizations would be set up under SMAD direction. Politics was to be run from above and not from below. This conformed to traditional Soviet thinking as demonstrated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

By consciously stifling grass-roots politics the Soviets missed a great opportunity to promote a socialist Germany. A vibrant socialist East Germany would have been attractive to the other zones and it would have been friendly to Moscow. This option was never seriously considered by Stalin. He may have feared that a socialist Germany, understood as an SPD-led Germany, would have pursued German national aims and therefore could have turned against the USSR. However he should have borne in mind that a socialist Germany would have been anti-militarist and therefore would not have posed a threat to Soviet security.

(2) A socialist Germany ruled by a Communist Party loyal to Moscow: this was the dream solution from Stalin's point of view. It guaranteed security and the opportunity to attract Germany's neighbours into the Soviet camp. Had a Communist Germany emerged it is likely that France and Italy would also have chosen Communism. A Communist Europe would then have been on the agenda.

The dream of a Communist-dominated Germany began to fade in the autumn of 1945 as it became evident that the SPD was becoming more popular than the KPD. The fault for this lay fairly and squarely with the Soviets. Moscow wanted reparations and began

5 H. Mehringer (ed.), *Von der SBZ zur DDR. Studien zum Herrschaftssystem in der Sowjetischen Besatzungszone und in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik*, Munich, 1995, contains a chapter on Brill by Günter Ehnert.

dismantling industrial plant and other installations in its zone of occupation in the summer of 1945. The Allies agreed that the Soviets had the right to reparations, but Socialists and Communists in the East could not understand why industry and the infrastructure were being dismantled if the goal was the promotion of socialism. Then there was the framework for political activity. It had all to be agreed at the top and this favoured Communists over Socialists. Last but not least was the problem of rape. East German society was the most female in Europe with about three million more women than men. Soviet personnel were allowed free access to the female population. If the woman attempted to gain redress from the authorities and condemned the behaviour of her assailant she could be sent to prison for anti-Soviet remarks. Those who criticized Soviets were treated by the courts as Fascists. It was only in 1947 that rape declined dramatically when Soviet troops were confined to barracks. Rape was an important reason for the poor showing of the SED in the 1946 elections and the unwillingness of women to stand for election. The KPD came to be perceived as the Soviet party and was blamed for everything the population did not like about the Soviet occupation. The Soviets added to their unpopularity by their lawless behaviour. If a group of German prisoners was being escorted from one place to another and, say, six escaped, it was normal for the Soviet guards to make up the numbers by grabbing six innocent males and counting them as prisoners. Only after prolonged protests from Germans did the Soviets release these men. The situation was such in the immediate post-war period that the sight of Soviets led to the local population running for cover.

The rise in SPD popularity so alarmed the SMAD that it ordered the fusion of the KPD and SPD, which took place in April 1946. Most Socialists were positively inclined towards a united party of the left but the forced marriage alienated them. This was demonstrated by the results of the first local and *Landtag* elections in the east in October 1946. The SED failed to achieve 50 per cent of the vote anywhere. The results in Berlin were a humiliation for the SED. The SPD polled 48.7 per cent, the Christian Democrats, 22.2 per cent, the SED 19.8 per cent and the Liberals 9.3 per cent. Even in East Berlin, the SPD proved the most popular party, obtaining 43.6 per cent of the vote against the SED's 29.8 per cent (the SPD was legal in East Berlin and the SED in West Berlin because Berlin was administered separately by the Allies).

The Western Allies vigorously opposed the fusion of the Socialist and Communist parties in their zones of occupation. Election results in the east, however, allayed their fears that the Communists were on the march. The prospect of the old (KPD) or the new (SED) Communist Party gaining a majority in elections was now remote. Only a Soviet-imposed revolution could transform Germany into a Communist state.

(3) A dismembered, truncated capitalist Germany which had limited political and economic potential: Stalin accepted that any attempt to reduce Germany to an agrarian state was doomed to fail. The Soviet goal was to ensure that Germany never again developed the industrial capacity to attack the USSR. One way to achieve this was to reduce Germany in size. The dismemberment of Germany began at the Tehran conference in 1943, when it was agreed to transfer the northern part of East Prussia to Russia and to compensate Poland for territory it was going to lose to Russia in the east. Hence Poland was to get the rest of East Prussia, Pomerania, Upper and Lower Silesia, Danzig, Stettin, indeed all territory up to the western Neisse. This was to achieve two Soviet objectives: take territory from Germany and ensure that Poland became dependent on the Soviet Union because its acquisition of German land would ensure Polish–German enmity. Germany was also to be weakened by being obliged to pay reparations. At the Yalta conference the sum of \$20 billion was proposed, with the Soviets qualifying for half. Initially they took capital equipment from their zone but subsequently they took from

current production as the economy began to recover. They obtained little from the western zones and the Americans stopped sending anything in May 1946. Thus eventually reparations did more harm to the East than the West German economy. As a policy for reducing German economic strength it was a signal failure.

The hub of German military and industrial capacity was the Ruhr and the Allies agreed to internationalize it. It was impossible, however, to reach agreement since the Americans would not accept Soviet participation if they held on to everything in their zone of occupation. The British were also finding the cost of occupation burdensome and wanted to cut their food deliveries. It became more important to get the Ruhr working than to argue over who should own it.

(4) A long-term occupation of Germany by the victorious powers (this could also involve transferring German territory to its neighbours): in the event four-power responsibility for Germany lasted until 1990. However the main reason for this was the inability of the Allies to agree on a common all-German policy. Lack of consensus produced two German states which became surrogates for super-power rivalry.

(5) A united, neutral Germany: this would have entailed the Soviets, sooner or later, leaving their zone of occupation and permitting the emergence of an all-German government, elected by all Germans. Four-power supervision of Germany could have been agreed to ensure that Germany never developed a military capacity to threaten its neighbours. During the period 1945–49 Moscow never openly advocated a united, neutral Germany. It always spoke of a united, democratic Germany, democratic being understood in the Marxist-Leninist sense of the word. The Russians knew that a united, neutral Germany would have a market economy and this would lead to its integration with the West.

Since Moscow accepted a united, neutral Austria, in 1955, why did it not accept the same solution for Germany? The answer must be related to the size and economic potential of Germany. It was too dynamic to be regarded as just another state in Europe.

(6) A divided Germany with the Communists running their own state: all I have said so far almost inevitably leads to the conclusion that Stalin favoured a divided Germany with his own state in the east. This would, however, be a false conclusion. Stalin never set out to divide Germany; it simply occurred as a result of his policies. The possibility of a divided Germany was always present but, given Stalin's concerns about Soviet security, the division of Germany became more probable as time passed. One can argue that, had Stalin always had an East German Communist state in mind, he would not have deprived Germany of so much territory. The Soviet zone of occupation did not have a raw materials base. An East Germany with all excised German territory (except East Prussia) would have been a viable state. There would also not have been the need to expel many Germans from lost territories (eventually a total of nine million were expelled). One can argue that Stalin's keenness to move the German frontier to the western Neisse and not to be content with the eastern Neisse reveals that he was not expecting to end up with a Communist East German state. At Tehran he may have thought that the Soviets would not eventually occupy any part of Germany and, if they did, the occupation would be of short duration.

What conclusions can one draw from Soviet policy in Germany in 1945 about their predilection for a separate Communist state? The institutions set up by Moscow in their zone in 1945 were intended to be all-German. The political parties, trades unions, youth organizations, central administrative bodies in Berlin, were all expected to function throughout Germany. These central administrative bodies coexisted with their counterparts in the *Länder* and provinces. Power was decentralized by the Allies in 1945 with a view to building a federal state. The relationship however, between, for example, the central

financial administration and the ministries of finance at the local level was unclear.⁶ The Soviet military had representatives in Frankfurt on Main, in the west, and the Western Allies in Potsdam, in the east. Maintaining an all-German presence was important for Moscow.

On the other hand the SMAD proceeded with reforms in the east which, presumably, it thought would serve as a precedent in the other zones. The nationalization of enterprises and farms owned by former Nazis was carried out in 1946 and thereby placed most economic activity in the state sector. However, the Communists did not gain much politically in the east or west from these initiatives. This applied especially to the land reform, which provided small and landless peasants and refugees with some land. It is striking how often the Soviets acted unilaterally in their zone in the hope of setting the all-German pace. Another reading of their behaviour would be that they were attempting to secure their own political and economic base in the east. When it came to personnel changes they were on stronger ground. They systematically removed teachers, judges, lawyers, officials and others with a Nazi past. This paralleled de-Nazification in the west. However they also removed officials, especially if they were Social or Christian Democrats or Liberals who had served in the administration up to 1945. This process was accelerated in 1947–48 when the Communists began rapid centralization of power and effectively ended the federal system.

Is it possible to date Stalin's reluctant acceptance of a separate East German state? The evidence points to 1947. Jochen Laufer concludes, on the basis of archival evidence, that the SMAD and the SED were working together to shape a separate East German state well before the Munich conference of *Land* minister-presidents in June 1947.⁷ The East Germans left the conference after only a few hours' discussion since no agreement had been reached on their proposal for the establishment of a central German administration which would pave the way for a unified German state. The Soviets however were not leading but reacting to events. The British and Americans had established Bizonia, the fusion of the economic administrations of their zones, on 1 January 1947. Molotov, the Soviet foreign minister, consistently offered a unified, democratic Germany at conferences of the Allied foreign ministers throughout 1947. The German Economic Commission became effectively the government of the Soviet zone in March 1948 since it could issue orders which were binding on all other organizations. Also in March 1948 Marshal Sokolovskii walked out of the Control Council in Berlin and effectively ended four-power collaboration on Germany as a whole. The SMAD declared the division of Germany an 'established fact'. Then came the Berlin Blockade and this cemented the division of Germany. However this does not mean that the Russians accepted a divided Germany as an unalterable fact. They tried to make a united Germany attractive to the Western Allies and Stalin never conceded defeat. The West, however, was not willing to risk its control over two-thirds of Germany for the sake of a united Germany.

German or Soviet Institutions?

The whole of Germany needed new institutions in and after 1945. The same functions had to be performed in east and west. In each zone the occupation forces rewarded those who co-operated with them and acted against those who opposed them. The goal was to shape a political and economic system which resembled that in the Allies' own countries. What was different about institutions in the east?

6 Ibid. See the chapter by Frank Zschaler.

7 See his chapter in J. Kocka (ed.), *Historische DDR-Forschung. Aufsätze und Studien*, Berlin, 1993.

Germany in 1945 had been a regulated market economy. The Nazis had decided against introducing a command economy and had attempted to take agriculture out of a competitive market economy. They promoted collectivity over individualism in economic matters. The eastern policy of nationalizing large and medium sized enterprises and taking over the landed estates could have been seen, therefore, as not a break with tradition, but as an expression of traditional collectivism. In October 1945 the SMAD took over all property that had belonged to the Third Reich, the NSDAP, Nazis, war criminals and banned organizations. Over 7,000 enterprises were nationalized. Some of these enterprises were turned into Soviet limited companies (SAGs) and the rest handed over to the local German administrations. A referendum in June 1946 supported the taking over of companies owned by 'Nazis and war criminals'. This was the signal for the nationalizing of any enterprise desired by the authorities. Almost all heavy industry was now in the state sector and by 1948 about 40 per cent of gross industrial production came from nationalized companies. The only articulated opposition came from the Christian Democrats and Liberals who argued that such a radical change in ownership should only be effected at an all-German level. The SMAD, however, soon overcame their opposition. The Christian Democrats and Liberals were always mindful of the fact that their supporters were mainly from the middle class and therefore would be impoverished by the seizure of their businesses since no compensation was offered.

The SAGs were run as Soviet enterprises and the profits passed to Moscow. They recruited German labour and Germans were expected to work in these companies whenever requested. A striking example of this was the uranium mine, SAG Wismuth, in which working conditions were very poor and wages low. Skilled labour from this or other SAGs could be shipped off to the Soviet Union to work on projects there. The SAGs were a clear example of a policy developed in the sole interests of the Soviet Union. One can argue that the nationalization of leading enterprises might have been carried out by a Social Democrat administration in the east, hence it was not necessarily only Soviet policy. Nationalization, in fact, made it easier for the German Economic Commission (DWK) to dominate the eastern economy from 1948 onwards, when output was almost back to 1936 levels.

The economy in the east before 1949 was not a command economy. East Germany had limited raw materials and energy and therefore was dependent on the Western zones of occupation. It was only after the Berlin Blockade that efforts were made to reorientate the economy increasingly to the east. Arguably it was only in 1958, after Walter Ulbricht had defeated the challenge of Karl Schirdewan and Fred Oellsner, that the GDR moved away from a regulated market to a command economy. Schirdewan, Oellsner and others, influenced by Yugoslav self-management methods, had favoured a minimum of central controls and a maximum of initiative and independence from below all based on economic laws, especially the law of value. However had it not been for the USSR's ability to supply the east with raw materials and energy, the eastern economy could not have survived without integration with West Germany. The expansion of trade with the Soviet Union inevitably inclined East Germany towards a command economy, and this was direct Soviet influence. A Communist East Germany (without a Soviet presence) or a Communist Germany would almost certainly have retained a regulated market and rejected a command economy.

The legal system had to be comprehensively overhauled and new personnel trained hastily. The zonal courts dealt only with civil and criminal cases and in the early years crime was rampant. The beginnings of the Communist police force only emerged in August 1946 when the Deutsche Verwaltung des Innern (German Interior Administration) was founded. In December 1946 it became responsible for the whole of the Soviet zone of

occupation and thereby the *Länder* and provinces lost their police powers. K-5, the precursor of the Ministry of State Security (Stasi) only surfaced in 1947. It found gaining public acceptance difficult, and it was even more difficult to recruit reliable personnel (many of them were to side with the insurgents in the June 1953 uprising). One of the reasons for K-5's difficulties was that it was seen as the German arm of the Soviet intelligence services. During the period 1945–49 Soviet courts were responsible for dealing with political opposition. They acted according to the RSFSR criminal code of 1927. The SMAD dealt vigorously with what it perceived as threats to its hegemony. Over the period 1945–49 there were about 120,000 political prisoners in NKVD-MVD camps (the Gulag) with over 42,000 dying in captivity.⁸ The Soviets had no compunction about using former Nazi concentration camps to house their prisoners. Some of the inmates were SPD members who had opposed the fusion of their party with the KPD and others were linked to the SPD Ostbüro which engaged in opposition in the eastern zone. Political opponents of the Western Allies were imprisoned, not placed in concentration camps. Soviet practice in the east was similar to that in the USSR itself.

The East German legal system was arbitrary during the years before 1949 and the Christian Democrats and Liberals complained on many occasions about legal judgements. The latter favoured the emergence of a *Rechtsstaat*, the rule of law, but the SMAD demonstrated little interest in that. However, a full-blown Communist legal system began to emerge in the GDR only in the 1950s under the direction of the ruthless Minister of Justice Hilde Benjamin. After 1949, GDR courts became responsible for dealing with political opposition. The deliberate rejection of a *Rechtsstaat* by the occupying power is clear evidence of Russification.

In education the first task was to remove Nazi teachers and, since they formed the overwhelming majority, this left a gaping hole in school staffs. Crash courses were arranged for new recruits, predominantly women. The curricula remained almost intact until 1948 when Communist influence began to be felt. Russian was introduced as the foreign language and children were taught to see the Red Army as the liberators of 1945. The same applied to the university sector but not much pressure could be put on the desperately needed staff since they could move to West Berlin or the Western zones if they so desired.

In May 1948 Major Tyulpanov of the SMAD expressed himself very clearly. The time was ripe for the emergence of a party of a new type. He had in mind the SED which until then had been a mixed Communist and Social Democratic party. Until then the factions enjoyed parity of office. The scene was now set for the SED to become more like the Soviet Communist Party. This involved a radical departure from the agenda the Social Democrats advocated for the SED: inner-party democracy within a pluralist society which had implied that socialism would take over through evolution and not revolution and that violence would not be used for political ends. The SED had proclaimed the German road to socialism in 1946 but this was abandoned in 1948. A fundamental problem was the base organization. For the Social Democrats this was the local (*Bezirk*) organization but for the Communists the enterprise (*Betrieb*) organization. These two forms of organization were acknowledged as equal in April 1946, but in December 1946 the enterprise organization was declared to be the primary SED organization. In 1947 the associations of local organizations were simply dissolved. No party congress convened in 1948 and 1949 and instead a party conference, not envisaged in the party statutes, met in 1949 to launch a party of a new type. All these moves were discussed with and implemented under SMAD

8 A. Kilian, 'Verschollen in Deutschland seit 1945, 1946, 1947...', *Deutschland Archiv*, 9, 1995, pp. 936–47.

guidance. Does this reveal that the SED had no choice but to become a party of a new type because that is what Moscow desired?

The Russians could not have obliged the SED to become a party of a new type without the support of the leadership. Nominally the party was led by Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, but Walter Ulbricht was the power behind the throne and had the best connections with the SMAD. Did Ulbricht favour a separate East German state from 1945? An argument to suggest that he did would be that, once it became clear in the autumn of 1945 that the Social Democrats were becoming the more popular party of the left in the east, the only way to power for the Communists was a united party of the left protected by Soviet power. Since Ulbricht was very ambitious, the argument would go, the route to becoming leader in the east was clear: become the leader of a party run on the lines of the Soviet Communist Party since a party in which Social Democrats were influential might not elect him leader and certainly would not permit him to acquire the dominance he wanted. The archival evidence reveals that he consistently pursued a radical line, advocating the centralization of economic and political power, central planning, the reduction of the influence of other political parties, the single-minded pursuit of (working) class interests and the propagation of the Soviet model for Germany. (All this sits ill with the Ulbricht of the 1960s. Then he pursued GDR interests in his relations with Moscow and was much concerned with the unification of Germany.)

What is striking about the 1945–49 period is that it divides into two neat halves: 1945–47 and 1947–49. The institutionalization of a Communist regime begins quite clearly in the second period. The decisive factor was the nature of the international environment, not the domestic scene.

Conclusion

The term sovietization is controversial: by it I mean the articulation and implementation of the Soviet model. This applies to the state and to society.⁹ The primary institution for sovietization was the SED and a key factor in the evolution of the KPD-SED was the leading role played by those who returned from exile in Moscow. The SMAD, naturally, gave them preference over those who had returned from Western exile. Opposition within the SED came more often from left Communists and left Social Democrats than from mainstream Social Democrats, and the policy adopted by a Communist Party when confronted with opposition within its ranks was the purge. The archives reveal that the SED had a high level of autonomy when it came to purging its ranks of undesirables. The Soviets monitored the exercise but interfered little in its implementation. The Ulbricht leadership could not overtly act against the advice of the SMAD but it could propose and implement policy to maximize its own influence. The transformation of the SED into a party of a new type was as much in the interests of the SED leadership as of the Soviets. The same applied to the state management of the economy.

The SED leadership always felt insecure *vis-à-vis* Moscow because it could never be certain that the Soviets would not do a deal with the Western allies which would obliterate the eastern state. Arguably it was only in 1958 that Moscow came to the conclusion that a socialist GDR was preferable to a united, neutral Germany which would inevitably slide into the Western camp. Until then the GDR was negotiable. Khrushchev had no illusions about the model in the east winning over the west. He was quite aware that if the Soviets left, the GDR would collapse. The Berlin Wall was built because eastern Germany could not compete with the West; without it the completion of the building of socialism was not

9 See the discussion of sovietization by A. Malycha, 'Probleme der Sowjetisierung', *Deutschland Archiv*, 6, 1997, pp. 949–52.

feasible. All this suggests that at some point after 1945 Moscow concluded that its model was not attractive enough to conquer West Germany. This may have been in 1946, 1948 or perhaps in 1952 when the Stalin note of 10 March offered far-reaching concessions but not free all-German elections. A further note of 9 April offered discussions about future elections but the Soviets reiterated their previous view that a peace treaty had to precede all-German elections. The exchanges petered out. Moscow may also then have concluded that if it left, the SED would lose power. This means that it never expected the SED to gain the level of legitimacy which would guarantee its continuance in power. If this is correct then sovietization was merely a mechanism for making it easier to run the east. The division of Germany was a price which Moscow was willing to pay to enhance its security but it remained a temporary arrangement until 1958. Hence one can state that Moscow's policy until 1958 was negative, preventing the whole of Germany falling into the Western camp, rather than positive, promoting the division of Germany with a Communist state in the east. In 1958 the Soviets appear to have concluded that the division of Germany enhanced their security and was thus in their interests. After 1958, proposals about a united German state tended to focus on a confederation, not a federation. Ironically, by 1961 the SED had developed its own mechanism of rule and borrowed only those aspects of the Soviet model it found useful for cementing its power monopoly. As the GDR matured as a socialist state so the attractiveness of the Soviet model declined. Indeed in the 1960s Ulbricht was holding up the GDR as a model for the USSR to follow. This then prompts the question: was the Soviet model, sovietization, ever adopted in the GDR? All the traces of Soviet influence, the refusal to implement a *Rechtsstaat*, the implementation of a command economy, the rejection of market socialism and a pluralist socialist society, the growth of the security police (Stasi) and the militarization of society were all policies willingly adopted by the east German Communists. The GDR state was ruled by the GDR model but it was inspired by the Soviet model. The SED grasped (except in the late Honecker years) that its power rested on Soviet foundations. Egon Krenz, in 1989, demonstrated this by pleading with Gorbachev to help the GDR since the USSR had fathered the east German state.

There is also the intriguing question of why the SED fashioned the most authoritarian state in East Central (that is excluding South-East) Europe. Whereas the Poles, the Czechoslovaks and Hungarians developed an intellectual opposition, which included radical, pro-market economists, nothing similar emerged in the GDR. In 1989 the opposition moved into government in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The exception was the GDR because it was intellectually bankrupt. There was not a single pro-market economist of repute in the country.

In 1945 the desperately difficult struggle to survive took precedence and the right of the Red Army to administer the territory could not be denied. The old institutions had failed and they had to be replaced. At the family level traditional German values prevailed with males well placed to reimpose their authority, even though they were outnumbered by women. These traditional hierarchical values were reproduced in society with the Communists playing the paternal role. Society could not be permitted by the Soviets to evolve democratically, in the pluralist sense, since this could result in the reemergence of Nazi-inspired political, economic, social and cultural values. The occupying power had to act paternalistically since it was attempting to re-educate and reform. The Western Allies were just as paternalistic in their zones. Developments were to reveal that in the Soviet zone of occupation paternalism developed into authoritarianism whereas in the Western zones it gradually gave way to pluralistic democracy. The onset of the Cold War in 1947 was probably the primary reason for this evolution in the Soviet zone. However, in the Western zones there was no guarantee that pluralistic democracy would put down deep

roots in the years immediately after 1945. The most impressive argument for the legitimacy of the views of the Allies in the Western zones was the economic boom which began to gather momentum after the currency reform of 1948. The east never enjoyed such an economic advance. Lack of rapid economic success increased the Communists' natural predilection for authoritarian methods because they wanted to keep themselves in power. The rush to introduce a planned economy, beginning in 1948, in order to compete with the market economy in the West, provoked the uprising of June 1953. One of the consequences of the failed uprising was to strengthen the authoritarian elements in the SED and to eliminate the influence of former Social Democrats. The fear of dissent and opposition gnawed away at the roots of the East German state and ended, in 1989, in the situation whereby there were in the GDR there were more secret police for every thousand citizens than there had been in Nazi Germany.

The source of authoritarianism in the east is to be found in the 1945–49 period when almost everything which happened after 1947 was a reaction to events in the West. For example, the coming into being of the GDR, in October 1949, was in response to the establishment of the Federal Republic. East Germany continued to be different from the other Soviet-occupied countries in East-Central and South-Eastern Europe in that policy was predominantly moulded by events in West Germany rather than in the USSR or elsewhere; it was just as preoccupied with West Germany as the USSR was with the USA.

May one argue that the authoritarian political culture before 1945 prepared the way for the dictatorship of the SED? An instructive aspect of East German society was the role of women. On average, they were better qualified than men. However, the less qualified men were placed above them in the administration, schools, police, the legal system and so on. This continued throughout the history of the GDR. It was a male-dominated society in which male values prevailed. This development was the consequence of sovietization and a continuation of German tradition. It constituted an example of Soviet practice dovetailing neatly into East German practice, one reinforcing and legitimizing the other. One cannot blame the Soviets for the East German regime but one can say that without their presence there would have been no such regime.

10 A 'Soviet' Currency Reform in Germany. The Soviet Union and the Question of German Currency, 1945–48

JOCHEN LAUFER

The impact of the post-war intentions of Moscow's and East Berlin's politicians on Germany as a whole is still overestimated. What are underestimated, however, are the difficulties the Soviet Union faced in securing its position in Germany at that time. Among contemporary historians the assumption prevails that until the spring of 1948 the USSR had been in favour of an all-German currency reform and that it was forced to act quickly only in reaction to preparations for a separate currency reform in the Western zones. In this chapter, I question this assumption in order to investigate the correlation between, on the one hand, the currency reform in the Soviet zone of occupation and, on the other, the transformation of the political and economic situation there.

Research in the area of contemporary history still faces huge problems as soon as it attempts to analyse Soviet sources systematically. The files of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SMAD), but also files concerning German issues from a number of different Soviet ministries are either not available at all, or only partially so. In contrast to this dissatisfying situation, the archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation opened its stacks to the public in 1992–93 fairly generously. Unfortunately, no financial decisions were made there. But staff members of the Foreign Ministry were involved in the correspondence between the Moscow Ministry of Finance and the Financial Department of the SMAD. This allows me to document here various events. The background of the few decisions that were made quite hesitantly, remains, however, hidden.

In this chapter, I shall proceed in three stages: first, I shall point out special circumstances in the finances in the Soviet zone of occupation; secondly, I shall present the SMAD's plans for currency reform in Germany; and, thirdly, I shall show how the currency reform was realized in East Germany.

I

Currency matters in the Soviet zone must be analysed in the light of a number of special circumstances. First, to this day, we do not know why in the spring of 1944, the United States handed over a second set of printing plates to the Soviet Union, without any agreement about the amount of and the accountability for the money to be issued.¹ Because of this separate printing of common occupation currency, it not only became the case that monetary standards developed differently in the American, British and French zones of Germany, on the one hand, and in the Soviet zone, on the other. In addition, the Soviet Union had the necessary financial basis to practise its own occupation politics.

Much of the information in this chapter will be found in my article, 'Die UdSSR und die deutsche Währungsfrage 1944–1948', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 46, 1998, 3, pp. 455–85.

1 See Vladimir Petrov, *Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II*, Baltimore, MD, 1967.

In contrast to the Western forces, the Soviet Union used its occupation money, called the 'M-Mark' (military mark), to a great extent to buy goods. The Soviet Union used these goods not only to support its troops and other Soviet staff in Germany, but also delivered some to the USSR. Between 1944 and June 1946 the USSR had large amounts of occupation money printed. Between 7 February 1945 and 20 April 1946, an 'allowance' (in fact, the entire run) of 17.5 million 'military marks' to different Soviet institutions was issued on the basis of orders from the Soviet Council of Ministers. The Western forces waited until the autumn of 1945 to ask the Soviet Union to account for the sum of M-Marks it had put in circulation; they did not receive an answer.

As far as we know, the USSR stopped issuing the Allies' military mark in June 1946. Until this date, the Soviet Union had used this money chiefly to cover its costs of occupation, which had been particularly high. Complete figures, however, are still not available. At the beginning of the occupation, these costs included the complete expenses of the USSR in Germany, for example the costs of the dismantling of plant and the acquisition of goods. According to internal Soviet reports, the costs of occupation between early 1945 and 1 April 1946 totalled 13.7 billion Reichsmark. More than half this sum — 8.5 billion — was covered by issuing M-Marks. According to the same report, the remaining 5.2 billion Marks were covered by the Soviet Union. Not included here are the expenses related to the occupation which the Soviet Union had sustained at home.²

Secondly, from immediately after the occupation until August 1945, all banks closed on the orders of Soviet military commanders. The Reichsmark holdings were confiscated and all accounts which had existed up to 8 May 1945 were blocked. These drastic measures served a number of purposes. They were as radical as the currency reforms which in 1945 were carried out in Poland and Czechoslovakia, which served the same purpose as in East Germany: to 'freeze' the huge amount of money which had come into circulation during the war.³ These measures also had the character of confiscation. They marked the beginning of the anti-Fascist democratic upheaval' in the Soviet zone of occupation.⁴ They were not entirely directed at the 'finance capitalists' who had been, according to the Communist line, the people truly responsible for the 'Fascist' regime in Germany. The confiscation was also directed against the propertied classes. Most assets acquired as of 8 May 1945 — according to estimates about 57 billion Reichsmark — were first blocked and later confiscated.⁵ The closing of banks and blocking of accounts, a measure the Soviet Union had already practised during its occupation of eastern Poland and the Baltic states, also served the purpose of transforming German society. By *de facto* expropriation, not only all holders of government loans were punished for financing the war, but also the downfall of the middle class stripped of its capital was envisaged.⁶ When, following a SMAD order, new banks opened,⁷ the previous German system of banks and savings

2 Archive of the Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation (AVP/RF), 082/30/130/32, pp. 42–43, Lozovskii to Mikoyan, 25 April 1946.

3 See V. P. Komissarov and A. N. Popov, *Den'gi, kredit i financy evropeiskich stran narodnoi demokratii*, Moscow, 1960.

4 See Kurt Schmalfuß, 'Die Entwicklung des Bankwesens in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik (1945–1961)', PhD dissertation, (East) Berlin, 1984.

5 Frank Zschaler, 'Die vergessene Währungsreform. Vorgeschichte, Durchführung und Ereignisse der ostdeutschen Geldumstellung 1948', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 45, 1997, 2, pp. 215ff.

6 Günther Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945–1948. Alliierte Einheit — deutsche Teilung?*, Munich, 1995, p. 258.

7 The order is published in G. Kohlmeier and C. Dewey (eds), *Bankensystem und Geldumlauf in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945–1955. Gesetzessammlung und Einführung*, (East) Berlin, 1956, pp. 115–18.

banks had been completely destroyed. Companies and individuals both had to use the new institutions, which granted credit according to new rules.

II

In early March 1946 the head of the SMAD, Marshal Georgii Zhukov, passed on to Moscow a proposal by his Financial Administration for an all-German currency reform.⁸ What is surprising about his initiative is both its early date and its similarity to a proposal by American financial experts, which was transmitted to the head of the American military government, General Lucius Clay, only two months later. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow refused to present Zhukov's suggestion to the Allied Control Commission. It agreed, however, informally to meet American experts in Berlin. Based on these talks, Zhukov's successor, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, repeated, in May 1946, the suggestion of a currency reform.⁹

In evaluating both initiatives for an all-German currency reform, we have to answer the question of whether the SMAD was interested in actually carrying out the reform, the need for which was caused by the situation in its own zone, or whether its initiative was a tactical move intended to thwart an anticipated American initiative.

The first part of this question has been and still is highly contested. Whereas in 1988 Christoph Buchheim, using American sources, rated the SMAD's interest in actually carrying out a currency reform very low,¹⁰ Günther Mai in 1995 had tended to give it more weight.¹¹ Frank Zschaler supports his argument.¹² All three base their claims on the judgement of a Soviet financial expert who pointed out the negative effect the desolate currency situation had had on the East German economy, where an abundance of money and a lack of goods resulted in a lowered interest rate to increase productivity in the industrial and agricultural sectors and in small businesses, and spurred inflation.¹³ And indeed, in May 1946, Sokolovskii stressed internal reasons for a reform to a much greater

8 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 20–21, Zverev to Molotov, 21 March 1946.

9 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 46–50, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 17 May 1946.

10 Christoph Buchheim, 'Die Währungsreform 1948 in Westdeutschland', *Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 36, 1988, 2, p. 207: 'On the one hand a certain diminishing of money in circulation had come about through the shutting of banks in their zone; on the other, non-monetary stimuli (for example, the legal obligation to work or the marked differentiation of food rations) played a greater role in the economy of the Soviet zone of occupation than in that of the Western zones. Apart from that, the Soviets' aim of exploiting their zone as much as possible constituted an argument against currency reform inasmuch as this would lead to a boost in production and a rise in the standard of living in the Western zones of occupation, and would make the maintenance of low-level provision of the population of the Soviet zone in order to benefit supplies to the Soviet Union markedly more difficult politically. On top of that the Soviet Union was apparently not interested in currency reform for ideological reasons, since the restoration of a functioning monetary economy would make the re-establishment of a capitalist system possible.'

11 Mai, *Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland*, p. 281: 'Finally, in the Soviet zone of occupation, "the bad state of the currency" increasingly influenced "production and distribution", since though the blocking of accounts had had a deflationary effect, it had not limited the circulation of banknotes as such and thus had "become for the most part ineffective."'

12 Frank Zschaler, *Öffentliche Finanzen und Finanzpolitik in Berlin 1945–1961*, Berlin, 1995, p. 75: 'The few extant sources allow us to assume that the Russian representatives' willingness to compromise has been underestimated.'

13 See V. K. Sitnin, *Finansy Germanskoi Demokraticheskoi Respubliki*, Moscow, 1951.

extent than Zhukov had done before him. Overall, he argued, all democratic parties and a broad segment of the population would press for a currency reform.¹⁴

Without any doubt, there was enough reason for such a reform on the part of East Germany by early 1946. More decisive, however, were political considerations. The fact that the reaction of the Moscow authorities was negative supports this view. In March 1946, the Soviet Minister of Finance demanded a guarantee for the Soviet zone of occupation that following a currency reform it could continue to print German money independently and without any restrictions.¹⁵ By the end of May of that year, the Soviet foreign ministry's economists and experts on Germany raised objections. They emphasized the point that before the formation of a central German government the issuing of a new, undivided currency, no matter whether this was done in certain zones or centrally, would be too early. They further argued that the foundation of a central German bank of issue and the introduction of a new German currency would lead to a healthy German economy, but at the same time would be against Soviet interests, since the Americans considered that ending the issue of M-Marks, as well as the curtailment of both costs of occupation and of expenses for reparations, were prerequisites for carrying through the currency reform.¹⁶

The Soviet position up to March 1948 may be characterized by the following dilemma: in Moscow, the people in charge neither wanted to allow an all-German currency reform that was initiated and controlled by the Allied Control Commission, nor did they want to refuse such a reform openly. Had they agreed to an all-German reform carried out under the control of the four powers, the transformation process of the East German economy, at that time well on its way, would have been endangered. At the same time, an open refusal of an all-German reform bore the danger of provoking a separate reform in the Western zones. In order to get out of this dilemma, Sokolovskii was to be instructed to agree to a currency reform in principle but, when it came to discussing how the reform was to be realized, to insist on a zonal right to issue, and thereby block the reform altogether.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the Soviet side also considered alternatives. In late January 1947 a draft of the Soviet Minister of Finance read: 'We consider it possible to agree to a four-sided control of issuing and the establishment of an all-German banking mechanism, consisting of a federal bank council and a commission of the German local banks at the Control Council, under the proviso that the Allies will guarantee full compensation of our occupation and reparation costs, including those met by current production.'¹⁸ Proposals of this kind remained scenarios developed on a ministerial level. They were never proposed to Stalin or to the Politburo. This fact suggests that their acceptance was not only considered highly unlikely but also that no one wanted to risk being blamed. Those members of the Soviet leadership who feared risking such a proposal lest it be accepted apparently proceeded on the assumption that surrendering sole fiscal autonomy in the process of an all-German currency reform would result not only in their losing control over Soviet-occupied territory, but also in endangering the interim results of the 'anti-Fascist upheaval' in East Germany.

In the SMAD preparations for an autonomous currency reform in the Soviet zone of occupation began in December 1946, shortly after negotiations in the Allied Control Commission about an all-German reform had begun. These preparations were triggered by hints that the Western powers might prepare such a reform on their own. Without waiting for the outcome of negotiations at the Control Council, Sokolovskii, at the end of 1946 and

14 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, pp. 46–50, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 17 May 1946.

15 AVP/RF 082/30/130/32, p. 20, Zverev to Molotov, 21 March 1946.

16 AVP/RF 07/11/13/177, pp. 10–12, Smirnov und Gerashchenko to Vyshinskii, 20 May 1946.

17 AVP/RF 07/11/13/177, pp. 13–14, Zverev to Molotov, 03 June 1946.

18 AVP/RF 06/9/48/704, pp. 7–13, Zverev/Maletin to Molotov, 21 January 1947.

beginning of 1947, proposed in Moscow the printing of separate banknotes for the Soviet zone of occupation.¹⁹

III

Immediately after the end of the London Council of Foreign Ministers, concrete political preparations began for changing the currency in the Soviet zone of occupation. The SMAD, anticipating corresponding moves on the part of the Western powers, took the initiative. In December 1947, Sokolovskii cabled the Soviet foreign ministry with drafts of two regulations concerning an East German currency reform to be released by the Council of Ministers of the USSR. But events took a different course. The first regulation brought into force Order no. 111 of the SMAD, signed on 23 June 1948.²⁰ The same day, an edited version of the second regulation was announced as a 'Decree of the German Economic Commission [*Deutsche Wirtschaftskommission*] on Currency Reform in the Soviet Zone of Occupation'.²¹ Added to both December drafts was a seven-page memorandum classified as 'top secret'. Here, the head of the SMAD presented the scenario for reform. The coupons which, in the event of the exchange of money, were supposed to be glued on to the old Reichsmark notes, were at that time ready for use (December 1947).²²

From 1946 onwards, the SED (German Unity Party) leadership had not been informed about the SMAD's preparations for currency reform. It was only in late January 1948 that Maletin explained to Wilhelm Pieck, head of the SED, the SMAD's ideas regarding an all-German currency reform. He announced that instead of current efforts to stabilize the Reichsmark, the old money should be withdrawn from circulation and exchanged for new banknotes.²³

At the same time, in Moscow, the issue was not a choice between an all-German or a Soviet-zone currency reform. In the process of coming to a decision about the drafts which Sokolovskii had sent in December 1947, what was at stake were merely the procedures of a reform that had been planned for the Soviet zone of occupation. The alternative, not taken into consideration at that time, was to prevent a separate reform in the Western zones through a compromise with the Western powers, thereby preparing the ground for an all-German reform. On 14 May 1948, the final version of the heavily edited December 1947 draft was sent to Stalin.²⁴ Moscow provided more than the political decision to reform the currency: even the details of implementation had been worked out by close co-operation between the SMAD's financial administration and the Soviet Ministry of Finance. In general, the conditions for money exchange were detrimental to property-owners; they favoured others — the unpropertied and small savers.

The exchange of the Reichsmark, Rentenmark (pension mark) and M-Mark, which until that day had been in circulation in the Soviet zone of occupation, began in all financial institutions on 24 June 1948, a Thursday. It ended on the following Monday, 28 June. On 30 June 1948, when the first stage of currency conversion had been barely completed, and the final exchange of coupon-marks into new banknotes had not yet been announced, the SED party board (*Parteivorstand*) published its draft of a two-year plan for 1949–50 'to

19 AVP/RF 082/30/131/33, p. 122, Zverev to Malik, 23 December 1946.

20 Published in Ministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR (eds), *Um ein antifaschistisch-demokratisches Deutschland. Dokumente aus den Jahren 1945–1949*, (East) Berlin, 1968, pp. 659–66.

21 See Kohlmeier and Dewey (eds), *Bankensystem und Geldumlauf in der DDR*, pp. 201–09.

22 AVP/RF 07/21zh/44/8, pp. 1–7, Sokolovskii to Molotov, 23 December 1947.

23 Zschaler, 'Die vergessene Währungsreform', p. 204.

24 AVP/RF 06/10/42/560, p. 2, Molotov to Stalin, 14 May 1948.

restore and develop the peace economy in the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany'. The primary goal of the currency conversion in the Soviet zone was the achievement of the financial prerequisites necessary to implement this long-term economic planning system. The two-year plan marked one further step on the way to the zone's economic and political separation from the rest of Germany.

The preparation of the second step of the currency exchange in the Soviet zone was also in Soviet hands. On 4 July 1948, Molotov passed the draft of a decree on the matter on to Stalin. According to this draft, the exchange, at parity, of the coupon-mark with the new 'Mark der Deutschen Notenbank', which was to be printed in the USSR, was to take place between 25 and 29 July 1948.²⁵ Even the last step of the currency reform, the destruction of the invalidated money, was decided in Moscow. On 9 October 1948, the Soviet Council of Ministers announced a decree to destroy a total of 1,600 tonnes of banknotes worth about 28 billion Reichsmark and M-Marks. The old money was supposed to be recycled into high-quality paper. To prevent the Germans finding out the exact amount of money involved, it was decided not to count it before it was destroyed.²⁶

Conclusion

In the Soviet zone of occupation, then, the currency reform was not intimately linked to the conversion of money that took place in the summer of 1948. The Soviet zone's currency reform was part of a lengthy process of transformation that began in the financial circumstances of 1945 and moved towards socialist-orientated financial management. The publication in July 1948 of a two-year plan for the Soviet zone, modelled on plans for the USSR and the other Eastern Bloc countries, between stage one and two of the East German conversion, indicates the degree of transformation that had been reached by that time. It was this process of transformation that determined the form and content of the East German currency reform. It is indicative of the interests of the Soviet occupation power: as far as currency matters are concerned, there is no indication of any USSR interest in an all-German solution. The USSR's main concern was to secure its position in the Soviet zone.

Given this background, the key position played by the head of the SMAD and his co-workers in the quarrels about currency issues becomes explicable. Precisely because they knew much more about the precarious Soviet position in Germany than the Moscow leadership, they took the initiative for the Soviets. The SMAD could settle on its own, without formal confirmation from Moscow, important currency matters, such as the partial release of frozen old accounts in March 1946, or the establishment of clearing-banks and a bank of issue in February 1947. The SMAD administration prepared the material for all the Moscow leadership's fundamental decisions. The SMAD's relative independence only came to an end during negotiations with the Allies. Here, the Soviet negotiating partners remained unable to act without orders from Moscow.

25 AVP/RF, 06/10/41/559, pp. 3–5, Molotov to Stalin, 4 July 1948.

26 GARF R-5446/50a/3809. Postanovlenie Sovet Ministrov SSSR no. 3829-15515.

11 Reform and Retribution: The British Impact on the Re-establishment of the Rule of Law in Germany after the Second World War

ULRIKE WALTON-JORDAN

Introduction

On 5 June 1945, the Allied Occupying Powers declared their ‘supreme authority with respect to Germany’. A major consequence of this was the abrogation of the National Socialist legal system and the aim to see it replaced by a new legal order. The Allies recognized that the perversion of the whole judicial process and the ensuing terror jurisdiction and legislation had been one of the pillars of the Nazi dictatorship. The reconstruction of the rule of law in Germany was closely bound up with the perceptions of the nature and legacy of Nazism and its impact on the judicial system. The Anglo-American Allies based their collective post-war plans for law reform in Germany on their own perceptions and, very important, on the views of *émigré* lawyers. In the Allies’ view, the legal system in Germany had witnessed a step-by-step corruption and ultimately a total instrumentalization by the Nazis’ terror jurisdiction. While the Special Courts (*Sondergerichte*) and the People’s Court (*Volksgerichtshof*) were created for these purposes, ordinary criminal courts had served as perpetrators of terror as well. This had been made possible by the introduction of new norms and general clauses, which had authorized judges to pronounce verdicts on the grounds of Nazi ideology: the will of the Führer, so-called ‘sound popular sentiment’ and the alleged ‘common good’ were only a few examples of such newly introduced criteria. Moreover, the police had taken over authority from criminal justice in certain areas, most notably with respect to ‘anti-social’ elements and Jews in the racist Nazi definition of the term.¹

Against this background, I shall concentrate on the British impact on the endeavour to deal with the state and consequences of National Socialist jurisdiction and legislation, which I hope to disentangle from the general Allied approach. In order to understand the post-war development, it is, however, necessary to trace this policy back to its roots in the 1930s and the war years. External and internal factors contributed to the evolution of occupation legal policies: external factors like the course of the war and inter-Allied agreements, like the ‘unconditional surrender’ formula which was present in American and British political discourse as early as 1942 as well as internal factors like the decision-making processes within the institutions of government.² Thus, my attempts to shed further light on these questions follow an interdisciplinary approach which aims to unite the perspectives of legal, political and social history. Historical research has so far

1 For an overview of the deformation of legal norms and jurisdiction in Germany from 1933 to 1945, see, for instance: Bernd Rüthers, *Entartetes Recht. Rechtslehren und Kronjuristen im Dritten Reich*, Munich, 1988; Lothar Gruchmann, *Justiz im Dritten Reich 1933–1940. Anpassung und Unterwerfung in der Ära Gürtner*, Munich, 1988. For a very influential contemporary analysis see Franz Neumann, *Behemoth. The Structure and Practice of National Socialism 1933–1944*, New York, 1944.

2 See Lothar Kettenacker, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung. Die Deutschlandplanung der britischen Regierung während des Zweiten Weltkrieges*, Göttingen and Zurich, 1989, pp. 186–87 *et passim*.

concentrated on other key areas of post-war planning and policy.³ There is, then, a place for an independent study of the legal thought which went into the planning phase. Since this was closely linked to the German-speaking *émigrés*' role in the evolving planning process, the whole field of exile studies makes for a pertinent area in the historiography of my theme.⁴ This has, in particular, sparked off studies on professional groups, most notably on the social sciences and history.⁵ However, an emphasis has lain on emigration to the USA. More work has recently been done on Britain, mainly on the basis of biographical or sociological approaches.⁶

The Evolution of British Legal Policy and the Role of Refugee Lawyers

In my attempt to outline the re-establishment of the judiciary and of legal norms in post-war Germany I shall focus on three broad chronological and topical phases in the evolution of a British legal policy *vis-à-vis* Germany: (1) The background of a growing knowledge of the situation in Germany from 1933 until 1941/42; (2) the phase of planning for the post-war situation, which moved from a scholarly to a practical plane from 1942 to 1945, and (3) the implementation of British legal policy in the zone of occupation from 1945 to 1949.

In the first phase, all British legal policy was developed with the help of German refugees' expertise, which was mostly of great benefit to the process of conceptual clarification. Initial information about the abolition of legal guarantees, most of all for those deemed 'non-Aryan' and 'anti-social' in Nazi ideology, was gathered through various channels of communication. Not only did the first wave of refugees from 1933 to 1938 bring personal experience to bear on British public opinion, but many individual attempts to relay vital information were made through individual networks (for example, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and his circle to the Bishop of Chichester, George Bell). British visitors to Germany as well as diplomats and journalists constituted another source of information. But the overall awareness remained patchy, as current research in these fields is revealing: private impressions often derived from mixed reactions to Nazism, and displayed a high regard for the so-called 'social revolution' of the Nazis. Moreover, feelers from the German opposition, often coming from Anglophile personalities like Adam von Trott zu Soltz, almost never reached government circles.⁷

An important source of information, however, was the *Manchester Guardian's* network of spies, the 'Special Information Service', within Germany, which provided detailed information of State oppression from 1933 to 1941.⁸ One could argue that this source formed the basis of the Foreign Office Research Department's comprehensive document on anti-Jewish legislation in Germany from 1933 to 1941. The interpretation of this

3 As, for example, on the reconstitution of the civil service (Ulrich Reusch), the establishment of political institutions (Barbara Marshall), economics (Ian Turner), as well as broad planning issues (Lothar Kettenacker).

4 See the analyses of Marion Berghahn, Gerhard Hirschfeld and Werner Mosse, amongst others.

5 The latest example is Peter Alter, *Out of the Third Reich: Refugee Historians in Post-war Britain*, London and New York, 1998.

6 See, for example, the biography of Gerhard Leibholz, brother-in-law of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, by Manfred H. Wiegandt, *Norm und Wirklichkeit. Gerhard Leibholz (1901–1982) — Leben, Werk und Richteramt*, Baden-Baden, 1995.

7 See Patricia Meehan, *The Unnecessary War: Whitehall and the German Resistance to Hitler*, London, 1992.

8 See Markus Huttner, *Britische Presse und nationalsozialistischer Kirchenkampf. Eine Untersuchung der 'Times' und des 'Manchester Guardian' von 1930 bis 1939*, Paderborn, Munich, Vienna, and Zurich, 1995.

anonymous report, which presumably dates from 1941/42, supports clearly what has later come to be known as the 'intentionalist' analysis of Nazi racist policy, that is, broadly speaking, the idea that the murderous racist and political intentions had been in place from (at least) the beginning of the Nazi dictatorship:

The militant anti-Jewish persecution, one of the main pivots of the National-Socialist Revolution, has most decidedly been carried out according to a minutely planned and thoroughly organised campaign. Every move, every incident — 'official' or 'spontaneous' — was a step in accordance with a most carefully prepared and controlled programme. A huge flare-up of press-propaganda, mass-meetings and wireless-talks initiated each new phase of spontaneous incidents, mobilising a tidal wave of popular 'passion' against the Jews. This climax was then mostly followed up by measures of local administration, resulting in official anti-Jewish Legislation using a phraseology which for many years duped world public opinion. All Legislation and unofficial spontaneous incidents must therefore be interpreted as co-ordinated or at least very closely interrelated activities, more often influenced by coming political events, or manipulated as a camouflage of internal cryptic tensions within the Party-hierarchy. The technique of this active and militant Antisemitism is as novel as it is destructive, and may certainly be well-worth studying as a *pars pro toto* of National-Socialist methods and mentality, of mass-psychology, intimidation and shock-tactics, culminating in the totalitarian Blitz-strategy of annihilation.⁹

The legal aspects involved in evaluating Germany's position were crucial to the British understanding of the National Socialist state and identifying the human rights issues involved. The Foreign Office Research Department documentation seems to support this view. In the years leading up to the outbreak of war and into the first two years of its duration, this exploration of the legal situation in Germany and its consequences deepened. Networks of *émigré* lawyers which provided links with key figures of the British academic and political world slowly began developing. The odds against which this took place have been described by scholars working in exile studies.¹⁰

A few examples will serve to illustrate these difficulties. The 'List and Supplementary List of Displaced German Scholars' for 1936 and 1937, as well as the report for 1941 of the 'Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars' mentions among the over 100 displaced German jurists at that time nine emigrants to Britain.¹¹ Among them were influential scholars like Max Grünhut, formerly Professor at Jena University, or Ernst J. Cohn, who left his chair at Breslau University in 1934. The future contributors to reform proposals came from a variety of professional backgrounds, but for the most part shared a Jewish background. Apart from London (predominantly north-west London), academic jurists were based in Oxford and Cambridge. My own analysis of the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning's records have yielded about 130 refugee lawyers, a considerable proportion of whom, however, did not remain in Britain.¹² Among the more

9 'Anti-Jewish Legislation in National-Socialist Germany from 1933–1941', typescript, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department Archive. I would like to thank Bob Dixon, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Research Department, for his kind permission to use this material and the material mentioned in footnote 20.

10 For a sociologically informed study see Marion Berghahn, *Continental Britons: German-Jewish Refugees from Nazi Germany*, Leamington Spa, 1988.

11 See Herbert A. Strauss et al., (eds), *Emigration. Deutsche Wissenschaftler nach 1933. Entlassung und Vertreibung. List of Displaced German Scholars 1936. Supplementary List of Displaced German Scholars 1937. The Emergency Committee in Aid of Displaced Foreign Scholars, Report 1941*, Berlin, 1987, parts 1–3.

12 Based on an analysis of the records of the Academic Assistance Council/Society for the Protection of Science and Learning (now the Council for Assisting Refugee Academics) held at the Bodleian Library.

prominent members of the legal profession who came to Britain and influenced the development of progressive legal thought there, Hermann Mannheim and Otto Kahn-Freund also contributed to the advisory bodies' work.

In the second phase of legal planning, during the early 1940s, the British government came to recognize the potential of expert advice, and contributions of emigrant jurists to this complex and controversial issue played a certain, though often indirect, role in the development of British planning from 1942 to 1945 and beyond. There was a change from a predominantly analytical to a more concrete, practical and educational approach over the period 1942 to 1945. From 1942 onwards the broad political-legal perspective of future regulations in Germany assumed centre-stage in the views of refugee jurists and British officials alike. Here as in other respects, the Italian capitulation in summer 1943 made the need to formulate plans for the post-war era more urgent.¹³ From around 1942, attention moved from the detailed economic considerations of a revision of the Versailles Treaty for the purposes of a future peace treaty with Germany to the need of a thorough revision of German law.¹⁴ Naturally, the German legal experts involved in drafting résumés were eager to influence future British policy.

The first German emigrant advisory body under the direction of Ernst Wolff, the former President of the German and Berlin Bar, had been advising on the future peace treaty provisions since early in the war.¹⁵ Communication between the Foreign Office and the 'Wolff Committee', had been through Sir Cecil Hurst, a former Legal Adviser at the Foreign Office, now engaged in work for the Home Office's Interned Enemy Aliens Tribunal at the Royal Courts of Justice. Hurst actively supported the setting up of the 'Committee for the Revision of German Law' under the chairmanship of Ernst Wolff and another *émigré* lawyer, E. K. Schalscha. On 6 January 1942, he met with Wolff and Schalscha, and two days later told the Foreign Office's Legal Adviser, Sir William Malkin:

The upshot of our discussion was that it would be a good thing to have this question explored. Dr. Wolff and Dr. Schalscha are to see whether they can obtain the collaboration of a few qualified individuals, say six in all, to undertake the enquiry, but these individuals will do so upon the distinct understanding that HMG [...] are not in any way to be committed to the view that the terms embodied in the peace settlement at the end of the war will contain any provisions on the subject.¹⁶

Encouraged by this interest on the government's part, be it ever so guarded, the two lawyers solicited the co-operation of colleagues who were willing to get down to work immediately. The new committee laid down the rules which the later advisory bodies, which were linked with Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) and the British Control Commission, would implicitly follow: 'The idea underlying the Committee's work is to examine all laws created by the Nazis with the view to suggest which of the provisions would have to be abolished for being incompatible with the elementary principles of justice and liberty, which could be modified and which could possibly be maintained.'¹⁷

Though law created by National Socialism, the lawyers agreed, must to a large extent be considered incompatible with fundamental principles of humanity and civilization, they

13 Kettenacker, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung*, pp. 172–80.

14 This is illustrated by the involvement of Ernst Wolff as government adviser, Public Record Office (hereafter PRO), FO 371/39032/Doc C 1115/291/18 and Doc C 291/291/18.

15 On the wider question of the post-war settlement plans, see Kettenacker, *Krieg zur Friedenssicherung*, pp. 394–409.

16 PRO, FO 371/39032/Doc C 291/291/18, Sir Cecil Hurst to Sir William Malkin, 8 January 1942.

17 PRO, FO 371/39032/Doc C 1115/291/18, Wolff to Sir Cecil Hurst, 19 January 1942.

were reluctant to cancel all Nazi-created law. In any case, so the argument ran, this could not be done with retroactive effect, since numerous legal relationships established under and based on Nazi law would thereby be deprived of all foundation. As a result, each law was looked at on an individual basis and recommendations were made on its status.

The Wolff Committee's work was the first significant step in post-war legal planning. The following three points were essential to their general approach: (1) At no stage did the Committee consider rewriting the German constitution of the Weimar years, nor, indeed, put any other pre-existing constitution in place after the war. It was for the German people to decide on their constitution at a later stage. (2) The Committee planned to include as one of the most urgent measures a declaration of the Rights of Man, referring back both to the German and American/French traditions and to the most recent developments in the Law of Nations. These rights included, among others, the Lockean triad of civil liberties (rights to life, liberty and property) without distinction of nationality, race, language or religion, legal security in the economic and professional area and equality before the law. (3) A proclamation to the German people was drafted which named these and other rights, and fundamental statements like 'Judges shall be bound by existing law'. Over the years, the Wolff Committee developed their survey of objectionable laws, widening the scope of their analysis to cover civil and criminal law in their entirety.¹⁸ Following this initial co-operation between the British and refugees in the first half of 1943, a British policy began to take shape which departed from the philosophical, and political and moral, foundations of the refugees. Linked with the refugees' vision was consideration of compensation for sufferings inflicted as a consequence of the deterioration of law in Germany. The British, and later the Anglo-American, initiatives still used the experts' knowledge in the working groups established as the Special Legal Unit Germany and Austria (under SHAEF G-5) and the British Special Legal Research Unit (Control Office Germany and Austria, London), yet they concentrated their efforts on the practical realization of occupation policy objectives 'on the ground'. This meant providing, among other things, lecture courses for future occupation officers, completing the list of objectionable legislation, summarizing the German legal system and the status of law-enforcement agencies. All of these matters were dealt with by *émigrés* to Britain or the USA (best known among them was perhaps the future legal adviser to General Clay, Fritz E. Oppenheimer).¹⁹ This pragmatic approach of the Allies, however, did not lose sight of the need to eradicate all vestiges of specifically Nazi law.

On the British side, there were deliberations on the general theme of the control of courts through another power in 1944, a topic which was not unheard of in British colonial history. It is, then, not surprising that the example of British control over Egyptians courts in the late nineteenth century featured in the Foreign Office's discussions on the matter.²⁰ Similar models were implicitly followed in some areas of post-war legal policy in the zone of occupation, such as in the institution of regional court control teams.

18 PRO, FO 371/8835/Doc C 8835/8835/18 (Report dated 31 July 1943). Cf. PRO, FO 371/39069/Doc C 902/116/18 (Supplementary Report dated 18 January 1944).

19 For the general background and organizational affiliations, see Matthias Etzel, *Die Aufhebung von nationalsozialistischen Gesetzen durch den Alliierten Kontrollrat (1945–1948)*, Tübingen, 1992.

20 'Control of the Administration of Justice by a Foreign Power', paper in the collection of the Foreign Office Research Department, 16 September 1944, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Archive, Whitehall, London.

The British 'Blueprint' and its Implementation

In the course of 1944–45 Anglo-American discussions led increasingly to concrete law policy outlines. The eventual outcome of post-war legal planning, the 'blueprint', as it were, of British legal policy before the end of hostilities (an analysis of American policy would differ somewhat) can be found in the statement of the UK member of the European Advisory Commission of 28 February 1945:

- (a) The abolition of legislation discriminating against individuals on racial, religious or political grounds; (b) the restoration of the equality of all citizens before the law; and the release of political prisoners; (c) the re-establishment of the 'rule of law' and of the authority and impartiality of courts and judges; (d) the purge of the German judiciary and the German public legal service of unreliable or politically undesirable judges or magistrates or officials; (e) the abolition of detention and imprisonment without trial.²¹

This whole process of finding such a legal policy blueprint had not, however, led to any mixed refugee-Allied groups, nor had it at this point led to the establishment of a sustained direct consultation between Allied institutions and refugee legal experts. Their long-term influence was none the less formidable. While their practical and empirical influence is clearly borne out by Allied legislation after the war, some of their underlying assumptions were also in harmony with British and Allied approaches. Their reluctance to impose a constitution on defeated Germany, for example, coincided with the British approach to the re-establishment of the rule of law in post-war Germany. Reports by the Special Legal Unit Germany and Austria were used in two ways for the formulation of Military Government Law No. 1 on the abrogation of National Socialist law (September 1944). Compilations of racially discriminating laws were completely incorporated into Part II of that law, and the concept of a general clause of abrogation, suggested by the Special Legal Unit Germany and Austria, was followed (against original British wishes for a suspension). Also, the evolving Allied and British legal policy statements, most important, those drafted in autumn 1945, partially bore out the *émigrés'* ideas.

There were, however, important differences in the British government and the *émigrés'* approach to the questions of German law revision and reform. The *émigrés'* emphasis on a 'natural rights' basis to all their deliberations on the re-constitution of German legal norms is an important feature of their analysis on the theoretical level.²² This perspective follows the Enlightenment tradition of pre-constitutional inalienable individual rights as documented in the English Bill of Rights, the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the American Constitution. These all prefigure the United Nations declaration of Human Rights of 1948. In this instance it seems that the French-American legal tradition of catalogues of rights comported with the English civil rights tradition in an attempt to create a firm ground from which to judge and legislate. The *émigrés'* also sought to continue the developments in international law which had taken place in the 1920s. While the British showed consideration for individual civil liberties, the ideas of pre-constitutional declaratory rights and the goal of international accountability for violations of human rights (a transparent international awareness of the contents of an 'International Magna

21 European Advisory Commission, Administration of Justice, Memorandum by the UK Representative, Lancaster House, London, 28 February 1945. PRO, FO 1060, no. 729.

22 This can be evaluated in the context of the so-called renaissance of 'natural rights thinking' in Germany after 1945. See Joachim Perels, 'Die Restauration der Rechtslehre nach 1945', *Kritische Justiz*, 17, 1984, pp. 359–79.

Carta') is not taken up.²³ Yet the British supported fully the Allies' general proclamation of 20 October, 1945 which voiced exactly these concepts of universal human rights: 'The Control Council, in accordance with its proclamation to the German people, dated 20 October 1945, deciding that the German judicial system must be reorganised on the basis of the principles of democracy, legality and equality before the law of the citizens, without distinction of race, nationality, or religion.'²⁴

As far as the implementation of these legal policy guidelines are concerned, it appears that the transition between planning and realization was marked by a number of institutional and theoretical continuities. The key group responsible for government legal advice, the British Special Legal Research Unit, continued to produce reports and analyses from London, which were frequently used in the day-to-day operations of the Legal Division of the Control Commission for Germany (British Element). Nevertheless, the practical situation and the inter-Allied command structure demanded changes to the British approach. Above all, this meant adjustment to the other Allies' ideas and perceptions of legal questions relating to Germany. At the Allied Control Authority Legal Directorate in Berlin a working group was established to produce a draft for the 'Reform of German Law'. This group met alongside the Allied Control Authority Legal Directorate meetings. Yvette Monier, a member of the French delegation, records in her memoirs:

It was an extraordinary atmosphere: we felt like pioneers and in a sense we were. Nothing like it had ever happened in the history of the world. We now have [...] become used to international co-operation in permanent or semi-permanent bodies like the United Nations, International Courts and, more recently, the European Parliament etc. But the idea of four countries, as geographically and ideologically diverse as ours, meeting week after week in an atmosphere of cordiality to re-establish order in a defeated, demoralised and ruined enemy country, and setting it back on its feet, was absolutely new and wonderful.²⁵

In the British zone of occupation in north-west Germany arrangements were made for the implementing of 'indirect rule'. In other words, the extent of obvious control over German courts was limited. A small German advisory group was established in late 1945, recruited from German lawyers who had been prisoners of war in Britain. Key figures in the German legal establishment were also found who could act as mediators of British guidelines (the eight presidents of the old *Land* supreme courts [*Oberlandesgerichte*] recommended themselves at first, until the establishment of *Länder* Justice Ministries and the Central Legal Office for the British zone in 1946 expanded the circle).²⁶

All theory about legal occupation policy merged into the necessities of practice when the occupation of Germany began in the autumn of 1944. Faced with the problem of reconstituting the administration of justice, all zones of occupation encountered similar

23 Compare the 'Wolff Committee's' term 'negative Magna Carta' for the Nazi law of 28 February 1933 which virtually annihilated all fundamental rights guarantees in Germany: PRO, FO 371/8835/Doc C 8835/8835/18.

24 Allied Control Council Law No. 4, 'Reorganisation of the German Judicial System', dated 30 October 1945, in 'Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Co-ordinating Committee Germany for 1945', Microfilm 10 Omgus SK11, DK 112.003 (Institute of Contemporary History, Munich).

25 Lady Wilberforce, *Anecdotes in My Life (A Memoir)*, published by The Philippine Branch of the International Law Association, Manila, 1993, p. 66.

26 The structure of the British Control Commission Legal Division in Berlin and its sub-headquarters in Bünde and Herford has been analysed by German and British scholars. See, for example, Martin Broszat, 'Siegerjustiz oder strafrechtliche "Selbstreinigung". Aspekte der Vergangenheitsbewältigung der deutschen Justiz während der Besatzungszeit 1945–1949', *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 29, 1981, pp. 477–544.

difficulties: an increased rate of criminality, a backlog of civil proceedings (mostly divorce matters) and the accumulation of untried cases from the pre-1945 period created serious problems throughout Germany. The influx of refugees from the east as well as housing and food problems and the extensive and often violent black market were only the most urgent among the problems that the occupying powers had to deal with. As Alan Kramer has pointed out, in the immediately post-war years the major law-and-order problem was property crime.²⁷

Apart from economic dislocation, shortages and the physical destruction of cities, other factors contributed to the crime wave. The presence of Displaced Persons in Germany (former slave labourers, prisoners of war and concentration-camp inmates) caused widespread concern, since they frequently survived on the basis of gang raids predominantly led by Polish DPs, but also by Germans; murder and armed robbery were rife.²⁸ The Military Government was, then, faced with considerable jurisdictional responsibilities. Given the size of the task, the implementation of the reconstitution (and control) of courts, was remarkably fast. On the basis of the court constitution law of 1924, local and *Land* courts opened in late May 1945, and in the autumn of 1945 the eight supreme *Land* courts followed. By the spring of 1946 a reasonable system of German law courts was working. The task of maintaining order was subject to a threefold organization of Summary, Intermediate and General Courts. These had jurisdiction over every person in the zone of occupation and pronounced sentences according to Allied, British and German criminal law. These courts were the main focus of criminal jurisdiction for both British and Germans at the time.

Using the 'blueprint' for British legal policy of February 1945 as my point of reference, I shall briefly explore the intent and realization of the key objectives in the British plan. I have chosen these objectives to illustrate the decisions that were taken in fulfilling them by the British Military Government and the British Control Commission from 1945 to 1949. In some cases, a model of congruence or discrepancy cannot be applied — a case in point is de-Nazification. In other cases one can broadly use it as in the case of the rule of law.

As far as the British law-and-order policy was concerned, not only criminal jurisdiction, but also the potential resurgence or persistence of Nazi tendencies exercised the British. Strong preventive principles existed along the lines of military occupation jurisdiction for some time and subsequently gradually gave way to jurisdiction by the British occupation power, which was less bent on the principle of deterrence. The de-Nazification of the law, on the other hand, had been a core task of the planning phase and saw implementation within the year 1945. After the first wave of Allied and British decrees and laws governing the abolition of the most obvious Nazi laws and institutions (Special Courts and so forth), the greatest effort went into the control of German jurisdiction through regionally and locally active groups of officers who shared for the most part a civilian legal background and thus implemented the principle of British 'indirect rule'.

The de-Nazification of legal personnel constituted a field of action which had of necessity to wait until the actual occupation. After a first surge of 'purging', by late 1945 the so-called *Huckepackregel* (piggy-back rule), that is the admission of one nominal

27 Alan Kramer, "'Law-abiding Germans': Social Disintegration, Crime and the Reimposition of Order in Post-war Western Germany, 1945-9' in Richard J. Evans (ed.), *The German Underworld: Deviants and Outcasts in German History*, London and New York, 1988, pp. 238-61.

28 See the statistics gleaned from a survey of British courts' jurisdiction in the British zone of occupation from 1945 to 1955. Murder and armed robbery (and related offences) were the second most frequently occurring crimes tried in the high courts and in the general and intermediate courts. See appendix at the end of this chapter.

National Socialist for every 'clear case' of no existing Nazi affiliations, prevented a thoroughgoing process of personnel exchange. In general, de-Nazification of the top positions assumed primary importance. This had a political impact as the years went on, which sometimes took the shape of anti-Communist tendencies, as the example of the establishment of the Hamburg judiciary demonstrates.²⁹ In contrast to these measures, the British attempts to influence the corporate identity of the new German generation of lawyers belonged to a different variety of 'indirect' policy. It differed from the other aspects in that it was firmly rooted in the post-1947, broadly-speaking 'early Cold War' era of the occupation. The courses for young lawyers (articled clerks), who came to Britain and took a short course on the principles and theory of English law, proved very successful throughout.³⁰

Something that was outside British legal policy planning, but where British lawyers became intimately involved was the war crimes tribunal. Especially the liberation of Belsen, but then the even more horrifying news of the German camps in Russian-liberated Poland, particularly Auschwitz and Majdanek, forced the British authorities to ponder the question of *nulla poena sine lege*, that is the admissibility of retroactive jurisdiction, which constituted the basis of the Nuremberg War Crimes trials. The official British standpoint adhered to the conventional definition of war crimes, but a debate was started under the strong influence of the American (and partly the German) view of the predominance of 'principles of humanity'. The Belsen trial under British auspices was especially important as the first Allied trial of this kind.

Conclusion

In December 1943, an internal Foreign Office memorandum expressed an opinion that summarized the general attitude of the British government to law reform in Germany during the post-war planning phase: 'German law regulates German lives, not ours: it is only just and reasonable that they should reform it themselves'.³¹ 'Just and reasonable' — the two poles of British idealism and pragmatism — posed different problems for the realization of post-war legal policy after the transition from war to peace. British legal policy in Germany evolved from an extremely important, yet insufficiently known subject amongst the issues of evaluation and post-war planning to a centre part of British occupation policy. In this transition, it lost most of its (*émigré*-motivated) role as yardstick for assessing the Nazi tyranny and assumed the key characteristics of the occupation policy as a whole: a measured, indirect control was paired with the encouragement of democratic and Anglophile legal thinking (without any attempt to alter the German approach altogether). However, this policy underwent an evolution dictated by the political events during the volatile period 1945–49: at first there was an approach to jurisdiction which was informed by the demands of military occupation and deterrence, while from around 1946–47 the agenda of the nascent Cold War entered the apparently ever-growing conformity of legal occupation policy in the British zone of occupation and among the Allies altogether.

29 See PRO, FO 1060 no. 1032 *passim* (Oberlandesgericht Hamburg, German Courts and Officials).

30 See Bundesarchiv Koblenz, collection Z 21, Vol. 314.

31 PRO, FO 371/8835/Doc. C 12961/8835/18, Foreign Office memorandum, 'The Reform of Nazi Law', dated December 1943.

*Appendix**Statistics concerning criminal jurisdiction by British Courts in the zone of occupation, 1945–55**1: Control Commission High Courts, Records of individual cases 1945–55*

Unlawful possession and use of firearms/explosives	52
Theft/aggravated theft/armed robbery/plunder/illegal export	45
Murder including attempted murder	26
Crimes against humanity	15
Offences prejudicial to the security of the Allied Powers	7
Acts hostile/prejudicial to the Allied Forces	3
Abortion	1
Public Disorder (AHC Law 14)	2
Offences against the German Opium Law	1
Illicit slaughter	1
Unlawful distilling	1
Indecency	1

2: Control Commission Summary Court, Records of individual cases 1945–55

Fraud	20
Disobedience and Resistance to Military Government	10
Theft/plunder	8
Unlawful possession and use of firearms and explosives	7
Assault	3
Dangerous driving	3
Acts to the prejudice of the Allied Forces	2
Acts to the prejudice of good order	1
Conduct hostile or disrespectful to the Allied Forces	1
Abortion	1
Murder	1
Illegal border-crossing	1
Violating the prostitution laws	1
Escape	1

3: Control Commission General and Intermediate Courts, Records of Individual Cases
1945–55

Unlawful possession and use of firearms	96
Murder including attempted murder and connivance	52
Theft/aggravated theft/looting	50
Fraud/bribery	27
Assault/riot	20
Acts to the prejudice of good order	13
Death by negligence	10
Wilful concealment of records/false statements	9
Disobedience to Military Government including insulting	9
Manslaughter	7
Public disorder including incitement	7
Sabotage	5
Black market offences	5
Escape	5
Assistance after escape/failing to report	4
Rape	4
Acts in support of the NSDAP and HJ (Hitler Youth)	3
Endangering the security of the Allied Forces by removing marks of blood groups of SS members	2
Disrespectful conduct towards the Allied Forces	2
Conspiring to commit acts in support of the NSDAP	2
Acts prejudicial to the interests of the Allied Forces	2
Wandering without permit during curfew	2
Promoting/aiding a public gathering without permit	1
Illegal border-crossing	1
Desertion from POW camp	1
Intelligence given to <i>Wehrmacht</i>	1
Abortion	1
Indecency	1
Threatening girls associating with British soldiers	1
Crimes against humanity	1
Espionage including intended espionage	1
Infanticide	1
Unlawful imprisonment	1
Illegally entering Germany	1
Illegal border-crossing	1
Enforcing measures against a person co-operating with the Allied Forces	1

4: Control Commission Court of Appeal, Records of individual cases 1945–55

Unlawful possession and use of firearms and explosives	23
Fraud/false statement in documents	22
Theft	21
Dangerous driving	10
Assault/unlawful killing	3
Crimes against humanity	2
Escape	2
Murder including incitement to murder	2
Disobedience to Military Government orders	2
Offences against the prestige and security of the Allied Forces (AHC Law 5)	2
Acts against the security of the Allied Forces	1
Acts prejudicial to good order	1
Black-market offences	1
Disrespectful conduct towards the Allied Forces	1
Buggery	1
Contempt of court (British national)	1
Act of assistance to a state at war with Belgium (Belgian national)	1

All data based on Public Record Office, FO 1060

12 Young People and Youth Movements in the Soviet Zone of Occupied Germany

GARETH PRITCHARD

From the very beginning of the Soviet occupation of eastern Germany, the military authorities, and the leaders of both the Communist party (KPD) and the Social Democratic Party (SPD), regarded the winning of the hearts and minds of youth as one of their key political objectives. There were several reasons for this. In the long term, young people represented the future of Germany, and both the Soviets and the German Communists were anxious to shape that future. In the short term, the loss of so many adult males during the war meant that, out of sheer pragmatic necessity, the process of economic and political reconstruction would require the full and active participation of young people. The Soviet authorities and Communist leaders also believed that German youth had been more deeply impregnated by Nazism than almost any other section of the population, and therefore required special remedial attention. According to Walter Ulbricht: 'The whole tragedy of the Hitler catastrophe weighed on the young German generation. Never were young people more shamefully betrayed and more completely led astray.'¹

In their strenuous efforts to influence young people, the east German authorities used a wide variety of tools. They implemented a sweeping reform of the education system in order to break what they saw as the reactionary traditions of German schools and universities, and in order to open up educational opportunities for young people from peasant or working-class backgrounds. They encouraged young people to join one of the various 'antifascist' parties licensed by the Soviets, ideally the Communist Party, or, following its creation in April 1946, the so-called 'Socialist Unity Party' (SED). There was an effort to win the gratitude of young people through enacting various reforms to improve their legal, political and economic rights. In addition to these positive measures there was also, of course, the use of repression and terror against those deemed to be irredeemable. Many thousands of young people, for example, were arrested and interned during the Soviet occupation on suspicion of being members of the supposed Nazi underground movement, the 'Werwolf'.²

Two of the most important tools with which the Soviet and Communist authorities sought to influence and control young people were the 'antifascist youth committees', which emerged in the summer of 1945, and the so-called 'Free German Youth' (FDJ), officially created on 7 March 1946. Since there were considerable differences between the youth committees and the FDJ in terms both of size and character, the remainder of this chapter will look at the two movements separately.

The Antifascist Youth Committees

The antifascist youth committees emerged more or less spontaneously during the first weeks of the occupation, and were given official recognition by the Soviet Military Administration (SMAD) on 31 July 1945. Working under the direction of local government, the antifascist youth committees set out 'to win young people to participation

1 Walter Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit*, Berlin, 1955, pp. 169–70.

2 M. Klonovsky and J. von Flocken, *Stalins Lager in Deutschland*, Munich, 1993, pp. 58, 74, 91, 98, 110, 143 and 179.

in the anti-Fascist democratic transformation'. On 10 September 1945, a Central Antifascist Youth Committee, under the leadership of one Erich Honecker, was set up in Berlin to co-ordinate the activities of youth committees throughout the Soviet zone of occupation.³ In these early, chaotic days, the antifascist youth committees tended to be small, usually comprising no more than thirty or forty young people. On the other hand, those who participated did so out of genuine commitment, and often displayed a good deal of spontaneous enthusiasm.

The youth committees attracted young people from a variety of social backgrounds. The bulk of the membership, however, was drawn from the ranks of the working class, and the committees were at their strongest in precisely those towns and cities where the traditions of the German labour movement had become most deeply entrenched. In the working-class districts of cities such as Berlin, Halle and Leipzig, the Nazis had never been able entirely to prevent these traditions from being passed on to young people, hence the proletarian youth gangs or '*Meuten*' which had plagued the Nazi authorities from time to time in these localities.⁴ The children of KPD or SPD activists, moreover, had often been persecuted and humiliated by Nazi teachers and zealous Hitler Youth members, and understandably emerged from the rubble in 1945 with a burning desire to exact revenge on their former tormentors.⁵

Another important factor which motivated working-class youngsters to become politically engaged was direct personal contact, either during the war or in its immediate aftermath, with adult members of the Social Democratic or Communist resistance.⁶ Typical is the case of Herbert Prauss, who, during the war, had been greatly impressed by a Communist family who happened to be on friendly terms with his parents. According to Prauss:

This family impressed me through their consistent opposition to Hitler and their willingness to make sacrifices for their Communist ideals. They did not always hold their tongues and, since they were known Communists; they thereby risked arrest on a daily basis. As a child, I felt for these Communists only admiration and open sympathy [...].

Later on in the war, after he had been apprenticed to a printing works, Prauss fell in with some Communist workers who impressed him by the fact that they 'openly denounced the injustices of the Hitler regime, and helped the racially persecuted foreign slave labourers in the factory to pull through and to find their feet in Berlin'.⁷

Much of the activity of the youth committees revolved around reconstruction and relief work. In Berlin, 10,000 young people, organized by the youth committees, helped to mend roofs and establish 200 youth centres. In Thuringia, the committees collected 400 hundredweight of apples for hungry children in Berlin.⁸ According to Peter Bordihn, an enthusiastic member of a typical youth committee in Berlin:

We removed rubble, organized emergency quarters for families in need, helped with the harvest in Malchow, and, along with experienced women, we set up sewing clubs [*Nähstuben*] in Langbahnstrasse, on the Mirbachplatz, and in Hohenschönhausen. In Berlin

3 K. Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der Freien Deutschen Jugend*, Berlin, 1978 (hereafter *Geschichte der FDJ*), pp. 11–13.

4 D. Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, London, 1987, pp. 165–66.

5 See, for example, Saxony State Archive (hereafter SStA), Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, KPD 1945–46, I/4/21, Bl. 64–67.

6 See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 1945–46, V/5/090 and 5/335.

7 H. Prauss, *Doch es war nicht die Wahrheit*, Berlin, 1960, pp. 13–16.

8 J. Heise and J. Hofman, *Fragen an die Geschichte der DDR*, Berlin, 1988, p. 50.

alone, 20,000 items of clothing for needy children and families were made for the first peacetime Christmas.⁹

The youth committees were also heavily engaged in political work. They held meetings and organized discussion circles. They put on courses to which they invited leading Communist and SPD functionaries as speakers.¹⁰ Significantly, during this early stage of the east German youth movement there was no attempt to impose ideological uniformity on the young activists. One did not have to be a Social Democrat or Communist to join a youth committee, though the centre of political gravity in the committees was definitely on the Left. Within the committees there was also open and often passionate discussion, even of sensitive issues such as reparations or the unification of the KPD and SPD. According to Peter Bordihn: 'Everyone could put forward their ideas without restriction, give free expression to their thoughts and opinions, bring in all their ideas and feelings. This woke in us the hope for a truly democratic development of the new society.'¹¹

In an attempt to win over the majority of young people who had no interest in politics, the committees made a point of campaigning for the rights of youth in education and at work. The youth committee in Chemnitz, for example, was actively involved in the recruitment of new, anti-Nazi teachers, and the appointment of youth trustees to supervise the employment conditions of young people in the city's workplaces.¹² More important, the committees attempted to broaden their appeal by organizing cultural, leisure and sporting activities. In the Döbeln area of Saxony, for instance, the local youth committees organized theatre groups in all the towns and in many of the villages of the district as part of the Christmas celebrations. Dances and other cultural events were staged. Five separate youth centres were established in the district in which members of the youth committees set up clubs for literature, music, singing, dancing, theatre, chess, table-tennis and even foreign languages.¹³ Given the absence of other forms of entertainment during those bleak post-war months, many young people were attracted to the committees simply because 'etwas los war' (something was going on).¹⁴

Yet, for all their activism, and despite their success at attracting numbers of otherwise apolitical young people to their social activities, the youth committees never came even close to achieving the goal for which they had been created in the first place, namely, the winning of young people 'to participation in the anti-Fascist democratic transformation'. The great majority of young east Germans in those first post-war months remained either indifferent or actively hostile to what the youth committees were trying to do. Internal KPD reports from the period continually noted that it was extremely difficult to interest the majority of youth in any form of political or public life.¹⁵ Most young people seemed to be apathetic, individualistic, and concerned only with matters which directly affected either themselves or their immediate circle of family and friends. In the words of Walter Ulbricht: 'The mass of young people were full of despair, letting themselves be driven by events, and many lived according to the principle of "every man for himself"'.¹⁶

9 Peter Bordihn, *Bittere Jahre am Polarkreis*, Berlin, 1990 (hereafter *Bittere Jahre*), pp. 12–13.

10 See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 1945–46, V/5/090, Bl. 3–4.

11 Bordihn, *Bittere Jahre*, p. 13.

12 SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 1945–46, V/5/090 Bl. 5–6.

13 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, KPD 1945–46, I/3/28.

14 Bordihn, *Bittere Jahre*, p. 13.

15 See, for example, SStA Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, KPD 1945–46, I/4/25, Bl. 169–71 and 315.

16 Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit*, p.169.

A number of factors underlay this apathy and individualism on the part of German youth. To begin with, the Nazis had to some extent succeeded in breaking down traditional collective identities based on religion, class, or political outlook. From the point of view of the authorities this was particularly problematic in terms of working-class youth, for it was precisely amongst this group that the Communists expected to find a natural constituency. Some working-class children in the Third Reich had, indeed, like Herbert Prauss, picked up certain notions of class consciousness from their parents, neighbours or older workmates, but many working-class youngsters knew little and cared less about the socialist traditions of their parents and grandparents.¹⁷

These tendencies towards political apathy and individualism were greatly reinforced by the concrete material circumstances obtaining in post-war Germany. On the one hand, food, fuel and other essentials were in desperately short supply. Sheer physical survival was a primary concern for most people, leaving them little time or energy for other matters. The state apparatus, meanwhile, had almost entirely disintegrated during the last stages of the war, and it took months before it could be put back into working order. In the struggle for survival, young people could thus expect little help from the new authorities or from any other public body. For many youngsters, individualism was thus a pragmatic response to the problem of staying alive.

In some ways, indeed, the new authorities constituted an obstacle to the short-term material interests of young people. The black market, for example, was a serious threat to long-term economic reconstruction, and the authorities therefore struggled hard to suppress it. For many young people, however, as for the population as a whole, survival in the short term required participation in the black market. In a similar vein, the authorities campaigned vigorously against the common practice of skipping school or work in order to travel into the countryside in the hope of bartering with the local farmers. From the point of view of the authorities, absenteeism was a major economic problem and an obstacle to the normalization of everyday life.¹⁸ Yet, from the point of view of individuals, such trips into the countryside might mean the difference between eating and going hungry.¹⁹

For most young people, the clash between the long-term public interest, as represented by official rules and regulations, and the short-term private concerns of the cold and the hungry, militated against any interest in the public sphere and in politics. In many cases, however, the contradiction between the public and the private interest took the form of criminal or delinquent behaviour. Under the prevailing conditions of social, economic and family breakdown, it was all too easy for occasional participation in the black market to lead to a more serious involvement in theft, fraud or prostitution.

Even before the outbreak of war in 1939 there had been an increase in youth criminality thanks to the Nazis' subversion, not just of the traditional moral order, but also of established authority figures such as parents and schoolteachers.²⁰ After 1939, the situation worsened considerably, for the war broke up families, made regular schooling impossible and exposed young people to the brutalities of war.²¹ The problem of juvenile delinquency was greatly exacerbated by post-war conditions. With the almost complete collapse of state and society in 1945, many children, whose moral bearings had already been corrupted by the Nazis, simply ran amok. In Berlin, for example, the level of youth crime in 1946 was

17 Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, pp. 145–72.

18 See, for example, Thuringian Main State Archive (hereafter ThHStA), Weimar, Bezirksparteiarchiv Erfurt, Ministerium des Innern [Ministry of the Interior], 142, Bl. 45.

19 Gareth Pritchard, 'German Workers under Soviet Occupation', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Wales, 1997, pp. 15–22.

20 R. Grunberger, *A Social History of the Third Reich*, London, 1971, pp. 340–41.

21 Peukert, *Inside Nazi Germany*, pp. 150–54.

no less than 850 per cent higher than it had been in 1938.²² In a typical report on the behaviour of young people in the Saxon town of Waldheim in December 1945, it was noted that

the waywardness of young people as well as of children is taking on alarming forms [...]. Their wildness manifests itself above all in gambling, in twelve-year-old children smoking tobacco in public [...] and in stealing. It must also be acknowledged that a large part of youth get out of doing any work. Hardly a day passes without the police having to intervene against young people or children. It is an absolute necessity that steps be taken here.²³

In the words of one leading Communist functionary, speaking at a meeting in Leipzig in March 1946:

We must acknowledge the problem of youth, and here I have to say that we stand before the most difficult and most tragic task of the time. Nazism has produced such an abysmal confusion in the heads of young people that I must say today that the simplest concepts of good and evil, honest and dishonest, right and wrong, are scarcely to be found amongst German youth.²⁴

The impact of Nazism, war and post-war material hardship on the political views and moral behaviour of youth was not substantially different in the Soviet zone from what it was in the western parts of Germany. In the British, French and American zones, as in the Soviet, the majority of young people had no interest in public affairs and was more attracted to the black market than to political engagement. In the Soviet zone, however, there was an additional factor which made east German youngsters even more reluctant to participate in public and political life than their West German counterparts, namely, their often traumatic encounters with Red Army soldiers.

For, during the final days of the war, German children and teenagers had often witnessed the arbitrary shooting of German civilians by Soviet soldiers, or had been caught up in the wave of drunkenness, violence and looting which had accompanied the Red Army's invasion. Later on, many thousands of young people were either arrested themselves on suspicion of Werwolf membership, or had members of their families arrested. All such incidents tended to leave long and bitter memories, and prejudiced German youngsters against all those organizations, such as the youth committees, which sought to co-operate with the hated Soviet conquerors.

Above all, large numbers of German girls were raped by Soviet troops, not only during the invasion, but also in the months and years thereafter. Such experiences often left an indelible legacy of hatred, not just against the Soviets, but against those who worked with them.²⁵ In one case, for example, a sixteen-year-old girl, shortly after having been repeatedly raped by Red Army soldiers, was asked 'if she did not want to participate in the building up of a new, democratic youth movement in east Germany'. Her reply was so vehement that she soon found herself in an NKVD cellar, and was thereafter sentenced to ten years' hard labour by a Soviet military tribunal on the charge of 'anti-Soviet propaganda'.²⁶

It would be quite wrong to suggest that Red Army troops always acted so barbarously during the Soviet occupation. They were also capable of acts of kindness and generosity,

22 C. Klessmann, *Die doppelt Staatsgründung*, Göttingen, 1991, p. 53.

23 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, KPD 1945–46, I/3/29.

24 Ibid., I/3/02, Bl. 156.

25 Norman Naimark, *The Russians in Germany*, Cambridge, MA, 1995, pp. 69–140.

26 Klonovsky and von Flocken, *Stalins Lager in Deutschland*, pp. 103–08.

particularly towards children.²⁷ Just as young Germans who were raped or assaulted or robbed often never forgave the Russians for what had happened to them, so the experience of unexpected charity at Soviet hands often left a lasting impression that influenced political attitudes and behaviour. A good example of this is furnished by the experience of Lothar Loewe, who in 1945, as a Hitler Youth member, was sent into battle against the Red Army. He and his comrades had been led to believe that, should they be captured by the Russians, they would be brutally mistreated or summarily executed. In fact, however, after their capture they were neither mishandled nor abused, but, on the contrary, were treated by their captors with consideration and sympathy. Those who had been wounded were treated, and they were given cigarettes and something to eat. One Red Army soldier even lent his mess kit and spoon to Loewe, so that he could eat the food he had been given. According to Loewe:

I had seen many Soviet POWs during the war. And I had also seen how they were treated [...]. The Soviets were always beaten, really, and they never got anything to eat. They were made to look like the subhumans we imagined them to be. The idea that a German soldier would give a Russian prisoner his mess kit and spoon to eat from was simply unimaginable to me. And the fact that this Soviet gave me his, voluntarily, happily, because he felt sorry for me, shook the foundation of my image of them.

That's when I told myself that perhaps the Soviets were much different from what they [the Nazis] had told us to believe. This was my first encounter with the Soviet people, and I'll never forget it for the rest of my life. And it has continued to influence my feelings towards the Soviet Union.²⁸

On the whole, however, nothing did more to undermine the work of the antifascist youth committees than the perception that they were Soviet stooges, and nothing did more to provoke anti-Russian sentiments than the violent behaviour of Red Army troops.

The Free German Youth

In March 1946 the development of the east German youth movement entered a new phase with the foundation of the Free German Youth, a cross-party umbrella organization which aimed at building a genuine mass membership amongst young people from the age of fourteen upwards. In December 1948 a subsidiary organization, the 'Young Pioneers', was established for children between the age of ten and fourteen. The first chairman of the FDJ was the reliable young Communist functionary Erich Honecker, who continued to hold the post until May 1955.

From the very beginning the FDJ was viewed with many reservations, even in circles which were otherwise sympathetic to the new regime in east Germany. Many Communists and Social Democrats, for example, wanted to see separate KPD and SPD youth organizations, rather than a broadly based mass movement such as the FDJ.²⁹ Inside the antifascist youth committees there was much debate about whether or not the FDJ constituted a step forwards, for memories of the old, uniform and *gleichgeschaltet* Hitler Youth were still fresh, and many thought that the time was not yet ripe to found another unified youth organization.³⁰ But the most serious obstacle to the creation of the FDJ was the fear of the other two antifascist parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU) and the Liberal

27 See, for example, SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 1945–46, V/5/33.

28 See J. Steinhoff, P. Pechel and D. Showalter, *Voices from the Third Reich*, New York, 1994, pp. 469–74.

29 Heise and Hofman, *Fragen an die Geschichte der DDR* (see note 8 above), p. 46.

30 Bordihn, *Bittere Jahre*, p. 14.

Democrats (LDPD), that the FDJ would fall too much under the influence of the Communists. Only after Honecker solemnly promised that the leaders of the FDJ would guard its cross-party status 'like the apple of our eye' did they reluctantly concede to give the new youth organization their blessing.³¹

The FDJ was designed to fulfil several functions, one of the most important of which was the selection and training of cadres. Not only did the mushrooming of the State and party bureaucracies create an insatiable demand for apparatchiks, but many of the veteran functionaries *in situ* were poorly educated, ideologically inflexible and, in the view of the authorities, obsolete.³² One of the primary tasks of the FDJ was thus to serve as a training ground for a whole new generation of educated, professionally competent and politically reliable apparatchiks.

But the most important function of the FDJ, despite Honecker's promise of party neutrality, was to act as a 'transmission belt' for Communist policy. Youth as a whole, it was hoped, would be guided and led by the FDJ, whilst the Free German Youth would itself be covertly directed by the Communists. To this end, young KPD and SED members were instructed to be as active as possible inside the Free German Youth in order to ensure that, in practice if not in theory, the FDJ would be under reliable political control. According to a leading FDJ functionary, speaking to young Communists and pro-KPD Social Democrats in Chemnitz in March 1946: 'It is the case that the Free German Youth movement is still a child of our two workers' parties [...]. Therefore it is necessary that it is precisely our comrades who become the most active members of the FDJ, for we have still a much, much higher goal than the one which, for the time being, we are able to proclaim.'³³

In the course of time, the covert domination of the FDJ by the Communists became more and more overt, particularly after the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947. In July of that year, Honecker led an FDJ delegation to the Soviet Union to study and learn from the Komsomol.³⁴ In 1948, in accordance with the practices of the Komsomol, the organizational basis of the FDJ was changed from the geographical locality to the workplace, and discipline was tightened up considerably.³⁵ In June 1949 the FDJ proclaimed that the goals of the SED were identical to its own. The SED leadership, meanwhile, began to intervene so openly in the internal life of the Free German Youth that the CDU and the Liberal Democrats withdrew their representatives from the FDJ Central Council as a protest.³⁶ The process of Stalinization was eventually completed in 1952, when the FDJ officially embraced the Leninist principle of 'democratic centralism', and recognized the leading role of the SED in East German society.³⁷

In some ways the FDJ fulfilled its appointed duties with a degree of success. Most important, it grew so rapidly in size that, by the time the Soviet occupation officially ended in 1949, it could claim to be a genuine mass movement. Whereas the FDJ in June 1946 had only 240,000 members, by June 1949 this figure had swollen to 677,000.³⁸ If one adds the

31 H. Weber, *Geschichte der DDR*, Munich, 1985, p. 169.

32 Prauss, *Doch es war nicht die Wahrheit*, pp.26–29.

33 SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, Aktionseinheit KPD-SDP, 1945–46, III/4/01, Bl. 55.

34 Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der FDJ* (see note 3 above), pp. 6 and 23.

35 Bordihn, *Bittere Jahre*, p. 24.

36 Martin McCauley, *The German Democratic Republic since 1945*, Basingstoke and London, 1983, pp. 37 and 53.

37 Mary Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship*, Oxford, 1995, p. 60.

38 Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der FDJ*, pp. 20 and 59.

Young Pioneers to that figure, no fewer than 1.2 million young people in 1949 were organized under the umbrella of the Free German Youth.³⁹

This spectacular rise in membership was in part because the sporting and leisure activities organized by the FDJ attracted numbers of otherwise apolitical young people.⁴⁰ The FDJ also posed as the champion of youth, and, during the early months of its existence, campaigned vigorously for the rights of young people at work and in society. It helped, for example, to organize vocational training for those whose education had been neglected during the war.⁴¹ It did its best to ensure that more and more young people were elected to positions of responsibility in the workplace councils, trade unions and local government.⁴² Its propaganda and public declarations, at least before the onset of Stalinization in 1947, were designed to make the FDJ appear at the same time moderate, idealistic and genuinely concerned with the interests of young people. Themes such as German unity, the right of young people to equal pay for equal work and the importance of leisure and educational opportunities for young people, were continually stressed.⁴³

But there were also more negative aspects to the remarkable growth in membership. Increasing pressure, both at school and at work, was put on young people to enlist in the FDJ. It became increasingly clear over time that any young person who failed to join the FDJ was likely to be discriminated against in terms of educational and vocational opportunities. The authorities also attempted to ensure the success of the FDJ by attacking potential rivals, in particular the 'Junge Gemeinde' movement of young Christians, which from the beginning of the 1950s became the victim of a vitriolic SED propaganda campaign.⁴⁴

Another area in which the FDJ could be considered to have been a partial success was the selection and training of young functionaries. Young people who were prepared to give their loyalty to the regime, whether out of careerism or genuine commitment, could expect to rise rapidly through the ranks of the FDJ and thence into responsible positions in government and industry. In 1946, for example, 8,000 out of 118,000 delegates elected onto workplace councils were young people,⁴⁵ and by 1947 the number of young people sitting on workplace councils had risen to 15,153.⁴⁶ In Thuringia in 1950, young people made up 17 per cent of trades-union officials in nationalized enterprises and 18 per cent of the trades-union leadership in private firms, despite the fact that they made up just 15.6 per cent of trades-union membership in Thuringia.⁴⁷ In the local elections of September 1946, some 2,000 young people were voted onto community councils, and by the end of 1946 250 FDJ members were sitting in district councils and thirteen sitting in regional parliaments.⁴⁸ By the spring of 1952, 35 per cent of all officials in government service

39 S. Baske and M. Engelbert (eds), *Zwei Jahrzehnte Bildungspolitik in der Sowjetzone Deutschlands*, Berlin, 1966 (hereafter *Zwei Jahrzehnte Bildungspolitik*), p. 124.

40 U. Olhme (ed.), *Alltag in Ruinen. Leipzig 1945–1949*, Dresden, 1995, p. 85.

41 SStA, Chemnitz, Bezirksparteiarchiv Karl-Marx-Stadt, personal reports, 1945–46, V/5/090, Bl. 5.

42 Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der FDJ*, pp. 21–24.

43 See, for example, Olhme (ed.), *Alltag in Ruinen*, pp. 67–68, and Heise and Hofman, *Fragen an die Geschichte der DDR*, p. 51.

44 Fulbrook, *Anatomy of a Dictatorship*, pp. 94–95.

45 H. Jendretzky, *Neue deutsche Gewerkschaftspolitik*, Berlin, 1948, p. 118.

46 Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der FDJ*, pp. 30–32.

47 ThHStA, Weimar, Bezirksparteiarchiv Erfurt, SED, IV/L/2/1-001, Bl. 27.

48 Jahnke et al., *Geschichte der FDJ*, pp. 21–26.

were young people, and 1,405 young people throughout east Germany occupied the post of *Bürgermeister*.⁴⁹

The rapid rise of a new generation of cadre excited a considerable amount of jealousy and resentment amongst the older apparatchiks who found themselves being eclipsed. Many of these older functionaries were veterans of the labour movement who had devoted their lives to the struggle against capitalism and Nazism. They therefore felt particularly aggrieved at being elbowed aside by youngsters who had no experience or memory of the battles of the past and who had never had to suffer for the faith.⁵⁰ There was a strong tendency amongst the older functionaries to regard their youthful rivals as, in the words of one particularly disillusioned veteran, 'conformists, subservient lickspittles, toadies, obsequious yes-men'.⁵¹

The practical consequence of these resentments was that the official policy of fostering youth was continually hampered by the unwillingness of older, lower-ranking functionaries to implement it. Throughout the four years of the official occupation, a persistent complaint of the KPD/SED leadership was that Party officials were, at best, only paying lip service to the regime's youth policy, and that at worst they were consciously seeking to subvert it. As early as the spring of 1946, for example, attempts were made on the part of older functionaries in the Halle district to exclude young people from the debate about the unification of the SPD and KPD. Young people, they reasoned, had no memory of the division of the labour movement in the period 1917 to 1933, and the resolution of those divisions was therefore not a matter on which they had any right to speak.⁵² In 1946, the *Leipziger Volkszeitung* roundly condemned 'backward trade unionists' for failing to understand that 'the winning of youth to the trades-union movement is an important precondition for the stabilization of democratic relations in Germany'.⁵³ In April 1948, the SED Party executive committee passed a resolution complaining that Party functionaries were 'unclear' about the importance and significance of the FDJ, as a result of which they gave insufficient support to its struggle to win over German youth. In June 1949, the joint chairmen of the SED, Wilhelm Pieck and Otto Grotewohl, wrote an open letter condemning the many older functionaries who either ignored their younger comrades or sought to boss them around.⁵⁴

If the FDJ could, broadly speaking, be considered a success in terms of the growth of its membership and its grooming of a new generation of apparatchiks, there were other, more fundamental, ways in which the Free German Youth failed miserably to fulfil its allotted tasks. It failed, for example, to lure young people away from the black market and instil in them a sense of work discipline. According to an internal report for the Thuringian Ministry of the Interior written in 1947, young workers in border districts were persistently absenting themselves from work and lived primarily from black-market trading and illegal crossings into western Germany.⁵⁵ Juvenile crime continued to be a serious problem into the late 1940s,⁵⁶ and young offenders demonstrated little eagerness to find rehabilitation in the ranks of the Free German Youth. The juvenile inmates of a prison in the Thuringian

49 'Zwei Jahre Jugendgesetz — Erfolgsbilanz unserer Friedenspolitik', *Neues Deutschland*, 10 February 1952, p. 4.

50 Pritchard, 'German Workers under Soviet Occupation', pp. 312–14.

51 A. Herbst, W. Ranke and J. Winkler (eds), *So funktionierte die DDR*, Berlin, 1994, p. 1129.

52 B. Bouvier and H. Schulze, *...die SPD aber aufgehört hat zu existieren*, Bonn, 1991, pp. 194–97.

53 'Nach den Gewerkschafts-Konferenzen', *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, 29 May 1946, p. 2.

54 Baske and Engelbert (eds), *Zwei Jahrzehnte Bildungspolitik*, pp. 62–63 and 124–25.

55 ThHStA, Weimar, Bezirksparteiarchiv Erfurt, Ministerium des Innern, 142, Bl. 55.

56 Gordon Schaffer, *Russian Zone*, London, 1947, pp. 147–51.

town of Eisenach, for example, refused to join the FDJ on the grounds that 'We were told that [the FDJ] was going to be a cross-party organization. What do we see, however? On social evenings the politics of the SED are forced upon us [...]. It is clear that, under such circumstances, no successful youth work can be performed.'⁵⁷

More important even than its failure to provide an alternative to crime and the black market, the FDJ did not succeed in establishing a firm hold over the hearts and minds of young east Germans. Nor did it instil in young people a feeling of loyalty to the east German regime or an acceptance of its political policies. Even Walter Ulbricht, who had every reason to play up the success of the FDJ, was compelled to concede that 'The larger part of youth still stood to one side. Many of the wishes of young people, such as the creation of sufficient educational opportunities and the improvement of food supplies and working conditions, could under the existing circumstances only be satisfied very slowly.'⁵⁸ According to one lower-ranking SED functionary, speaking to a meeting of young workplace council delegates in Leipzig in September 1946, young people could be divided into three categories. First, the activists, who accepted the regime's policies and worked hard to implement them. Second, the doubters, who were openly sceptical. But the third and by far the largest group was comprised of the 'eternally inert and waiting [*Abwartenden*], who have no independent views on the questions of political life'.⁵⁹

To a large degree, the FDJ failed to attract young east Germans for exactly the same reasons as the old antifascist youth committees, namely, the continued legacy of Nazism and war, the impact of the material circumstances of the time, and the disgust produced by the violence of Red Army soldiers. In the later 1940s, however, the regime gave young people a series of new reasons to regard the FDJ with either indifference or contempt. Between 1945 and 1947, the antifascist youth committees and Free German Youth had been able to make some limited progress in terms of winning over east German youth. From 1947 onwards, three separate factors combined to negate much of the progress which had been made.

First, the economic situation in east Germany continued to be precarious, partly due to unavoidable factors such as the exceptionally severe winter of 1946–47, but partly due to the huge amounts of reparations which were still being extracted by the Soviets. In the western zones, by contrast, a slight economic upturn in 1947 was greatly accelerated by the arrival in 1948 of millions of dollars of Marshall Aid. In 1945 and 1946, economic conditions had if anything been slightly better in the Soviet zone than in most of western Germany. By 1949, the west German economy was clearly pulling far ahead of that of the Soviet zone of occupation, a fact which no amount of SED propaganda to the contrary could conceal.

What this meant in terms of young people in east Germany was that the fascination with the West, which had already been there in 1945, was greatly intensified. Not only did the West offer apparently unlimited material opportunities, but the individualistic and hedonistic character of American youth culture was much more in tune with the spirit of post-war German youth than the collectivist, austere, rather puritanical official culture promoted by the Free German Youth. In the words of Torsten Diedrich: 'The American way of life held more appeal for most teenagers in the GDR than the role model of the diligent Soviet youth activist.'⁶⁰ When the British journalist Gordon Schaffer visited the Soviet zone in 1947, he was told by a social worker in a home for delinquent youths that

57 ThHStA, Weimar, Bezirksparteiarchiv Erfurt, Büro des Ministerpräsidenten [Minister-President's Office], 662, Bl. 344.

58 Ulbricht, *Zur Geschichte der neuesten Zeit*, pp. 172–73.

59 'Jugend will mitgestalten', *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, 6 September 1946, p. 3.

60 Torsten Diedrich, *Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR*, Berlin, 1991, pp. 148–49.

'The boys' one idea is to get over the zonal frontier and to live on cigarettes and other goods cadged from the American and British soldiers. The girls are obsessed with the idea that they may succeed in marrying a British or American soldier if only they can reach the West.'⁶¹

A second reason why it was becoming increasingly difficult for the Free German Youth to persuade young people to join and be active in the movement was the Stalinization of the organization itself. With the tightening of discipline and the introduction of regular political schooling, the activities of the FDJ became less and less attractive, even to many FDJ functionaries. As early as July 1946, we find a member of the secretariat of the SED in the Leipzig region not just bemoaning the low political level of the vast majority of FDJ members, but openly advocating that young people between the ages of eighteen and twenty be more or less abandoned as a lost cause since 'they are not going to be converted by anything'.⁶² But, by the later 1940s and early 1950s, the problem of youth indifference to the FDJ had become much worse. When regular political schooling was introduced in the early 1950s, for example, the response of the FDJ membership was so unenthusiastic that even *Neues Deutschland* acknowledged that there was a serious problem.⁶³ The internal life of FDJ groups, meanwhile, almost completely withered on the vine. Meetings were infrequent and poorly attended. FDJ literature was neither distributed nor read. FDJ notice boards in schools and factories were left empty or filled with notices and announcements belonging to other organizations.⁶⁴ Even SED members, who were expected to be the most active and enthusiastic members of the FDJ, were affected by the mounting wave of disaffection. In a revealing incident in the Saxon town of Böhlen, the local SED secretary complained to the regional Party leadership that young SED members were interested only in their motorbikes and spent no time on their political work in the FDJ. In response, the regional leadership instructed the local FDJ secretary in Böhlen to confiscate their motorbikes 'in order that they learn that they have other duties to fulfil'.⁶⁵ By 1952 even the Central Council of the FDJ was admitting that 'many functionaries and leading organs have lost touch with youth both at work and in education'.⁶⁶

The national leadership of the SED in Berlin was aware that something was going badly wrong in the FDJ, but it had no real understanding of the causes of the problem, and no effective solutions. If young people did not want to participate in FDJ schooling, it must be because of ineffectual teaching.⁶⁷ If the organizational life of the FDJ groups was grinding to a halt, the cause must lie in an insufficient level of ideological awareness, which could be countered only through more schooling and tighter discipline. The FDJ thus embarked on a vicious circle of its own making. The more alienated youth became, the more the regime sought to use the FDJ to control and indoctrinate, which only succeeded in making the FDJ still less attractive to young people.

The third and probably most important reason for the gulf which divided the Free German Youth from the majority of youngsters was the close association between the FDJ and highly unpopular government policies. From 1947 onwards, Soviet economic practices

61 Schaffer, *Russian Zone*, p. 149.

62 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/BV/94, Bl. 38.

63 'SED Sachsen-Anhalt muß FDJ-Schuljahr mehr unterstützen!', *Neues Deutschland*, 16 January 1952, p. 4; 'Die Erziehung der Jugend', *ibid.*, 27 January 1952, p. 1.

64 See, for example, 'Zirkelleiter sind bereit — aber die FDJ-Kresleitung hinkt nach', *ibid.*, 8 January 1952, p. 4; 'Die Hilfe für die FDJ in den Großbetrieben verstärken', *ibid.*, 15 February 1952, p. 3.

65 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/24, Bl. 97–100.

66 "'Vergeßt das frohe Jugendleben nicht!'", *Neues Deutschland*, 17 February 1952, p. 3.

67 See, for example, SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/25, Bl. 30.

were imposed on the east German economy, gradually at first, but with increasing ruthlessness in the years before Stalin's death. The introduction of centralized economic planning, production targets, piece-rates and shock-work bore down hard on the whole working population of the Soviet zone of occupation and was deeply resented. Young workers, being more vulnerable than their older, more skilled and more experienced colleagues, were particularly badly affected. The FDJ, however, made no effort to protect young workers from exploitation, but on the contrary justified the regime's demands. The fourth 'parliament' of the FDJ in May 1952, for instance, announced the creation of Youth Control Brigades (*Jugendkontrollbrigaden*) to invigilate young factory workers on the shop floor. In August 1952, the FDJ leadership demanded the strengthening of 'socialist competition'.⁶⁸ The consequence of the FDJ's assumption of the new role of slave-driver was a final rupture of trust and confidence between thousands of young people and the movement which purported to represent their interests.

In private, if not in public, the SED leadership was prepared to acknowledge these problems. Shortly after the uprising of 17 June 1953, for example, a member of the SED regional leadership in Leipzig frankly summed up the situation in the following terms: 'One of the main causes of 17 June was the fact that the larger part of young people had little or no trust in their FDJ at district or regional level [...]. We won the trust of young people after a real struggle [...] above all through representing their interests. Now we have lost this trust'.⁶⁹

More damaging even than the support lent by the FDJ to the government's economic policies was its active role in the militarization of German youth. On 1 July 1952 the decision was taken to start building an East German army, which for propaganda purposes was euphemistically referred to as the 'Peoples' Police in Barracks' (KVP). By December 1952 the KVP had recruited 90,000 members, and by the summer of 1953 this figure had swollen to 113,000. Not only did this remilitarization take large numbers of people out of productive work, but equipping them with uniforms, vehicles and arms required a large financial commitment at a time when living standards were already coming under pressure as a result of the government's economic policies.⁷⁰

With regard to the subject of this chapter, the most significant aspect of these developments was that the FDJ was given the task of acting as the regime's primary recruiting sergeant. In schools, colleges and workplaces throughout eastern Germany, young people came under increasing political pressure from the FDJ to join up. Since the great majority of young people was extremely reluctant to enter the ranks, the methods of persuasion used by the Free German Youth often bordered on press-ganging. If a particular factory, for example, yielded insufficient recruits to the KVP, this would often be declared to be a sign of the presence of saboteurs and enemy agents, which in turn would lead to a witch-hunt.⁷¹

The degree of bitterness which these policies occasioned in young people was demonstrated in explosive fashion during the uprising of 17 June 1953. It was a bloody testament to the failure of the FDJ that young people played a disproportionately large role in the events of that day, not just in terms of numbers, but also in terms of violence. It was also significant that one of the chief targets of the enraged crowds were offices and buildings of the Free German Youth.⁷²

68 Bundesministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen, *SBZ von A bis Z*, Bonn, 1966, p. 137.

69 SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/28, Bl. 77–100.

70 Diedrich, *Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR*, pp. 23–30.

71 See, for example, SStA, Leipzig, Bezirksparteiarchiv Leipzig, SED, IV/2/1/25, Bl. 69–71.

72 Diedrich, *Der 17. Juni 1953 in der DDR*, pp. 142–49; A. Mitter and S. Wolle, *Untergang auf Raten*, Munich, 1993, pp. 96–110.

Conclusion

The East German youth movement was created in order to win over young people to the policies of the new, Soviet-backed government. In this task, both the antifascist youth committees and the Free German Youth failed. On the other hand, the antifascist youth committees did succeed in harnessing the energy and enthusiasm of a section of the juvenile population, drawn above all from the ranks of the anti-Nazi working class. With the creation of the Free German Youth in 1946, however, the regime greatly increased the size of the youth movement but at the cost of watering down its quality. With the influx of tens of thousands of young people, whose only motives in joining the FDJ were careerism or conformism, the idealism of the first post-war months was lost forever.

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, a number of factors combined to turn the indifference of the majority of young people towards the FDJ into active hostility. The 'economic miracle' taking place in West Germany greatly increased their dissatisfaction with life on the Soviet side of the iron curtain. The Stalinization of the FDJ, and, above all, the support of the FDJ for the government's unpopular economic and military policies, caused an unbridgeable gulf to emerge between east German youth, on one side, and the east German youth movement, on the other. On 17 June 1953 the anger of young people spilled onto the streets, with crowds of enraged youngsters attacking FDJ functionaries and property. Nothing could illustrate more clearly that the movement which purported to represent the interests of young people had in fact become one of the primary instruments of their oppression.

13 Compensation for Nationalized American Property in Czechoslovakia, 1945–49

SLAVOMÍR MICHÁLEK

Developments in post-war Czechoslovakia did not take place in isolation from the rest of the world. On the contrary, they were determined by, and reflected to a large degree, the changes and the problems in international relationships. If we take into account the pending political incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence at the end of the Second World War, close economic co-operation between Czechoslovakia and the USA seemed uncertain when the most important issue was the signing of a trade agreement and, related to that, the compensation of American citizens and companies for nationalized and confiscated property. The issue of compensation became a barometer of economic relations between Czechoslovakia and the USA in the first stages of the post-war period.

Czechoslovak–American trade and economic relationships had been regulated by the trade agreement signed on 7 March 1938. Its validity was annulled by the USA following the occupation of Bohemia and Moravia by Germany. According to this American decree of 23 March 1938, the regulations of this trade agreement and its supplementary protocol ceased to be valid in Czechoslovakia.¹ At the end of the Second World War, when normal trade and economic contacts were revived, there was a need for a new trade agreement between the two countries.

A draft for the conclusion of a temporary economic agreement was worked out by the State Department and sent to the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a memorandum of 29 June 1945. This draft contained the same principles as the 1938 agreement. The Czechoslovak counter-proposals started a series of negotiations during which both parties were defending their own interests.

At the end of April 1946, the Czechoslovak Ambassador Vladimír Hurban held negotiations with the State Department. He proposed an agreement that would contain only the ‘most favoured nation’ clause and presented the Czechoslovak arguments against the adoption of other principles which related to the reorganization and revival of the economy. Czechoslovakia also had to deal with the economic collapse of neighbouring countries as well as transport difficulties. The American side agreed to this proposal but made a condition for the signing of the agreement: commencement of negotiations on compensation for American property which had been nationalized and confiscated. It also required that the texts of the Czechoslovak–Soviet trade agreement, the reparations agreement with Hungary and a general description of other Czechoslovak economic agreements were included.²

Following further complicated multilateral negotiations in the first half of 1946, exchanges of diplomatic notes, proposals and supplements by both ambassadors and ministries of foreign affairs, the State Department presented a new text of the trade agreement on 8 July 1946.³ This proposal contained eight articles. The seventh article delimited the issues of compensation for the nationalized or confiscated property originally owned by

1 Archives of Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs (hereafter ACMFA), Prague, USA, box 32, no. 70783/IV-1/B-45.

2 P. Prokš, ‘Ekonomicko-politické rokování mezi Československem a Spojenými Státy v letech 1945–1947’, *Slovanský přehled*, 1, 1992, p. 11.

3 ACMFA, USA, box 18, no. 7894/46.

American nationals and companies. The State Department refused to restrict the issue to nationalized property only. The Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington recommended that the Prague government study this note and give urgent attention to its decision to sign the agreement, which could have positively affected the negotiations on a \$50 million American loan for reconstruction in Czechoslovakia and the purchase of American products and equipment.⁴

A difficult issue in the proposed trade agreement was the question of compensation not only for Americans but also for Czechoslovak citizens resident in the USA. The naturalization of Czechoslovak nationals in the USA and the status of their former Czechoslovak nationality were regulated by the treaty between Czechoslovakia and the USA of 16 July 1928 (no 169/29). According to Article 1 of this treaty, Czechoslovak nationals who have been (or will be) naturalized in the USA lose their original nationality and become US nationals. This regulation did not apply, according to Article 1, Section 3 of the Treaty, to Czechoslovak nationals who obtained naturalization in the USA in time of war led by their own country. These citizens were considered still to be Czechoslovak nationals. That meant that Czechoslovak regulations for foreigners did not apply and they could not claim compensation for nationalized property.⁵ The most conspicuous case in this connection was that of Petschek's property. The interests of the Prague financier Victor Petschek were defended by his lawyer Bernard Yarrow, who visited Czechoslovakia in early December 1945 and in 1946. In 1946 he spoke to President Beneš, Minister President Zdeněk Fierlinger, Minister of Finance Vavro Šrobár, the Minister for Industry Bohumil Laušman and the Minister of Foreign Trade Hubert Ripka. All these informed him that the compensation for Petschek (and another Czech banker, Gellert) would be adequate but recommended that they wait until the total level of compensation could be worked out. In his report to the senior partner of his firm in New York, F. Dulles, Yarrow expressed appreciation for the activity of the American ambassador, Steinhardt, who represented his government in this matter. Steinhardt required from Yarrow that the amount of compensation be stated. He also suggested that the American party set a minimum which he was willing to accept. In the conclusion to his report Yarrow wrote that the resolution of this matter would depend on the financial circumstances of the Czechoslovak government following the elections and the credits it would obtain from the USA.⁶ In December 1946 Hubert Ripka informed Yarrow orally that the Czechoslovak party had not yet appointed a representative for the resolution of the matter.

The Czechoslovak government reacted positively to the American note of 8 July 1946 that was to become the basis of the Czechoslovak–American trade and economic agreement. It proposed supplementing the text with a requirement of adequate and effective mutual compensation for nationalized and confiscated property, which the American party considered absurd,⁷ mainly because of the word 'mutual': no Czechoslovak property in the US or in Czechoslovakia had been or was to be nationalized or confiscated by the US government.

According to the report of the American Ministry of Finance (Treasury Department) on the census of American property abroad published in December 1947, American property in Czechoslovakia was valued at \$148 million on 31 May 1943. This consisted mainly of shares in companies (\$67.1 million), metals, coins, deposits (\$13.75 million) real estate (\$28.4 million), securities (\$11.7 million), private property, life insurances, annuities and

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., box 12, no. 48134/VI-3.

6 Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, DC, Steinhardt Papers, box 83.

7 *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Washington, DC (hereafter *FRUS*), 1946, vol. 6, p. 227.

inheritance deposits.⁸ The American administration categorized the property related to company investments abroad according to whether they were independent companies or branches, and whether it was a matter of direct participation or of participation through foreign companies. The main companies involved were the Vacuum Oil Company, International Telephone and Telegraph, Remington Rand, the Standard Oil Company, Paramount and International Standard. The largest capital share in Czechoslovak industry was held by the Vacuum Oil Company. On the other hand, according to the Census of Foreign Owned Assets of the USA published by the Ministry of Finance in 1945, Czechoslovak property in America amounted to \$9.4 million. These consisted of deposits, securities, land and real estate, inheritances and a small number of shares in companies.⁹

When the nationalization of key industries was being prepared, the USA tried to prevent Czechoslovakia from nationalizing American companies. On 23 July 1945, that is, three months before the nationalization decrees, Steinhardt asked for a promise from the Czechoslovak government to leave American companies alone. If, however, nationalization should go ahead, he asked for a promise of full and adequate compensation.¹⁰ In his negotiations with the minister of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Vladimír Clementis, on 29 August 1945, he warned the Prague government not to nationalize the Kolín refinery that belonged to the Vacuum Oil Company. If that refinery should be nationalized, he threatened to stop supplies of the machinery necessary for oil drilling, which could have caused Czechoslovakia serious problems with oil and petrol supplies. Should the Czechoslovak government postpone the nationalization of the refinery, he promised oil supplies imported from Venezuela and transported via Cherbourg and Germany.¹¹

Steinhardt's personal activity in the resolution of concrete cases in which original owners were demanding compensation is demonstrated, for example, by his letter to the managing director of the Vacuum Oil Company, Harold F. Sheets, which was published in the Paris *L'Aube* three days prior to the elections in the Czechoslovakia (the text was also published by *Tvorba* on 10 March 1948). Steinhardt's letter pointed out the close link between the economic and political aspects of the matter. He wrote that he expected the victory of non-Communist parties in the coming elections (which did not happen), which, in his view, would have greatly influenced negotiations on compensation. Sheets was not to be concerned if he heard about limitations on credit from the Exim Bank because the granting of credits was to be conditional on compensation for nationalized property.¹² The companies affected were also claiming compensation directly from the Czechoslovak state. The main companies involved in direct negotiations were the Vacuum Oil Company, Standard Oil, International General Electric (which was claiming its patent rights) and the Universal Oil Product Company (which had a share in the Bratislava Apollo refinery).¹³

The question of compensation for International Telegraph and Telephone is particularly interesting. Its two companies on Czechoslovak territory — Lorenz in Vrchlabí and Schuchard in Bruntál — had been given to the Soviets as war booty (reparations), and their equipment had been slowly dismantled and transported to the USSR.

On the matter of the total amount of compensation to be paid, Steinhardt negotiated with the head of the economic department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Zdeněk Augenthaler, on 29 October 1946. In answer to a direct question, Augenthaler stated that

8 ACMFA, ZU-Washington, box 1946–1947, no. 1197947.

9 Ibid.

10 *FRUS*, 1946, vol. 4, p. 478.

11 ACMFA, USA, box 18, no. 24121/A/45.

12 Library of Congress, Steinhardt Papers, box 58.

13 National Archives and Records (hereafter NAR), Washington, DC, Rg-59, no. 860F.5034/5-2847, no. 860F.5034/6-1746, no. 860F.6363/5-946.

‘Czechoslovak experts’ had calculated the amount of justified American claims at \$2.34 million. Steinhardt pointed out that Vacuum Oil alone was demanding compensation of \$14 million. If the Prague government worked on the assumption that American compensation for nationalization would be in the range of two to three million dollars, ‘it will be difficult to resolve the matter’.¹⁴ In his report on these negotiations to the State Department, he further said that the Czechoslovaks would like to start the talks on the compensation for nationalized American property as soon as possible, in the hope that it would facilitate their obtaining the \$50 million loan (negotiations on the loan had ceased in September 1946). Given that the Czechoslovaks had no intention of offering more than two to three million dollars, he concluded, ‘Therefore I am against the renewal of negotiations on the loan as long as the question of American property or rather its compensation is not satisfactorily resolved.’¹⁵

The Czechoslovak government laid down the criteria for compensation at its session on 8 November 1946. Compensation for nationalized property was allowed only in cases where it could be proved that the invested capital had come from abroad. Representatives of the American and Czechoslovak governments worked out the official versions of their countries’ declaration on the trade policy in late October 1946. The Czechoslovak text of the trade policy declaration was handed over with a memorandum to Steinhardt on 8 November 1946 by deputy minister president Fierlinger (who had lost his post as minister president in the 1946 reshuffle), who explained the Czechoslovak view. Steinhardt did not agree with several passages of the memorandum and drew attention to the Petschek case. He pressed the State Department not to accept the memorandum on Czechoslovak procedure in compensation.¹⁶

The Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington and the State Department exchanged diplomatic notes which were signed by Dean Acheson and the ambassador, Juraj Slávik, on 14 December 1946. This provided a practical basis for a new economic and trade agreement between the USA and the Czechoslovakia,¹⁷ while also putting an end to the current state of affairs, but with no agreement. Both notes (which were identical) were described as a ‘declaration on trade policy and compensation for nationalization’; they dealt with matters of economic co-operation. In the declaration both governments expressed their intention to start negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on friendship and trade as soon as possible. They gave the products of the other country ‘most favoured nation’ status and Czechoslovakia committed itself to giving America information on its trade relations with other countries. This clause was asymmetrical in the declaration, since there was no similar commitment on the American side.

The issue of compensation for nationalized and confiscated property was resolved in Article 7 of the declaration where it was said that ‘the US government and the Czechoslovak government will provide adequate and effective compensation to the other country in view of their rights or interests in the property that has been or will be nationalized or confiscated by the government of the other country’.¹⁸

The signing of the declaration on trade policy and compensation signalled the fact that tensions between both countries had been overcome for the time being. With regard to the rather friendly atmosphere in which the final negotiations were held, it was assumed that the negotiations on the \$50 million loan which had ceased on 13 September 1946 would be revived. The declaration was a signal to the USA that the countries in the Soviet sphere of

14 Ibid., no. 860F.5034/10-2946.

15 Ibid.

16 Archives of ÚV KSČ, State Central Archives (hereafter SCA), Prague, 100/24, no. 1157/1.

17 ACMFA, USA, box 33, no. 11949/46.

18 SCA, 100/24, no. 1157/1; ACMFA, USA 1945–54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/1.

influence could accept the American principles of multilateralism in respecting business norms as dictated by private enterprise. A substantial part of the declaration was given over to the fact (or rather to the Czechoslovak commitment to the fact) that American nationals whose property had been nationalized or confiscated by the Czechoslovak government would obtain compensation.

Another reason why the declaration on trade policy and compensation was signed was that Czechoslovakia came to the final talks in the second half of 1946 in a new spirit. Freezing the credit for the purchase of American army surplus reserves in Europe and putting a stop to negotiations for the American loan on 13 September 1946, which caused some dismay in Czechoslovak trade circles, had acted as a goad. The government had decided to revise its procedures and to study the American conditions carefully. They were, in principle, identical with the conditions that the USA had stipulated for the Exim Bank reconstruction loan for the purchase of machinery, equipment and material.

For Czechoslovakia the declaration meant, in addition to the possibility of reviving negotiations on the loan, also an opportunity to secure a loan from the International Bank. It also gave them hope that the high American customs tariffs that were preventing the expansion of commercial contacts between both countries could be abolished. However, the issue of full compensation had not been resolved by the declaration. This was the subject of further negotiations in 1947 which continued (after the Communist take-over) in the period between 1948–49, and later.

There were two ways of resolving the issue of compensation for American individuals and companies, either on a case-by-case basis or as a package deal. In 1947, American interest was focused mainly on the cases of Vacuum Oil and Petschek, although together with such companies as ITT, Remington Rank or Corn Product Refining, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs registered a total of 225 American applications or petitions by 1 September 1947. The applications covered agricultural property, companies manufacturing rubber, silk, the mouthwash Odol and weaving mills, as well as paintings, manor houses and so forth. In this category one might mention Aries Gloves, the A. Stern National Cash Register Company, H. A. Evans, Manon Manion, the Maort Company, J. G. Ziegler, Otto Maria Mandl and G. Lambert.¹⁹

Steinhardt was particularly firm in asserting the interests of Corn Product Refining Co.; this was reflected in his personal message to Lubor Niederle, the Czechoslovak Government intendant, as well as the American Embassy note of 2 September 1947 which stated that 'unless this property is returned, the company intends to take steps it will consider appropriate and which will relate to the reparation supplies for the ČSR from Germany'.²⁰

The Americans' dominant interest, however, concentrated on resolving the issues of Vacuum Oil's and Petschek's property. In Petschek's case the American government proposed that Petschek transfer his claim to some American company which would then claim compensation. The settlement in the remaining cases was, to use Steinhardt's word, 'smooth', and compensation could be paid in Czechoslovak crowns. At the same time he said that Czechoslovakia could obtain a credit from the USA for \$80 million.²¹

The Czechoslovak Minister of Foreign Trade, Ripka, also commented on the Petschek case in early November 1947. He was willing to accept the American proposal provided Czechoslovakia obtained the American credit. Steinhardt was of the opinion that Czechoslovakia would obtain the credit after Petschek's application had been settled. Ripka, on the other hand, was arguing that both issues (Petschek and credit) should be

19 SCA, 100/24, no. 1157/1.

20 ACMFA, USA 1945–54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/1.

21 Archives of Presidential Office (hereafter APO), Prague, no. T-3030/47.

settled simultaneously.²² The Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior investigated whether the claim was justified. On 13 September 1947 it sent the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a letter dealing with all members of the Petschek family. It stated that, according to their investigation, all members of the Petschek family had registered as Germans in the 1930 census. They had all acquired foreign citizenship, mostly American. The Ministry of the Interior further stated that the men, according to Article 240 and ensuing articles in Czechoslovak defence regulations (government decree no. 141/27), were not released from national service duties, and to ask for foreign citizenship at a time of increased threat to the Republic was considered as a breach of loyalty to the country. The conclusion of the letter stated that with such persons one of the conditions for being excluded from confiscation (according to decree 108/45, Article 1, Section 1, Point 2) had not been met.²³

Petschek's property in Czechoslovakia was not negligible. The Americans were claiming compensation of 600 million Czechoslovak crowns, which, after the deduction of a 30 per cent property tax, was rounded to the amount of 400 million crowns. They were asking for 50 per cent in dollars (400 million crowns) 20 per cent in pounds sterling (80 million crowns) and 30 per cent in crowns (120 million).

The potential credit for Czechoslovakia was divided by Steinhardt into three parts: \$20 million for the purchase of cotton, \$20 million for the purchase of goods for the Czechoslovak home market, and \$40 million for the purchase of military surplus equipment, mainly tools and machinery for the maintenance of roads and vehicles.

As far as Vacuum Oil was concerned, the exact amount of compensation had not been settled by autumn 1947. Steinhardt, who had been the company lawyer between the wars, was personally involved in the negotiations. Harold Sheets was willing to dispense with compensation provided the company obtained a privileged position in Czechoslovakia. This was a reference to crude oil drilling in South Moravia. Vacuum Oil would have provided technology and practical assistance and were willing to offer technical co-operation in the manufacture of synthetic fuels and in the prevention of losses in the production of light petrols. They also demanded participation in petrol stations and in the Czechoslovak trade in oil products.²⁴

The original amount of compensation was \$14,683,000, more than 700 million crowns. It turned out at the negotiations that the Americans were insisting on compensation which was in the range of 200–300 million crowns after property tax; while a half of the amount was to be paid in US dollars.²⁵ The Czechoslovak estimate was 80 million crowns. This calculation was based on the value of the company at the time of liberation, when the Kolín refinery was still in ruins after the Allied air raids.²⁶

In the summer of 1948, American diplomats started probing the possibility of reviving negotiations on compensation. Czechoslovakia, represented by the Office of the Government Intendant at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, responded favourably, but pointed out that compensation would not include claims resulting from the Czechoslovak land reform. Czechoslovakia was not willing to pay in cash and stipulated a condition that frozen commercial contacts be revived and extended.²⁷ The Commission for Compensation, chaired by Eugen Löbl, decided that Czechoslovakia would pay compensation only if it received a

22 Ibid.

23 ACMFA, Generální sekretariát-Kabinet 1945–1954, box 39, no. 3316.

24 SCA, 100/1, box 82, no. 612.

25 APO, no. T-3030, p. 2.

26 SCA, 100/1, box 82, no. 612.

27 ACMFA, USA 1945–54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/1.

US credit of two to three times the value of compensation paid. Löbl expressed the view that the higher the compensation, the higher should be the credit.²⁸

In September 1948 the commercial attaché of the American embassy in Prague, Ernest Kekich, met a delegation from the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington to discuss compensation. During talks with Karl Fink, Kekich mentioned that the US were willing to negotiate compensation for nationalized property on the basis of principles that had been the subject of preliminary negotiations at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Finance. He said that the Americans had agreed on the principle of a package deal on compensation. The compensation was to be determined on the basis of a percentage of overall exports from Czechoslovakia to the USA on the condition that there would be a single cash payment into the compensation account. As far as the amount of compensation was concerned Kekich said that the sum of \$45 million had been negotiated. He added immediately that it could be \$35 million or even less.²⁹ The American commercial attaché took the initiative and demanded that Fink inform the appropriate authorities in Prague that the negotiations on compensation for American property would continue on 15 December 1948 in Washington. Kekich explained the reasons for this American initiative by the fact that the Americans who have been affected by property nationalization are putting pressure on central authorities in Washington, pointing out that Czechoslovakia had already made agreements in this respect with other countries and therefore the Washington authorities had an interest in this issue being speedily resolved.³⁰ In Kekich's opinion it was necessary to revive foreign trade between the East and the West. In connection with the pre-war experience he placed special emphasis on the extension of foreign trade, mainly with Czechoslovakia and Poland. On the issue of resources for payment (the Czechoslovak shortage of dollars), he said that Washington had discussed this issue and was willing to offer credit, or partial credit, for this purpose.³¹

In his letter of 2 November 1948, Fink informed Kekich that the Prague government wished to negotiate first in Prague and later in Washington.³² The material for the negotiations in Prague was drafted by the Commission for Compensation at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At its first meeting on 11 November 1948, it studied the American proposal for the package resolution of compensation. It suggested that, during further negotiations with the USA, the Czechoslovaks insist on an American credit twice as high as the agreed total amount of compensation as the only possible arrangement for Czechoslovakia. The procedure was argued on the basis of the permanently passive balance of payments with the USA and the difficulties of obtaining US dollars from any other source. An agreement on the payment of compensation concluded on any other basis would not be in earnest on the Czechoslovak side, because Czechoslovakia would not be in a position to abide by it. Another Czechoslovak condition was that American exports to Czechoslovakia not be limited by the refusal to issue export licenses. The Commission assumed that the credit would be covered by gold to the extent of between 50 and 60 per cent.³³

The preparatory meetings of September 1948 in Prague and Washington subsequently continued from 24 January to 7 February 1949 in Prague. The basic principles of American procedure expressed in the official government memorandum, the 'Instructions for American negotiations with the Czechs on compensation requirements', were drafted by

28 Ibid.

29 SCA, 100/24, no. 1157/2.

30 Ibid.

31 Ibid.

32 NAR, Rg-59, no. 860F.5034/12-2948.

33 SCA, 100/24, box 102, Appendix no. 3 of no. 1157/2.

the economic section of the State Department on 11 January 1949. It stated that under current circumstances it was not possible for the State Department to give active support to the issue of the International Bank loan to Czechoslovakia unless the issue of compensation was taken into account. The State Department, however, admitted that during the talks it would be possible to announce to the Czechoslovak party that the doors of economic co-operation with the West were open. 'In general, however, American financial assistance to Soviet satellite countries was in discrepancy with American policy', but the memorandum did admit the possibility of credits. In this matter, however, the American attitude depended on the Prague response to compensation for nationalized property.³⁴ An appendix to the quoted material from the economic section was worked out by the Central European and European departments on 13 January. It stated that the total amount of compensation required should not be less than \$40 million. Under no circumstances was the delegation to go below this limit.³⁵

The American side was represented by Kekich, the commercial attaché, and F. D. Taylor of the State Department. The Czechoslovak delegation was led by the deputy Minister for Foreign Trade, Löbl. Both delegations had accepted the principle of package compensation as the only possible way towards a successful resolution of the issue. There were different views, however, on the amount of compensation (H. Skála, on behalf of the Czechoslovaks, suggested \$18–20 million, Taylor insisted on \$40 million) as well as the terms of payment. The Americans required payment in dollars, whereas the Czechoslovaks wanted to pay in crowns.³⁶

On 24 March, new American ambassador J. F. Jacobs informed the State Department that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had confirmed the negotiations on compensation by a note of 15 March. He also obtained information on Czechoslovak instructions to their delegation members for the coming negotiations. According to these, Löbl was to declare that if the attitude of the State Department towards the required credit was negative, then under certain circumstances Czechoslovakia was prepared to use its gold reserves as a guarantee for securing private loans.

The Czechoslovak delegation, led by Löbl, left for Washington. The negotiations in the USA were influenced, in their early stages, by the decision of Skála, who had been most active in the previous negotiations, to resign and request political asylum on his arrival in the USA. He left the Czechoslovak delegation and took a substantial part of the Czechoslovak side's documentation. The following day he sent a written note to the Czechoslovak ambassador, Vladimír Outrata, saying that he had never tried to hide his non-Marxist conviction and that by his resignation he was openly expressing a protest against the policy of the contemporary Prague government.³⁷

The talks were led by Paul H. Nitze for the USA. In his introduction he stated that the Americans welcomed the coming dialogue which was to resolve the issues of compensation for nationalized property. According to international law, the USA was ready to recognize the nationalization only after compensation had been granted. The Czechoslovak government had accepted the principle of compensation on several other occasions. He proposed adopting a bilateral agreement on a package resolution of the matter.³⁸ The American proposal for the meeting's agenda contained nine points; including the matter of dual nationality, claims which included investments in crowns, genuine property according to American law, claims arising from the land reform, public and private claims, methods

34 NAR, no. 860F.5034/1-1449.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid., no. 860F.5034/4-2349.

38 SCA, 100/1, box 64, no. 523.

of compensation distribution, the amount of compensation and the terms of payment, and other economic topics.³⁹ Löbl, the head of the Czechoslovak delegation, had arrived in the US with the instruction that the main task of the delegation negotiating compensation was to obtain a credit and an extension of commercial contacts. Löbl argued that the first six points could not be negotiated because of the missing Czechoslovak documentation. At the same time he suggested resolving the issue of compensation distribution, the sum involved, terms of payment and other economic issues (this included the granting of a credit). The delegations did not find common ground on any of these points and, following an instruction from Prague, which had been required and obtained, the negotiations on compensation for nationalization were interrupted for technical reasons.⁴⁰

In July 1949 Jacobs informed the State Department once again that, according to sources close to the Embassy, Czechoslovakia would like to revive the negotiations on compensation in September 1949, because of its need of credit and a proposal to abolish the American export controls. The Czechoslovaks wanted to suggest compensation of \$32 million.⁴¹ The delegation was to negotiate specific technical requirements; it was not authorized, however, to conclude an agreement. As the delegation members were not prepared for negotiations, their journey to the USA was cancelled.⁴²

The resolution of the matter of compensation was in the distant future. From 1950 onwards, American interventions on behalf of American citizens' property began to diminish. The Americans proposed a compensation package again in the summer of 1956, this time amounting to \$18 million.⁴³ They also specified the method of completion. One part was represented by the profit from the sale of a rolling mill (\$9 million), a part was to come from a share in the government gold (\$6 million). The outstanding amount of \$3 million was to be repaid gradually by setting aside a percentage of the profits from Czechoslovak exports to the USA, while securing a minimum annual payment of \$500,000. The Czechoslovak side was willing to accept the American proposal of compensation based on the sum of \$18 million, but with different terms of payment.⁴⁴ Due to differing attitudes and the mutual unwillingness to find a compromise, the issue of compensation for nationalized and confiscated property of American companies and citizens remained unresolved.

Another round of negotiations started in 1961. These were in connection with the return of Czechoslovak gold, a part of which was to be used for compensation. Czechoslovakia proposed allocating \$12 million for compensation, which the USA refused to accept, arguing that the value of their property confiscated by the state after the war was substantially higher. This property was valued at \$113 million. In 1967, when these issues were negotiated again, the American side reduced their demands and asked for only \$44 million.

The whole matter of compensation was resolved in the early 1980s. At the end of February 1982 a part of the Czechoslovak gold, looted by the German occupying forces in 1939 and retained by the US government, was returned to Prague. A total of 18.4 tonnes of gold in foreign currency and coins at the market value of \$247 million was handed over by Switzerland. The operation took place on the basis of the agreement of 29 January 1982, by which the Czechoslovak government accepted the obligation to pay \$130 million in compensation for the property of American companies and individuals confiscated as a result of October 1945 presidential decrees.

39 ACMFA, USA 1945–54 Secret, box 11, no. 412411/54-ABO/1.

40 Ibid.

41 NAR, no. 860F.5034/7-2549.

42 Ibid.

43 SCA, 100/3, box 178, no. 603.

44 Ibid.

14 National or Social Revolution? Liquidating the Latifundia in Czechoslovakia, 1945–48

EAGLE GLASSHEIM

When politicians from all Czech political parties in 1945 called for a redressing of the Battle of White Mountain, they were echoing a slogan used twenty-five years before by proponents of land reform in the young Czechoslovak Republic. As the earlier reformers saw things, 1620 was a turning point in Czech history; after the White Mountain, Czechs lived as subjugated peasants on the estates of a foreign feudal aristocracy. Land reform was to be an enactment of historical justice, the expropriation of land from the great landowning nobility and its redistribution to small (mostly Czech and Slovak) farmers. In 1945, 'redressing' the White Mountain took on a much more radical meaning. The nobility was largely forgotten, and in its place fell the whole German population of Czechoslovakia. 'Historical justice' came to mean the expulsion of over three million ethnic Germans.

This chapter primarily concerns land reform from 1945 to 1948 in Czechoslovakia. But, as I shall argue, we cannot separate land reform from the expulsions. Nor can we separate either from the rhetoric and circumstances surrounding land reform in the inter-war period. I shall begin by comparing the use of anti-noble and anti-German rhetoric during the two transitional periods of 1918–20 and 1945–48. From there, I shall consider the interaction of national and social goals during the three stages of land reform from 1945–48. Overall, I shall suggest that all the stages of the post-war land reform were partially orchestrated by and played into the hands of the Communists. Not only did they effectively use the expulsions and land reform in their pursuit of absolute control of the state, but these acts also facilitated the collectivization of agriculture after the Communists had eliminated their political enemies in 1948.

Redressing the White Mountain

The collapse of Austria–Hungary under the strain of total war in 1918 was a catastrophe for the Monarchy's proud and powerful aristocracy. The richest and most influential families of the Austrian half of the Empire held vast estates in Bohemia and Moravia. When these provinces became in 1918 an integral part of Czechoslovakia, nobles found themselves in a state whose leaders showed a marked hostility to the nobility they inherited. As early as November 1918, the provisional National Assembly outlawed noble titles and made it clear that a comprehensive land reform was imminent.

Though the anti-noble mood was a popular manifestation, it also served the goals of Czechoslovakia's state-builders. As contemporary politicians saw it, the largest threats to the new state were Habsburg revanchism, Bolshevism, and German separatism. Much of the Czech population identified the nobility with the Habsburgs, seeing both as anti-Czech, anti-modern, and anti-democratic institutions. While introducing the land reform legislation in 1919, the Social Democratic deputy František Modráček argued typically that 'the aristocracy formed a vital pillar of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire'.¹

1 Národní shromáždění, Meeting 46: 16 April 1919. Text at <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/eknih/1918ns/ps/stenprot/046schuz/>. Technically Modráček was a member of a splinter

At the same time, most parties represented in the National Assembly feared the spread of revolutionary socialism to Czechoslovakia. Communist revolutions in Russia, Bavaria, and Hungary made the threat particularly vivid as legislators debated land reform in April of 1919. Thus a proverbial Czech 'hunger for land' became, along with 'redressing White Mountain', a major rhetorical foundation of the land reform. If the seething countryside were not appeased, advocates argued, revolution was waiting around the corner.

Finally, many legislators saw land reform as a way to make inroads on ethnic German ownership of the vast forested borderlands of Bohemia and Moravia. Though Sudeten German attempts to found an independent republic in 1918 failed, Czechs had every reason to believe in 1919 that the Germans would use all means available in a continued effort to separate from Czechoslovakia. The ostensible justification for the nationalization of border forests was military necessity, but it was clear to all parties at the time that the state was taking land out of the hands of what it considered an internal national and political enemy.

The rhetoric justifying land reform legislation was historical. In 1918 large landowners, most of them noble, owned around one third of the land area of Czechoslovakia. To Socialists and Agrarians alike, these lands were ill-gotten spoils accrued by noble allies of the Habsburgs in the Thirty Years War in the seventeenth century. To choose a symbolic point, politicians used the White Mountain, the battle soon after which the Habsburgs exiled much of the Bohemian Protestant nobility. Since the National Revival, Czech nationalists viewed 1620 as the start of a 200-year decline. The Revivalists sought to reverse this Czech 'dark age' by modernizing the Czech language and simultaneously restoring it to its late-sixteenth-century glory, at least from 1848 onwards, and asserting themselves politically within the Habsburg Empire. National independence in 1918 was the culmination of the Czech national movement, and land reform was seen as historical justice, the undoing of 'three centuries' of Habsburg subjugation. As Modráček argued in 1919:

By these several articles [of the land reform bill] we are deleting the landed aristocracy from the future history of the Czech nation. Today we are ridding ourselves once and for all of that aristocracy that played such an infamous role in the history of our nation, and an especially sad role from the Battle of White Mountain to the present.²

Deputies like Modráček, as well as much of the Czech public, saw the nobility as not only feudal, but also foreign (German). After the White Mountain, the Habsburgs had encouraged Catholic noble allies from all over Europe to settle in Bohemia and Moravia. These families, from Ireland, Italy, Germany, and France, among others, made the provinces their home and for the most part adopted the German language and a Habsburg patriotism. Though some, like the Schwarzenbergs, had supported Czech national aspirations in the late nineteenth century, Czechs tended to think of nobles as German in sympathy. The National Democratic deputy Bohumil Němec argued that all nobles were in fact germanized: 'In the lands of the Bohemian Crown, there are many nationally alien, mercenary and rapacious noble families. Czech Catholic nobles also enriched themselves, but they soon lost their national consciousness; the Catholic restoration ended by germanizing them.'³

As it turned out, the inter-war land reform treated individual Czech and German large landowners pretty much equally. Even so, the majority of Bohemian nobles were considered German, so the reform gave the appearance of bias against Germans. The

social democratic party in 1919. He rejoined the Social Democrats in 1924. See Josef Tomeš, *Slovník k politickým dějinám Československa 1918–1992*, Prague, 1994, p. 124.

2 Modráček, Národní shromáždění, Meeting 46: 16 April 1919.

3 Němec, *ibid.*

important point is that both the Czech and German publics saw the reform in national terms.⁴

Overall, the 1919 bill put around four million hectares (all holdings over 250 ha.) under *zábor*, or expropriation. *Zábor* was not confiscation; it left the land in the hands of its original owners, only reserving for the newly-established State Land Office the right to redistribute it as necessary. Dominated by the powerful Agrarian Party, the Land Office worked methodically, parcelling out some estates, sparing others. By the late 1920s, most of the reform was completed. Over a million hectares had gone to small and medium-sized farmers, who became solid supporters of the Agrarian Party. On the other hand, almost two million ha. were released from *zábor*, leaving most noble families with still substantial holdings, primarily forest land. The reasons for this are numerous, including international pressure; the government's desire to leave nobles income to maintain historical and natural landmarks; and successful noble lobbying (including bribes) with Agrarian legislators. The reform, then, turned out far less radical than the speeches of 1918–19 would have suggested.

Unsurprisingly, the rhetoric of 'redressing the White Mountain' and 'hunger for land' reappeared in similar form in 1945. Only this time it was used to justify far more than land reform. Redressing the White Mountain now meant the mass expulsion of the whole Czechoslovak German population. Though all political parties called for expulsions, the Communist daily *Rudé právo*, as usual, made the point the most vividly (and distorted history most effectively): 'The decree on the expulsion of all foreigners from Czech soil [...] returns to the Czech nation land that has been for 300 years in the hands of a foreign nobility.'⁵ With the 'cleansing' of the borderlands, the White Mountain would be undone.⁶

On 1 June 1945, thousands of farmers and workers gathered on a field on the western edge of Prague, the mythical White Mountain, to hear politicians speak on the 325th anniversary of the battle. The Social Democratic Minister President, Zdeněk Fierlinger, made a clear connection of that battle with the German occupation of 1939–45:

We have gathered on the historical soil of the White Mountain to celebrate one of our most important revolutionary acts: the confiscation of the land of our age-old enemies, the Germans and the Hungarians [...]. With today's celebration we want to emphasize that the wrong inflicted upon us after the White Mountain, which was again to have been repeated under the Nazi regime, will be completely undone; that Czechs and Slovaks will again be the masters of their own land.⁷

Fierlinger's speech typically connected Czechs and Slovaks, as well as their putative national enemies, the Germans and Hungarians. Curiously, many Slovak politicians (especially Communists) also used the White Mountain formula for denouncing Hungarians in Slovakia, in spite of the lack of significant Hungarian or Slovak links to the battle. It is unclear if the White Mountain rhetoric had any resonance among Slovaks, however.

Other Communist and Social Democratic speakers from the National Front hammered on with the same theme. The Communist Minister of Agriculture Július Ďuriš: 'The White Mountain is undone! German aggression is historically liquidated';⁸ the Social Democratic

4 For an excellent recent overview of the Czechoslovak first land reform, see Mark Cornwall, "'National Reparation'?: The Czech Land Reform and the Sudeten Germans 1918–38', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 75, 1997, 2, pp. 259–80.

5 'Odcizená půda se navrací národu', *Rudé právo*, 17 June 1945, p. 1.

6 'Naše půda bude vyrvána z cizáckých rukou', *Rudé právo*, 7 June 1945, p. 1.

7 Zdeněk Fierlinger, 1 July 1945, in *Odčिňujeme Bílou horu*, Prague, 1945, p. 12.

8 *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Minister of Food Václav Majer: 'We are free once again. We have our own state. Therefore it is only just that the agricultural property of Germans be confiscated without compensation [...] an act finally undoing the unfortunate legacy of the White Mountain.'⁹ The implications were clear: confiscation and expulsion were acts of historical justice.

How did the White Mountain rhetoric's implications change so dramatically by the end of the Second World War? All over Europe, depression, heightened national tension, and Nazi brutality had radicalized the sense of the possible in the 1930s and 1940s. Begun in the mid-1920s in the Balkans, massive population exchanges enjoyed increasing legitimacy. In contrast, transfer or expulsion was not raised as a possibility in 1919, when the primary threats were seen to be social: the influence of feudal and monarchist elements on the one hand, revolutionary agitation on the other. In 1945 the main enemy and threat was national; after six years of a humiliating and often brutal occupation, expulsion seemed to Czechs the best available method of securing their future as a national state. The White Mountain rhetoric was already familiar and popular, and Communist and non-Communist politicians alike adapted it successfully.

The Expulsions and Land Reform

Once President Edvard Beneš had marshalled support among the Allies in 1943 for an expulsion of Czechoslovakia's Germans after the war, that goal became paramount. The chance to create an ethnically pure national state was of such historical magnitude that returning politicians were willing to cut legal and political corners to carry it out. Like many other post-war goals, land reform took a back seat to the expulsions. On the other hand, confiscation and redistribution of German property in itself implied a radical change in ownership. What followed in late 1945 and in 1946 was a national and social revolution, or as the chief Ministry of Agriculture propagandist, Jiří Kořátko wrote: 'The wholesale transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia [means] the liquidation of German land ownership on Czechoslovak soil, the national purge of Czech land, the national revolutionary period of the new land reform.'¹⁰ The expulsions were the first and most significant stage in a vast reorganization of the Czechoslovak countryside from 1945 to 1949.

Following the Soviet army on its way west, the new Czechoslovak government announced the general outline of its post-war programme in Košice on 5 April 1945. German collaborators (later extended to all Germans, save anti-Fascists) would lose their citizenship and faced expulsion. Locally-elected National Committees, or in overwhelmingly German areas centrally-appointed Administrative Commissions, were mandated to choose National Administrators to oversee German property.¹¹ Once the government arrived in Prague in May, the Ministry of Agriculture sent a directive to National Committees clarifying policy with regard to German land. Local and regional committees were to act at once to secure German land, 'without waiting for the appropriate laws to be enacted'. They were to select members of Agrarian Commissions 'for the preparation of parcelization of confiscated land'. Finally, the directive triumphed, 'the property of the foreign Germano-Hungarian nobility will be confiscated without compensation'.¹²

9 Ibid., p. 22.

10 Jiří Kořátko, *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, Prague, 1948, p. 13.

11 *Košický vládní program*, Prague, 1974, pp. 23–24.

12 'Směrnice pro Národní výbory o nejnutnějších opatřeních v zemědělství', 10 May 1945. Státní ústřední archiv, fond Ministerstvo zemědělství-sekretariát (SÚA MZ-S) 195, carton 372.

The returning Czechoslovak government enacted the Košice Programme in a series of presidential decrees, now known as the Beneš Decrees. On 21 June 1945 the government issued decree no. 12, mandating 'the confiscation and rapid distribution of the agricultural property of Germans, Hungarians, traitors and enemies of the Czech and Slovak nation'. The decree confiscated all German property without compensation, placing it temporarily in a National Land Fund. The Fund was to take applications from Czechs and Slovaks for up to twelve hectares of land. Priority in redistribution fell to 'those who served in the fight for national liberation, particularly soldiers, partisans, former political prisoners and deportees'. In overwhelmingly German areas, the Fund would hold the land for eventual (post-expulsion) colonization. Local National Committees, often dominated by Communists, were to elect local committees of farmer-applicants to suggest and oversee plans for redistribution. Final decisions over parcelization rested with the Communist Ministry of Agriculture, which also was given a 'technical' advisory role locally.¹³

The national land reform (that is, redistribution of German and some Hungarian land) involved a total of 1.65 million ha. of arable land and 1.3 million ha. of forest, almost 25 per cent of Czechoslovakia's surface area.¹⁴ By the end of the resettlement action, around 1.1 million ha. of agricultural land had gone to private individuals (a total of 122,000 families). Of the remaining agricultural land, 100,000 ha. went to co-operatives and 75,000 ha. remained still unallocated as of 1948.¹⁵ Forest land went primarily to the state, which transferred 840,000 ha. to the National Forestry Administration.¹⁶ Of the total confiscations of around three million hectares, only 545,946 ha. fell in Slovakia. Because of Czechoslovakia's failure to expel its Hungarians, most Hungarian land was not redistributed under the national land reform. The overall picture is of a substantial increase in the number of Czech small farmers working their own plots of around 10 ha.

Because the land reform in the German borderlands was seen as primarily national, statistics on its impact on the Bohemian nobility are scarce. But it is clear that German nobles lost hundreds of thousands of hectares to confiscation. The Buquoy family, for example, must have lost around 20,000 ha; Clam-Gallas 18,000 ha.; Clary-Aldringen 7,000 ha.; Thun-Hohenstein 10,000 ha.; Waldstein 25,000 ha. In addition, Adolf Schwarzenberg's 55,000 remaining hectares were confiscated by a special law passed by the National Assembly in July 1947.¹⁷ After the inter-war land reform, the majority of remaining noble land was forest. In effect, then, the state took over the German latifundia as the administrator of vast forested estates in the borderlands.

For agricultural land, the government developed a wide-ranging resettlement apparatus.¹⁸ The first stage, set up by decree no. 5 of 19 May 1945, called for applications for positions as National Administrators, who were sent to the borderlands to oversee German property. The key paragraph in the decree was typically vague, empowering National Committees to send National Administrators 'to all properties that require uninterrupted operation of production and of economic life, especially [...] those that are held, administered, rented or leased by people considered unreliable with regard to the

13 Decree 12/45 Sb. Josef Šebestík and Zdeněk Lukeš, *Přehled předpisů o Němcích*, Prague, 1946, pp. 23–27.

14 Jiří Koťátko, *Pozemková reforma v Československu*, Prague, 1949, pp. 24–25.

15 Koťátko, *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia*, pp. 18–19, 23; around 100,000 ha. went to public entities, for military and other public uses.

16 Ibid., p. 27.

17 Usnesení ústavodarného Národního shromáždění, 10 July 1947; copy in Archiv kanceláře prezidenta republiky (AKPR), D 10429/47.

18 For an informative account of resettlement, see Lubomír Slezák, *Zemědělské osídlování pohraničí českých zemí po druhé světové válce*, Brno, 1978.

state'.¹⁹ Though it was intended to apply to German firms and property that would be vacated in 1945 or 1946, the Communist government used the same law to ease kulaks (or 'the rich ones', as the Czechoslovak Communists preferred) off their farms after February 1948.²⁰ Overall, by 1946 there were 82,000 National Administrators of agricultural land, 70,000 of whom would gain full title to their fiefdoms after the Germans were expelled.²¹

Parcelization and resettlement continued feverishly in the first half of 1946. Local Farmers' Commissions and National Committees worked through a total of 157,000 applications for land, approving a total of 122,000. Successful applicants tended to come from the ranks of landless labourers, small farmers, and occasionally non-agricultural workers. Agricultural resettlement was part of a vast colonization of the whole Sudeten region, or approximately 20 per cent of post-war Czechoslovakia. Altogether, 1.8 million Czechs moved into towns and cities in the borderland, occupying former German houses, taking over German land, and receiving title to German businesses. In the May 1946 elections, these settlers would vote overwhelmingly for the Communist Party.²² In Slovakia, on the other hand, where resettlement was minimal, the Communists did poorly.

As the year progressed, the expulsion and resettlement process went relatively smoothly; even so, in November 1946 the Ministry of Agriculture expressed frustration at the number of outstanding cases of ambiguous nationality before National Committees. Many German farmers had no objective signs of nationality, such as a census record or membership in particular German organizations. The Ministry urged National Committees to speed up action on such cases. Though there was no formal law on what to do, the Ministry directed Committees to base their decisions on subjective factors, such as mother tongue, 'political conviction', or even 'methods of child raising'. In a chilling hint of what was to come in 1948, the Ministry justified its approach:

Every legal case is a living organism, on which it is not possible to apply mechanically the dead letter of the law by methods of formal jurisprudence. A jurist of the newly-forming legal order will have to take on functions similar to those of Roman praetorians, projecting himself onto new levels of popular law and thus becoming *viva vox iuris publici*, the living voice of popular law.²³

Overall, the Communists reaped an overwhelming political and administrative bounty through the land reform/expulsion process. The Ministry of Agriculture, under the relentless Slovak Communist Ďuriš, was seen as the prime mover behind redistribution as well as the champion of small farmers. In areas where the population was overwhelmingly German, the Communist Ministry of Interior appointed regional Administrative Commissions as a substitute for elected National Committees. Thus Communists directly controlled redistribution in areas that had the most land subject to confiscation. Many, and perhaps most, elected National Committees also ended up under Communist control. As

19 Decree no. 5/1945 Sb. in Karel Jech and Karel Kaplan (eds), *Dekrety prezidenta republiky 1940–1945*, 2 vols, Brno, 1995, II, p. 216.

20 Drahomíra Kopejková, 'K úloze národních správ a nucených nájmu jako nástroje změn v pozemkovém vlastnictví v Československu na konci 40. a na počátku 50. let', *Slovanský přehled*, 77, 1991, 5, p. 397.

21 Ibid., p. 397.

22 Vlastislav Lacina, 'Pozemková reforma v lidově demokratické Československé republice' in Milan Otáhal (ed.), *Zápas o pozemkovou reformu v ČSR*, Prague, 1963, p. 216. See also Slezák, who points out that 80 per cent of the resettled border regions gave the Communists a majority of votes (in a third of the districts, the Communist vote exceeded 60 per cent): Slezák, *Zemědělské osidlování*, pp. 109–12.

23 Ministerstvo zemědělství to Zemské národní výbory (Praha, Brno, Ostrava) 25.11.46. In MZ-S, SÚA, carton 372, inventory number 195, folder 1.

Kořátko succinctly noted, 'The decisive factor in the first land reform was the bureaucratic machinery of government, controlled by the reactionary Agrarian Party; the new land reform is being carried out by Farmers' Committees, democratically elected, and fully supported [...] by the ministry of agriculture.'²⁴ Communists dominated the whole process of confiscation and redistribution, expulsion and resettlement; seen as the guarantors of these tremendously popular measures, they built a vast reservoir of support that helped bring them success in the 1946 elections.

Revision of the First Czechoslovak Land Reform

In early 1948, Kořátko summarized the results of land reform to date. 'We can safely say', he wrote, 'that the problem of German ownership of land has been solved completely in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia [...]. The first stage of the new Land Reform is thus at an end, having achieved its aims; it only remains to deal with the problem of large estates in the hands of Czech and Slovak landlords.'²⁵ By the end of 1946, in fact, most Germans had been expelled from Czechoslovakia and resettlement was well under way. In late 1946 the National Front began what became a rancorous debate over Kořátko's stage two, the parcelization of non-German large estates. The subsequent bill, known as the 'Revision of the First Czechoslovak Land Reform', was passed in July 1947. Combined with legislation creating a United Association of Czech Farmers, the revision further consolidated the Communist hold on the countryside during the crucial months leading up to the February crisis in 1948.

All Czech parties of the National Front (Communists, Social Democrats, People's Party and National Socials) agreed that the inter-war land reform had been insufficiently carried out. Though four million hectares had fallen under *zábor* in 1919, only around half was redistributed to small farmers or taken over by the state. Close to two million hectares were returned to large landowners, most of them members of the former nobility, by the early 1930s. With resettlement of the borderlands almost complete in late 1946, the National Front began work on a bill that would return remaining large estates to *zábor* and then redistribute them to small farmers or the state. Much of the two million ha. released from *zábor* had belonged to Germans, and thus had already been confiscated in the course of the national land reform in 1945–46. Overall, the National Assembly estimated that 450,000 ha. would fall under the proposed revision.²⁶ The Communists, however, also questioned the redistribution of so-called 'residual estates' to allies of the Agrarian Party in the inter-war period. The Ministry of Agriculture therefore inserted language into the bill calling for revision of residual estates as well. The Communist slogan was 'land to those who work it', and they saw residual estates as a bastion of absentee landownership.

The aggressive approach of the Ministry of Agriculture in September of 1946 drew sharp responses within the National Front. A number of ministries complained that the Ministry of Agriculture had given insufficient time for consideration of the details of the proposed reform. Using a common Communist tactic, the Ministry had submitted the draft law with a two-day deadline for responses. The People's Party-held Ministry of Posts raised a number of typical objections, most notably that the Communists were proposing an entirely new land reform, not just a revision. In their view, the definition of a residual estate was vague, and the bill would therefore be used to expropriate all but small farms.

24 Kořátko, *Land Reform*, p. 29.

25 Ibid., P. 33.

26 Smejkal, 66. schůze ústavodárného Národního shromáždění, 10 July 1947. Text at <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/066schuz/>.

Moreover, there remained almost 100,000 ha. of unsettled land in the border regions,²⁷ and the effects of the national land reform on production, social structure and so on were still not clear. The People's Party therefore questioned 'whether undertaking a revision of the first land reform [...] is at this time suitable and expedient'.²⁸ With substantial opposition within the National Front, the Communists withdrew the proposal, ostensibly to prepare a new draft of the bill.

When the new, hardly-changed draft arrived in February of 1947, the Ministry of Agriculture was better prepared for opposition. First, the Communists had arguments to counter all the objections extended in 1946. Second, they mobilized the Agricultural Commissions, which flooded the government and National Assembly with petitions calling for rapid passage of the revision law. In spite of persistent objections from the People's Party and National Socials,²⁹ the bill reached the National Assembly in July of 1947. The Communists had made only two concessions. First, reconsideration of the first land reform was to be undertaken by a Revision Commission, with representatives of all political parties, and not directly by the Ministry of Agriculture. Second, the lower limit for expropriation of residual estates was to be set at a solid 50 ha., instead of the flexible limit favoured by the Communists.³⁰ Even so, the fact that the term 'large estate' now meant any land-holding over 50 ha. bore witness to the remarkable Communist revalorization of inter-war rhetoric.³¹ Like the 'foreign aristocrat' that had come to symbolize all Germans in Czechoslovakia, now the concept of aristocratic landowner had begun to apply to kulaks, land-speculators, and anyone with over 50 ha. Like the German population, this group would have to be 'liquidated'.

As the Agriculture Committee and then the National Assembly debated the bill in June and July of 1947, a steady stream of farmers rallied in Prague and delivered petitions of support for quick passage.³² The Social Democrats supported the bill fully, but added the proviso that holdings under 50 ha. should remain secure.³³ The People's Party continued to voice serious reservations. As deputy Benda said in the National Assembly debate:

The declared public interest of hunger for soil conflicts with the public interest of the preservation of the rule of law [...]. [Moreover] the revision excludes government estates, even though these today make up the largest latifundia. At the same time, the bill attempts to support collectivization [...]. Czech soil would be thrown onto the market of agitation, where it would not end up redistributed to small farmers, but would be used by the Communist Party as an instrument for gaining votes and for securing political power.³⁴

The Czech National Socials shared the People's-Party concern over increasing state ownership and control of agriculture. Even so, they agreed with the fundamental premiss

27 Overall, 16 per cent of the borderlands remained uninhabited in 1947. See Tomáš Staněk, *Odsun Němců z Československa 1945–1947*, Prague, 1991, p. 347.

28 Ministerstvo pošt to Ministerstvo zemědělství, 11 October 1946, SUA MZ-S 87/43, carton 73.

29 See 'Záznam o poradě 5–7.března 1947 v Ministerstvu zemědělství', SUA MZ-S 88/34, carton 90. Among other things, the People's Party wanted to exclude Church property from the revision.

30 Lacina, 'Pozemková reforma', p. 223.

31 In the inter-war period, the term 'large estate' (*velkostatek*, *Grossgrundbesitz*) generally referred to holdings of 200 ha. or more. See Wilhelm Medinger, *Grossgrundbesitz, Fideikommiss und Agrarreform*, Vienna, 1919, p. 14.

32 Lacina, 'Pozemková reforma', p. 222.

33 See speech of Social Democrat Sluka in 66. schůze ústavodárného Národního shromáždění, 10 July 1947. Text at <http://www.psp.cz/cgi-bin/win/eknih/1946uns/stenprot/066schuz/>.

34 Benda, *ibid.*

of the reform, that those who work the land should own it. That being the case, they voted with the Communists and Social Democrats in favour of the bill.

The new law, no. 142/1947, set up a Revision Commission to reconsider the release of any holdings over 250 ha. from *zábora* in the inter-war period. In addition, the Commission was to re-expropriate all residual estates in excess of 50 ha. The Ministry of Agriculture was responsible for naming commissioners and setting the Commission's agenda, though both required the approval of the government as a whole.³⁵ The process of revision went rather slowly, only beginning in early 1948.³⁶ A little over one million ha. came under review, including 627,000 ha. of large estates and 400,000 ha. of residual estates. Around three-quarters of the total was forest, and therefore went to the state. Most of the rest was divided among small farmers.³⁷ Because the national land reform had not been consistently carried out in Slovakia, just over 50 per cent of the total revision took place there. It is difficult to determine how much of the revision land was redistributed before 20 February 1948 (the beginning of the government crisis), or the eventual amount of compensation received by the owners. Kořátko claimed that the Revision Commission settled 'more than half of all revision cases' before the February crisis.³⁸ Lacina suggests that very few cases were resolved before the government crisis, but that 'after February, the tempo of the Commission sped up markedly'.³⁹ In any case, the Commission was decisively pro-Communist and worked closely with the Ministry of Agriculture; its revisions served to further cement small-farmer support for the Communist Party.

While working on the revision legislation, the Communists also prepared a proposal for the third stage of land reform, which would buy up all holdings over fifty ha. and those with absentee landlords. The idea was to realize completely the slogan 'land to those who work it'. Because of growing conflict in the National Front in late 1947, the law finally passed in March 1948, a month after the Communists took full control of the state.⁴⁰ Only 347,000 ha. fell under the conditions of the law, indicating the extent large and medium estates had already been broken up by mid-1948. In 1949 National Committees completed the final (pre-collectivization) stage of land reform, with most of the land going to the state or to newly emerging collective farms.⁴¹

Concurrent with the earlier revision bill of July, 1947, the National Assembly passed a law formalizing the creation of a United Association of Czech Farmers (*Jednotný svaz českých zemědělců* or JSČZ). In many ways, the German occupation and reordering of Czech politics prepared the way for this Communist mini-coup of 1947. Because of the taint of collaboration, the powerful Agrarian Party was banned from political life after the war. The Nazis themselves left their mark by outlawing all independent agrarian organizations and forcing the creation of a single Agricultural Union. With the field cleared, the Ministry of Agriculture had begun in 1945 preparing a unified organization on the lines of the National Front; there would be no external opposition, and internally, it would be dominated by Communists.

In April 1947, the Ministry of Agriculture began consolidating its control of the new Union by sending two Communist 'specialists' from the Ministry to oversee the work of its

35 'Zákon o revisi první pozemkové reformy' (142/1947 Sb.), Prague, 1947.

36 Jana Burešová, 'Návrat k první československé pozemkové reformě po druhé světové válce v mezinárodních souvislostech', Uherské Hradiště, 1994, p. 132.

37 Kořátko, *Pozemková reforma v Československu*, p. 30.

38 Ibid., p. 28.

39 Lacina, 'Pozemková reforma', p. 229.

40 'Zákon o nové pozemkové reformě (trvalé úpravě vlastnictví k zemědělské a lesní půdě', *Sbírka zákonů a nařízení*, 46/1948.

41 Lacina, 'Pozemková reforma', p. 231.

preparatory committee. In a terse note, the Ministry reminded the committee that its officials 'are entrusted with the carrying out of all measures that the Ministry of Agriculture [...] considers necessary, and of which the preparatory committee of the Union will be duly informed'.⁴² Less than a week later, the People's Party sent a strong protest to Július Ďuriš, accusing the Ministry of Agriculture of sending 'government commissars' to intervene unlawfully. Not only was the move undemocratic, but it went against the spirit of the National Front, which required all-party debate over major issues.⁴³ Both the Social Democrats and National Socials shared the complaint of the People's Party. A few months later, however, the leadership of the JSČZ sent an official request for Ministry of Agriculture oversight of 'discrepancies' in certain parts of the JSČZ organization.⁴⁴ The Ministry willingly complied.

The JSČZ received sanction for its monopoly with the passage of law #145/1947 on 11 July 1947⁴⁵; though non-Communists managed to obtain a few concessions, the law mainly codified perpetual Communist control of the organization. The Ministry of Agriculture would have 'control' over the JSČZ's work, and it could also send mandatory directives regarding 'tasks of public interest'. The JSČZ itself was to be the sole representative of farmers; members and non-members alike were subject to its decisions on agricultural issues. In a concession to the non-Communist parties, the law stated that leaders of the Union were to be elected from lists submitted by all the political parties in the National Front. Even so, this made little difference, since Communists and their Socialist allies carried a majority in the Front. The result was a single, Communist-leaning agrarian union, representing all farmers whether they liked it or not.

By the end of 1948, then, the reorganization of the Czechoslovak countryside was complete. Land-holdings were now fragmented, with few farmers owning more than fifty ha., and the majority under ten. The once strong large- and medium-estate lobby no longer existed, the Agrarian Party was broken up. Communists now dominated both the political and administrative organs of the countryside, leaving little democratic space for farmers to resist the transition to collectivization that would begin in 1948–49.⁴⁶

By late 1946, when a few former Agrarian notables came together to commemorate the death of the inter-war Agrarian giant Antonín Švehla, speeches were muted. When one farmer began criticizing the Communist agricultural programme, 'He was repeatedly warned that he should not speak so loudly, that Ďuriš had certainly sent his spies, that for the moment it is not worth it, that the Communists are only waiting for an excuse to take action against farmers.' This was no idle paranoia, for at that very moment a Ministry of Interior agent was recording the speech and taking note of those attending.⁴⁷

Conclusion

The most significant recurrent theme surrounding the Czechoslovak land reforms from 1918 to 1948 was that of national purification. The relatively benign anti-noble, anti-German and anti-foreigner rhetoric of the inter-war period turned radical and violent in

42 Ministerstvo zemědělství to Preparatory Committee, Jednotný svaz českých zemědělců (JSČZ), 2 April 1947, SÚA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70.

43 People's Party to Július Ďuriš, 8 April 1947, SÚA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70.

44 JSČZ to Ministerstvo zemědělství, 7 August 1947. SÚA MZ-S 87/36, carton 70.

45 'Zákon o organizaci zemědělců republiky Československé', Sbírka zákonů a nařízení, 145/1947, 11 July 1947.

46 For more on the transition to collectivization, see the useful document collection, *Vznik JZD, kolektivizace zemědělství 1948–1949*, Prague, 1995.

47 'Hlášení výročí švehlová úmrtí', Zemská oddělení bezpečnosti II, PZ-U 148/A-Y 13/16 17.12.46; copy in SÚA MZ-S 202, carton 390.

1945, sanctioning one of the largest waves of ethnic cleansing in the twentieth century. The expulsion of Sudeten Germans and the rapid resettlement of the cleansed districts became the primary task of the Czechoslovak government. Land reform was secondary; German land was redistributed quickly in 1945 and 1946, but a consistent, state-wide reform would have to wait until 1948. Ironically, the expulsions were the main obstacle to the Communists in their pursuit of society-wide land reform from 1945 to 1947.⁴⁸ Settlement of the border areas was seen as a goal of fundamental national and strategic importance, and non-Communist parties argued successfully that reform in the interior would have to wait until the borderlands were safely resettled. As a result, phase two of the land reform began only in January 1948. Most of the revision of the first Czechoslovak reform would take place only after the Communists had seized complete control of the state in February, 1948.

Even so, the expulsions and the national land reform proved a significant help to the Communists on their road to total power in Czechoslovakia. As the flexible Communist use of the word 'cleansing' showed, it was not very far from the cleansing of Germans to the cleansing of class enemies. With this in mind, revisionist Czech historians of the 1970s treated expulsion in a moral sense, arguing that the expulsion of Czechoslovak Germans undermined respect for property, the rule of law, and democracy.⁴⁹ Such moral arguments are hard to prove or disprove. But we can now say with certainty that the expulsions and land reforms helped prepare the way institutionally for the Communist seizure of power in February 1948. Along with control of security forces and National Committees, the Communists used the apparatus of confiscation and resettlement to dominate local politics and limit the democratic space available for opposition. By 1948 very few truly democratic institutions remained through which citizens could oppose Communist power.

Though teleological history is often problematic, this is one case where it clearly applies. Czechoslovak Communists had a goal, and they pursued it unfailingly. Jiří Kořátko admitted in 1945 the role land reform would play in the socialization of agriculture. His model was the Soviet Union. In spite of their collectivist convictions, he wrote, the Bolsheviks had handed out land to five million peasants, thus creating a deep well of support for the fight against counter-revolution. 'And it was this very redistribution of land that brought Soviet power, after a twinkling of the eye in the cycle of dialectical evolution, to the socialization of land, to the victory of the kolkhoz system! Without the redistribution of land in October 1917, there would have been no collectivization in 1929.' Czech Communists were also following a pragmatic course, Kořátko wrote, because farmers were unlikely to settle the depopulated borderlands without the promise of their own land. Though breaking up large estates might be a temporary setback on the road to collectivization, it was only 'the first step' in the agricultural revolution. 'We know where we're going', he assured his Communist readers, 'and we see our goal clearly!'⁵⁰

48 Ben Frommer argues that the expulsions similarly hindered Communist goals in post-war trials of collaborators: 'Retribution in Czechoslovakia after the Second World War and the Forced Migration of Sudeten Germans', Conference Paper, Gliwice, 22 November 1997.

49 See Bradley Abrams, 'Morality, Wisdom and Revision: The Czech Opposition of the 1970s and the Expulsion of the Sudeten Germans', *East European Politics and Societies*, 9, 1995, 2, pp. 234–55.

50 Kořátko, 'Vláda národní fronty dělá pořádek na české půdě', *Tvorba*, 14, 2 (2 August 1945), pp. 18–19.

15 The Communist Coup in Czechoslovakia: Western Policy and Response

ABBOTT GLEASON

The vicious circle of the Munich syndrome was closed when the 'Western betrayal' of the Czechs (if there was such a thing) was compensated by the 'Czech betrayal' of the West, if there was such a thing.¹

Thus, within exactly a week, the second Munich was accomplished. The pattern following the settlement faithfully reproduced the well-known Hitler technique of arrests, purges and censorship. A picture of Stalin came to replace the picture of Hitler which had once adorned every classroom.²

I

One aspect of the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia that jumps out at a newcomer to this problem is the readiness of the Western powers to write Czechoslovakia off very early, accompanied by a peculiar inability to understand fully that they had done so. At least in part because of Beneš's pro-Soviet policies, Czechoslovakia was from early on regarded as part of the Soviet empire, so the imposition of a Soviet dictatorship was not anticipated as being a serious defeat for the 'West'. The so-called 'Czech democrats', in a not dissimilar piece of self-deception, declined to see the probable consequences of having delivered themselves into Soviet hands. This common lack of realism played an important role in shaping the crisis of 1948 and its consequences for the unfolding of the Cold War.

The connection between the February coup and Munich is clear. Munich persuaded Beneš he had to look east; when he did so (with a vengeance), he came to be regarded as naive by the West, or even as a Soviet pawn. Once that had happened, it was easy to decide that Czechoslovakia had been 'lost' — long before February 1948. 'It is of cardinal importance to remember', as an American revisionist historian writes, 'that East Europe was given away not at Yalta but at Munich'.³

As early as the Yalta conference (February 1945), Anthony Eden and his staff already considered Czechoslovakia to be a 'satellite' of the Soviet Union.⁴ Certainly as soon as the United States and Britain began to believe in a post-war Europe divided into spheres of influence, they would think of any Beneš government as within the Soviet sphere. But the vital question of what a Soviet sphere of influence would actually be like remained for the future to reveal.

I would like to thank Alison Rosenthal for invaluable research assistance and to Norman Naimark for bibliographical suggestions.

- 1 Ivan Sviták, *The Unbearable Burden of History*, 2 vols, Prague, 1990, I, p. 16.
- 2 'Russia and the Czech Crisis: Background of the Revolution', *Manchester Guardian*, 2 March 1948, p. 4.
- 3 Donald Fleming, *The Cold War and Its Origins*, Garden City, MI, 1961, p. 1041, quoted in Sviták, *The Unbearable Burden of History*, I, p. 8.
- 4 Law and Sargent to Eden, 9 February 1945, quoted in Robert Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944–1947*, New York, 1981, p. 114.

The view from the East seems to have been rather similar. Following the August 1945 meeting in Potsdam, Molotov told the Yugoslav ambassador that the way the meeting had turned out indicated that the West had conceded Eastern Europe as well as the Balkans.⁵

It was western Europe that was always the priority for the United States. Already in early 1945, George Kennan wrote in a private letter to his friend and colleague Charles Bohlen that the United States would do well to settle for spheres of influence after the war, in which the Soviet Union would take eastern Europe and the United States western Europe. Bohlen at first disagreed, but within a few months had come to see that the Soviet Union was going to have its sphere and 'is incapable of making a distinction between influence and domination, or between a friendly government and a puppet government'.⁶

Churchill's forebodings about Soviet behaviour in eastern Europe increased steadily over the spring and summer of 1945. He spoke to the visiting American envoy Joseph E. Davies of Soviet 'gestapo methods', and mentioned something which Davies (characteristically not getting it right) transcribed as a 'Black Curtain'.⁷

Truman initially failed to appreciate Churchill's apprehensions. American policy coming into the Potsdam meetings was to seek to discourage *both* the British *and* the Russians from dividing Europe into spheres of influence.⁸ But his face-to-face meeting with Stalin quickly changed his mind. By the spring and summer of 1946, the disagreements over Germany had led to a process by which Washington had begun to 'wall off' the eastern part of Germany from the rest and integrate western Germany into western Europe.

II

The power and influence of the Czech Communists increased greatly between 1938 and the end of the war, for several reasons: Western behaviour at Munich, and the German depiction of Czechoslovakia as a 'red aircraft carrier' for the Soviet air force helped legitimize both the USSR and the idea of Communism. Russian treatment of Beneš was more courteous than that of France, and Czechoslovaks were more than kept aware by Soviet diplomacy and propaganda of the major role that the Soviet Union was playing in the defeat of Nazi Germany. The USSR denounced the Munich Agreement and recognized the Czechoslovak government-in-exile before Britain did. It was also expected that the Soviet Union would support the expulsion of the German and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, envisaged for the post-war period.⁹ Britain and the United States did so in very general terms, but hesitated when they realized the scope of what the government intended.¹⁰ Soviet support remained firm. In the minds of the Czechs, Britain and France were actually associated with the Nazis.¹¹ The Soviet Union was not.¹²

5 Leonid Ia. Gibianskii, 'Doneseniia iugoslavskogo posla v Moskve ob otsenkakh rukovodstvom SSR potsdamskoi konferentsii i polozheniia v vostochnoi Evrope (avgust-noiabr' 1945g.)', quoted in Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, New York, 1996, pp. 22 and 206, n. 61.

6 Kennan's letter and Bohlen's memo of 18 October 1945, both from the Bohlen Papers in the National Archives, quoted in John Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, New York, 1987, pp. 48–49. 53.

7 Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership*, p. 161.

8 Ibid.

9 Former Central Committee official Karel Kaplan reminds us of the 'ever recurring fear [in the Czechoslovakia of that time] of a future German or Hungarian threat': Karel Kaplan, *The Short March: The Communist Takeover in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948*, London, 1987, p. 16.

10 Ibid., pp. 4, 7.

11 Igor Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism' in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianski, *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949*, Boulder, CO, 1997, pp. 244–46.

The grand wartime alliance confirmed Beneš in the view that he had chosen the right policy after 1938 and that he 'saw farther [...] than others', that his pro-Soviet view was realism. He viewed France as incapable of leading Europe after the war — only Russia, he thought, could do that.¹³ In December 1943 came Beneš's trip to Moscow to negotiate a treaty of friendship. There he said to his Communist colleague, Klement Gottwald: 'You will be the strongest element of the new regime. And this element I shall always uphold [...]. I shall pursue a policy which will enable you to be a part of every government'.¹⁴ As Beneš reeled off a list of concessions, Gottwald and his colleagues in Moscow listened 'with growing disbelief'. Lukes attributes Beneš's extreme position and optimism about Soviet intentions to what the West had done at Munich.¹⁵ Beneš was perhaps not totally naive; for example, he hoped to dilute the power of the Czechoslovak Communist Party by incorporating it into a broader grouping of the left.¹⁶ His optimism was also connected to the upsurge of leftism in Czechoslovakia during the war, when belief in a post-war socialist Czechoslovakia was widespread. Such a Czechoslovakia would perforce be a close ally of the Soviet Union. But Beneš was wilful and his vision of the post-war world was drastically inadequate.¹⁷

It is hard to know how far ahead Stalin was thinking, during this visit in 1943. He 'might have been willing [...] to consider a post-war arrangement which would not place Czechoslovakia fully inside the cordon sanitaire of socialist states [...] nevertheless [...] having found Beneš willing to give more than to take, Stalin must have decided to give his blessing to a more complete design and faster timetable'.¹⁸ But when Stalin decided to move forward faster has not yet been wholly clarified by new documents. In 1944, Zubok suggests, the Czechoslovak treaty of the previous year helped Stalin persuade Hitler's former allies to surrender to the Red Army.¹⁹

General Eisenhower's opposition (on the usual strictly military grounds, and Marshall agreed with him) to any effort to push Anglo-American forces dramatically further east reveals the degree to which spheres-of-influence thinking was already commonplace on the American side. 'Why should we endanger the life of a single American or Britain [*sic*]', Marshall wrote to Eisenhower, 'to capture areas we soon will be handing over to the Russians'.²⁰ As the Americans also believed that the Soviet Union would be needed in the war against Japan, it was not thought desirable to antagonize the USSR. So it was Marshal

12 In defending the February 1948 coup, Gottwald chose his words well. 'We should not accept lessons in democracy and constitutionalism', he declared, 'from those who are responsible for Munich, who bargained away our existence with Hitlerite Germany, and wholly undemocratically and illegally tore up the treaties and alliances with Czechoslovakia': 'Czech Premier's Reply to the West', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 February 1948, p. 5.

13 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 247.

14 Vladimir Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia' in Martin McCauley, *Communist Power in Europe 1944–49*, New York, 1977, p. 75.

15 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 248.

16 M. R. Myant, *Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia 1945–1948*, Cambridge, 1981, p. 52.

17 See also Walter Ullman, 'Beneš Between East and West' in H. Gordon Skilling, *Czechoslovakia, 1918–1988*, New York, 1991, pp. 55–65. Vojtech Mastny provides a devastating critique of Beneš in *Russia's Road to the Cold War*, New York, 1979, pp. 135–43. 'No other contemporary statesman spoke to the Soviet leaders with the same mixture of studied informality and eager subservience', he notes on p. 137.

18 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 75.

19 Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, Cambridge, MA, 1996, pp. 117–18.

20 Quoted in Sviták, *The Unbearable Burden of History*, I, p. 70.

Konev who liberated Prague in March 1945, despite Churchill's efforts to change the mind of the Americans.²¹

By the autumn of 1945, the American government already informally regarded Czechoslovakia as 'under complete Soviet domination'.²² US–Czechoslovak relations had already deteriorated because of small irritations, such as the persistent claims of Czechoslovak publicists that supplies that had come to Czechoslovakia from UNRRA were actually 'gifts of the Soviet Union'.²³ The Americans and British were not reassured by Beneš's remarks on freedom of the press:

Journalism is a public service. Unbridled freedom to publish newspapers must not be re-established. This is a restriction of personal liberty [...] but one of the factors in public life that is subject to today's socialising trend in journalism. How to harmonise that with freedom of speech is another matter, but the freedom of the individual must be subject to the freedom of the whole.²⁴

But both sides were interested in negotiating some kind of economic relationship. Doing so had not yet been ruled out by the development of spheres-of-influence thinking.

One cannot escape the conclusion that neither the Czechoslovak democrats nor the Western allies had realistically thought through the consequences of their own policy assumptions. But the announcement of the nationalization of 'key' industries (with promises of compensation) on 28 October was an indication of the future Czechoslovak economic policy; despite the promises, only some American claims were satisfied. But the Red Army and the US army left (simultaneously) in November 1945.

The Eighth Party Congress in March 1946 still saw the 'present period' as non-socialist, but added that the achievements of the national and democratic revolution ought to be 'further developed'. 'The period of May 1945 to the spring of 1947 can only be described as a steady progress of the Communist party towards ever-greater authority and influence'.²⁵

In the 26 May 1946 elections, the Communist Party garnered 153 seats in the National Assembly and received 38 per cent of all votes cast, but only 30 per cent in Slovakia. British and American sources blamed Beneš's weak leadership for the Communist success.²⁶ The Soviet Union planned to march some 100,000 troops through the country on the eve of the election, but this brazen attempt at intimidation was abandoned on 22 May, just four days before the election, when it began to appear seriously counterproductive.

By the summer of 1946 it was hard for American eyes to see how the Czechoslovak coalition government could have followed the Soviet foreign political line more assiduously. Secretary of State Byrnes 'was convinced that the time had come when [the] United States' should endeavour by all fair means to assist [its] friends in Western Europe and Italy [...] rather than to continue to extend material aid to those countries of Eastern Europe at present engaged in the campaign of vilification of the United States'.²⁷ In

21 Myant, *Socialism and Democracy in Czechoslovakia*, p. 52.

22 Ibid., p. 59. See also *Foreign Relations of the United States* (hereafter *FRUS*), 'The Conference of Berlin 1945', Washington, DC, 1960, vol. 1, p. 831.

23 See the account in Walter Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, New York, 1978, pp. 36–38. The Prague correspondent of *The Times*, reported on this problem on 14 May 1946 ('Czech Critics of UNRRA', p. 4).

24 'The Press in Czechoslovakia', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 November 1947, p. 4. For a more general view of the restrictions placed by the government on Czechoslovak democratic procedures, see Kaplan, *The Short March*, pp. 39–40.

25 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 78.

26 Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, p. 55.

27 Byrnes to Will Clayton, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 43.

August Byrnes called a halt to economic assistance (an Export–Import Bank loan) to punish the Czechoslovak delegation for applauding Vyshinskii's Paris Peace Conference remark that the United States 'was enslaving Europe by means of economic handouts'.²⁸

Let us now turn to how the timing of the coup was determined. When in the spring of 1947 French and Italian governments were formed without Communist participation, Stalin almost certainly counted this as militating against the prudence, perhaps even the possibility, of any gradualist approach. Did he then decide to 'fence off' his 'East European Domain'?²⁹ It was at least an important moment in the evolution of his thinking. Zhdanov and Stalin had been taken completely by surprise when the 'increasingly isolated' French and Italian Communists decided to leave their governments and go into opposition.

Stalin's decision against participation in the Marshall Plan played a crucial role. On 21 June 1947, he approved a 'reconnaissance mission' to Paris, headed by Molotov, who arrived on 26 June. But after Molotov was given secret intelligence reports on Anglo-American conversations suggesting that the Marshall Plan was intended as 'a defense of Western Europe against a Soviet threat', at the session of 30 June he broke off the conversations and left the meetings, departing Paris on 2 July.³⁰

Discussions began in Prague about Czechoslovak participation as early as 24 June. By 4 July, a tentative decision had been made to take part, provided, as Jan Masaryk put the matter, 'its aim was to unite Europe'; he would be opposed to participation 'if it acted as a divisive force'.³¹

Continued Soviet indecision allowed Masaryk to issue a statement on 1 July saying that he 'welcomed the opportunity' offered to participate.³² But that decision did not last long. On 5 July, Stalin sent a telegram to Gottwald marked 'only for the leaders of the Communist Party'. It clearly stated that the Soviet Union would not participate in the meeting and added that 'some countries allied to the Soviet Union' did not want to participate either. Even better than non-participation, however, would be to send delegations 'which would demonstrate directly the unacceptability of the Anglo-French plan [for participation]'. Then they would leave, taking with them as many delegations as possible. But whether there was a communications problem on the Soviet side or not, as late as 6 July the Soviet ambassador indicated to Masaryk that a final decision had still not been made on participation, and so on 7 July Britain and France were informed that Czechoslovakia would come to Paris on 12 July. The Czechoslovaks were told that the Poles, too, would participate. The American press deduced that 'after all there existed a certain freedom in Czechoslovakia's relations to the USSR'.³³

The Czechoslovak delegation, with both Gottwald and Masaryk, left for Moscow on 8 July, where discussions continued. Just before they left, they received a telegram from Stalin indicating that the United States, through the agency of the Marshall Plan, was going to infringe upon the sovereignty of small nations; and that its purpose was to create a 'West Bloc', centring on western Germany. On 9 July in Moscow, Stalin first spoke alone with Gottwald and then received the entire Czechoslovak delegation. He told them that it

28 William Taubman, *Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War*, New York, 1982, p. 148.

29 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 80.

30 Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War*, pp. 104–05.

31 Masaryk's remarks made at a conference in Oslo, quoted in *ibid.*, p. 76. Upon his return from Oslo on 26 June he reiterated and expanded upon this view. See Karel Krátký, 'Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan' in Odd Arne Westad, *The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe 1945–1989*, New York, 1994, p. 12.

32 *Ibid.*, p. 13.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 17.

would be 'intolerable' if the Czechoslovaks went to Paris. The die was cast.³⁴ In December, Masaryk told Bruce Lockhart that 'I went to Moscow as the Foreign Minister of an independent sovereign state; I returned as the lackey of the Soviet government'.³⁵

Stalin's view, not entirely incorrect, was that the Marshall Plan meant the United States was putting its weight behind the formation of a Western Bloc. Such a Western Bloc would have to be countered by an Eastern Bloc — which doomed whatever might remain of Gottwald's hope for a policy of 'separate paths to socialism'.³⁶ Under such conditions, no participation could be contemplated.

The Secretary of State, Marshall, matter-of-factly accepted that, although the Czechoslovaks were eager to come to Paris, the Soviets could prevent them. Lukes argues that if the West had in some spirited way defended the right of the Czechoslovaks to participate in the Marshall Plan, it might have made a difference in helping the Czechoslovaks to try to remain 'masters in their own house'.³⁷ This would seem doubtful. What could a verbal American intervention have achieved? Walter Ullman agrees with him, however, that the clear American tendency to write the Czechoslovaks off in the summer of 1947 'contributed immeasurably to the further and more intense division of Europe on ideological grounds'.³⁸ Perhaps Beneš agreed. When the new Swedish ambassador presented his credentials in June (that is, before the débâcle over the Marshall Plan), Beneš told him that 'we can preserve ourselves only if a Soviet advance [*prodvizhenie*] is countered by a demonstration of Western force'.³⁹ Neither the American ambassador in Prague, Laurence Steinhardt, nor the government in Washington was prepared to undertake anything of the kind, however. Steinhardt merely pledged to Washington a heightened state of alertness — among other things, for the possibility of a coup.⁴⁰

The Marshall Plan episode clearly forced a major step in Soviet thinking about the future and it had a significant impact on both Czechoslovak public opinion and on opinion in the West, although in different directions. The Prague correspondent of *The Times* reported that 'a large part of [Czechoslovak] public opinion remains more moved by that absence [from Paris] than by any event in time of peace since the day of Munich'.⁴¹ Clearly public opinion in Prague understood that Czechoslovakia was becoming part of the East in a polarized world.

34 There is now a much fuller text of Stalin's remarks in recently released Soviet documents. For the official notes, see T. V. Volokitina et al., *Vostochnaia Evropa v dokumentakh rossiiskikh arkhivakh 1944–1953gg.*, 2 vols, Moscow and Novosibirsk, 1997, 1, pp. 672–75. See also I. I. Orlik, 'Zapad i Praga v fevrale 1948', *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia*, 1998, 2 (March–April), p. 5. A more general account can be found in Anna Di Biagio, 'The Marshall Plan and the Founding of the Cominform' in Francesca Gori and Silvio Pons (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War 1943–1953*, New York, 1966. See especially pp. 210–11.

35 Quoted in Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 251. For Moscow's hesitation, see Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, pp. 27–28. Stalin's contemptuous bullying of the Czechoslovaks is revealed in documents quoted by Orlik: see 'Zapad i Praga', p. 5.

36 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 81.

37 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 251.

38 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 86. See also the pessimistic view of H. Freeman Matthews, the head of the European desk at the State Department, in a late July letter to Dean Acheson, then under-secretary: Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, pp. 133–34.

39 E. Táborský, *President Beneš mezi Západem a Východem*, Prague, 1993, p. 252, quoted in Orlik, 'Zapad i Praga', p. 6.

40 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 80.

41 *The Times*, 14 July 1947, p. 4.

Walter Bedell Smith, the American ambassador in Moscow, thought the episode was a turning point. The Soviet decision — after ‘a disquieting hesitation’ — to refuse to participate in the Marshall Plan reconciled American officials once and for all to ‘the inevitability of a divided Europe’.⁴² Karel Krátký has recently written that the Czechoslovak refusal to participate ‘signalled the political and economic division of Europe into two spheres of influence. From mid-1947 on the Soviets seem to have methodically strengthened their control in Eastern Europe [...] to gain an extraordinary level of control.’⁴³ Most Western observers would call that level of control ‘totalitarian’.

The establishment of the Cominform too ‘must [...] considered as having induced an acceleration of the power struggle in Czechoslovakia, even if the issue did not figure on the list of topics then and there’.⁴⁴ The first meeting, which took place in Szklarska Poręba from 22 to 27 September 1947, saw the emergence of a new policy to respond to the Marshall Plan: the promulgation of a policy of two implacably hostile camps in Europe, already implied by the Soviets denial of Marshall-Plan participation to the nations of Eastern and Central Europe. The Cominform was to ensure that the Soviet nations fought the capitalists together, rather than separately.⁴⁵

Zubok put the matter even more bluntly: ‘this new policy entailed the transformation of five countries into Soviet satellites under the control of Communist regimes cloned from the regime in Moscow’. The creation of the Cominform ‘was a sketch of the future Soviet regional bloc with its affiliations in Western Europe — not a replica of the dead Communist International’.⁴⁶

Rudolf Slánský’s report to the Czechoslovak Politburo about the meeting in Poland on 2 October almost certainly marked a stage in the movement towards ‘extra-parliamentary’ methods.⁴⁷ The Czechoslovak Communist leader could hardly have failed to understand what was meant when Luigi Longo in Italy and Jacques Duclos in France were accused of ‘parliamentary cretinism’ and it is likely that more concrete preparations were undertaken for a seizure of power, perhaps to be undertaken during the national elections in May 1948.⁴⁸ This was essentially how *The Times* read the situation. The paper noted that the Czech Communist press (*Rudé právo*) had accused the Czechoslovak Socialists of ‘defending the interests of millionaires, big landowners, black marketeers and collaborators’. If Czech ministers were to be subjected to the sort of harassment visited on their Slovak colleagues, the *Times* correspondent thought the National Front government could not continue; the ‘probably inevitable talk of coups d’état’ would continue. The only

42 Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 56.

43 Krátký, ‘Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plan’, p. 21. The Prague correspondent of *The Times* questioned whether ‘Czechoslovak democracy can survive in a divided Europe’, and ominously predicted the coming of a ‘one-party system’: ‘Between East and West’, *The Times*, 25 July 1947, p. 5.

44 Kusin, ‘Czechoslovakia’, p. 82. See also Nataliia I. Egorova, ‘Stalin’s Foreign Policy and the Cominform, 1947–53’ in Gori and Pons (eds), *The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War*, pp. 197–207.

45 Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, pp. 30–32. See also the excellent analysis by L. Ia. Gibianskii, ‘Dolgi put’ k tainam: Istoriografiia Kominforma’ in G. M. Adibekov, A. di Biagio et al., *Soveshchaniia Kominforma, 1947, 1948, 1949. Dokumenty i materialy*, Moscow, 1998, pp. xxiii–xlvi. Andrei Zhdanov played a particularly important role in the formulation of the ‘two-camp theory’.

46 Zubok and Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War*, p. 111.

47 Kaplan, *The Short March*, pp. 76–77.

48 Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, p. 33.

countervailing factor, he opined, was that Czechoslovakia needed Western help to get through the winter without starvation.⁴⁹

Even circles closer to the Communist Party evinced alarm. On 19 October, the Social Democratic Party, just then passing under the control of its right wing, criticized the establishment of the Cominform, which it described as an 'instrument of strife'. Czechoslovakia, according to the statement, did not need the kind of democracy 'brought in from abroad'.⁵⁰ But despite its loss of influence, the Fierlinger wing of the party continued its close co-operation with the Communists. Beneš, by this time more and more alarmed himself, was delighted to take credit for Fierlinger's loss of influence in a conversation with the American ambassador.⁵¹ But at this point, the 'scenario and timetable' for the Communist taking of power was still related to the next parliamentary election, which was expected to provide the Communist Party with an absolute majority.⁵²

Various polls (public and otherwise) in late autumn of 1947 showed the Communists actually losing support. The bad harvest made people fear the coming winter and predisposed them towards the West, whence assistance might come. And if Communist support was eroding, that would be a recommendation for quick action. Lukes and almost all recent commentators believe that Communist support was dramatically declining by the turn of the year. If so, it made a Communist *Machtergreifung* truly plausible, especially if there were to be no strong Western reaction. Mastny agrees.⁵³ Lukes also stresses the stunning defeat of Communist candidates in the university elections in November, especially in the Arts Faculty of Prague University, where they had previously been very strong. Beneš seemed somewhat more open in expressing his hostility to the Communists. But the hour was very late.

Shrewd Western observers were also expecting relatively quick and decisive action. In November, George Kennan anticipated that the USSR would probably try to offset its difficulties in Western Europe by consolidating in Eastern Europe, by 'clamp[ing] down completely on Czechoslovakia'.⁵⁴ Kennan did not suggest any American response, nor did Steinhardt, when Beneš discussed the matter with him on 20 November.⁵⁵

'What Benes and Masaryk seem still not fully to have grasped was clear to the Communist Party leadership: that the Western powers had no plans whatsoever to act, politically or otherwise, on behalf of the democratic cause in Prague.'⁵⁶ How could Beneš and Masaryk have not known that? But at the eleventh hour, one saw again that neither the Czechoslovak democrats nor the Americans had looked the future they had together created straight in the eye. The American chargé in Prague, John Bruins, supported by Ambassador Steinhardt, in America for medical treatment, discussed the possibility of using a trade treaty as bait to turn Czechoslovak public opinion towards the United States; but before anything could come of that, the blow had fallen.⁵⁷

49 'A Czech Schism: East Versus West Controversy', *The Times*, 14 October 1947, p. 3.

50 'Czechoslovak Socialists Attack', *The Times*, 20 October 1947, p. 3. For the caustic response of a Soviet 'observer', see Volokitina et al., *Vostochnaia Evropa* (see note 34 above), pp. 740–41.

51 Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, p. 107. See also Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 251.

52 Kusin, 'Czechoslovakia', p. 84. See also 'More Soviet Grain for Czechs: Mr. Stalin's Promise', *The Times*, 3 December 1947, p. 3.

53 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 251; Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, p. 33.

54 *FRUS*, 1947, vol. 1, p. 771, quoted in Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, pp. 41–42.

55 Táborský, *President Beneš mezi Západem a Východem*, p. 40, quoted in Orlik, 'Zapad i Praga', p. 7.

56 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 255.

57 Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, pp. 144–45.

The Czechoslovak and Soviet Communists had a much better grasp of how little was to be expected from the West. By the end of 1947, crucial intelligence reports were not going to Masaryk, but to his Communist deputy, Vladimír Clementis. 'Political circles in Great Britain', according to these reports, 'express doubts that under the present circumstances the anti-Communist elements will prove strong enough to resist outside pressures which are, in the opinion of the aforementioned circles, likely to increase.'⁵⁸

On 13 January 1948, the British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, sent a memo to Marshall asking Washington to 'reinforce the physical barriers which still protect our Western civilization', suggesting that the Marshall Plan needed something more by way of physical capability to supplement it.⁵⁹ The American reply, as George Kennan remembered it, 'was encouraging',⁶⁰ and certainly marked a step in the direction of what became NATO.

A little over a week later, an important speech by Bevin (22 January 1948) in the House of Commons called for a 'Western Union', and incidentally caused Czechoslovak intelligence to conclude that Britain had already given up on Czechoslovakia, and that in the event of an adventure, Western policy would be to draw together and keep Communism from coming any further West. And Czechoslovak intelligence read the Americans, based on a top-secret briefing of military attachés in Paris by Lucius Clay and others, as believing that they could not take the lead in a new war unless a strong Germany had already been built up.⁶¹ *Rudé právo* commented that 'Mr. Bevin fired the opening shots in a global attack on the Soviet Union in which Britain, France, and Germany are to be the spearhead.'⁶²

So from Stalin and Gottwald's point of view, as Lukes writes:

There seemed to be little risk involved. British national security concerns were focused on efforts to secure the Empire and not central Europe. The United States would have to move swiftly to fill the vacuum the British were leaving in Greece and Turkey, and Stalin was not inclined to take France seriously. Therefore the lands between Germany and Russia were open to Soviet domination. The ZS [Czechoslovak intelligence] reports seemed completely plausible: no one in the West was prepared to challenge the imposition of totalitarian rule over Czechoslovakia.⁶³

Lukes has plausibly stated that the imposition of 'totalitarian rule' had been 'accepted as a fait accompli' weeks earlier, citing the visit of the new British ambassador in Prague, Pierson John Dixon, to the Minister of Justice, Prokop Drtina. The ambassador told Drtina that 'according to his sources' the Communist Party was likely in the near future to impose a Communist dictatorship as had happened in Poland, Hungary and elsewhere. Dixon did not express any particular British view of this, and Drtina alleged himself (presumably with considerable irony) to be 'grateful' that the British ambassador did not offer any false hope!⁶⁴

The day before the coup, Marshall notified the United States' embassy in Paris that a seizure of power by the Communists 'would merely crystallize and confirm for the future previous Czech policy'.⁶⁵ Marshall seemed to confirm that as long as Czechoslovakia was

58 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', pp. 255–56.

59 Bevin's message sent to Marshall on 13 January 1948, quoted in Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 62.

60 George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950*, Boston, MA, 1967, p. 398.

61 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', pp. 256–57.

62 'Czech Dilemma', *The Times*, 24 January 1948, p. 4.

63 Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 257.

64 Ibid.

65 *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 4, p. 736, quoted in Lukes, 'The Czech Road to Communism', p. 257.

a *de facto* ally of the Soviet Union, it did not really matter that the country had not yet become a dictatorship. What was important was what might happen in the West: the democratic cause in Czechoslovakia had been written off.

Had Stalin known, however, what the effect of the coup would be further west, he might well have hesitated: 'to discredit the Soviet Union even further in the eyes of the West European left; [... to] hasten [...] final Congressional passage of the European Recovery Program and [to] stimulate [...] the beginnings of discussions that would lead, a year later, to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization'.⁶⁶ Characteristic of the American response was Senator Arthur Vandenberg's interview with the *Detroit Free Press*, in which he said that 'approval of the Marshall Plan was absolutely necessary to forestall the greatest "hazard since Pearl Harbor [... if peace and justice are at the mercy of expanding, hostile, totalitarian aggression"]'.⁶⁷

The Red Army did not have to be used; there was virtually no resistance. There was no overt military pressure from the Soviet Union, although troops were insistently offered by Stalin and were in fact already on the Hungarian border. Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin, the former Soviet ambassador to Czechoslovakia, was present in a semi-official capacity, having arrived 'late in the evening of February 17' to threaten Beneš if there should be 'disturbances'.⁶⁸ Gottwald refused the troops, saying he would not need them, and later observed that he 'couldn't believe it would be so easy'.⁶⁹ According to Kaplan, Stalin himself told Gottwald on 19 February that the time was 'now'. Gottwald 'welcomed the order'.⁷⁰ A secret report, delivered to M. A. Suslov in April, was scathingly critical of the Czechoslovak Party's history of wavering and 'parliamentary illusions', but indicated that the Soviet government considered that the page had now been turned on all that.⁷¹

The coup played an important role in Western Europe, and on the future of US–Soviet relations, but the initial Western response was purely verbal. The American, British and French ambassadors issued a joint statement of protest, but as far as joint action was concerned merely declared their intent to 'discuss the development of events'.⁷² The American press used the increasingly widespread rhetoric of 'totalitarianism' to describe what had happened, led by Albion Ross of the *New York Times*, but there was no suggestion of action.⁷³

Despite the long-held and apparently complacent attitudes of both the Czechoslovak government and the Western allies, however, the broader reaction to the coup turned out to be as powerful as if it had been a bolt from the blue. Georges Bidault, the French foreign minister, soon issued a statement saying that 'there can be no democracy where you shoot or hang your opponent, or where people speak of their truth, their freedom and their justice, and not simply of truth, freedom and justice'. Sir Oliver Harvey, the British ambassador to Paris, told critics of Western foreign policy that it 'was really not difficult

66 Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 157.

67 Quoted in Thomas E. Lifka, *The Concept 'Totalitarianism' and American Foreign Policy*, New York and London, 2 vols, 1988, II, p. 679.

68 'Russia and the Czech Crisis', *Manchester Guardian*, 3 March 1948, p. 4.

69 Quoted in Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, p. 42.

70 Kaplan, *The Short March*, p. 175. According to Kaplan, when Gottwald refused the offer of Soviet troops it was the only time in his whole career when he did not do what Stalin wanted.

71 Volokitina et al., *Vostochnaia Evropa*, pp. 831–58 (document no. 274: 'On Some Mistakes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia').

72 *FRUS*, 1948, vol. 4, p. 738.

73 Albion Ross, 'Benes Is Opposing Totalitarian Rule in Czech Deadlock', *New York Times*, 22 February 1948, p. 1; 'Czechs to Impose Totalitarian Rule by Edicts on Radio', *New York Times*, 1 March 1948, p. 1; 'Czech State Is Rapidly Pressed into Totalitarian Mold', *New York Times*, 7 March 1948, section E, p. 5.

or heroic to be totalitarian'.⁷⁴ Herbert Morrison spoke of Munich and so did Georges Bidault.⁷⁵ Secretary of State Marshall told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee behind closed doors that 'by intimidation, fraud and terror, communist regimes have been imposed on Hungary and Czechoslovakia.'⁷⁶

Public opinion in both France and Italy saw the events in Prague as meaningful for them, possibly in the near future.⁷⁷ The resonance was particularly powerful in France, and also in the Scandinavian countries.⁷⁸ The Finns were encouraged to speed up their negotiations for a 'military assistance treaty' with the Soviet Union, suggested by Stalin to President Paasikivi on 22 February.⁷⁹ And the Western press tended more and more frequently to make the Stalin–Hitler comparison.⁸⁰

That the Soviet Union could have regarded the Marshall Plan as a threat, on the other hand, seemed far-fetched to most Western observers. 'No rational being, one would think, could see in the Marshall Plan a threat to Russian security.' That, at any rate, was what the highly rational *Manchester Guardian* thought.⁸¹

The coup suggested to Washington that 'the Marshall Plan alone would not restore self-confidence in Europe; some form of explicit military guarantee would be needed as well'.⁸² *The Times* echoed this view in an editorial: 'there could be no stronger argument than this new Czechoslovak tragedy for a prompt end to the inhibitions which have held up the unqualified collaboration of Britain, France and the other western countries in the joint work of European recovery.'⁸³ To which the *Manchester Guardian* added: 'it is a terrible warning to countries like Italy, Finland, Greece and even France, where there are substantial Communist parties'.⁸⁴ Privately, Bidault was communicating precisely the same message to Marshall.⁸⁵

But the developments on the Western side did nothing for Czechoslovakia. Indeed, the United States could scarcely be said to have even had a policy towards Czechoslovakia. The principal historian of American–Czechoslovak relations of the period wrote that 'looking back on the last three years, it is next to impossible to discern any systematic or long-range approach to or any basic understanding of the problems of Czechoslovakia by the U.S. Department of State'.⁸⁶

The shock of the coup was heightened by Masaryk's mysterious death on 10 March, after which the American Secretary of State 'told reporters that Czechoslovakia was living under a reign of terror'. A few days later he told an audience at the University of

74 'Danger of Events in Prague', *The Times*, 26 February 1948, p. 5.

75 *The Times*, 27 February 1948, p. 4, and *ibid.*, 28 February 1948, p. 4.

76 *Time*, 22 March 1948 (vol. 51, no. 12), p. 19.

77 'Threat to Czech Independence: French Comment' and 'A Czech Parallel with Italy? Communists' Moves', *Manchester Guardian*, 23 February 1948, p. 8.

78 David Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, New Haven, CT and London, 1994, pp. 105–06, 208–09.

79 'Finnish President Gets Majority. Can Negotiate with Russia', *Manchester Guardian*, 6 March 1948, p. 5.

80 See the story on the reaction of the French press, especially *Le Monde*, in the *Manchester Guardian* ('French View of Crisis in Czechoslovakia', 27 February 1948, p. 5).

81 'Consolidation', *Manchester Guardian*, 28 February 1948, p. 4.

82 For initial reaction along those lines, see 'Plans for Strengthening Western Europe', *Manchester Guardian*, 1 March 1948, p. 6.

83 *The Times*, 27 February 1948, p. 2. See also 'M. Bidault Appeals for Unity of Those Still Free' *Manchester Guardian*, 28 February 1948, p. 5.

84 'Closing the Door to the West', *Manchester Guardian*, 26 February 1948, p. 5.

85 Bidault to Marshall, quoted in Orlik, 'Zapad i Praga', p. 11.

86 Ullman, *The United States in Prague*, p. 168.

California, Berkeley, that the situation reminded him of the final days before the outbreak of the Second World War.⁸⁷ Debate began precipitously in the US Congress on a reinstitution of conscription, and even representatives of the accommodationist left, like Max Lerner of the leftist newspaper *PM*, expressed their doubts about the possibility of working with the Soviet Union.⁸⁸ Senator Claude Pepper of Florida, an opponent of the Marshall Plan, declared himself converted.

George Kennan remembered the heightened anxiety of the next few months as constituting a real 'war scare'.⁸⁹ The *New York Times* took the most dire view of what might happen in Western Europe. The Italian election of 18 April was described by the *New York Times* as 'Europe's most fateful [...] since the war', because of the possibility that Italy might choose to join the Soviet Bloc.⁹⁰

Shortly before his death, Masaryk himself is alleged to have said that the end of Czechoslovakia was coming, but he expected another eight months. In a remarkable aside to his interlocutor he was alleged to have said that he still hoped for intervention from the West and wished that 'war would be here already'.⁹¹

87 Lifka, *The Concept 'Totalitarianism' and American Foreign Policy*, II, pp. 680–81. On 13 March, the former Secretary of State Byrnes declared that in the next four or five weeks the United States might face a serious international crisis and must be prepared to respond with 'more decisive action than letters of protest if Russia threatens Italy, France, Greece or Turkey'; quoted in Orlik, 'Zapad i Praga', p. 11.

88 Alexander Werth in Moscow was virtually alone among old leftists in seeing matters resolutely from the Soviet point of view: *Manchester Guardian*, 17 March 1948, p. 4.

89 Kennan, *Memoirs*, p. 400.

90 Raymond Daniell, 'Pattern for a Totalitarian State', *New York Times Magazine*, 11 April 1948, p. 7.

91 'End May Remain a Mystery. Suicide a Negation of his Life's Work. From a Special Correspondent Lately in Prague', *Manchester Guardian*, 11 March 1948, p. 5.

16 Austria and the Bohemian Lands, 1945–49: The Two Paths of Two Neighbours

ARNOLD SUPPAN

The histories of the Austrian Second Republic and of the Bohemian Lands within the Czechoslovak Third Republic differ so greatly that we have to look back to before 1526 to find another period when the paths of the Austrian and Czech populations diverged to such a comparable degree. Since there has been no thorough study of the sources, and since this is still not possible in many cases, this chapter presents a brief outline of the problem. My interpretation will, of course, have to be verified.

The two 'areas' began to diverge as early as May 1945 when Nazi rule collapsed, the Wehrmacht capitulated and the Gauleiter and the Gestapo disappeared. In the Bohemian Lands and the eastern half of Austria from the Mühlviertel to Upper Styria, the Red Army had contributed to this development, and the Communist commissars and the NKVD soon followed. At this point, different reactions could be observed. While the majority of Czechs welcomed the Red Army as liberators from the Germans and as the armed wing of their great 'Slav Brother', most Austrians did not associate this 'liberation' with freedom. There had been too much plundering, too many rapes and attacks on the civilian population for this to be the case. The flight and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, some 250,000 of whom came to Austria, also contributed to the division between the Czechs and Austrians, as did the 'return' of some 20,000 Viennese Czechs in the years 1945–46.¹

However, the most important question with regard to the political system was whether Stalin would be able to implement the observation that he had made to Milovan Djilas, that the one who conquers a country can also force his own social system upon it. Superficially, the early party political system in Czechoslovakia and Austria appeared similar. The Košice Programme of early April 1945 led to the creation of a National Front government consisting of Communists, Social Democrats, National Socialists, the (Catholic) People's Party and, in Slovakia, the Democrats, Communists, the Freedom Party and the Labour Party. Although the left-wing Social Democrat Zdeněk Fierlinger led this government, thirteen ministers out of a total of twenty-six were pro-Communist. Since the end of April 1945, a government led by the right-wing Social Democrat Karl Renner in coalition with the newly founded middle-class and agrarian Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) had governed Austria. The Socialist Party (SPÖ) had eleven ministers, ÖVP nine and the KPÖ seven, including the minister of the interior and the head of the police, as well as the minister of education. However, even in the first more or less free elections to be held in both states (the former National Socials — some 500,000 persons were still 'registered' — in Austria and the former Agrarian Party in Czechoslovakia were excluded), the party political structures developed differently. In the first parliamentary election held in Austria on 25 November 1945, the ÖVP won 50 per cent and the SPÖ 45 per cent, while the KPÖ won only a disappointing 5 per cent of the

1 Richard G. Plaschka, Horst Haselsteiner, Arnold Suppan and Anna M. Drabek (eds), *Nationale Frage und Vertreibung in der Tschechoslowakei und Ungarn 1938–1948*, Vienna, 1997; Ernst Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten des Staates. Österreichische Gesellschaftsgeschichte im 20. Jahrhundert*, Vienna, 1994 (hereafter *Der lange Schatten*), pp. 395–98; Victor S. Mamatey and Radomir Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1918–1948*, Princeton, NJ, 1973, pp. 387–96.

vote. In the elections to the National Assembly held on 26 May 1946 in the Bohemian Lands, the Communist Party was far more successful, with 40 per cent of the vote, ahead of the National Socialists with just under 24 per cent, the People's Party with 20 per cent and the Social Democrats with 15.6 per cent.²

Since the KPÖ soon left the government, the 'Grand Coalition' party political system was created in Austria. This system has often been described as *Proporzdemokratie*, and Ernst Hanisch called it a 'consensual democracy based on two pillars' (*versäulte Demokratie*) in reference to the division of the state into two relatively independent spheres of influence, which in some respects continue to exist today. Thus the private sector, represented by the Chamber of Commerce and the Association of Industrialists, the agricultural sector, represented by the Presidial Conference of the Chambers of Agriculture, and the civil service employees, represented by the public servants' union, are considered ÖVP supporters, while the nationalized industries, 'Waldbrunner's Kingdom', Austrian Railways, as well as the now non-aligned Austrian Association of Trades Unions (ÖGB) and the Chambers of Labour are considered to be supporters of the SPÖ. Incidentally, the provinces of Vienna and Carinthia had absolute 'Red' majorities until the end of the 1980s, while absolute 'Black' majorities ruled Lower Austria, Upper Austria, Salzburg, the Tyrol, Vorarlberg and Styria. The 'Grand Coalition' which lasted from 1947 to 1966 and once more from 1987 to the present day was based on the concentration of special interest groups, their co-operation with one another within the system of social partnership, the division of power in all important areas of national and social life, as in the case of the large banks, and, last but not least, on the custom of filling positions on the basis of party allegiance in the executive, in the high courts, and right down to district governors (*Bezirkshauptleute*) and school heads. The universities and the arts were the only areas that remained to some degree exempt. The Roman Catholic Church, however, retreated from party politics, and increased its overall influence on society as a result.³

In spite of heavy war losses (247,000 Austrians had fallen in battle and 144,000 civilians had been killed, 65,000 of whom were Jews), Austrian society emerged from the catastrophe of National Socialist rule (in which a disproportionately large number of Austrians played a leading role, including seven *Gauleiter*, thirteen high ranking SS and police figures and 207 *Wehrmacht* generals), as a more homogenous society than it had been before 1938. This partly derived from the levelling process which had taken place since 1938 and which resulted in the murder or exile of parts of the landowning aristocracy, the entire Jewish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia and parts of the Catholic bourgeoisie and educated middle classes. On the other hand, the majority of the population had been put to work in a modern war economy. Since the targeted allied bombing attacks on Austria's industrial towns and railway junctions in the summer of 1943 an 'emergency society' had developed which had then closed ranks even more tightly under the impact of defeat and liberation, or at least Allied occupation. This effect was increased by the pillage and rape in eastern Austria, and in spite of the existence of 1.6 million displaced persons in the summer of 1945 — some half a million of whom, particularly Sudeten Germans and

2 Milovan Djilas, *Gespräche mit Stalin*, Frankfurt on Main, 1962, p. 146; *Československé dějiny v datech*, Prague, 1986, pp. 454–68; Jiří Sláma and Karel Kaplan, *Die Parlamentswahlen in der Tschechoslowakei 1935 — 1946 — 1948. Eine statistische Analyse*, Munich, 1986; Alfred Ableitinger, 'Die innenpolitische Entwicklung' in Wolfgang Mantl (ed.), *Politik in Österreich. Die Zweite Republik: Bestand und Wandel*, Vienna, Cologne and Graz, 1992, pp. 119–40.

3 Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten*, p. 42; Joseph Marko, 'Verbände und Sozialpartnerschaft' in Mantl (ed.), *Politik in Österreich*, pp. 429–78; Heinrich Schneider, 'Kirche — Staat — Gesellschaft' in *ibid.*, pp. 523–70; Manfred Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei. Die Große Koalition in Österreich 1945–1966*, Vienna, 1987.

Volksdeutsche, remained in Austria. As the Soviet model of Society was hopelessly discredited as a result of the violence committed by the Red Army on citizens and property, the only alternative after 1945 was the Western community of values. Naturally, the Allies first demanded a de-Nazification process that led to 170,000 dismissals, 100,000 fines and forty-three death sentences being imposed by the courts. However, these measures did not lead to public discussion about the National Socialist period. Nevertheless, leading Austrian politicians and civil servants could assert one moral claim *vis-à-vis* the Allies: they had been dismissed themselves in 1934 or 1938 and, in many cases, had spent several years in concentration camps, which had led to the development of the 'spirit of the camps' (*Geist der Lagerstrasse*). This made a rapid reconstruction of state structures possible.⁴

Economic reconstruction initially proceeded more slowly, although the industrial structures in western and south-eastern Austria had improved during the Second World War as a result of relocations from Germany. Actual reconstruction only began with the nationalization of seventy companies and, in addition, three major banks which had been declared 'German property' and which the Potsdam Conference had planned as Austria's share of compensation, and particularly with Austria's inclusion in the Marshall Plan programme in the summer of 1947. On the one hand, the USSR incorporated 300 firms with 40,000 workers in its own USIA administration programme, including the valuable oil and natural gas fields in the Marchfeld area; on the other hand, the European Recovery Programme pumped \$1.6 billion into Austrian reconstruction, particularly in the Western zones of occupation. Five price and wage agreements between the government and 'social partners' ensured social stability, which was only temporarily disturbed by the Communist-led strike of October 1950. It is not yet clear whether political calculations on the part of Moscow played a role here. The start of the Korean War makes this appear unlikely; similar actions in East Central Europe since 1945, however, make it seem more probable. The enormous speed of reconstruction is illustrated by the fact that GDP was already higher in 1950 than in 1937 and 1913. There is no doubt that Austrian society had been taken over by unparalleled enthusiasm to work and increase its prosperity after 1947. This was true of all groups within an increasingly open Austrian society, from the new entrepreneurs to the new skilled workers, from the bureaucracy, which was now better trained, to the modernized school system, and even to higher education. Thus previous social or religious divisions disappeared. At the same time, young people in the 1950s became open to the new mass culture imported from America.⁵

Austria's situation with regard to foreign affairs, naturally enough, remained a problem. Although on 20 June 1949 the Allies had agreed on the Austrian borders of 1937, Austria was still faced with the threat of becoming a football between the two superpowers at the start of the Cold War. Strategically, the Soviet Union wanted to maintain a foothold in eastern Austria, while the USA wanted to control the route between Italy and Germany in the west. Thus solving the German question was of prime importance for both powers, whereby Stalin considered neutralizing Germany and Austria to strengthen the cordon sanitaire around the Soviet Union in East Central Europe. One of the main factors in this consideration was Stalin's fear that Germany might regain its strength and achieve a

4 Anton Pelinka, 'Österreich unter nationalsozialistischer Herrschaft: Zulauf, Anpassung, Widerstand, Vernichtung' in Mantl (ed.), *Politik in Österreich*, pp. 35–48; Hanisch, *Der lange Schatten*, pp. 337–97.

5 Roman Sandgruber, *Ökonomie und Politik. Österreichische Wirtschaftsgeschichte vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart*, Vienna, 1995, pp. 439–70; Erich Bodzenta, Hans Seidel and Karl Stiglbauer: *Österreich im Wandel. Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Raum*, Vienna and New York, 1985.

position where it would be able to take revenge. However, as far as Eisenhower was concerned, neutrality was more like an undermining of Western positions that offered the Soviets the possibility of gradual infiltration. At the beginning of 1954 the Soviet Union was not yet willing to withdraw the whole Red Army. It was only with the fall of Malenkov in January 1955 that Nikita Khrushchev became the undisputed leader in the Kremlin who could pursue a more open foreign policy. Therefore, when Chancellor Raab and Deputy Chancellor Schärff, foreign minister Leopold Figl and his deputy Kreisky went to Moscow in April 1955, permanent neutrality on the Swiss model became a key idea. Raab accepted the idea immediately — not least because of information that he had received from his brother in Switzerland — and Schärff agreed after being put under pressure by Kreisky. The USA had already demanded that neutrality must be both voluntary and armed, a fact often forgotten in later discussions. At any rate, the State Treaty of 15 May 1955 finally set the seal on Austria's freedom and the withdrawal of all foreign troops, which until 1989 was a rare event in the world. However, since Figl was still able to negotiate away any responsibility on Austria's part for the Second World War, the theory that Austria had been a victim was prolonged and only officially corrected after the Waldheim Affair in 1986.⁶

In comparison to this rather straightforward Austrian success story, Czech political and social history after 1945 suffered at least three major breaches: 1948, 1968 and 1989. In the beginning, the Czechoslovak Republic was in a favourable position compared to other European states with regard to both immediate war losses and German property. However, the negative consequences of the murder of 77,000 Bohemian and Moravian Jews by the Germans and the expulsion of almost three million Sudeten Germans by the Czechs themselves soon had a negative effect on Czech society. These effects were particularly noticeable in the greatly diminished number of entrepreneurs, particularly in the outlying border districts, which were largely abandoned and some of which then went into serious decline. On the other hand, the Communist Party used this 'bourgeois haemorrhage' quickly to increase Party membership and to strengthen its hold on social affairs. The new Communist minister president who took power after the elections in May 1946, Klement Gottwald, skilfully set about expanding his power base in both the executive and the propaganda and censorship apparatus, without President Beneš and the conservative ministers noticing very much until the autumn of 1947. Nevertheless, the new government voted in favour of accepting the Marshall Plan at the beginning of July 1947. However, Moscow immediately signalled that this Western invitation should be rejected. In Moscow, the foreign minister, Jan Masaryk, heard threats of a second Munich because, after the French Communists had left the government of France, the situation was now ripening for confrontation with the West. And the chief Soviet ideologist Zhdanov set a more aggressive course for the sister parties in September 1947 with the creation of Cominform. The Czechoslovak Communist Party now started falsely 'exposing' political opponents as 'collaborators' and fuelled their internal disagreements.⁷

When opinion polls taken in January 1948 indicated that the Communists could now only expect 25 per cent support, the Party went on the offensive. A special department was

6 Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945–1955. Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität*, Graz, Vienna and Cologne, 1985 (a new edition appeared in 1998).

7 Jörg K. Hoensch, *Sowjetische Osteuropa-Politik 1945–1975*, Düsseldorf, 1977, pp. 17ff; Emilia Hrabovec, *Vertreibung und Abschub. Deutsche in Mähren 1945–1947*, Frankfurt on Main, 1995; Sudetendeutsche Archiv (eds), *Odsun. Die Vertreibung der Sudetendeutschen. Begleitband zur Ausstellung*, Munich, 1995; Václav Černý, *Pláč koruny české*, Toronto, 1985, pp. 454–97; Karel Kaplan, *Der kurze Marsch. Kommunistische Machtübernahme in der Tschechoslowakei 1945–1948*, Munich, 1981.

set up to infiltrate other parties and the minister of the interior, Václav Nosek, made personnel changes in the police corps. When the non-Communist ministers demanded that these measures be withdrawn on 12 February 1948, the Communists began to mobilize the Communist-controlled trades unions and other mass organizations. When, on 20 February, armed people's militias were permitted, twelve non-Communist ministers resigned. Their intention was to force the creation of a new government without Communist participation. However, the demonstrations increased, openly supported by the Minister of Defence, General Ludvík Svoboda. The Soviet deputy foreign minister, Valerian Zorin, ostentatiously promised supplies of wheat, but also promised to prevent Western intervention. For this purpose, Red Army units went into readiness on the border. Thus, on 25 February 1948, President Beneš was forced to accept the new list of ministers presented by Gottwald. However, on 10 March Jan Masaryk was found dead under the window of his office in the Czernin Palais. The death looked like suicide, but today many still speculate that it was political murder. Without a doubt, the Communist take-over was cleverly arranged and the non-Communist ministers were no match for Communist deviousness. Moscow wanted to incorporate Prague into its sphere of influence, and Bohemia and Moravia were supposed to serve as socialist models for other sister parties — and for anti-colonial movements outside Europe. However, while Milovan Djilas (who travelled through Czechoslovakia in 1946) recognized that the wealth that still remained was not a fruit of a socialist economy, the majority of delegations who followed certainly did not recognize that.⁸

The take-over in Prague shocked the government in Vienna as well as the entire Western world. The *Arbeiter Zeitung*, in particular, clearly recognized the decisive step taken away from democratic socialism to a Communist dictatorship. The fact that some 100,000 people left Czechoslovakia, including the Czechs who emigrated in 1945–46, that the uniform list of the National Front had more than 89 per cent of the votes at the end of May 1948, and that Beneš had resigned on 6 June, before the signing of the Communist constitution, confirmed that external observers had judged the situation correctly. A nationalization law and other measures in June 1948 introduced the collectivization of agricultural land, as well as state control over the whole economy, education and the legal system; it also encouraged persecution of the Roman Catholic Church. In autumn 1948 the first Five-Year Plan was announced. At Stalin's insistence, representatives of the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria created the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance on 25 January 1949. Thus began the economic incorporation of Czechoslovakia into the Soviet sphere of influence.⁹

A radical restructuring of Czech society and its structures of ownership, comparable to the restructuring after 1620, now also started to take place. Communist Party officials who, in many cases, had been trained in Moscow, now appeared as new élites accompanied by the left-wing intellectuals of the inter-war years and the 'generation of *Totaleinsatz*', those born between 1921 and 1928 who had become socially and nationally radicalized by the negative experiences of occupation and being sent into the Reich as forced labourers. The first of the great show trials, this time against non-Communist politicians and intellectuals, took place between 31 May and 8 June 1950 to combat enemies of the state. Among those executed as a result were the National Social feminist functionary Milada Horáková and

8 Karel Kaplan, *Nekrvavá revoluce*, Prague, 1993, pp. 157–68; Richard J. Crampton, *Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century*, London and New York, 1994, pp. 235–39; Mamatey and Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic*, pp. 409–15.

9 Collegium Carolinum (eds), *Tschechoslowakei. Länderberichte Osteuropa III*, Munich and Vienna, 1977, pp. 79–90; Karel Kaplan, *Stát a církev v Československu v letech 1948–1953*, Brno, 1993.

the historian Závěš Kalandra. It was more difficult to explain away the former General Secretary of the Communist party, Rudolf Slánský, and the former foreign minister, Vlado Clementis, at the end of November 1952, as trials against Trotskyists, Zionists, 'bourgeois nationalists' and Titoists. However, Stalin and the NKVD directed affairs from behind the scene.¹⁰

In conclusion, I should like to emphasize three fundamental changes that took place within Austrian and Czech society which mark a clear contrast between the period after 1945 and earlier periods.

(1) As a result of the murder of one third of Austrian Jews and the majority of Bohemian-Moravian Jews by the Germans, as well as the expulsion of most of the other Jews, the Jewish middle class and the Jewish intelligentsia, who had played a major role in shaping economic, cultural and intellectual life, also disappeared from Prague and Vienna. Therefore, in these areas of social life, a strong trend towards bohemicization and Austrianism can be observed after 1945.

(2) The flight and expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, some 250,000 of whom ended up in Austria, increased this trend towards national homogenization. While this economically and culturally important population group was lost for the Bohemian Lands, it strengthened the Austrian population in the will to rebuild their country. In addition, another 250,000 German refugees also came to Austria from Hungary and Yugoslavia.

(3) This development, as well as other violent interventions during the Second World War (concentration camps, emigration, military service, resistance, executions and so forth) also changed the structure of the élites in Austria and the Bohemian Lands. Although the vast majority of the 1934 and 1938 political and administrative élites in Austria had returned, the academic and cultural élites had undergone massive changes. The economic élite had also suffered considerable diminution.

Without a doubt, there was less continuity in the Bohemian Lands with regard to the political élite, since not all of the political actors of 1938 had survived the war or returned from exile. On the other hand, the Communist élite that had been trained in Moscow had returned to the country. However, the élites in the administration, the army and parts of the cultural sphere demonstrated an ability to adapt to the new regime. The economic élite was shattered, since, apart from the murdered Jews and the Germans who had been expelled, many investment leaders emigrated, industry and agriculture were extensively nationalized, and the Communist Party regime resulted in a high degree of social levelling.¹¹

By 1950 Austria was on its way to becoming a thinking Western economy, something it had never managed to become before the Second World War, where the once extraordinarily prosperous Czechoslovakia was well on its way to becoming (save the blip of 1968–69) one of the loyalest allies of the Soviets. In the year of Stalin's death, the works of T. G. Masaryk and Beneš were banned from bookshops and public libraries.

10 Karel Kaplan, *Die politischen Prozesse in der Tschechoslowakei 1948–1954*, Munich, 1986.

11 František Svátek, "'Staré" a "nové" elity v českých zemích ve 20. Století', *Česko-slovenská historická ročenka* 1996, Brno, 1996.

17 Chiliastic Factors in Post-war Czech Literature and the World of Jan Karafiát's *Little Beetles*

VLADIMÍR MACURA

In 1947, the State Publishing House in Prague published the perhaps best-loved Czech book for children, *Broučci* (Little Beetles, 1876), by Jan Karafiát (1846–1929). This fact is hardly surprising: since its first publication it had seen numerous new impressions. But the 1947 edition represented an unusual venture: the book was a Russian translation under the title *Svetliachki: Skazka dlia malen'kich i bol'shikh detei*. The text was translated by Arnošt Kolman and Ekaterina Kontsevaia and the author of the Preface was the cultural ideologue Zdeněk Nejedlý, at that time Minister of Labour and Social Security in Klement Gottwald's cabinet. The Communist minister's commendatory Preface was a clear signal of the importance of this publishing project. Of course, the book was intended as an aid to Russian-language learning. At the same time, however, it was much more than a practical manual. Moreover, it was everything but a belated ceremonial publication to mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the author's birth. By no means could it be optimistically interpreted as a product of the abolition of Protectorate censorship, a sign of new times, when a child will 'finally able to read freely, not what was imposed upon him or her as it was in the time of Hitlerite regime', as Zdeněk Nejedlý puts it.¹

Svetliachki is not a straightforward Russian version of a famous Czech book for children; it is a cunning manipulation of it, a battle with its author's attitudes and opinions. The book, written by a Calvinist priest, is marked by an expressly Christian moral message. His moral principles define all the components of the book: the plot, which is not based on the physical action, but submits humbly to the universal rhythm of birth and dying; the characters — the 'little beetles' (or more precisely, the fire-flies), who make for an allegory of life accepted as harmonious service to God; the narration marked by its formative, educative character. It presents a story of education and initiation into life through fulfilling duties to God and His Providence.

Zdeněk Nejedlý's Preface already destroys the original allegorical structure: Karafiát's fire-flies are distanced from Christian symbolism and turned back to the pre-Christian folklore repertory as a supposed object of Ancient Slav worship. Nejedlý makes the summer night the main scene of the children's tale: in this way, the important position of the dark hibernal imagery, recalling the temporal limitations of earthly life in Karafiát's work, is ostentatiously suppressed. The consistent Christian pathos of Karafiát's text is completely re-evaluated by means of references to the *Unitas Fratrum* as the heirs of revolutionary Hussitism ('the heirs of John Huss and the Czech Hussites, who as early as in the fifteenth century began their struggle for the better life against the feudal oppressors').² Zdeněk Nejedlý tries to explain the systematic changes in the text of the translation and interprets them as attempts at replacing the 'evangelical aspect' of the book by the 'universal aspect' of humanity. At the same time, he declares that all the changes leave the real meaning of the work untouched.

1 Zdeněk Nejedlý's preface to Ia. Karafiat, *Svetliachi: Skazka dlia malen'kich i bol'shikh detei*, Prague, 1947, p. 6.

2 Ibid., p. 8.

The opposite is true: the true meaning of the children's book was radically deformed in the Russian translation. At the very beginning, the dedication of the book to Jane Dennistoun Buchanan of Auchentorlie is omitted. Jane Buchanan was Karafiát's adviser and supporter, whom he met in Edinburgh in 1871, when he was there as a guest of the Free Church. This omission impairs the personal framework of the work; in a sense, the book has been 'expropriated' from its author. But the omission of any allusions to the universal order of God so typical of Karafiát's work is even more destructive. The prayer, one of the leitmotifs of Karafiát's book, is systematically replaced with a 'song'; instead of the ritual praying in the original we find a 'merry singing' in the translation: 'Don't you know what Daddy instructed you to do and why we pray every morning?'³ becomes 'Don't you know what Daddy instructed you to do? Have you forgotten the song we sing every morning?'⁴

'Godfather' and 'godmother' (*kmotřiček* and *kmotřička*), as notions connected with the rite of admitting a person into the Christian Church (*krestnyi otets*, *krestnaia mat'*), were replaced with the appellations *diadiushka*, *tetushka*). An important rite in the Church, deprived of prayers and sermons, has been turned into a monstrous and incomprehensible scene with singing, and the church is replaced with a 'neutral' school episode: 'what was the sermon today about?' (Cz, p. 52) becomes 'what did they explain to you today in school?' (R, p. 50). The logical construction of the original episode, where Pavel, a young priest giving his first sermon, talks about his wrongdoing in childhood, while his mother and sister are sitting in the last pew of the church, is entirely deformed. The presence of mother and sister at the school desk makes no sense in the Russian version.

Above all, it is God who is ousted from the text. The word 'God' is systematically omitted ('God will make you understand!' [Cz, p. 46] becomes 'You will understand some time' [R, p. 46]); God is transformed into a simple salutation ('God be with us and evil gone' [Cz, p. 17] becomes 'Good luck and may evil away' [R, p. 19]). God can be replaced with a chaotic force of coincidence: 'God cares about all obedient bugs and nothing nasty can happen to them, and if something happens nevertheless, it is all right' [Cz, p. 28] becomes 'everybody cares about the good bugs; nothing nasty can happen to them, and if something happens nevertheless, it does not matter!' (R, p. 28). Sometimes — and this instance is particularly interesting — God is substituted by the terrestrial community of all the beetles and their solidarity: 'Daddy interrupted them: "Do you really think, Beetleboos, that Joannie-Fly is alone there? No, God is there with her!"' (Cz, pp. 27–28) becomes 'Daddy interrupted them: "Do you really think, Beetleboos, that Joannie-Fly is alone there? No, all the beetles are around her!"' (R, p. 28).

What is more, the text of the translation is divided into chapters — their added titles introduce into Karafiát's narrative a new optimistic mood rooted not in Karafiát's certainty of the endless pleasure of the final fusion with God's plans, but only in the hectic swarming community of the microcosm of insects deprived of any higher, spiritual sense: 'Dreams and Plans under Snow'; 'It Is Getting Better'; 'A Happy Family'; 'Happiness, Despite Hard Trials'; and 'Everything Turns Out Well'. The sense of Karafiát's narrative is thoroughly reformulated in this way: the consistent architecture of the author's universe, where the microcosm also submits to the same laws of God, has been completely destroyed in the Russian version. The final triumph of Death, when all the beetles, the heroes of the book, die in winter, in a logical climax of Karafiát's fiction — the motif of humble acceptance of one's earthly fate reaches its culmination here:

3 Jan Karafiát, *Brucci pro malé i veliké děti*, Prague, n.d. [1902], p. 11 (original hereafter referred to as Cz with page numbers in the text).

4 Karafiát, *Svetliachi*, p. 14 (translation hereafter referred to as R with page numbers in text).

And winter came. Oh, it was a bad, cruel winter. All brooks were frozen to the bottom; birds were falling from the skies; oh, such a frost, a sparkling frost. And how is it with the beetles over there under the juniper, can they stand it? No matter. If they freeze to death, they die humbly. — And then spring returns. Everything, everything was in bloom, every-everything, and over there, under the juniper, twelve daisies were blooming, nine white as milk, and the other three flowers had red, blood-red edges. They are blooming there still now. (Cz, p. 120)

An ending of this type would be impossible in the Russian version, which runs:

And winter came. Oh, it was a bad, cruel winter. All brooks were frozen to the bottom; birds were falling down during their flight; oh, such a frost, a sparkling frost. And what about the beetles over there under the juniper, can they stand it? They will. Spring will come soon. Everything, everything will be in bloom, every-everything. And everything will be good. (R, p. 112)

The heroes of the Russian version of Karafiát's children book do not die, they live through the winter and the narrative ends not with a nostalgic scene of twelve daisies as an emblem of death (as it is in the original text) but, on the contrary, with an apotheosis of the coming eternal spring.

The mechanism of the transcription of the Christian children's book into a new shape is worth attention. In a pure form, the transcription contains, perhaps, all the features of the 'new culture' of the post-Second World War era. Above all, it constitutes a denial of the 'old world'. The children's book, generally accepted as a classic of the past, has been definitively re-coded: all the allusions to religion or to God, as the final point of intersection of all its narrative lines, have been pedantically removed. All the corrections, including the deletion of the noble addressee of Karafiát's work, aim to ignore the whole 'world past', the pre-war world. The spring, in Karafiát's book only one of the returning seasons of a year over the period of time allotted by God to all living creatures, becomes in the Russian version a final stage of life, the era of everlasting and, of course, earthly happiness. The community of beetles, and, through this allegory, the human community itself, 'the collective' ('all of us'), 'the human masses', become the supreme value, assuming God's position in the destroyed world of Karafiát. Even the Russian language of the book is symptomatic: its use is not only a means of teaching a foreign language; Russian becomes one of the values aggressively intruding into the old scheme of values of Karafiát's world. It embodies ideology instead of simply being language.

This peripheral text is remarkably compatible with the processes taking place in Czech culture after the Second World War. Euphoria at the end of the war, together with the conviction that any return to the pre-war regime (suspected of being the cause of the collapse of Czechoslovakia) could be disastrous, helped to strengthen the chiliastic tendencies that had been accumulating in Czech culture for years. The most traditional components of these tendencies were the Revivalist ideas about the special Slav mission, about Slavdom as the power of the future, and left-wing and Marxist visions of the new world of justice to come. Socialist theories conventionally resulted in utopian models: they presupposed a final vision of a happy future as the last stage of human history. The official project of 'scientific socialism' was no exception to the rule, although it declared its radical abandonment of pre-Marxian socialist conceptions, labelling them 'utopian socialism'. Despite its attempt to utilize some rational construction, to operate with 'logical' systems of economic data, transparent and simple philosophy or statistics, the conception of the future, conveyed by an apparently rational structure, remained after all mythological and chiliastic. Utopia and science were supposed to fuse ('Let Utopia drink from science's fountains', wrote Pujmanová).⁵

5 Marie Pujmanová, *Miliony holubiček*, Prague, 1950, p. 51.

The 'future happy age' was perceived as something that had to come, something predicted and inevitable.⁶ The war, just finished, played the role of an initiator: it was viewed as the last struggle of the Apocalypse opening the door to the 'new world'. In his *Pět minut za městem* (Five Minutes Beyond the Town, 1940), the individual manifestations of Nezval's scepticism towards modern civilization are connected into a universal system. His book of verse is an attempt at a final reckoning — with modern culture, with the author himself, with the status of the modern poet and, in this way, with his own style and poetics. On all levels of this absolute scepticism, the need of a new order is declared. Its germs are found in natural human values represented by idyllic emblems of village life, and (in opposition to the exclusive imagery of modern poetry) by the traditional symbolism of the National Revival. The 'old world' is presented as undermined by an inner crisis, afflicted by a catastrophe. The text of the poem abounds in warning symbols (the swarm of locusts, the dark wedding guest, the wolf and so on). It is a world irretrievably lost in the past. Through bizarre fragments of its former wholeness one can see new signals of the future universe: in the motif of a 'new thirst' (*nová žízeň*), for example: 'Wailing tears pride lust self-tormenting/we have drunk these drinks out/Poisoned by them we have a new thirst'⁷ The end of the old world is viewed here as something inevitable, not as the result of aggression from outside, but rather as a product of the crisis of Western civilization itself. Even the same poet's stylization of the September 1938 days into an 'historical picture', constructed of archaic properties, was not dictated by the inertia of the norms and preferences of his recently abandoned Surrealist doctrine. More probably it was predefined by the interpretation of those norms, as well as those of the Decadent verse he cites, as definitely lost with the ruins of the old world. The motif of time, at the end of Nezval's *Historical Picture*,⁸ does not promise a resurrection of the past: its phantom scenery is a constituent part of the message declaring the decline of the age. Bidding farewell to the old world means for Nezval bidding farewell to himself as a former poet of the Avant-garde: the status of modern poetry seems to him to be shattered; the lyrical 'narrator' of these poems, locating himself at the crossroads between the world of the past and the world of the future, explicitly abandons Modernism ('Farewell, Pelican, you contorted bird [...]. For a long time now I have not liked the exotic').⁹

As early as the beginning of the 1940s, Nezval's verse formulates the conflict that was to be extremely topical after the war. František Hrubín in *Jobova noc* (The Night of Job, 1945) defines this conflict clearly as a fight between 'the old land' and 'the new land' and, following Nezval, connects it with the quest for a meaning and a message for poetry. The old land is characterized as 'sickly', 'in decay', driving everyone to live in loneliness. A representative of the 'old land', a 'Decadent poet', Job, a prototype of the modern poet, is as 'sickly' as the old land itself; 'he is distilling poisons of loneliness'¹⁰ and ignores the suffering of the 'crowds'. 'He does not want to hear [their voices], this deaf poet Job'¹¹. The 'old land' is confronted with a 'new land' clearly associated with Russia. This confrontation is supported by the opposition of Verlaine, mentioned in the description of the 'old land', and allusions to poetry of the Russian revolutionary poet Vladimir

6 See Vladimír Macura, *Šťastný věk*, Prague, 1992.

7 Vítězslav Nezval, *Pět minut za městem*, Prague, 1940, p. 105.

8 Nezval's *Historický obraz* was first published as a poem in two cantos in 1939; its refrain and much imagery are based on the Decadent Karel Hlaváček's *Mstivá kantiléna* (Cantilena of Revenge, 1898). A new edition, with a third canto proclaiming Stalinist values, and lacking the Decadent intertext, was published in 1945.

9 Nezval, *Pět minut za městem*, pp. 105 and 108.

10 František Hrubín, *Jobova noc*, Prague, 1945, p. 15.

11 Ibid., p. 20.

Maiakovskii in the style of Hrubín's verse, as a part of the picture of the 'new land'. The loneliness of a Decadent poet (Job, Verlaine), is contrasted with the revolutionary poet, who is not only a speaker for the masses, but even their incarnation ('And all of them, all, are poets/called Maiakovskii').¹² The Second World War was interpreted explicitly as the culmination of a long fight between the old and new worlds and thus as an immediate and logical continuation of the Russian Revolution of 1917.¹³

The vision of the new world was closely connected with the idea of a 'new man': Nezval tries to treat this notion by neglecting the attributes of the 'modern poet': the 'new man' should be 'unsophisticated', 'simple', 'ordinary', belonging to all the others. All those motifs are to be found in Hrubín's *Jobova noc*. Hrubín projects his ideal of the 'new man' onto the contrasting background of the 'Decadent poet'. But this confrontation is connected in his poetry with a definite political conclusion — the apotheosis of Soviet man.

In the same way, the search for the 'new man' is accented in Vladimír Holan's poetry of 1945. In his *Panychida* (The Memorial Ceremony), the poet asks a rhetorical question: 'Who will change the phantoms back into human beings?'. He declares the necessity of 'reaching the man,/whom we are approaching only through irony'.¹⁴ He expects to find this new man among 'the poor': there is no doubt that the postman with a peony or the 'bright tram-driver' 'salting his slice of bread' in the finale of *Panychida* does not belong to phantoms.¹⁵ Projected onto the map of the world, this fact indicates the same orientation towards the east, towards Soviet Russia, as was the case in Hrubín. The portraits of the Soviet soldiers in Holan's cycle *Rudoarmějci* (The Red Army Soldiers, 1945) constitute something like visions of the passage to this dreamed-of new world where nothing is left of the moments of crisis in modern culture.

It is necessary to repeat that these sentiments were initiated by the experience of war and the collapse of the Czechoslovak state, as well as by the experience of the failure of Western civilization. Regardless of the formal restoration of Czechoslovakia, the past seemed to be unrestored. The only possible point of departure seemed to be beginning from zero. All this helped to create a suitable 'messianic atmosphere'.¹⁶ However, the chiliastic moment of the 'new empire's' coming was not accepted at this time as a specifically Czech problem; in the Bohemian Lands we do not meet any 'Czech chiliasm' or 'Czech messianism' such as existed in the nineteenth century. The messianic gesture was restricted to affiliation to foreign, Soviet, inspiration. The Soviet system, decorated by its 'glorious victories' in the war, seemed to offer a pre-fabricated variant of social development. After the war, many intellectuals in the Bohemian Lands were speaking of the necessity of an orientation towards socialism according to the Soviet model. The theme of 'the East', associated with Russia, is more or less generally bound to a picture of the rising sun as a metaphor of a new day, and to a symbol of the star over Bethlehem under which the Messiah was born ('Oh east of five-pointed stars').¹⁷ The dreamed-of new world finds in Russia its true model. 'Only socialism', writes Jiří Weil, 'is able to show mankind

12 Ibid., p. 23.

13 The notion that the Second World War was the culmination of the October Revolution was not restricted to Communist minds. It forms a recurrent motif of, for example, Edvard Beneš's *Demokracie dnes a zítra*, London, n.d. [1942], a 'free [sic] translation', 'taking into consideration the Soviet Union's entry into the war', of the work originally published in English, Eduard Beneš, *Democracy Today and Tomorrow*, London, 1939.

14 Vladimír Holan, *Panychida* [1945] in *Sebrané spisy*, Prague, 8 vols, VI, 1976, pp. 159 and 167.

15 Ibid., p. 177.

16 See J. Ujejski, *Dzieje polskiego mesjanizmu*, Lemberg, 1931, p. 23.

17 František Halas, *Barikáda*, Prague, 1945, unpaginated.

a way from the stage of animality to the stage of humanity'.¹⁸ Here socialism means unequivocally socialism of the Soviet type. The art of 'ivory towers' is generally ignored and dozens of intellectuals call for a new, 'people's', style. Journalists as well as writers search for a 'new man'. 'Every regime forms new faces', comments *Kulturní politika* on photographs of young men and women in 1945. The journal accepts as typical for the post-war times only faces 'with open windows, communicating with the world outside, free of the cadaverous underworld of spirit', faces which are 'good material and a great responsibility for those who are going to work on it'.¹⁹ This pragmatic formulation will be typical for the years after the Communist coup in February 1948, but we find them very often even in the period immediately after 1945 — and not only in the Communist press.

The ideal of the new man is the ideal of a man who is not individualized, who is defined exclusively by his adherence to a broader community, to a 'collective' ('Me, nameless me,/me, a soldier of my people,/help me, Red Army,/help me, hear my misery').²⁰ In those times, the de-personalized 'I/me' seemed to be stronger, seemed not to be dissolved in the loneliness of egotism as it had been in the 'old world': 'Me, nameless me/I did not cry in vain/the Red Army/is now flying towards my voice [to relieve my misery]'.²¹

In Czech culture after the Second World War, long before the Communist coup, utopian elements of this kind (a binary interpretation of social reality, a chiliastic vision of destruction of the old world, belief in the speedy advent of the new era, the ideal of a 'new man', a mythicizing of the Soviet Union and Stalin himself as the new Messiah and so forth) became dominant. These chiliastic tendencies often clashed with attitudes that would not accept this version of Utopia. At first, it was Catholic poetry that expressed a fervent opposition to this earth-bound chiliasm — it is telling that one of the components of the lyrical repertory of the Catholic poets was the symbol 'old land' (*stará země*), an embodiment of traditional, archetypal values connected with tradition — Christian belief, God (Jan Zahradníček, *Stará země* [The Old Land, 1946]). Strictly speaking, this fight was decided before it began: in the prevailing messianic atmosphere Catholic, or spiritual, poetry was viewed as a fading expression of the old, decadent world.

After February 1948, the chiliastic euphoria engulfed all official culture in Czechoslovakia.²² The adored 'happy age', viewed simultaneously, almost schizophrenically, both as 'coming' and as already 'reached', was linked with the motif of immortality ('After all, we shall reach our hands/into the most distant future/and we shall see that happy world/with the eyes of our grandsons';²³ 'we have gained the right to live after death'.²⁴ Death was cancelled in the 'new world': the new world was presented as the realm of life, happiness and joy. Everything was new in this empire: 'new human beings', 'new literature', 'new language' (symptomatically, Ivan Skála speaks in almost Orwellian words of the 'Czech newspeak of happiness [*novočeština štěstí*]'.²⁵

The translation of Karafiát's *Broučci* into Russian, this new epoch's prestigious language (which Ivan Skála's 'Czech newspeak' wants to equal), in a rudimentary form, but distinctly, exposed what was to become taboo for this awaited new world. However, the expunging of the topic of death and dying, of religious belief, humility and God, as well as

18 Jiří Weil, 'Být člověkem', *Kulturní politika*, 1, 1945, p. 16.

19 [Anon.], 'Lidská tvář', *Kulturní politika*, 1, 1945, p. 16.

20 František Hrubín, *Chléb s ocelí*, Prague, 1945, p. 42.

21 Ibid., p. 44.

22 On 'socialist' messianism see B. Baczko, *Wyobrażenia społeczne: Szkice o nadziei i pamięci zbiorowej*, Warsaw, 1994, pp. 126–57.

23 Pavel Kohout, *Čar lásky a bije*, Prague, 1954, p. 112.

24 Milan Lajčiak, *Verše*, Bratislava, 1953, p. 101.

25 Ivan Skála, *Máj země*, Prague, 1950, p. 35.

the replacing of God with society, completely destroyed the special, fascinating universe of Karafiát's book. In spite of the concluding picture of triumphant spring, the exclusion of sacred values from Karafiát's universe left behind only a sad and forlorn microcosm whose flat insect existence was brutally revealed.

This insect existence was at the same time a depressing metaphor of human existence in this everlasting 'happy age' of the eternal spring to come.²⁶

26 This chapter constitutes one of the last papers Vladimír Macura presented. He died, at the age of fifty-three, almost exactly a year after he had delivered it, on 17 April 1999. He almost did not come to London to give the paper because he was feeling so ill. That he came demonstrated the personal courage and the love of literature typical of him. He had always been a courageous literary scholar as well, during Communism and afterwards. An obituary appeared in the *Independent*, 20 May 1999, 'Thursday Review' section, p. 6. (R.B.P.)

18 The Drama of Local Power: Theatre as Politics and Metaphor in Bolesław Drobner's Cracow

LAURIE KOLOSKI

For decades, official Polish historiography touted the Communists' victory in the 'battle for people's democracy'. *Émigré* Poles and Western historians used military metaphors as well, to characterize the period and shape their analyses, and to construct an entire 'Cold War historiography'. On both sides, hindsight — exultant or disillusioned, depending on the perspective — contributed to a simplistic view of the period and an analytical structure based on clear-cut winner-loser, perpetrator-victim dichotomies. Given historians' emphasis on party politics, this bipolar opposition has persisted even beyond 1989. More and more studies based on previously unavailable documents tell us exactly who did what to whom when, though the prevailing view now demonizes rather than lionizes the Communists. Yet few scholars have attempted to reconceptualize the intellectual clothes-line on which they hang these documents out to dry, retaining instead the traditional Cold War dichotomies of coercive state versus passive society, collaborator versus resistor, us (the Poles, the non-Communists) versus them (the Communists, the Soviets).

My attempt to 're-read' developments outside the traditional sphere of central party politics has convinced me such dichotomies are of little use. Moving beyond Warsaw to Cracow and beyond party politics to the politics of culture, I explore early post-war art and theatre as fairly autonomous realms in which alternative ideological, social, and political models could emerge. In Cracow, non-Communist agenda signalled a continuing debate about old and new and a contest over differing visions of society and state-society interaction. Putting the Communist 'new' in place after 1945 was not just a matter of political repression. It was a lengthy process of socio-cultural negotiation, in which models of the Polish past were often more powerful than those of the Stalinist future.

In this chapter, I present a story about a local politician's use of theatre as a metaphor for a broader agenda of social and political autonomy. For Bolesław Drobner, a lifelong socialist and consummate party politician, politics was what life was about. Yet in early post-war Poland, politics was not the only language he could use. Especially before 1948, Drobner used the language of theatre to promote a 'third way', an alternative agenda based on a vision of historically shaped and socio-politically unique constituencies, in this case his political party, the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), and his hometown, Cracow. Behind his support of these two concrete entities lay Drobner's belief that Poland and the communities which comprise it must be defined not by post-war geopolitical dictates but by their historical legacies, not by the central authorities in Warsaw but by their own cultural traditions.

Though the bulk of my chapter is devoted to Drobner's post-war activities, the first section provides a biographical sketch, drawn largely from his own memoirs. Drobner was a contentious figure for much of his life, and contemporary Polish scholars generally dismiss him as a colourful figure of only marginal importance. My purpose here is not to raise Drobner above intellectual or political marginality, but to contextualize his post-war activities and *persona*. In a broader sense, my goal is to look beyond the surface of Drobner's political tactics and *persona* (i) to his role as a symbolic proxy and (ii) to theatre

as metaphor in this process. It is possible that Drobner himself was something of a joke. But the myth he represented and promoted, the symbolic singularity of Cracow, was no joke at all.¹

Drobner's Political Background and Persona

Born in Cracow in 1883, Drobner grew up under the Habsburgs, survived two world wars and witnessed the victories and disappointments of the Communist-dominated post-war regime.² When he first joined the Polish Social-Democratic Party (PPSD) at the age of fifteen, the nineteenth century was just drawing to a close. Half a century later, the political ideals he had pursued seemed close to fruition. Drobner would, however, have to continue struggling for his 'third way' until he died in 1968.

He had grown up in a town which prided itself on its uniqueness. Cracow had been Poland's capital until 1572, and although the city's political fortunes had declined thereafter it continued to play a leading role in culture, education, and religion. Its status as a free city between 1815 and 1846 helped foster its reputation as the guardian of Polish spiritual and national values.³ From the 1860s onwards, 'Austrian' Poles enjoyed far greater political and cultural autonomy than their counterparts in German- and Russian-held territories. This further consolidated Cracow's status as the Poles' symbolic capital.⁴

In 1897, representatives of Galician socialist parties gained seats in the Reichsrat for the first time. One of these was Ignacy Daszyński, leader of the PPSD and an early political mentor to Drobner. Drobner had begun his political career at fourteen as a scout in Daszyński's 1897 campaign. When he joined the PPSD himself the following year, he set about finding schoolmates willing to join him for clandestine study groups.⁵

In his memoirs, Drobner is passionate about these experiences and about the family's maid, from whom he heard the word 'socialism' for the first time at the age of seven.⁶ Whether or not he embellished such stories for effect, Drobner identified himself as a man raised on socialism. Polish patriotism was only slightly less important for him. Though Drobner came from a family of assimilated Jews who had lived in Cracow for generations, he believed Jewishness was a bestowed identity, something to hold close on a personal level but to overcome on a social and political level. Polishness, by contrast, was something one earned through sacrifice and public social and political commitment. The best way for Jews to succeed in Poland, Drobner believed, was to become Poles.⁷

At eighteen, Drobner went to study in Berlin, Lemberg and Zurich, where he forged ties with the international socialist movement. Still, like many Polish socialists, Drobner was

1 What follows is an abbreviated version of 'Taking Kraków's Cue: Bolesław Drobner and Theater as Politics' in L. Koloski, *Painting Kraków Red: Politics and Culture in Poland, 1945–1950*, PhD dissertation, Stanford University, 1998, pp. 38–99.

2 Background material on Drobner is drawn mostly from the following sources: Drobner's three-volume memoirs, *Bezustanna walka: Wspomnienia*, Warsaw, 1962–67; his collection of essays, *Wspominki...*, Cracow, 1965; Mirosław Chałubiński, *Bolesław Drobner: Wybór prac i artykułów*, Warsaw, 1980 (hereafter *Bolesław Drobner*); and Michał Śliwa's biography, *Bolesław Drobner. Szkic o działalności politycznej*, Cracow, 1984.

3 See Jacek Purchla's *Matecznik polski: Pozaekonomiczne czynniki rozwoju Krakowa w okresie autonomii galicyjskiej*, Cracow, 1992, pp. 36–38.

4 See Jacek Woźniakowski, 'Kraków: Miasto stare, nowa sztuka', in Zbigniew Baran (ed.), *Kraków: dialog tradycji*, Cracow, 1991, p. 78.

5 Drobner, *Bezustanna walka*, I, pp. 95, 96.

6 Ibid., pp. 34–36.

7 For Drobner's views on assimilation, see *ibid.*, pp. 45–49, and Drobner, 'Ważne problemy' in *Drogowskazy*, Cracow, 1946, pp. 91–93.

never a true internationalist. He did not sympathize with the Rosa Luxemburg view that independence would derail the proletariat's international struggle, and when war broke out in 1914 he put aside politics and joined Józef Piłsudski's anti-Russian Provisional Commission of Confederated Independence Parties and its military wing, the Riflemen (subsequently reorganized as the Polish Legions under Austrian command). 'There was no turning back', he later wrote, 'the only thing that mattered was to fight the Tsar, to fight for Poland's independence'.⁸

With independence virtually dumped into the Poles' laps in 1918, Drobner and his fellow socialists could turn their attention elsewhere. Drobner himself set about building a Socialist Party which could meet workers' demands in the newly democratic Poland. Drobner's insistence that the PPS advocate a dictatorship of the proletariat proved too radical for many of his party colleagues, and he eventually broke with the PPS and founded an independent socialist party.⁹ (He rejoined the mainstream PPS in 1928.) He was sympathetic to the Communist cause, and spent time in the USSR in 1936. Not surprisingly, the authorities labelled Drobner a 'crypto-Communist', and he was arrested several times during the inter-war period and, indeed, once imprisoned for his advocacy of a united Socialist-Communist front and his 'glorification' of the Soviet regime in a series of public lectures.¹⁰ Nevertheless, Drobner was adamant that the differences between the Socialists and Communists were significant and that he would never abandon the Socialists. The Communists, he wrote in 1922, 'were revolutionary maniacs' and 'showed an inability to understand life's realities and the desire above all to copy the Soviets' methods of revolutionary struggle'.¹¹ What Poland's workers needed, Drobner believed, was a party steeped in the workers' own Polish experiences, a 'third way' between the political authoritarianism and social cowardice of the right-wing parties and the unrealizable pipe dreams of the left.

Drobner gained as much notoriety outside the PPS as inside. He never missed an opportunity to join a worker's strike, or to use a public platform or the courtroom to air his passionate views. He continued the work he had begun before the war with the Workers' University Society (TUR), travelling throughout the region to give lectures to worker and peasant groups, and he built and led a youth group within the organization. He gained a seat on the city council in 1933, which he was to hold until his death. He was a skilled orator and a tireless self-promoter, but he was also an unyielding and contentious man. In addition to his political opponents, he alienated many allies.

In September 1939, Drobner left Cracow and headed east to Lemberg. Although the Soviet invasion of Poland's eastern territories on 17 September 1939, initially seemed to promise 'freedom', as Drobner notes in his memoirs, in 1940 he was one of some 1.2 million Poles the Soviets deported to Siberia and a number of Central Asian republics.¹² Freed from a Siberian labour camp in 1941, Drobner was able to rejoin his family, which had been deported to Central Asia. Drobner's memoirs are remarkably free of rancour for the Soviets.

Drobner had a keen sense of the possible and the plausible, and by early 1943 he understood he would have to pursue his vision within a particular set of constraints. Soviet

8 Drobner, *Bezustanna walka*, I, p. 330.

9 The party was the Partia Niezależnych Socjalistów (PNS), later renamed the Niezależna Socjalistyczna Partia Pracy (NSPP): see Śliwa, *Bolesław Drobner*, pp. 78–112.

10 See Drobner's *Moje cztery procesy*, Warsaw, 1962, for accounts of his trials, based on court transcripts.

11 Bolesław Drobner, 'Do całej klasy robotniczej w Polsce!' in Chałubiński, *Bolesław Drobner*, p. 42.

12 See Drobner, *Bezustanna walka*, III, pp. 133–66 for his account of exile.

prisons and labour camps had no doubt reinforced Drobner's scepticism about Communist tactics, but they had not impaired his commitment to 'the struggle' and his determination to realize his own vision of a socialist Poland. Eventually, Drobner joined forces in the USSR with Wanda Wasilewska's Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP), an organization founded in 1943 to prepare a vanguard of Soviet-trained Communists who would move into positions of power once Poland was liberated. When the ZPP joined with the Polish 'home' Communists to form a temporary government in July 1944, Drobner held one of the fifteen ministerial portfolios.

Drobner's post in this temporary government was as close as he got to the national political appointment he hoped to secure. In December 1944, he was not appointed to the provisional government, and instead of heading for Warsaw, he followed Soviet troops into Cracow in January 1945. There, he threw himself into the two roles which most clearly defined his early post-war *persona*: PPS leader and city council member. The Socialist Party was as large a part of Drobner's life as it had been before the war, though he now found himself fighting different battles. He embraced the Communists as a co-operative partner but dismissed the possibility of merging the two workers' parties. The PPS deserved equal influence. Of the three factions which took shape within the PPS, Drobner generally held the middle line, refusing to support those who advocated joining the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) against the Communists but disagreeing with those who advocated merging with the Polish Communist Party (PPR). The gap between the Socialists' and Communists' 'different paths' and 'approaches', Drobner believed, would no doubt diminish with time. 'But for now', he insisted, 'we live separately'.¹³

Conflicts between the PPS and the PPR emerged quickly, and the Communists in Cracow sought to isolate Drobner and prevent further factionalism within the PPS. Eventually, they were successful. Drobner was pushed out of his position as Cracow's PPS leader just before the December 1948 merger of the PPR and PPS into the United Polish Worker's Party (PZPR). Until mid-1948, however, the PPS was the largest and most influential party in Cracow, and Drobner was one of the city's most visible politicians.¹⁴ Political and ideological constraints probably led most monographs on post-war party politics in Cracow to marginalize Drobner. In one telling example, Kazimierz Ćwik, who devotes an entire book to PPR-PPS relations in the Cracow region with virtually no mention of Drobner, remarks in passing that Drobner's failure to appear at a joint PPS-PPR celebration in March 1948 signalled the downward 'turning point' for the Cracow Socialists.¹⁵ He did not depart without protest: 'I'm not going to let myself be sold down the river! I'm not going to dig my own grave!' Everyone understood and appreciated his determination, and even the cynical Jakub Berman said with resignation 'The United [Worker's] Party can afford to have one Drobner.'¹⁶ Nevertheless, when Drobner applied for PZPR membership in January 1949, local party officials turned him down. Only after he appealed to the party's central authorities was he permitted to join the new party.

13 The article was published in the Cracow PPS weekly, *Naprzód*: Bolesław Drobner, 'O jasności w naszej taktyce', *Naprzód*, 26 March 1946; reprinted in Chałubiński, *Bolesław Drobner*, pp. 221, 223.

14 For more on PPR-PPS developments in early post-war Cracow, see Kazimierz Ćwik, *Problemy współdziałania PPR i PPS w województwie Krakowskim 1945-1948*, Warsaw, 1974 (hereafter *Problemy współdziałania*); Zenobiusz Kozik, *Partie i stronnictwa polityczne w krakowskim, 1945-1947*, Cracow, 1975; and Jan Tomicki, *Polska Partia Socjalistyczna 1892-1948*, Warsaw, 1983.

15 Ćwik, *Problemy współdziałania*, p. 237.

16 Stanisław Dobrowolski, 'Bolesław Drobner jakiego znałem' in Śliwa, *Bolesław Drobner*, p. 17.

Politics as Theatre, Theatre as Politics

Drobner's memoirs are nothing if not dramatic. This was a man for whom play-acting came naturally. In fact, he had also dabbled in theatre from childhood. Indeed, when still a child, he had performed bit parts at the Cracow Sary Theatre, and he remembered seeing his first production of *Hamlet* in 1893 at the newly finished municipal Słowacki Theatre.¹⁷ Drobner continued acting through his university days, though he soon placed all his performance skills at the service of politics. He never lost his interest in the theatre, however. The municipally funded and managed Słowacki Theatre had been among Poland's best during the inter-war period, at a time when the central government offered little support to culture.¹⁸

While involved in the post-1945 political tussles between the PPS and PPR, Drobner also spent time on the city's theatres. For Drobner, theatre was never only about plays. It was part of a larger vision about how people should organize their social, political, and cultural lives and who should be in charge of their endeavours. In 1930, Drobner and his PPS colleagues had sponsored a morality play about a political trial and then organized a mock trial of their own (Drobner played the prosecutor), relishing the public attention they gained as a result.¹⁹ That was politics as theatre. After 1945, Drobner's role was more peripheral. Now, he was a politician *using* theatre to promote a broader social and political agenda. This was theatre as politics.

Drobner had been elected to the city council in 1933, and was reappointed when he returned to Cracow in 1945. The pre-war city councils had been elected, autonomous bodies which worked with, but not at the behest of, the city 'president'. The architects of Poland's post-war institutions had intended the City National Councils (Miejska Rada Narodowa, MRN) to function more like soviets, with members appointed from 'progressive' local organizations and their function limited to an advisory role.²⁰ In fact, although the Cracow post-war City National Council did not correspond institutionally or ideologically to the pre-war councils, it was far more like them than the Communists had intended or wished to admit. Until 1949, when all private and municipal theatres were nationalized, the city council subsidized and managed two major theatres (the Sary and the Słowacki), often decided which of the city's other theatres would receive subsidies, and had formal jurisdiction over all theatres within the city limits. As the chairman of the council's Committee for Culture and the Arts throughout this period, Drobner had a good deal of influence—and he used it.²¹

Documents from city council meetings in the late 1940s demonstrate Drobner's skill in manipulating ostensibly apolitical issues to political ends. When Drobner brought a cultural matter to the council floor for debate he always pursued broader socio-political

17 See Drobner's essays on theatre in *Wspominki...* (see note 1 above), pp. 78–87.

18 Though the Polish government established a separate Ministry for Culture and the Arts in 1918, it lasted only until 1922, leaving local administrations and private entities to fill the support gap: see Joanna Pollakówna, 'Ministerstwo Sztuki i Kultury' in Aleksander Wojciechowski (ed.), *Polskie życie artystyczne w latach 1915–1939*, Wrocław, 1974, pp. 546–50.

19 See Drobner's account of the event in *Wspominki...*, pp. 97–99.

20 For a detailed description of the councils' changing jurisdiction and activities during this period, see Zygmunt Rybicki 'Powstanie i działalność rad narodowych w latach 1944–1950' in Anon. (eds), *System rad narodowych w PRL*, Warsaw, 1971, pp. 106–38.

21 There was a two-month period in the spring of 1945 when Drobner left Cracow to serve as city 'president' in Wrocław: see his account 'Zdobyliśmy Polskie Złote Runo!' in Mieczysław Markowski (ed.), *Trudne dni (Wrocław 1945 r. we wspomnieniach pionierów)*, Wrocław, 1, 1960, pp. 75–106. He does not explain why he went to Wrocław or why he returned to Cracow so quickly.

goals: the character that emerges from city-council debates is not gentle or particularly tolerant.

Conflicts between Socialists and Communists were not uncommon at city council meetings, and Drobner took every opportunity to protect and promote his own party. In late 1946, Drobner launched a campaign to designate a former palazzo on the city's main square, which the Red Army had taken over in early 1945, as a new community cultural centre. When PPR council members accused him of acting against the Soviets, Drobner used council time to recount his friendly conversations with the Soviet garrison commander (who had agreed to move his troops elsewhere) and to remind his opponents that he had been imprisoned for pro-Soviet activities. Although PPR members abstained from voting, other council members unanimously approved Drobner's plan, and he used this to put across to the public the PPS's role as a benefactor.²² Drobner engaged in other campaigns to promote the PPS's role in culture such as promoting the interests of a PPS-sponsored workers' theatre. In 1946, Drobner and his PPS colleagues in the city council led a campaign to force the independent Stry Theatre to merge with the municipal Słowacki. The Stry had rented a city-owned building since the end of the war, but was fiscally and artistically autonomous. The Słowacki was subsidized and managed — which meant control over appointments and repertoire selection — by the city council. Drobner launched his offensive on more than one flank, noting allegations of fiscal improprieties by the Stry directors, the city's need to reserve the building for official occasions, and the need to co-ordinate the repertoire of the city's most important theatres. What was really at stake was the city council's right to make its own decisions and to decide for the community as a whole.

On one side of the Stry debate, the theatre's directors and actors, the theatre union and provincial state officials lined up in favour of less city interference and the theatre's right to autonomy.²³ On the other side, the city council, led by Drobner, argued for tighter municipal control. In the end, Drobner won. Officials in Warsaw at the Ministry of Culture and the Arts sided with city officials, and from the beginning of the 1946–47 season, the Stry became the second of Cracow's municipal theatres. What for Stry officials was a violation of artistic autonomy was for Drobner and other city leaders a victory for local autonomy. Individual artists and theatre management, Drobner clearly believed, should not take precedence over the interests of the wider community.

Whether in the theatre or elsewhere, such institutional wrangling in early post-war Poland was about control — about who has the right to make decisions, spend money and exert power. The Stry's directors appealed to Ministry officials in Warsaw, promoting themselves as creative and socially beneficial individuals in a bid for autonomy and protection. Drobner's position suggests he was contemptuous of such 'bourgeois' attitudes, and in his determination to impose a notion of 'collective' priorities he was not very different from the Communist leaders in Warsaw.²⁴

By the beginning of the 1946–47 season, Drobner turned to other issues. The Cracow theatres were immensely successful during this period, and Drobner used their success as a

22 Cracow, Wojewódzkie Archiwum Państwowe (hereafter WAP), Miejska Rada Narodowa (hereafter MRN) 3, 'Protokół posiedzenia MRN w Krakowie w dniu 1 października 1946 r.', pp. 156, 210–16. See also WAP Kr, Komitet Wojewódzki PPR (hereafter KW PPR) 1/VII/6, 'Sprawozdanie [Wydziału Propagandy] z miesiąca października br. [1946]', pp. 93, 94.

23 See Emil Orzechowski, *Stry Teatr i Studio*, Cracow, 1974, pp. 29–40, 152–75. Orzechowski's study is the only document-based account of the Stry's first two years, and many of the relevant documents are cited at length or attached as appendices.

24 See Orzechowski, *Stry Teatr i Studio*, and the following MRN reports: MRN 13 (2 May 1946), p. 2; MRN 3 (8 July 1946), pp. 3–5; MRN 3 (1 October 1946), pp. 189–90.

metaphor for the city's prosperity, viability and long-standing institutional, fiscal, and political autonomy.²⁵ Cracow's local government had done a fine job of subsidizing and managing its theatres for decades, Drobner could brag — just one more way it had shown itself worthy of retaining its independent status.

Compared to other Polish cities, Cracow received little in the way of central subsidies for its theatres, and Drobner went to great lengths to show that such funding was marginal to the theatres' success and to point out the accomplishments of Cracow's theatres compared to those of other cities. Cracow receives less from the central government, Drobner explained at a council meeting in May 1947, because it is capable of more on its own. Cracow was 'a pioneering vanguard', he claimed, which needed to defend its own interests, 'giving Warsaw no peace so that we may have peace in Cracow'.²⁶ There could be no question, he continued, that city leaders were pursuing the best path:

It is correct to do things in this manner; it is right that we set our sights on the growth of culture and the arts. Our city can never become a major industrial centre, and we must move in the direction we are moving — not neglecting, of course, to work towards securing industrial institutions as well [...]. Above all, however, we must emphasize — and we rightly do emphasize — education, culture, the arts. We must give our schoolchildren the opportunity to see the monuments which constitute the enormous cultural and artistic legacy of the entire republic. That is why none of us is insulted when Warsaw jokingly calls us little culture-vultures [*małymi kulturnikami*]. This is our source of pride, of glory.²⁷

Drobner was not disputing the need for industrialization, but arguing that other cities — which had no serious cultural traditions of their own — should bear the brunt of it. Cracow was no place for a steel mill, he hinted. Cracow would help take care of the future by educating Polish society about the importance of its past.

Time and again, Drobner returned to such issues at city council meetings. Theatres, claimed Drobner, 'sustain the country's culture as a whole', and for that reason it made sense to subsidize them. Another benefit of municipal subsidies and management was particularly important to Drobner, namely, control. In late 1947, he addressed his comments beyond city council chambers when he spoke of the council's ability to 'influence theatre repertoires':

Every play must be approved by the [city council's] Commission on Culture and the Arts. The municipal theatre's director came to us and said he wants to produce *Kordian*. The Commission approved the play. All of a sudden news comes from Warsaw that it was wrong to produce this play, that its protagonist is a typical Romantic, that such things are harmful. Well, the old character Wiarus in *Warszawianka* is a typical Romantic, too, but there is absolutely nothing here to be afraid of. What the play presents is the struggle against the Tsar, and there's absolutely nothing harmful about that. You see, citizens, if our theatres were nationalized, we'd have no say at all.²⁸

25 Part of the reason Cracow's theatres were so successful was that the city had escaped wartime destruction. Warsaw was almost entirely destroyed, and Łódź, which was a predominantly industrial city, was the only other major Polish city to avoid devastation.

26 Cracow, Wojwódzkie archiwum Państwowe (hereafter WAP), Miejska Rada Narodowa (hereafter MRN) 4, 'Protokół nr 4 posiedzenia budżetowego MRN w dniu 12 maja 1947 r.', p. 182: 'my musimy być niejako awangardą pionierską, któraby Warszawie spać nie dała i żyć, aby też i Kraków mógł odpowiednio żyć'.

27 Ibid.

28 WAP, MRN 4, 'Protokół nr 8 posiedzenia budżetowego MRN w dniu 20 grudnia 1947 r.', pp. 577, 578. Juliusz Słowacki wrote *Kordian* in 1834. In one scene, the title character joins a plot to kill the Russian Grand Duke Constantine. Stanisław Wyspiański, a dramatist strongly influenced by another Romantic writer, Adam Mickiewicz, wrote *Warszawianka* at the turn of

Local control of Cracow's theatres also meant being able to tell Warsaw's Communist bureaucrats when they were being foolish.

Polish Romanticism in these plays, he chided Warsaw bureaucrats and PPR dogmatists, was not to be equated with anti-Russian or anti-Soviet sentiment. It was to be celebrated as the Poles' heroic struggle for independence from the tsars. Anyone who so wished could have detected a subversive message in Drobner's rhetoric. By the end of 1947, Drobner was no longer using Cracow theatres to have his way in local politics. Instead, he was using them to proclaim the fundamental *viability* of local politics and to defend Cracow's autonomy against Warsaw's centralizing agenda.

Conclusion

In the end, Drobner saw his vision of a culturally and politically independent Cracow collapse. The year 1948 marked the beginning of Poland's second early post-war revolution.²⁹ Power in Warsaw had shifted, and with it the tactics used to encourage compliance. For Drobner, both personally and as a proponent of the cultural and political autonomy of Cracow, 1948 marked the onset of imposed Communist conformity. In mid-1949, not long after the Communists forced the PPS–PPR merger, the state nationalized all theatres and took away the cities' right to manage them. Drobner mustered one last defence of Cracow's theatres at an October 1949 city-council meeting, again citing attendance figures and ticket sales as if to prove that in the theatres if nowhere else, Cracow remained superior to Warsaw.³⁰ In 1950, the Communists abolished autonomous local governments altogether, and although city and provincial councils remained in place, their ability to wield power had vanished. Drobner could continue to raise his voice at city-council meetings, but after 1950 he could not hope to accomplish much by doing so.

Drobner was too strong a local and Polish patriot to condone the Warsaw Communist leadership's Soviet vision of political and social change. In terms of his socialist ideals, Drobner professed to be an internationalist, yet when bringing those ideas to fruition he insisted on the freedom to do so within a local context. There was no 'year zero' for Drobner, no way to impose a 'new' set of ideologically-inspired institutions and dictates at the expense of decades of lived experience. He knew the Communists could not escape the past. He wanted to celebrate it. It is tempting to see Drobner's early post-war stance as clear and simple resistance to the Communist agenda, and that may be true of the period after 1948. Earlier, however, Drobner had believed he could forge a separate path alongside the Communists, neither entirely anti- nor pro-Communist.

In retrospect, Drobner's story tells us as much about what the Communists could not crush as about what they could. Drobner himself remained active in Cracow, sometimes more, sometimes less politically. During the heady days of October 1956, he was even appointed first secretary of the provincial-level PZPR (a position he held only until early 1957). Among the immediate changes he called for was the city's autonomy within existing administrative structures.³¹ More important, even if Drobner failed to avert central

the century. The character Drobner refers to is an old man who has joined with the forces of General Żymirski to fight the Russians in the 1831 Uprising: see Czesław Miłosz, *The History of Polish Literature*, Berkeley, CA, 1983, pp. 232–43 and 351–58, for his discussion of Słowacki and Wyspiański.

29 See Padraic Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950*, Ithaca, NY, 1997, p. 4.

30 See WAP, MRN, 'Protokół nr 9 posiedzenia MRN w Krakowie odbytego w dniu 3 i 4 października 1949 r.', pp. 26–28.

31 Śliwa, *Bolesław Drobner*, pp. 274–77.

control, he had succeeded in promoting and preserving a vision of Cracow which defied Warsaw's monopoly on power. Cracow deserved better. It was a city with the legacy of a century's self-rule, of which citizens of other Polish cities could only dream. True, it was not the capital, but it understood the relationship between the political centre and the peripheries upon which the centre relied for its power. If Cracow was not what Warsaw wanted, Drobner maintained, perhaps that was because of Warsaw's shortcomings and not Cracow's. Drobner reflected and helped perpetuate an idealized local identity which enabled many in Cracow to keep an intellectual and even concrete distance from Stalinist conformity.

Debates — some friendly, some less so — over Cracow's special place and the conflict between central and local authority continue even today. In December 1995, on the day Poland's Supreme Court declared Lech Wałęsa's loss to former Communist official Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a handful of Cracow residents carted a hastily constructed guard booth and a red-and-white-painted stake to the historical border between Austrian Galicia and the Russian partition. The border and the election, it turned out, were closely linked. In the communities on the northern, 'Russian' side of the line, residents had voted 70 per cent in favour of Kwaśniewski. Their neighbours to the south, in Galicia, had voted 70 per cent in favour of Wałęsa. Attired in nineteenth-century Austrian border patrol costumes, the Galician patriots stopped incoming vehicles long enough to present mock entry visas to their occupants, each carefully hand-lettered and bearing a facsimile of a Habsburg imperial seal. In a ceremony prepared specially for the occasion, 'officials' intoned the following: 'Let this marker fill with new strength the hearts of the violated Galician minority; let it act as a border, separating us for centuries from the mental plague.'³²

In addition to laughs, the border crossing incident fuelled yet another round in the debate about Cracow's autonomy and a lengthy article in the weekly *Polityka* entitled 'Cracow Apart: The Long Shadow of His Majesty's Royal Monarchy'. At the top of the article, the sentiments of a Cracow patriot and former centre-right senator stood in bold letters: 'This is not any separatism towards the rest of Poland. The division is simply a real one, both in an historical and mental sense. We are different.' Among the dissenters was a Cracow senator from Kwaśniewski's Democratic Left Party (SLD), who complained that 'people who serve in Cracow's local government seem convinced they have been called to express their opinions about Poland's foreign affairs and the world'. Still worse, the senator added, these people promote the notion of Galician singularity: 'The myth of Galicia, which is resuscitated these days with such pleasure, is fine within the confines of the cabaret, but taking it seriously in the political realm is very dangerous. [...] The danger of this Galician myth lies in its autonomous approach to the idea of Poland. It garners no support in many regions of the country, and may in fact damage Cracow.'³³

Krzysztof Kozłowski, former Minister of the Interior in Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government and a senator from Miechów, across the border in the Russian partition, is then introduced as a more objective observer than the two Cracow senators. 'Cracow's quarrel with Warsaw is, in its essence, about the shape of Poland', Kozłowski observed. 'It is about the choice between a Poland with autonomous regions and one which is centralized, in which those who control the money believe their rights are greater and that others must bow to their authority. Warsaw simply has no right to consider itself the hub of the universe.'³⁴ Drobner could hardly have said it better — though he might have done so with a reference to cabaret.

32 Mariusz Urbanek, 'Osobny Kraków: Długi cień c.k. monarchii', *Polityka*, 4, 1996, p. 24.

33 Ibid., pp. 24, 26.

34 Ibid., p. 26.

19 'Unreconstructable Girondins': Hungarian Radicals after the Second World War

ATTILA PÓK

Historians working on Hungarian politics in the twentieth century face no difficulty in identifying periods. In the first half of the century the country on two occasions found it necessary to start building a new political order: in 1918 and in 1945. The First World War brought defeat, and the Trianon Treaty left Hungary reduced to less than a third of its former territory and a little over two-fifths of its population. Territorial revision was the fundamental aim of all domestic and foreign policy over the next two decades. The Second World War once more brought defeat and the vanishing of any hope of undoing the Trianon Treaty. Nevertheless both 1918 and 1945 appeared to present chances for the creation of a new social order based on democracy. It was an obvious fact, though perhaps less so in 1918 than in 1945, that the old social establishment was in ruins and that the country's resurrection was possible only on the basis of a fresh start. The political force called the Hungarian Radicals was on both occasions closely associated with these attempts.

The Radicals in 1918 and in 1945

In 1918 the chance for the establishment of a democratic order was open only for a very short time: a couple of months in the immediate aftermath of the war. On 16 November, Hungary was proclaimed a republic. Universal suffrage, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press and other civil liberties were promised. The president of the republic, Count Mihály Károlyi, a very rich aristocrat, parcelled out of some of his own estates among landless peasants. However, the loss of 'Historic Hungary', the territorial question, sealed the fate of the first attempt to establish a democratic republic in Hungary. In March 1919 Béla Kun's Soviet Republic replaced the Károlyi regime.

The year 1945 appeared at the time a more promising start. Seven months after the devastating war had come to an end, and in spite of the presence of the Red Army and the Soviet dominance of the Allied Control Commission, free general elections were held in November 1945. Multi-party parliamentary democracy replaced the traditional political system based on the 'historical classes'. The features of the new society were, however, to say the least, not yet clear. In this chapter I discuss the character of a small group of Hungarian politicians, the Radicals, sometimes referred to as the 'Hungarian Gironde'. The contemporary term to describe this group was 'bourgeois [*polgári*] radicals' or 'radical democrats'. Most of them were born in the 1870s, came from German or assimilated Jewish urban middle-class families, studied law and modern sociology and were in opposition to the pre-war Hungarian establishment. They criticized the system of huge latifundia, the narrow franchise, and were opposed to aggressive Hungarian nationalism. Democracy was the key concept in their ideology but they did not possess nor did they claim to possess the monopoly in that respect. The left wing of the Independence Party in parliament demanded the extension of the narrow franchise. Moreover, the successful lawyer-politician Vilmos Vázsonyi had launched the Party of Democrats in 1901. The franchise had been the centre-piece of their programme. The Radicals, however, went further: they demanded universal, equal and secret suffrage. Again, a major concern of Vázsonyi was state support for the urban small entrepreneur. The Radicals' concern was the dismantling of class rule based on the latifundia; also they were eager to co-operate with the Social Democratic Party which

had acquired growing influence before and during the First World War.¹ In contrast to Vázsonyi, who could not accept the Social Democratic programme of nationalization of the major means of production, the Radicals accepted the Socialist programme as a long-term aim and believed that 'modern bourgeois democracy' was the first step in that direction.

The leading Radical Oszkár Jászi defined the essence of radicalism as 'the movement of the working middle classes directed at creating material, intellectual and moral goods. Politically it aims to support all efforts at developing and organizing productive forces and eliminating unearned income.'² So in essence they were socialist. They could accept neither Béla Kun's Soviet Republic nor the old social order restored under Admiral Horthy in 1920.

Before 1918 the Radicals were active in the Társadalomtudományi Társaság (Society of Social Sciences, founded 1901), the Polgári Radikális Párt (Bourgeois Radical Party, founded 1914) and the Galilei Kör (Galileo Circle, founded 1908). From 1907 to 1919 the periodical *Huszadik Század* (Twentieth Century, launched 1900), the first Hungarian monthly on modern sociology, was also associated with the Radicals. In the inter-war years they supported the periodical *Századunk* (Our Century). After 1945 they published a few periodicals and the Radicals always had a strong presence in the Masonic lodges.

It was a younger member of this group, Imre Csécsy, who in a 1939 article first used the term 'Hungarian Gironde' for self-identification. With this reference to the more moderate grouping among the actors of the French Revolution he was trying to clarify the position of the group. The Right in politics — he argued — always tried to limit civil liberties whereas the Left struggled for the extension of the political and economic rights of the individual. Communism with its totalitarian state was closer to the extreme Right than to the Left. After 1945 the Girondists were part of the moderate Left, believing that social order ought to be maintained through consensus rather than by the authority of an autocratic state. Further, the democratic order could best preserve the country's independence.

The Radicals were inactive during the Second World War. In 1945, the Magyar Radikális Párt (Hungarian Radical Party), which was reorganized and became politically active once more, managed to recruit only few members. Perhaps they had between one and two thousand supporters, mostly in the professions: university teachers, doctors and lawyers. In November 1945 the Radical Party won 5,625 votes at the parliamentary elections, which was not enough to get them a seat in parliament. The 1947 elections, due to the popularity of a Social Democrat old hand, Károly Peyer, who had left his old comrades and joined the Radicals, brought them six seats. The Radicals' newspapers and periodicals had a readership of not more than twenty to thirty thousand — mostly in the capital.

There were many reasons for the very limited influence that the Radicals mustered in the country. People who in 1918 would probably have joined their ranks had at least six parties to choose from in 1945: the Smallholders' Party, which had a 'polgári' (bourgeois) section, the Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party, the Peasant Party, the Polgári Democratic Party, as well as the Hungarian Radical Party. Indeed, all these parties supported policies that were similar to those of the Radicals of the pre-1918 period. Differences among the parties involved means rather than ends. They all stood for land distribution, large-scale social reforms, and suffrage. In vain did the Hungarian Radical Party claim that it had advocated all these reforms before the others. Because it had played no part in carrying out these reforms it did not become a significant political force. The only thing it could do was to point to its unbroken consistency of principle, which, in itself, is not a winning political

1 For a comparison of the different views on democracy see Attila Pók, *A magyarországi radikális demokrata ideológia kialakulása*, Budapest, 1990, pp. 14–15.

2 Oszkár Jászi, *Mi a radikalizmus*, edited by the Országos Polgári Radikális Párt (National Bourgeois Radical Party), n.d. Quoted by János Varga, 'A Magyar Radikális Párt újjáalakulása 1945-ben', *Történelmi Szemle*, 1975, 1, p. 101.

programme and did not constitute a political alternative. The central figure of the party between 1945 and 1949 was Imre Csécsy, a writer and editor in his early fifties. Other leading figures in the group were the literary critic Marcell Benedek, the doctor and public health specialist Zsigmond Kende, and the publicist Béla Zsolt. The Radicals, conscious of the fact that there was no wider social class in the country to which they could appeal, claimed to be the party that represented the public interest. When *Huszadik Század* was re-launched with Csécsy as editor in 1947, he announced that the periodical wished to offer the educated reader facts instead of political slogans, independent criticism in well-researched articles instead of dogma. The three volumes of the new *Huszadik Század*, which appeared between 1947 and 1949, testified to the spirit of these promises. Yet their impact on the public was rather limited. This had much to do with the Radicals' political philosophy.

Enlightenment and Marxism

The Radicals were a good fit in post-1945 politics. They were avowed egalitarians and many were socialists. They believed in co-operation with the Social Democrats; indeed they were influenced by Marxism, an ideology treated with respect. But the philosophy to which they were wedded from the time they appeared on the political scene before 1918 was Enlightenment rather than Marxist. Now, the Enlightenment, based on the omnipotence of reason combined with anti-clericalism and materialism, still had some appeal around the turn of the century. By 1945, however, the rationalist morality of the *philosophes* had largely lost its appeal even among the intelligentsia. The Radicals were not, however, concerned about their unreconstructability. Moreover, their moral sensibilities induced them to attack Hegelian–Marxian dialectics on a most sensitive point. This may have been tactically a political blunder, but it underlined their fierce opposition to politics which disregarded fundamental moral principles by reference to some dialectical historical process.

In *Világos pillanat* (Luminous Moment), written during the war but published only in 1945, Csécsy dismissed dialectics as an ideological method supporting the superiority of the German state. Csécsy and his friends' ideal was not Hegel³ (or Marx) but Kant, whose central political conviction was that morality and politics must be related. That philosophy, he wrote, 'some modern critics say, is mostly past history. Indeed, it is historic in its significance. Some parts of it may have proved mistaken, but by advocating the universality of human achievement and by demanding a strict self-control of reason it aimed to lead society to the right path. When and where did European thought go astray? Well, the rot set in with Hegel, I suppose.'⁴ This critical perception of post-Kantian German intellectual and political developments was the position from which the Radicals approached Marxism or historical materialism. Oszkár Jászi, more explicitly than Csécsy, had summed up in an article commemorating the 100th anniversary of Hegel's death in 1931 what could well be regarded as the *credo* of the Radicals: 'the future of our whole civilization depends on whether or not mankind will be able to reconcile Hegel and Marx's tremendously strong historical vision of what *is* and *was* with Rousseau and Kant's deep moral intuition of the thing which *ought* to be'.⁵

3 See, for example, László Szenczei, 'A dialektika és az elme igazi forradalma': 'Dialectics, the core and driving force of German philosophical idealism and romanticism in the past century contains German counter-revolutionary spirit in such a dense form that not even Marx's prophetic power was able to expel it' (*Huszadik Század*, 1947, p. 305).

4 Imre Csécsy, *Világos pillanat*, Budapest, 1946, p. 51.

5 Oszkár Jászi, 'Hegel — a Hundred Years After' in György Litván (ed.), *Oszkár Jászi: Homage to Danubia*, New York, 1945, p. 52.

The other factor that influenced the Radicals' attitude to Marxism was the principle that society should be organized on a rational basis, in which individual interests (mostly the small proprietors) are reconciled with those of the community. The Radicals' vision was a Hungary which forged a bridge between Western and Eastern ideas of social organization and foreign relations. They accepted historical materialism as a method of social analysis but rejected Marxism as the ideology and programme representing a single class, the proletariat. 'We recognize the great value of Marxian social criticism and we agree also with many elements of their economic theory; nevertheless Marxism could never become our Bible. We do not consider historical materialism (even in its improved version) the peak of science and philosophy, despite the various elements of truth it may have discovered.'⁶

The radicals were engaged in a permanent debate over Marxist socialism in *Haladás* and *Huszadik Század*, and at meetings of the Masonic lodges. The Marxist method of social analysis, they argued, should be incorporated into a comprehensive ideology based on rational principles on which society, led by enlightened leaders, serving both individual and public interests, should be organized. This attitude did not attract much sympathy either on the Left or on the Right. The Radicals fell between two stools.

Absence of 'Bourgeois' Development

Views about the national past have always been an indispensable source for establishing political credentials in Hungary. Both the Communists and the Radicals used history to explain their political aims. The Communists' guiding principle was social progress attained through class conflict combined with the struggle for national independence: society moved inexorably from feudalism through capitalism to socialism. For the Communists 1848 had to be the Hungarian 'bourgeois revolution' in order to assert that after 1945 the socialist revolution was 'on the historical agenda'. And revolution, as in the past, necessarily featured the 'intensification of the class struggle'. This was clearly an assertion to prop up the Communist take-over.

The Radicals believed in social progress no less than the Communists; likewise they accepted socialism. Yet they knocked the central contention out of the Marxist creed: the presumption that a 'bourgeois revolution' had already taken place in Hungary in order to justify the Communist take-over to introduce socialism. The Radicals' concern was the backwardness of Hungarian society, the weakness of the urban middle classes, which they considered the most serious drawback for the attainment of progress. Csécsy wrote, 'There has never been a bourgeois revolution in this country. In Hungary the transformation has not even begun which the West European countries went through between the seventeenth century and the middle of the nineteenth, leading to the French Revolution by which the bourgeoisie as a class and bourgeois mentality and lifestyle prevailed over the autocratic feudal system.' It is true, Csécsy went on, that French revolutionary ideas reached Hungary but in 1848, when in France the lower middle classes were already challenging the bourgeoisie, in Hungary even the feudal forces were not broken. The revolution was not led by the bourgeoisie but by the nobility. When, later, the bourgeoisie developed it, it accepted gentry leadership and was largely concerned with the making of profit.⁷

What the Radicals found wanting was not so much the bourgeoisie as the *citoyen*. Csécsy's view about the helplessness and responsibility of the Hungarian bourgeoisie was criticized by the doyen of the Radicals, Oszkár Jászi. Csécsy, he objected, had not recognized that 'there is no unified middle class or bourgeoisie which, in fact, is composed

6 Imre Csécsy, 'És mégis tovább', *Haladás*, 10 November 1945, p. 1.

7 Imre Csécsy, 'Az októberi forradalom és a népköztársaság', *Századok és tanulmányok*, 21, 1946, p. 331.

of different, even opposing elements': the owners of the means of production or 'banking capitalism' and the *citoyens*, that is the working middle class. The latter did not come to power even in Western Europe and so 'the great [...] spirit and the values of socialism originate mainly from the working middle class and the petty bourgeoisie'.⁸

Csécsy accepted Jászi's distinction: 'you are a bourgeois as far as you are independent, and a proletarian as far as you depend economically on others'. The idea that 'a *citoyen* is a big-bellied bourgeois who does not do anything but exploit others'⁹ does not hold true. By the distinction between the bourgeoisie and the *citoyen* and by stressing the common interests of the latter with those of the proletariat Csécsy and his group adapted themselves to post-1945 political expectations. Significantly, the party's new name, Magyar Radikális Párt, left out the epithet *polgári* (which could mean either bourgeois or *citoyen*'s) in 1945. For the Radicals capitalism was still the mother of democracy, they maintained (in contrast to the so-called people's democracy of Communist propaganda) which made the free development of the individual possible. Alas, the bourgeoisie was concerned only with profit, hence the necessity of society's transition to socialism. The new order based on morally upright citizens would be superior to capitalism based on excessive competition and it would eliminate the threat of totalitarian dictatorship either of the Left or of the Right.

Epilogue

The political fate of the Radicals was sealed by the Communist take-over in Hungary in 1948. Their party was never formally dissolved, but vanished in late 1948 or 1949. Although dispersed as a group, the Radicals were not influential enough to be crushed by their opponents. Many were allowed to survive in the professions under Rákosi's dictatorship, such as Marcell Benedek, writer and professor of literary history, textile-engineer and factory manager József Litván, or chemist Zsigmond Kende. The homes of such 'Girondins' were 'magic islands', 'embassies of Europe' in Communist-controlled Hungary.

The Radicals' attitudes to the regime veered from the stoic to the romantic. In February 1950 Rezső Homolyai once more referred to the 'Girondists': 'Our activities in the past were mostly directed at solving urgent social problems. [...] Today these problems are handled by the state and the only thing that remains for us is to polish the rough stone, shaping and refining the soul.'¹⁰ In contrast, Ruztem Vámbéry, in a premonition, recalled the attitude of the Girondists who had been in the forefront of the Revolution but did not refrain from turning against it as soon as they realized that it had been led into a cul-de-sac by the new leaders. 'They went to the scaffold with a clear conscience singing the Marseillaise, the bridal march of the Revolution, even under the gallows.'¹¹

8 Oszkár Jászi: 'Leszámolás a Katasztrófa előtt', *Huszadik Század*, 1947, pp. 363–75.

9 Imre Csécsy, 'A polgár és a szocializmus', *ibid.*, pp. 355–62.

10 *Kelet*, 7 March 1950.

11 Ruztem Vámbéry (criminologist, son of Ármin Vámbéry, the orientalist), writing in *Világ*, 1 March 1946, p. 1. Hugh Seton-Watson's valedictory may be worth recording: 'There was something very sad and moving to me personally in my visits in 1946 and 1947 to Hungary, about the spectacle of people from the generation of 1914, who in their young years had fought an uphill struggle against the semi-feudal regime; who for a very brief period had shown their heads above the surface in 1918 when that regime collapsed; played a role; had been knocked down first by the Communist dictatorship of Béla Kun and then by the regime of Horthy; had recovered by the late 1920s but again been pushed out by the Gömbös regime and its wartime successors; and now again they came bobbing up to the surface full of hopes and enthusiasm, only to be finally submerged in the noisome flood let loose by Rákosi and his boys', Hugh Seton-Watson, 'Thirty Years After' in Martin McCauley (ed.), *Communist Power in Europe 1944–1949*, Basingstoke and London, 1977, pp. 226–27.

20 British Political Attitudes to Hungary through the Workings of the British Component of the Allied Control Commission, 1945–47

ÉVA FIGDER

In the aftermath of the Second World War relations between the United Kingdom and each of the small states of Central Europe were in varying degrees conditioned by British perceptions of Soviet power and intentions. There was already a tendency in the Foreign Office to regard much of the area as having fallen within the 'Soviet sphere of influence' where local Communist Parties could be used 'as direct instruments of Soviet policy'.¹ Nevertheless, British officials did not exclude the possibility of continuing co-operation with Britain's former wartime allies. One possibility for continued co-operation was within the Allied Control Commissions (ACC) to be established in Germany and former satellite countries like Hungary.

The tripartite Allied Control Commission was set up in accordance with the terms of the Hungarian armistice² signed on 20 January 1945 and was stationed in Hungary between January 1945 and September 1947. Its primary purpose was to supervise the enforcement of the armistice terms with Hungary until the conclusion of the peace treaty. Since Hungary had been liberated by Soviet forces, Soviet leadership prevailed within the Commission, which also implied a restricted scope of activity for the other two members, the British and the Americans. The statutes of the ACC were drawn up to meet the conditions of war with the agreement of all three constituent members. However, these statutes were not detailed enough to be effective. For example, due to the insufficient clarity of wording, one of the most important paragraphs led to constant misunderstandings, misinterpretations and conflicts.³

In early 1945 the British were committed to sending their political and military representatives to Hungary, which had never been a British sphere of interest. However, the geographical position that Hungary occupied in the context of the emerging bipolar division of Europe compelled the British to commit resources and attention to Hungary's future. This chapter examines the changing British attitude towards Hungary in the early stages of the Cold War through the workings of the British component of the Allied Control Commission. Naturally, the Hungarian context will, from time to time, be expanded to include Great-Power relations in the European context. An understanding of the changes in British attitudes towards Central Europe, and Hungary in particular, between 1945–47 is relevant to present-day issues such as the enlargement of the European Union and Britain's relations with Central Europe.

Because of the partial inaccessibility of primary sources, the workings of the ACC in Hungary have not been completely revealed. This chapter therefore still constitutes a

1 M. E. Pelly, H. J. Yasamee et al. (eds), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series 1, vol. 6, 'Eastern Europe August 1945–April 1946', London, 1991, pp. 46–49.

2 United Nations Treaty Series, no. 471, pp. 405–19.

3 The paragraph reads as follows: 'The Soviet Chairman of the ACC will give directives on questions of principle to the Hungarian Government after agreement to those directives by the British and American representatives.' It proved difficult to define what 'questions of principle' meant, let alone 'after agreement with the British and the American representatives'.

working paper.

In late February 1945 the seventy-eight-strong British Mission arrived in Hungary, having obtained permission from the Russians.⁴ According to the political directive⁵ issued to members of the Mission, their main task was to 'ensure, in the closest collaboration with your Soviet and United States colleagues, that the terms of the armistice with Hungary are strictly carried out'. It acknowledged the Soviet government's principal role in enforcing the armistice because Hungary was a Soviet theatre of war.⁶ However, any Soviet attempt to encroach on Hungarian sovereignty or independence, warned the directive, should be resisted by the British. Although the British accepted the effective Soviet domination in enforcing the armistice terms, there was 'no question of abdicating our claim to have an equal share at the peace settlement and in the post-war period in all questions affecting Hungary'.

Hostilities had not yet ceased in Hungary and there was no representative government. Therefore the members of the Mission could not be instructed which political party or personality they should support. 'Much will clearly depend', continued the document, 'upon the Soviet attitude towards the present Government and regime'.

The first few meetings with the members of the Hungarian government and the Russian representatives of the ACC convinced the British political representative that as long as the Hungarians obediently fulfilled Russian wishes, 'the Russian policy will be one of liberality towards them'.⁷ One month had already passed, but no meeting of the ACC took place, and any initiative on the part of the British and Americans was obstructed by the Russians, which caused considerable frustration. Therefore the British were not surprised when it was deliberately secretly leaked from Hungarian government circles that Hungarian officials had been warned indirectly not to have close relations with the British and the Americans.⁸ The first major conflict arose in connection with the land reform which was introduced by an executive decree without the consent of the Hungarian Provisional National Assembly. It was obvious that the reform had been forced through by the Russians. The British argued that Marshal Voroshilov, the Russian Chairman of the ACC, was acting outside his remit as Chairman of the ACC because land reform was an internal affair for the Hungarian government.⁹ Further, both the British and the Americans should have been consulted in advance.¹⁰ The land reform was, no doubt, a cornerstone of post-war politics despite some of its weaknesses and, given the abortive land distribution in 1919 by Count Károlyi, it was inevitable. There was hardly any person or party who would have objected to this measure in principle, though a less drastic reform might have been carried out without Communist influence. Considering the messy internal political and economic situation, it could be argued that the way the reform was carried out was justified. Naturally, the Hungarian Communists exploited the reform in order to win favourable publicity and to increase sympathy for themselves and their Russian backers.¹¹

4 As severe fighting had been going on in the streets of Budapest, the British arrived at a provincial town in eastern Hungary, Debrecen, which also served as the seat of the Provisional National Government established in December 1944.

5 Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), FO 371/48478.

6 Hungary was finally liberated by the Soviets on 4 April 1945.

7 PRO FO 371/48479.

8 PRO FO 371/48467.

9 Prior to the announcement of the decree, self-appointed committees started distributing land to the peasants throughout the country.

10 Compare Article 18 of the armistice.

11 Later on the decree was formally put before the National Assembly, which duly gave its consent.

The number of reports giving gloomy accounts of the lack of food-stocks, and projecting unusually low production that year, increased. Because it was the Hungarian government's responsibility to feed the occupying Red Army, the Russian chairman often referred to Article 11 of the armistice and stated in no uncertain terms that the control of food supplies and related matters no longer constituted an internal affair. The Foreign Office thought that the severe shortage of foodstuffs would provoke political unrest in a country which was a 'breeding ground for Communism'.¹² They also suspected that the Hungarian situation would help increase the impending famine in Europe.

Subsequent to the cessation of hostilities in Europe, the need arose to reorganize the Control Commissions in the former satellite countries. This second period was to last until the conclusion of the peace treaties. At the time of the Potsdam Conference there was a frequent exchange of letters concerning the matter. In his minute to Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote the following: 'We want nothing specific about Hungary at the present Conference, apart from the improvement of the status of our Control Commissions and the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated areas.'¹³ In other minutes exchanged between senior FO officials two underlying issues were exhaustively discussed. One was the conclusion of peace treaties with the defeated countries and the replacement of 'the present puppet governments'.¹⁴ By holding free and fair elections, the will of the majority of the people would inaugurate a democratic government; thereby the principles undertaken in the Yalta Declaration were to be fulfilled. Further, the victorious Western powers would be willing to sign the peace treaties with these new democratically elected governments.

The Soviets also called for the reorganization of the Control Commissions. Their proposal differed in the case of Hungary, where directives were to be issued after they had been agreed to by the British and the Americans. In Hungary the chairman of the Commission had the right to decide on questions concerning members' entering and leaving the country. In other countries where Control Commissions operated, directives were to be issued after preliminary discussion with the British and American representatives. After some deliberation, the British decided that the Hungarian position appeared to be most satisfactory from their point of view. Eventually, the Allies agreed to the revision of the procedures of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary and accepted the Soviet proposal for Hungary as a basis.¹⁵

British diplomacy in Eastern Europe was more usually handicapped by a lack of materials and of a physical presence with which to achieve its objectives than by an absence of formal rights. This was particularly apparent in the case of the former German satellites, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary; from whose Soviet-sponsored regimes the British government continued to withhold diplomatic recognition, since it was unable to consider them 'as representative or democratic within the meaning of the Potsdam decisions'. Nevertheless, Great Britain, like the United States, maintained political representatives in Sofia, Bucharest and Budapest, in each of which cities an Allied Control

12 A most surprising remark on Hungary. First, Hungarians have always regarded themselves as a rebellious nation under foreign rule. Moreover, fifty years of the Communist experiment proved unsuccessful, not only in the end but throughout the period, to varying degrees Hungary's dissent from mainstream communist ideas was always obvious. Secondly, in no other document produced by the Foreign Office that I have seen was there any such reference to Hungary.

13 R. Butler and M. E. Pelly (eds), *Documents on British Policy Overseas*, series 1, vol. 1, 'The Conference at Potsdam', London, 1984, p. 436.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 762.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 699–701.

Commission was established. The ACC, whose primary purpose was to supervise the enforcement of the armistice terms, provided the two Western powers with additional opportunities for influencing internal developments, and Ernest Bevin, the new Foreign Minister, thought it in Britain's interest to ensure that their functions were not restricted and that, if possible, their competence should be extended to cover such matters as public security, control of demonstrations and censorship. At the same time he required that all three posts be kept informed of actions taken by the others.¹⁶ Their reports left him under the impression that in Bulgaria, as in Hungary, the Soviets were set upon manipulating elections in order to ensure the continuation of a 'government completely subservient to Moscow' and 'to show the world that its government is representative'.¹⁷ According to C. A. Macartney, then a political adviser at the Foreign Office Research Department, Bevin's statement that no peace treaties would be concluded and no diplomatic relations resumed with East European countries until a 'representative' government came into power, would discourage democratic elements in these countries; thus 'the British are playing into the hands of the Communists'.¹⁸ Macartney suggested that Bevin's remark be accompanied by a strong caution: elections alone would not make a government representative; the electoral law and the conduct of the elections had to be fair, too.

The Bulgarian elections in August 1945 were rigged by the Soviets; a joint list was introduced in order to ensure Communist victory. Therefore the postponement of the Hungarian elections by two months was a much welcomed development. When in October municipal elections in Hungary resulted in a striking victory for the moderate 'Smallholders', the Foreign Office saw this as an encouraging sign with regard to the results of the general elections to be held in November 1945. This victory, at the same time, was found surprising because an obviously peasant-dominated party could capture the majority of votes in Budapest, where the largest number of industrial workers and middle-class voters was concentrated. In a wider context, this was the first 'encouraging sign' that the Russian Bear might not necessarily dig its claws into all countries it liberated, and thus new democracies could spring up in the region, democracies deemed to be so by Western standards. A. D. F. Gascoigne, the British political representative in Hungary, was less optimistic. Hungarian government officials unofficially informed him that the Soviets were demanding that all parties should join in presenting a common electoral list. Gascoigne predicted that if the 'Smallholders' refused, the Soviets would 'tighten the screw economically', that they might 'possibly arrange for further widespread outbreaks of unrest', and that the Communists might try to stage an armed coup. He therefore cautioned Bevin against accepting an unofficial Hungarian representative in London as 'it might be unwise to count our democratic chickens before they are hatched'. In the event, however, elections held on 4 November appeared to conform with democratic principles, and the 'Smallholders' won 57 per cent of the votes polled.¹⁹

The Foreign Office welcomed this satisfactory development which, two or three months before, they had not expected. Hungary became the second country under occupation after Finland to hold fair elections.²⁰ Now an unofficial Hungarian representative as Minister Delegate could be received in London. However, the distribution of government portfolios was a great surprise as it did not reflect the result of the elections. According to Sir Orme

16 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), *Documents in British Policy Overseas*, 'Eastern Europe August 1945–April 1946', pp. 40–42.

17 PRO FO 371/48465.

18 PRO FO 371/48465, Macartney's memorandum of 21 August 1945.

19 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), *Documents in British Policy Overseas*, 'Eastern Europe August 1945–April 1946', pp. 157–61, 199–201.

20 PRO FO 371/48477.

Sargent, deputy under-secretary at the Foreign Office, indirect Soviet pressure nullified to a large extent the result of the elections. The Communists were allotted the Ministry of the Interior, with full control of the police and the Ministry of Agriculture. Moreover, there were Communist under-secretaries of state in all other ministries and in other key positions.

Gascoigne was convinced that the Soviet authorities were seeking to use the Communist Party to impose their political will on Hungary. They seemed equally determined to take advantage of their military occupation of the country to maintain their economic pre-eminence there as elsewhere in Eastern Europe. A Soviet–Hungarian agreement of August 1945 had provided for Soviet participation in almost every sphere of the Hungarian economy, and Stuart of the Foreign Office's Southern Department was in little doubt that this would be 'converted into domination'. Bevin was at first reluctant to accept Gascoigne's similarly gloomy assessment of the implications of the agreement. He believed that Britain's 'strongest card to play with the Hungarians [was] the prospect of trade with the west', and he wanted 'to take no steps to make unnecessary difficulties with Russia'. But the Russians were unwilling to discuss the matter within the ACC, and the Hungarians, who whether reluctant or not lacked the courage to secure any satisfactory substitute from either the Americans or the British, eventually yielded to Soviet threats and ratified the agreement.²¹ By December it was only too apparent that in Hungary the meetings of the ACC did not match the requirements of the statutes agreed at Potsdam, and that, as Gascoigne noted, the Russians were formulating policy and carrying it out without any prior reference to the representatives of Britain and the United States.²²

The Board of Trade's interest in establishing relations with Hungary may have resulted from the encouraging signs in Hungarian political life, on the one hand, and, on the other, from the need to penetrate the East European market, which entailed mild political penetration. British views concerning possible trade with Hungary varied. Letters sent from the Board of Trade to the Treasury emphasized the importance of establishing economic ties with Hungary mainly for two reasons. First, there were enormous stocks of British wool available for which they could not find a market. Secondly, this small amount of assistance would have helped Hungary to 'keep a window open to the West'.²³ The Foreign Office did not deny the political advantages in granting credit for the purchase of wool. However, as a result of a tentative credit to Hungary, they expected similar requests from Yugoslavia, Greece and other countries, which 'might be difficult to refuse'.²⁴ Another view did not rule out the possibility of helping Hungary in a 'modest way' through the ACC, but noted that any concrete proposal had so far met with frustration in every case. Hungary was not considered as 'a suitable object for [the] export drive'. Its public credit-worthiness was rated at zero and it could not offer anything which the British might want in exchange for their products.

By the beginning of 1946 it was evident to the Foreign Office that its ability to influence events in those areas of central and south-eastern Europe that were under Soviet occupation was limited. This was just as clear in the economic as it was in the political sphere. A paper of 12 March 1946, the final draft of which was prepared by the Economic Relations Department, drew attention to the way in which the Soviets were seeking to exploit and remould the economies of the region. It was believed that the primary motive for this policy was the rapid reconstruction of the Soviet Union. They also thought that, by

21 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), *Documents in British Policy Overseas*, 'Eastern Europe August 1945–April 1946', pp. 170–77.

22 Ibid., pp. 220–25.

23 PRO FO 371/48520.

24 Ibid.

integrating the economies of the East European countries with its own, the Soviet Union would want to reinforce its domination and make it more difficult for them to function separately from the Soviet system. But harmful though Soviet policies might be to British economic interests, Britain's pre-war investments in, and trade with, these countries were small. There was in any case little that Britain could do to prevent the Soviets from establishing an economic stranglehold over such countries as Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary, and at this stage Britain did not consider obtaining the financial support of the United States. There was 'no striking panacea' which could be applied to Eastern Europe. The Soviets were too close and the memory of their overwhelming physical strength too recent. Governments of the area could not be expected to take any step that might displease Moscow, and this made it essential that any British counteraction be unobtrusive and of a rather general character. 'The best we can do is to hold a door open — or hold enough doors open — for the Eastern Europeans to catch frequent glimpses of a more attractive and prosperous world in the West and be encouraged, when the occasion offers, to pass through.'²⁵

In late March 1946 a British parliamentary delegation was sent on a study tour to Hungary with the explicit objective of discovering areas of potential co-operation between the two countries.²⁶ (The Hungarian Political Police, by then completely under the control of the Communist Party, attached so much importance to the visit that fifty of its agents closely followed the movements of the delegation.) During the ten-day visit their assessment of the political situation was as follows: 'a sense of purpose and political awareness was shown by almost the entire population. This was undoubtedly due to the new democratic opportunities provided by the recent Electoral Law [...]. They were convinced that there were 'now established in Hungary the seeds of a new democracy which, given encouragement and understanding to enable it to surmount present difficulties and evident "growing pains" may finally establish itself along Western parliamentary lines'. They believed that Britain could best show her sympathy by contributing in such tangible ways as were possible towards a just and lasting peace, not only in Hungary but in the whole Danube Basin.

In March 1946 the British Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee issued a revised report on 'Russia's Strategic Interests and Intentions',²⁷ based on a careful study of the prevailing situation. It concluded that the short-term aim of the Soviet Union was to avoid war with the Western Bloc. Meanwhile, if any dangerous attempts were made to undermine the Soviet Union's position in the countries which had been tacitly recognized as part of its sphere of influence, it would use any means it had to retaliate. In areas such as the Mediterranean, Turkey and Persia, where it was likely to face a strong combined Anglo-American resistance, it would extend its cordon sanitaire. It would extend its political influence wherever it was possible, for example, promoting Communist Parties in the West. Although the Soviet Union would try to avoid war in the near future, it was alarming that demobilization was slow, and Soviet forces and industry still operated on a wartime footing. 'In brief', the Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee reported, 'although the intention

25 PRO FO 371/48520.

26 PRO FO 371/59050. The visit took place between 23 April and 5 May 1946. Members of the mission: Richard Adams (Labour MP for Balham & Tooting), Stanley Evans (Labour MP for Wednesbury), John Haire (Labour MP for Wycombe; leader of the delegation), David Jones (Labour MP for Hartlepool), J. A. Lanford-Holt (Conservative MP for Shrewsbury), Hugh Linstead (Conservative MP for Putney), G. Wadsworth (Liberal MP for Buckrose), F. T. Willey (Labour MP for Sunderland).

27 Pelly, Yasamee et al. (eds), *Documents in British Policy Overseas*, 'Eastern Europe August 1945–April 1946', pp. 297–301.

may be defensive, the tactics will be offensive, and the danger always exists that Russian leaders may misjudge how far they can go without provoking war with America and ourselves.'²⁸

By early 1947 the so-called salami tactics employed by the Communist Party was in full swing. It entailed the gradual elimination of political opponents. In mid-1947 the first democratically elected minister president of Hungary, Ferenc Nagy, was prevented from returning to Hungary after his holiday in Switzerland. The Political Police were using methods similar to those employed in the Soviet Union during the purges in the 1930s. In this atmosphere of terror Denis Healey visited Hungary to attend the annual congress of the 'Social Democratic Party'. He went as Labour representative with a view to helping the Party to stay alive. He found that the 'icy winter which gripped the country symbolised its politics'.²⁹ At first glance the conference had a slight air of a Nazi rally given by the presence of attendants dressed sloppily in white shirts, red armbands and ties, and military hats. Otherwise it appeared orderly and democratic — more like an English than a French or Italian conference. He quickly perceived what the battle behind the scenes was:³⁰ questions of power and representation; on these issues the so-called right wing failed to hold the extreme left in check.

As regards relations with the Communist Party, he felt considerable friction. First, the workers disliked the agreement by which leading factory positions were shared equally irrespective of the strength of the two parties. Secondly, fusion was not even considered. Contrary to the general view held by the British Legation, he thought that Soviet influence did not depend mainly on the Control Commission and the occupation troops, of whom there were only about 20,000 tucked away in a corner of Hungary. Consequently, it would not greatly diminish after the ratification of the peace treaty. Many Hungarians thought that the Soviets might ratify and fulfil the conditions within six weeks of signing. According to Healey, Soviet influence depended mainly on the Communist Party, on political and military policy, economic power, petty persecution and physical terror.

He concluded that the 'Social Democratic Party' was a genuine and sincere party of old Socialists. It was, moreover, the only tolerable alternative to Communism in Hungary. The present tension between Socialists and Communists would grow. When the crucial decision was to be made, the Socialist leaders would be influenced by their estimate of the help which the Western parties would give them morally as a party and economically as a government. Unless Hungary received considerable credits from the West, a 'Social Democratic' internal policy would become impossible.

Under the Communist Minister of the Interior, non-Communists were removed from the administration, and trials of war criminals and political opponents took place on a large scale in 1947.³¹ Nationalization of the economy was proceeding at full tilt. At the rigged general elections of 1947, the Communists gained a victory over the Smallholders', though by no means a landslide victory.³² By then the non-Communist parties were disintegrating as a result of constant pressure. In 1948 the Social Democrats had no choice but to merge with the Communists; thus the one-party system, the final stage of Communist take-over, was firmly established, with the backing of the occupying Red Army.

28 Ibid.

29 Denis Healey, *The Time of My Life*, London, 1990, p. 85.

30 PRO FO 371/67191, Healey's report dated 10 February 1947.

31 On the pretext of a nationalist plot, the Communists successfully discredited some of the Smallholders' leaders; thus the weakened Smallholders' became increasingly vulnerable.

32 The Communists gained 22.3 per cent as opposed to the Smallholders' 15.4 per cent.

Conclusion

In 1945 it was not obvious that the road to Communism was already being systematically built by the Soviets and their Hungarian stooges. The immediate pressure was mitigated by the fact that the Hungarian Communists were eager to outdo Soviet requests. They were meticulous political workers who, with perfectly tailored demagoguery and timing, could win the support of large sections of the people.

The Soviets slight improved conditions for the sharing of responsibility in the work of the Control Commission. Questions of policy remained in Soviet hands, but both the British and the Americans hoped to conclude peace treaties fairly soon. For that reason they lost interest in improving the status of their Missions.

Documentary evidence seems to suggest that by early 1946 mutual hostility and mistrust prevailed in Anglo-Soviet relations. The British did not underestimate the possible threat that the Soviet Union posed. However, they were confident in believing that if they developed a firm political line, buttressed by American aid, an imminent war could be avoided and, at the cost of lack of commitment to Eastern Europe, their traditional spheres of influence could be retained. With regard to Eastern and Central Europe, the British undertook the implementation of the Yalta Declaration, which in Hungary's case was fulfilled. The British political representative feared that Hungary would be sovietized due to the extent of direct Soviet intervention in Hungarian internal affairs. The Foreign Office doubted Soviet aspirations to sovietize Hungary and found the gloomy reports coming from Budapest exaggerated, and so they still emphasized the notion of collaboration with the Soviets. They wanted to conclude peace treaties quickly, recognized the Soviet need to build up buffer states, thus confirming that Hungary, together with other countries of the region, belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence. This was the price the British had to pay for keeping their traditional spheres of influence and maintaining their leadership in the Italian Commission. In addition, the British attitude was that, until Germany's position was clarified, everything else could wait.

Official Foreign Office thinking on the Soviet Union shifted substantially in 1946 towards the views long held by the Chiefs of Staff. The result was a new Russia Committee to monitor Soviet conduct and publicity. One of the shapers of this policy was Sir Frank Roberts, then chargé d'affaires at the Moscow embassy. He stated that Soviet security had become hard to distinguish from Soviet imperialism, and that it was questionable whether there was a limit to Soviet expansionism. However, it was not until the creation of the Cominform in October 1947 that Bevin and the Cabinet echoed the view of the Russia Committee. The aim of British policy should now be to 'reinforce the physical barriers which still guard our Western civilisation of which we are the protagonists. This in my view can only be done by creating some form of union in Western Europe, whether of a formal or informal character, backed by America and the Dominions.'³³

Reports from the British Legation in Budapest regarding the internal political situation became gloomier by the day. S. D. Stewart, a senior member of the British mission, described it as follows. 'I do not know whether there can be such a thing as a premeditated and planned chaos. There are some who say that here we have the proof that there can be. But it is difficult to imagine even the most prolonged premeditation and the most detailed planning proving so utterly successful.'³⁴

On the other hand, the final report by the commissioner of the British component of the ACC, giving an assessment of their activities in Hungary, sounded a trifle more

33 See Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution*, London, 1950, pp. 169–71.

34 PRO CAB 129/23; PRO FO 371/59010

optimistic.³⁵ It did not deny the fact that Allied control had never really been on a tripartite basis. With one power in such dominant position, 'it is difficult to see what one would expect, especially with the Soviet mentality.'³⁶ Therefore, the British and the American components of the ACC had chiefly remained observers. Still, Major-General Edgcumbe, the British Commissioner, firmly believed that the British and Americans had a considerable influence within the Commission and had 'acted as a brake on their Soviet colleagues' since meetings were held on a regular basis and the agenda submitted by them enabled them to raise any questions they wished to discuss. However, he also admitted that their activities were restricted because the statutes of the ACC limited direct access on the part of the members of the Hungarian government to the Soviet representatives. Moreover, their freedom of movement in the country was often curtailed by the High Command of the occupying Soviet forces.

As regards Hungarians, the British had taken special care to avoid making special friends with any particular political group or class of people. Thus cordial relations were maintained with everyone; so much so that two officers and twenty other ranks married Hungarians during those two and a half years. 'Hungarians', summed up the Commissioner, 'are on the whole very pleasant people, and in many respects are highly cultured. They generally give the impressions of being efficient and hard-working. Apart from outside influences, if they could think less about politics and their past, they should be capable of becoming a true democracy.'³⁷

All in all, the British mission was considered to have fulfilled its function as satisfactorily as possible in relation to the Allied Control Commission, having regard to the situation in Hungary. Little though they could do to help Hungary remain neutral and democratic in the Western sense of the word, 'the Mission has done its utmost to maintain British prestige'.³⁸

35 PRO FO 371/67209B, written by Major-General O. P. Edgcumbe, dated 15 September 1947.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.

21 Václav Černý, 1945–48

PETER BUGGE

Throughout his life the literary historian and critic Václav Černý (1905–87) remained a controversial figure in Czech intellectual life. This was very much due to Černý's appetite and talent for polemics and to his eminently moralizing approach to art as well as life.¹ The years 1945–48 formed no exception to this rule. After his release from a German prison and a brief spell of political activism in the Czech National Council Černý returned to Prague University as professor of comparative literature. He also renewed his literary journal *Kritický měsíčník* (Critical Monthly, hereafter referred to as *KM*), founded in 1938 and closed by the German occupation authorities in 1942. Černý soon came to use *KM* as a platform for intense polemics especially with the Czech Communists. The strife turned into what might be described as a genuine '*Kulturkampf*', a struggle to define a doctrine for art and literature in a new socialist Czechoslovakia that culminated in the closing of *KM* in October 1948 and the imprisonment of Černý for seven months in 1952–53.

Černý's efforts have often been depicted as a fight for democracy and freedom against Communist authoritarianism,² in which Černý, like the 'overwhelming majority of socialist-liberal democrats', largely followed the political line of Edvard Beneš and Jan Masaryk.³ Some have even interpreted Černý's activities as a 'desperate attempt to save what could be saved'⁴ of the ideals of pre-war democratic humanism, that is, as a

This chapter is a revised version of a paper, 'Václav Černý aneb Západ a Vychod', presented at the conference 'Václav Černý — život a dílo', Náchod 23–25 March 1995, and printed in Věra Brožová (ed.), *Václav Černý — život a dílo*, Prague 1996, pp. 130–48.

- 1 Černý's autostylization as prosecutor and judge of Czech national weaknesses reached a climax in his memoirs (*Paměti*). The third volume in particular, covering the years 1945–72, is vitriolic in its verdicts on Czech society in general and its predominantly Communist cultural and academic élites in particular.
- 2 Thus Václav Klaus found in these articles 'a severe critique of the spiritual preparation of February 1948 and the admirable ability (and courage) of Václav Černý to reveal the falseness of the at the time still seemingly democratic Communist ideologists.' Václav Klaus, 'Jeden z velkých Čechů', *Lidové noviny*, 25 March 1995, p. 5. Černý has generally had a very good press in Czechoslovakia/the Czech Republic since 1989, where he has been celebrated as a courageous anti-Communist moral and intellectual authority.
- 3 R. Vévoda, 'Václav Černý jako "nepřátelská osoba"' in Brožová (ed.), *Václav Černý — život a dílo*, p. 337. One wonders what exactly a 'socialist-liberal democrat' stands for, but perhaps this terminological jumble is a fitting indicator of the ideological confusion among the non-Communist political élites in post-war Czechoslovakia. See Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, 'Demokraten in der Sackgasse: Das Bild der kommunistischen Machtübernahme in den Memoiren besiegtter tschechischer Politiker' in the volume edited by her, *Kommunismus und Osteuropa: Konzepte, Perspektiven und Interpretationen im Wandel*, Munich, 1994, pp. 203–20.
- 4 J. Homoláč and P. Málek, '1945–1948 (I)', *Tvar*, 8 1995, p. 16. See also M. Drápala, 'Spisovatelé na rozcestí', *Soudobé dějiny*, 4–5, 1994, pp. 450–62, and Peter Drews, 'Zur Orientierungsdebatte in der tschechischen Kulturszene 1945–1948' in Hans Lemburg (ed.), *Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Prägung-Kontinuität und Wandel in Ostmitteleuropa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg*, Marburg, 1991, pp. 450–62.

predominantly *defensive* effort typical of the democrats as they were confronted with ever increasing Communist militancy after 1945.

This last interpretation has, however, no support in Černý's own writings, neither then nor later. Černý, like most of Czech society, had in 1945 no wish to return to anything pre-war. And, more important, Černý saw his own activities not as defensive, but in a far more optimistic, forward-looking perspective. When a collection of his articles, *Boje a směry socialistické kultury* (Struggles and trends in socialist culture), was published in 1946. Černý wrote in the Preface:

I am not proud that I have won the polemic about my thoughts ... I am just happy that I have helped with all my might to clarify the cultural situation here and that today opinions very close to the ones that I from the beginning fought for are suddenly being accepted as the basis of this life, shared by all who have a truly new life at heart, and also because those with whom I often had to fight about them — though without admitting it for God's sake — tacitly accepted them and began to apply them.⁵

With a certain tragic irony Černý repeated this idea in one of his last articles in *KM*, published on 20 February 1948, a polemic with the Soviet critic R. Kuznetsova. Černý had not, he claimed, subscribed as suggested by Kuznetsova to the cultural programme of the Communist Party. On the contrary some Communists (Vincent Kramář) had taken over *his* opinions as he had fought for them with the Communists. And, he added, 'it has now been fought to victory here!'⁶ In his *Paměti* (Memoirs), written in the early 1970s, Černý remained equally categorical:

For nearly a quarter century it was the last big polemical campaign on the meaning of our culture in the history of our modern education and literature. We won it factually and morally, but it was, of course, beyond our powers to prevent the dusk and soon the complete night descending over our national cultural consciousness: a moral and cultural victory can never in itself prevent and atone for political defeats; a cultural authority cannot stand in for an incompetent politician.⁷

Černý defined the theme of this 'campaign' in general terms as the question of the creative and spiritual freedom of the Czech nation. But although his opponents received nothing but scorn in the *Paměti*, Černý remained vague about the exact nature of his own victorious arguments and viewpoints. In the following I shall therefore take a closer look at Černý's discourse in these crucial years, focusing particularly on his definition of the historical role of the Czech nation, his attitude to the USSR, his conception of socialism — and his perception of his opponents.

East and West

Černý found his starting point in the lively debate on the 'Eastern' or 'Western' orientation of Czech cultural life after 1945. This, he claimed, was not a genuine conflict, since historically the Czechs were chosen to be open to all sides or even to reach a *synthesis* of East and West: 'East and West, so that we can be our own, ourselves, as much and as well as possible. East and West, since we should not refrain from considering ourselves a mirror

5 Václav Černý, 'Tato kniha' in Václav Černý, *Skutečnost svoboda*, Prague, 1995, pp. 145–49 (146).

6 Václav Černý, 'Kritika z Moskvy a odpověď' na ni', in *ibid.*, pp. 214–24 (220).

7 Václav Černý, *Paměti III*, Brno, 1992, p. 73. The 'we' of the quotation is a *pluralis majestatis*; in spite of a brief word of thanks to František Kovárna and Pavel Eisner (*ibid.*, p. 74), Černý refers only to his own contributions, sees the whole debate as *his* fight with the Communists.

of the whole world and the centre of the world.’⁸ Since the beginning of their history the Czechs had been a Western nation, Černý tells us. But it had also often sought moral support from Russia, and Czech Russophilia was a ‘natural and unforced love, our ancient self-preserving instinctual drive towards the broader family’, Černý stated, following a well-established formula in Czech self-perception of the nation’s westernness, its need of Slav reciprocity and its avant-garde position among the nations of Europe.⁹

Thus far Černý has been solidly embedded in the Czech tradition, but some of his accents were new. In his presentation, ‘East’ and ‘West’ were *de facto* reduced to Russia and France while the other Slavs as well as Britain and the smaller Western European countries were largely neglected. Only the Moscow–Prague–Paris axis counted. And, more fundamentally, on this axis the East had unequivocally been given priority. Černý explained this not merely as an expression of gratitude towards the liberators but also as a consequence of a change in the ‘constellation of political power’ which made the ‘Russian orientation [...] absolutely necessary, vitally necessary, and advantageous’.¹⁰

One might claim, as has often been claimed, that Černý here sought a balance between East and West, but in reality the two concepts play very different roles: France (the West) represents the best of a proud cultural, literary and political heritage, that is, the past, while Russia represents the future, first of all in the political and social sphere, but also in its cultural policies. Černý, for example, is full of admiration for Stalin’s contribution to popularizing Maiakovskii¹¹ and he praises the USSR for having been until recently the only country where it was possible to do something concrete and constructive to bring great literature closer to the people.¹² Černý sees in this fundamental difference between the two sides a great advantage for the Czechs, offering far more than a mere balancing of Eastern and Western impulses:

At this moment we are in the world in the position of a *privileged* nation, since we are — next to the dreadfully exhausted Poles — the *only* nation with a markedly Western culture entering now into the sphere of a decisive *Russian* politico-cultural influence. The question of the longed-for synthesis has been given, nay even committed to our care for us to solve as the first and, perhaps, to set an example to all of Europe.¹³

The Untouchable USSR

In these years Černý clearly considered it a privilege to belong to the Russian sphere of influence and what separates him from Julius Heidenreich-Dolanský, Ladislav Štoll or other radical ‘Easterners’ is more his insistence on Czech national uniqueness than his

8 Václav Černý, ‘Mezi Východem a Západem’, *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, 3–5, p. 73.

9 Ibid., p. 70. Černý here takes up an argument from F. X. Šalda’s ‘Češství a Evropa’ (*Šaldův zápisník*, 7, 1935, 7–8, pp. 226–31). This line of argument can, however, be traced back at least to the Czech National Revival to Josef Jungmann, Jan Kollár and František (Franz) Palacký. The notion of the Czechs as a chosen people was at the centre of T. G. Masaryk’s *Česká otázka* (1895); he put his ideas on the ‘Czech question’ into a broader historical context in his *Světová revoluce* (Prague, 1925, chapters. 117–19). On Černý’s Slavophilia see Antonín Měšťan, ‘Václav Černý a Slované’, Brožová (ed.), *Václav Černý — život a dílo*, pp. 156–68.

10 Černý, ‘Mezi Východem a Západem’, p. 70.

11 Václav Černý, ‘Cesta literatury k lidu a lidu k literatuře’, *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1946, 14–16, p. 321.

12 Ibid., p. 312.

13 Václav Černý, ‘Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem’, *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, 6–7, p. 141.

attitude to the USSR, which Černý in 1945 did not hesitate to call 'the paragon and source of a moral example'.¹⁴ In fact, in the whole period Černý did not allow for a single word of criticism of the USSR or Soviet policies, from himself or from colleagues.¹⁵

In 1945 *KM* printed two articles by Karel Brušák on contemporary English literature, in which the author allowed himself to speak positively about social and cultural life in Britain and to recommend a Czech cultural orientation in this direction.¹⁶ Although the author only once briefly mentioned the USSR it clearly appeared that he was not among its admirers. This brought the young Communist critic Jiří Hájek to attack Černý vehemently for giving room to such 'treacherous anti-Soviet agitators' in his journal.¹⁷ Černý did defend his author's honour, but he remarked —contrary to the truth— that he did not know Brušák personally, that they had met only once, and that he had received the articles on Kamil Bednář's recommendation,¹⁸ but he was equally specific about Brušák's opinions: 'some statements of Brušák [...] reveal an unfavourable *political* attitude to the Soviet Union. I categorically say that my attitude to the [Soviet] Union is the opposite and that it is necessary to refute Brušák's as erroneous and harmful.'¹⁹

Similarly, in his speech at the Congress of Czech Writers on 17 June 1946 Černý did not hesitate to ridicule André Gide, whom he otherwise admired, and his 'well-known little book' (*Retour de l'URSS*), which he had reviewed very favourably ten years before,²⁰ for the manner, full of misunderstanding, in which he reacted to the cult with which the Soviet collective honours Stalin's personality. This poet all his life proclaimed the greatness of the creative individual, indeed at times even the justification of the non-creative individual: but in Russia it suddenly causes him trouble to understand and accept the reality of a great personality, adored by the collective to the point of manifestations of childish devotion.²¹

A final example can be found in Černý's reaction to Zhdanov's attacks in the autumn of 1946 on Akhmatova and Zoshchenko and thus on the few remnants of artistic freedom left in the USSR. One might expect a few words in the writers' defence from Černý, but he explicitly refused to do so for reasons imbued with political opportunism: 'in the whole

14 Ibid., p. 144.

15 I thus cannot agree with the authors of the entry *Kritický měsíčník* in *Lexikon české literatury 2/II K-L*, Prague, 1993, p. 981, when they claim that Černý 'criticized the Zhdanovite official cultural-political programme and the cultural situation in the USSR'.

16 See Karel Brušák, 'Současná anglická poesie', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, pp. 3–5, and Karel Brušák, 'Anglický román za války', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, pp. 6–7.

17 Jiří Hájek, 'Doc. V. Černý a Kamil Bednář', *Generace*, 2, 1946, p. 287. Reprinted in Černý, *Skutečnost svoboda*, pp. 286–88.

18 Václav Černý, 'Hrst poznámek k polemice věčné i nevěčné', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 3, p. 71. As Brušák confirmed in London in April 1998, he and Černý met regularly in Prague in 1945 and had no need for intermediaries to hand over manuscripts. Eventually, Černý, when editing the articles, weakened their criticism of Zhdanov. I am grateful to Karel Brušák for illuminating this incident.

19 Václav Černý, 'Útoky na mne aneb Trojští koně bez Řeků', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, p. 159. Černý certainly did not follow Brušák's suggestions. In the years 1945–47 (I have not had access to the 1948 volume) not a single translation from English appeared in the *KM*.

20 Václav Černý, 'Humanista Gide a stalinský komunismus. Nad poslední Gideovou knihou', *Lidové noviny*, 10 January 1938. Reprinted in Černý, *Tvorba a osobnost I*, Prague, 1992, pp. 595–7.

21 Václav Černý, 'Osobnost a kolektivum', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 12–13, p. 278. Ten years before Černý had written: 'The ideal is here an absolute conformism, absolute impersonalisation; this is directly connected to the slavishly fawning cult of Stalin's personality: Gide brings simply delightful examples of this.' Černý, 'Humanista Gide a stalinský komunismus', p. 278.

world of today the Soviet purge is a most welcome titbit for the reactionaries. And this — I admit quite openly and I calmly risk my reputation on this declaration — is enough for me not to bring *as much as a single little word of dissent* in this matter.’²² Černý further justified his attitude with reference to the inner needs of the Soviet state. Being unable to defend the purge from a cultural-policy perspective, Černý sought instead to present Soviet behaviour as mere ‘political politics’, inspired not by a ‘definite view on the character of the artist’s work and being’ but by thought for the Soviet reader, who at that moment had to have defensive fighting spirit engraved in his mind. Černý’s conclusion was: ‘I believe that the Soviet regime acts as it does in the spirit of a deliberate sacrifice, imposed upon it willy-nilly, and in no other spirit. And I assure you here, if you expect the the opposite, that no word will pass my lips that could belittle or defame the decision of the Russian Bolshevik party.’²³

The sacrosanctity of the USSR and its leaders was also used as a device in Černý’s polemics with domestic Communists. Černý constantly confronted the spiritual poverty of his local opponents with the greatness of the Soviet paragons, accusing the former of not knowing or understanding Soviet theory or practice. In questions of cultural politics and theory Černý in these years quoted only five people (apart from the left-wing National Revivalist F. M. Klácel): Marx, Engels, Bakunin, Lenin and Stalin, with a preference for the last two. Also, the quotations always had the same function, to express an opinion or a rule with which the author identified.²⁴

‘We’ and ‘They’

In the polemics, the Communists may appear as Černý’s great opponents, but this is true only in the sense that they are the addressees of much of his argument, the objects of his persuasion. And Černý was in 1946 and again in 1948 quite convinced that he had succeeded in inducing them to accept his opinions. In Černý’s discourse, the opposition Černý–Communists was thus subordinated to a greater opposition of socialists on the one hand and the reactionaries on the other. ‘The morrow is ours’, Černý proudly exclaims, and his ‘We’ are the builders of a new socialist culture, ‘the only *rightful* heirs to [...] the culture of former times’.²⁵ Černý often repeated that the Communists were an integral part of this team of socialists engaged in the ‘social restructuring and re-education of the people that is today our chief common task’,²⁶ and in 1946 he stated that his relationship to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was ‘necessarily positive’²⁷ since he accepted its goal of a Communist restructuring of human society in both its forms and its full extent.

22 Václav Černý, ‘Sovětská čistka, česká kocovina a leccos jiného, *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 17–18, p. 386.

23 Ibid., p. 387.

24 Černý’s fervent enthusiasm for Lenin and Stalin goes far beyond mere time-serving lip-service or purely tactical manoeuvres to defend creative freedom by referring to authorities recognized even as its opponents, as suggested by Drápala in ‘Spisovatelé na rozcestí’, p. 453. Nor can it be explained as merely a wilful use of the conventions of the day, as proposed by Vévoda in ‘Václav Černý jako “nepřátelská osoba”’, p. 338. See, for instance, Černý’s devoted article ‘Lenin a literatura’, *Kulturní politika*, 14, reprinted in *Skutečnost svoboda*, pp. 54–58.

25 Václav Černý, ‘Basníková trnitá cesta do socialistické společnosti’, *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, 9–10, p. 240.

26 Václav Černý, ‘První číslo *Generace*’, *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, 9–10, p. 263.

27 Václav Černý, ‘Do služeb sociálního pokroku a lidské svobody’ in *Kultura na prahu zítřka*, Prague, 1946; reprinted in *Skutečnost svoboda*, pp. 53–54 (54).

In 1946, the attitude of the Czech Communists to the Soviet purge, or to the question of the necessity of similar steps in Czechoslovakia, aroused certain doubts in Černý. A few months before he had claimed to 'stand on the same side'²⁸ as the Communists, now he greeted Václav Řezáč 'from the other side'.²⁹ But Černý continued to appeal to the Communists to understand that with their attacks on him they were only damaging their common Socialist cause and helping the reactionaries.³⁰ Even after the unpleasant experience of this debate Černý kept using a 'We' in this sense, and before 1948 Černý did not abandon his conviction that he was basically at one with the Communists in his goals and ideals.³¹

The big 'They' in Černý's universe were the reactionaries, a more or less demonic, never truly identified, group of people always waiting for their chance to abuse the weakness of the Socialists. Černý was vitriolic in his onslaught on the enemies of his socialist dawnings, talking of their 'profaned nudity' and their abuse of 'Western' labels to hide their own 'inner poverty, deprived of content, programme and good advice'.³²

Černý never bothered to mention the domestic reactionaries by name, nor did he ever mention or discuss anything said or done in the few Czech non-Socialist journals of the time.³³ He did, however, clearly link reactionaries to the bourgeoisie as a class, while insisting that the liberation of Europe from Fascism was solely the work of the proletariat and the USSR.³⁴ And in one of his rare discussions of events abroad — in his article on the Soviet purges — he listed Churchill, de Gaulle and the Americans as the true villains behind Soviet defensive measures,³⁵ albeit without informing his readers about the character or nature of their wickedness.

Černý's Socialism

Černý made no secret of his Socialist convictions, calling himself a 'scientific socialist'.³⁶ But, one might argue, his Socialism was of a libertarian kind, inspired by French and Russian socialists and anarchists like Proudhon and Bakunin, and Černý never hesitated to stress the need for creative freedom under socialism. This is true, and especially his article from January 1948, 'Socialistický rok 1848 a jeho dědictví' (The Socialist Year 1848 and its Heritage), is a courageous testimony to these convictions. Černý here described the ideologies of Proudhon and Marx as complementary rather than antagonistic entities

28 Václav Černý, 'Literatura umělecká a literatura užitková', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 1–2, p. 2.

29 Černý, 'Sovětská čistka, česká kocovina a leccos jiného', p. 391.

30 Ibid., p. 388.

31 Or, one might well argue, in fact before 1969. See Černý, *Paměti III*, pp. 508ff.

32 Černý, 'Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem', p. 145. One can find several further examples of the same kind in his writings from these years.

33 In 1947, Černý did submit one footnote to Ferdinand Peroutka's *Dnešek* ('Němci v Penklubu', *Dnešek*, 13, 1947; reprinted in *Skutečnost svoboda*, pp. 175–80). See also *Paměti III*, p. 63. This expulsion of the 'reactionaries' well over the horizon out of sight is perpetuated in his memoirs, with the exception of one noteworthy remark about Pavel Tigrid (ibid., p. 502).

34 Václav Černý, 'Pár slov o kulturním ethosu', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 3, p. 66.

35 Černý, 'Sovětská čistka, česká kocovina a leccos jiného', p. 386. In his report from the PEN-Club congress in Zurich from 1947 Černý noticed with regret the absence of Soviet writers (without reflecting upon the reasons for it), who could best have defended their country against American attacks. In their absence, Černý was proud to tell, the Czechs and the Poles had worked hard to stop any attempt to criticize or damage their 'absent friends', Černý, 'Němci v Penklubu', pp. 177 and 180.

36 Černý, 'Do služeb sociálního pokroku...', p. 53.

within Socialism and portrayed the victory of the German, Marxian position and the exclusion of Bakunin from the International in 1872 as the root of and reason for Socialism's present shape and faults:

Marxism lacks [...] reflection upon the autonomy of man and the substance of the human personality; it lacks respect for their value and often even the awareness, originally self-evident, that the meaning of Socialism is not to take public power, control the state and exult in its own power, but immediately and without end to increase the sphere of that autonomy and the possibilities for the development of a free personality.³⁷

It would nevertheless be misleading to present Černý's socialism as a complete alternative to the Marxism-Leninism of the Communists or to juxtapose the two as opposites. First, Černý himself strove hard to prevent any such juxtaposition, stressing again and again the complementary nature of these two sides of socialism, their shared ideals and goals.³⁸ And secondly, Černý's own perception of socialism was deeply influenced by Marxist-Leninist thought.

Thus he accepted Lenin's theory of the state in both its fundamental dimensions: its notion of the nature of the state as a mere instrument of the ruling class,³⁹ and its idea of the historically necessary withering away of the state after the victory of Socialism.⁴⁰ His rejection of 'bourgeois democracy' was therefore similarly uncompromising:

We know that in a society based on the power of money and social inequality there cannot be real freedom, no more for the artist than for anybody else: the freedom of the artist in a capitalist regime is just a masked dependence, dependence on the buyer, on the financial supporter, on the corrupter, on the money-bags [...]. But right now we see this regime crumbling and making way for a new order.⁴¹

The artistic freedom that Černý called for was thinkable only within a socialist order, and Černý even made it conditional on support of this order. Thus he referred to 'Lenin's perceptive statement about freedom, which may also mean the freedom to shout, lie and write whatever one likes' and continued: 'No, such a freedom is not what we crave!'⁴² Elsewhere we read that 'society has the right to demand a positive social attitude in individual creative works',⁴³ and that 'there is not, there truly cannot be literature against socialism'.⁴⁴ To save Valéry and other French, as we are told, only seemingly bourgeois avant-garde writers for socialism Černý therefore argues that, in reality, these authors

37 Václav Černý, 'Socialistický rok 1848 a jeho dědictví', *Kritický měsíčník*, 9, 1948, 3–4; reprinted in *Skutečnost svoboda*, pp. 198–211 (210).

38 Lenin became again the highest authority in this question, since he, as Černý reminded, 'in all his criticism of anarchist revolutionary methods, did not stop repeating that the ultimate meaning and goal of both anarchism and Communist revolutionary socialism is the same'. Černý, 'Osobnost a kolektivum', p. 287.

39 'Lenin's theory of the state — always a class state and always an oppressor [...] I, too, support it.' Václav Černý, 'Má odpověď' bude tentokrát ještě kratší', *Kritický měsíčník*, 8, 1947, 9–10, pp. 237ff.

40 Václav Černý, 'Stát a básník', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 10–11, p. 215.

41 Václav Černý, 'Pozdrav mrtvým', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, 1, p. 13.

42 Ibid.

43 Černý, 'Osobnost a kolektivum', p. 279. He continues: 'The demand for a positive social attitude in an artistic work is here just a kind of moral and legal expression of the fact that an artist without an audience is just an actor, playing or making faces in the solitude of his room before the mirror.' Ibid. What can a 'legal expression of a positive social attitude' mean here if not a legal intervention into the freedom of expression?

44 Černý, 'Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem', p. 6.

belong to the revolutionary artistic left, and quoting Engels he blames the Communists for a poor understanding of the dialectic that can explain this.⁴⁵

This proximity to Leninist views resulted in a complete negligence of all the institutional dimensions of 'bourgeois democracy'. As products of a rotten social order they spurred no sympathy and Černý did not even see a political problem in this, since in his (as in Lenin's) perspective the withering away of the state under socialism was also the death of politics, its transformation to pure technicalities: 'With the introduction of an association that excludes the class principle, the reality and, indeed, the very concept of political authority dissolves and actual political power vanishes as an expression of class antagonism.'⁴⁶

The notion that the running of socialist society was a mere administrative or technical matter void of political content also affected Černý's lexis. We have already met the phrase 're-education of people' and Černý could also describe the elevation of popular understanding for great art as a problem 'from the domain of social technology'.⁴⁷ In the Soviet call for propaganda literature Černý saw an appeal to the writer not as an artist (his sense of quality prevented him from accepting this primitive kind of Socialist Realism),⁴⁸ but as 'technicians of convincing [...] professionals of persuasion'⁴⁹ Černý found such demands justified — a social service — if understood as a means in the period of fighting for Socialism and not as a part of its substance, and so he *de facto* accepted a postponement for tactical reasons of the realization of the principle of artistic freedom.

This purely functionalist perspective acknowledging no contradictions within Socialism also affected Černý's view on the relationship between the individual (the artist) and society. The whole conflict 'is one of those antitheses that are not substantially given in the concept of humanity itself. Instead it dwindles away as development goes on in the harmony of a synthesis or higher integration, in which both poles do continue to exist, but supplementing and empowering each other instead of refuting each other'.⁵⁰ Černý thus envisaged a development that eliminated even the possibility of a fundamental opposition between artist and society. In fact, he saw in socialism the precondition for the

45 Černý, 'Básníková trnitá cesta ...', p. 239.

46 Václav Černý, 'Stát a básník', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 10–11, p. 215. For Černý, politics thus becomes, here as in his memoirs, a mere question of the morality and character of political leaders, and the problem of how legally and politically to delimit and control their powers lies beyond his horizon. According to Schmidt-Hartmann Černý was, however, in this respect fully in accordance with the then prevailing political culture in his country: Eva Schmidt-Hartmann, 'Das Konzept der "politischen Kultur" in der Tschechoslowakei 1945–1948' in Lemburg (ed.), *Sowjetisches Modell und nationale Prägung*, pp. 195ff. See also A. J. Polan, *Lenin and the End of Politics* (1984) for a brilliant interpretation of Lenin's *The State and Revolution*.

47 Černý, 'Cesta literatury k lidu...', p. 323.

48 Černý rejected Socialist Realism as it appeared in Jan Drda's *Němá barikáda* (The Silent Barricade, 1946), but he did not discard the concept or idea of Socialist Realism as such; on the contrary he tried hard to develop a meaningful definition of it (Václav Černý, 'Hrst poznámek k socialistickému realismu', *Kritický měsíčník*, 8, 1947, 15–16). This explains how Černý in the same article could both declare himself a critic of Socialist Realism (Černý, 'Kritika z Moskvy...', p. 223) and exclaim: 'The writers of Czechoslovakia [...] are able to distinguish the genuine method of Socialist Realism from different surrogates and [...] in their hands this method will become a powerful tool for the building of a new Czechoslovak culture, socialist and at the same time ours, original and growing from our traditions and needs.' Ibid., p. 224.

49 Černý, 'Literatura umělecká a literatura užitková', p. 7.

50 Černý, 'Osobnost a kolektivum', p. 285.

disappearance of the individual and individualism as essentially bourgeois categories, which would be replaced by a 'personality' (*osobnost*) emancipating itself from the randomness of its given individuality.⁵¹ So like Lenin's socialist utopia, Černý's also removed any space for a genuine conflict of interests,⁵² and thus for the very things that give life to social and artistic processes.

The Absence of World Events

Černý insisted that the artist had a duty to engage in public life, now more than ever in Czech national history.⁵³ And yet it is remarkable how little Černý's writings in *KM* in these years reflected or reacted to events in the social or political sphere, domestic or international. He responded promptly, willingly and with great polemical verve to every event in Czech cultural debates, but apart from that Černý's writings seem to have taken place in a strange no man's land: there is not a word about the National Front and the struggles within it, about the elections in 1946 and their consequences, about Slovakia and Czech-Slovak relations, about the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans.⁵⁴ The only concrete criticism of specific government policies after 1945 concerned the publishing of *KM*, which brought Černý to attack post-war printing restrictions and to suggest that he knew 'whose and which broader interests of power had had them enforced'.⁵⁵ He abstained, however, from drawing any conclusions from this.⁵⁶

Similarly, the only foreign event that produced a response was the Soviet purge, which brought Černý to stress the right of every country to choose its own road to socialism (the Party leader, Klement Gottwald, said the same at this time, but of course with less vehemence). Since socialism, Černý claimed, had already won in Czechoslovakia in

51 Ibid. Černý's rejection of individualism as a bourgeois concept seems to contain an anti-liberal element that was not totally compensated for by his theory of personality: 'just as it is true that socialism is cold to the concept of the individual, it is true that it fully gravitates towards the concept and the ideal of the personality' (ibid., p. 286). Černý's thinking is generally characterized by a strong focusing on exceptional personalities, in culture as well as in politics (Lenin, Stalin). 'Ordinary people' play only a marginal role in his universe mostly as objects of social 're-education'. Černý's terminological rejection of concepts related to the despicable past (especially 'liberalism') was again typical for the Czech post-war cultural public. See Drápala, 'Spisovatelé na rozcestí', p. 452, and Eva Hartmannová "'My" a "Oni": hledání české národní identity na stránkách *Dneška* z roku 1946' in *Stránkami soudobých dějin. Sborník statí k pětadesátinám historika Karla Kaplana*, Prague, 1993, pp. 98ff.

52 'I suggested rather talking about the harmonization of the personality with the community under socialism.' Václav Černý, 'Hrstka poznámek k sjezdové debatě o osobnosti a kolektivu', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 12–13, p. 300.

53 Černý, 'Do služeb sociálního pokroku...', p. 53.

54 A similar social and political vacuum prevailed on the pages of Peroutka's journal *Dnešek* (Hartmannová, "'My" a "Oni"').

55 Václav Černý, 'Panu G. Barešovi, šéfredaktorovi Rudého Práva', *Kulturní měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 1–2, p. 24.

56 In his polemics with Raisa Kuznetsova Černý came very close to admitting openly that the Communists were a serious threat to the freedom that he was fighting for: 'I simply search for truth and honesty, in art as in life, and I fight for them. This can still be done freely in Czechoslovakia, outside the prescribed path: no bureaucratic form of artistic truth has been introduced and we therefore all seek it on our own and at our own risk. Far from hiding myself behind some solid wall, I am on the contrary one of those whom no wall protects.' Černý, 'Kritika z Moskvy', p. 224.

1945,⁵⁷ there was no need here for purges or any such defensive measures against the reactionaries. But Černý hastened to assure his readers 'that Russia will not and does not want to prescribe anything for us in this matter'⁵⁸ and that 'not even the Soviets claim that Soviet socialism is the only possible one'.⁵⁹ During these years there seemed to be no end to his faith in the goodwill of the USSR.

Conclusion

It is thus hard to agree with Černý's own conclusion in his memoirs that his articles in *KM* from these years 'do not, I think, leave any fundamental question about culture in the modern world and especially in the socialist world unanswered'.⁶⁰ Read today, they appear as an amalgam of nationalist megalomania⁶¹ and socialist cliché bordering on newspeak, as Černý tried to top the Communists with Communist terminology.

One conclusion is evident: there is no foundation for seeing Černý's activities as one contribution among others in democracy's fight with Communism about the shape of post-war Czechoslovakia. Černý did not see the conflict in these terms (in his eyes the real battle was between Socialism and reactionaries), and he had no interest in the preservation of any 'bourgeois' values, the virtue of which his Socialist convictions prevented him from understanding. Nor did he succeed in developing any libertarian socialist alternative. For that his thoughts conformed far too much to Leninism, and the nature of his writing talent was evidently more polemical than politically analytical. In another context Rupnik concludes:

The victory and lasting power of Czech Stalinism (and on the other hand the weak resistance to it) cannot be ascribed only to the terror following 1948, but primarily to the fact that the

57 'The fact of socialist victory is in our country firm, beyond dispute and already materialized in laws, efficiently transformed into forms of our renewed social functioning. And the development will not even stop at the juncture reached today: it will go even further, that is, even further to the left, for Masaryk's well-known saying has by no means lost its validity here. By the way [*sic*], this coincides with the popular will.' Černý, 'Literatura umělecká a literatura užitková', p. 63.

58 Černý, 'Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem', p. 143.

59 Černý, 'Hrst poznámek k polemice věčné i nevěčné', p. 300.

60 *Paměti III*, p. 79.

61 A few examples have been given above. Černý was convinced that 'we are a nation with a key historical mission, with a most important current historical task, and [...] a great part of the world considers us to be this.' (Václav Černý, 'O naší moderní socialistické tradici a co s ní souvisí', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 8–9, p. 178.) From time to time Černý did refer to universal values (though mostly in order to stress the unique Czech contribution to these), but in his argument actually only the Czech national interest counted. Černý's conception of the nation (*národ*) was clearly Herderian, 'völkisch' (as was Masaryk's). This only added to his disregard for the state, in which he saw nothing but an instrument, be it of a class (see above) or of a given nation (Černý, 'Stát a básník', p. 216). Černý also believed in stable national characters, and in his defence of anarchism he praised its Slav and Latin nature while denouncing dialectical materialism and Marxism as purely German (Černý, 'Osobnost a kolektivum', p. 287; 'Socialistický rok 1848 a jeho dědictví', p. 210). Later, in his memoirs, the Jews were to replace the Germans as the prime alien evildoers to the Czechs. For an interesting portrait of Černý stressing his nationalism and the illusions that accompanied his political ambitions, see Zdeněk Urbánek, 'O Václavu Černém', *Lidové noviny*, 12 April 1990, 'Literární noviny' supplement, p. 2.

Communists controlled more than the apparatus of power in the state; they also controlled the system of values, the symbolic structure of meaning in the eyes of individuals and of society as a whole.⁶²

One might question how far the whole of Czech society after the war actually was under this spell, but it seems evident that in 1945 Václav Černý had succumbed to this symbolic structure or discourse, this system of values, and that essentially his writings consolidated its position and validity, rather than unmasking it.⁶³

In his memoirs Černý wrote that 'in 1945 the whole world had already long since been informed about the essence of Stalinism and become sceptical of its methods; the truth about the trials of the 1930s was clear; one knew generally about the labour camps, the prisons, the hecatombs of human lives'.⁶⁴ If this were true — and Černý had after all reviewed both Gide and Jiří Weil in the 1930s⁶⁵ — then why did Černý himself so eagerly quote Stalin, why did he denounce Gide in 1946, and why did he defend the legitimacy of the Soviet purges? One might ascribe it to servility or to fear,⁶⁶ but such explanations seem inadequate given Černý's courage in other situations during these years.

More plausibly the war and liberation inspired a collective self-induced amnesia *vis-à-vis* Stalin, affecting also minds less radically inclined than Černý's such as Beneš's and Jan Masaryk's, and resulting in struthious policies and wishful thinking. What is remarkable in Černý's specific case is the eagerness with which he sought to come to terms with Stalin's proselytes in his own country, while simultaneously criticizing them vehemently. There is almost a schizophrenic touch to the way Černý continued to court the Communists while at the same time refusing to go all the way, truly to join the ranks. But what Černý seems to have sought — and what he continued to seek for twenty years after 1948 — was to be recognized by the Communists on equal terms.⁶⁷ Černý paid dearly when their rejection of him became definitive in 1969, but in retrospect probably the only worse thing the regime could have done to him would have been to make him its accomplice.

62 Jacques Rupnik, 'Intelektuálové a moc v Československu', *Soudobé dějiny*, 1, 1994, 4–5, p. 541.

63 Pavel Janoušek claims that, although Černý did speak in a language 'that today looks almost identical with the language of his Communist opponents [...] both he and his contemporary opponents very precisely noticed the differences and shifts in accents that gave their statements quite different semantic dimensions'. Pavel Janoušek, 'Konference o nás (a Václavu Černém)', *Tvar*, 8, 1995, p. 11. This is a pertinent observation, but one must then ask why this 'Communist' discourse was so hegemonic that dissent could be expressed only 'in code', and also what consequences this hegemony had for the possibility of articulating genuine alternatives to the Communist symbolic order.

64 Černý, *Paměti III*, p. 294.

65 That is, Weil's very critical novel from 1937 about life in the USSR, *Moskva — hranice* (1937); see Václav Černý, 'Rusko čistek v české beleterii', *Lidové noviny*, 10 March 1938, the 'Literární pondělí' supplement, p. 4; reprinted in Černý, *Tvorba a osobnost*, I, Prague, 1992, pp. 595–97.

66 Vévoda, 'Václav Černý jako "nepřátelská osoba"', pp. 337ff.

67 Černý's efforts in this direction in the late 1950s, which included attempts at academic as well as political rapprochement are discussed in Mojmír Grygar, 'Václav Černý a marxismus' in Brožová (ed.), *Václav Černý — život a dílo*, pp. 313ff, in Vévoda, 'Václav Černý jako "nepřátelská osoba"', pp. 332ff, and in Karel Kaplan, 'Opožděné zveřejnění dopisu Václava Černého', *Literární noviny*, 14, 1998.

22 ‘Verachtet mir die Meister nicht’: The Furtwängler Case

RICHARD ACZEL

‘Wo ist *mein* Deutschland?’ Yehudi Menuhin recalls overhearing this *cri de coeur* from the great German conductor Wilhelm Furtwängler during a rehearsal in Berlin in 1947.¹ Today such a phrase, when associated with a man whom Goebbels could call at once a childish primadonna and a pillar of the cultural policy of the Third Reich, cannot but resonate with overtones of bathos and undertones of repulsion. That it does so is itself an index of the transition that took place in the assessment of German culture and identity, both in and outside Germany, after the Second World War. *Deutschland* in the possessive, together with such collocations as *deutsche Seele* (German soul), *deutsche Tiefe* (German profundity) or even the term *Deutschtum* (Germanness) itself — once part of the staple vocabulary of a tradition that reaches from Goethe and Schiller, through Lagarde and Wagner to figures as ideologically far apart as Ernst Jünger and Thomas Mann — have become tarred beyond recognition or retrieval with the brush of National Socialism. As the music historian Joachim Kaiser has put it: ‘One may no longer use the word *deutsch* in connection with elevated abstractions.’² What did Wilhelm Furtwängler mean by *his* Germany, and what part did he play, both in and after the Third Reich, in making this and related nationally specific abstractions ‘unusable’? After the war, Furtwängler himself repeatedly insisted on a distinction between ‘his’ Germany and a Germany ruled by the Nazis. The ‘Case of Furtwängler’, as seen (and thus referred to) not only by the likes of Goebbels and Göring, but also by the de-Nazification Commission the conductor faced in December 1946, and thereafter by such critics as Bruno Walter and Thomas Mann, was always a case of distinguishing between two notions of Germany entangled in a complex web of collaboration and resistance. I am interested not in the question of whether or not Furtwängler was a Nazi collaborator — although the question will inevitably be touched on several times in this chapter — but rather on how his activity during and after the Third Reich contributed to the very conflation of the two sets of values he sought to separate and whose conflation has had such far-reaching consequences for the transition of post-war German culture.

When the Nazis came to power in January 1933, Furtwängler was forty-seven years old and at the very top of his profession. Eleven years earlier he had succeeded Arthur Nikisch as director of both the Berlin Philharmonic and the Leipzig Gewandhaus orchestras. In 1927 he became chief conductor of the Vienna Philharmonic and in 1928 was appointed General Music Director of Berlin.³ In the last days of the Weimar Republic he signed a contract as director of the Staatsoper in Berlin. In Germany he was revered as a musical authority and worshipped as an interpreter of the German classics. Celebrated throughout

1 Yehudi Menuhin in his Foreword to Hans-Hubert Schönzeler, *Furtwängler*, London, 1990, p. vi.

2 Joachim Kaiser, ‘Politische Biographie eines vermeintlich Unpolitischen’ in Gottfried Krauss (ed.), *Ein Maß, das heute fehlt*, Salzburg, 1986, p. 124.

3 In 1928 Furtwängler left the Gewandhaus orchestra to concentrate on his work with the Berlin Philharmonic. Similarly, he left the Vienna Philharmonic Orchestra after two years because of his commitments in Berlin. He continued, however, to perform regularly with the Vienna Philharmonic and became musical director of the orchestra again in 1939.

Europe, with three successful tours of the United States behind him, he was a cultural asset the Nazis were bound to take seriously. Moreover, Furtwängler was not initially without enthusiasm for the National Socialist movement and its emphasis on German tradition. Although Furtwängler by no means ignored the work of contemporary composers — he gave the world première of Arnold Schoenberg's first full orchestral piece based on the twelve-tone system, 'Variations for Orchestra, Op. 31', in December 1928 — he was concerned that 'modern' music had begun to endanger the direct, living relationship between artist and public which was to prove one of the cornerstones of Furtwängler's music ideology. The Nazis at least appeared to attribute a central role to the *Volk* in their cultural ideology: 'It is a decisive merit of National Socialism, which none of its opponents can deny, that it has determinedly revealed to the whole world how today the very core of the relationship between creator and perceiver, artists and audience, art and people is endangered.'⁴

Differences of interest and opinion between the conductor and new regime, however, were very quick to appear. On 11 April 1933 Furtwängler published an open letter to Goebbels criticizing the Party's racial policy. The letter anticipates the awkward hybrid of dissension and concession that was to characterize Furtwängler's relations with the regime for the next twelve years. Writing 'entirely as an artist', Furtwängler begins by drawing the minister's attention to developments in German musical life which, in the conductor's opinion, 'cannot definitely be seen as helping that restoration of our national dignity which we all so joyfully and gratefully welcome'.⁵ After this cautious beginning, Furtwängler goes on to insist that the function of art is to unite, not to divide: as an artist, the only division he can recognize is that between good and bad art. When applied to artists, the distinction between Jew and non-Jew is not only beside the point, but 'not in the interests of cultural life'. He continues, in the most unambiguous statement of an otherwise tortuously formulated text: 'It must therefore be clearly declared that men like Walter, Klemperer, Rheinhard and others will in the future also have to have their say with their art.' Having said this, Furtwängler immediately reverts to a more concessive (and compromised) tone. He concludes:

Our struggle is against the rootless, degenerating, enfeebling, destructive spirit, but not against the real artist, who, however one may judge his art, is in his own way a shaper and as such has an edifying effect.

With this in mind, I appeal to you in the name of German art not to allow things to happen that, perhaps, could never be put right.⁶

The use of the first-person plural and of unmistakably Nazi vocabulary certainly seem to justify Thomas Mann's somewhat wry and bitter (13 April 1933) diary allusion to 'Furchtwängler's [*sic*] letter on culture to Goebbels which, though accommodating Nazi ideas, was nevertheless a warning'.⁷ But in what other terms would it have been feasible to address a public criticism of Party policy to the Minister of Propaganda in 1933, and who else in the musical sphere would take a similar stand for his or her persecuted colleagues?

One wonders whether the 'Our struggle' is the language of tactics or of conviction. The question raises itself again in connection with the letters and memos Furtwängler wrote in preparation for his first 'audience' with Hitler on 8 August 1933. These writings clearly

4 Unpublished notebooks for 1933, cited in Fred K. Prieberg, *Kraftprobe: Wilhelm Furtwängler im Dritten Reich*, Wiesbaden, 1986, p. 54.

5 Reprinted in Wilhelm Furtwängler, *Ton und Wort*, Wiesbaden, 1955, p. 70.

6 Furtwängler, *Ton und Wort*, p. 71.

7 Thomas Mann, *Tagebücher 1933-4*, Frankfurt on Main, 1977, p. 47. The word-play *Furcht* — instead of *Furt* — alludes to the musician's cowardice; *Furcht* = fear.

show that the conductor still believed at this point that he could directly influence Party policy, at least in assisting Jewish musicians. Appealing, in a letter to Hitler of 4 July 1933, to the international reputation of figures like the violinist Carl Flesch and the composer Arnold Schoenberg, he insists that ill-treating them will only damage Germany's image abroad. For this reason, he argues: 'it is desirable that such special cases should, perhaps, be settled by the Herr Reich Chancellor himself, not considering the legal side and the bureaucracy, because of their significance for [Germany's] international standing'.⁸ There are other statements, however, where the tactical rhetoric is much more ambiguous. In a memo marked as addressed to the *Führer* Furtwängler remarks:

It is in foreign relations that politics must come in, in foreign relations that one must formally offer compromises, but in fact not surrender anything of the cause. *Sauviter in modo*, to that musical relations are particularly suited. In the whole Jewish question we must above all beware of allowing ourselves to be pushed to the wrong front. Propaganda concerning the Jewish question must lose its opaque and blind [*sic*] character. Insofar as the Jew is a spiritual enemy, one must fight him with spiritual weapons [...] one cannot solve spiritual questions *only* biologically.⁹

In the context of a memo to Hitler, this statement is more likely to represent a tactical move in Furtwängler's overall campaign to defend Jews in musical life — and above all the Jewish members of the Berlin Philharmonic — than to constitute a genuine tactical contribution to the Party's Aryan policy. But the line between the two is perilously thin, especially when Furtwängler's own initial attitude to the new regime was one of qualified support. In an undated notebook entry from the same period he notes: 'I am a supporter, not a member, since I am an artist and, to my knowledge, not a politician.'¹⁰

Furtwängler never joined the Party — unlike the man who would later become his greatest rival in the Reich, Herbert von Karajan, who joined twice, early in 1933 (once in Austria and then in Ulm).¹¹ This did not prevent the Nazis, however, from seeking to commandeer him for their other institutions. His new boss at the Berlin Staatsoper, Hermann Göring — who as Minister President of Prussia was directly responsible for all Prussian theatres — appointed him Staatsrat in July 1933, a position he was to share with the likes of the opera director Heinz Tietjen and the actor Gustaf Gründgens, and in September of that year Goebbels made him Vice-President of the *Reichsmusikkammer*. Though these were honorary titles rather than positions of power or influence, they did reflect the seriousness with which Furtwängler was taken by the Reich as an international advertisement for German culture at a time when the 'aryanization' of culture was already exciting widespread condemnation. Yet there were limits to how far Furtwängler could go in defending the 'enemies' of the new regime, as the 'Hindemith Case' was to demonstrate at the end of 1934.

Although he must have been aware of Hitler's dislike of the composer, Furtwängler had scheduled a premiere of Paul Hindemith's new (and as yet unfinished) opera, *Mathis der Maler*, with the Berlin Staatsoper for the 1934/35 season. Göring immediately removed the work from the programme and, when Furtwängler protested, insisted that the opera could not be performed without the *Führer*'s personal approval. A campaign against Hindemith ensued in the Nazi press — concerning the composer's 'spiritual decadence' and 'Jewish

8 Cited in Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 142.

9 Ibid., p. 145.

10 Ibid., p. 144.

11 On Karajan's relations with the Nazi regime see Robert C. Bachmann, *Karajan: Anmerkungen zu einer Karriere* Düsseldorf, 1983, pp. 60–162.

connections'¹² — and before the matter of this première had been decided, Furtwängler gave a world première of Hindemith's symphonic version of three orchestral interludes from the opera with the Berlin Philharmonic on March 11 1934. The performance was greeted with rapturous applause, both as a musical triumph and as an act of political defiance, and Furtwängler was emboldened to take further steps in his defence of Hindemith. When, by the autumn, he had still not received permission to perform *Mathis der Maler* at the Staatsoper, Furtwängler published an article in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* with the Nietzschean title 'Der Fall Hindemith' (The Hindemith case) insisting that the public and not the State should have the right to judge the value of new works of art. Predictably, the article, which appeared on the front page of the Sunday edition of the *DAZ* for 25 November 1934, caused a sensation: the edition sold out immediately and had to be reprinted. When Furtwängler conducted *Tristan* at the Staatsoper the following Sunday a full house erupted in thunderous applause as soon as the conductor appeared and again before Acts two and three of the opera. Goebbels and Göring were both present and did not fail to understand the significance of the demonstration. 'Der Fall Hindemith' had become 'der Fall Furtwängler' and it was now the conductor who became the target of a savage campaign in the Nazi press which would ultimately lead to his resignation from all public posts on 4 December 1934.

Furtwängler's resignation had disastrous financial consequences for both the Staatsoper and the Berlin Philharmonic, and Goebbels was fully aware that the situation was equally detrimental to his own cultural propaganda. At the end of February 1935, the minister reached a compromise with Furtwängler, according to which the latter would, in return for a public declaration of acceptance of the fact that 'the determination of Reich policies [...] lies solely in the hands of the Chancellor-*Führer* and the ministers he assigns such duties'¹³ be allowed to resume his musical activities as a freelance guest conductor and as an independent, 'apolitical artist'. The terms of this 'independence' were never articulated, but what it would amount to in practice was that the Nazis, more often than not, tolerated Furtwängler's refusal to conduct the 'Horst Wessel-Lied', to give the Nazi salute even when Hitler was present in the audience, to conduct at state functions and, during the war, to conduct in the occupied territories.¹⁴ In April 1935, Furtwängler was again conducting his Philharmonic in Berlin and Goebbels could comment with satisfaction in his diary: 'A great moral success for us. These artists are the most extraordinary little people in the world. Politically utterly dull' (2 March 1935).¹⁵

After his return to musical life in April 1935, Furtwängler's relations with the Reich become somewhat harder to document. There are no more public scandals like the open letter to Goebbels and the Hindemith affair. Those who try to defend Furtwängler as an heroic opponent of the regime are generally fairly quiet about the years 1936–45, pointing

12 Among other things, Hindemith was criticized for making a recording of his 'String Trio No. 2' with Furtwängler's Jewish concert master, Szymon Goldberg and the cellist Emanuel Feuermann in London in January 1934.

13 Report of the agreement in *Die Musik*, March 1935, cited in Bernd Wessling, *Furtwängler: Eine kritische Biographie*, Stuttgart, 1985, p. 293.

14 Furtwängler did, however, perform in occupied territories three times during the war, twice in Copenhagen (in 1942 and 1943) and once in Prague in 1940. The Prague concert took place in connection with Goebbels's 'atonement' visit in early November 1940. Goebbels's note in his diary for 5.10.40 that Furtwängler: 'is very obliging and is offering to join with the Philharmonic on a visit to Prague. This visit must crown our work in making [them] content [there]. I shall organize it all very cleverly.'

15 All references to Goebbels's Diaries are based on the twenty-volume edition by Elke Fröhlich, *Die Tagebücher von Joseph Goebbels*, Munich, 1987–94.

only to his efforts to avoid state occasions and concerts in the occupied territories. Even Prieberg's *Kraftprobe*, the best researched book to date on Furtwängler's relations with the Nazi regime, devotes almost 350 pages to the first six years of the Reich and fewer than ninety to the second.¹⁶ Although Furtwängler no longer offers any major public statements in the press after his 'rehabilitation', convincing testimony to his continued tightrope walk between resistance and collaboration is to be found in Goebbels's Diaries. Between 1933 and 1945 there are over ninety entries on the conductor, and most of these are more than passing references to concerts the minister has attended. Nearly all of them document Goebbels's high regard for Furtwängler as an artist and show that the minister fully recognized both the conductor's enormous popularity — 'Furtwängler is respected like a god' (11 February 1937) — and his value for the regime — 'Discussed the Furtwängler case with Göring. Not to be allowed to go abroad' (25 December 1934); 'we can make good use of him' (9 January 1940). The early entries confirm the well-documented fact that Furtwängler frequently intervened on the behalf of Jewish musicians ('As always Furtwängler on the Philharmonic and the Jewish Question' (7 July 1933). After the compromise of February 1935, Goebbels is pleased to note that 'Furtwängler has greatly changed' (22 July 1936) and in 1936 there are two entries which confidently state that the conductor is 'now entirely with us' (27 July, and 11 December 1936). There are, however, still conflicts. When at the end of June 1936, Goebbels congratulates himself on the *Führer's* acceptance of his prohibition of public criticism of the arts, he is forced to concede that 'Only Furtwängler is still unsatisfied.' He is, however, quick to add that 'it does not help him any longer' (27 November 1936). In 1937 there are further references to Furtwängler's recalcitrant position on the 'Jewish Question', and the extent and vigour of Furtwängler's resistance to Nazi policy in this area is documented by an entry for 3 August 1937: 'There are still some half-Jews in the Philharmonic. I shall try to get rid of them. It will not be easy. Furtwängler does everything in his power to keep them.' By the end of the year Goebbels is again complaining of the conductor's 'daily new demands' (7 December 1937). In July 1938 there is a reference to Furtwängler's reluctance to participate in Party and State functions. He had been asked to conduct a performance of Wagner's *Die Meistersinger* on the eve of the Party Congress in Nuremberg in September: 'Furtwängler does not want to conduct in Nuremberg. For decency's sake. That is nonsense. He should not be so cautious. I am exerting pressure on him' (2 July 1938). Goebbels's pressure achieved the desired result: Furtwängler did conduct, and the baritone Rudolf Bockelmann, who sang Sachs, commented in his diary: 'One cannot imagine greater enthusiasm than after the last curtain, when two leaders of the nation met with a storm of joy from the festive audience. Two true, significant leaders with their sights set on eternal values: Adolf Hitler and Wilhelm Furtwängler!'¹⁷

After the entry for 2 July 1938, and with the coming of war, there is a striking change of tone in Goebbels's diary references to Furtwängler. On 22 November 1938, Goebbels remarks that Furtwängler 'has again performed great services for us abroad'. This is probably a reference to a successful concert with the Tonhalle Orchestra in Zurich on 14 November, but it should not be forgotten that earlier in the year the French had awarded Furtwängler the Légion d'honneur — an international propaganda coup for the Nazis, even if Hitler did not want the news made public at home. In April 1940, Furtwängler is in Copenhagen during the German occupation. Goebbels is pleased to be informed by the conductor that 'Our soldiers' behaviour was exemplary, which contributed a great deal to

16 In addition to Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, and Schönzeler, *Furtwängler*, see Elisabeth Furtwängler, *Über Wilhelm Furtwängler*, Wiesbaden, 1979 and Sam H. Shirakawa, *The Devil's Musicmaster: The Controversial Life and Career of Wilhelm Furtwängler*, Oxford, 1992.

17 Cited in Wessling, *Furtwängler: Eine kritische Biographie*, pp. 24–25.

the peaceful accomplishment of the matter' (17 April 1940). In the same entry Goebbels notes that Furtwängler is interested in succeeding Peter Raabe as President of the Reichsmusikkammer:¹⁸ 'It would be good', the minister remarks. Two months later the minister notes: 'He has become a real chauvinist. I am very pleased' (20 June 1940). By the end of 1941 and the beginning of 1942, Goebbels is able to congratulate himself on Furtwängler's apparent conversion:

I am pleased that I have succeeded in making Furtwängler hold such a positive view of the State and the Reich. It cost a lot of effort, but still he is with us now, and I prefer a Furtwängler who causes one work as a citizen of the Reich to a Toscanini who causes one no work, but sits abroad as an émigré and can be used against Italy. (28 November 1941)

Furtwängler is visiting me. He has made a journey through Sweden and Denmark and is positively exuberant in his national enthusiasm. This man has been through a change that gives me an extraordinary amount of joy. For years I have fought to win him and now I can see success. (28 February 1942)

By June 1943 Goebbels is delighted that 'the *Führer* has so positive an attitude to this great conductor. Furtwängler is one of our greatest assets in our whole cultural policy' (10 June 1943). The entries on Furtwängler for 1944 are full of Hitler's praise for the musician. On 25 January 1944 Goebbels writes that Furtwängler 'has done wonderfully, and the *Führer* has given me the task of confirming that to him and of adding that we shall never forget what he has done in the future'. The conductor has become so precious to the Reich that Hitler cannot bear the thought of losing him in an air-raid and wants to build him a personal bunker (4 March 1944). Furtwängler's defenders make much of the fact that the conductor turned the *Führer*'s offer down. The reasons Furtwängler expressed in a letter to Hitler of 21 May 1944 could only have added to the conductor's patriotic esteem: 'At a moment when every German has the duty to play his part in the war, and when I neither can nor will withdraw from mine, such a large building project just for me and my family seems certainly too pretentious, especially given the unlikelihood of such danger here in the country.'¹⁹ As Goebbels wrote of Furtwängler in his diary for 24 March 1944: 'He is an upright patriot and a warm supporter and advocate of our politics and war-leadership. Nowadays one only needs to intimate a desire and he fulfils it immediately.'

What was responsible for the 'transformation' that Goebbels believed Furtwängler to have undergone after the middle of 1938? On the one hand, it is undoubtedly the case that, as the regime gathered confidence and its grip over every aspect of cultural life tightened, Furtwängler was forced to recognize that the type of open resistance he had practised in the early days of the Third Reich was no longer possible. Even two weeks before the publication of his defence of Hindemith in November 1934 he could write to his former teacher and life-long friend, Ludwig Curtius:

Above all, it is my firm opinion that the present regime in Germany will *not* 'collapse' as foreigners wish and believe. Not even if the imposed autocracy led to the greatest impoverishment [...]. Therefore every German who has a position today is faced with the question, whether he wishes to keep and fulfil the duties of that position or not. If he does want to, he *must* come to some practical *modus vivendi* with the ruling party. On the other

18 The first president of the Reichsmusikkammer, directly responsible to the Reichskulturkammer presided over by Goebbels, had been Richard Strauss. Furtwängler had been vice-president until his resignation from all public positions in December 1934. He did not take up this office again on his return to musical life in the spring of 1935.

19 Cited in Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 404.

hand, if he *wants* to give it up, that is something else [...]. To pursue the sentiments of humanity and decency here is sheer romanticism.²⁰

Clearly referring to his coming public intervention on Hindemith's behalf, Furtwängler goes on to write that the question of his own remaining in Germany is about to be decided. He is fully aware that 'the possibility of departing from Germany *forever* exists, for me too'.²¹ Furtwängler's assessment of his situation was accurate. After the publication of 'Der Fall Hindemith' and the conductor's subsequent resignation, Goebbels did tell him that he if he left Germany now, he would be leaving Germany for good. This Furtwängler could not do in 1934, still less after coming to his *modus vivendi* with the regime in returning to musical life in the spring of 1935, and still less with the coming of war.

The war played a central role in Furtwängler's apparent rapprochement with the regime, especially when a German defeat became increasingly likely. Goebbels himself remarks that: 'There are people who find their way back to themselves only at a time of crisis. Furtwängler is also one of these. Earlier, when things were going well, he could not stop criticizing this or that. Now that we are in a state of need and misfortune, he is one of the most energetic and firmest defenders of our rights and our fight for life' (3 November 1943). By the beginning of 1944 he could add that: 'the worse it goes for us, the more [Furtwängler] closes ranks with our regime' (13 January 1944). Even at the beginning of the war, however, Furtwängler was not unenthusiastic. In an undated notebook entry for 1939 he writes:

Why will Germany win in this war? Why will, with the passing of time, the authoritarian system necessarily be successful? It is of the essence of man, that he cannot endure unbounded freedom, or just too much freedom. That is just as clear in art. Reger and Strauss, not to mention the atonalists, represent this state of freedom. They are now old-fashioned and done for. What is necessary is a new kind of fulfilment of the law.²²

This is an extraordinary statement. That an ideologically motivated and drastically oversimplified perception of modern music should serve as a parallel to, if not justification for, the belligerence of the authoritarian state is an indication not only of the political naivety Goebbels recognized in Furtwängler, but also of the absurdity of the conductor's overestimation of his own aesthetic ideology. 'Gesetz' (law) is clearly a key term here, and one which lies at the heart of Furtwängler's thinking. That it occurs most frequently in Furtwängler's writings in a music or literary historical context is itself an illustration of the degree to which the 'apolitical' artist's politics was grounded in his aesthetics. Thus in an article on Beethoven from 1942 we read: 'What strikes one most about Beethoven and what has a greater effect in him than in others is what I should like to call the "law". Like no other he achieves natural accordance with the "law", the definitive, and from this comes the extraordinary clarity that characterizes his music.'²³ This ominous forging of the 'lawful' and the 'natural' helps explain Furtwängler's hostility to the (highly rule-bound) dodecaphonic music of the Second Viennese School and its followers. For Furtwängler, the 'laws' of twelve-tone composition are to be rejected because, unlike those of the European 'tonal' tradition, they are artificial rather than natural laws, and are therefore, in a phrase the conductor can, remarkably, still use in 1947, 'biologically inferior'.²⁴ This

20 Letter to Ludwig Curtius, 10 September 1934, in Wilhelm Furtwängler, *Briefe*, ed. Frank Thiess, Wiesbaden, 1964, p. 77.

21 Ibid., p. 77.

22 In Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 361.

23 'Die Weltgültigkeit Beethovens' in Furtwängler, *Ton und Wort*, p. 184.

24 'Essay über tonale und atonale Musik' (1947) in Wilhelm Furtwängler, *Gespräche über Musik*, Mannheim, 1983, p. 105.

association of law and nature returns in an essay on Mendelssohn, also from 1947, in which Furtwängler praises the composer's championship of Beethoven and Bach and speaks of Mendelssohn's 'Leipzig school' as 'a school of laws': 'The property of Mendelssohn's law is something that has been lost today, something I would call "the category of naturalness".'²⁵ In the same article 'law' is also tradition, which, while the product of great individuals, goes beyond individualism: 'This law, this tradition is, above all, a repudiation of individualism, a real repudiation.'²⁶ Perhaps the clearest explanation of Furtwängler's notion of 'law' can be found in a notebook entry on Goethe from 1939 where again the aesthetic and the political are conflated:

Why did Goethe not like the French Revolution? Why was he not at all a revolutionary? Because he saw the restrictions as well as the freedoms, that is, together with the freedoms. He had a total view of the world before him, knew that restriction, the law came from freedom and freedom from the law. And that anywhere where there is life. Anyone who has adopted this total view like Goethe, who seeks it everywhere like Goethe, is saved forever from any revolution, any propaganda.²⁷

This is a simplification of Goethe. Where Goethe treats freedom and law in social terms they are generally seen as the poles of a conflict — as in the struggle between the poet-genius and the court in *Torquato Tasso*, a play which raises questions particularly pertinent to the role of the artist in society, a theme which so preoccupied Furtwängler. In a more limitedly aesthetic sense, however, Furtwängler's statement is a direct echo of Goethe's famous sonnet on 'Natur und Kunst' (Nature and Art): 'In der Beschränkung zeigt sich erst der Meister,/Und das Gesetz nur kann uns Freiheit geben' (The master shows himself truly when he is set limits,/And only the law can give us freedom). It is one thing, however, to appeal to the liberating (creative, inspiring) potentiality of strict regulations in a manifesto for the sonnet — as Wordsworth was to do in one of his defences of the form ('the prison, unto which we doom/Ourselves no prison is') — and another to use such an artistic credo as a justification for an authoritarian and aggressive political regime. Furtwängler's notebooks for 1939 contain a defence of the ideological principles of National Socialism which cannot but sound perverse alongside the appeal to Goethe: 'As far as Fascism, revolution, etc., are concerned, their ideas are transitory. If they also include the law, that is not so. In spite of its mass character — significant and vital. There is truly something new, unknown to the world in this and in National Socialism.'²⁸ One is tempted to reply with Goethe's injunction, which Furtwängler himself was later to quote in his notebooks: 'Bilde Künstler, rede nicht!' (Artist, create, don't talk).²⁹

The 'transformation' Goebbels begins to notice in Furtwängler after the middle of 1938 cannot, however, be solely explained either on the basis of a pragmatic recognition of the futility of resistance or of an apparent ideological rapprochement between minister and conductor. Furtwängler had a more personal motive for seeking to keep in the minister's good books by the end of the 1930s. This motive was the rise of a serious rival, Herbert von Karajan. On 22 October 1938 the *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung am Mittag* carried a glowing review by Edwin von der Nüll of a performance of *Tristan* under the baton of a thirty-year-old 'conducting sensation' who had much to teach his fifty-year-old colleagues (a reference to Furtwängler). The review bore the title 'Das Wunder Karajan' (The Karajan

25 'Mendelssohn, zu seinem 100jährigen Todestag, 1947' in Wilhelm Furtwängler, *Vermächtnis*, Wiesbaden, 1956, pp. 116–17.

26 Ibid., p. 117

27 Wilhelm Furtwängler, *Aufzeichnungen 1924–1954*, Zurich and Mainz, 1996, pp. 183–84.

28 Unpublished notebooks, cited in Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 361.

29 Furtwängler, *Aufzeichnungen*, p. 284.

Wonder). Behind the article stood Göring, who could no longer tolerate Furtwängler's antics at the Staatsoper, and who, as the man in charge of all Prussian theatres with the Berlin Staatsoper the jewel in the Prussian theatrical crown, had been engaged in a bitter rivalry with Goebbels and his Reichskulturkammer from the beginning of the Third Reich.

When Furtwängler had resumed his musical activities in 1935 he had attempted to dictate to Göring the terms of a new contract with the Staatsoper which would give the conductor full artistic authority. Göring, who had just signed a twelve-year contract with the conductor Clemens Krauss, was probably relieved when Hitler, still smarting from Furtwängler's direct challenge to the *Führer's* musical judgement in the Hindemith affair, refused to agree to Furtwängler's new proposals and insisted instead that the musician be given in the first instance only a guest-conductor's contract for ten performances. In the event, this guest contract did not come into effect until the beginning of the 1937/38 season, by which time Krauss had left the Staatsoper and had been replaced as overall director by Heinz Tietjen. Furtwängler and Tietjen did not get on, and by the middle of December 1937 Furtwängler wrote to Göring asking to be released from his duties at the Staatsoper. Göring's impatience with the conductor is quite clear from his reply of 16 December 1937:

I received your letter from Vienna. It was probably once again time for me to be visited by difficulties created by you. For everything has gone smoothly for almost three months [...]. But it is doubtless also of value to you that your reputation does not seriously suffer as a result of the continuing inconveniences you have, now here, now there, whether it should be Berlin or Bayreuth, the Opera or the Philharmonic. I have felt obliged at last to say that to you quite openly so that you are able fully to realize your situation. As it is with all of us, your duty, too, is in the first place to Germany. But you absolutely cannot demand of me that I should have a Furtwängler Case in the Staatsoper regularly every year.³⁰

That the Prussian Minister President and commander of the *Luftwaffe* should express his irritation with a musician in such a manner is not only a reflection of Furtwängler's peculiarly ambivalent position in Nazi Germany, but also of the mixture of cultural snobbery and personal intrigue that characterized a regime that was already brutally and impersonally engaged in a project of mass murder. Furtwängler's reply is no less remarkable in its self-assurance. The whole matter, the musician reminds the minister, could have been avoided had Göring accepted Furtwängler's proposed contract in 1935:

At that time I was entirely willing to devote my best efforts to the Staatsoper. You made no use of my willingness. You were evidently thinking for your institution (just like Frau Wagner in Bayreuth), not thinking about Furtwängler the artist as a total personality who was ready to assume shared responsibility for the leading opera house and, thus, for the standards of all musical life in Germany, but instead thinking about only the popular conductor.³¹

The arrogance reflects Furtwängler's own view of both his potential and purpose, the mission, he would later insist, he had stayed in Germany to fulfil. This was more than Göring could take, and when the no less disgruntled Tietjen came up with the idea of 'discovering' a young, star conductor to undermine Furtwängler's position as the uncontested master of German musical interpretation, Göring gave him all the support he needed. Karajan, until then musical director of the relatively low-profile Opera in Aachen, was to be celebrated in the press, where possible to the detriment of the older conductor. Furtwängler, a vain man by nature, was devastated by the campaign. 'The Karajan Wonder [*Wunder*]' became 'the Karajan wound [*Wunde*]'.

30 Cited in Wessling, *Furtwängler: Eine kritische Biographie*, pp. 325–26.

31 Ibid., pp. 326–27.

This new 'conspiracy' sent Furtwängler running to Goebbels, who at first responded supportively. A telegram was sent to the *BZ am Mittag* complaining about the tone of von der Nüll's review. By 1940 there are repeated references in Goebbels's diaries to complaints by Furtwängler about the 'deification' of Karajan in the press. At this stage Goebbels continues to support him: 'Furtwängler furious about Karajan. Karajan becoming too celestial in the press. Furtwängler is right there. After all, he is a world star. I shall stop it' (22 December 1940). Less than a month later Goebbels speaks of a 'hot dispute' with Furtwängler over the freedom of newspaper critics. In an obvious reference to the Karajan affair, the minister is quick to point out the conductor's inconsistencies: 'He wants freedom for newspaper critics, but when it touches him a bit too closely, he runs to me for help. I tell him that quite openly, too' (15.1.41). By the end of 1942 Goebbels is becoming perceptibly impatient with Furtwängler's petty and self-contradictory behaviour in connection with Karajan:

A new conflict is brewing between Furtwängler and Karajan. Furtwängler is extraordinarily short-sighted and petty in dealing with Karajan, though he has no need to be. He likes to call on the powers of the National Socialist state at his disposal for himself when they can serve his purpose. I am, however, not in the position to allow that such a rising talent as Karajan be silenced by Furtwängler's rather tough methods. (17.12.42)

By July 1943 Goebbels has had more than enough and records his fairly telling impression of the two conductors:

The row between Furtwängler and Karajan continues its unswerving course. These over-vain conductors, who behave like prima donnas, are beginning to get on my nerves. One may not judge them from a political point of view; they are like children, and they perform extraordinary things in their own field, music. (13.7.43)

Both Furtwängler and Karajan had to face de-Nazification trials after the war. By January 1946 Karajan was free and conducting again. Furtwängler had still not been given a date for his trial and only in December 1946 was his case finally heard. It lasted two days, and certainly only skimmed the surface of the conductor's involvement in the Third Reich. The Commission's preliminary investigations had shown that Furtwängler had not been a member of the Nazi Party, that he had helped individuals persecuted on racial grounds and that he had avoided giving the Hitler salute. He was not therefore being tried as a Nazi, but, in the first place, as someone who had 'served the Nazi regime'. The vagueness of the accusation did much to predetermine the inconclusiveness of the trial. At one point, for example, Furtwängler was accused of having conducted the Berlin Philharmonic at the Nazis' Nuremberg Rallies. Furtwängler replied that he had conducted a performance of *Die Meistersinger* with the Vienna Philharmonic in Nuremberg in September 1938, but that the performance took place the day before the rallies and was thus not part of the official celebrations. There were simply no criteria available by which to judge the degree of 'complicity' represented by such an act, and the matter was dropped. The trial was paralysed by the same lack of criteria throughout, and Furtwängler was acquitted on 17 December 1946. At the end of the trial Furtwängler read out a short declaration. In it he claimed:

It is the political function of art, in our times in particular, to be above politics. Thus, if I remained an apolitical artist above politics in Germany, by so doing I was indulging in active politics against National Socialism. For National Socialism recognizes only politicized art. I

know that Germany was in a terrible crisis. It was my task to help German music, for which I felt responsible, get over this crisis with all the feeble strength I had.³²

The 'crisis' in German music — or of the German music and German culture that Wilhelm Furtwängler stood for — did not come to an end with the collapse of the Third Reich and the end of the Second World War. No sooner had he conducted his first concert in post-war Berlin, than Furtwängler had to realize that the real trial was just beginning. The concert itself, on 25 May, was an overwhelming success. Long after it had been announced that the concert was completely sold out, streams of enthusiastic Berliners turned up at the box office with vases, paintings, coffee, cigarettes and even pairs of shoes in the hope of acquiring a ticket.³³ Furtwängler conducted an all Beethoven programme — the 'Egmont Overture', the 'Fifth' and 'Sixth' symphonies — to a packed house which greeted him with tumultuous applause when he appeared on the podium and gave him sixteen curtain calls and a fifteen-minute ovation at the end of the concert. The reviews of the concert were also enthusiastic, except for one, which particularly wounded Furtwängler. The author was Thomas Mann's daughter, Erika, who in a report for her American newspaper, *The New York Herald Tribune*, telegraphed from Zurich on 31 May, described the concert as a pro-Nazi demonstration celebrating the triumphant return of 'Hitler's favorite maestro and music propagandist abroad' from the clutches of the unpopular de-Nazification commission. Furtwängler responded, not to Erika Mann, but to her father, who had already publicly criticized the conductor, and to whom Furtwängler in a previous letter had suggested the idea of a meeting in Switzerland to discuss 'German questions'.³⁴ Mann had turned the musician down, reiterating his disapproval of Furtwängler's involvement in the Third Reich and seconding his daughter's objections to the May concert in Berlin. Furtwängler's reply to this letter is among the conductor's fullest post-war statements of his own perception of his conduct during the Nazi regime. First, he strongly denies having collaborated with the Reich: 'Everyone in Germany knew and knows that more than any other musician who remained there, I resisted in matters great and small at the risk of my life, untainted by the fact that I was exhibited and photographed by Hitler's propaganda machine.'³⁵

Then, he directly challenges Mann, who, in his Washington speech on *Deutschland und die Deutschen*, had rejected any notion of there being two Germanies, one true, the other false and wicked. To Mann's claim that a work like Beethoven's *Fidelio* should never have been performed in Himmler's Germany, Furtwängler objects, using an argument to which he would frequently return in the post-war years: 'There never was a Himmler's Germany, only a Germany raped by Himmler. It would be more than silly if such a very German work were not to be put on — when would any other nation have found the inner potential to produce such a work?'.³⁶

Finally, with characteristic naivety, self-assurance and self-righteousness, Furtwängler reminds Mann of his duties as a German: 'You have exceptional possibilities, and thus to a degree also the obligation, to help Germany — it is quite immaterial how the Germans would judge it.'³⁷

Even in 1947, and writing to a patriot who had been driven from his homeland in great bitterness by a regime that had branded him a semi-Bolshevik and confiscated his property,

32 Ibid., p. 379.

33 See the account given by Klara Höcker in *Die nie vergessenen Klänge: Erinnerungen an Wilhelm Furtwängler*, Berlin, 1979, pp. 95–98.

34 Furtwängler, *Briefe*, p. 165.

35 Ibid., pp. 166–67.

36 Ibid., p. 168.

37 Ibid., pp. 168–69.

it did not cross Furtwängler's mind to question the assumption that two serious German artists would automatically share a sense of duty towards 'their' nation. Mann did not reply to Furtwängler's letter; he merely noted in his diary: 'A long letter from Furtwängler. Foolish.'

Another important German artist who entered a critical exchange of letters with Furtwängler in the late 1940s was the conductor Bruno Walter. Furtwängler approached Walter at the beginning of January 1949 after an invitation to guest conduct the Chicago Symphony Orchestra had led to an outcry in the American press. Walter was one of the few prominent musicians who refused to take part in a boycott of Furtwängler and made this clear to the latter in a telegram. Furtwängler sent a telegram in return expressing, in addition to his gratitude to Walter, his astonishment that there should be a protest against him of all people ('who, of all the musicians in the Third Reich, had done most to help Jews'), and his hope that men like Walter and himself, 'who come from the same cultural sphere and, actually, share the same views on art and its mission, would become more conscious of what they had in common in a so completely changed world'.³⁸

Like Thomas Mann, Walter was appalled by Furtwängler's complete lack of self-criticism and his complacent assumption of common ground between a celebrated figurehead and a persecuted outcast of the Third Reich. Walter replied somewhat angrily, and accused him:

That your art was for years and years used as a particularly effective means of foreign propaganda for the devils' regime, that you performed valuable services to this regime through your personality and great talent, and that the presence and activity in Germany of an artist of your rank of itself helped these terrible criminals to cultural and moral credit, or at least did a great deal towards that credit.³⁹

Furtwängler had lived for twelve years, Walter went on, in a regime of terror without having to experience fear or horror himself. In the light of all this, Walter wondered, how significant the fact was that Furtwängler had helped a handful of individual Jews?

In his reply Furtwängler probably imagined that he was making considerable concessions, but in fact he remained characteristically stubborn and unrepentant. If the self-righteousness of Furtwängler's letter to Thomas Mann had struck the latter as merely 'foolish', his reply to Walter can hardly be called less than contemptible: 'I can quite understand the Jews' feelings about the Germans, particularly if they had something to do with Nazi Germany, but is it not far more terrible to be oppressed, terrorized and finally, with more or less justification, pilloried by one's own people, as happened to us Germans who stayed behind?'⁴⁰ Furtwängler was very probably precisely the vain, unself-critical, and politically naive artistic genius Goebbels so effectively describes in his diaries. But, in addition to his art, which has, through countless recordings, survived the personal and political trial of the artist, Furtwängler's 'case' remains an important chapter in the perennial debate about the relationship between artist and society, and, more important, a chapter whose pages extend significantly beyond 'Music in the Third Reich'. I should like to close by addressing the question of how, or rather on what level, it is possible to separate Furtwängler's aesthetic ideology from that of the masters he served in the Nazi era, and of what, at the end of the day, we are to make of Furtwängler's post-war claims for 'another Germany', 'the real Germany', 'the true Germany' to which the musician so frequently returns in his notebooks, and which, in his mind at least, could, as late as 1949,

38 Furtwängler to Bruno Walter, 1 January 1949, in *ibid.*, p. 188.

39 Walter to Furtwängler, 13 January 1949. Cited in Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 15.

40 Furtwängler to Walter, 22 January 1949, in Furtwängler, *Briefe*, pp. 191–92.

still serve as the basis for a common heritage and mission uniting him with the Jewish *émigré* Bruno Walter.

From Furtwängler's notebooks it becomes clear that even for him the two Germanies are not as separable as he would sometimes have chosen to imagine:

I know what the system based on violence and terror really could and had to achieve, in any human being, in any nation. And I know too how far the German nation was in reality from this terrible phenomenon that rose up from its own womb.⁴¹

The decisive question is: how could National Socialism deceive the whole world, indeed even the Germans, that it was Germany, while it was not Germany, but the opposite or, at least, an inwardly misunderstood Germany?⁴²

To insist on a clearer separation than this — either on the level of historical description or moral prescription — is most probably 'sheer romanticism', and at least these statements come closer to the middle ground between distance and proximity which characterized Furtwängler's own stance during the Nazi regime. It is precisely in Furtwängler's own sense of his place and function in this middle ground that his 'case' takes on its full significance in the wider — if still essentially German — context of the role of the public artist as an intermediary between 'art' and 'people', and between the claims of artistic freedom and of social 'law'.

The programme of Furtwängler's first concert in Berlin after his 'de-Nazification', on 25 May 1947 — Beethoven's 'Egmont Overture', the 'Pastoral' and 'Fifth' symphonies — has a double significance. On the one hand the political implications of Beethoven's incidental music to Goethe's drama were not lost on Furtwängler's audience. Goethe's Egmont is the hero who does not abandon his people, who stays behind to face the dictator when all others have flown. The parallel, of course, is somewhat thin and dubious: the Duke of Alba is not only the representative of a foreign power, but he also has Egmont put to death, while Hitler was so concerned for Furtwängler's safety that he offered to build him a bunker. This did not seem to deter Furtwängler's enthusiastic public, who greeted their 'Egmont' on his appearance in the concert hall not only with thunderous applause, but also with repeated cries of 'Remain here! Remain here!' The deeper significance of the programme, however, lies in the fact that it was an exact replica of the first concert Furtwängler gave in Berlin after his resumption of conducting duties in April 1935. Then too 'Egmont' stood before his applauding 'people' and was greeted with cries of 'Remain here! Remain here!' The wife of the pianist Adrian Aeschbacher wrote of the event in a letter to her mother in Zurich:

Yesterday was a great festival for us. Furtwängler's return was met with a veritable tempest of joy [...]. I have never experienced such ovation, such enthusiasm, such a manifestation of emotions. Everything that people may not say today, that, for the long period of privation, they simply had to smother, was here expressed in jubilation that gave free run to the heart.⁴³

Furtwängler was called back twenty times and the ovations 'would not stop'. The Manns were surely wrong to see the response to the May 1947 concert as a pro-Nazi demonstration. Applause for Furtwängler was by no means synonymous with applause for the Nazi regime. As Boleslav Barlog, director of the Schiller Theater in Berlin, argued on the second day of Furtwängler's trial: 'For me Furtwängler was the reason for remaining alive for the duration of the Third Reich. Every four weeks a Furtwängler concert — when

41 Furtwängler, *Aufzeichnungen*, 1945, p. 252.

42 Ibid., p. 263.

43 Cited in Elisabeth Furtwängler, *Über Wilhelm Furtwängler*, p. 124.

they happened, one did not need to despair entirely.’⁴⁴ Or in the words of Count Gerhard Kanitz, ‘In the Furtwängler concerts we are one single family of resistance!’⁴⁵ Undoubtedly one must treat such statements with caution, and there were certainly Furtwängler concerts which would be difficult to interpret as acts of resistance, such as the performance of Beethoven’s ‘Choral Symphony’ he was forced into giving in the presence of the *Führer* on the latter’s birthday on 19 April 1942. The following day Goebbels commented in his diary: ‘I have never heard it so fervently performed as this time. The audience is most profoundly enthralled. Tears flood the eyes of the workers and soldiers sitting next to me’ (20 April 1942).

Even here, however, it is difficult to draw any definite conclusions about the relationship between the character of the performance itself and the ideology which in this instance it was clearly intended to serve. A Furtwängler performance of the same symphony from March 1942 has survived on record, and is held by most critics to belong to the greatest and most thrilling of Furtwängler’s recordings. Listened to with the birthday concert and the whole background of the war in mind, it is difficult not to be discomfited when the male voices of the choir sing ‘Run your course, brothers, joyous like a hero on the way to victory’ in the *Allegro assai vivace* of the last movement. The tone is brazenly military, but then the section is marked ‘Alla Marcia’, and the extraordinary orchestral fugue, played at breakneck speed, may well be felt to evoke the madness of human conflict, rather than faith in victory. Also, the full choir’s rapt ‘he must live above stars’ in the closing bars of the *Adagio ma non troppo, ma divoto* section is far more an anguished, if not desperate appeal to a Christian God to show himself to the ‘fallen millions’, than a celebration of a ‘superhuman’ hybrid of Charlie Chaplin and Joan of Arc, as Furtwängler described Hitler after their first meeting.⁴⁶

While any attempt to read a musical performance ideologically is bound to be questionable, one is on safer ground in interpreting musical occasions as instances of political collaboration or resistance. In this sense, both the première of Hindemith’s *Mathis der Maler* which Furtwängler gave with the Berlin Philharmonic on 11 March 1934, the *Tristan* performance at the Staatsoper after the publication of ‘The Hindemith Case’ on 25 November 1934, and Furtwängler’s first Berlin concert (26 April 1935) after his resignation over the Hindemith affair are of crucial importance in understanding the musician’s political role. The massive ovations the conductor received on all three occasions obviously both flattered and fired his personal vanity. But they also meant more to Furtwängler than that. For the conductor, the ultimate test of the value of a work of art lay in the response of the public, not in the reactions of critics or state organizations. This had been one of the central theses of his defence of Hindemith. In the month after his resignation, Furtwängler developed this idea in a number of drafts of memos intended for Goebbels. In one such draft, with the title ‘Problems of German Music’, and dated 17 December 1934, Furtwängler argued that the public should be actively involved in the judgement of works of art because:

The people is the actual ‘other partner’ of the artist’s to whom he turns, indeed whose tacit co-operation as a judging and evaluating factor in the birth of the work of art is absolutely indispensable [...]. Therefore one can say that every artistic decision is a matter of a sort of people’s decision in miniature. To forestall this through the authoritarian means of the state

44 Cited in Curt Riess, *Furtwängler: Musik und Politik*, Berne, 1953, p. 292.

45 Cited in *ibid.*, p. 241.

46 See, among others, Schönzeler, *Furtwängler*, p. 50.

(in so far as it is not a matter of blatant cases of trash or kitsch on the one hand, or of cultural Bolshevism hostile to the state on the other) means simply postponing the real decision.⁴⁷

The parenthetic proviso about kitsch and cultural Bolshevism constitutes primarily a concession to the idiom of the Party. Furtwängler was convinced that art could exist only within and for a given community, and his performances of pieces by modern composers of whose work he did not fully approve, such as Schoenberg, Bartók and Stravinsky, proves that he was willing to put his principles to the public test. In the same memo, Furtwängler points out that while the people or nation (*das Volk*) is represented in musical life by the public, the two terms are not identical. This is a distinction the conductor appears all too frequently to have forgotten. As his letters to Mann and Walter suggest, Furtwängler gave little thought to what was happening in Germany beyond the confines of the concert hall. When he talks about his commitment to 'the common people' or even to 'the true Germany', he has above all his applauding public in mind.

Furtwängler's view of the relationship between the artist and the people draws directly on his reading of Richard Wagner's *Die Meistersinger*. In Wagner's opera, Walter von Stolzing — for Furtwängler the artistic natural genius — seeks to join the guild of the mastersingers in order to be able to take part in a singing contest, the prize of which is the hand of his beloved, Eva. Walter sings before the masters, but as his song does not conform to their strict rules, they fail, with one exception, to understand his music and he is rejected. The one exception is Hans Sachs, who recognizes Walter's genius in spite of the unfamiliarity of his art. On the day of the contest, Sachs has Walter sing before the people of Nuremberg, who — not poisoned by artistic prejudice and personal interest like the masters — he is confident will intuitively understand Walter's song and give him their full support. The people, including Eva, react with such enthusiasm to Walter's art that he not only wins his prize, but is at once invited to join the mastersingers. When Walter angrily rejects this invitation, Sachs steps in once again to warn Walter not to scorn the mastersingers and to honour their art ('Verachtet mir die Meister nicht/und ehrt mir ihre Kunst' [Do not despise the masters, but honour their art]). The mastersingers are the upholders of tradition, and without them all that is 'German and genuine' will disappear for good. In an essay of 1944, 'Hans Sachs wies den Weg: Gedanken über Kunst und Volk' (Hans Sachs Showed the Way: Thoughts on Art and the Nation), Furtwängler clearly uses *Die Meistersinger* as a parable for his own time. The mastersingers are referred to as the 'Meistersingerorganisation': a group of essentially 'mediocre' artists who know 'what profit the individual derives from belonging to an organization'. In contrast to this organization are the 'real', the 'born' artists, Walter von Stolzing and Hans Sachs, who are more or less distant from the 'Meistersingerorganisation'. And finally there is *das Volk* — 'free of prejudice and false knowledge' and 'free of the spirit of intrigue'. The real drama of the opera, for Furtwängler, lies in Sachs's attempt to bring 'genius' and *Volk* together as 'two compounds which belong together'. What is at stake here is, for Furtwängler, nothing less than one of the fundamental conditions of art itself: 'Only natural genius and *Volk* in their vital interaction create the whole reality of art.' But for its survival, art also requires the assistance of the organization: 'Wagner-Sachs, the understanding one, the one with the overview, knows very well that an organization, even though in this case it appears as the representative of the mediocre, of the average artist, does have its significance and function in the history of art.'⁴⁸ Hence the significance of Sachs's final warning 'Verachtet mir die Meister nicht'. Even the genius must recognize his debt to the masters: 'Even the greatest cannot sow in uncultivated land, nor produce,

47 Cited in Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 203.

48 'Hans Sachs wies den Weg', in Furtwängler, *Ton und Wort*, p. 196.

nor harvest. Seen thus, organizations also have their sense, indeed are necessary on the soil of art.⁴⁹ The parabolic parallel with Furtwängler's sense of his own role in the Third Reich is unmistakable, and the writer was surely taking a considerable risk in associating the (state) organization with mediocrity. Furtwängler himself is Hans Sachs bringing the genius of German music to its rightful partner, *das Volk*. As an intermediary, he may not be the 'artistic natural genius' himself, but, like von Stolzing, he is a born artist and is 'more or less distant' from the organization. He cannot reject the organization altogether, because it stands for tradition, which for Furtwängler is at least partly synonymous with 'law'. But nor does he give the organization the last word. Wagner's opera may end with Sachs's appeal 'honour your German masters', but this is only a coda to the real drama: 'The saving of the masters' honour does not come until the end of the work, after the real drama is over.'⁵⁰

Furtwängler had his reservations about the music of Hindemith and certainly did not consider him an 'artistic natural genius' like Wagner's von Stolzing (or his creator). That he none the less saw in his own role in the Hindemith affair a parallel with that of Sachs in *Die Meistersinger* is more than probable. He even makes a direct reference to Wagner's opera in a memorandum, probably intended for either Hitler or Goebbels, that he wrote early in 1935, which criticizes the 'complete organization of cultural life by the Party'.⁵¹ And one further connection between the issue of 'art and *Volk*' in *Die Meistersinger* and Furtwängler's defence of Hindemith's *Mathis der Maler* can be identified in one broad thematic parallel between the two operas. Like Wagner's Sachs, Hindemith's Mathis, based on the early sixteenth-century German painter Matthias Grünewald, finds himself standing between state and *Volk*: dependent as an artist on the Archbishop of Mainz, he none the less supports the cause of the peasants in their revolt.

If Furtwängler did identify himself with Sachs, he ought to have reminded himself that Wagner's cobbler may have been at odds with the 'Meistersingerorganisation', but he was still a leading and respected member of the guild, rather than being 'more or less distant'. Listening to the closing words of Wagner's opera ('Heil Sachs! Heil Nürnbergs teurem [precious] Sachs!' in the 5 September 1938 Nuremberg recording under Furtwängler, it is all too easy to picture Rudolf Bockelmann's 'two leaders of the nation'. Both Hitler and Furtwängler, ironically enough, were probably imagining they were Hans Sachs. I believe one can conclude with some confidence that their reasons for doing so would have been substantially different.

49 Ibid., p. 196.

50 Ibid., p. 197.

51 See Prieberg, *Kraftprobe*, p. 192.

23 Surrealism and the Catholic *Moderna* in Slovakia, 1945–48

LUDWIG RICHTER

Introduction

Surrealism is the decisive avant-garde trend in Slovak literature that developed almost simultaneously with the so-called Catholic *Moderna* in the mid-1930s. Unlike the Catholic *Moderna*, however, the Surrealist group maintained its cohesion not only during the war but also beyond. Surrealism assimilated impulses from both the French epicentre and, especially conceptually, from the Prague variety of the movement.¹

Slovak Surrealism

The foundations of Slovak Surrealism lie in Rudolf Fabry's *Uťaté ruky* (Severed Arms, 1935); subsequently, Surrealism developed into a nationally important trend in the late 1930s when it received theoretical support from the *Vedecká syntéza* (Scientific Synthesis) group (1937–43) which was associated with the Formalist School and the Prague Linguistic Circle. The Slovak Surrealists sought a new poetics (for example, free verse and a positive effulgence of metaphors). They did not, however, seek to escape into 'unreal worlds'; on the contrary, they sought an authentic approach to the 'most burning reality'.² They rejected the utilitarian notion of poetry's commitment to the service of the nation, but they acknowledged the poet's historical responsibility. In his collection, *Vodné hodiny hodiny piesočné* (Water-clock Hourglass, 1938), Fabry conjures up the horrors of war in apocalyptic visions and expresses the hope that mankind may be saved by 'changing the world'. The Slovak Surrealists (they called themselves *nadrealisti* — 'super-realists' — to indicate their difference from the Paris and Prague schools and better to describe their aims) published several anthologies containing, apart from poems and theoretical essays, reproductions of modern painting: *Áno a nie* (Yes and No, 1938), *Sen a skutočnosť* (Dream and Reality, 1940), *Vo dne a v noci* (By Day and Night, 1941) and *Pozdrav* (Greeting, 1942). These provoked fierce public debate.

Slovak Surrealism was syncretist in character; it increasingly diminished its programmatic rigour and began building bridges to the earlier trends — to Symbolism, Impressionism, Czech Poetism and, above all, to Romanticism; indeed with its religious symbolism it built a bridge as far back as the Baroque.³ Attempts to pursue *écriture automatique* were only partial. 'Critical-paranoiac activity as a spontaneous method of irrational cognition', developed by Dalí, 'based on the critically interpreting association of insane phenomena',⁴ was not accepted. The Slovak Surrealists shared common ground with the French Surrealists primarily in what they were against; the bourgeois culture

1 On the analogies and differences between the Slovak and French Surrealist movement see Ludwig Richter, 'Wesenszüge des slowakischen Surrealismus im nationalliterarischen und internationalen Kontext', *Zeitschrift für Slawistik*, 33, 1988, 2, pp. 212–22.

2 Mikuláš Bakoš, *Avantgarda* 38, Bratislava, 1969, p. 65.

3 Michal Považan, 'Čo je nadrealistická poézia?' in Považan, *Novými cestami*, Bratislava, 1963, p. 178.

4 Compare Dalí's definition in 'La Femme visible' (1930), quoted by Karl-Heinze Barck, *Surrealismus in Paris 1919–1939*, Leipzig, 1986, p. 672.

industry was not seriously challenged (it had barely developed in Slovakia), but uneasiness was articulated as far as the state of literary life was concerned. The anarchic revolt against the conventions of bourgeois life did not prove that radical either. The struggle against all forms of institutional oppression, above all against nationalism and clericalism and finally against Fascism was waged with such force that the Slovak Surrealists made it impossible for themselves to hold any public office. From this point of view the Surrealists constituted a small, but intellectually sophisticated, opposition in the German-satellite Slovak Republic. Slovak Surrealism continued to exist as an intact movement until 1948, which is remarkable from an international point of view if we look at the fates of the original Surrealist groups in Czech, Hungarian, Romanian and Serbian literature. In those cultures Surrealism existed for shorter or longer periods, but that existence was not continuous.

In the years immediately after the war, however, it underwent a far-reaching change which gradually entailed an erosion of the formal principles of Surrealism, for its representatives now wanted to escape 'compulsory banishment from life' and become 'co-creators of a new life, architects of a better future'.⁵ Now they replaced their 'cry of protest' with 'a hymn to the beauty of the whole of great, creative, rich life'.⁶ Such an alternative artistic objective held the danger that the differentiated old would be replaced by the undifferentiated new, that the former catastrophist visions would turn into utopian social illusions about the future. As a result of discussions among themselves and with their public, they decided to bring the creators of art closer to its recipients. They did, however, reject easy comprehensibility at all costs, felt committed to the aesthetic standard they had achieved. They considered that 'the cultural level of wide sections of the reading public should be raised', as Pavel Bunčák asserted.⁷ Thus they rejected the vapid didactic conception of literature for the people that was being officially promoted. But, then, the Surrealists had always had to justify themselves amongst the Slovak intelligentsia, who had been brought up on the notion that Slovak literature was a national literature and thus a people's literature. Nevertheless, they had clearly committed themselves politically to contributing to the 'establishment of a society which will gradually get rid of all the attributes of the capitalist system'.⁸

In the immediate post-war years relations with the French Surrealists began to be revived. Translations were published of Breton's assessment of the Surrealistic movement in the 1920s and 1930s *La Situation du surréalisme entre les deux guerres* (1942),⁹ of Eluard's pamphlet *Poésie et vérité* (1942),¹⁰ and of Tzara's collection *Terre à terre* (1946).¹¹ Through Vladimír Reisel, who was press attaché at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Paris from 1945 to 1949, close contacts developed with Eluard and Tzara 'in the name of everything that unites us: the clear hope for a happy, free and unaffected man', as Eluard assures his 'Slovak brothers' in 1946.¹² On 11 April 1946, Eluard spoke in Bratislava on poetry in the service of truth, and on 14 December, Tzara spoke there on the revolutionary sources of French poetry. Both poets confirmed the Slovak Surrealists in their endeavour to be co-creators of a world of peace. They did not consider this a break with Surrealism but as evidence of Surrealism's ability to change on the basis of new experience.

5 Vladimír Reisel, 'Spisovateľ a dnešok', *Nové slovo*, 2, 1945, 6, p. 15.

6 Vladimír Reisel, '1. Máj kultúrnych pracovníkov', *Pravda*, 1 May 1945, p. 1.

7 Pavel Bunčák, 'K otázke dnešnej umeleckej tvorby', *Nové slovo*, 2, 1945, 2, p. 14.

8 Reisel, 'Spisovateľ a dnešok', p. 15.

9 André Breton, 'Situácia surrealizmu medzi dvoma vojnami', *Slovenské pohľady*, 62, 1946, 11–12, pp. 642–53.

10 Paul Eluard, *Poézia a pravda*, Bratislava, 1946.

11 Tristan Tzara, *Zem na zemi*, Bratislava, 1948.

12 See facsimile in Bakoš, *Avantgarda* 38, p. 235.

Although they emphatically declared their belief in the new 'reality' they would not completely relinquish their Surrealist code; they would just 'do away with certain requisites in order to find a new guiltless and unspent artistic basis', as Rak put it.¹³ The literary critic and formulator of the Slovak Surrealist programme Michal Považan tried to underline the significance of the group in a national-literary context, to emphasize its contribution to the moulding of the socialist man in articles such as 'Ľudové základy slovenskej literatúry' (The Popular Bases of Slovak Literature, 1948): 'After a period of interesting experiments the Surrealist poets gradually produce works which contribute to the colourfulness and variety of poetic expression. Each of these poets is an individual personality, which will be confirmed in the near future.'¹⁴ But this did not help. The acceleration of the construction of a 'socialist national culture' after the Communist take-over in February 1948 and in the light of the general East European debate on 'formalism', the end of Surrealism became inevitable. In the early 1950s it was classified as belonging to that 'decadent' literature hostile to the common people. It was Juraj Špitzer who announced the apodictic Party verdict 'Surrealism is an off-shoot of cosmopolitanism, is a world-view militantly opposed to Marxism-Leninism, to art altogether; its art leads to extinction.'¹⁵ Surrealists felt obliged to revise their creative principles and they began to indulge in public self-criticism, as Marenčin said in his account of the movement's death-agony.¹⁶ Považan simply accepted all Stalinist accusations and labelled Surrealism and, indeed, Structuralism 'typical bourgeois literary theories, which again developed the dualism of life and literature in order to lead young people astray'.¹⁷ Attempts to restore Surrealism in the 1960s failed, but some Slovaks, like Albert Marenčin and Karol Baron, joined the Prague Surrealist group of Vratislav Effenberger. Thus a Czechoslovak Surrealism developed in underground, unsanctioned literature.¹⁸

The Catholic Moderna

The Slovak Catholic *Moderna* developed at the time when (Czech) Poetism, Surrealism and the Lyrical Prose school dominated the Slovak literary environment. Like Surrealism, it manifests syncretist features. Through their creative reception not only of Bremond and Claudel but also of Baudelaire, Rimbaud, Breton and above all of Rilke as well as through their own lyric works the Catholic *Moderna* makes its contribution to the 'modernization' of Slovak literature in the second half of the 1930s and in the 1940s.

In the programmatic poem 'Čo som chcel v Paríži' (What I Wanted in Paris) by Rudolf Dilong it becomes particularly clear that the Catholic *Moderna's* declaration of its belief in modern, experimental lyric verse goes beyond a literature explicitly linked with one Christian denomination:

S Hlbinom hľadím na tu polnoc prostú,
jak Rimbaud driemem pod oblakom mostu
druh jeho Verlaine za 5 frankov pije
ale druh jeho Verlaine nemocný je

13 Ján Rak, 'Pomer dnešného básníka k mase', *Pravda*, 20 May 1945, p. 3.

14 Považan, *Novými cestami*, Bratislava, 1963, p. 40.

15 Quoted by Michal Feodor, *Slovenský nadrealizmus. Anotovaná bibliografia*, Martin, 1968, p. 76.

16 Albert Marenčin, 'Ťažký život a ľahká smrť slovenského nadrealizmu — alebo naopak' in Marenčin, *Nikdy a Návraty na Muráň*, Bratislava, 1996, pp. 169–81.

17 See *ibid.*, p. 179.

18 Heribert Becker (ed.), *Aus den Kasematten des Schlafs. Tschechoslowakische Surrealisten*, Munich, 1980, p. 21.

pán abbé Bremond hľadí spoza chmáry
 ten abbéovský klobúk váš je starý
 vravte ste básnik, je to epiteton
 ako sa máte majstre André Breton?

[With Hlbina I look at midnight's sky/like Rimbaud under bridges I dozing lie/for five francs
 his friend Verlaine drinks many a glass/but his friend Verlaine is ill, alas/Abbé Bremond
 looks through a threatening cloud/his abbé's hat is old and worn-out/say poet, this is your
 epitheton/how are you, my dear André Breton?]

Elsewhere Dilong formulated his own programme thus 'my poetic creed; to create a new poetry (we call it "poetry of a new vision"). What does that mean?... A new strength of expression, a new semantic burden for the poetic word, new, unimagined, unforeseen poetic experiences'.¹⁹ Then Dilong adds pointedly: 'Let one poet do it through a Surrealist structure, or an old Romantic structure, or one could choose Futurism, that does not matter. [...] A poem may have many kinds of mission. This could be an attempt to articulate one's own pain or defiance, or a certain order. The mission of poetry may also be to entertain, to distract, or to express a full enjoyment of life'.²⁰ In this statement we see elements of Poetist and of Surrealist designs. And that is not chance. Pavel G. Hlbina's early works *Harmonika* (1935) and *Dúha* (The Rainbow, 1937) are strongly influenced by Poetism in the pictorial quality of their poetic language, and in the rhythmic and euphonic structure of the poems. The same can be said about the lyric works of Paľo Ušák-Oliva, as Viliam Turčány has shown in his analytical readings.²¹ And when we read Nezvaesque phrases like 'poetry of a new vision' in Dilong's credo, the programmatic borrowings from the Surrealist Vladimír Reisel are self-evident. Both Dilong and Hlbina repeatedly turn to the poetics of Surrealism in general and of Slovak Surrealism in particular. Their aim throughout is to combine a Surrealist poetics with the mystical.

This led the Surrealists to write of the ideological discrepancies between them and the Catholic *Moderna*. Fabry's article 'Surrealismus a kresťanstvo' (Surrealism and Christianity) is a graphic testimony to that. Whereas in the wartime Slovak Republic the Surrealists constituted a left-wing opposition, various representatives of the Catholic *Moderna* made nationalist statements in public so that they became to a degree representatives of the ideology of the state headed by the Roman Catholic priest Jozef Tiso. For this very reason and because as clergymen they feared persecution by the Communists, most of them emigrated to the West in 1945. Among them were outstanding personalities who had a formative influence on poetry like Rudolf Dilong himself, or Mikuláš Šprinc or Karol Strmeň. Thus the group was split and henceforth its members continued their writing in different conditions, which led to conflict between the poet as poet and the poet as priest, between the abstract-spiritual and the concrete-sensual elements that reflected the lyrical subject's striving for spiritual harmony.²²

Not all the representatives of the Catholic *Moderna* were priests. The *Moderna* priests' aesthetic innovation also cast its spell on authors who did not feel strong denominational

19 Quoted by Jozef Melicher, 'O katolíckej moderne vecne i kuriózne', *Literika. Literárnokritický kvartálnik*, 1, 1996, 3–4, p. 21.

20 Ibid.

21 See Viliam Turčány, *Rým v slovenskej poézii*, Bratislava, 1975, pp. 210–20.

22 For different views on the Catholic *Moderna* in Slovak literary history see Mária Bátorová, *Roky úzkosti a vzopätia*, Bratislava, 1992; Bátorová, 'Katolícka Moderna' in Jozef Hvišč, Viliam Marčok, Bátorová and Vladimír Petřík, *Biele miesta v slovenskej literatúre*, Bratislava, 1991, pp. 43–60; Pavol Winczer, *Slovenská literatúra*, 38, 1991, 2, pp. 132ff.; Ján Frátrik, *Slovenská katolícka moderna v premenách času*, Žilina, 1994.

ties. Among them were the poets Miroslav Válek and Vojtech Mihálik, who as Communists dissociated themselves from the postulates of the Catholic *Moderna*, but who in their early work made use of the group's poetics. Mihálik's first collection of poetry, *Anjeli* (Angels, 1947), was referred to by contemporary critics as Catholic lyric verse. Even the young Válek (later a senior cultural politician), discerned his basic topic to be 'človek, duša, Boh, láska' (Man, soul, God, love). After all, even after 1945, there was at first still a certain scope for religious literature as, for example, the journal *Verbum* and the editions associated with it, 'Lux', 'Opus' and 'Vita', demonstrate. After 1948 the Catholic *Moderna* was administratively disposed of. Nevertheless some of those who had not emigrated tried somehow or other to adjust themselves to the changed circumstances prevailing after 1945. So Janko Silan in his collection *Úbohá duša na zemi* (Poor Soul on Earth, 1948) could still publicly profess his faith in God and declare himself to be a priest and poet: 'And so I, Janko Silan, a priest,/smile and say:/All that remains is love and its glow/and the goodness of God whom I celebrate.' Then, however, he had to leave sanctioned literature. He continued to write, but until the 1960s he could publish only a few bibliophile collections. With the volume *Oslnenie* (Dazzling, 1969), he even returned to the status of officially discussed poet for a short time. In *samizdat* he published his diary, *Dom opustenosti* (The House of Loneliness), which recounts something of the difficulties of living as a Christian in a totalitarian atheist society.

On the other hand, Hlbina articulated his commitment to 'peace' in three collections of poems without shedding the religious aspect of his poetry; he even expressed apprehension. In 'Studnička' (The well) from the collection 'Podobenstvá' (Parables, 1947) his foreboding is clear

Studnička v poli bola čistá,
dnes ráno zakalil ju vietor času,
pili z nej kone apokalyptické
s tajomnou hviezdou na čele.
Nemáme jazdca, ktorý by ich skrotil,
čo by sa na nich ozaj niesol.
Všetci sme padli pod kopytá
tých koní, ktoré nikto nevidel.
Ich dupot všetkých naľakal,
mnohi sú ranení a mnohí mrtvi...

[The well in the fields was clear,/the wind of time muddied it this morning/the horses of the Apocalypse drank from it/with mysterious stars on their brows./We do not have a horseman who could break them in,/who could actually ride them./We all fell under the hooves/of these horses, which no one had seen./Their galloping frightened everyone; many are injured, many dead...]

Later on in works like *Ozvena slnka* (Echo of the Sun, 1950) or 'Mierové ráno' (Peace Morning, 1952), Hlbina tries to meet the postulates of Socialist Realism, but after the publication of the collection *Ruže radosti* (Roses of Joy, 1955) he fell silent.

One could no longer think of the continued existence of the Catholic *Moderna*. The emigration of leading members of the group and the limits to religious freedom imposed by the regime meant that anyone who wanted to continue writing poetry in the mode of the group's original intentions could do so only outside sanctioned literary life. One of those who 'wrote for the drawer' was Ján Motulko, whose collection *Čas Herodes* (Herod Time, written 1948–49) became available in extracts only after 1989; this verse was felt by readers to be simply 'a distant echo of a cruel reality'.²³ Svetoslav Veigl, shocked at

23 Quoted by Jozef Melicher, see note 19.

dissolution of monasteries and convents stopped writing for thirteen years and took up his pen only after the assassination of Kennedy in 1963 to commemorate the American president in *Zo studňa úzkosti* (From the Well of Anxiety) which remained in manuscript. In the eased cultural and political atmosphere of the Prague Spring, Veigl published *Mesto na návrší* (The Town on the Hill, 1968). At intervals of ten years this was followed by selected poems in the periodical *Slovenské pohľady* (1978), and a selection of his verse, *Pred ružou stojím nemý* (I Stand in Silence Before the Rose, 1988). These were signs of the gradual reintegration of this Catholic poet into Slovak literary life even before 1989.

This chapter has, then, surveyed two trends in Slovak literature that were virtually annihilated by Socialism. The period of transition, 1945–48, became a period of last flickering, in which the Surrealists had, to a degree, compromised their aesthetic, though not actually their politics. One of the two poets I mentioned as coming strongly under the influence of the Catholic *Moderna* in his early days, and occasionally later, Vojtech Mihálik turned fully to Socialist Realism. Today both trends are being treated more seriously by Slovak literary scholars than they ever were in their own time.

24 'National Revival': The Programme of a Newspaper

PETRA BOMBÍKOVÁ

The period of Slovak history between 1945 and 1948 represents an interlude between two totalitarian regimes. It was a period of relatively free speech in which a first and unsuccessful attempt was made to define a position of equality for Slovakia within the constitutional organization of Czechoslovakia. It was also a period in which new potential representations of 'Slovakness' were formulated. These new ideas of Slovakness were, for the most part, advanced in daily newspapers whose explicit purpose was to influence the development of events in Slovakia.

Of the 553 Slovak magazines and newspapers which were published between 1939 and 1944, only twenty or so continued to appear after 1945. These were mostly long-established, specialist publications. Concomitant with the social and economic changes after 1945, however, a number of new periodicals and newspapers sprang up. Many of these only survived in their original form until the beginning of 1948.¹

The defining event which shaped the immediate post-war development of Slovakia was, at least in the eyes of Slovak political leaders, the Slovak National Uprising of August 1944. Slovak political and social structures continued to draw their legitimation from their relationship to the crucial phenomenon of the Uprising. Thus, the Slovak National Council (SNC) — an institution which declared itself to be the 'bearer of legislative, governmental and executive power' — came into being during the preparations for the Uprising. In the territory controlled by the insurgents during the war, all the structures of an independent state were established in parallel to those of Bratislava which were linked in to the Third Reich. The Slovak National Council gradually took control of those areas liberated by the Red Army. On 1 February, 1945 in Košice, the delegates of the SNC began to take responsibility for these areas, and gradually the system of deputies and an assembly of deputies were re-established. In March 1945, the leaders of the SNC, as representatives of the Slovak part of the republic, took part in negotiations in Moscow with representatives of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile concerning the future organization of Czechoslovakia. At the same time, the Uprising became the central element in the official post-war conception of nationhood and the cornerstone of a new national tradition.

On 1 February, 1945, a few days after the opening of the first sitting of the Delegates of the Slovak National Council, the first newspaper aimed at the civilian population began to appear in liberated Košice: *Národná obroda* (National Revival), and it bore the subtitle, 'Organ of the Slovak National Council'. At first, it appeared three times a week, but, following its move to Bratislava, from 20 May 1945, it came out daily with the exception of Monday. Not long after the appearance of *Národná obroda*, the first editions of two other papers appeared in Košice. Both of these belonged to political parties: *Pravda*,² to

1 See M. Fedor, *Bibliografia periodík na Slovensku v rokoch 1939–1944*, Martin, 1950; and M. Bahúlová et al., *Bibliografia novín a časopisov vychádzajúcich na Slovensku v rokoch 1945–1960*, Martin, 1995.

2 *Pravda* was published three times a week in Košice from 6 February 1945, and then daily from 13 April 1945 in Bratislava.

the Communist Party of Slovakia, and *Čas*³ (Time), to the Democratic Party. Over the subsequent months, many other publications started up. This raised the question at the end of 1945 whether publication of *Národná obroda* should cease, as 'normality' had returned to political life, meaning that each political party had its own organ. The editors of the paper, however, decided that *Národná obroda* should remain as a unique expression of the united 'voice' of the Uprising generation. Thus until its closure in May 1948, *Národná obroda* remained unique as the only officially independent daily, although especially after the parliamentary elections of May 1946, it tended, for the most part, to toe the line of the Communists.⁴

The newspaper followed the programme of the SNC in so far as it was responsible for publishing all the official documents of the SNC. From today's perspective it is interesting to note the extent to which *Národná obroda*, which considered itself able to form opinion, was indeed capable of influencing social change, although it was dependent for its very existence on the political changes then taking place in Slovakia, and Czechoslovakia as a whole.

Besides the position of the Uprising in official ideology, another important aspect of cultural change in Slovakia was the notion of national rebirth or the revival of Slovak society which *Národná obroda* presented to its readers, particularly in the first period of its existence. The paper attempted not to comment on events, but rather to provide the public with information and a non-party-political view of the situation. Nevertheless, on the evidence of the material provided by editorials, *feuilletons*, and particular columns, it is possible to discern the ideological position of the newspaper and of those behind it.

Its choice of name is itself an unambiguous sign that the newspaper's primary function was to represent the formulation and dissemination of the idea of a revived, renewed nation. In its first few months, the paper also saw its function to be to support the rebuilding of a state destroyed by war, its economy, and transport system, and as playing a role in the normalization of post-war life. In the first issue, the editor-in-chief, the Communist Ladislav Novomeský, the Commissioner for Education and Culture and a respected poet, gives the following explanation:

It is not by accident that we have chosen this name for the newspaper of the Slovak National Council. The rebirth of our nation is the common programme of all the factions which make up the Slovak National Council, the publisher of *Národná obroda*. We have witnessed the need for the revival of our nation in the many difficult and bitter experiences of our past, the recent past included.

A practical expression of the revival of our nation will be achieved when the true core of the nation becomes its leading element; that is to say, the peasants, workers and, of course, the Slovak intelligentsia who are linked with them. Our national politics will be dictated by the economic, social and cultural interests of these classes — not by individuals belonging to these classes, but by entire classes.⁵

This editorial also commented on the Manifesto of the SNC which was published in the same edition. This Manifesto, addressed to all Slovaks, 'Slováci a Slovenky!', gave an outline of the basic principles of the SNC's programme. One of its main pillars was a

3 *Čas* started as a daily on 19 April 1945 in Bratislava. After raids on its offices publication was abandoned on 23 February 1948.

4 The leader of the winning Democratic Party, Jozef Lettrich, accused the paper of partisanship. Hence the newspaper had to remove its subtitle 'Organ of the SNC' from June 1946. In February 1948 *Národná obroda* adopted a new subtitle 'Independent daily', stating clearly its position in the changing times.

5 [no title], *Národná obroda*, 4 February 1945, p. 1. Henceforth I shall refer to articles in *Národná obroda* by date and page number following the quotation.

declaration of support for the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and an outline of the form which this future state should take: 'The fruit of our nation's struggle will be a new Czechoslovak Republic, which shall be a people's republic of Slav nations.' The text goes on to explain: 'In agreement with the leaders of the Czech nation, we shall establish the relationship between Czechs and Slovaks in the new Czechoslovakia on the basis of complete equality of rights, in such a way that Slovaks will govern their affairs in Slovakia and Czechs will do likewise in the Bohemian Lands' (4 February 1945, p.1).

The programme of the SNC, indeed, of the entire generation following the Uprising, did indeed declare its allegiance to a re-established Czechoslovakia. At the same time, however, on the question of the organization of government, it supported the principle of Slovakia as an equal partner of the Czechs. This was the federal principle, equal with equal, formulated by representatives of the SNC at the end of 1943 as one of the key goals of the Uprising. This programme was then presented during the first negotiations with the Czechoslovak exiles in London and Moscow in March 1945 by members of the SNC, acting as recognized spokesmen of Slovak national interests. After six years of a theoretically independent Slovakia, this demand was an unavoidable prerequisite if the programme of the SNC was to appeal to a broad cross-section of the Slovak population. If the six years of the existence of the wartime Slovak state had had any not entirely negative effect, it was in a strengthening of Slovak national consciousness. Just as the political leadership of the Slovak Republic had done, so the political generation which emerged from the Uprising put forward a notion of Slovak nationhood based on national self-determination. The SNC attempted, however, to redefine this notion in order to bring it into line with its own political purposes, and to accommodate the realities of post-war circumstances. It was necessary to find a new definition of Slovakness, and simultaneously to preserve continuity with the conventional understanding of Slovakness in order to gain as much support as possible from the populace. It had to be demonstrated that it was not the Slovakness of the wartime Slovak state, but the Slovakness of the Uprising that represented the 'true' pedigree of the Slovak national tradition. The Slovaks had to be persuaded that the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic did not threaten Slovak national interests.

A natural part of this process was an appeal to a symbolic vocabulary accepted by the largest possible section of the population, and a re-interpretation of a range of historical figures and events. It is typical of the twentieth-century history of the Slovaks, particularly at crucial moments, that practical politics as expressed in propaganda is intertwined with the re-interpretation of history: politicians seek in the past arguments with which to legitimate themselves and their ideology. As Ivan Kamenec writes in his article on stereotypes in Slovak history and historiography: 'The frequent and unfortunately not always positive political changes in Slovakia have resulted in the continuous re-evaluation of history according to the ideological model current at the time.'⁶

The very term *obroda*, revival, used in the title of the newspaper, has the association of 'National Revival'.⁷ This suggests a continuity with the process of formulating and creating a new democratic Slovak nation. The link to an older tradition is strengthened also by the name given to the assembly and the organization which published the newspaper. The Slovak National Council is a direct reference to the tradition of the Slovak Awakener,

6 Ivan Kamenec, '14. marec a 29. august', *Občianska spoločnosť*, 1998, 3, p. 3.

7 It is particularly associated with T. G. Masaryk, who had renamed the Czech *probuzení* (awakening) *obroda* (revival) in his *Česká otázka* (1895). Furthermore, Masaryk regarded himself as part of the *obroda*, which only came to an end with the declaration of Czechoslovak independence in 1918. The term 'national revival' was also used by other Central European nations, like the Germans or Slovenes in the nineteenth century.

Ľudovít Štúr, and the first SNC which was linked to the first armed uprising of Slovaks in 1848. The second SNC was a temporary institution founded in October 1918, set up so that the Slovaks could express their agreement with the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic and with the inclusion of Slovakia in the new state.

The fundamental characteristics of Slovakness as presented in the editorials of *Národná obroda* were antifascism, allegiance to the spirit of Uprising, Slav orientation, support for the re-establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic and the principles of people's democracy. The choice of historical events to be included by these authors of a new conception of nationhood can be seen in the occasional editorials written mostly by the editor-in-chief, Ladislav Novomeský, or by Gustáv Husák, especially after Husák had become chairman of the Board of Commissioners. The first piece of evidence, however, can be seen in an early issue of the paper, on the sixth anniversary of the establishment of the Fascist Slovak state. Here the author of the editorial, Ján Pull, explicitly contrasts this anniversary of the 14 March 1939 with the date of the beginning of the Uprising on 29 August 1944: 'The Fourteenth of March is dead. Its architects are packing their bags and are getting ready to flee to Germany. The Twenty-Ninth of August lives, and its spirit will rule Slovakia and soon, we hope, the whole of Czechoslovakia' (14 March 1945, p. 2).

It was in this spirit that the Uprising became an event to which the paper devoted particular attention. Thus, for example, the special issue of the paper which came out in 1946 to celebrate the second anniversary of the Uprising consisted of fifty-six pages as compared with the usual four. Beside the Uprising, *Národná obroda* celebrated the end of the war (9 May),⁸ major Church festivals such as Christmas and Easter, May Day, but also the 28 October, the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, and the birthdays of T. G. Masaryk and Beneš. One new holiday was added which received particular attention — the Day of the Slavs, 5 June, the feast of SS Cyril and Methodius.⁹ Most of the holidays which had already existed gained a new significance, not only as a result of the interpretations given to them in the special editorials, but also thanks to specific political events. For example, 28 October was celebrated not merely as the anniversary of the founding of Czechoslovakia, but also as the Day of Nationalization (the programme of nationalization had been announced on this date in 1945) and as the day of the announcement of the two-year plan in 1946. Thus we read: 'Our freedom, which was won twenty-eight years ago, shall be ensured by the great national achievement of the two-year plan' (announcement of the National Front concerning 28 October; 13 October 1946, p. 1). Similarly, new interpretations were given to the deeds and merits of individual historical figures. Amongst these was Milan R. Štefánik. Although there was no doubt that, as co-founder of the Czechoslovak state, a place in the 'national pantheon' was his by rights, Štefánik's unambiguously negative attitude towards Russia and the October Revolution was problematic for a post-war generation which was explicitly pro-Russian and pro-Soviet. Novomeský, the author of the editorial to the special edition which appeared to mark the anniversary of Štefánik's death in an air-crash asks the following question: 'Would M.R. Štefánik today, during this war, still hold the to the opinions which he

8 Whereas in the rest of Europe the end of the war was traditionally regarded as falling on 7 May (Germany's unconditional surrender), in Czechoslovakia (as in Poland), until after the fall of Communism, it was 9 May, since that day allegedly marked the end of fighting on Czechoslovak soil. In fact 9 May was simply the date of Marshall I. S. Konev's 'liberation of Prague'. The leadership of the Prague Uprising had come to an agreement with the Germans on 8 May, when they started leaving Prague; furthermore the last serious military action took place on 12 May in Milín near Příbram (Bohemia).

9 After the fall of Communism this day was made a public holiday in both 'halves' of Czechoslovakia.

expressed whilst he was alive?' The answer, we are told, is to be found in a statement made by Štefánik himself where he claimed he had denied his belief in Slavdom only to the Western Allies in the interests of the creation of Czechoslovakia. Novomeský goes on to state that 'Štefánik's belief in Slavdom, which was as ardent as his belief in Slovakness, was, at that time [that is 1914–18], possible only as an illicit, unexpressed allegiance, a hidden faith' ('Logika Štefánikovo odkazu', 4 May 1946, p. 1).

The idea of belonging to Slavdom was of particular importance in post-war Czechoslovakia. The emphasis on the position of Slovakia and Czechoslovakia in the post-war world as belonging to a community of Slav nations had a significance which reached beyond the borders of Czechoslovakia. Panslavism had a particularly long tradition in Slovakia; from the publication of Štúr's *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (in Russian translation 1867, German original, 1931), representatives of this tradition had advocated not only a cultural alliance with the other Slavonic nations, as had Kollár, but also a political alliance with Russia at its heart. This latter idea was incorporated into the ideological repertoire of the members of the Slovak Communist left, particularly the members of the *DAV* group¹⁰, with the difference that they considered the historical mission of the Slavs to be the realization of socialist revolution — yet another example of the 're-evaluation of values'. As Novomeský put it in the editorial of *Národná obroda* on the occasion of the celebration of the Day of the Slavs in 1946:

now after the Second World War, the Slavs are a real force. This is no longer a dream dreamt by poets, not a philosophical idea or political goal, but a political and military fact as represented by the Red Army [...]. The Slav world has come of age and lived to see victory against the most powerful threat to the Slavs which history has ever known. The Slavs are destined to play an exceptional and positive role in the interests of humanity. ('Slovania v dnešnom svete', 5 July 1946, p. 1).

This 'positive role' clearly means the creation of 'socialist society' and of a socialist Slav bloc of states. The editorial which appeared on the occasion of the celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution makes this explicit: 'It is enough to remember the fact that, thanks to the victory of the October Revolution, the Slavs have embarked upon their historic mission' (7 November 1946, p. 1)

The post-war orientation of Czechoslovak foreign policy towards the Soviet Union, confirmed as it was by the outcome of the war, had, of course, a far more material foundation than that provided by the ideology of Slovak Communists. This would later result in quite different forms of co-operation between the 'brother Slavs'. One such example is the agreement on the status of the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine¹¹, as interpreted by

10 *DAV* was the name of a periodical and of the group of left-wing and Communist writers it represented. The periodical appeared irregularly between 1931 and 1937. The title is based on a word-play; *dav* means 'masses, mob' and is made up of the Christian names of three of the group's leaders, Daniel Okáli, Andrej Sirácky and Vladimír Clementis. The two best known editors of *DAV*, the Communists Clementis and Novomeský, were arrested in 1951 and put on trial, as was Gustáv Husák, for 'bourgeois nationalism'. Clementis was executed in 1952, Novomeský and Husák given long prison sentences in 1954.

11 The Sub-Carpathian Ukraine (Ruthenia) had been part of the First Czechoslovak Republic. As a result of Soviet manipulation, the first Congress of National Committees of the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine met in Mukačevo on 25 and 26 November 1944. The Congress elected a National Council, to be led by the Communist I. I. Turjanica, which welcomed the proposal contained in the manifesto, 'Towards a Re-unification of the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine'. The National Council refused to communicate with the representative of the Czechoslovak government-in-exile. The Congress marked the *de facto* secession of the region from Czechoslovakia; it became a part of the Soviet Union on 29 June 1945, when

Clementis: 'It can be said that, with the agreement on the Sub-Carpathian Ukraine, we have written a unique chapter in history' (5 July 1945, p. 2).

The pro-Slav orientation of post-war Czechoslovakia did not find its expression only in positive pro-Soviet sentiment. It also comprised antipathy towards the various non-Slav national minorities in Slovakia, particularly towards the Hungarians the expulsion of whom (later the process was renamed 'exchange') received particular attention in the editorials of *Národná obroda*. Anti-German and anti-Hungarian attitudes formed part of official ideology, and the expulsion of non-Slav minorities from the territory of the republic was one of the central demands of the Czechoslovak delegation at the Paris peace conference. *Národná obroda* followed the negotiations in detail, and published daily reports written in the following tone:

The applause which greeted the speech of the Czechoslovak delegation meant a number of things; from our perspective, however, we have particular reason to read into it international agreement with the decision of the Czechoslovak Republic not to tolerate the existence on its territory of colonies of minorities. (4 August 1946, p. 1)

The speech in question was given by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jan Masaryk.

Given the bitter conflicts that had existed within Slovak society and which had reached a climax with the Slovak National Uprising, *Národná obroda* attempted to have a unifying effect on Slovak society. This involved using all possible means to find negative elements around which the Slovaks could unite positively. Hence, the attempt to find 'enemies of the Slovak nation', be they internal enemies, the allegedly small group of 'usurpers' who took power in 1939, and tried to 'seduce' the nation onto the wrong path, or 'external' enemies, who, in the period 1945–48, were the alien Germans and Hungarians. *Národná obroda* devoted close attention both to the expulsion of minorities and to the trials of the leaders of the wartime Slovak state.

The years 1945 to 1948 were exceptionally dynamic. The attempt of Slovak politicians to achieve a constitutional organization of Czechoslovakia on the basis of the equality of Czechs and Slovaks failed. By 1947, after the signing of the Third Prague Agreement,¹² it was clear that this problem would remain unresolved. As the position of the Communist Party grew more secure, the interpretation given to the Uprising itself began to change. In 1945, on the first anniversary of the Uprising, articles in *Národná obroda* had stressed the 'purity' and almost sacred function of the Uprising. In the words of the writer Alfonz Bednár: 'The world will not recognize or accept a collective whose altar-cloth has not been bloodied, and whose history flows past unnoticed. The sacrifice was great, yet the Slovak nation made it to cleanse itself of its shame' ('Slovenské národné povstanie a dejiny', 29 August 1945, p. 7). A year later, however, this same event is put into a different context. Merely the fact that on the second anniversary of the Uprising *Národná obroda* published an interview with the Czechoslovak Prime Minister indicates the changed view of this event; once an event of Slovak self-expression, it had now become a part of official state ideology. Gottwald, for example, stated: 'Loyalty to the legacy of the Uprising today means loyalty to the government programme of building socialism; it means enthusiastic

Czechoslovakia signed an agreement with the USSR; the secession became valid *de jure* when the National Assembly ratified the agreement on 22 November 1945.

12 The Third Prague Agreement was ratified by the SNC on 16 July 1946. It was designed by the Czech Communists to remove all power from the Democratic Party which had so successfully trounced the Slovak Communists in the May elections. It made the Slovak Board of Commissioners, who were the *de facto* government of Slovakia, subordinate to the Czechoslovak government and gave the central government the power to impose legislation on Slovakia.

and diligent work to make socialism real' ('K druhému výročí Slovenského národného povstání', 29 August 1946, p. 1). From this point on, the tradition of the Uprising is treated just as any other political event, according to the particular political and ideological needs of the moment.

The newly appropriated 'tradition' of the Uprising was used to deny the need for a solution to the question of constitutional organization; with the ascendancy of the Communists, the Party began to emphasize the fact that the development and prosperity of Slovakia were in any case guaranteed. 'The political forces which are now in power are a guarantee that Slovakia is threatened by neither bureaucratic centralism nor social pressure, let alone the prospect of being marginalized economically. These issues belong to the past, and what remains is only the problem of Slovak society' (Miloš Marko, *Stav povereníkov do nového údobia*, 17 August 1946, p. 2).

The last number of *Národná obroda* appeared on Sunday 30 May 1948. It stated that *Národná obroda* had completed its mission since the general principles of the Uprising had been enshrined in the constitution of the re-established republic. The following serves as a farewell:

At that time [when the newspaper began to appear] the Slovak National Council was still recognized as the creator, expression and representative of a true Slovak and Czechoslovak unity — not a unity of coalition which is superficial and depends on special circumstances, but a real unity in both short and long-term aims such as was created during the years of preparation for our National Uprising and later during the Uprising itself amongst our unified people. The preservation, cultivation, development, and forging of this political unity in the renewal of our nation was one of the main aims of the mouthpiece of the SNC, which our newspaper has been. (30 May 1948, p. 1)

30 May, 1948 was the date of the first entirely unfree Czechoslovak elections, in which the National Front list won 89.3 per cent of votes (70 per cent Communists, 19.3 per cent the rest). Such was the death of *Národná obroda* that, as late as 1984, it still had not earned a place in the articles on Slovak newspapers and periodicals in the standard companion to Slovak literature (*Encyklopédia slovenských spisovateľov*). The official attempt to erase the newspaper from history could be seen in the official biographies of officially approved figures which made no mention of their involvement with *Národná obroda*. Yet despite the newspaper's erasure from official history, it had made sufficient impact on unofficial consciousness that in 1990 when a new newspaper came into publication, seeking to be once again the genuine voice of a nation, it took the name *Národná obroda*, with the subtitle 'the independent daily for Slovak citizens'.

25 Panslavism in the Work of Czech Writers in Wartime Exile

VLADIMÍR PAPOUŠEK

Attempts of Czech intellectuals in the immediate post-war period to come to terms with the new political status of the Soviet Union and to look positively on links with the Eastern cultural tradition were frequent and unsurprising. In left-wing intellectuals one could understand it as a culmination of the glorification of the 'Russian miracle'. This glorification had continued from the 1920s to the end of the 1930s in polemics both with opponents of the exporting of revolution to central and western Europe and with difficult customers within the ranks of the left-wing who sought a critical analysis of the realities of the new Soviet state.¹ Amongst liberals, including socialists with a non-Communist orientation like, for example, Václav Černý², one may understand the coming to terms with the Soviet Union as the expression of a simple intellectual need to react to a new state of affairs³ and as a means of overcoming the shock of rejection most western-orientated intellectuals had experienced after the Munich Agreement.⁴

The frequency with which this coming to terms exploited the Panslav myth, the notion of a single mighty united Slav nation is, perhaps, remarkable. Russia is interpreted as the unifier of the dispersed nation and universal saviour. Contributions to the resuscitation of this myth were, strange as it may seem, also made by Czech writers in exile in the West. They went as far as supporting Soviet ideological interventions in the Slav states that were in the Soviet sphere of influence.

One of the first Western centres of exile was Chicago, where liberal exiles were concentrated around Edvard Beneš who, since his resignation on 5 October, 1938, was lecturing at the University.⁵ Panslav feeling was clearly perceptible in the circle around Beneš, in Beneš himself and in his ideological fellows, of whom the most significant was the Protestant theologian, Josef Lukl Hromádka who during the war published in Chicago the periodical *Husův lid* (The People of [Jan] Hus).

Chicago was an apt location, since the expatriate community had an old 'Slav' tradition. The Panslav idea had come over with the first Czech settlers in the Midwest around the middle of the nineteenth century. During the time that Vojtěch Fingerhut/Náprstek was in America (he escaped Vienna, having been politically active in the 1848 revolution), he and his fellows were considering transferring new Czech immigrants from St Louis to Russia, where a Czech colony called Nová Čechie was to be established on the River Amur. An expedition set out for Russia, led by Náprstek's friend, Vojta Mašek, who was to negotiate the matter with the imperial government. Because the Russians were unwilling to come to a decision on the colony, in the end this utopian project did not come to fruition; it simply

1 See, for example, S. K. Neumann, *Anti-Gide*, Prague, 1937, or Karel Teige, *Surrealismus proti proudu*, Prague, 1938.

2 See Václav Černý, 'O komunistickém kulturním programu a budovatelském optimismu', *Kritický měsíčník*, 8, 1947, pp. 163–74.

3 For example, Jindřich Chalupecký, 'Konec moderní doby', *Listy*, 1, 1946, pp. 7–22.

4 See Edvard Beneš, *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války*, Prague, 1946.

5 He arrived there in February 1939 as a visiting professor at the University of Chicago.

remained a matter for discussion in the periodical *Slávie*.⁶ Even after this, however, the Panslav tradition survived as an important element of the expatriate community's self-definition in a predominantly English-speaking environment. On the eve of the First World War the most influential poet among the Czechs, both Roman Catholics and freethinkers, was the neo-Revivalist Svatopluk Čech.⁷

Čech's ardent enthusiasm for national ideals and his romantic visions of Slav unity aided Czech Americans of various clubs and fraternities to justify their exclusivity in the ever more self-confident 'Anglo-Saxon' American society.⁸ Czech-American periodicals like *Svornost* (Concord) in Chicago maintained Panslav consciousness right up to the beginning of the Second World War.⁹ At that time there was already a Communist periodical in Chicago, *Nová doba* (New times), which consistently toed the Comintern line of Stalin, who exploited the Panslav idea as a propaganda tool to encourage pro-Soviet sentiments. *Nová doba*'s duty to fulfil Comintern instructions sometimes led to predictably comic tergiversation in editorial opinion. For example, articles violently attacking pro-Beneš exiles appeared in the number for 24 November, 1939. Jan Masaryk was bitterly criticized in an article headed 'Není syn jako otec' (His Father's Footsteps?); in 'Churchill naličil past' (Churchill Set a Trap) the British Prime Minister is described as a warmonger. Once the Germans invade the USSR, *Nová doba* lauds Beneš, Churchill and Jan Masaryk as friends.¹⁰ Now articles begin to appear which portray the Soviet Union as Slavdom's martyr and employ the Panslav myth to legitimize Stalin's regime. One may compare this with the article published as late as 18 July 1941 under the title 'Nechte spát mrtvolu panslavismu' (Let the Corpse of Panslavism Sleep), which also attacks *New-Yorské listy* for the view that Beneš was close to realizing his greatest dream, Panslavim. *Nová doba* rejects the notion that the Soviet Union was reviving the Panslav myth. A few weeks later, *Nová doba* became an ardent supporter of Panslavism. The *Clevelandský obzor* (Cleveland Survey), two pages incorporated in *Nová doba*, started to publish entirely in the spirit of Slav Reciprocity and to abound in invitations to Panslav occasions.¹¹ The *Nová doba* of 18 May, 1943 brims with pieces devoted to the Panslav Congress in Moscow.¹²

Soon after the German invasion of the USSR, *Nová doba* began to pretend to be non-ideological, to support democracy and national ideals. Thereby it attracted to its columns liberal exiles like the actor Jiří Voskovec, the writer and cartoonist Adolf Hoffmeister, or the novelist Egon Hostovský. In the last case, by contributing to *Nová doba* the novelist was demonstrating that he did not share the views of the New York circle around the journalist Arne Laurin and *New-Yorské listy*.¹³ Another occasional contributor to *Nová doba* was the chairman of the (Czechoslovak) National Council in the USA, Josef

6 See Tomáš Čapek, *50 let českého tisku v Americe*, New York, 1911, and R. Bubeníček, *Dějiny Čechů v Chicagu*, Chicago, IL, 1905.

7 See J. H. Zachar, *Echa prérií a babylonských věží*, Prague, 1916, and J. Vránek, *Na půdě americké*, Chicago, IL, 1905.

8 J. Martínek, *One Hundred Years of the CSA*, Cicero, IL, 1955.

9 Articles exhibiting the Slav idea will be found in *Věk rozumu* as well as *Svornost* from 1938–40.

10 This applies to numbers of *Nová doba* from 22 June 1941 onwards. *Nová doba* is held by the University Library at Chicago in the ACASA special collection.

11 Panslav thinking remained part of *Nová doba* policy for some time after the war. For example, an article headed 'Spojme se v neděli s ostatními Slovany' (On Sunday Let Us Join with Other Slavs) on 1 September 1949.

12 One example with an esoterically bilateral title is 'Pozdrav Churchillovi či Slovanský kongres zdraví FDR' (A Greeting to Churchill, or: The Slav Congress greets FDR).

13 Jiří Brabec, 'Konfliktní přijetí Hostovského románu *Sedmkrát v hlavní úloze*', *Kritický sborník*, 8, 1993, pp. 41–44.

Martínek. Martínek distanced himself from Panslavism, which in 1945 led to a rift between him and *Nová doba* and the Panslav, pro-Soviet National Association and its chairman, Adolf Kačer.¹⁴ Martínek, together with Josef Falta,¹⁵ represented the Social Democrat wing of the expatriate community. Falta's scepticism about Panslavism is evident from his 1942 series of talks on the wireless, 'Russia as an American Ally Yesterday and Today.'¹⁶ Nevertheless, he remained in the National Association until the Communist take-over. On the whole one may say that Social Democrats rejected the Panslav myth. On the other hand those who claimed to be maintaining the tradition of T. G. Masaryk like Beneš and Hromádka shared much with the Panslav views propagated by the Communists.

The former Czechoslovak premier Milan Hodža was fully aware of the dangers inherent in this fusion of ideas, as we see from a quaintly nationalist memorandum from 1944:

The basic point, however, is that the Slav conception of civilization was born of, and survived on, ideals like 'humanist' democracy, the freedom of individuals and nations, freedom of conscience and thought. Many Czech thinkers from Jan Hus, to Comenius, to Palacký and Masaryk devoted their lives to these ideals. Moscow's Slavness is of a somewhat different nature. Tsarist diplomats used Slav romanticism as propaganda. It is the same today. But propaganda is not constructive politics.¹⁷

Hodža was one of Beneš's greatest critics. What we do not know is whether Beneš and his circle did not realize that Russian Panslavism was simply propaganda, or whether they simply wished to conceal that knowledge in the interests of their political goals, especially during the period of negotiations of the new Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact. In any case, for many Czech intellectuals Panslav thinking in considering future relations with Moscow and Moscow's future role in Central and Eastern Europe seemed legitimate, given the Soviet Union's role of saviour in the current crisis of European civilization. These intellectuals imagined that war-torn Russia was going through a major political and ideological change in which its awareness of its responsibility to the Slav world and to the defence of the Slav world against Pan-Germanism played a fundamental role.

After the signing of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact on 21 December 1943, Beneš declared in an address broadcast from Moscow:

Dearest Czechoslovak citizens, you must understand my journey today in the spirit of our national history over the last two centuries. It reflects what our great National Revivalists saw in the Russian nation, how Dobrovský, Kollár, Palacký, Šafařík saw Russia in the spirit of the future development of our people's relationship with the Russian people, what our great democrat Havlíček, what our Palacký and Rieger, expressed with their journeys to Russia, how Masaryk saw Russia, how Zdeněk Nejedlý has understood and understands Russia here in Moscow, and how I understood and defended Russia on my journey here in

14 As chairman of the National Association (ČNS), Kačer was hostile to representatives of Beneš policies like Martínek and J. Papánek. After the 1945 rift, when the ČNS refused to co-operate with the National council (ČNR), Kačer's conflict with Martínek led to a court case. The ČNS had a positive approach to Gottwald's government and continued to provide financial support to Czechoslovakia, as we learn from František Kozumplík, *Adolf Kačer*, Chicago, IL, 1956.

15 As we gather from Martínek's correspondence, deposited in the ACASA special collection, he regarded Falta as a supporter of Kačer, since Falta worked in the leadership of the ČNS. Martínek changed his opinion only after Falta's public departure from Kačer's camp over his condemnation of the 1948 Communist take-over.

16 Subsequently published, Josef Falta, *Rusko — spojenec Ameriky, včera a dnes*, Chicago, IL, 1942.

17 Robert B. Soumar, *Hodžova politická koncepce za druhé světové války*, Chicago, IL, 1954, p. 11.

1935 as Czechoslovak foreign minister and as a defender of the new Slav, democratic, people's politics.¹⁸

One has to assume that this visible confusion of various Czechs' and Slovaks' views on Russia derives partly from the needs of pro-Soviet propaganda, partly from a life surrounded by nationalist clichés, and partly from either dishonesty or a lack of education. Dobrovský and Šafařík's views were largely those of philologists and, a little later, at least in the case of Šafařík, romantic Slavism. Kollár liked Russia as the great, free Slav brother, but saw in the empire an equal partner with other Slavs in his scheme of Slav Reciprocity. For most of his career Palacký saw Russia as a dangerous autocracy; only at the end of his life when he had turned against Austria, did he hope for help from Russia for the Czech cause and he was disappointed. Havlíček's journey to Russia cured him of Panslavism and inspired a hatred of the whole Russian set-up. T. G. Masaryk was very suspicious of Russia's 'oriental' nature and he loathed Bolshevism. Rieger had, perhaps, a somewhat romantic attitude to Russia like the senescent Palacký. Nejedlý was a Stalinist. One notes also Beneš's peasantish nineteenth-century nationalist 'our' in 'our Palacký and Rieger'.

Beneš later interprets his journey to sign the pact as the result of the natural evolution of Czechoslovak politics over the previous fifty years, a result of a tradition firmly rooted in the national consciousness. The change he sees in Russia's European role is more or less explicit. The Soviet Union is no longer predominantly the engineer of world revolution, but the defender of Slavdom: 'the Soviet Union will never allow any German *Drang nach Osten* in the future'.¹⁹ Even given the emotionality naturally inspired by the state of war, Beneš's glorification of the USSR is hyperbolic, mythicizes: 'It is a massive, strong, consolidated state, now militarily invincible, economically fully prepared to wage this war to its victorious end, has inexhaustible material reserves.'²⁰ Beneš appears sincerely to have believed that the Soviet Union was changing fundamentally, as is clear from words he wrote a few months later, on 3 February 1944, in the essay 'Na cestě k vítězství' (On the Path to Victory): '[Russia's] new attitude to the Orthodox Church, to religion altogether, its incredibly lively and profound cultural, artistic and literary life, its profound Soviet patriotism and new national feeling, its favourable stance towards the so-called Slav policy.'²¹ Beneš clearly believes that the spirit of change is permanent: 'the Soviet Union has changed essentially since its beginnings and it will be forced to continue changing'.²²

It is not the aim of this chapter to determine to what degree the isolation of exile, the success of Communist propaganda or the latent Panslav enthusiasm of Czech expatriates formed Beneš's thinking, but rather to establish the existence of various Panslav models being propagated in the West during the war, models that would then fuse with the model of the Czech Communists in exile in Moscow, and form a large part of the basis of the Third Republic ideology that soon led to the Communist take-over.

A major contribution to exile Panslavist thinking was made by J. L. Hromádka. During the war he worked at Princeton and his periodical, *Husův lid* provided him with a platform for expressing his political views. He also, together with the historian Otakar Odložilík, published the most significant Czechoslovak exile cultural magazine in America, *Zítřek* (Tomorrow). A fervent Benešite, Hromádka went into exile, a believer in Masaryk and Rádl's conception of Czech history as linked with the Western Christian tradition and its religious and social reformism. In 1950, Vojta Beneš wrote that Hromádka 'betrayed his

18 Beneš, *Šest let exilu a druhé světové války*, p. 217.

19 Ibid., p. 218.

20 Ibid., p. 221.

21 Ibid., p. 366.

22 Edvard Beneš, *Paměti*, Prague, 1947, p. 420.

teachers Masaryk and Rádl as Judas betrayed Christ'.²³ This emotional condemnation, a reaction to Hromádka's willingness to collaborate with the Communist regime, is entirely understandable in the context of the beginnings of the Cold War. One does wonder, however, whether Hromádka's 'betrayal' did not constitute something more like an over-zealous fidelity to Edvard Beneš's wartime Panslav idealism or, indeed, even camouflage for the sake of his faith, given that by February 1948 it was perfectly clear what Stalinist Panslavism actually entailed.

After the war, Hromádka published the essays that had appeared primarily in *Husův lid* and *Zítřek*, in the two volumes, *Mezi východem a západem* (Between East and West) and *S druhého břehu* (From the Other Shore).²⁴ In some of these essays he considers the relationship of Czech culture, and Czechs altogether, to Russia and imagines the future relationship of the Soviet Union to Central Europe. Similarly to Edvard Beneš, he starts from the premiss that fundamental ideological, cultural and social changes were taking place in the Soviet Union.

In the preface to *Mezi východem a západem*, Hromádka considers the Soviet Union's potential contribution to the post-war era, which he maintains lies chiefly in a social experiment which gives a new context to the concept 'democracy': social security, a passionate regard for the weak and oppressed, tender-heartedness and the mighty tradition of Russian Christianity and Russian literature.²⁵ Hromádka is here and elsewhere in his essays trammelled up in conventional representations of the Russians that had existed for a good hundred years in the central European Slav mind. Russia is still Mother Russia under whose wings it is possible to find clucking safety from non-Slav aggressors, and Russia itself is still peopled by Tolstoyan muzhiks. Hromádka seems to have forgotten or wanted to ignore Masaryk's comments on this image of the simple Russian.²⁶ Another sentence from this preface, 'Czechoslovakia is beginning a new historical epoch closely linked with the Soviet peoples',²⁷ no doubt implies the simple Russian people he knows from Tolstoi and Dostoevskii, as well as the fulfilment of the Panslav dream. One could attribute such a conception of history to the euphoria of the period, but actually we see in it not only a link with the discourse of Edvard Beneš, but also something like a culmination of ideas present in earlier works by Hromádka.

In the article 'Evropa a Amerika pod křížem' (Europe and America under the Cross, 1942), Hromádka gives Russia a defining role in the future, sees in Russia hope for European social and moral reform, essentially hope for socialism in Europe. 'The participation of Soviet Russia, together with the profound social changes that are taking place in all countries in Europe, including Great Britain, are a challenge for us to think about, a challenge to examine our own views on all basic questions: the relationship between employers and workers, and between various social strata, and who should be in charge of large-scale capital.'²⁸ Like Beneš, Hromádka clearly starts from the premiss that Western democracies are suffering general moral degeneration. This premiss indubitably derives from the shock of Munich. It presupposes the need for a moral renewal — to use Masaryk's phrase — that will affect the whole of Europe. The guarantor of this renewal is to be the Soviet Union; evidently because it has demonstrated through its self-sacrifice in the war its moral purity and legitimacy, Soviet Russia was to become not only the military,

23 Vojta Beneš, *Poslání československých krajanů v Americe*, New York, 1950, p. 20.

24 J. L. Hromádka, *Mezi východem a západem*, Prague, 1946; J. L. Hromádka and O. Odložilík, *S druhého břehu*, Prague, 1946.

25 Ibid., p. 8.

26 See Karel Čapek, *Hovory s T. G. Masarykem*, 3 vols, Prague, 1928–35, II, pp. 36–37.

27 Hromádka and Odložilík, *S druhého břehu*, p. 8.

28 Ibid., p. 56.

but also the moral saviour of Europe. At the end of his essay on Hostovský's novel *Sedmkrát v hlavní úloze* (Seven Times in the Leading Role, 1942), Hromádka asks some almost grand theology-tinged questions: 'When we have slept it all off at home by the dung heap, what will we do? Will the common people to whom we shall be returning give us a vision of truth and the strength to live? For whose image will we build a new church? What sort of altar will we place in it? Before whom will we bow our heads?'²⁹ On the one hand, Hromádka is alluding to Hostovský's novel in which characters fall under the spell of the charismatic writer Kavalský, who becomes their false messiah and the ideological leader who brings about their disasters. On the other hand, it is clear from Hromádka's essay that these questions have a more general meaning relating to the need for a new ideology for the Czech nation. One notes that it appears that the Czechs will find this ideology in something external, not in the re-evaluation of their own ideas. One sees here, too, that some yearning for an ideal and national redemption prevails over critical thinking. It is not without interest that a parallel yearning for salvation is evident in several works of Czech fiction from the 1940s, where a weak, helpless main character tries to resolve the hopelessness of his life by devoting himself to some divinity or ready-made ideal. One thinks of Miroslav Hanuš's *Méněcennost* (Inferiority, 1942) where the main character saves himself by joining a religious sect, Bohuslav Březovský's *Člověk Bernard* (A Man Called Bernard, 1945) has a similar conclusion, and in Hanuš's biblical travesty, *Legenda o Tomášovi* (Legend of Thomas, 1947) the saviour is named: the worker bringing the people a vision of a just Communist system. One may see such a search for an external saviour as representing the behaviour of a nation that considers itself 'small' (smallness has, of course, very little to do with the number of people who count themselves members of that nation). Escape under the wing of a strong saviour suggests not only the sense of inferiority in a 'small' nation, which will be used to always seeking protection in a strong nation, but also an unwillingness to sacrifice itself since it is more comfortable to follow someone else's powerful idea. If we look at Beneš and Hromádka in this light, it is easier to understand why they should follow dead, or warmed-up, myths.

In his collection of wartime essays, *Mezi východem a západem*,³⁰ Hromádka frequently lays stress on the notion that the USSR is a shield for Europe. In 'Rusko a západ' (Russia and the West), he expresses the hope that 'the present war will in a sense create a synthesis between the Soviet Union and Europe'.³¹ Hromádka is well aware of the social and cultural differences between the Soviet Union and the rest of Europe, and his interpretation of them is based on Masaryk's in *Rußland und Europa*. When in these essays he forgets Masaryk and attempts to create models of how these differences may be overcome, he often wanders off into realms of fantasy. What he writes about the October Revolution has a great deal of truth in it, though he appears to consider the extreme interpretation of French and German ideas embodied in the Revolution positive, and to forget the realities of it: 'The West was victorious in Russia. But it was the West conceived of in its most radical philosophical and social ideas. This victory frightened Europe.'³²

In these essays, Hromádka sees the USSR becoming ever more Western. He sees that in the country's growing interest in its own history, in the cultural and social traditions of Russia.³³ He understands Stalin's increasing interest in pre-Soviet traditions, actually an attempt to gain the widest possible sympathy for the war among Soviet citizens, as a

29 Ibid., p. 126.

30 The essays were originally published in periodicals between 1940 and 1945.

31 Hromádka. *Mezi východem a západem*, p. 48.

32 Ibid., p. 49.

33 Ibid.

rational corrective of a system that has matured to greater wisdom, as a proof that Russia is westernizing itself.³⁴

No doubt that, too, is linked with Hromádka's generally romantic perception of Russia. After all, he considered the real reason behind the Bolshevik Revolution to lie in the idealism of the Russian nation: 'Behind the Russian social experiment one can hear that mighty Russian yearning to help the weak and to create a brotherhood of humanity.'³⁵ The notion of Russians having idealism at the centre of their 'national character' goes back to the National Revival, to Šafařík and Fingerhut/Náprstek, and to the neo-Revivalist Čech, and even the Russophil first premier of the Czechoslovak Republic, Karel Kramář. In this tradition, Russia is a sleeping giant who, once awakened, will be the last hope for European civilization. Naturally, this line of Czech nationalist Panslav thinking actually goes back to a German, Herder.

In his essay, 'Duše Ameriky' (The Soul of America), Hromádka refers to the Revivalist tradition by quoting a saying of Kollár's, a saying conventionally attributed to the influence of Herder: 'When you say "Slav", may you hear "human being".'³⁶ So too he echoes the Herderian *Humanität* so beloved of Masaryk when he writes in the same essay, 'Czechness and Slavness have remained subsidiary to humanity.'³⁷ As for Kollár, however, for Hromádka the Slavs clearly represent a zenith of humanity. All Slav deeds are sanctified by this humanity, and thus all Soviet deeds, too. He may have forgotten Masaryk (who had also admired Kollár), but he certainly remained loyal to Beneš.

Not all exile Panslavism arose in the Beneš-Hromádka camp. Vladimír Clementis, in exile in London, a Slovak taking instructions from Moscow, was among Beneš's opponents at the beginning of their exile, when he was interned, first by the French, and then by the British. Once the Communist line changed in 1941, and the British had released him, Clementis worked with Beneš, like other members of the Party. The Panslav ideas we find in Clementis's work are rather different from Beneš's but certainly he does not employ them cynically like the propagandists of the Chicago *Nová doba*. Unlike Hromádka and Beneš, Clementis neither imagines nor desires westernizing changes in Soviet Russia. His vision of the USSR seems to come even closer than theirs to the romantic Panslavism of a Šafařík or Náprstek. He harbours a naive faith in the eastern empire of free Slavs apparently similar to that of Vojta Mašek and his fellows dreaming of a new home on the River Amur. It was also not a matter of a wartime resuscitation of slumbering patriotic sentiment in Clementis; even before the war, in an article from 1937 headed 'K dvadsiatemu výročiu Októbrovej revolúcie' (On the Twentieth Anniversary of the October Revolution), he wrote: 'In the nationalities question and other social questions I see the Soviet Union as having realized the endeavours proclaimed by the best representatives of mankind in the past.'³⁸ For the Slovak Clementis, the USSR was primarily a model for the solving of the nationalities question in that every nationality in the Union, in theory, had the right of self-determination. Similarly he writes elsewhere: 'Today we no longer have to theorize about what socialism means for small nations. Today we can proudly, and objectively, point to the lives of small nations in the Soviet Union.'³⁹

34 Ibid., p. 50.

35 Ibid.

36 Quoted in J. L. Hromádka, 'Duše Ameriky', *Zítřek*, 3, 1944, p. 132.

37 Ibid.

38 This article was first published in the commemorative volume, *Československo sovětskému svazu k dvacátému výročí* (Prague, 1937), then reprinted in the posthumous collection (Clementis had been executed by his fellow Communists), Vladimír Clementis, *Vzduch našich čias*, Bratislava, 1967, p. 384.

39 *Slovenské zvesti*, 1, 20 May 1936, p. 2.

Quite apart from his book, *'Panslavizmus' kedysi a teraz* ('Panslavism' in the Past and Now, 1943), Clementis frequently touches on Panslavism during his time in London.

He notices, for example, how the Slovak Fascist state is abusing Panslav ideas. In his article, 'Národosocialistický panslavizmus' (National Socialist Panslavism) from September 1942, he attacks a Slovak academic journalist, Stanislav Mečiar, who had suggested replacing the term 'Panslav' with the term 'National Socialist':⁴⁰ 'we may judge that the Slovak Slavophil tradition is alive and well, in the good sense of the word, if regime people like Mečiar have to turn to such contortionist methods'.⁴¹ He returned to the same matter in his broadcast entitled 'Slovenská literatúra žaluje' (Slovak Literature Accuses) from 10 December, 1942.⁴² Clementis appears to consider the Panslav tradition so much part of every Slovak's make-up that not even Fascism can seriously deform it. That is evident also from another broadcast, 'Vyst'ahovanie Čechov zo Slovenska' (The Expulsion of the Czechs from Slovakia); Clementis's playful distortion of the title of the mid-nineteenth-century Slovak Awakener, Ľudovít Štúr's *Das Slawenthum und die Welt der Zukunft* (Slavdom and the World of the Future), which had recently (1931) been published for the first time in the original may also be pertinent to this chapter: in this work Štúr writes of a decadent West and a healthy Russia with a lovingly dictatorial regime such as was appropriate for the greatest Slav nation. Clementis writes: 'You know how they vetted those whom they sent to the front, to make sure they were not nationally conscious Slovaks brought up in the Slovak tradition, but still good news is constantly coming in about the best of them, now their Slovak and Slav hearts are awakening in them, how in their deeds had spoken the spirit of Štúr, who dreamt of a "Slavdom of the future world"'.⁴³ By 'Slovak and Slav', Clementis suggests that an intensely felt brotherhood for all Slavs is fundamental to the Slovak national character. Thus the Slovaks' relationship to the Russians is to a 'fraternal nation'.⁴⁴ An orientation towards the East and the conviction that only the Soviet Union as leader of Slavdom could ensure the future stability of Czechoslovakia are, apparently, a logical consequence of this national Slavophilism;⁴⁵ here the liberal Beneš, whose Panslavism was to a great degree a result of the lack of success he had had with his pro-Western policy, meets with the Communist Clementis, who puts traditional Panslavism above Communist internationalism. He also shares with Beneš the conviction of the coming final reckoning with non-Slavs' oppression of the Slavs. In his article 'Nové Maďarsko' (The New Hungary), published in the London exile periodical *Čechoslovák* on 5 January, 1945, Clementis manifests a Slovak nationalist reaction to the Red Army's entry into Hungary: 'This time it is the armies of the largest Slav nation, Russian armies, that have put an end on the age-old Magyar policies which were directed against the Slav nations and, above all, against us Slovaks'.⁴⁶ Thus, where for Beneš Soviet victory meant an end to the German *Drang nach Osten*, for Clementis it meant the end of the marginalization of Slovaks.

The romanticizing Panslav sentiment expressed by Czech and Slovak writers of various political hues was influential during the war and even more so immediately after the war. Certainly the Communists used and abused it, but it also persuaded large sections of the public that liberation by the Red Army (the fact that Western Bohemia was liberated by the

40 Mečiar was referring here to Svetozár Hurban Vajanský's article, 'Kde síla' (1888) which was devoted to the Panslav tradition among the Slovaks.

41 Vladimír Clementis, *Odkazy z Londýna*, Bratislava, 1947, p. 347.

42 Ibid., p. 37.

43 Ibid., pp. 41–42.

44 Ibid., p. 113.

45 Ibid., p. 205.

46 Ibid., p. 503.

Americans was usually conveniently forgotten in Prague, even before the Communist take-over) took on the aspect of a Fate-driven natural conclusion to patriotic dreams. For all the raping and pillaging of Soviet soldiers, the Soviet Union remained, for a while, old-world Russia rather than a totalitarian state with imperial ambitions. No doubt Hromádka and Beneš's view that major ideological and cultural changes had taken place in the Soviet Union during the war also played its role. After all, in the first edition of the teetotal Beneš's book on alcohol and alcoholism, published just before the First World War, the Russians had been hopelessly hard drinkers; in the second edition, published after the Second World War, Russians are particularly sober, only drinking at times of great stress, for example during wars.

On the other hand, one may not blame those like Hromádka and Beneš for all the abuse of Panslavism that followed the war. That did have its sources in Moscow, where a Panslav Committee had been established in 1942, and had been greatly fostered by Zdeněk Nejedlý there and would continue to be so in liberated Czechoslovakia. An extreme example of that is the way he reinterpreted the Slovak Jan Kollár's cycle of narrative sonnets, predominantly from the 1830s, into a prophecy of Soviet liberation of the Slavs. Slav Committees were set up in the Slav countries liberated by the Red Army, and the constitutive meeting of the Czechoslovak Slav Committee took place on 4 September, 1945; the chairman of this Committee was Nejedlý. At the end of 1947 a political anthology, with prefaces by Beneš and Jan Masaryk appeared with the title *Jednotou Slovanstva k míru* (Towards Peace through Slav Unity). Perhaps the most poignant contribution to this volume was that of the politician and social worker Milada Horáková, who had been in German prisons and camps, and who was shortly, like Clementis, to be executed by the Communists. Her words remind us of what Hromádka and Beneš, and Clementis, had been writing during the war, for example, the glorification of the Soviets: 'Our Soviet sisters, happy in that they could fight actively, played a role in the Patriotic War which history will some time best evaluate. Their work in factories, in the fields, behind the lines, constituted a firm battlement on which the brilliant victories of the Red Army could lean.' In the prisons and camps, Slav women excelled women from all other nationalities because they had far better health and far more resistant bodies. In the 'fight for peace' the main task was to keep under control 'the age-old enemy' of the Slavs, the Germans. Czech and Slovak women now see 'as their first duty to build close, warm links with the women of Slav nations led by the women of the USSR'.⁴⁷ As Antonín Měšťan has pointed out, official effusions of Slav feeling were soon suddenly to come to an end. When they had served their Soviet propaganda purpose, in February 1948.⁴⁸

47 Milada Horáková, 'Slovanská idea a československé ženy' in [editor not given, editor of literary anthology given at end as Miloš Vacík], *Jednotou Slovanstva k míru*, Prague, 1947, pp. 151–52.

48 See Antonín Měšťan, 'Slovanství a Slované v české kultuře v letech 1945–1948' in Petr Hruška (ed.), *Rok 1947. Česká literatura, kultura a společnost v období 1945–1948*, Prague, 1998, pp. 106–11.

26 Catastrophe and Renewal: On the Post-War Situation of German Literature

DAVID MIDGLEY

Let me begin by sketching the familiar historical background to cultural developments in Germany during the period which this volume concerns. Germany came under four-power occupation at the end of the Second World War. Negotiations between the Allies in the course of 1943 and 1944 had led to agreement on three zones of occupation initially, with the north-west allocated to Britain, the south to the USA, and the area that was later to become the German Democratic Republic to the Soviet Union. Four-power control of Berlin, involving France, was also agreed; and following the Yalta conference of February 1945, an area in the south-west corner of Germany was assigned to French occupation. Practical difficulties arising from economic dislocation, including serious shortages of food and fuel, led the British and American administrations to co-operate in the formation of Bizonia by the end of 1946, and France, while suspicious of the potential emergence of a strong political unit in western Germany, acquiesced in this development. In the course of 1947, the Western Allies abandoned earlier plans for radically decreasing German industrial production, and agreed instead to the Marshall Plan for the economic revival of western Europe, and to implement a currency reform in Germany in the spirit of that plan. In the Soviet zone of occupation, meanwhile, measures were already well advanced to reorganize political life in ways which effectively ensured Communist dominance through the newly formed Socialist Unity Party (SED), and to reform the ownership of land and industry in line with Marxist thinking. In retrospect, as government papers from the 1940s have increasingly been made available to researchers, it has become possible to see how the antipathies which were to characterize the Cold War period were already affecting policy formation before the end of the Second World War,¹ and Winston Churchill made his 'iron curtain' speech in Fulton, Missouri as early as March 1946. But the event which publicly signalled the parting of the ways for the eastern and western zones of Germany was the Soviet decision in June 1948 to exclude the western currency reform from its zone of occupation and to cut off overland communication routes between Berlin and the West. For the next eleven months, West Berlin was supplied from the western zones by means of the famous airlift. At the end of that period, in May 1949, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany was brought into effect. The German Democratic Republic was founded in October of the same year.

The political division of Germany that came about in this way was to remain a seemingly intractable feature of European political and cultural life for the next forty years, and it therefore takes an effort of the imagination to reconstruct a situation in which that division did not yet appear inevitable, and it still seemed to make sense to speak in terms of German culture as a unified phenomenon. What I want to do in this chapter is, first, to give a brief indication of the practical relationship between culture and politics in occupied Germany in the period 1945–49, and, secondly, to consider, with reference to two prominent literary writers, the sense in which a cultural transition was occurring at that time which needs to be understood in terms that are distinct from developments in the political sphere. If I appear to be neglecting developments in the British zone of

1 A. Deighton, *The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War*, Oxford, 1990, pp. 16ff.

occupation, this is because the most significant cultural activities nurtured there had a long-term impact on the German media — radio and television as well as the press — rather than on literary writing.²

For all the obvious political differences between the occupying powers, one common aim on which they could agree was the need for 're-education'. When a list of German publications that were to be removed from circulation was issued in the Soviet-occupied zone in April 1946, it met with uniform approval from the other allied administrations and from all German political parties.³ The German writers who spearheaded campaigns of cultural renewal at the time similarly voiced their unequivocal revulsion at all that the Nazi regime had perpetrated, and saw it as their prime task to provide intellectual leadership and to fill the 'vacuum' left by the suppression and banning of cultural products, both German and international, during the twelve years of the Third Reich. Their efforts to define German cultural goals for the future were, however, undeniably circumscribed by the policies of the occupying powers, as the history of the cultural journals licensed in the various zones clearly shows.

The two most influential and most widely circulated journals were *Der Ruf*, which was based in Munich, and *Aufbau*, which was based in the Soviet sector of Berlin. *Der Ruf* provided an initial rallying point for the two figures who were to give the lead to West German literary writing in the post-war years through the Gruppe 47, Hans Werner Richter and Alfred Andersch. This publication had originally grown out of the campaign of political re-education in American prisoner-of-war camps, and its editorial operations were transferred to Germany in the course of 1946. But the insistence with which Andersch and Richter sought to promote the idea of an independent, united and socialist Germany led to the American administration demanding their removal as editors in April 1947 as a condition for the continuing publication of the journal.⁴ *Aufbau* was the journal of the Kulturbund zur demokratischen Erneuerung Deutschlands (Cultural Union for the Democratic Renewal of Germany), an organization which was formally independent of the Communist Party, but whose history shows how susceptible cultural policies in the Soviet-occupied zone were to political pressures from within the Soviet Union.

The Kulturbund, like *Der Ruf*, had grown out of attempts from 1943 onwards to re-educate German prisoners of war in preparation for the establishment of an anti-Nazi regime at the end of the war. What gave it an organizational advantage over other German attempts to initiate cultural renewal after 1945 was the fact that literary figures who had gone into exile in Moscow — Johannes R. Becher and Willi Bredel, as well as the critics Georg (György) Lukács and Alfred Kurella — had become closely involved in the publishing activities of the Communist movement, and thus returned to Germany with a ready-made set of influential contacts, and with well-prepared proposals for cultural organization. The activities of the Kulturbund were initially consistent with the attitudes of the Popular Front period; that is, it sought to nurture broad support from intellectuals in the struggle against Fascism and militarism; only as the Soviet leadership gradually lost interest in seeking to influence developments outside their zone of occupation (the Berlin Blockade of 1948 was a clear sign of this), did the narrower cultural policies associated

2 See A. Bance, (ed.), *The Cultural Legacy of the British Occupation in Germany: The London Symposium*, Stuttgart, 1997.

3 B. Adam and D. Müller, 'Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur' in G. Hay (ed.), *Zur literarischen Situation 1945–1949*, Frankfurt on Main, 1977, pp. 147ff.

4 V. C. Wehdeking, *Der Nullpunkt. Über die Konstituierung der deutschen Nachkriegsliteratur (1945–1948)*, Stuttgart, 1971 (hereafter *Der Nullpunkt*); R. W. Williams, 'Alfred Andersch and the Cold War' in R. W. Williams, S. Parker and C. Riordan (eds), *German Writers and the Cold War 1945–61*, Manchester, 1992, p. 226.

with the conception of Socialist Realism come to dominate in the Soviet zone, culminating in an official campaign against Western 'formalism' and 'decadence' in the early 1950s, after the foundation of the GDR.⁵ In the situation of 1945, Soviet policy towards the reform of their zone of occupation not only led to the sanctioning of political parties at an earlier stage than in the West,⁶ but also to the positive encouragement of diverse cultural activity. *Aufbau* was granted a publishing licence in the Soviet zone as early as June 1945, and in its first few years it circulated widely throughout Germany and carried a prestigious list of broad-left contributors.⁷ While the journal faded out in the course of the 1950s, the publishing house of the same name continued as the chief literary publisher of the GDR; it provided the major outlet inside Germany for exile authors during its early years, and survived the collapse of the SED regime in 1989–90 because of its legally independent status.

The brief history of another journal published in East Berlin illustrates more poignantly how the attempt to build cultural bridges between East and West was rapidly undermined by international political developments. *Ost und West* was a valiant attempt by a lone intellectual, Alfred Kantorowicz, to establish a forum for cultural debate across the zones of occupation, and for a brief period in the late 1940s it perhaps came closest to providing a form of intellectual leadership that was truly independent of the occupying forces. But it was a late-comer to the scene, starting publication only in July 1947; it had the misfortune to be granted a licence only in the Soviet zone; and following the foundation of the two German states in 1949 its independent line was rapidly overtaken by the hardening of Cold War antagonism. Indeed, by the end of 1947 Kantorowicz already found himself faced with Communist pressure to exclude renegade intellectuals from his list of contributors on the one hand, and the embarrassment of having to respond to the banning of Kulturbund activities in the American zone on the other.⁸ Another ambitious single-handed attempt to influence the development of post-war German literature occurred in the French zone. Alfred Döblin — the only author of stature from the 1920s who attempted to settle in western Germany after the Nazi period — returned to Germany as a French citizen and a recent convert to Roman Catholicism. He was able to launch his periodical *Das Goldene Tor* in September 1946 and to maintain it with a very large measure of editorial freedom until 1951, when the French authorities withdrew funding to such cultural ventures.⁹ All these journals were conscious attempts to influence cultural attitudes inside Germany, but as research into the history of each one of them has shown, they encountered a public mood which was hesitant in its cultural choices and deeply sceptical towards any form of ideology whatsoever in the light of the disasters into which the Hitler regime had led the German nation.¹⁰ A common perception among German writers who sought to contribute

5 A. Stephan, *Die deutsche Exilliteratur 1933–1945. Eine Einführung*, Munich, 1979, pp. 221ff.; V. Wehdeking and G. Blumberger, *Erzählliteratur der frühen Nachkriegszeit (1945–1952)*, Munich, 1990, pp. 32ff.

6 Mary Fulbrook, *The Divided Nation: A History of Germany 1918–1990*, Frankfurt on Main, 1992, pp. 136ff.

7 H. Engelbach and K. Krauss, 'Der Kulturbund und seine Zeitschrift *Aufbau* in der SBZ' in Hay (ed.), *Zur literarischen Situation 1945–1949*, pp. 169ff.

8 C. Heinschke, 'Ost und West oder die Eintracht der Literaten' in *ibid.*, pp. 199ff.

9 A. Birkert, 'Das Goldene Tor. Alfred Döblins Nachkriegszeitsschrift (Rahmenbedingungen, Zielsetzung, Entwicklung)' (hereafter 'Das Goldene Tor'), *Archiv für Geschichte des Buchwesens*, 33, 1989, p. 239.

10 Hay (ed.), *Zur literarischen Situation 1945–1949*, pp. 86, 122ff. and 159ff.

to the process of cultural renewal in the period 1945–49 was that German culture in the wake of the collapse of National Socialism was experiencing an ‘interregnum’.¹¹

Licensing procedures, censorship, and the control of paper supplies all contributed to the sense that truly independent cultural activity was not yet possible.¹² But the practical constraints on literary communication were not exclusively attributable to political factors. Recent detailed research into the operation of Döblin’s journal sheds light on the specific difficulties experienced by such ventures. Döblin did encounter a suspicion among potential German contributors that his efforts would be too closely controlled by the French censors, but he was able to use that experience to increase his own editorial freedom.¹³ *Das Goldene Tor* was banned on one occasion in the Soviet zone in early 1948 when it carried an article overtly critical of the Soviet administration, but otherwise it circulated freely in all four zones, even though its editorial policy was clearly not pro-Marxist.¹⁴ In common with other publishing outlets, Döblin’s journal encountered the difficulties that arose from differences in licensing policy among the zones and from uncertainties about the treatment of copyright under these circumstances: it was not uncommon for material that had been legitimately published in one zone to be reprinted in another zone without the author’s permission, and by implication, without payment. The uncertain financial climate in any case created incentives for writers to publish in daily newspapers rather than in more serious intellectual journals. Unreliable postal contacts made it very difficult for Döblin to bolster his journal with the contributions he would have liked to elicit from prestigious exile writers, with the result that he found himself having to turn to the well-established network among both Communist and non-Communist authors that existed in the Soviet zone.¹⁵ These mundane factors, as well as the increasingly manifest political pressures of the late 1940s, placed limitations on the ability of such journals to realize their cultural aims.

When we look at the cultural programmes that Döblin and the other journal editors sought to promote, we find a large measure of agreement. When Döblin, in his first editorial for *Das Goldene Tor*, speaks of wanting to throw open a ‘window on the world’, or when he invokes the notion of ‘injecting’ new cultural bacilli into the German body politic,¹⁶ his approach does not differ greatly from that of *Der Ruf*, or *Ost und West*, or *Aufbau*. All of them were concerned to introduce German readers to the foreign literature they had missed out on since 1933,¹⁷ to help them rediscover the German classics in forms untainted by Nazi misrepresentation, and to recover the ‘other Germany’ that had been driven out or driven underground by the Nazi regime. The spirit of reconciliation among all writers who had not been directly associated with that regime was particularly manifest at the First German Writers’ Congress held in Berlin in October 1947, even if the contribution from Stephan Hermlin on that occasion, which was sharply critical of the ‘inwardness’ and metaphysical concerns of Western writing, has been seen as signalling the onset of hardening attitudes in the Soviet zone.¹⁸ Writers from all four zones were welcomed by Ricarda Huch (a member of the Kulturbund, but anything but a Communist), who invoked the unifying potential of the literary language; contributions published in *Ost*

11 G. Boehringer, ‘Zeitschriften der jungen Generation’ in *ibid.*, p. 101; Wehdeking, *Der Nullpunkt*, p. 127.

12 See Adam and Müller, ‘Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur’, pp. 149ff.

13 Birkert, ‘Das Goldene Tor’, pp. 226 and 229ff.

14 *Ibid.*, p. 234.

15 *Ibid.*, pp. 240–46.

16 Alfred Döblin, *Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur*, Olten and Freiburg, 1989, p. 388.

17 Adam and Müller, ‘Amerikanische Literaturpolitik und Literatur’, p. 155.

18 Wehdeking and Blamberger, *Erzählliteratur der frühen Nachkriegszeit (1945–1952)*, pp. 40ff.

und West included Elisabeth Langgässer on writers under the Nazi dictatorship and Alfred Kantorowicz on German writers in exile. Döblin, admittedly, stayed away, suspicious of a congress which had been organized from within the Soviet sector of Berlin and without wider consultation.¹⁹ There were manifest differences between Döblin and Andersch over how warmly to welcome writers of the so-called *innere Emigration* into the post-war fold, particularly in such cases as Ernst Jünger and Gottfried Benn, whose writings had contributed to the Modernist ferment of the 1920s, but who had also identified themselves strongly with the Fascist outlook in the early 1930s.²⁰ But what stands out above all in the programmatic writings of the immediate post-war years is the common interest in recovering a heritage that had been expunged from public awareness, in providing the impulses which might in due course lead to cultural regeneration.

Both for those who were returning from exile and for those who were keen to welcome the exiles back, it was natural that comparisons should be made with the literary situation in 1933, that is, with the cultural ferment that had existed immediately before the impact of National Socialism. But both groups were also quick to see that that situation simply could not be restored. Döblin is explicit on that point in his essay, 'Die literarische Situation' of 1947;²¹ Alfred Andersch, in his lecture 'Deutsche Literatur in der Entscheidung' of 1948, expresses the hope that the exiles will indeed return (he is thinking particularly of Thomas Mann, who never did resettle in Germany after 1945, and Bertolt Brecht, who did not take up the invitation to settle in East Berlin until 1949), but also makes it plain that what matters even more is the reception of their works as models and stimuli for younger German writers.²² Hans Werner Richter is quite explicit in an early essay in *Der Ruf*, 'Warum schweigt die junge Generation?' (Why Is the Young Generation Silent?) of September 1946, that both the physical devastation of Germany in the closing stages of the war and the intellectual devastation caused by twelve years of National Socialism make it quite impossible to reassemble the cultural constellation that was dispersed in 1933.²³ A study conducted in the mid-1960s showed, moreover, that the younger generation of the 1940s, including Richter and Andersch themselves, lacked the reading experience and thus the linguistic skills that would have enabled them to shake off the clichéd manner of expression with which they had grown up under the Nazis.²⁴

It is necessary to distinguish between the will for a new start in literary writing after 1945 on the one hand and the practicalities of developing the literary techniques which would do justice to the terrible experiences of the Nazi period and the perspectives of a post-war reading public on the other. The desire for a 'Kahlschlag' — a *tabula rasa* approach to writing, an attempt to strip away the ideological connotations with which many items of German vocabulary had become tainted under the Nazis — is already clearly apparent in the critical and programmatic writings of Hans Werner Richter in 1945–46, and becomes sloganized in an anthology of new writing published by Wolfgang Weyrauch in 1949.²⁵ But in practice, the efforts of the young to give voice to their immediate experiences as the war came to an end proved, with one or two notable

19 Birkert, 'Das Goldene Tor', p. 228.

20 See Hay (ed.), *Zur literarischen Situation 1945–1949*, pp. 9 and 192ff., and Birkert, 'Das Goldene Tor', p. 270.

21 Döblin, *Schriften zu Ästhetik, Poetik und Literatur*, pp. 409ff.

22 Hay (ed.), *Zur literarischen Situation 1945–1949*, p. 9.

23 H. Vormweg, 'Deutsche Literatur 1945–1960. Keine Stunde Null' in M. Durzak (ed.), *Die deutsche Literatur der Gegenwart*, Stuttgart, 1976, p. 19.

24 U. Widmer, *1945 oder Die 'Neue Sprache'. Studien zur Prosa der 'Jungen Generation'*, Düsseldorf, 1966.

25 Ibid., pp. 13ff., and Wehdeking, *Der Nullpunkt*, pp. 122ff.

exceptions such as Heinrich Böll, to be short-lived, and the German publishing market of the late 1940s remained dominated by works of older writers from the *innere Emigration*, whose careers apparently continued largely uninterrupted.²⁶ It might be objected that Vormweg's account of the literary situation after 1945 as anything but a *Stunde Null* (fresh start) is coloured by a sense of how little sign there had been in the post-war period of a literary response to the full horrors of the Nazi period (Carl Zuckmayer had presented the ethical dilemmas of a military figure serving under Hitler in *Des Teufels General* in 1946, but Peter Weiss's dramatization of the Auschwitz trials in *Die Ermittlung* did not come until 1965). And Widmer's study of the language of young authors in the late 1940s might appear hypersensitive towards particular items of vocabulary — *Bewegung, Raum, Bereich* — which had been loaded with ideological connotations under National Socialism, but are in themselves inescapably banal. However, the significant point that both Widmer and Vormweg bring out is that a stylistic analysis of post-war German writing reveals the sheer ineptitude of a generation that had been brought up with the vapid phrases of the Nazi dictatorship ringing in their ears. A pragmatic view of how German literature developed after 1945 would therefore be bound to conclude that an eclectic period of assimilating the expressive potential of modern literature was necessary before writers could achieve the stylistic competence to address the realities of the recent past with a vigorous and independent voice. That process took a full decade in East as well as West: it is not until the late 1950s and early 1960s that we encounter the early works of Günter Grass, Uwe Johnson, Heiner Müller, and Christa Wolf — or indeed the first novel of Alfred Andersch, *Sansibar oder Der letzte Grund*.²⁷

But there is another perspective that I would like to place alongside this pragmatic interpretation of the literary situation in Germany in 1945–49. We can bring this alternative perspective into focus by drawing a comparison not with the situation in 1933, but with the situation in 1918. At that time, notwithstanding the carnage and the depredations of the First World War, German literary writing was buoyed up by a strong mood of activism. It was at this time that Expressionist writers were turning from the representation of individualistic revolt to the invocation of utopian visions for the social world. This was essentially the literature of a generation in revolt against what it sensed to be the mechanisms of modern society, but within a framework of institutional continuity — the theatres, even if some of them had been converted from court theatres into state theatres, were still there to nurture and to provide the audiences for new cultural trends. In 1945, by contrast, we have a moment of radical institutional discontinuity (the discrediting of the defeated regime and the administration of Germany by foreign powers), in which the dominant literary voices appear to be those of tradition — conservative in the West, socialist in the East. Recent investigations into the history of German literature between 1918 and 1945 have emphasized two features which should make us cautious about ascribing the major changes in cultural activity to the direct influence of political events. First, the underlying utopian thrust of Expressionist literature is carried forward into the avant-garde culture of the 1920s with its ambitious projects for influencing the political character of society (Brecht and Piscator on the left, Jünger and the writers of the Conservative Revolution on the right) — even if, within the more practically orientated climate of the 1920s, the intellectual comes to see himself as a catalyst in the collective processes of society rather than as a prime mover in changing the world. Secondly, the retreat from activism into heroic pessimism and the pursuit of metaphysical interests does not only set in with the advent of Nazi rule in 1933, but is discernible from about 1930

26 Vormweg, 'Deutsche Literatur 1945–1960. Keine Stunde Null', p. 16.

27 See *ibid.*, p. 14, and C. Smith, 'All Quiet on the Eastern Front?' in Williams, Parker and Riordan (eds), *German Writers and the Cold War 1945–1961*, p. 22.

(with the onset of the Great Depression) and can be seen to manifest itself among German left-wing exiles as much as among writers who stay in Germany.²⁸

There is no scope in a short chapter like this to explore the implications of these historical perspectives in depth, but what I should like to do in the space available is to illustrate their relevance to the situation in 1945–49 with reference to two novels by authors who may fairly be regarded as contrasting representatives of German Modernist writing. Thomas Mann is commonly thought of as having consolidated the bourgeois Realist tradition in narrative fiction with his early novels *Buddenbrooks* (1900) and *Der Zauberberg* (The Magic Mountain, 1924), and Alfred Döblin, chiefly remembered for the innovative montage effects of *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929), is seen as a self-consciously radical experimenter. They were certainly viewed as opposing models for narrative writing in the 1920s, and there is clear evidence that the differences between them sharpened into strong antipathy, particularly on Döblin's part, by the 1940s.²⁹ But when we look at the novels these two authors were writing around the time that the Second World War came to an end, then we may well be struck by the affinities rather than the differences between them.

In *Doktor Faustus*, written in 1944–45, Thomas Mann works with his characteristic blend of realism and symbolism to present Germany as the site of a doomed culture. In the figure of the composer Adrian Leverkühn he constructs an emblem of a Modernist culture which has advanced to an extreme historical self-awareness with regard to techniques of musical expression developed in the past, and which then seeks to surpass that self-awareness by developing twelve-tone music, a mode of composition which releases the harmonic relations between notes from past systems of tonality, and binds them into a new discipline of sequence instead. The model for Leverkühn's technical innovation is, of course, Schoenberg, or more precisely, the historical significance of Schoenberg's development of modern music as interpreted in the philosophy of Adorno; and the Faust legend invoked in the novel's title hints at a wealth of suggestive connections to the cultural history of Germany since the Reformation. But far from depicting Leverkühn's contribution to modern culture as a triumph of historical and intellectual insight, Mann presents it as a manifestation of inhumanity accompanied by a descent into illness, isolation, and death. He does so by constructing Leverkühn's story primarily out of motifs taken from the biography of Nietzsche (including the notion that the mental disorder to which Nietzsche succumbed at the age of 44 was the result of a syphilitic infection) and mapping these onto the history of Germany in the first half of the twentieth century. Characteristically, Mann presents these associations at an ironic distance, allowing the story to be told by a first-person narrator who himself incorporates the ineptitude of a fading bourgeois humanism, Leverkühn's erstwhile school-friend, Serenus Zeitblom. But that device in itself lends emphasis, as well as poignancy, to the sense that the acknowledged power of Leverkühn's music is derived from the abandonment, not only of the values of humanist tradition, but of all humane principles.

In *Die Entstehung des Doktor Faustus* (an account of the circumstances in which the novel came to be written, published in 1949), Mann notes with approval a comment by Lukács on his pre-1914 work *Der Tod in Venedig* (Death in Venice) as signalling the presence of 'a barbaric underworld within modern German civilisation', and

28 H. D. Schäfer, *Das gespaltene Bewußtsein. Über deutsche Kultur und Lebenswirklichkeit 1933–1945*, Munich, 1981, pp. 55ff.; M. Lindner, *Leben in der Krise. Zeitromane der neuen Sachlichkeit und die intellektuelle Mentalität der klassischen Moderne*, Stuttgart, 1994, pp. 142ff.

29 J. Meyer, *Alfred Döblin 1878–1978* (Exhibition catalogue of the Deutsches Literaturarchiv, Marbach), Munich, 1978, pp. 406ff.

enthusiastically applies Lukács's point also to *Doktor Faustus*.³⁰ If we draw out the comparison between these two works of Thomas Mann's, then we may easily recognize the sense in which the later work represents an elaborate leave-taking from the vitalist world-view which had largely characterized Mann's earlier writings, and which owed its intellectual foundations precisely to Nietzsche. For its time, *Der Tod in Venedig* was a radical, as well as an exquisitely controlled, experiment in the depiction of the life-forces at work behind the processes of artistic production according to the ideas contained in Nietzsche's *Birth of Tragedy*. The narration maintains a delicate balance between revealing the self-abandonment of the protagonist, a famous writer, to Dionysian intoxication, infatuation, and self-indulgence on the one hand, and allowing him the continued dignity of Apollonian pretence on the other. The pertinence of Lukács's comment lies in the way the story reveals a realm of passion and (from the point of view of social convention) incipient depravity which is at work in the generation of art, but is simultaneously concealed behind the cultured appearance of art. *Doktor Faustus* continues to work with an expressive vocabulary which is essentially similar to that of Mann's early writings: it generates its play of tensions by confronting an inherited conception of cultural forces as life-enhancing (but illusory) with a sense of historical development dominated by an undeluded, but inherently inhumane intellectualism. Thomas Mann's indebtedness to Nietzsche's critique of modern culture remains apparent in the novel's evocation of the subordination of human culture to the process of intellectualization; his repudiation of the very intellectual culture that Nietzsche had engendered is apparent in his association of it, through the story of Leverkühn, with the German nation's descent into inhumanity.

The novel that Döblin was writing in 1946–47, *Hamlet oder Die lange Nacht nimmt ein Ende*, also shows an intimate connection with themes he had developed at an earlier stage of his career. Vitalist motifs of catastrophe and regeneration had characterized his major works of the period after the First World War. In *Berge Meere und Giganten* (Mountains, Seas and Giants, 1924) he had imagined a future in which humanity's drive for technological power had led to increasingly severe political conflicts and ecological disasters, until small surviving communities return to a life disciplined by the veneration of natural forces; and the personal story at the heart of *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929) could be summarized as the struggle between the protagonist's internal impulses and the unrelenting forces at work in his external environment, until his personality is finally reduced to a vital core from which a new social identity can grow. In *Hamlet*, Döblin imagines the situation of a young Englishman, Edward Allison, who has returned severely injured from the Pacific War. Edward's father is presented as a famous writer who has warded off the major catastrophes of the twentieth century by persuading himself that war is a natural occurrence. Edward himself is looking for someone or something to blame for the injury done to him. The text of the novel is largely composed of the stories told by members of the family and their circle of friends, as they try to come to terms with their situation, and the effect of the story-telling is both to expose unpalatable truths about the personal relationships within the family and also to keep open the question about how honest any one of them is being about the nature of humanity's fundamental impulses.

The father begins with what is apparently intended as a diversion from the distressing circumstances of the present, telling of the troubadour Jaufré Rudel and the cult of courtly love — but his version, which purports to bring out the truth behind the legend, turns into a starkly grotesque account of erotic domination exercised by the Princess of Tripoli to whom Jaufré addressed his songs, and of the brutal revenge eventually exacted upon her. The story of King Lear is similarly reinterpreted in such a way as to give it the character of

30 Thomas Mann, *Rede und Antwort*, Frankfurt on Main, 1984, p. 226.

a struggle for sexual dominance between the ageing king and the woman at whose hands he has experienced humiliation. Artistic creativity as a means of sublimating the overpowering desire for love is evoked through the person of Michelangelo, and the unremitting demand of spiritual love is shown through a tale of medieval Mariolatry. Edward's mother finds the destructive sensuality of Salomé intruding upon her pursuit of pious thoughts, and the story she tells about a woman from ancient Alexandria illustrates the potential for personal identity to become suppressed in relations between the sexes: it is the story of a woman who rediscovers her husband after believing him lost at sea and after adapting to the life of the *bon-viveur* who has meanwhile wooed her, and who opts for death in the desert, unable to resolve the tensions between her present self and her former self. What Döblin achieves with this complex interweaving of narrative threads is a reflection and externalization of various latent aspects of personal relations in the contemporary world through the imagery of legend. The mystery revealed to young Edward as he probes, Hamlet-like, into the true nature of his situation is that the source of aggression lies within the self, and particularly within the sexual self: he is the son of parents whose relationship has been marked by precisely such conflicts as have been illustrated in the story-telling. This Hamlet novel ultimately serves to repudiate the faith in processes of organic renewal which had characterized Döblin's major works at the height of his writing career, and to emphasize instead the potential destructiveness of forces inherent in human nature. The outcome he envisages for Edward in the version of the ending he originally wrote (although he obligingly provided a secularized conclusion for the version which was actually published, in East Germany, in 1956) is a retreat into a monastery.

Within the scope of this chapter I have been able to discuss only two novels, albeit by authors who are both representative of the Modernist movement in German literature and illustrative of the diversity within that movement. What I have sought to highlight with this choice of works, however, is the evidence they contain of a melancholy and valedictory turn within the very Modernist literature that the pioneers among the younger generations of German writers in the period 1945–49 were hoping to emulate. Both Döblin and Thomas Mann are presenting the organic imagery that had earlier been their stock in trade in a negative, repudiatory light. I would suggest in the light of that evidence that the sense of emptiness and disorientation we find in German literature in the immediate post-war phase is not just a consequence of the way Modernist literature had been denied to those younger generations; it is also related to the fact that the characteristic discourse of that Modernist literature had itself entered a phase of exhaustion and renunciation. The question of how the themes and techniques of Modernist writing were in fact absorbed into the German literature that younger authors went on to write in later decades, or whether these new authors can be said to be operating within a recognizably different paradigm, is one that still calls for further investigation.

27 Austria's Second Coming: The Literary Response to a Restored Austria in the Early Years of the Second Republic

ANTHONY BUSHELL

Although the concept *Mitteleuropa* might be considered in large measure to be an Austrian invention, Austria itself fits but awkwardly into the pattern of Eastern and Central European history for the immediate post-war period. Austria's final attainment of sovereignty in 1955 left the country looking very different from most states discussed in this volume. By 1955 Austria was to witness the Soviet Army leave voluntarily along with the other occupying forces of Britain, France and the United States; its territorial integrity was to be restored to that of its pre-war position; the country stood outside the two major military alliances and its economy was set, if at a somewhat slower pace than that of West Germany's, on a course that was to lead it to unparalleled economic prosperity and to an institutional stability it had not experienced throughout the years of the First Republic, that unplanned-for state created in the aftermath of the Habsburg Empire in 1918.

The year 1949 may be invoked as a marker in one significant, if negative, respect as a defining moment in post-war Austrian history. By then the Austrian Communist Party had been rejected unreservedly by the Austrian electorate in two general elections for the Nationalrat. In December 1945 the KPÖ had polled only 174,257 votes — this at a time when the Americans were so fearful of the perceived Soviet and Communist grip over Vienna and eastern Austria that they had at one point considered creating Salzburg as the capital of their own, alternative, Austria. At the next parliamentary elections in October 1949, when conditions and the electoral roll had become slightly more stable, the Communist vote rose to 213,066, but by this time the party had already fallen to fourth position, receiving fewer than half the votes of the party now occupying third place, the WdU (Wahlpartei der Unabhängigen, the Independents), the forerunners of the Freedom Party.¹ Also by 1949 a clear electoral pattern had been established between the two principal parties, the conservative ÖVP and the socialist SPÖ, who commanded almost equal support amongst the Austrian electorate, thus setting up a tradition of Grand Coalition government that has lasted almost without interruption for the entire life of the Second Republic. Coalitions, and especially grand coalitions, naturally demand a large element of compromise. And there remains the question, or rather the concept, of transition in the case of Austria. Transition requires movement from and to different places or different states. The movement may not always be intentional, voluntary, planned or coherent. There may be no clear idea of where the movement will lead and when that phase of transition will be completed. But usually there can be some agreement about the starting point in any journey. In the case of Austria, however, for the key political players in the immediate post-war period there was no agreement about the point of departure, an uncertainty that was also reflected in the attitude of the occupying forces.

With the exception of the Communists, the impetus behind much political activity was not for a simple transition towards new terrain; there was a desire, in part, to return to

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1 W. Oberleitner (ed.), *Politisches Handbuch Österreich 1945–1972*, Vienna, 1972, p. 18.

some form of the status quo before the *Anschluss*, Germany's annexation of Austria, and to the reassertion of Austria's territorial integrity. To that extent the double-headed eagle of the defunct Habsburg Empire rather than the single-headed eagle of the Second Republic served as a fitting image for what was taking place in post-war Austria: the gaze was not set exclusively on the future; it was rather a Janus stance, with as much regard to the past. Not for Austria the well-established, if ultimately unsustainable, idea of a *tabula rasa*, a *Kahlschlag* or a *Stunde Null* that characterized discussion of the nascent West and East German states in this period. The Austrian perspective was rooted both in law and sentiment. To have abandoned all concept of restoration in favour of a completely new order or fresh beginning would be to acknowledge both the impact of the *Anschluss* and to throw into doubt the status of the First Republic. Were a wholesale replacement of institutions to have been accepted it would have acknowledged openly the bankruptcy of pre-war Austrian life at all levels. In detaching itself from the part that individual Austrians played in the Third Reich, it seemed essential to Austrian politicians after 1945 to interpret — and to ask the outside world to interpret — the years Austria was incorporated into the German Reich as an aberration and nothing but a most unpleasant interregnum in the history of modern Austria. Thus establishing continuity rather than embarking upon transition was in many ways the more urgent task. The whole process, however, was blurred by two factors: the length of the Allies' occupation of Austria and the Allies' own uncertain attitude to post-war Austrian reconstruction. For as long as the Austrians could not be sure of the Allies' approach to their country there was a general consensus to rock the boat as little as possible by internal dissention.

The idea of restoration was not, however, without considerable problems. Which Austria was to be restored in 1945? The question bedevilled the main political parties for it threatened to open up old wounds and antagonisms. To claim post-war Austria was a continuation of the Austrian state that had disappeared in March 1938 would be an endorsement of Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg's Austria, in which Communists and Socialists alike had been driven underground, yet it was only in the dying days of the *Ständestaat*, the corporate state, that a concerted effort at the creation of an Austrian identity had been belatedly attempted. Yet it was difficult to find a suitable alternative point at which the Second Republic could be grafted back emotionally onto the First Republic. To summon up the Austria immediately before the creation of Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß's corporate state was to evoke the period of the civil war, whilst to appeal to the spirit of the very early days of the First Republic would be a reminder of those years when the Austrian Socialists, in particular, had clamoured for union with Germany.

The task facing Austrians after 1945 was to find some form of consensus on the notion of what constituted Austria, but at the same time to avoid too great an insistence on specific detail, for this would inevitably highlight those bitter divisions that had left Austria with too weak a conception of itself to resist the Nazi take-over. As far as the matter of compromise is concerned, the sharing of power after 1945, including cabinet portfolios, the apparent lack of any possibility of one party gaining absolute power and the need not to offend the occupying powers combined to convince Austrian politicians not to relive old battles. They had other calculations to contend with, including an awareness that at some point in the future many of the minor and now disenfranchised Nazi functionaries would have the right to vote returned to them. It would not pay politically to pursue the past too vigorously for fear of alienating this significant minority within the Austrian electorate. The importance of not antagonizing this sector of the electorate far outweighed the significance given to those who formed such a characteristic aspect of any discussion of Central Europe in this transitional period, namely the men and women who had spent

the preceding years in exile and who were now returning or considering returning to the countries from which they had fled or been expelled. In Austria there was little general enthusiasm to make room for those who had spent the *Anschluß* or earlier years abroad. And since the Allies in their Moscow declaration had given Austria victim status, those who had remained in the country throughout the war years had less incentive to show deference to those who had suffered the privations of exile. An important contrast to many other countries in this transition phase had been the absence of an Austrian government in exile during the war years. This absence did little to raise the status of those individual Austrians who had fled abroad and amongst whom there were few common denominators, for whilst some had fled Nazi Austria, others had escaped persecution from their fellow Austrians in the corporate state of Dollfuß and Schuschnigg.

And it seems as if post-war Austrians could also live with other irreconcilables, no more so graphically illustrated than by the person with ultimate responsibility for overseeing the rebirth of an independent Austria, Karl Renner. He was to be the first Staatskanzler and the first Bundespräsident of post-war Austria. As a leading Socialist in the immediate days following the First World War, Renner had been a vociferous champion of Austria's union with Germany. He had subsequently endorsed the *Anschluß* after Hitler had marched into Austria. Yet in 1945 he set about the task of restoring an independent Austria. Renner's case is only the most striking example amongst a widespread pattern of key individuals and whole classes of functionaries and civil servants taking up posts they had held before the *Anschluß*.

While the Allies remained as occupying forces within Austria, the Austrians themselves had only limited room for manoeuvre, yet it was precisely this limited scope in the exercise of power that helps explain the importance of culture in the emergence of the Second Republic. It is worth recalling how fragile the idea of Austrian nationhood has been throughout the twentieth century. Even as late as 1965 fewer than half (48 per cent) the respondents to a survey believed that Austrians were a nation. By 1977 this figure was still a modest 62 per cent.²

The principal challenge in the early post-war years was to disentangle Austrian identity from that of Germany, and culture was to be enlisted as a major instrument in that task. The incentive to achieve this separation was naturally very great indeed. With the inevitable question of war guilt and reparations on the agenda of the occupying Allies, it was in Austria's interest to distance itself from all that was German. The experience of life in the Greater German Reich had also turned sour following the destruction and suffering that had ultimately visited Austria, and in that regard the situation in 1945 was markedly different from that of 1918; it was therefore not mere opportunism that lay behind the change of position held by many politicians who had once been champions of union with Germany. But this willingness to dissociate would not of itself guarantee the creation of a clear Austrian identity. The First Republic had been too short-lived and too unstable for its simple evocation to guarantee acceptance of the Second Republic. A whole generation of young Austrians had been educated under the Nazis when the idea of Austria had been systematically eradicated, while many older Austrians predated the First Republic, and it is understandably difficult to feel a sense of veneration for institutions younger than oneself. Attempts to evoke an Austria before 1918 and the imperial grandeur of the Habsburgs constituted a real problem, yet, as the work of Joseph Roth in particular illustrated, the sense of loss with the passing of Empire was a very potent strain in the work of some writers after 1918. The problem was that any evocation of a point in history before 1918 would be to endorse pre-republican Austria. Had Austria's post-1918 history been happier,

2 P. Dusek et al., *Zeitgeschichte im Aufriß*, Vienna, 1988, p. 337.

this may not have been a dilemma, yet the First Republic was too weakly established in the minds of many; it could offer few endearing memories for Austrians of all classes: the professional classes had experienced hyper-inflation particularly keenly and the collapse of banking institutions; the Communists and Socialists had been persecuted by their fellow Austrians; it had been a time of *Schattendorf*, street unrest and eventually of civil war.

Voltaire was the first modern European to appreciate fully the link between a nation's history and a nation's literature, seeing in literature 'a constitutive element for the existence of nations'.³ Yet Austrian literature of the immediate post-war period, and indeed well beyond the period under discussion in this volume, displayed a remarkable reluctance to engage either with the concrete details of day-to-day reality in Austria immediately after 1945 or in discussing the uneasy history of Austria between the wars. A sympathetic reader might feel that it was an unnatural expectation for Austrian literature to come to terms with the post-1945 situation when it had yet to demonstrate it had absorbed the tremendous upheavals that had followed the Treaty of St Germain after the First World War. Yet many literary scholars have noted the absence of that *Trümmerliteratur* (literally, literature from the ruins) which was such a strong feature of West German writing after the war: 'To a large degree [Austria] did not have writers like Borchert, Böll, Nossack, who, torn between radical despair and hope for a radical new beginning, provided the decisive features to the face of immediate post-war German literature'.⁴ It has taken all the analytical skills and a bravura performance by Austria's most distinguished scholar of contemporary Austrian literature to repudiate the idea that post-1945 Austrian literature has been politically supine.⁵

But for politicians on the right and left the need for an affirmative Austrian identity was an essential element in securing future political goals as well as finding the way back to that hypothetical Austria from which the nation had been violently derailed by the German occupation. Until this could be achieved through tangible political institutions, an identity would have to be constructed and transmitted by cultural, including educational, means. In June 1945 the People's Party (ÖVP) issued fifteen guiding principals, the eighth of which called for the conscious cultivation of the Austrian spirit and culture.⁶ And the Communists, too, accepted that any idea of internationalism would have to wait until an Austrian identity had been firmly established. Ernst Fischer, the leading Austrian Communist thinker and first education minister in Renner's post-war cabinet recognized that the antidote for a workforce corrupted by years of Nazi propaganda would be a sense of Austrian patriotism.

He and the subsequent ministers for education, Felix Hurdes and Ernst Kolb, both conservative ÖVP men, placed particular emphasis on textbooks and the school syllabus in the task of creating an Austrian identity. In recent years it has become a commonplace of Austrian literary history — but no less true for being so — that early post-war literature was remarkably conservative and hostile to innovation. Young authors and those writers who had gone into exile were to experience particular difficulty in finding an outlet for their work or a sympathetic critical reception, and this no doubt explains in part the intense bitterness of the delayed response to all things Austrian when it finally expressed itself more fully in the 1960s. Many voices were to be lost altogether. Peter Eppel, for example,

3 W. Krauss, *Grundprobleme der Literaturwissenschaft*, 4th edn, Reinbeck, 1973, p. 26.

4 W. Weiss, 'Die Literatur der Gegenwart in Österreich' in M. Durzak (ed.), *Deutsche Gegenwartsliteratur*, Stuttgart, 1981, p. 602.

5 W. Schmidt-Dengler, 'Von Sturm, Gewitter, Windstille und Frost oder: Mein Gedicht ist mein Messer!' in H. Seuter (ed.), *Die Feder, ein Schwert? Literatur und Politik in Österreich*, Graz, 1981, pp. 162–69.

6 K. Berchtold, *Österreichische Parteiprogramme 1868–1966*, Munich, 1967, p. 377.

established the names of 121 Austrian authors who had gone into exile in the United States. Ninety of these (74 per cent) were to remain in America and only twenty (16.5 per cent) were to travel back to Austria permanently.⁷

Modern, avant-garde literature, from the politicians perspective, was an unsuitable instrument for creating a national identity amongst a broad reading public. In post-war Austria there was, in addition, little enthusiasm amongst the professional literary and academic establishment for encouraging modern writing, despite the efforts of H. C. Artmann, Oswald Wiener, Friedrich Achleitner and other writers associated with the Wiener Gruppe. (The Vienna Group's initial name, 'Exil', clearly betrayed the attitude many young and experimental writers felt towards the state of Austria.) Many of the leading critics and literary scholars from the *Anschluß* era survived well into the Second Republic: Josef Nadler, Norbert Langer, Heinz Kindermann and Adalbert Schmidt. In their works they were simply to ignore the Nazi years and in their treatment of writers who had continued to publish throughout the Nazi period they often withheld biographical information that related to that period. By abandoning a chronological approach to literary history in favour of a somewhat vaguely formulated appeal to the Austrian tradition, it was possible to present Austrian writing as uncontaminated by Austria's contact with Hitler. There were writers, both of socialist and conservative persuasion, who did attempt to engage with Austria's inter-war history, men such as Rudolf Kreutz, Ernst Lothar, Fritz Habek, Wilhelm Waldstein, Rudolf Brunngraber, Franz Höllering, Reinhard Federmann, Franz Kain and Alois Vogel, yet even in these instances there was much ill-ease at direct engagement with the disintegration of the First Republic and Austria's move towards National Socialism. The conservative writers in particular looked more towards the last phase of an independent Austria than to the years of the civil war. And for many writers Austria's recent history represented predominantly a back-cloth for the telling of stories about individuals or individual families than for large-scale historical or social analysis. As for the years immediately after 1938, there were attempts to deny they had any impact at all on Austrian literature. Typical of such a stance was that of Alexander Lernet-Holenia, the epitome of Austrian literary conservatism and a subsequent president of the Austrian PEN-Club. In 1946 he wrote an article in the journal *Geist und Wort* in which he argued that the unwholesome impact of Germany upon Austria's cultural life in the immediate past should not be overestimated: 'It is probable that Austrian writing would be approximately where it is now, even without the political events that tried for a time to drive it off its track'.⁸ Such a view suggested that Austrian literature after 1945 had leapfrogged over the Nazi years and taken up where it had left off in the 1930s and earlier. If post-war cultural life could ignore the impact of the years under National Socialism, it followed that it could also afford to ignore what individual artists had done during that time. As a result many writers of what is known as *Ostmark-Literatur*, that is, works and anthologies avowedly in support of an Austria absorbed into Greater Germany, found little impediment to continuing work after the war or having earlier work reproduced if in that earlier work patriotic Austrian sentiment could be clearly distinguished. (Just how quickly the past could be forgotten is illustrated by the fact that by 1953 Josef Nadler could undertake an edition of the collected works of Josef Weinheber for the Salzburg publishing house of Otto Müller.)

7 P. Eppel, 'Bemerkungen zur Frage der Rückkehr österreichischer Emigranten aus den USA' in Johann Holzner et al. (eds), *Eine schwierige Heimkehr. Österreichische Literatur im Exil 1938–1945*, Innsbruck, 1991, p. 112.

8 J. McVeigh, *Kontinuität und Vergangenheitsbewältigung in der österreichischen Literatur nach 1945*, Vienna, 1988, p. 93.

Despite energetic and pioneering work in a number of literary journals emerging after the war striving to make contact with world literature, the general direction of the cultural response to a restored Austria could best be described as the search for timelessness: Austrian literature was to be *Dichtung* untainted by base day-to-day politics, conveying a picture of intact Austrian values. In a 1946 edition of the journal *Plan*, Hans Weigel, the influential Jewish writer and critic recently returned from exile, noted with alarm Austrians' willingness to isolate themselves even from the best in German culture.

It is tempting to say that Austrian literature was doing nothing new. The retreat from political reality had also marked the literary response to 1848, as demonstrated by Austria's greatest prose writer of the nineteenth century, Adalbert Stifter, that 'mild and timid liberal'⁹ who had evoked a world where individuals matured and fulfilled themselves outside social and political engagement, but here I touch on elements in Austrian cultural life that go well beyond the chronological parameters of my theme for, as one cultural historian has commented, 'the militant Counter-Reformation had virtually isolated the Habsburg monarchy [from the rest of Europe] in the seventeenth century'.¹⁰ When the day of reckoning with the Second Republic finally did begin to take place in Austrian literature from the 1960s onwards and in the works of such writers as Hans Lebert, Franz Innerhofer, Thomas Bernhard and Peter Handke, it was to emerge out of the most unlikely and unexpected context for genuine upheaval, namely a period of political stability and economic prosperity, by which time Austrian public memory had compounded its problem: for if Austria immediately after 1945 was exposed to the charge of having promptly forgotten its recent past, by the 1970s voices could be heard lamenting the fact that memory of those difficult early post-war years after 1945 was also on the verge of disappearing. Austria, it could be claimed, had itself entered comfortably into that post-historical world it had wished to create in its literature and was, according to the former editor of *Die Presse*, a nation that had put its own history behind itself and was now taking it easy in the warm autumn sunshine, resting against the wall of its house, sheltered by hedges from any cold winds that might still be blowing.¹¹

The Austrian historian Anton Pelinka is right in claiming that the taboos and other acts of self-deception developed by the Second Republic had a protective function, for they created the space in which the healing process of a fragile nation could begin.¹² Such taboos, however, are, as he reminds us, of only limited effectiveness. They may have rendered service to the transitional Austria of the immediate post-war period, but they left those acts of literary and cultural maturation associated with a truly confident and secure nation to a later generation.

9 Roy Pascal, *The German Novel*, London, 1965, p. 53.

10 E. Wangermann, *The Austrian Achievement 1700–1800*, London, 1973, p. 19.

11 O. Schulmeister, *Der zweite Anschluß. Österreichs Verwandlung seit 1945*, Vienna, 1979, p. 12.

12 A. Pelinka, 'Taboos and Self-deception: The Second Republic's Reconstruction of History' in G. Bischof and A. Pelinka (eds), *Austrian Historical Memory and National Identity*, New Brunswick, NJ and London, 1996, p. 100.

28 The Rise and Fall of Bourgeois Literature in Hungary, 1945–49

MIHÁLY SZEGEDY-MASZÁK

The origins of the literature of the Hungarian bourgeoisie can be traced back to the Freemasons of the late eighteenth century who tried to liberate themselves from the constraints of feudalism. Their initiative was continued by intellectuals of humble origin who could profit from the social mobility of the Age of Reforms that culminated in the revolution of 1848. Although the rise of bourgeois culture suffered setbacks in 1849 and at the end of the First World War, such temporary declines were far less serious than the damage caused by the German occupation of 1944. At the end of that year the chances for some continuity were so slim that it was an open question whether recovery was possible.

Hungary suffered serious military, material, civilian, and intellectual losses in the Second World War. Some 800,000–900,000 people were killed in the war and 40 per cent of the national wealth of 1938 was destroyed. About 450,000 Jews perished in the Shoah. Political and social changes were inseparable from a large-scale migration that affected between 450,000 and 550,000 people. Between sixty and eighty thousand ethnic Hungarians fled to Hungary from neighbouring countries; 170,000–180,000 ethnic Germans were forced to leave. Owing to a Czechoslovak–Hungarian population exchange scheme, 90,000 ethnic Hungarians left Czechoslovakia for Hungary and 60,000 Slovaks left Hungary and settled in Slovakia. In 1949 the population of the country was 9,200,000. Of this number, 376,173 were born outside Hungary. Economic factors made it very difficult for the country to recover after the end of the war. In 1938 the per capita national income amounted to \$120, which was 60 per cent of the European average. The Second World War and its consequences led to a rapid decline, and the 1938 income level was not reached again until 1950.

In short, the period 1945–49 was marked by an increasingly backward economy and serious intellectual losses. The poets Miklós Radnóti and György Sárközi, the short-story writers Károly Pap and Andor Endre Gelléri, the essayists Antal Szerb and Gábor Halász died in forced labour camps. No fewer eminent writers were killed by the Communists in 1945. The philosophers Tibor Joó and József Révay, and the short-story writer and critic István Örley were among them. Continuity was broken also by the arrival of a group of Communists from Moscow. The film critic and writer Béla Balázs, the philosopher György Lukács, the journalist Andor Gábor, and the critic József Révai belonged to a generation active since the early twentieth century. Like the somewhat younger novelists Béla Illés and Sándor Gergely, they lived in the Soviet Union before and during the war. Largely ignorant of conditions in Hungary, they made an immediate attempt to force the Soviet system on the country. What the American historian John Lukacs wrote about his namesake, recalling their meeting shortly after the philosopher's return to Budapest may give some idea of the distance between a Communist leader who had spent long years in Moscow and the experience of someone who survived the Shoah and the siege of Budapest: 'His conversation, or what I remember of it, consisted mostly of tired *Kaffeehaus* witticisms with which he tried not only to lighten the customary Marxist platitudes but also to cover up the condition that he knew remarkably [...] little of what Hungary had lived through and what Hungarians were thinking'.¹

1 John Lukacs, *Confessions of an Original Sinner*, New York, 1990, pp. 97–98.

In spite of the lack of material resources and the presence of Soviet troops, the Moscow Communists met with considerable resistance. The surviving representatives of the literature of the inter-war period tried to restore the continuity broken by the German occupation which had started on 19 March 1944. In April 1945 the journal *Magyarok* was set up with the idea of preserving the tradition of *Nyugat*, the organ of the liberal bourgeoisie and the most important literary journal of the first half of the century. The next autumn *Válasz*, the periodical of the Populists, began appearing. Lajos Kassák also made an attempt to continue the activities of the literary and artistic avant-garde by publishing *Kortárs* (1947–48). In 1946 members of the younger generation, the poets Sándor Weöres, János Pilinszky, Ágnes Nemes Nagy, and others also decided to start a monthly. By adopting the title of a collection of poems by Radnóti, published in 1935, *Újhold* openly referred to the tragic experience of the Shoah. The same year saw the publication of Radnóti's posthumous volume, containing the poems composed in a forced labour camp that are justly regarded as this poet's most significant contribution to Hungarian literature, texts which have an additional documentary value by representing an unexpected legacy from the dead. Since my assessment of Radnóti's late works, together with a critique of their English translations, has been published with some other papers of the Radnóti Memorial Conference,² in this chapter I merely state that this posthumous publication served as a starting-point for Pilinszky, the most important Hungarian poet to emerge in the years following the end of the Second World War. *Trapeze and Parallel Bars* (1946) represented a new start: identifying himself with the fate of the victims of the Shoah, the young Catholic poet focused on a cosmic homelessness and created a language of great complexity in short and cryptic pieces. His influence was felt even in the work of Weöres, an outstanding poet of the previous generation, who with *The Colonnade of Teeth* (1947) published a series of one-line poems.

The movement represented by Pilinszky and others, sometimes characterized as a form of Central European 'catastrophism', was at odds with the propaganda literature written in the spirit dictated by the Moscow Communists. Its first product was an anthology entitled *May Choir, 1945*, which contained poems by Tibor Méray, who is known in the West as the co-author of a book on the uprising of 1956. For György Lukács and József Révai, the chief architects of the culture controlled by the Hungarian Communist Party, the immediate purpose was to establish the political grounds of the ideology of what Mátyás Rákosi was to call 'salami tactics'. The first step towards this goal was made by Révai, who in *Marxism and Populism*, published in Moscow in 1943, proposed a popular front.

There are two radically different interpretations of the years 1945–9. Some argue that, after the end of the war, Hungary had a better chance for democracy than in previous times and the high hopes of the Hungarian intelligentsia were lost only because of the Communist Party take-over. Others believe that the fate of the country was sealed from the beginning of 1945. It is difficult not to find the topic depressing and controversial. Some of the documents are still not accessible and may prove to have been lost. Popular beliefs notwithstanding, the post-war years cannot be called a closed chapter. Surprisingly little has been written on this period since 1989. There are some survivors with painful memories and any interpreter may hurt personal feelings. As my field is limited to the sphere of literature, I cannot claim to make a general statement. All I can suggest is that the plan to have full control over literature was made by a group of Communists in Moscow, before the Soviet troops reached Hungarian territory

2 See, for example, Mihály Szegedy-Masák, 'National and International Implications in Radnóti's Poetry', *Hungarian Studies*, 11, 1996, pp. 13–28; George Gömöri, 'Miklós Radnóti and the Bible', *ibid.*, pp. 3–12; and Z. Ozsváth, 'From Cain to Nahum', *ibid.*, pp. 29–44.

In 1945 Révai and Lukács were given roles that suited them well. Révai's task was to take measures against 'the enemies of the people', while Lukács was expected to provide a theoretical framework for the campaign against bourgeois culture. One of the lessons the Hungarian Communists had learned after the failure of the 1919 Commune was that a one-party system could not be introduced without the support of some spokesmen of the rural population. In the 1930s Révai worked out an ideology for a popular front. After his return to Hungary his chief objective became to strike a deal with some members of the bourgeoisie and some writers who claimed to have represented the interests of the peasantry in the inter-war period. Underground Communists in both groups were eager to help him. The others had to make a quick decision. Since we are talking about a period that calls for a drastic reinterpretation, it is still not easy to make generalizations.

In 1945 it was stated by the new political leaders of Hungary, the members of the coalition government that included Communists, that no one was immune from accountability for personal conduct. To avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to emphasize that it is not my intention to suggest that more people should have been punished. According to independent (Western) estimates over 250,000 people were deported to forced-labour camps in the Soviet Union after the end of the war, and between January 1945 and March 1948 there were almost 40,000 political legal prosecutions which resulted in over 20,000 people being sentenced.³ Hungarian intellectual life was, then, manipulated from the very beginning, so that the chances for the development of a democratic system were very slim. Some urban intellectuals were tolerated although their totalitarian or gratuitously opportunistic inclinations were already apparent in the 1930s, and some Populists were accepted as representing a 'progressive', democratic movement, while the questionable elements in their ideology were ignored.

Révai decided to have the poet and prose writer Gyula Illyés as an ally. In March 1945 he compared Illyés to such 'progressive' figures in history as Ferenc Rákóczi II, Lajos Kossuth, and Sándor Petőfi. Illyés responded by arguing at a meeting of the National Peasant Party that 'the Communists have gone much further in guaranteeing freedom for writers than we expected. We have to appreciate this'.⁴ It is far from easy to define the role played by Illyés in the period. On the one hand, he is still respected by many Hungarians; on the other, it is undeniable that his artistic and political reputation has declined since the 1980s. Older people maintain that he saved some intellectuals, in a literal or metaphorical sense, while the younger generations blame him for never opposing the political establishment. It is true that he was awarded the Kossuth Prize in 1948 and 1953, and never stopped publishing in the early 1950s, when almost all Hungarian writers of distinction lived in internal exile. It cannot be forgotten, however, that as a shrewd tactician he often outwitted the authorities and in 1950 he composed *One Sentence on Tyranny*, a poem that later became associated with the 1956 uprising.

In more general terms, there may be several open questions concerning the position of the Populists in intellectual history. The only book available on the subject was written in the West. While it is reliable in most respects, it fails to address the question of antisemitism. The following statement may be open to criticism: 'As for the Jewish question and the interpretation of antisemitism, the Populist writers were balanced, good-natured, and humane; they condemned the discriminative measures, the persecution and extermination of Jews, and they regarded antisemitism as useless and detrimental'.⁵

3 J. K. Hoensch, *A History of Modern Hungary 1867–1986*, London and New York, 1988, pp. 161 and 178.

4 É. Ständeisky, *A Magyar Kommunista Párt irodalompolitikája 1944–1948*, Budapest, 1987, p. 29.

5 G. Borbándi, *A magyar népi mozgalom: A harmadik reformnemzedék*, New York, 1983, p. 390.

At the present stage the only hypothesis I can formulate is that Hungarian Communist Party leaders sometimes tolerated writers who had compromised themselves in the 1930s or during the Second World War. My example would be József Erdélyi, whose volume of poetry *Violet Leaf* (1922) may be regarded as representing a paradigm shift in Hungarian literature by heralding the Populist movement that was to play a decisive role in the political, social, and intellectual life of the inter-war decades. Erdélyi was an unquestionably talented poet of half-Romanian origin whose ideology was strikingly similar to that of Octavian Goga and Lucian Blaga, or the young E.-M. Cioran and Mircea Eliade.

For an understanding of the antisemitic elements in the ideology of the Hungarian Populists, it is necessary to refer to an incident in the nineteenth century. On 23 May 1882 an antisemitic member of the Hungarian parliament reported the disappearance of a peasant girl, Eszter Solymosi, from Tisza-Eszlár, a village in eastern Hungary, just a week before Passover.⁶ A ritual-murder allegation was made and another member of the Lower House, Győző Istóczy, who modelled his activities on those of Wilhelm Marr and made a speech in the Hungarian parliament on 25 June 1878 with the title 'Jews, the Iron Ring Around Our Necks',⁷ appeared with a portrait of the alleged victim at an international antisemitic congress held in Dresden. The Tisza-Eszlár affair resulted in a trial and the fifteen defendants were acquitted. The defence was represented by Károly Eötvös, a Liberal member of the parliament who was also well-known as a writer. His account, *The Great Trial That Started a Thousand Years Ago and Is Still Not Over* (1904), published in three volumes, was widely considered a document on the triumph of liberalism over superstition, still at the time when József Erdélyi composed a poem entitled *The Blood of Eszter Solymosi* (1937), suggesting that the verdict should be reversed, because the girl had been a victim of ritual murder. In post-war Hungary Erdélyi was brought to justice. After spending almost three years in prison, he could make a new start as a poet. His collection *A Return* (1954) contained poems written between 1945 and 1954.

My intention is not to find fault with Erdélyi or other such Populists as István Sinka, Péter Veres or János Kodolányi, who expressed similar antisemitic views, but to suggest that such prominent Communists as Lukács or Révai were responsible for not only a large decrease in personal liberty in the years following 1945 but also for the survival of antisemitism.

Instead of passing a moral judgement on some Populists, it needs to be pointed out that in their works antisemitism was not simply closely linked, but even subordinated, to anti-capitalism. Historians are divided in their assessment of the role played by the industrial magnates who were largely responsible for the economic growth of Hungary around 1900. On the one hand, for example, Manfred Weiss, the owner of the factories of Csepel, made a very important contribution to the rise of Budapest; on the other hand, his success was partly due to his significant involvement in the arms industry in the years 1914–18. Some Populist writers were uneducated and their antisemitism was largely based on emotional folklore. The other side of the coin is that several Hungarian Communist leaders who had important functions in the years following 1945 came from families closely associated with capitalism. Because of their social background, they felt vulnerable to the criticism levelled at capitalist exploitation of workers and agricultural labourers, and tolerated the antisemitism of some Populists. They may have been taken by surprise by the fact that the most sophisticated analysis of antisemitic feelings came from István Bibó, a political

6 G. Istóczy, *Országgyűlési beszédei, indítványai és törvényjavaslatai 1872–1896*, Budapest, 1904, pp. 118–25.

7 R. S. Levy (ed.), *Antisemitism in the Modern World: An Anthology of Texts*, Lexington, MA, 1991, pp. 100–03.

scientist associated with the Populists. His long essay *The Jewish Question in Hungary After 1944* was published in the Populist journal *Válasz*, in October and November 1948, shortly before he was silenced by the Communists.

It is almost certain that the reason the Populists were favoured by the Hungarian Communist Party was political. The first issue of *Újhold* appeared in July 1946. Shortly afterwards, the Communist Party monthly *Forum* appeared, edited by György Vértess, György Lukács and two intellectuals who had been called fellow-travellers by some historians. The term is somewhat misleading, since both had joined the Communist Party in the 1930s and had been given the task of undermining other political parties. Officially the folklorist Gyula Ortutay was a member of the Smallholders' Party, while the fiction writer József Darvas belonged to the National Peasant Party. The first issue of *Forum* contained an article by Lukács attacking *Újhold*. A few months later *Válasz* appeared almost simultaneously with an essay by Lukács in *Forum* that praised the Populist journal edited by Illyés.

The discrimination was obvious. In his opening statement Illyés claimed that in politics the working-class, in literature the peasantry, was destined to lead. This division of labour was tacitly accepted by Lukács. There is every reason to believe that the philosopher regarded the pact with some Populists as temporary. After twenty-five years spent abroad, Lukács badly needed disciples. Among the first of them were the philosopher József Szigeti and the literary critic István Király. Szigeti's attack on the bourgeois decadence and irrationalism of the poetry of Weöres, in his essay 'Hungarian Lyric Verse in 1947', published in the October issue of *Forum*, was followed by the banning of *Újhold*. Király was rumoured to have been affected by right-wing ideas, so his sudden conversion to Marxism may have been influenced by a desire to make people forget his earlier activity. In October 1946 he published a long article on László Németh, in which he maintained that this author's essays were greatly inferior in significance to his fiction.⁸ This text signalled the intention of the Communist Party to put political pressure on the representatives of what it considered the most important intellectual movement of the inter-war years. Németh was known to have a strongly anti-Communist ideology. Before the war he published a lucid analysis of Stalinism and insisted that Hungary was part of the Western world. At the same time, he had one important advantage over the urban intellectuals: he paid serious attention to the other nations of Central Europe. Although what he called 'the revolution of quality' was conceptually unclear, it implied a rejection not only of Western capitalism but also of Eastern Bolshevism. By defending Németh, Király set himself the task of manipulating him. Although in the immediately post-war period Németh refused to make concessions and his novel *Revulsion* (1947) is free of any Communist influence, other Populists proved to be less independent. They paid a heavy price for their survival: they became compromised in the eyes of the later generations.

It has to be added that Social Democrats and bourgeois Radicals expressed discontent with the compromise between the Communist Party leaders and the Populists. Moreover, by 1947 even some Communists thought it was time to end the alliance with the spokesmen of the rural population. On 16 February Géza Losonczy — who died in prison after 1956 — condemned the pessimism of Illyés in an article published in the daily of the Communist Party, and in June László B. Nagy, a young Communist born in 1927 who committed suicide in 1973, harshly criticized the Populists and attacked Bibó as the architect of their reactionary ideology.⁹

8 I. Király, *Irodalom és társadalom: Tanulmányok, cikkek, interjúk, kritikák 1945–1975*, Budapest, 1976, pp. 339–52.

9 László B. Nagy, 'A Válasz útja', *Valóság*, 3, 1947, pp. 446–70.

By this time the goals of the campaign against bourgeois values were largely accomplished. After a considerable number of articles and books attacking contemporary writers associated with these values, the next task was rewriting the past. A new canon had to be established and institutionalized. During their years spent in Moscow Lukács and Révai interpreted works on the basis of a dichotomy: progressive traditions were opposed to reactionary trends. Sándor Petőfi and Endre Ady were regarded as representing the mainstream of Hungarian literature. After 1945 a third name was added, that of Attila József, mainly because of an initiative taken by Márton Horváth. A drastic selection of the texts by these three poets was made with official interpretations attached to them. Later the most trustworthy literary historians were commissioned to write books on the three poets. The task of Pál Kardos (Pándi) was to develop Marxist interpretations of the poetry of Petőfi that could replace the highly influential book published in 1922 by János Horváth, who was to be forced to give up his position at the university, together with other bourgeois scholars. István Király, the son of a Calvinist priest, was asked to find an explanation for Ady's attachment to Socialism and Calvinism, and Miklós Szabolcsi, a well-educated critic with a special interest in twentieth-century French literature, was destined to discuss the poetry of Attila József, which had obvious links with the international and Hungarian Avant-garde.

The consequences of this canon formation were far-reaching and sometimes damaging. At a conference celebrating the 175th anniversary of the birth of Petőfi, held at the beginning of April 1998, several participants spoke of a general lack of interest in the works of this nineteenth-century author, and in February 1998, at a colloquium devoted to the activity of Ady, most of the papers addressed the issue of the decline of this poet's reputation. As for József, in recent years documents concerning his conflict with the Communists were published, and the interpretation of his works has changed radically since the immediate post-war years.

Some poems by Petőfi, Ady and even József seem unreadable today. Teachers do not know how to handle them, and they are usually avoided by the authors of dissertations. By contrast, the young critics of the 1990s are avid readers of works by the authors who were dismissed by the Marxists in the late 1940s. In June 1998 a collection of essays, mainly by scholars in their twenties, appeared, testifying to the high reputation of Dezső Kosztolányi (1885–1936). In the years following 1945 this middle-class writer was the main target of the Communists. In March 1947 Árpád Szabó, now emeritus professor of Classics and a prominent member of the Calvinist Church, published an essay in which he condemned Kosztolányi as a 'Fascist': 'I belong to that part of the Hungarian intelligentsia', he wrote, 'which needs Kosztolányi to be aware of what we wish to eliminate for the sake of the future'.¹⁰ The essay appeared in *Valóság*, a monthly edited by Sándor Lukácsy, who later was at least partly responsible for the abolition of the Eötvös College, the equivalent of the École Normale Supérieure, founded in 1895, and for making a long list of books that the Communist Party wished to destroy.¹¹

Szabó's article was part of a large-scale campaign led by Lukács and Révai with the purpose of restructuring the canon of Hungarian literature. Lukács was consistent in the condemnation of certain representatives of the bourgeois tradition and expected his disciples to support him. In 1957, when he was afraid of a revival of the legacy that has been virtually eliminated in the late 1940s, he urged a former student of his to repeat the attack on Kosztolányi. The main thesis of the book entitled *The Disintegration of Ethical Norms* by Ágnes Heller, currently professor at the New School for Social Research and a

10 Árpád Szabó, 'Írástudónak', *ibid.*, p. 220.

11 Sándor Lukácsy, 'Boldogult funkciókban', *Négy évszak*, 9, 1984, 9, pp. 10–18.

member of the Hungarian Academy, is but a variation on the line of argument followed by Szabó ten years earlier.

Szabó and Heller's works are indebted to the articles Lukács published between 1939 and 1941 in *Új Hang*, the organ of the Hungarian Communists who lived in Moscow. In 1945 these pieces appeared in Budapest with a twenty-page preface, still written in Moscow, in March 1945, which set out to herald a new era marked by 'the annihilation of the relics of feudalism, the creation of Hungarian democracy, and the defence of the independence of the Hungarian people'.¹² Since Lukács was convinced that greatness in literature could be achieved only by serving social progress, writers who did not seem to have an unqualified belief in progress were dismissed as inferior. Lajos Kassák, a free-verse writer and Constructivist painter who in 1919 refused to subordinate his creative activity to the principles laid down by the Communist Party, was rejected for 'having obscured the real interests of the workers', and Kosztolányi was called 'a conscious, malicious reactionary'.¹³

On 20 and 21 May 1945 the Hungarian Communist Party held a conference. There were long and passionate debates over the tactics to be followed. On 31 May, Márton Horváth, the editor of the Communist Party daily *Szabad Nép*, launched a campaign against bourgeois culture in a summary of the conclusions of the conference entitled *The Death Mask of Babits*. His main target was Sándor Márai, who was widely regarded as the most celebrated representative of the bourgeois liberal tradition of Mihály Babits and Dezső Kosztolányi.

One of the most important books published in Hungary in 1945 was the diary Márai kept during the German occupation. This work was characterized as reactionary by Lukács in a lecture he gave in December 1945. 'The Hungarian middle class is so rotten that it still does not want and has no courage to face reality', wrote Márai in 1943 about those who believed in a German victory.¹⁴ After 19 March 1944 he lived in internal exile, and when the persecution of the Jews started, he identified himself with the victims. 'I cannot expect anyone to forgive me that I was alive, writing novels while (s)he was in a labour camp.'¹⁵ To my knowledge no one formulated a conclusion comparable to the following: 'Although we all suffered much, we are all guilty'.¹⁶

Lukács made his unfavourable interpretation from the perspective of *pártköltészet*, a term denoting a strong political commitment, defined in the following manner: 'to give a wide, profound, and all-embracing picture of the development of social life. To fight for the progress of mankind, for a higher development by revealing the direction of such a progress, the driving forces behind it, and the interior and exterior powers that try to block it. The true and faithful reflection of social life is the main instrument that can be used to exert an influence on the people.'¹⁷

Since Márai was the most important writer driven to leave Hungary by the Communists, his case might help us understand their cultural policy. Born in Kassa (Košice) in 1900, he came from the 'Saxon' bourgeoisie of what was Upper Hungary until 1920.¹⁸ His original name was Grosschmid, but he adopted the name of one of his Hungarian ancestors at the

12 György Lukács, *Írástudók felelőssége*, Budapest, 1945, p. 4.

13 Ibid., p. 11.

14 Sándor Márai, *Napló (1943–1944)*, Budapest, 1945, p. 4.

15 Ibid., p. 231.

16 Ibid., p. 462.

17 György Lukács, *Irodalom és demokrácia*, 2nd edn, Budapest, 1948, p. 119.

18 Today's Slovakia was confirmed as part of Czechoslovakia only on 4 June 1920 by the Treaty of Trianon. For Czech and Slovak historians Slovakia had been part of the new state since October 1918 (editor's note).

very beginning of his career. His first book, a collection of verse, was published in 1918. Although he was a non-Communist, after the fall of the first Hungarian Commune of 1919, he left Hungary because he disapproved of the right-wing regime. In the Weimar Republic he became a respected journalist and published fiction, drama, and essays in German. In 1923 he married the daughter of a Jewish merchant. Having spent the years 1923–28 in Paris, where he was associated with the international Avant-garde, he returned to Hungary. The motive behind this move was simple: he loved the Hungarian language and wished to continue the tradition of Dezső Kosztolányi and Gyula Krúdy, the leading prose writers of the early decades of the century.

In Search of Gods: The Novel of a Journey (1927), written at the end of the author's first period of exile, provided a shrewd analysis of ethnic and religious conflicts in the Near East. As a publicist he wrote a series of articles from 1933 onwards attacking Hitler. His two-volume autobiography, *The Confessions of a Citizen* (1934–35) was received by many as an imaginative characterization of the life of the Hungarian liberal bourgeoisie. By the end of the 1930s he developed a considerable reputation as novelist, short-story writer, essayist, playwright and poet. Because of his opposition to the Nazis, after 19 March 1944 he had to seek refuge in a village north of Budapest and could not return to the capital before the Soviet occupation.

Márai was described by Lukács in his December 1945 lecture as representing 'vulgar bourgeois individualism',¹⁹ the opposite of a progressive writer who 'never stops singing of the great national humanist mission of the party that plays its role in world history'.²⁰ As for world history, Lukács asserted it was dominated by such great individuals as Cromwell, Marat, Lenin, and Stalin, 'who could unite their individual strengths with the task given them by the party in a higher synthesis that is new, exemplary, and had the status of the Classics'.²¹

In April 1947 Lukács placed the text of this long lecture in a larger context, in a volume called *Literature and Democracy*. To promote Realism, the author asked for the introduction of tighter controls and outlined a programme aimed at 'destroying the reactionary thought of imperialism'.²² In the introduction Lukács specified the following features of the culture that was to be rejected: 'aristocratism, the rejection of equality, a contempt for the masses, the underestimation of economic, political, and social motives, the cult of irrationalism and myth, an emphasis on the vanity of life, a distance from life, and a focus on the psyche'.²³ Assuming that after the 1848 revolutions the bourgeoisie ceased to be a progressive force in European history, Lukács argued that in the twentieth century bourgeois writers could produce either so-called pure literature, dominated by the cult of the ivory tower, or works of kitsch. Both these weaknesses were detected in the works of Márai. According to the deal struck with the Populists, great art was defined as inspired by peasant or working-class culture. Márai had no place in the literature of post-war Hungary.

In May 1947 the younger members of the Communist Party started new journals. *Emberség* was edited by Imre Keszi, Tamás Aczél, and Tibor Méray, while one of the two editors of *Tovább* was Géza Losonczy. Supported by the daily *Szabad Nép* and the periodical *Forum*, they urged writers to follow the instructions of Zhdanov and the example of Fadeev, the main representative of Socialist Realism. Márai's comment on one of these journals was not published until 1993. He called *Tovább* 'a perfect copy of the

19 Lukács, *Irodalom és demokrácia*, p. 126.

20 Ibid., p. 128.

21 Ibid., p. 127.

22 Ibid., p. 7.

23 Ibid., p. 10.

Fascist *Egyedül vagyunk* in typography, setting, spirit and tone', and gave the following characterization of the antisemitic articles that appeared in the Communist weekly: 'The photographs of Jewish bankers appear with a text entitled "We have worked for such people". This is what the Fascist newspaper did three years earlier. The only difference is that in the past the attacks on Jewish capitalists were made by blackmailing Christian journalists, whereas now the authors of similar articles are blackmailing Jewish journalists'.²⁴

In the September–October issue of *Emberség* Imre Keszi demanded 'the art of the rising workers' and condemned 'the trends serving the taste of the old ruling classes'.²⁵ By that time Rákosi, whose desire was to be called 'the Wise Leader of the Hungarian Nation', could boast that he had 'sliced off like salami' most of the parties and factions other than his own. After the expulsion of those from the Smallholders' Party who spoke about Communist Party malpractice, the revelation of an alleged 'counter-revolutionary conspiracy' led to the arrest and deportation of Béla Kovács, Secretary of the Smallholders' Party, by the Soviet military police. A great flow of refugees began. After Ferenc Nagy, the Smallholder prime minister, the Roman Catholic priest and speaker of Parliament Béla Varga, and Imre Kovács, one of the leaders of the National Peasant Party had left, it was the turn of Social Democrats to be liquidated. In October 1947 *Kortárs* was started. Edited by Kassák, it was a last attempt to preserve the tradition of the socialist Avant-garde. On 16 December Géza Losonczy dismissed Kassák's movement as representing 'anti-Realism' and the contributors to his periodical as the most consistent enemies of Marxist-Leninist aesthetics. At the same time, the first issue of *Csillag* appeared. This monthly would determine the ideological principles for Hungarian culture until 1956.

One of the functions of *Csillag* was to strengthen links with Soviet culture. In this respect the activity of Béla Illés, a Soviet major and editor of the Red Army's Hungarian journal *Új Szó*, must be mentioned. In 1947 he published a story *The Gusev Affair* with the purpose of setting the tone for the centenary of the 1848 revolution. To play down the Russian invasion that quelled the 1848–49 Hungarian war of independence, Illés decided to give publicity to the merits of a previously unknown lieutenant. Gusev was said to have revolted against the Tsar in support of the Hungarian revolution. A street in the centre of Pest was named after him, and an abridged version of the story was included in the textbooks published for primary schools. In recent years the street had its original name returned, since Gusev proved to have been invented by Illés, an author whose works are entirely forgotten today.

In Communist Party historiography 1948 was called the 'year of the turning-point', which transformed the country into a people's democracy. On 12 February the Politburo made a decision to establish ideological unity. In his speech 'The Analysis of Literary Life in Hungarian Democracy', published in the March issue of *Csillag*, Márton Horváth condemned writers as different as Kassák and Márai, Németh and Weöres, and associated even Illyés with 'anti-democratic' forces. On 7 March the leader of *Szabad Nép*, written by Rákosi himself, called for an improvement in the theoretical activity of the Communist Party. A Committee of Cultural Policy was set up with the aim of defining the norms that artists and writers should respect. All cultural institutions were to be subordinated to the Committee that had four members, including its chairman Márton Horváth. Otto Klemperer, the artistic director of the Budapest Opera, was sacked on the grounds that he

24 Sándor Márai, *Ami a Naplóból kimaradt 1947*, Budapest, 1993, pp. 209–10.

25 Imre Keszi, 'Buta, de tehetséges', *Emberség*, 1, 1947, p. 298.

was an American citizen of German birth and conducted works by Wagner. Painters were commissioned to work for a project called 'The Portrait Gallery of the Heroes of Labour'.

The first draft of the declaration of the Hungarian Workers' Party was published in *Szabad Nép* on 9 May. At the first congress of the 'new' party, held in June, Lukács spoke of the liberation of creative activity from the pressure of capitalism, the end of reification and alienation, the triumph of realism, and the supreme value of the Soviet experience. What followed was the darkest period in the history of Hungarian culture, dominated by an extreme form of censorship.

After the Hungarian Communist Party merged with the Social Democratic Party, several books were banned. One of these was the fifth volume of Márai's *roman-fleuve*, *The Work of the Garrens*, containing a visionary presentation of a 'Leader' addressing a public demonstration and the narrative of a meeting of the autobiographical hero Péter Garren with the famous writer Berten, who has been placed under house-arrest. Although these parts were based on Márai's article about Hitler's 1933 speech in the Berlin Sportpalast and on his interview with Gerhart Hauptmann, retrospectively it is possible to assume that the Communist authorities saw in the book a general criticism of totalitarian systems. The scene in which the 'Leader' succeeds in manipulating his audience concerns fanatics who lose their personalities and are controlled by the 'centre', a small group which has power and is alienated from the community. The general import of the meeting of the two writers, the young Péter Garren and the old Berten is no less obvious. Berten's hypothesis is that only communities with discontinuous memory can be manipulated from above. In other words, despotism is made possible by the destruction of historical consciousness, the distortion of collective memory.

Other works by Hungarian writers had a similar fate in 1948. A volume of poetry entitled *A Dream*, by the Transylvanian-born Zoltán Jékely, was printed but not published. From 1949 onwards many writers were forced to fall silent, including the avant-garde poet Kassák, the Roman Catholic Pilinszky and the Populist Németh. In 1948 the *Geistesgeschichte* philosopher Lajos Prohászka was expelled from Budapest University, and during the next two years a great number of scholars lost their positions at the universities or at the Academy of Sciences.

To my knowledge Márai's diary and his memoir *Land, Ahoy!* (1972) represent the only account of the years 1945–48 that can claim credibility. Ironically, his diary was not made accessible in its entirety until the 1990s. István Csicsery-Rónay, a Smallholder, made a drastic selection when he published the diary covering the years 1945–57 in Washington, DC in 1968. As he told me some years ago, he refused to include those passages in which Márai called the Populist writer Gyula Illyés an 'opportunist'. Other parts were excluded because of the strong opinions the author had on sensitive issues. An entry from 1946 will serve as an example: 'The problem with Jews is not that they failed to learn anything from suffering and misery. Who would have been different from them in this respect? The problem is that they have learned to continue Fascism in their own style.'²⁶

It is not easy to generalize about why so many writers renounced their past in the years following the end of the Second World War. Except for Márai, no one is known for having expressed strong reservations about the behaviour of the Soviet soldiers, and no other writer questioned the lawfulness of the expulsion of Germans. By 1948 Márai became increasingly isolated for two reasons: he was unwilling to accept Communist black-and-white judgements and refused to assume any political function. He asked for discrimination between Germans who supported and those who opposed Nazi Germany: 'It is hard to win and hard to be defeated. It is hard to be Russian and to be human', he

26 Sándor Márai, *Ami a Naplóból kimaradt 1945–1946*, Budapest, 1992, pp. 131–32.

wrote in the summer of 1945,²⁷ and later made the following observation about the Soviet soldiers he met: 'Their aim was to give up their personality [...]. I as a Western man cannot accept this argument. Giving up my personality, this crazy ideal, would mean giving up my attachment to life'.²⁸

In a period when many of his colleagues modified their views under political pressure, Márai was consistent: throughout his life he approved of socialism but he never renounced his individual freedom. 'My experience is that writers lose as much of their artistic and moral integrity as they gain in political significance', he remarked in 1945,²⁹ and two years later he expressed his disgust when he witnessed manipulation and corruption: 'Elections. [...] It is no solution to keep silent in the midst of idle talk. *Not to respond from the inside*, not to listen — that is the real task.'³⁰ He regarded radical land reform as 'the greatest event in the life of the Hungarian people'³¹ and held the whole nation responsible for the massacre of Jews but described the Soviet soldiers' idea of the bourgeois as ridiculous and felt contempt for those who enjoyed the executions. 'It is not enough to like what they like; they expect you to hate what they hate. There we drift apart', he declared about the Communists.³²

In the summer of 1947 Aragon and Elsa Triolet visited Budapest. In his public lecture, Aragon attacked those who lived in an ivory tower and called Paul Valéry a Nazi sympathizer who admired Pétain and Salazar. Márai wrote about Aragon's visit with contempt. For there was an unbroken continuity between the German and Soviet occupations. He refused to distinguish between class-hatred and racism. No one had the inclination or the courage to share this view. The first sign of his alienation from a country living in fear was that on the Day of Hungarian Books, in the summer of 1946, Ferenc Nagy, the Smallholder minister president, avoided him. 'I cannot side with the left', he confessed one year later, 'because it would be moral suicide to leave my class. I can criticize it from the inside, but do not wish to be treacherous. Nor can I make a single step towards the right, because I am not willing to support the Fascism that may be hiding behind honest right-wing people'.³³

Although feudalism had been abolished in Hungary in 1848, the rise of bourgeois culture was aborted by Communism. This was the conclusion Márai reached in 1948, shortly before he left the country: 'In Hungary two types of man could play a full role: the aristocrat and the peasant. What stood between them had to step down before it could fulfil its function in history.'³⁴

One of the clichés of Marxist historiography is that Hungary never had a bourgeoisie. One of the worst consequences of the impact of the works of Lukács and Révai was the transformation of Hungary into a country with a history of backwardness. In 1948 Márai was forced to emigrate. A sense of foreboding haunted him, and his predictions proved to be correct: the persecution of kulaks, the nationalization of Hungarian industry, the banking system and education were followed by the trials of Cardinal Mindszenty and the Communist Rajk in 1949 and by the large-scale deportations of 'class-enemies'. György Lukács himself was subject to criticism. On 29 April 1949 Rákosi received a long essay from László Rudas, an arch-enemy of the philosopher, in which Lukács was attacked for

27 Sándor Márai, *Napló (1945–1957)*, Washington, DC, 1968, p. 15.

28 Sándor Márai, *Föld, föld!... Emlékezések*, Toronto, 1972, p. 78.

29 Márai, *Napló (1945–1957)*, p. 17.

30 Márai, *Ami a Naplóból kimaradt 1947*, p. 152.

31 Márai, *Napló (1945–1957)*, p. 46.

32 Ibid., p. 57.

33 Márai, *Ami a Naplóból kimaradt 1947*, p. 147.

34 Márai, *Napló (1945–1957)*, p. 64.

viewing Hitler as a tragic figure in history. Although the essay was not printed without significant changes in *Társadalmi Szemle*, the political-theory journal of the Hungarian Workers' Party, others joined in the debate. On the 25 December *Szabad Nép* contained an article in which Márton Horváth blamed Lukács for degrading Socialist Realism to 'an obscure generalization that can be approached with the help of abstractions rather than with that of the living reality of Soviet literature'.³⁵ The philosopher had to indulge in self-criticism. Ironically, the main target of his opponents was *Literature and Democracy*, the book which was largely responsible for the fall of bourgeois literature.

By this time, most of those he attacked between 1945 and 1948 were involved in writing fairy-tales for children or translating from Russian. The only major exception was Márai, who was facing poverty in exile. The rest of his life demonstrates how difficult it had been for him to leave his country and can be interpreted as a sad epilogue to the history of bourgeois literature in post-war Hungary. For forty years he continued to write and publish in Hungarian, but his works were inaccessible in his native country. The reason for this distortion of the past was obvious: those historians and critics who identified Hungarian culture with the traditions of the gentry could not find a place for a writer whose works contradicted their ideological assumptions.

'Darkness surrounds me and I can see only one goal: I have to write in Hungarian as long as I can. This is the only task that is still meaningful. I have signed a contract with this language; this is the destiny I can never forget.'³⁶ These words were written in 1947, at a time when many Hungarian writers denied their attachment to the bourgeoisie. Márai had expressed many reservations about his class throughout his career, but remained committed to its values to the very end. One of the reasons for his decision to commit suicide in San Diego (California) on 21 February 1989 was that he saw no chance for the recovery of bourgeois literature in Hungary. After forty years of Communism those chances still remain very much in doubt.

35 K. Urbán, 'A Lukács-vita. Újabb adalékok az 1949–1950-es vita hátteréhez', *Tanulmányok a magyar népi demokrácia negyven évéről*, Budapest, 1985, p. 174.

36 Márai, *Ami a Naplóból kimaradt 1947*, p. 107.

29 Transition in the Work of Václav Řezáč

ALENA PŘIBÁŇOVÁ

Since the fall of socialism, the discussion of the relationship between literature and contemporary socio-political circumstances has been a subject of much discussion.¹ The tendency to separate historical circumstances from literary reflections is an understandable and predictable reaction to the years literary criticism suffered from the persistent application of extra-literary criteria to works of literature. During this period literature was interpreted and evaluated mostly from the perspective of the functions it performed or was supposed to perform in society. Sanctioned critics understood literature primarily as a device for ideological education; nevertheless the sociological and instrumental approach to the literary text prevailed also among opposition critics, and, first and foremost, among readers. Political events (the beginning of the Second World War, the end of the war, the beginning of the Communist regime, the 'Velvet Revolution', and sometimes even Stalin's death or Khrushchev's speech at the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party) were more or less generally accepted as turning-points that delimited literary periods: we did not speak of the literature of the 1940s, 1950s, 1970s, or 1980s, but of literature after 1939, after 1945, after 1953, after 1956, Normalization literature, literature before 1989 and after 1989.² These dates were (and very often still are) considered as turning points in literary history and in the development of individual authors, the work of whom was thus divided into several phases alternately praised or criticized according to the political sympathies of the critic. The fiction writer Václav Řezáč (1901–56) is one of those authors remembered by both sides as a writer whose work changed radically under the influence of the political changes that took place during the 1945–48 'transition period'.

In 1944 Václav Řezáč published *Rozhraní* (Border-line). It was his fifth novel (I except three works for children) and it concluded a series of three psychological analytical novels opened by *Černé světlo* (Black Light, 1940) and followed by *Svědék* (The Witness, 1942). He had the reputation of being an author of deep psychological insight, a major representative of a great wave of psychological analytical novels that had appeared in Czech literature in the 1930s that comprised authors like Egon Hostovský, Jaroslav Havlíček and Vladimír Neff. In 1948, Řezáč started writing a new novel which he published in 1951, *Nástup* (Falling In), a work that became one of the classics of Socialist Realism — a panoramic view of Czech colonization of the Sudetenland and the expulsion of the Germans in 1945–46. Contemporary reviewers greeted the novel as Řezáč breaking free from 'individualistic psychologism'; they rejected his earlier work as a relic of old times.³ František Buriánek and František Götz, literary critics who analysed Řezáč's work in

1 Petr A. Bílek, 'Prolegomena k dosud ne(na)psaným Dějinám české literatury', *Tvar*, 7, 1996, 14, pp. 1, 4, 5.

2 This approach distributed writers and texts into more or less definite categories, which narrowed and deformed the view of literary context (as Zdeněk Kožmín and Jiří Trávníček show in *Česká poezie od 40. let do současnosti*, Brno 1994), discovering new connections between wartime and post-war poetics that had been 'invisible' from the traditional perspective).

3 Jan Štern, 'Román o nástupu lidové demokracie', *Tvorba*, 20, 1951, pp. 459–60; Jiří Hájek, 'Nástup k novému životu naší země', *Rudé právo*, 24 June 1951, p. 5; Pavel Reiman, 'Řezáčův Nástup', *Lidové noviny*, 10 June 1951, p. 4.

context,⁴ were not as strict in their judgement, but still they regarded the earlier works as a preparatory phase of his development towards the large-scale social novel. Václav Řezáč himself contributed to this perception of his work by exaggerated self-criticism.⁵ In several interviews in the early 1950s he interpreted his wartime novels as an allegorical protest against Fascism and defended his psychological analytical approach as a necessity imposed by circumstances. At the time Řezáč also became active in discussions on the role of art in a 'democratic society' as a defender of the concept of Socialist art serving the masses.⁶ He started to publish widely in Communist-orientated newspapers (for example, *Práce*, *Rudé právo*, *Obrana lidu*); this contributed to his becoming established as a regime author; it also supported the notion of his 1945 instant conversion to Communist ideology (before 1945 he belonged to the circle of the writers around *Lidové noviny*, and became one of Karel Čapek's successors as a columnist;⁷ after 1940 he worked on the editorial board of the same newspaper; in the 1930s he neither worked for left-wing periodicals nor was a member of the Communist Party, though he voted for it). Řezáč's conversion was usually explained as a reaction to the radical changes that took place in society between 1945 and 1948.⁸ However, if we focus on his novels and do not set up the 'psychological' and 'social' parts of Řezáč's work as opposites, his development does not seem to be either surprising or inconsistent.

The main character of *Rozhraní*, the just middle-aged Jindřich Aust, after years of toying with literature sets about writing a novel to prove to the world and to himself that he is capable of a significant achievement. He has to give up the limited but safe comfort of life as a secondary-school teacher and to overcome financial difficulties. He struggles with his doubts about himself and with his book. Work on the novel makes him face questions about the writer's craft and the function of literature. From the idea of literature as a way of self-presentation he comes to the concept of literature as a complex phenomenon, the main task of which is service to society. Literature must reflect real life — Aust continually measures the quality of his novel by its ability to depict the characteristic features of life: fictional situations are 'good' when they are 'true', when they can be verified by reality (Aust becomes satisfied with the crux of his novel when he learns that a similar story happened to the editor of the magazine he writes for; Jarmila, Aust's girlfriend, starts to believe in his talent when she meets a publican who behaves exactly like the publican in his novel, and so on).

Rozhraní is probably the most autobiographical of Řezáč's novels. Like Aust, at the beginning of his career Řezáč made a living writing short stories for a popular magazines, and his love of theatre and experience as a critic explain the theme of Aust's novel. But more important, similar views on literature to those expressed in *Rozhraní* are less explicitly present in Řezáč's reviews from the beginning of the 1930s, in which he demanded that art should offer a typical picture of contemporary life,⁹ and in the

4 František Götz, *Václav Řezáč*, Prague, 1957; František Buriánek, 'Nad dílem Václava Řezáče', *Literární noviny*, 6, 1957, 25, p. 5; idem., *Současná česká literatura*, Prague, 1960, pp. 96–99.

5 *Panorama*, 25, 1950, pp. 56–57; *Lidové noviny*, 6 May 1951, p. 4; *Host do domu*, 1, 1954, 1, pp. 28–30.

6 In his article 'O nový realismus', *Práce*, 2 June 1945, p. 2, written in reaction to a lecture by Zdeněk Nejedlý, 'Za lidovou a národní kulturu' (Towards a People's National Culture, 29 May 1945), but in fact in most of his reviews published in *Práce* and *Rudé právo*.

7 His columns from the years 1941–43 were collected and published in *Stopy v písku*, Prague, 1944.

8 See Jiří Holý, *Česká literatura od roku 1945 do současnosti (2. polovina 20. století)*, Prague, 1996.

9 Řezáč's critical work is analysed in Götz, *Václav Řezáč*, pp. 18–30; this problem is also mentioned in an article by Miloslav Nosek, 'K otázkám typisace ve vývoji Řezáčovy prózy', *Česká literatura*, 4, 1956, 3, pp. 236–63.

theoretical texts that he continued to write throughout his life, but especially in the period 1945–48.

Jiří Opelík, who has written about Řezáč's work and prepared editions of it,¹⁰ points out in his doctoral thesis¹¹ that the autobiographical elements are one of the features shared by all the writer's wartime novels (according to Opelík, another feature linking them is that they can all be interpreted as more or less open contemplations on the role of the artist in society). His first novel, *Větrná setba* (Sowing by the Wind, 1934), narrating the story of a poor student coming of age in the harsh times of the First World War, also has a strong autobiographical streak. However, we can find more links between *Větrná setba* and the 'wartime trilogy' than autobiographical features: in all four attention is focused on a single character and stress is put on the individual psychology of complex characters. Řezáč's heroes are far from positive figures, but unlike writers in the mainstream of psychological analytical fiction (Havlíček, Neff) Řezáč does not pick exceptional or deformed individuals to show the complexity of the human psyche; he attempts to show the way of thinking of typical representatives of various social groups. This agreed with the way he reflected the method of psychological introspection at the time: as a device by which to depict objectively characteristic aspects of his age.¹² His own experience seems to function as a store of verified facts lending legitimacy to his fiction.

In his post-war novels *Nástup* and *Bitva* (The Battle, 1954; another novel based on the same *realia*, written after the success of *Nástup*), Řezáč evidently turned to other means. Having published *Nástup*, he explains in an interview, he realized that he was 'writing an historical novel that like a magnifying mirror was meant to reflect the complicated political reality in our country' and that he had 'wanted to follow the changes both in industry and in agriculture'.¹³ Řezáč tended to more general testimony and felt it must be backed by 'external' evidence: he spent three years travelling in the border areas and collecting material¹⁴ — it seems that he came to the conclusion that individual experience was not sufficient for the ambitious project. In his study 'Proměny Řezáčovy metody' ('Transformations in Řezáč's Method'), Opelík compares one of the episodes of the novel with the short story 'The First Day',¹⁵ written in 1948. (According to Řezáč's wife, the short story was originally written as an exposition of the novel, but later Řezáč decided to change the conception and used the situation described in the short story as an episode.) He demonstrates that in the novel Řezáč deliberately eradicated everything accidental or individual and replaced it by the typical. The main character in the short story Jan Teska, a paviour from Prague who goes to Potočná (the setting of the novel, previously Grünbach)

10 'Proměny Řezáčovy metody (Od Rozhraní k Nástupu)', *Česká literatura*, 10, 1962, 1, pp. 1–22; 'Povídky Václava Řezáče', *Host do domu*, 3, 1956, 9, pp. 407–08; 'O autorovi Rozhraní', Introduction to *Rozhraní*, Prague, 1961, pp. 391–94; 'O Václavu Řezáčovi', Afterword to *Černé světlo*, Prague, 1961; 'Vyslovit pravdu svého času', *Kultura*, 5, 1961, 18, p. 6; Afterword to *Slepá ulička*, Prague, 1972; Opelík also edited and annotated a book of Řezáč's theoretical thinking: *O pravdě umění a pravdě života*, Prague, 1960.

11 Jiří Opelík, 'Románové dílo Václava Řezáče', unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Brno, 1961.

12 'We want to see what happened inside us, not around us — because it is what we understand and what does not puzzle us' (1930): quoted in Opelík, 'Proměny Řezáčovy metody', p. 4.

13 'Václav Řezáč o svém novém románu', *Literární noviny*, 1951, 3, p. 40.

14 He started to travel to the border areas as early as in May 1945 and was so well informed about the situation in the regions that he was asked to draw up a secret report for the Ministry of Information. From August to September 1946 (16, 23 and 25 August and 1, 7 and 28 September, all p. 5) he also published a series of reportages in *Práce*, in which we recognize situations and *realia* we know from the novel.

15 In Václav Řezáč, *Tváří v tvář*, Prague, 1967, pp. 167–75.

by accident, is replaced by Vincent Postava, an ideologically more suitable farm hand who goes there because he no longer wishes to work for others. Evidently, Řezáč intentionally avoided anything autobiographical. In this respect, the replacement of the name Teska by Postava is illustrative (Řezáč used the name Teska several times in his unpublished works for the characters of straightforward, hardworking men; the name is linked with Řezáč's life — Karel Teska was a schoolmate).¹⁶

Autobiographical elements in Řezáč's work were connected with the psychological analytical method and the monographic character of his novels. The retreat from autobiography is attended by a tendency to an 'external' perspective and an effort to produce a social panorama. Nevertheless, these features, often mentioned as characteristic of the writer's post-war work, can be seen to be developing in one novel written before the Second World War, namely *Slepá ulička* (The Dead End, 1938). As in *Nástup*, here Řezáč also leaned on 'external' evidence and exploited concrete statistical data on the state of Czechoslovak industry during the Depression which he collected over several years when working for the State Statistics Office. Originally he intended to tell the story of a family of manufacturers, placing at the centre of attention a single character, the young lupine inheritor of the family business; in 1937, probably under the influence of Pujmanová's *Lidé na křižovatce* (People at the Crossroads, 1937) and the critical response to it, he rejected the first version, *Michal Gromus*, and its monographic approach and started to work on the definitive text that portrays the 1930s in terms of the confrontation of characters representing various classes. *Slepá ulička*, *Nástup* and *Bitva* are the only novels set at a specific historical time; in other novels we may detect the period they are set in, but the period is irrelevant to the plot.

For Řezáč this method was artistically problematic: he was a master in the portrayal of detailed scenes, not of panoramic pictures. His attempts to draw a map of contemporary reality in *Nástup* and *Bitva* led him away from detailed psychological analysis to depicting model situations; detailed portraits of characteristic figures are replaced by simplified, schematic characters acting the way the author imagined they would act as representatives of their classes. The novels are overladen with explanations of the characters' views and convictions, excessive description and didacticism, something that Řezáč himself identified as deleterious to a literary work.¹⁷ Nevertheless, we can hardly say that these problems appear in Řezáč's work as a result of his search for a completely new style that would be more politically acceptable (in connection with *Slepá ulička*, Buriánek had already criticized Řezáč's effort to balance the number of representatives of individual classes in the novel).¹⁸ From the fragment of his last novel *Píseň o věrnosti a zradě* (A Song of Fidelity and Betrayal, 1956) we see that he was fully aware of the flaws of his post-war novels.

His attempt to write 'an historical novel about his own time'¹⁹ was evidently motivated by the social changes that followed the war but cannot be explained simply by his desire to hop on the political bandwagon after 1945 or 1948: the roots of the method he tried to exploit reach deeper into the past. Both his psychological and social novels are written from the position of a writer who regarded literature as a report on his times and understood the role of the writer as that of a witness.

16 An introduction to a fragment of Řezáč's novel *Starý dým* (unfinished, probably written shortly before *Černé světlo*), *Plamen*, 2, 1960, 12, p. 165.

17 Václav Řezáč, 'O nového člověka', *Lidové noviny*, 21 March 1948.

18 Buriánek, *Současná česká literatura*, pp. 98–99.

19 Jiří Opelík used this term in connection with *Nástup* in the study 'Proměny Řezáčovy metody', p. 4.

30 Stanisław Dygat and the 'Re-evaluation of the Intelligentsia' in Polish Fiction, 1945–49

HANS-CHRISTIAN TREPTE

The Dilemma of the Intellectuals

The end of the Second World War brought a fundamental change for European culture, and Polish culture was no exception. The years 1945–49 constituted a transition from war to peace and from chaos to a new social and political order. In these years fundamental changes took place in Polish cultural life. The cultural transition had six aspects: (1) A fairly soft ideological transition to Marxism as the philosophical base of the new cultural ideology and policy, a 'soft cultural revolution' (*łagodna rewolucja kulturalna*); (2) a cultural transition to a homogeneous national culture and literature (that is, a change of dominant historical conceptions from the tradition of the Jagiellonians to that of the Piasts); (3) a transition in poetics to a new literary method and literary criticism to comply with the demands of the new society. (The Fourth Congress of Polish Writers in Szczecin in 1949 meant the victory of the Soviet cultural and literary model in Poland); (4) a transition to a new function of literature, directed to a new mass reader; (5) a transition to a new relationship to the 'national' cultural heritage (a preference for *ratio* as against *emotio*: Enlightenment, Positivism, Realism; and (6) a transition to a type of new fictional character (originating from the new ruling class).

How did literature, especially fiction, react to and interact with these transitions and changes? Writers who did not leave the country had to come to terms with the rules of the new regime and the new cultural policy. Under the pressure of historical, political and ideological events a few authors even started changing their traditional topics, and their poetics. For them the war and the occupation became ever increasingly the dominant literary themes.

The literature of the 1940s did not yet, however, reflect problems desired for artistic treatment by the newly proclaimed ruling class. The new character, demanded so insistently by left-wing critics, remained wishful thinking. Indeed, Polish fiction, published in the transitional period of the 1940s, hardly ever met the new prescriptions, which had been fulfilled by some poets. While war and occupation meant a new beginning for poetry, fiction demonstrated a notable continuity of tradition. Many writers simply resumed their literary work, treating similar themes to those they had treated in the pre-war Polish republic. The new values, first of all propagated by *Kuźnica* (Smithy), a left-wing cultural periodical, remained alien to them. In re-evaluating the past, those fiction writers did not change their aesthetic mode of production, but continued to exploit their own experiences, emotional and physical. Their novels did not try to present a broad panorama of the current thinking on the basis of authentic facts and their analyses of the conscience of the intellectual concentrated on limited Modernist perspectives of observation. Reality was disguised and characters often resembled living masks. Nevertheless these works were used as weapons in contemporary discussions on the role, and the new tasks, of the Polish intelligentsia, because they seemed to disqualify the traditional Polish intelligentsia from intellectual leadership in the new post-war society.

In 1946 the journal *Pokolenie* (Generation) published Bratny's article, 'Próba rachunku' (An Attempt at Re-evaluation),¹ in which the writer expresses his disgust at the Polish 'cultural conspiracy' with the new political and cultural realities. At the First Congress of the Polish Workers' Party (PPR) in December 1945, the party leader Władysław Gomułka introduced the party's new attitude towards the Polish intelligentsia: 'We as the Workers' Party, as the leading party, must help these intellectuals overcome their doubts [...]; the general trend should be to use different ways to attract these people to us.'² But the main debates focused on the appropriate choice of literary tradition. The left propagated a clear preference for Realism and the treatment of the new realities of everyday Polish life. Realism was demanded by Władysław Gomułka in his speech in the Academy of Polish Culture in Wrocław on 9 June 1945: 'Give the people a culture that has grown out of Polish reality.'³ The future Stalinist ruler of Poland, Bolesław Bierut, was even more radical in his views on tradition. When he opened the new broadcasting station in Wrocław he spoke about the future role of young workers and farmers, the new artistic values which arose from the new Polish reality and demanded a selective and ideologically filtered choice of the best in the Polish tradition: 'From historical Romanticism we took what suited us ideologically. Realism was our slogan; its contents took only selected elements from the past. Everything that came from the literary heritage was filtered through our world-view.'⁴ Polish Romanticism, especially, gave rise to sharp controversies. There were voices that demanded a complete rejection of Romanticism and an emphasis on the Positivist tradition (what Poles conventionally call Positivism is what Western Europeans conventionally call nineteenth-century Realism). The critic Jerzy Borejsza wrote at that time in *Kuźnica*: 'Our age is apparently meant to be a negation of Romanticism and a thorough approval of Positivism.'⁵

Bierut himself reminded his audience of the positive, mobilizing role which Romanticism had played in Polish history and society: 'An adequate example would be to recall how great a role was played by Mickiewicz and Słowacki in all Polish society in the period of servitude. Our artists sought to remember that they are obliged to mould their work in such a way as to cultivate and enthuse the nation.' Gomułka agreed with Bierut and emphasized the importance of Romanticism for the development of the Polish nation: 'The Romantic trend, which emerged after the fall of Poland, made it easier for us not only to preserve our national features, but also, despite the loss of independence, drove the nation down the path of development.'⁶ Polish exile circles, primarily representatives of Polish *émigré* literature like Witold Gombrowicz, were sceptical about the postulates of the new cultural policy and the narrow, dogmatic conception of a 'Realist' Polish literature. In an open letter Gombrowicz supported pluralist, democratic structures in politics and culture.⁷

Marxist critics of *Kuźnica* disqualified novels reflecting the experiences of intellectuals in the past as 'intellectual's acts of penance' (*kajanie się inteligenta*).⁸ The literary scholar,

1 Roman Bratny, 'Próba rachunku,' *Pokolenie*, 1946, p. 1.

2 PPR, *Odezwy, rezolucje, instrukcje i okólniki KC 1944-45*, Warsaw, 1959, p. 161.

3 J. Kądzelski, *O problemie modelu rewolucji kulturalnej*, Warsaw and Łódź, 1959, p. 14.

4 H. Gosk, *Krytyka w poszukiwaniu bohatera: W kręgu 'Kuźnicy'. Dyskusja krytycznoliterackie lat 1945-1948*, Warsaw, 1985, p. 122.

5 Jerzy Borejsza, 'Obrachunki na węzłowej stacji', *Kuźnica*, 2, 1946, 50, p. 6. See also Gosk, *Krytyka w poszukiwaniu*, p. 126.

6 Kazimierz Wyka (ed.), *Zagodnienie polityki kulturalnej PRL. Wybór tekstów*, Warsaw, 1969, p. 2.

7 Witold Gombrowicz, 'List do ferdydurkistów', *Nowiny Literackie*, 6, 1947, p. 6.

8 Jan Kott, 'Zoil albo o powieści współczesnej', *Odrodzenie*, 2, 1947, p. 35.

Kazimierz Wyka, replaced this pejorative expression with the less ideologically loaded description '*obrachunki inteligenckie*' (a re-evaluation of the intelligentsia). He used this term to characterize a more or less homogenous group of novels, including, *Drewniany koń* (The Wooden Horse, 1946) by Kazimierz Brandys, *Jezioro Bodeńskie* (Lake Constance, 1946) by Stanisław Dygat, *Sedan* (1948) by Paweł Hertz and *Sprzysiężenie* (The Plot, 1947) by Stefan Kisielewski.⁹

Wyka's diagnosis was discussed in connection with the controversial article on the genealogy of the Polish intelligentsia published by the sociologist Józef Chałasiński in 1946.¹⁰ Chałasiński stated in his article that the Polish intelligentsia did not come into being as a result of social progress but as part of the process of social degradation in the Polish gentry (especially after the Partitions). Therefore representatives of the Polish intelligentsia had their own specific intellectual attitude towards life and work: they tended to feel superior, to isolate or ghettoize themselves, and to treat representatives of other social strata with contempt.

The critical attitude towards intellectuals, reflected in the novels by Brandys, Dygat, Hertz and Kisielewski, was not imposed on literature by reviewers and representatives of the new cultural policy. On the contrary, it reflected the frustration and disillusion of the authors themselves. First, the authors clearly considered that writing should help liberate the psyche both from the nightmares of war and from accepted but ever more questionable social and cultural norms. In this respect these novels could be regarded as 'therapy' for lost intellectuals. Secondly, from a sociological point of view, this fiction resulted from a fundamental revision of a previous world-view, which had not been the subject only of literature. As a result of the liberal autumn of 1956 these novels 're-evaluating the intelligentsia' experienced another renaissance. They were not only republished, Brandys's in 1958, Dygat's in 1956 itself, Hertz's a little later, in 1966, and Kisielewski's in 1957, but also interpreted and discussed in a now changed political and cultural context. This time the forlornness and isolation of the intellectual was interpreted in categories of Existentialism. This interpretation seemed more appropriate. It liberated these literary works from the narrow, political restrictions of the time when they were published. A new approach towards literary characters was possible as was demonstrated by the scholar Helena Zaworska who focused her contribution to the discussion on the decline of intellectual myths.¹¹ The identification of 'Polishness' with a particular social group like the gentry and the intelligentsia had been rousing suspicion and ridicule since the end of the nineteenth century as, for example, in Stanisław Wyspiański's 'mocking morality play' *Wesele* (The Wedding, 1901). Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński made fun of the 'dying nation' of Polish intellectuals.¹² Gombrowicz presented a compromised representative of the new intelligentsia in his novel *Ferdynand* (1937), and Witkiewicz stated that the average Polish intellectual was just nasty and disgusting.¹³

The 'vivisection' of intellectuals in the prose of the 1940s was, then, nothing new in the history of Polish literature. In spite of all the cataclysms Poland had endured these novels demonstrate a remarkable continuity in the literary tradition from Karol Irzykowski (1873-1944) via Żofia Nałkowska (1884-1954), Stefan Żeromski (1864-1925) and

9 Kazimierz Wyka, *Pogranicze powieści*, Warsaw, 1974, p. 137.

10 Józef Chałasiński, 'Inteligencja polska w świetle swej genealogii społecznej', *Kuźnica*, 4, 1946, pp. 36-38.

11 Helena Zaworska, 'Po upadku mitów inteligenckich. O prozie tzw. Obrachunków inteligenckich w latach 1945-1949' in A. Brodzka and Z. Zabicki (eds), *Z problemów literatury polskiej XX. Wieku*, vol. 3, Warsaw, 1965, p. 96.

12 Konstanty Ildefons Gałczyński, quoted in Gosk, *Krytyka w poszukiwaniu*, p. 228.

13 See *ibid.*, p. 304.

Tadeusz Breza (1905–70), to Gombrowicz. For example Dygat's *Jezioro Bodeńskie* followed on from Gombrowicz's avant-garde *Ferdydurke*. The outbreak of the Second World War had, however, postponed Dygat's début (actually Dygat's real, and now forgotten, début was a grotesque short story *Różowy kajecik* [The Little Pink Exercise Book, 1938]). 'The outbreak of war in 1939 drove different people with different experiences into strange places and circumstances. I also drove my début forward in years, and formal pretexts actually had nothing to do with it.'¹⁴ All four novels I am concerned with here, Brandys's, Dygat's, Hertz's, Kisielewski's, have a hybrid character. They used different poetics and literary conventions, and a strong continuity was appreciated as a precondition for the health of Polish fiction after the war. Jarosław Iwaszkiewicz was impressed by this continuity: 'There would have been no Dygat without Gombrowicz, no Breza without Kaden [...] the indubitable blossoming of Polish fiction [...] is a positive product of the work of 1920s *littérateurs*.'¹⁵

We may, indeed, state that the year of the gradual liberation of Poland, 1944–45, was an historical and political caesura, but have to be wary of stating that the year constituted a cultural, or literary, caesura. In the post-war period of transition two dominant literary models coexisted, *littérature engagée*, which served the (new) state and society, and a literature concentrated on the past and on its own literariness. The latter followed traditional narrative convention in having a specific narrator, but it also gave rise to a particular literary figure, the sensitive Polish intellectual, introverted, immature, impotent (often also psychologically) who is situated between two political and cultural systems and *Gesellschaften*. He still has his roots in the old pre-war society but is expected to assess new post-war realities. These intellectuals are aesthetes. Familiar with European culture, they often view the outside world through the prism of art. International contacts, family ties and long journeys helped them achieve supranational attitudes and sentiments. Especially the literary figures portrayed by Dygat and Hertz manifest cosmopolitan experience, broad geographical and intellectual horizons. The authors used the attributes to demonstrate the specific exotic features of their characters' 'European' relatives — aesthetic fastidiousness, intellectual voyeurism, political escapism and cultural sophistication, which contrasted with Central European egocentric patriotism. The politically inspired switch from the multicultural heritage of the Jagiellonians to the local (and, indeed, geographically inspired, given that the westward translation of Poland placed the country more or less where it was in past times) heritage of the Piasts was not realized. The figures in these novels did not meet the new criteria either, and their themes and aesthetic methods were regarded as old-fashioned.¹⁶ The choice of characters from the Polish intelligentsia had focused the attention of the authors on three main problems: first, the inability of the individual to free himself from his social environment; secondly, the relationship between the individual, the nation and its 'tradition'; and thirdly, the problem of the social consequences of the intellectual's cosmopolitanism and hence the question, Who was responsible for the dilemma Polish intellectuals found themselves in?¹⁷ The third problem became the leitmotiv of this fiction.

Stanisław Dygat

I take as my example of an exponent of this fiction Stanisław Dygat (1914–78) who studied architecture and philosophy in Warsaw and who was one of the most gifted writers

14 Stanisław Dygat, *Jezioro Bodeńskie*, Warsaw, 1976, p. 7.

15 Gosk, *Krytyka w poszukiwaniu*, p. 211.

16 See *ibid.*, pp. 227–48.

17 See Zaworska, 'Po upadku mitów inteligenckich', p. 96.

of the 're-evaluation of the intelligentsia' group. Because he had a French passport (he was partly of French descent), he was interned in a camp located in a school in Constance. His fairly strongly autobiographical *Jezioro Bodeńskie* is a unique, and entertaining (self-) criticism of 'eternal' Polishness. It without doubt represents the greatest literary achievement of the four novels in the group. Dygat's novel was first interpreted particularly narrowly as an attack on the Polish bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Although it did not meet the demands of the new cultural politics it was universally acclaimed and awarded prizes. (An interview with Dygat was published entitled 'Writers together with the people struggle for a socialist Poland.')

¹⁸

Although published in 1946 the novel recounts little of the horrors of war. War and history form a distant background. The isolated prisoners seem to live in a huge glass ball which distorts them into caricatures. The closed space of the prisoner-of-war camp generates discussion, play-acting and outright performance. A whole range of eccentrics of different national origins had been interned here in 1941. Conditions in this camp are rather comfortable; the internees have to endure nothing but their boredom as they wait for the end of the war and their liberation. Dreaming and play-acting formed the creative and individual side of Dygat's strange, egoistic hero. By means of provocation and scandalization he tries to liberate himself from form and convention. Day-dreams, escapes into another world, deliver him from his unpleasant duties in a grey, tedious life. The isolated co-existence with representatives of other nationalities and cultures provoked particular forms of play-acting. All gestures and roles are acted out in the imagination of the character first. Play-acting becomes his second nature, forced on him by the alien reality of the camp. His roles and masks are lifted from the old familiar world, which had existed before the war. They were to help him hide his true feelings. Faced with an international auditorium, Dygat's anonymous 'hero' begins to present himself as a Pole. Therefore he assumes romantic gestures and attitudes, reminiscences from Polish literature, to demonstrate his Polishness. Like Konrad in Mickiewicz's *Dziady* (Forefathers' Eve, 1823–32), he tries to leave his prison, to perform something impressive. Like Rafał Olbromski from Żeromski's historical novel *Popioły* (Ashes, 1904), he leaves the school-prison to join a Polish legion. But he remains in a state like catalepsy, a state of weakness typical of Słowacki's *Kordian* (1834) but also of some of Wyspiański's characters in *Wesele*. Especially in the scene where the 'hero' prepares himself for action, Dygat makes creative intertextualizing use of Wyspiański's play.

Stagnant time linked with aimless motion in a closed space form a circle symbolizing absurd and hopeless situations as such. The whole construction of the novel, with daydreams interspersed with mental journeys and escapes, represents the structure of a closed space, a circle. Thus the novel begins and ends with the same statement (and justification), which explains a hopeless situation: 'In the meantime war had broken out'. Exploiting the Polish literary tradition, Dygat adopts traditional symbols — such as the image of the dance, much employed in Polish literature of Romanticism and the *Fin-de-siècle* (Young Poland), Mickiewicz's last polonaise from his poem *Pan Tadeusz* (1834) and the *chochol*-dance from Wyspiański's *Wesele*. Like Wyspiański's characters, the Poet and the Host, Dygat's 'hero' starts lamenting about his inactivity and weakness. Infected with the bacillus of Polish Romanticism by his reading of the 'poet-prophets', he plays the role of a martyr and begins suffering for his people and for other nations. He escapes to Switzerland to become the leader of a Polish legion, in order to liberate Poland and the world. But finally he doubts his own power to carry out his plans. He leaves his

18 'Pisarze idę wraz z ludem do walki o Polskę socjalistyczną,' see Gosk, *Krytyka w poszukiwaniu*, p. 240.

compatriots and returns to the internment camp voluntarily, justifying his decision with the ridiculous statement that he has to finish reading Słowacki's *Kordian* first. Thus another circle is closed. But suddenly he hears the mocking song of Chochół from Wyspiański. 'Fool, you once had a golden horn' which encourages him to another heroic deed. But when he is about to attack a German guard impotence comes over him again. As in Wyspiański's *Wesele*, a cock crows and dawn breaks. When he finally wakes up out of his adventurous dream, he is relieved to ascertain that there is no way out of the camp. The performance of Chopin's 'Polonaise' in A flat major in the camp constitutes another grotesque scene that demonstrates the symbolic Polish dance as a circle. All Poles situated in the camp suddenly start dancing and hugging each other, emphasizing thus their Polishness and the Polish avowal of friendship taken from Mickiewicz's 'Kochajmy się' (Let Us Love One Another) from *Pan Tadeusz*, which has the status of 'the national poem'. But the magic of Polish Romanticism affects even non-Polish prisoners-of-war. Two reserved Englishmen suddenly start hopping to the rhythm of the Polish *oberek*, and even a German guard cannot restrain himself. The assembly hall of the school changes into a whirling ballroom: 'Let us love one another [...]. You Englishmen and a Pole, let us love one another.'¹⁹

Dygat's main character uses different masks and disguises not only in his social contacts but also in his love affairs. Love is no longer genuine; it is artificial, a game. To conquer the French Suzanne he uses the mask of the amorous Pole of Romanticism. In his relationship with the British girl Janka Birmin he puts on the mask of a stiff-upper-lipped charmer. To make an impression on another young woman, Renée, he tends to be a cynical clever-dick.

In his play-acting, 'patriotic' feelings and national masks can be exchanged. Dygat's 'hero' can even put himself into the position of a German: 'Ich liebe Deutschland — I sigh to myself and see a beautiful, spreading country full of tidy, clean towns, charming nooks inhabited by the beauty of the greatest musicians. I feel contact with the old myths, the gods of Walhalla and the whole fairy-tale world around the Rhine.'²⁰

The highlight of all his 'national performances' is the grotesque lecture 'My Nation and I' (*Ja i mój naród*), delivered by the narrator, a brilliant satire on Mickiewicz's lectures on Slavonic literature at Collège de France in Paris (published as *Les Slaves*, 1849). Dygat's 'hero' tries to start another Polish dialogue with the ignorant West. (The West confuses different countries like Poland and Russia and cannot distinguish between the Polish and Czech languages.) But in vain; the spectacle ends in a scandal.

Dygat's novel *Pożegnania* (Farewells, 1948), continues to treat the problems at the centre of *Jezioro Bodeńskie*. This time, however, the intellectual is placed in the bourgeois milieu of pre-war Warsaw society. This character is also bored and frustrated. He, too, tries to escape from an unpleasant reality into an emotional, mental reality, which is to liberate him from tiresome conventions. But the escape turns out to be just a Sunday escapade, because he lacks the courage to renew his life. War and occupation, and the tragic defeat of the Warsaw Uprising had destroyed his familiar environment, liberated him from the pre-war conventions against which he had revolted in vain. History had done the job for him. Waiting together with other weird refugees and other lost souls in a Warsaw suburban house, he nourishes the stubborn hope that the battle-front and the fast-approaching final catastrophe might cure him of his inactivity, allow him to begin a new but uncertain life. This novel is a witty critique of bourgeois conventions and habits. But it also quite evidently constitutes the author's critical appraisal of himself as artist, such as would

19 Dygat, *Jezioro Brodeńskie*, p. 106.

20 Ibid., p. 97.

become typical of the Stalin period at the beginning of the 1950s. If we look at *Pożegnania* as a further instalment of *Jezioro Bodeńskie*, we notice important changes in construction and message. The ending of the novel, especially, artificially appended to a literary whole (a not uncommon habit of writers at the end of the 1940s), demonstrates a clear ideological intention. The approaching Soviet tanks and soldiers, with red stars on their caps, meant the end of an historical period and a dubious liberation of the country, its people and the main character of the novel. Most of the novels about intellectuals I have mentioned do not suggest any solution to the circle. But *Pożegnania* does break it. The author seems to be suggesting that History has taught him a lesson. The ending marks the end of an intellectual attitude. It marks a clear transition into a literature of black and white values, a literature that increasingly sought to fulfil Stalinist demands, and that soon produced a new hero of its own. But even during this dour period 'progressive' representatives of the 'humanist intelligentsia' were to be incorporated into the new socialist society. Conditions in Poland were different from those in the other countries of the Soviet Bloc. Nevertheless the 'old' Polish intelligentsia was even in Stalinist times not 'decapitated', as in the Soviet Union, nor was it deprived of power, as in East Germany or Czechoslovakia, where new, socialist intelligentsias were cultivated. Polish culture went through a rocky period, especially in the first years of Communist rule, but it never collapsed, however many of its major scholars and writers defected to the West.

31 Days of Judgement: Egon Hostovský and the Period 1945–48

RADOJKA MILJEVIĆ

The term 'transition', if it has any meaning, given that every culture and every living thing is always in a transition of kinds, must connote the change from one state to another, the departure from and ending of one thing, the arrival to and beginning of another. Through the works and correspondence of a Czech writer, Egon Hostovský, I shall examine the eschatological aspect of transition and approach the years 1945–48 as a period of incrimination, as an inexorable progress towards disillusion, and as an awakening of the desire for a lost mythic unity.

Hostovský was born to a Jewish Czech family on 23 April 1908. In his late twenties and early thirties he began to establish himself in Czech literature as one of its foremost exponents of psychological 'analytical' prose. Supporting his writing career variously through work as an editor, translator and, later, as an administrative clerk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he found himself cast into exile — accidentally, as it were — by the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia shortly after his arrival on a lecture tour in Belgium, at the behest of the Belgian PEN club, on 15 March 1939.¹ He chose not to return home, fearing that, as a Jew, a grisly fate would await him; indeed, he alleges that he later learned that the Gestapo were looking for him as early as 16 March 1939.² Hostovský's own experience of this period, even before Occupation, was clearly one of immense fear, bordering on paranoia: the poet Ivan Jelínek recalls in his memoirs Hostovský's comments on meeting him in Prague: "I must get away, away!" he repeated, "I am a Jew, and, what's worse, a Czech Jew [...] I shall be among the first whom they will kill",³ and Jelínek remembers how ashamed he felt for Hostovský, 'who jerked with every approaching step, every rustle of paper, every waft of wind. He truly imagined that we were being followed, that somebody was listening to us.'⁴ After having spent periods of time in Belgium, then France, Spain and Portugal, Hostovský accepted the offer of work from the Czechoslovak consulate in New York, and spent the remainder of the war there. During this period he published three works, *Listy z vyhnanství* (Letters from Exile, Chicago, 1941),⁵ *Sedmkrát v*

1 According to Hostovský himself, he hesitated in accepting the offer since he blithely believed that nothing worse could happen to the Czechs after the Sudetenland had been ceded by the Czechoslovak government to Germany on 30 September 1938. He finally made up his mind to leave when an old friend, a Catholic poet, came to visit him to instruct him to leave, claiming that Hostovský was one of the few Jews worth defending and that he hated all other Jews and thought them responsible for all the country's woes (see Hostovský's interview with Antonín J. Liehm in Liehm, *Generace*, Cologne, 1988; the edition referred to here is Prague, 1990, p. 376).

2 See Hostovský's interview with 'mt' [Michal Topol'sky?], 'Hovoříme se spisovatelem Egonem Hostovským' in *Svobodné slovo*, 2, 20 June 1946, no. 141, p. 7.

3 Ivan Jelínek, *Jablko se kouše*, Prague, 1994, p. 350 (Jelínek does not record the date of this meeting).

4 Ibid., p. 351.

5 The work was translated into English by Ann Krtíl as *Letters from Exile*, London, 1942. Apparently the Czech collection was sold out within three weeks of being published (see Hana Weislová's piece on Hostovský, 'Egon Hostovský za války' in *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, 1/2, pp. 44–45).

hlavní úloze (Seven Times in the Leading Role, New York, 1942)⁶ and *Úkryt* (The Refuge, New York, 1943), which were received favourably, on the whole, by American and English critics, and which were published in Czechoslovakia in 1946.

These wartime works are studies of betrayal; they reflect an almost censorious disposition towards the consequences of withdrawing from life and retreating into aestheticism and games, and a less than indulgent examination by Hostovský of the figure of the dreamer. On the international scale, the collapse — or rather, according to Hostovský's depiction, the capitulation, and therefore betrayal — of France⁷ in the face of the German threat is treated by him as arguably a more significant turning-point than the Munich Agreement. *Listy*, for example, was described by one critic as a portrait of exiles waiting in vain for French *force majeure*,⁸ and it cannot be coincidental that the Book of Revelation constitutes one intertext for these works; indeed, one might view the whole of Hostovský's post-war work as reverberating with the after-shock of this 'apocalyptic' event. Paris is always the destination of the betrayer, and the Frenchman often, although there are exceptions, the embodiment of betrayal. In the short story 'Zápisky Bedřicha Davida o velké nevěře' (The Notes of Bedřich David on the Great Unfaithfulness), which monitors the progress of a small group of exiles from France to Portugal, a mysterious Belgian is suspected of being a German spy by the narrator and is accused by him of planning to betray the three Czechs, to which the Belgian responds: 'We have been tricked a thousand times. What happened in France? Unfaithful soldiers, unfaithful generals, unfaithful ministers, unfaithful priests. We belong to each other; how could I betray you even if I wanted to? Why, you have been betrayed [...] long ago!'⁹ When the exiles encounter a group of French soldiers in the countryside, they are shocked to discover that the Frenchmen have no intention of returning to fight, but have in fact deserted the army in order to while away their last few hours in the company of women. The narrator is arrested as a suspected enemy parachutist and is saved by an old friend, the Frenchman Baron Loiseau, but even the Baron turns out to be a willing collaborator with the Germans.

In *Sedmkrát v hlavní úloze* Hostovský metaphorizes the figure of the Frenchman, Professor Marcel, as French nationhood. When the first-person narrator (Jaroslav Ondřej) first meets the professor, Marcel brings them French wine to drink together and Ondřej's description of the wine serves as an intimation of the impending betrayal of Europe by France, 'that wine with the taste of a mistress's breath, [...] with the taste of a crop which has become overripe, with the taste of power, which has fallen asleep, with the taste of riches, which do not belong to you'.¹⁰ Professor Marcel is satirized by Hostovský as the epitome of French immorality and irresponsibility. Marcel's world-view is grounded on selfish principles: man lives for himself alone and his only duty in life is to observe. He is initially positive about the prospects for France in its armistice with Germany, contenting himself with the thought that France and Germany as large nations are like grown-ups who do not need the consent of children (that is, Czechoslovakia) to come to a satisfactory

6 Both this novel and *Úkryt* sold so well that second editions were published. *Sedmkrát* was also dramatized for radio, with Arnold Moss in the leading role. See *ibid.* *Sedmkrát* was translated into English by Fern Long as *Seven Times the Leading Man*, London and New York, 1945; *Úkryt* was translated into English, again by Fern Long, as *The Hideout*, New York, 1945.

7 Indeed, in an interview on the occasion of Hostovský's first (and brief) return to Czechoslovakia after the war for a meeting of writers, Hostovský alleges that most of the Frenchmen whom he met in France did not even know where Czechoslovakia was (see 'Dnešní Amerika očima Pražana' in *Mladá fronta*, 2, 2 July 1946, p. 5).

8 'jšk' [J. Š. Kvapil] in *Naše doba*, 53, 1946–7, p. 43.

9 Egon Hostovský, *Listy z vyhnanství*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946 (hereafter *Listy*), p. 110.

10 Egon Hostovský, *Sedmkrát v hlavní úloze*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 142.

agreement. He is subsequently embarrassed by his warm feelings towards Germany after a chance meeting with a Nazi at a party, where the German voices his hopes for France to be the German nation's prostitute.

More generally, however, we identify betrayal in either one of two extremes: in an exclusively intimate sphere — betrayal of one's spouse, one's family, one's friends, one's self, even — or in the public sphere, in the individual's relationship to the abstract entities of nation or state. In the short story 'Přízraky' (Phantoms), essentially an *exemplum*¹¹ concerning the individual's negation of his own desires and his assumption of responsibility for the downtrodden, Hostovský pits one form of betrayal against the other. Barely any significant action takes place: a man from Prague appears at the narrator's flat, tells the narrator of his moral dilemma; they go to a bar frequented by *émigrés*; the narrator leaves in horror at the vision of people sinking inexorably into various states of degradation and immorality; the man pursues the narrator and reveals how he has finally resolved his dilemma as they part. The man's dilemma is posed as a choice between betraying his lover (a Jewess who has had to flee to Switzerland and to destitution) and betraying his country — he has been entrusted with an important message, indirectly perhaps from the government-in-exile, to take to Prague, but a coded telegram from home suggests that he will be killed on his return. The solution of the dilemma resides in its ambiguous dissolution, as the man states that: 'A man cannot betray his country, nor his only love; he cannot live by such actions. A man can betray no one, can betray nothing, only [...] Jesus Christ!'¹² Elsewhere in Hostovský's wartime work personal responsibility is paramount: every deed has political implications. Betrayal in the personal sphere becomes tantamount to betrayal in the political. The war becomes a symbolic representation of the consequences of an amalgam of individuals' guilt, 'because each of us loved someone and something which we were forbidden to love'.¹³

Betrayal is also a theme, however, in the reception of one of these wartime works. *Sedmkrát* treats the intelligentsia's collusion in the rise of Fascism through a study of the behaviour of a clique of seven hangers-on (six Czechs and the Frenchman Marcel) grouped around the Russian *poète maudit*, Josef Kavalský, who are drawn together by their common weakness and immorality during the period immediately preceding and following the Munich crisis. The novel provoked a scandal among the Czech *émigré* community in America when it was first published, for the *littérateurs* and critics — drawn to a literal interpretation of the text — seized on it with nationalist fervour as treacherously anti-Czech in its depiction of the Czech intelligentsia. One critic called for a people's tribunal, and the Czech *émigré* press incriminated Hostovský as a traitor of the people with veiled comments about his involvement in some kind of financial transaction.¹⁴ Roman Jakobson, internationally renowned for his role in Formalism and the Prague Linguistic Circle and for his leading part in establishing Structuralism as a critical approach, was the chief instigator of the vilification campaign against Hostovský.

Jakobson begins attacking Hostovský indirectly even before the publication of the novel. In August 1942, while Jakobson was teaching at the Free French University in New York, he wrote an article for the *émigré* newspaper *New-Yorské listy*, concerning the role of

11 V. Kocourek comments also on the lack of action in the stories, which he thinks sometimes resemble a *causerie* or a *feuilleton*: 'rek', reviewing *Listy* in *Rudé právo*, 25 June 1946, 146, p. 4.

12 *Listy*, p. 56.

13 Egon Hostovský, *Úkryt*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1946, p. 58.

14 Památník národního písemnictví [Museum of National Literature], Prague (hereafter PNP), Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 27 April 1946.

European emigrants in, and their impact on, both American and European culture.¹⁵ The rather bland title of the article belies its venomous and polemical import. Jakobson outlines a special role for European academics in America to be relentless in their exposure of Nazi contraband in international academic studies; he exhorts other academics to ideological warfare and to a witch-hunt to root out any traitors or fifth column in their midst. Jakobson warns his readers that they may find Nazi watchwords where they least expect them, and he chooses Hostovský (identified only as a well-known Czech novelist) as his paradigm. Jakobson's venom is not reserved for those he considers merchants of Nazi ideology alone, but rather for all those involved in German academic research, and, one might add, for all Germans. He bombastically charges European (and especially Czech) intellectuals to demonstrate that the bloodthirsty Germans of today are no different from their forefathers.

Hostovský's novel was published in New York in December 1942. According to Jiří Brabec, on 25 February 1943 Jakobson gave a lecture on Czech novels from abroad, in which he concentrated almost exclusively on Hostovský's new work;¹⁶ furthermore, the contents of his lecture concurred in certain points with a review of Hostovský's novel which had appeared a month earlier, 24 January 1943 — written by a close friend of Jakobson's, Stanislav Budín.¹⁷ From its outset Budín's review sketches political parameters in which to read Hostovský's novel: Hostovský has the advantage of writing freely, unlike those writers living in a 'Nazi hell', thus it is incumbent upon the author to deliver something appropriate. The characters are, however, liars and swindlers (whom Budín interprets as Hostovský's representation of the Czech intelligentsia); Hostovský further compounds his crime, in Budín's view, by forging most of the characters as active traitors. Budín thus allows himself to stage his outrage as he unleashes a patriotically sentimental series of counter-examples to compare with one of Hostovský's notional characters: Karel Čapek, 'whose heart broke with grief over the national catastrophe'; Vladislav Vančura, 'who died a martyr's death in the combat front lines of the people'; and all the writers 'who are today tortured in German concentration camps'.¹⁸

In Hostovský's correspondence of 1945 and 1946 with his friend Josef Träger, the main editor of *Melantrich* who was responsible for the re-issuing of Hostovský's wartime works, the author's anxiety concerning the novel's imminent reception is a recurring motif.¹⁹ Hostovský writes to Träger, as though to warn him in advance, that there had been a great campaign against the novel in America,²⁰ with public meetings organized against him by such critics as Jakobson and Budín: 'I was supposed to be destroyed morally and politically. Taking part in the campaign were also high-ranking dignitaries from London'²¹

15 Roman Jakobson, *Nedělní New-Yorské listy*, 52, 9 August 1942, no. 32.

16 See Jiří Brabec's 'Konfliktní přijetí Hostovského románu Sedmkrát v hlavní úloze' in *Návrat Egon Hostovského: Mezinárodní vědecké sympozium o životě a díle Egon Hostovského, Hronov 21.–23. května 1993*, Prague, 1996, pp. 7–12.

17 See Stanislav Budín's piece in the *New-Yorské listy*, 12, 24 January 1943, no. 6, 'Román "o zradě" českých vzdělců'.

18 Ibid.

19 See, for example, PNP, Letters from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 30 November 1945 and 15 September 1946.

20 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 16 October 1945.

21 According to Hostovský, the envoy/minister Šejnoha sent 'secret' material about Hostovský to his boss, Papánek, in London — the material seems to have been some kind of evidence proving Hostovský to be mad — with the response from Papánek that he could not yet publish the article because there was a strong feeling of sympathy for Hostovský in America at that time, but that he would save the material for a more propitious opportunity. Hostovský terms these activities, with irony, as the 'resistance abroad in the West' (PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 27 April 1946).

[...]. Jakobson and Budín went as far as to accuse me of national betrayal, of being a right-winger and of pedalling Nazi ideology.' Various prominent Czechs, such as Jiří Voskovec, Jan Werich and Otakar Odložilík, as well as the newspapers of the extreme left, defended Hostovský, but he complains that no one from London contacted him and no one denounced the campaign, 'Today the originators are ashamed of their actions. I was, at that time, forced to go on unpaid leave. I returned only through the efforts of Jan Masaryk.' On 27 April 1946 Hostovský clearly forgets that he has already informed Träger of the public meetings organized against him, mentioning them again, and adding the fact that his countrymen spat in front of him, and that he was threatened that 'people of my kind back home' would end up being executed.

The immediate post-war reception of Hostovský's wartime work, apart from reflecting one facet of the culture of transition, is important also as a further commentary on this accusation of betrayal. While the Czech reception, in 1946, was on the whole positive, there are some notable exceptions. I cite briefly a few examples as representative of this critical reception, and as indicators of the political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia at the time. Among those critics who appear critically objective and genuine are Jan Grossman and František Götz. Grossman describes *Sedmkrát* as a portrait of the intellectual crisis of the century: as modern man is increasingly confronted by the multiformity and relativity of reality, he correspondingly loses his ability to occupy a firm standpoint and participate in life by action.²² Götz attempts a serious interpretation of the novel, arguing that Hostovský was transposing his vision of pre-war France onto Czechoslovakia, which in the light of Hostovský's preoccupation with the French (and in particular the Frenchman Marcel in the novel) may be an acute observation.²³ Běhounek welcomes Hostovský's work as an unencumbered view of the war from outside,²⁴ and appears to defend Hostovský from the allegations of treachery against him.²⁵ One strand, which denigrates Hostovský's work for its lack of realism,²⁶ may be motivated by the (at that time) fashionable rejection of the psychological approach to the novel. Another is politically orientated in understanding Hostovský's advocacy of action as the hallmark of a 'new' society.²⁷ František Jakubův, however, exemplifies the Czechocentricity, and the slightly more pernicious approach, of

22 Jan Grossman in *Lidová kultura*, 2, 5 December 1946, no. 43, p. 6.

23 See 'G' [František Götz], 'Románová apokalypsa Egona Hostovského' in *Národní osvobození*, 17, 26 November 1946, no. 271, p. 5. Götz argues that it was precisely against the intelligentsia in Czechoslovakia that the occupiers targeted their hatred, and that the situation was the same elsewhere in Europe; he also suggests that ordinary people felt themselves to be united with the intelligentsia.

24 'vbk.' [Václav Běhounek] points out that domestic novels have had to withstand the pressure of the censors weighing every word and sometimes altering the direction of writers (in *Práce*, 2, 2 June 1946, no. 129, p. 6).

25 See 'vbk.', 'Český román evropské kolaborace' in *Práce*, 2, 10 November 1946, no. 259, p. 4.

26 'Z.S.' [Z. Šmíd] adjudges *Cizinec hledá byt*, for example, to be cast too vaguely and unable to compete with novels which concern themselves with 'a description of the real tragedy of the Second World War'; Hostovský's sentences are not 'broken from hard rock' but rather characterized by a smooth coalescence and diffused imprecision. See 'Hostovského pokus o román metafysický' in *Lidová demokracie*, 3, 5 August 1947, no. 180, p. 4.

27 Michal Sedloň, for example, thinks the novel is a parable in which Hostovský is already unveiling the signs of the new humanity. See *Rudé právo*, 10 July 1946, no. 156, p. 4. František Götz follows a similar direction: he interprets the wartime works as a portrait of people who are broken by the times growing to a moral power. See 'G' on *Listy* and *Úkryt* in the review 'Vzestup Egona Hostovského' in *Národní osvobození*, 17, 21 May 1946, no. 117, p. 4. On the belief that Hostovský is unveiling some kind of 'new' world, see also František Listopad, 'Boj starými zbraněmi o nový svět' in *Mladá fronta*, 2, 19 November 1946, p. 5.

some reviewers: he approaches *Úkryt* with the conviction that readers will be curious to know whether Hostovský's 'stay abroad' has had any effect on his mode of thinking, but is relieved to discover that Hostovský's roots are firmly established in 'native soil'. Jakubův goes as far as to interpret the novel as a representation of the situation in which Czech man finds himself: 'he has been led down a blind alley, and, alone, without foreign help, must contemplate the path to the source of humanity'.²⁸ If we remember that the protagonist has, by his own confession, led himself down this blind alley, and that his existence depends on foreign help (he is, after all, being concealed and fed by a Frenchman), what the review may intimate is a lingering sense of betrayal of the Czechs by the West in the Munich Agreement; moreover, there may be some intimation of concern about Hostovský's 'foreign' or 'native' orientation in the East–West cultural tug-of-war and of the critic trying to ascertain whether Hostovský has indeed remained faithful to his Czechness.

The reclamation of Hostovský as Czech must also be placed against the broader context of the post-war reconstruction of national identity: the desire to return to a 'normal' state of affairs and to restore some sense of national identity depended in some part on the symbolic recovery of integrity through the physical return of those individuals who had been in exile. That notional integrity was, however, irrevocably shattered, and in the case of Hostovský what has generally been accepted by critics as a second exile after the Communist take-over in 1948 was in fact a continuation of his first exile: Hostovský's so-called return was never wholehearted.²⁹ Hostovský experienced the war period as a barrage from all sides. As a Jew, he was the subject of a German campaign in occupied Bohemia against his 'Jewish-Masonic' books, and he gathered from his sister that someone who had once been a guest in their house had spearheaded the campaign.³⁰ He was accused by the Americans of being a Bolshevik and by the Soviets of being a Fascist.³¹ After the end of the war Hostovský had sent an amicable letter to his former friend, the writer Vladimír Neff, only to discover from somebody else that Neff had broken all contact with Hostovský and considered him 'a villain who had betrayed his own family'.³² It is not surprising that after experiencing such a series of accusations and counter-accusations, Hostovský, a fundamentally apolitical man, did not return to Czechoslovakia immediately in 1945. It may also be true that it suited the Czechoslovak authorities to allow Hostovský to remain in America for propagandistic reasons.

In any case, Hostovský's lingering concern with his public reputation is the subtext of much of his correspondence of this period: in a letter to Träger of 22 May 1946 he writes: 'Of course I don't know how I am regarded today and whether it's fitting. I have in Prague all kinds of well-meaning chaps who readily take care of my defamation. Neff so excels in that regard that I have already felt tempted to submit an accusation of slander immediately after my return. But, anyway, the devil take him!'³³ Clear also, however, from Hostovský's

28 See *Lidová demokracie*, 2, 2 June 1946, no. 128, p. 4. Compare Evžen Jiříček's review of *Úkryt*, in *Akord*, 13, 1946–7, no. 1, pp. 35–37, in which even the Normandy countryside is transmuted into the Czech homeland.

29 Václav Černý writes of Hostovský's return to Prague in 1946 that he came back to Czechoslovakia only to secure himself a post in Norway: Černý, *Paměti III: 1945–1972*, Brno, 1992, p. 179. Černý also reports how Hostovský was assisted in gaining his post as cultural attaché in Scandinavia by Jan Masaryk (*ibid.*, p. 198).

30 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 30 November 1945: Hostovský mentions correspondence with his sister from the period 1941–42 in which she informed him of these facts.

31 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 27 April 1946.

32 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 3 January 1946.

33 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 22 May 1946.

correspondence of this period is his sense of being emotionally blackmailed by his friends to return to Czechoslovakia, and even perhaps his fear that his absence was being attributed to political reasons.³⁴ He writes, on 6 November 1945, that

*I want to return and have never doubted that I 'could'. [...] Political and economic events at home are in no way keeping me in America. I am more loyal to today's government than are those newcomers who declare their loyalty with bombastic speeches and articles.*³⁵ I am not courting any title or any position and am not afraid in the slightest of how difficult it will be in the beginning. Only people who are very naive imagine that the whole of my exile was a paradise. Neither I nor my second wife have any remaining blood relatives. Only a handful of friends have remained. We miss most of them more than they miss us. And, with regard to my friends, some of them have not changed in their relationship with me. Others have. It appears to them that I have forsaken my family, that I have become americanized, and I don't know what else. That is all lies. As far as my most intimate family matters go, I have an entirely clear conscience. And that goes for my relationship to my homeland too. Indeed, I had lots of difficulties abroad precisely because everywhere I defended my interest in my homeland and the rights of people back home in everything, and I didn't conceal the fact that I could suddenly myself be tainted back home by exercising my free will.

Today the war is past. I have the right now to think a little about myself. I am abroad, no longer in exile, and home is no longer a dream, but above all people. Those people have different worries from former *émigrés*. But if to some friends, out of sheer friendship, it matters to have me amongst them soon, they shouldn't have to make the issue of return difficult for me by their gauche reproaches and doubts about me.³⁶

Hostovský's perhaps hypersensitive self-justification and explicit statements of patriotism in this letter are, most likely, a response to the climate of incrimination and retribution which characterized the post-war period. The letter also demonstrates, however, Hostovský's acute awareness of a gulf between him and his friends, and one might suggest that from this point onwards this sense of separation and his wartime experiences were to intensify Hostovský's fictional portrayal of disintegration. The disjunction between the worries of 'people at home' and those of 'former *émigrés*' and the exploitation of guilt in this relationship form the basis, for example, of Hostovský's short story 'Návrat' (Return), published in the 1948 collection, *Osamělí buřiči* (Lonely Rebels). 'Návrat' is a study in insularity and guilt. The Jewish protagonist, the civil servant Alex Braun, refuses to recount his wartime experiences to his old schoolfriend when he returns to Czechoslovakia to look for his brother because he would prefer to avoid what happens to most 'half-foreigners' in these situations: 'we argue with people from home about who had been through more, for in that way we can sometimes apologize for the fact that we are pleased

34 Some teaching material for secondary schools even mentions the fact that, when the Second World War ended, it was surprising that Hostovský did not hurry to return to his homeland (see Jiří Svoboda, *Spisovatel Egon Hostovský* [Tématická jednotka pro střední školy], Ostrava, 1992, p. 6).

35 On 16 October 1945 Hostovský writes to Josef Träger that he needs to stay in America to fulfil various obligations he has undertaken in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that 'I am needed here more than at home and more depends on that than on my feelings. Anyway those are "mixed" in view of my complicated personal history. Politically, today's Czechoslovak government is far more to my liking than any which the Republic ever had. Everywhere in government are people who know what they want. I think that they have already had splendid results. [...] I fear only one thing, and that relates rather to the role of intellectuals than of the government: that in the anti-German battle (which of course must be unrelenting) they didn't hide people to whom admittedly Germanness mattered, but Fascism or quasi-Fascism not at all.'

36 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 6 November 1945.

to have remained alive'.³⁷ The outsider's perspective of the returnee serves as a device to expound the social changes precipitated by the war. Not only is there social breakdown in the form of the atomization of the little town community — Alex and Mikuláš encounter no one on their walk to find a pub because people have got used to sitting at home — but also instances of personal collapse (Mikuláš's wife seems to have suffered a nervous breakdown) and, predominantly, communicative breakdown: most of the characters are driven by the need to talk, not listen, to be understood, not to understand. The uneasy tension of 'Návrat' is located in the forced amiability of the characters and the manner in which they attempt to conceal their alienation from one another.

The disintegration of society as a consequence of war was a theme Hostovský had already treated in the 1920s, but his works after the Second World War are more sharply parabolic, counterpoising anomie with a quasi-spiritual search for an irredeemable unity. Hostovský's first work after the end of the Second World War, the novel *Cizinec hledá byt* (A Stranger Looks for a Flat, 1947), had already been completed before he eventually returned to Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1947. The novel signals a movement into a more complex and ambiguous binary plane of narration, in this instance through the figure of the *bloud* (the *ingénu*). The critic and novelist Daniela Hodrová has identified among the characteristics of this sub-genre the nomadic protagonist's 'difference', manifest as madness or foreignness; his displacement from another time or place or even world, so that he may sometimes act as conveyor of a chthonic motif in the text; his immanent difference from others; his habitation of attics or hotel rooms; his witnessing of intimate events — sometimes his instrumental role in action as a kind of *agent provocateur*; and his existence on the boundary between two worlds, whether this world and another, or the human and the animal.³⁸ Hodrová argues that, in some cases, the figure embodies the fragmented world, as well as often being the representative of a degenerated mythic consciousness: 'the *ingénu* comes from outside with the desire to restore the expelled myth inside and together with that restore himself, and to vault over the ravine between Nature and city, art and life, the esoteric and the empirical'.³⁹ The Myshkin-like Marek embodies all these characteristics: he is described by one character as different from Americans, but different also from other refugees, and by another as different from other mortals; he is described as being outside earthly time because he knows that he is dying; the action concerns his search for a room in which to work; he carries a heavy black case with him, which one might consider a chthonic motif (the case as coffin); he talks to himself and occasionally greets questions with silence (Hodrová identifies a deep tradition of silence or of inability to speak as one form of mythic or sacred speech); he is associated with the animal world through his being befriended by a dog; and he involuntarily causes disruption in every household he enters. Moreover, Marek often plays witness to other's intimacies, and his role as an observer frequently overlaps with the third-person narration so that we are forced to interpret the action through his reading of it. Hostovský's inclusion of Marek's perspective in the narration has the effect of emphasizing his difference, for he appears as an alien concentratedly trying to learn the rules of human behaviour and thus an unwitting exposé of the lack of real communication between characters.

Hostovský's text at every point simultaneously evokes and parodies the sacred. The reader is led by the narrator to believe that Marek is one of God's messengers on earth (he bears the name of an Evangelist) entrusted to discover if people are capable of attaining real peace; the woman by whom he is being enticed, the narrator seduces the reader into

37 Egon Hostovský, *Osamělí buřiči*, Brno, 1948, p. 144.

38 See her article 'Dostojevského Idiot v tradici románu o bloudovi' in *Slavia*, 50, 1981, 1, pp. 30–38.

39 Ibid., p. 32.

believing, is Death (again the chthonic motif and Marek's role as a bridge between two worlds), and yet Death communicates with Marek by means of a telephone, but the woman caller could be interpreted as either Marek's mistress or the mother of his son.⁴⁰ He describes his work as a fight against disease, which, on the sacred plane of narrative, represents his role as God's envoy, and, on the prosaic plane, his search for a cure for high blood pressure.

Marek's attempt to vault over the ravine is, however, predictably doomed to failure: 'The messenger pronounced neither the much sought-after precept nor the magic spell. He uttered only a riddle.'⁴¹ The fact that no one but Marek can reach this other world (others are frustrated by the fact that they do not know the telephone number of the mysterious woman) is another variation on the fracture of the two worlds. Hostovský's binary approach to his subject matter in this novel leads him to a new structural composition in his post-war work in his treatment of the sacred and the profane. Furthermore, Marek's realization that the individual cannot find peace and freedom without withdrawing from the world marks the beginning of Hostovský's conception of exile as the only viable alternative through which the protagonist can retain his individuality and integrity.

Considering Hostovský's return to Czechoslovakia in the autumn of 1947, one remembers how he had felt in America about growing apart from his friends, and his description of the culture of recrimination he found on his return to Prague must have appeared to him as a nevertheless shocking realization of his forebodings: he claims that people were full of bitterness towards their fellow men for all the humiliation and suffering they had experienced and that there were 'too many vain attempts to find a common denominator for all the evil with which we had met'.⁴² In the light of Hostovský's concern in his wartime work with the paramountcy of individual responsibility, the 'collectivization' of guilt which he comments upon here, and which was doubtless the product also of an increasingly socialist Czechoslovakia, can only have fuelled further his sense of a social crisis.

Hostovský's return coincided with the strengthening and stifling hold of the Communist Party on domestic politics. Although Hostovský was never a Communist, according to Antonín Měšťan the effects of Hostovský's failure to adopt a clear-cut political position during and after the war were twofold: following the Communist coup of 1948, Clementis (who assumed the role of foreign minister after Jan Masaryk's suicide) had no grounds on which to expel Hostovský from his diplomatic post, and some writers thought Hostovský a 'fellow-traveller' of the Communists.⁴³ The image of Hostovský as a Communist sympathizer may in part have been generated by his role at the meeting of seventy-seven young Czech writers and other guests, brought together purportedly to create an agreement between two different artistic circles, at the manor house in Dobříš (just outside Prague) between 13 and 17 March 1948. The meeting was, however, transformed into a political attraction in which the Communist writers were the political masters and the other writers

40 František Götz, while identifying that the novel concerns the inner fate of Man who has lost his home, nevertheless offers a wholly literal interpretation of the function of the woman in the novel. See 'G.' [Götz], 'Románová psychologie churavého lidství' in *Národní osvobození*, 18, 22 May 1947, no. 119, p. 5.

41 Egon Hostovský, *Cizinec hledá byt*, Prague, 1947, p. 162.

42 See Liehm, *Generace*, p. 380. See also in the same collection of interviews Jiří Voskovec's account of his return to Prague in the autumn of 1946, where he describes how difficult it was to get close to people and how the young seemed unnaturally restrained, as though everybody were trying to give nothing of themselves away (*ibid.*, p. 426).

43 Antonín Měšťan, 'Egon Hostovský jako politický emigrant za války a po roce 1948' in *Návrat Egona Hostovského*, p. 41.

merely their guests.⁴⁴ The attendees were greeted by telegrams from Klement Gottwald and the ideologue Zdeněk Nejedlý, the language of which ('uncompromising propagators of socialist culture', 'cultural workers') must have left no one in doubt that the function of the gathering was political rather than academic. The meeting was interrupted by news of the poet Ivan Blatný's defection from Czechoslovakia while in London with a writers' delegation: the poet was denounced in the Czech press by a declaration, allegedly prepared by Hostovský (while he was planning his own departure from Czechoslovakia) and issued on behalf of the 'Club of Young Writers'.⁴⁵ Given what we know of Hostovský, his distaste for politicking and how he suffered himself as the target of Jakobson's nationalistically inspired campaign against him, not to mention the fact that Blatný had been one of Hostovský's friends in the inter-war period, the fact of his participation in the denunciation of Blatný is one of the most surprising to emerge from his biography, and furnishes yet another variation on the theme of betrayal in this period. According to Veselá-Nyklová, Hostovský felt that he was acting on a matter of principle, since he allegedly said at the time: 'Admittedly I am not a Communist, but I think that since Ivan Blatný was a member of the Party he should have behaved differently. What he did is betrayal.'⁴⁶ If one interprets this statement as a sincere expression of Hostovský's views, then his principled objection to Blatný's behaviour sits ill with Hostovský's support for the non-conformist outsider in his *oeuvre* (a support which intensifies in his post-war work). One might also imagine, however, that having been accused of treachery himself during the war, Hostovský may have been taking extreme measures to demonstrate his loyalty to the nation and state — certainly he felt under enormous pressure to be sporting political colours of some kind.⁴⁷

Soon after this event (May of the same year), Hostovský left for Norway to serve as a chargé d'affaires, only to resign from his post in 1949 (his books were officially banned and he was expelled from the Union of Writers) and return to America. He had visited Prague in the interim only to realize that he could not contemplate returning: he reasoned that, even if he tried to overcome his objections to joining the Communist Party, he would never be genuinely accepted by the Party and would be made to feel guilty by those who suspected his motives. Although Hostovský may initially have been optimistic about the prospects of the coalition government, the fiction of his second exile expresses disillusion with all political parties, whatever their hue, and he is quick to draw parallels between the behaviour of the nascent Communist regime and that of the wartime Nazi one and their instrumentalization of the individual. The individual's integrity and authenticity are threatened by the conformist, alienating politics and culture (whether Socialist, democratic or capitalist) outside him: the decent individual has symbolically to exile himself from the world in order to remain vital. For Hostovský, a writer prone to exploring crises of one kind or another, the war and its aftermath signified a rupture with any ideals and values which may once have existed. The characters of his post-war work are irrevocably shaped, distorted even, by their wartime experiences; action is partially structured around the ineluctable unfolding of a protagonist's dark secret or torments from the Second World War.

In Hostovský's 1951 novel *Nezvěstný* (Missing), which is set against the background of the hostile political atmosphere leading up to and during the Communist take-over of 1948, betrayal of friends and acquaintances is the conscious *modus operandi* of members of the

44 See Černý's memoirs; another contributor to this volume, Michal Bauer, has also described the events as irrefutably socialist in orientation — see his extensive account of the proceedings in *Tvar*, 1998. 14 (2 September), *passim*.

45 Václav Černý, *Paměti*, vol. 4, Toronto, 1983, p. 201.

46 See Milena Veselá-Nyklová, 'Cizinec hledá domov' in *Návrat Egona Hostovského*, p. 80.

47 See Liehm, *Generace*, p. 378.

Party and of the agent of the American secret services; others, however, also betray their friends⁴⁸ unwittingly through naivety about the vortex of political intrigues in which they are impotently trapped. Fates are monstrously connected so that the individual can have no reasonable foresight of the relationship between an action and its consequences. The title of the novel provokes the reader to question who or what is missing, so that one may interpret *Nezvěstný* as an indictment of a society in which core values or ideals are absent. Although Hostovský does allude to real historical figures, such as Gottwald and, more important, Jan Masaryk, he is less interested in the polemics of the events of February 1948 than he is in their symptomatic expression of a profound moral crisis: the population of Prague, for example, is portrayed as an automatist collective dulled into a sick lethargy. Hostovský treats Masaryk sympathetically in the novel as a wryly disillusioned moral and political outsider and mirrors therein aspects of his own relationship with Masaryk, which strengthened during the course of the war and especially just after it. Having complained to Masaryk (in November 1946) of living more wretchedly and in greater poverty than in the worst days of his exile, Hostovský writes to Träger of a subsequent meeting in New York with Masaryk that: 'I told Masaryk that after my return I was going to leave the Civil Service and he did not allow me even the pleasure of trying to dissuade me but instead launched forth enthusiastically, "And there, Egon, you are absolutely right. What would you be doing in that shitty organization."'⁴⁹ According to the novelist Graham Greene, who was staying in a hotel in Prague during the Communist coup, Hostovský was particularly upset by Masaryk's alleged intention to leave the government: 'One day the novelist Egon Hostovsky [...] came and sat on my bed [...] and told me how that afternoon Masaryk, the Minister, had said good-bye to his staff. He wept as he told the story and between us we finished my whisky. A few days later Masaryk was dead.'⁵⁰ This account probably lends support to the argument that Jan Masaryk committed suicide.

If Munich and the war had precipitated a personal crisis for Hostovský in terms of his physical displacement from his home, then the transitional period under review here provoked in him a profounder sense of his spiritual displacement 'at home'. The longed-for mythopoeic rustic idyll of his wartime work had dematerialized into Socialist political chicanery and was to disintegrate into the futile posturing of the Cold War. In Hostovský's post-war work, his exiled protagonists no longer seek to return home, but rather seek an elusive security within themselves in the knowledge that there is no turning back.

48 The novel is also a study of friendship constructed around an intermediary, the 'missing' journalist Pavel Král, through whom all the representatives of different political viewpoints are connected in some way. Král's absence from the centre of action generates wide speculation on the nature of his character, and Hostovský may be treating indirectly his own experience of false accusations and incriminations during the wartime and immediate post-war period.

49 PNP, Letter from Egon Hostovský to Josef Träger, 23 November 1946.

50 Graham Greene, *Ways of Escape*, London, 1980, p. 104.

32 Warsaw in 1945–55: The Emergence of a New Chronotope

WOJCIECH TOMASIK

The Romantic Heritage

As Katherine Clarke observes, the term ‘chronotope’ should not be restricted to talking about literature; it is more fruitful in a broader sense, indicating ‘the most basic characteristic of any cultural system in its assumptions about time and space.’¹ I follow Clarke in this chapter, using ‘chronotope’ alternately with the term ‘symbolic pattern’ (‘symbolic space and symbolic time’).

Society lives not only in a physical environment and in historical time, but also in a symbolic space. The last is shaped concentrically, around a holy place, a grave. To indicate the holy place means to choose the national tradition. Choosing the holy place is followed by a certain interpretation and evaluation of the national past. The distinction between one or another grave is balanced by the acceptance of some version of national history, or by its rejection. Eventually, marking out the holy place always indicates the system of values the society has made its own.

There is no doubt that Warsaw is the central point in the Polish symbolic space. Literary works and iconography demonstrate that the shape of that space was formed in Romanticism and has been preserved until now. The Romantic poet Edmund Wasilewski wrote in 1841: ‘Oh, for a graveyard, and Poland is one!’² The special significance of Warsaw was bound to the fact that from the moment Poland had lost its independence the city was perceived as a central point of the national graveyard. It was understood as a place in which the bones of national heroes and martyrs had been buried.

Warsaw occupies the centre of Polish symbolic space and in this respect it is homogeneous, everywhere saturated with holiness. In a broader Polish perspective, Warsaw has its own privileged area, excluded from the rest of the city and perceived as its symbolic centre. Warsaw’s graves occupy different places which cannot be mistaken. However, in the symbolic Warsaw space all significant graves are side by side. They are all the same national grave, with a unique monument towering over it, the Sigismund Column on Castle Square.

The location of the Sigismund Column in the symbolic space of Warsaw was established by Juliusz Słowacki’s poem ‘Uspokojenie’ (The Calming Down). The work was written a few years after the quelling of the 1830 Uprising and had a prophetic meaning: ‘Uspokojenie’ brought the image of a future, victorious uprising that would take place in Warsaw’s Old Town and the neighbourhood of Castle Square. The poem was not published during the poet’s lifetime, only reaching its public in 1861, shortly after the death of the participants in a nationalist demonstration. This demonstration, at the end of

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- 1 Katherine Clarke, ‘Political History and Literary Chronotope: Some Soviet Case Studies’ in G. S. Morson (ed.), *Literature and History, Theoretical Problems and Russian Case Studies*, Palo Alto, CA, 1986, p. 231.
- 2 In the anthology appended to Maria Janion, *Reduta. Romantyczna poezja niepodległościowa*, Cracow, 1979, p. 403.

February 1861, was a harbinger of the next National Uprising, that of 1863, which ended in defeat and new graves. From that moment the Sigismund Column became a monument commemorating the victims of two national uprisings. It became the national Holy Rood, on which Warsaw was crucified twice. The Słowacki poem became a source of inspiration for many generations of Polish poets. Among them were those who tried to express the experience of the Second World War.

The symbolic space of Warsaw contains not only its Holy Rood, the instrument of national martyrdom, but also its Golgotha. The function of the Polish Golgotha was fulfilled by the Fortress of Warsaw, built by the Russian authorities after the putting down of the 1830 Uprising. From the beginning the Fortress did not have an exclusively military function. It was used as a prison; the courtyard and slope descending to the River Vistula became the area where executions took place. The space of national martyrdom covers the part of Warsaw extending from the Łazienki Palazzo in the south to the Fortress of Warsaw in the north. It is that centre Cyprian Norwid wrote about in his poem 'Pieśń od ziemi naszej' (Song from Our Land, 1850), 'Where the last gallows shines/my centre is — my capital city'.³

As Janion points out, 'a gallows-cross' belongs among the most characteristic images of nineteenth-century Polish poetry. It was popularized by Romantic poets, who employed numerous variants, for example, an altar-gallows, a forest of crosses, or grass growing on the grave. The common feature of the images is the motif of Arcadia destroyed. A garden transformed into a desert or ruin indicates, in turn, the space that had initially belonged to civilization and had later been re-incorporated into Nature. The garden stands for a world devastated by a cosmic cataclysm. Paradoxical expressions like a 'forest of gallows' or 'a stone garden', which fuse Life and Death, transform Warsaw into a living creature, usually a human being. Destroying the city means the death of Warsaw as woman: 'a mourning woman', 'old mother', 'mother of the people' and so forth. Romantic poetry has left an important ideological component: the belief in the superiority of public matters to private. It has established the hierarchy where 'the death of the city' is more painful than the loss of one's own home.⁴

The Chronotope of Defeat

During the Second World War and in the first post-war months Warsaw was again the central point, the cosmic axis, marked as a place where the national *sacrum* had been profaned. The image of the Sigismund Column, knocked to the pavement by an enemy tank, recalls the scene from the poem by Cyprian Norwid on Chopin's smashed piano.⁵ Władysław Broniewski used the same artistic tools for indicating the centre of national space. In one image he mixes two Romantic motifs: 'a cross-column' and 'a Warsaw pavement saturated with blood' ('I love/this piece of smashed land,/with each sigh, each sob').⁶

In the poetry from the war and the immediate post-war period the Romantic motifs of martyrdom and profaned Arcadia, of the garden abandoned, transformed into a graveyard, abound: 'a small grave on a green', 'the graveyards on the green', 'a garland of watch-

3 Ibid., p. 145.

4 See *ibid.*, pp. 439–30, and H. Zaworska, 'Miasta szcz szczęśliwe i miasta zburzone', *Odra*, 7, 1970.

5 I refer here to K. Winkler's 'Pozdrowienie dla Kolumny Zygmunta' (Greeting for the Sigismund Column) in S. Ziembicki (ed.) *Warsawa twoje miasto. Antologia*, Warsaw, 1951, p. 147. The allusion is to Norwid's portrayal of the piano falling, 'a coffin-like object', from a window, and to the last line, where 'The ideal has reached the pavement.'

6 Władysław Broniewski, *Mazowsze i inne wiersze*, Warsaw, 1952, p. 42.

towers and gallows', 'the black gardens'. The tragedy of war is reinforced by personification. War-torn Warsaw becomes 'a dolorous Mary', 'the Madonna of Mazovia', 'the Job of Polish cities'. Warsaw is now the very opposite of a garden. It is a death-space, an area covered by 'slag and ashes', 'the ruins of trees', 'a chain of smoky and bloody brick hills', a chain of stumps 'standing out in a desert of the dead city'. 'The death of the city' and the collective tragedy overshadow the misfortunes of individuals, whose houses have become 'gravestones'. Few poets were able to question this order of values

In the poetry of this era the national Golgotha and twice-crucified-city motifs return from Romanticism. The first martyrdom of the city took place in September 1939, the second five years later. The martyrdom of 1944, the Warsaw Uprising, is linked in social memory with the name of month, August, and with the numeral 63. Literary images of the 'twice-crucified-city', found in the works of Broniewski, Jastrun and Antoni Słonimski, employ a vocabulary and ideology inherited from Romantic poetry. In physical space there are no repetitions. Each event has its own singular nature and may be only in some respects similar to those that took place earlier. On the other hand, because of the cyclical repetition of sacrifices and redemptions the centre of symbolic space is established. All the conspirators from the 1830–31 and 1863 uprisings were buried in the same symbolic grave, at the foot of the Sigismund Column, as the defenders of Warsaw from September 1939 and the Home Army soldiers from August 1944. Here was 'the national, holy grave', where people, 'ordinary, simple, not great' would be buried, in 1939 and 1944.⁷

I now take three examples. The texts differ from each other in genre, and were written for different reasons and in different situations. The first is a poem written in Jerusalem by Władysław Broniewski, after he heard of the defeat of the Warsaw Uprising. By the title of the poem, '63', the poet includes the events of 1944 into the time-space pattern shaped during Romanticism. Polish history is understood as a recurrence of defeats. The numeral of the title indicates the duration of Warsaw Uprising, sixty-three days, but also alludes to the year 1863. In August 1944 Warsaw repeated a sacrifice she had offered in January many years before. Furthermore, Broniewski's '63' could be taken as an adaptation of Mickiewicz's mystical number 44, the numerological name of the future saviour of the nation (that is, 1944 should have fulfilled the Romantics' 44, but it was another 63).

My second example is taken from the article written in 1946 by Juliusz Kleiner concerning the original version of Słowacki's 'Uspokojenie'; he published this specialist literary historical paper in the popular weekly *Odrodzenie* (Revival), and gave it the title 'A Poem by Słowacki on the Warsaw Uprising'. Kleiner writes as if his subject-matter were a sacred message. Kleiner considers that the poem by Słowacki is of 'uncanny present-day interest: as a prophetic poem on the Warsaw Uprising'.⁸

My third example is Stefan Kisielewski's short piece on Warsaw. The author spent the whole war in Warsaw, took part in the Uprising and thus experienced its defeat. In 1948, responding to an *enquête* organized by *Kalendarz Warszawski*, where respondents had to answer the question 'Why just Warsaw?', Kisielewski described his relationship with the city in a semi-religious manner: 'I lived through the terrible, pathos-filled days, as a result of which Warsaw ceased to belong among the various cities of Poland and instead became a symbol of the whole Nation; the affairs of that city assumed a waft of eternity, and it bore on its wings the fate of the Nation.' In the following, Kisielewski comes down to earth a little, to a degree adopts the perspective of a man in just one part of the city: 'Krakowskie Przedmieście Street, Saski Square, the debris of the Old Town — these are not only an assemblage of ruined old tenement houses, palazzi, churches and monuments;

7 These two phrases come from Antoni Słonimski's 'Mogiła Nieznanego Mieszkańca Warszawy', in Ziembicki (ed.), *Warszawa*, p. 122.

8 Juliusz Kleiner, 'Poemat Słowackiego o powstaniu warszawskim,' *Odrodzenie*, 1946, 9.

they are a great battlefield, where each building was fought for; it is a Polish Pantheon, the most pathos-filled Polish landscape.'⁹

The many attempts to fit the Second World War into the history pattern inherited from Romanticism lead me to label the post-war symbolic space of Warsaw a 'chronotope of defeat'. This chronotope gives one an opportunity to find interpretations discordant with the conventional martyrdom image of Polish history, or contradicting it. Discussion on how one should understand the national past had begun in the nineteenth century, but the events of September 1939 and August 1944 increased the heat of this discussion, and gave the chronotope-of-defeat advocates and their opponents fresh arguments. A careful alteration of the national tradition was undertaken by the Communist authorities early on. At the beginning this process seemed not to blur the borders of the national sacrum, but seemed to sharpen their visibility.

In the immediate post-war period the authorities tried to persuade Polish society that there was no contradiction between the Romantic tradition and the tradition the new state would build on. The 'revived' Poland promised fidelity to the values expressed by the chronotope of defeat. The first night of a new production of Słowacki's *Lilla Weneda*, which inaugurated the post-war activity of the Polish Theatre, contained the first symptoms of the revalorization of Romantic tradition. The performance was received by the press with reservations. The idea of the drama was perceived as 'martyrdom and pessimism', something discordant with the new age, something that ignored the expectations of the new audience. The addressee of this performance, it was suggested, was that part of Polish society that retained a distance from the post-war 'reality', and 'indulged in dreams of defeat'. The first night was to celebrate the first anniversary of the liberation of Warsaw by the Red Army on 17 January 1945. From the immediate post-war period onwards 'January' gradually became the month to be associated with liberation rather than defeat. Step by step the 'new' January was to take over the symbolical function of the 'old' (January 1863).

The events of 17 January 1945 were fixed in social memory by Warsaw monuments. The first new monument was devoted to 'Polish-Soviet Brotherhood in Arms'. It was situated in the Praga district, on the right bank of the River Vistula, quite far from the borders of the 'national centre', and was unveiled in the autumn of 1945. The unveiling ceremony, which had been planned for 1 November, was postponed for a few days. This postponement made it possible to ignore one of the main components of the national calendar (All Saints' Day). The symbolic functions of the Praga monument were to be taken over in 1946 by the Soviet Soldiers' monument. The latter was designed to contain elements of the Romantic imagination and was destined to stand up near Łazienki Park. On 21 December 1948 the corner stone of the Soviet Soldiers' Cemetery-Mausoleum was placed at Żwirki and Wigury Street. On 9 May 1950 (so-called Victory Day) the garden-like cemetery became the necropolis of the Red Army.¹⁰

Pre-war Warsaw monuments were also to contribute to the revision tasks of Polish history. In 1948 the Mickiewicz monument, one of many destroyed in the war, was to be reconstructed and set up in its old place, on Krakowski Przedmieście Street. This restoration of one of the most valued Warsaw erections constituted at the same time a test for the reinterpretation of the Romantic heritage, a test of the authorities' ability to take possession of part of it. The unveiling of the monument did not take place on 24 December 1949 (on the 151th anniversary of the poet's birth) but on 20 January 1950, the fifth anniversary of the Red Army crossing onto left-bank Warsaw. The Sigismund Column,

9 Stefan Kisielewski, 'Dlaczego właśnie Warszawa,' *Kalendarz Warszawski*, 1948, p. 79.

10 See S. Grzesiuk-Olszewska, *Polska rzeźba pomnikowa w latach 1945–1995*, Warsaw, 1995, pp. 46–50.

destroyed by the Germans, also reappeared on Castle Square on a day belonging to new calendar. The unveiling ceremony took place on 22 July, 1949, that is on the day commemorating the proclamation of the Lublin Manifesto and celebrated as Revival Day. On the same day the Copernicus monument returned to the front of the Staszic Palazzo.

Polish writers joined in the blurring of the national centre borders very early. The chronotope-of-defeat distortion was often made by the same people who, a few months earlier, had tried to intensify the sense of holy place in the Polish consciousness. Moreover, utterances confirming the borders of 'the national grave' were sometimes juxtaposed with utterances questioning the shape of the Romantic chronotope. Such utterances may be separated by a few months or, in extreme cases, by a few lines in one literary work. In Broniewski's 'Kolumna', one reads not only words of adoration, but also passages polemicizing with the Polish pattern of the past ('King Sigismund III was a bad king, [...] It is doubtful that cranes flying to or from Poland had rested there').¹¹ The polemic with the chronotope of defeat is even more spectacular in the poem entitled 'Warszawa zgruzowstała' (Warsaw Raised from the Rubble).¹² In this poem 'the bad King' is no longer the most important person in Warsaw and the column bearing the royal statue is not the highest building in Warsaw. The cosmic axis, connecting Heaven and Earth, has been degraded. In the place formerly occupied by the King, looking over the national grave, a new person appears. This is 'the Great Builder', a powerful man, who, hammer and trowel in hand, 'goes through the cities'. This titan rejects past martyrdom: 'Down with the tears on the ruins', and repeating the gesture of Wyspiański in the last section of his poem 'Casimir the Great'. Broniewski's Warsaw will be revived not by the forces that come from Heaven, but by the efforts of 'the Great Builder'.

One voice against the chronotope of defeat had an enormous impact, Stanisław Wygodzki's 'Plan'. Wygodzki wrote disturbing 'hospital poems', dedicated to his murdered relatives. As a former prisoner of Auschwitz, Oranienburg and Dachau, he appealed in 1950: 'Down with comparisons! Down with analogies!/Leave the dead, the cells and the gas./Silence for the Birkenaus, silence for the graves./The steel and iron are necessary for the living.'¹³ The destruction of the grave-space left by the Romantics and confirmed during the war did not omit the national Golgotha. The Fortress was fixed in Polish consciousness, but in the war, and especially in the days of the 1944 Uprising, the most impressive image was the phoenix motif. In the Second World War Warsaw burned twice, first in September 1939, as a consequence of German air-raids, and for the second time after the Warsaw Uprising, when German troops started burning the remains of the demolished city. The fires spread through many districts of Warsaw, but symbolic significance was achieved only by the fires that had burned places in the national centre, the fires of the Royal Castle, the Krasiński Palazzo, Freta Street. The burning the Old Town imposed upon Poles a quest to find sense in this sacrifice and an analogy in the past. The events of the autumn of 1944 reminded them of the young conspirator Karol Levittoux, who in 1841 committed suicide in the Fortress of Warsaw by burning himself alive. Levittoux's act became an interpretative pattern and gave the Poles consolation. Levittoux's suicide was perceived as analogous to the fate of the phoenix renewed by fire. In post-Uprising Warsaw the words of Kornel Ujejski ('With the smokes of fires, with brother's blood dust')¹⁴ were restored their meaning, Polish revival in fire. The same idea was used by Roman Zmorski, who in 'Modlitwa' (The Prayer), a poem dedicated to

11 Broniewski, *Mazowsze*, p. 42.

12 Ibid., p. 30. The word *zgruzowstała* (raised from the rubble) is Broniewski's neologism based on *zmartwychwstała* (raised from the dead).

13 Stanisław Wygodzki, *Wiersze*, Warsaw, 1950, p. 82.

14 Kornel Ujejski, 'Chorał' in Janion, *Reduta*, p. 405.

Levittoux, wrote: 'From the martyrs' bones,/Sown for many years/May the freedom tree grow,/That will cast its shade all over the world!'¹⁵

The Fortress of Warsaw has two symbolic meanings in the conventional literary portrayal of the national past. In the first, the Fortress is presented as a place of uprising and heroes' martyrdom, such as those of Artur Zawisza, Levittoux, Romuald Traugutt and other Polish model men from 1863. In the symbolic Warsaw calendar the Fortress corresponds to November and January. The second meaning embodied in the Fortress of Warsaw is linked with other heroes, the Communists Hibner, Kniewski and Rutkowski. It corresponds to another month, August (that is, August 1925, when these three were shot on the Fortress slope).

These two symbolic meanings are juxtaposed in Broniewski's poem commemorating Żeromski's death. The work was written before the end of November 1925 and in manuscript copies it has three titles, 'The Rose', 'The Rose-Dual Voice', 'The Voices in the Night'.¹⁶ 'The Chorus', comprising poetical repetitions of Żeromski's thoughts, employs images of 'the bright house', 'the great force' that would 'rise from ashes'. By juxtaposing these images Broniewski shows a vision of the future, when social injuries would be redressed. This future is shaped like a rose, growing from 'Okrzeja's heart'. Żeromski's death reminds Broniewski not only of Okrzeja's execution that had taken place in the Fortress of Warsaw in July 1905, but also the executions of August 1925.

The Chronotope of Revolution

About five years after the war the chronotope of defeat, centred on the Sigismund Column, began to change and a new symbolic Warsaw space established its centre. The year 1950 was made into a year of commemoration for events that had taken place in the Fortress of Warsaw. From this time, the symbolic function of the Fortress remained, but it began to be linked with other incidents and other graves. The place which for over a century had been an integral part of the chronotope of defeat became part of a new space-time pattern. The year 1950 gave the authorities the opportunity to keep alive the memory of people whose activities could legitimize the new People's Poland. To commemorate the new heroes was to establish in the social consciousness the notion that the post-war order had not been imposed on the Poles, but was based on a national tradition stretching back into the remote past. One may describe the immediately post-war period in Poland as the gradual decomposing of the chronotope of defeat, or as the inventing of a new tradition. The authorities' search for this tradition created the new symbolic pattern, the chronotope of revolution. Władysław Broniewski, exploiting the Romantics' imagery, wrote in his poem 'Cytadela' (The Fortress): 'In the Fortress there is the gallows-tree/ under glass. [...] PPS men died there/and SDKPL/ died there, decayed—/Their Goal remained. [...] Montwiłł, Kasprzak, Baron, Okrzeja—/That is they on the many looms/Hope! /Spring!'¹⁷

A similar text is used by Lewin in his 'Pomniki' (Monuments), which also attempts to destroy Romantic symbolic connotations: 'The bones of warriors/Do not shine in vain,/When we built the friendship monument/For the Kasprzaks and the Okrzejas'.¹⁸ Although two new monuments were erected in the five years after the war, Lewin did not

15 In *ibid.*, p. 315. Cyprian Norwid, who was against the plotting of revolutionaries, alludes to Levittoux's death in his poem, 'The Storm'; see George Gömöri, *Cyprian Norwid*, New York, 1974.

16 See F. Lichodziejewska, *Twórczość Władysława Broniewskiego. Monografia bibliograficzna*, Warsaw, 1973.

17 Broniewski, *Mazowsze*, p. 27.

18 Leopold Lewin, 'Pomniki', *Arkusz poetycki*, 5.

have any particular statue in mind. In the 'new' Fortress other graves belonged to the new chronotope. The victims of the 1905 revolution (S. Okrzeja, M. Kasprzak) and of the pre-war political repression (W. Bagiński, W. Hibner, W. Kniewski, H. Rutkowski) became members of the new Polish Pantheon.

The Warsaw chronotope of revolution was partly outlined by 'living monuments', a notion promoted in many literary works which juxtapose the old (dead) monuments, expressing defeat, and the new active Poles. For example, Dobrowolski juxtaposes the Sigismund Column and the scaffold, where 'a bricklayer/stands with his two mates,/an old bricklayer stands and sings while he works'.¹⁹ Undoubtedly, the decree submitted in August 1950 by the Warsaw Committee of the PZPR joined in the process of 'inventing' the new Polish tradition. Through the decree on the commemoration of Hibner, Kniewski and Rutkowski's death the 'living monuments' idea materialized. The planned mausoleum was to be a symbolic act of imposing the left-wing tradition on the old independence tradition and was to change the meaning of Warsaw's August. To control the Fortress would mean to remove the old August from the national calendar (November 1830, January 1863, August 1944) and to create a new chronology (August 1925, July 1944, January 1945, May 1945). The mausoleum, not a single monument but a whole ensemble of park and monuments, had its symbolic function reinforced by literary works, portraying 'the people of Red Wola district' and 'the heroes stronger than death'.²⁰

On 22 July 1955 Warsaw received another building, another 'living monument', the Palace of Culture and Scholarship. In a Dobrowolski poem, the Palace was situated next to the Fortress of Warsaw ('Where the blood on the pavement and the Fortress wall,/[...] where until yesterday,/there was no town, but a monument to death,/today the Palace's brow rests on the cloud').²¹ In fact, there is a couple of kilometres between those points in the physical space of Warsaw.

Shortly after the opening of the Palace the plan of the new memorial ensemble was prepared. The aim of this project was to bind the chronotope of revolution to the 'living monument', and to manifest the superiority of life to death. In August 1955 the plan to transform the Fortress area into a municipal park was ready. It was but a component of the greater Communist Party design, to control the whole symbolic space that reaches from the Fortress of Warsaw to the Łazienki Palazzo, and includes the Grave of the Unknown Warrior under the arches of the Saski Palazzo. The plan was submitted as a decision of the Politburo concerning 'the gradual transformation of the Fortress-of-Warsaw area into a Pantheon of Revolution'.²²

The draft of the decision is worth mentioning for at least three reasons. First, it shows the difficulty the new authorities were presented with by Warsaw's symbolic shape. In the post-war 'rebuilding' of Warsaw the ideological presuppositions are evident. Often urban layout was a blend of architectural and ideological requirements. The Fortress-of-Warsaw rebuilding project, viewed from this standpoint, seems to be the best example of that blend. The suppression of utility by ideological obligations is found in earlier projects, such as the W-Z Thoroughfare, the MDM district or the Palace of Culture. However, the Fortress of

19 Stanisław R. Dobrowolski, 'Warszawscy murarze' in Dobrowolski, *Poezje wybrane*, Warsaw, 1953, p. 68.

20 I refer to two short stories important for this mythopoeia, J. Warmiński's 'Ludzie czerwonej Woli' and J. Piórkowski's 'Silniejszy od śmierci'.

21 Stanisław R. Dobrowolski, 'Nowe epos' in *Drugi notatnik warszawski*, Warsaw, 1955, p. 95.

22 See *Projekt Uchwały Biura Politycznego KC PZPR w sprawie stopniowej przebudowy terenu Cytadeli warszawskiej na Panteon Rewolucji*, TS, 1995. I am indebted to Dr M. Napiontkowa for drawing my attention to this little-known document (CA KC PZPR 237/XVIII-101).

Warsaw, transformed into a municipal park, would have been the most spectacular blend of architecture and ideology ever witnessed in post-war Poland.²³

Secondly, the Fortress-of-Warsaw rebuilding plan is important for chronological reasons. The draft of the 1955 decision helps us to understand that the Thaw was neither stable nor unidirectional. Moreover, by 1955 it seemed to be reversible. The events preceding the 'Polish October' demonstrated that the Party's politics had been softened but the concessions made by the Party did not violate the principles of its doctrine. The plan for the rebuilding of the Fortress of Warsaw took shape when Warsaw was welcoming the participants of the Fifth International Festival of Youth and Students, and when Ważyk's 'A Poem for Adults' was published in the weekly *Nowa Kultura*.²⁴ In September 1955, not long after the publication of Ważyk's poem, Kazimierz Brandys's short novel (Before Being Forgotten) appeared. A few days later an orthodox text was available, Stefan Żółkiewski's article 'Let Us Pay More Attention to Artistic Groups', published in a Party monthly. These two formally different texts resembled each other in their optimistic message. The plan for the Fortress of Warsaw shows that the Party was using the transformed Fortress to try to restore a chronotope-of-revolution shape.

Thirdly, the project displays an attempt at including Polish symbolic space in a broader symbolic pattern. The aim was to make post-war Warsaw a second holy place on which 'the Kremlin casts its light' and where it is pleasant to listen to 'Moscow's singing birds'.²⁵

The Pantheon of Revolution was to contain four components: the Cemetery at the foot of the Execution Gate, the Polish Soldiers' Monument, the Central Museum of Progress and the Revolutionary Traditions of the Polish Nation, and the Museum of the Tenth Blockhouse. The Pantheon designers pointed out that they had followed the conventions of Soviet memorial ensembles, such as the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum in Moscow and the Peter and Paul Fortress in Leningrad. It was argued that Poland remained behind the other Communist countries, since they 'have their central museums and are about to prepare regional museums as well'.²⁶ The slope descending to the river-bank was to be the Polish equivalent of the Kremlin Wall, close to the Lenin-Stalin Mausoleum. The Cemetery was to hold the ashes of 'eminent revolutionary men'. It was also planned as the burial-ground for 'the leaders and the most notable men of People's Poland'. The terrain below the Execution Gate was to be moulded into an amphitheatre, descending to the River Vistula. The realization of this plan would follow 'the putting in order' of the area close to the Execution Gate. To 'put in order' meant in turn to remove 'the superfluous crosses which were erected only symbolically on the Fortress's slopes'.

The Polish Soldiers' Monument was designed as a place where 'homage could be paid to the memory of soldiers and partisans who had lost their life for People's Poland'. The designers set great store by this part of the ensemble because it was intended 'to replace the Grave of the Unknown Warrior'. To change the symbolic grave (that is, to translate it from Victory Square to the Fortress of Warsaw) would be to delete November 1918 from the national calendar and to give its function to July 1944 (the Lublin Manifesto). The municipal park was to be the frame of the whole memorial ensemble, which would be built on the Fortress of Warsaw. The axis of the park would be marked out by a 'Men-of-Merit Avenue' with 'statues, busts or monuments devoted to the most meritorious fighters for

23 See A. Aman, *Architecture and Ideology in Eastern Europe during the Stalin Era. An Aspect of Cold War History*, translated by R. and K. Tanner, Cambridge, MA, 1992, *passim*.

24 Adam Ważyk's 'Poemat dla dorosłych' was a condemnation of the failure of the Communist regime.

25 My quotations come from two poems in Arnold Ślucki's *Ziemia jaśniej. Poezje*, Warsaw, 1950.

26 *Projekt Uchwały*, see note 22.

progress and the freedom of the homeland'. The Hibner–Kniewski–Rutkowski Mausoleum, having already existed for five years, was to be incorporated into the planned park.

The Pantheon of Revolution was to be added to a series of buildings, expressing the pulse of the new life and delimiting in Warsaw an enclave of silence — a small part of the city where the calm flows 'from the coffin-lid of centuries'.²⁷ The northernmost element of the living monuments was the Warszawa steelworks, the southernmost the Soviet Soldiers' Cemetery–Mausoleum. The other living monuments were, for example, the Dzierżyński Monument, the Palace of Culture and the Kasprzak monument in the Wola district. The right-bank area of Warsaw contains the other components of the chain: the concrete-plant in Żerań district, the Praga Monument of Polish–Soviet Brotherhood in Arms and the Tenth Anniversary Stadium. Inside the circle thus delimited, the national past was to be arrested. Only a part of it could be released. The Royal Castle, completely destroyed during the war but understood as an essential component of the national centre, had to wait to be restored. The Castle seemed to be closely tied to 'nobiliary and imperialist Poland'. The 'people's' tradition was strengthened by the restoration of the Old Town and by Mariensztat, a district close to the Old Town built for workers. The parliament's decision of 1949 concerning reconstruction of the Royal Castle was left unrealized for more than twenty years.

In spite of all the efforts of the Communists Warsaw was not cut off from its past. Concrete, steel and iron were defeated by the graves' silence. The smoke coming from Warsaw's steelworks was not able to cover the image of the Old Town burning after the defeat of the August Uprising. November 1918, present in Warsaw's space as the Grave of the Unknown Warrior, was more durable than July 1944.

27 Dobrowolski, 'Znów rośnie wiersz' in *Drugi notatnik Warszawski*, p. 52.

33 Building the Organs of State Power: Soviet 'Cadres' and the Polish People's Army, 1945–49

PAUL LATAWSKI

According to the hagiographers of People's Poland, the Polish People's Army (Ludowego Wojska Polskiego, LWP) was the brain-child of Polish Communists. Writing on the thirty-fifth anniversary of its birth in 1978, Major-General Jerzy Bordziłowski, reflected this official view in a celebratory article extolling the 'Role of the Soviet Army in the formation of the People's Polish Army and in the liberation of Poland': 'The Polish nation would need an army of a new type, one that could battle for the Polish nation and society [...]. Such an army, the Polish People's Army, was able to come into being only under the ideological leadership of the Polish Communists on the territory of the natural ally of Poland, the Soviet Union'.¹ For the Polish Communists seeking to gain power in Poland, the reality was different. One of their future organs of state power, the armed forces, was in fact a Soviet invention. The scale of dependency on the Soviet Union in building the Polish People's Army is most powerfully demonstrated by the large-scale presence of Soviet officers in the LWP during the Second World War. Bordziłowski, who dutifully espoused the official line personified the gulf between the official line and the reality of the pervasive influence of Soviet officers on the wartime development of the LWP. He was a Soviet officer who entered the LWP in 1944 and remained in Polish service until his retirement in 1968.²

The story of the role of Soviet officers in building the LWP during the Second World War had to a large extent already emerged in the historiography produced in Poland during the Communist period. Organizations such as the Military History Institute devoted considerable effort to examining the wartime development of the LWP and the 'brotherhood in arms' with the Soviet Union.³ Given the number of Soviet officers seconded to the LWP between 1943 and 1945, avoiding discussion of this matter was impossible. Historical interpretation, however, often presented only a partial or inconsistent view of the numbers of serving Soviet officers.⁴ Their presence in large numbers was often justified in Communist historiography as necessary because of a

The opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of either Royal Military Academy Sandhurst or the Ministry of Defence.

1 Jerzy Bordziłowski, 'Rola Armii Radzieckiej w tworzeniu ludowego Wojska Polskiego i w wyzwoleniu Polski', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 3 (July–September 1978), p. 35. See also Zbigniew Kumos, 'Działalność wojskowa Komitetu Organizacyjnego ZPP w Związku Radzieckim', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 4 (October–December 1976), pp. 29–44.

2 Edward Jan Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej w Wojsku Polskim 1943–1968*, Warsaw, 1995, p. 168.

3 Benon Miśkiewicz, *Polska historiografia wojskowa*, Poznań, 1996, p. 310.

4 Ignacy Blum, 'O składzie socjalno-demograficznym Polskich Sił Zbrojnych w Związku Radzieckim Maj 1943–lipiec 1944', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 2 (April–June 1963), pp. 3–34, and Czesław Grzelak, 'Kształcenie kadr w Polskich Siłach Zbrojnych w ZSRR Maj 1943–lipiec 1944', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 1–2 (January–June 1985), pp. 316–47.

shortage of suitable Polish cadres to fill leadership positions, and on account of the wealth of experience they brought to the LWP.⁵

Since the end of Communism in Poland, historians have been beginning to address formerly taboo subjects such as the numbers of Soviet officers who served in the Polish armed forces. Thanks to the detailed work of Edward Jan Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej w Wojsku Polskim 1943–1968* (Officers of the Soviet Army in the Polish Armed Forces), we have a much clearer and more comprehensive picture of Soviet ‘cadres’ in wartime Polish military service between 1943 and 1968.⁶ Nalepa fills in ‘blank spaces’ left over from the Communist period. His work, however, represents only one segment, albeit an important one, of developments in the post-war Polish People’s Army.

The initial post-war period running from May 1945 to November 1949 was one of dramatic transition encompassing the violent birth and consolidation of the Polish People’s Republic (PRL). Nalepa has done much to quantify the presence of Soviet officers in the post-war LWP, but questions concerning their role and influence still remain. How did Soviet officers contribute to the building of the post-war Polish People’s Army and by extension to the consolidation of Communist power in Poland? Was the influence of these Soviet officers all-pervasive or did Polish officers with a more ‘national’ orientation, Communist or otherwise, play any significant countervailing role in the Polish armed forces? Only by addressing these questions can historical fact be separated from Communist legend on the condition and reliability of the Polish armed forces in the context of Polish domestic civil conflict and mounting East–West hostility in the international arena during the second half of the 1940s.

Wartime Help with Cadres: Stalin’s Polish Army: 1943–1945

The formation of the Kościuszko infantry division in May 1943 marked the beginning of the Polish People’s Army. Nominally under the direction of the Union of Polish Patriots (Związek Patriotów Polskich, ZPP), a front organization for Polish Communists and pro-Moscow Poles, it was in fact a Soviet creation.

Sent into action in October 1943 before completing its training, the Kościuszko division lost about one-third of its strength at the Battle of Lenino. From a military point of view the battle was costly and pointless; from the point of view of Stalin and the Polish Communists it served an important political purpose in that it signalled an alternative to the London Polish government-in-exile and its armed forces.⁷

From one division, the Polish forces under Soviet tutelage quickly expanded. Drawing in Polish prisoners of war and civilians on the territory of the Soviet Union, by August 1943 the division grew into the First Polish Corps and by March 1944 the Soviet authorities agreed to the formation of the Polish Army in the USSR. Expanding the Polish forces in the Soviet Union was in theory a straightforward task, since there was a large pool of Polish manpower in the Soviet Union. The prisoners of war captured during the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland numbered around 230,000, to whom could be added males of military age

5 For example, see Waław Jurgielewicz, ‘Pomoc Związku Radzieckiego w utworzeniu ludowego Wojska Polskiego’, *Wojskowy rzegląd historyczny*, 1 (January–March 1972), pp. 111–12, and Kazimierz Kaczmarek, ‘Wstawienie 2 armii WP Sierpień 1944 r.–styczeń 1945 r. Cz. I’, *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 4 (October–December 1971), p. 40.

6 Ibid.

7 Czesław Grzelak, Henryk Stańczyk and Stefan Zwoliński, *Bez możliwości wyboru: Wojsko Polskim na froncie wschodnim 1943–1945*, Warsaw, 1993, p. 162.

among Polish civilians on Soviet territory.⁸ The recruitment pool could be broken down into the following six categories: (1) Polish civilians from eastern Poland as well as refugees from other parts of the country deported to the interior of the Soviet Union in 1939–41; (2) Poles mobilized into the Soviet army serving in construction battalions and military units; (3) Poles freed by an amnesty from Soviet camps and prisons in 1941; (4) Soviet citizens of Polish ancestry, principally officers and NCOs; (5) Soviet officers (not of Polish ancestry) seconded to the Polish forces; and (6) Poles found among *Wehrmacht* prisoners of war.⁹ Missing from this list, however, was one vital category: trained Polish officers.

The shortage of trained Polish officers was the direct result of Soviet policy. In 1939, approximately 11,000 Polish army officers fell into Soviet hands as prisoners of war. Over 8,000 of these men were held at camps in Kozelsk, Ostashkov and Starobelsk and were executed on the order of the Soviet leadership in May 1940.¹⁰ The surviving 3,000 officers joined the Anders Polish army as a consequence of the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile in London. These remaining Polish officers left Soviet territory with the evacuation of the Anders Polish army to the Middle East in 1942. Only a handful of pro-Soviet officers from the pre-war Polish army chose to stay behind in the Soviet Union.¹¹ The most prominent of these was Zygmunt Berling. The reasons for his pro-Soviet leaning were not readily apparent. Berling served in Piłsudski's legions from November 1914, fought in the Polish-Soviet war in 1920 during which he earned a Silver Cross of the Order Virtuti Militari. In September 1939, he was arrested by the NKVD in Wilno (Vilnius) at which time he is alleged to have begun his co-operation with the Soviet authorities.¹² Although he held a series of important military posts including deputy commander-in-chief of the Polish Army in 1944, his importance was more political than military. For propaganda reasons he provided a thin Polish veneer to a Soviet military construction. Berling and the clutch of Polish officers who placed themselves at the disposal of the Soviet authorities were not trusted. In particular, Berling's outspoken views on drawing the post-war Polish-Soviet frontier further east than the Curzon Line drew unfavourable comment from his Soviet masters.¹³ The Soviet authorities tolerated their 'reactionary' Polish officers largely for political reasons and because they had eliminated the alternatives previously available to them.

The artificially created shortage of Polish officers necessitated the use of Red Army officers in the Polish forces organized in the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet officers in the Polish army according to the best estimates numbered in the period of May 1943 to

8 Wojciech Materski (ed.), *Z archiwów Sowietkich tom I: Polscy jeńcy wojenni w ZSSR*, Warsaw, 1992, p. 9. According to various estimates the number of civilians deported from eastern Poland in 1939 numbered between 1,250,000 and 1,600,000. Included in this population were males of military age. See Keith Sword, *Deportation and Exile: Poles in the Soviet Union, 1939–48*, London, 1994, p. 27.

9 The list presented here is a consolidation of the list appearing in Grzelak, 'Kształcenie kadr w Polskich Siłach Zbrojnych w ZSRR Maj 1943–lipiec 1944 r.', p. 317.

10 See note, Chief of NKVD, L. Beria, to J. Stalin, March 1940, in Ewa Wosik (ed.), *Katyń: Dokumenty Ludobójstwa*, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 35–39.

11 See note, L. Beria to J. Stalin, 12 March 1942, in Wojciech Materski (ed.), *Z archiwów Sowietkich tom II: Armia Polska w ZSRR 1941–1942*, Warsaw, 1992, pp. 49–73.

12 Grzelak, Stańczyk and Zwoliński, *Bez możliwości wyboru*, pp. 222–23.

13 See report of the State Security Commissar, G. Zhukov, Political Bureau, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) to the Chief Political Administration, Red Army, Col. Gen. A. Shcherbakov, 16 February 1944, and a similar report from V. Sokorski, who served in the Polish Army in the USSR, to Shcherbakov, 16 April 1944, in Józef Dawid and Aleksander Kochański (eds), *Polska–ZSRR struktury podległości: Dokumenty WKP(B) 1944–1949*, Warsaw, 1995, pp. 34–35 and 52–55.

May 1945 between 16,800 and 19,700. In July 1943 they represented 66 per cent of officers in the Polish army in the Soviet Union; a year later they amounted to 64.4 per cent of total officers and at the conclusion of the war 45 per cent of all officers.¹⁴ Large numbers of junior and senior Soviet officers held positions at in the Polish army. The proportion of Soviet officers in the technical arms such as armoured forces, artillery, and signals was consistently very high (approximately 80 per cent) until the last months of the war. More Polish officers then began to occupy positions in these branches but the picture remained mixed since Soviet officers overwhelmingly filled positions in new branches like the air force and chemical warfare units.¹⁵ The Soviet domination of the command positions reflected the pattern in the technical branches. This was the most important source of Soviet influence. In the spring of 1944, 70 per cent of the command positions in the army were in the hands of Soviet officers. In such sensitive areas as military intelligence, the proportion of Soviet officers reached 100 per cent.¹⁶

The employment of so many Soviet officers in what was supposed to be a Polish military organization was not a straightforward exercise. Although Communist historiography made much of the Polish ancestry of Soviet officers, one of the most fundamental problems was the inability of the vast majority of them to speak Polish. This created obvious command and control problems in front-line units that led the Soviet military command to issue a directive in September 1944 that only Soviet officers who could speak Polish could wear Polish uniforms. All others remained in Soviet uniforms and efforts were made to give them Polish language instruction.¹⁷ Apart from the practical difficulties of commanding troops in the field where two languages are in use, the Soviet officers were not very popular with Polish junior officers or with other ranks whose political sympathies could scarcely be described as pro-Soviet.¹⁸

The numbers of Soviet officers began to fall in the Polish forces as the Red Army moved westwards. The advance across the river Bug and the liberation of Lublin Poland greatly increased the manpower pool available for mobilization. In 1944, under the authority of the National Home Council (*Krajowa Rada Narodowa*, KRN) the Polish Communists ambitiously decreed the creation of the Second Polish Army and had plans to create a Third. They managed only the Second by the end of the war. So great were the shortages of Polish officers that many of those who were mobilized or pressed into service in 1944 came from underground organizations including the Home Army, whose sympathies and politics linked them to the London government-in-exile.¹⁹ As the Soviet forces advanced into German territory late in the war another sizeable group of Polish officers became available. These were officers of the pre-war Polish army who had been in German prisoner-of-war camps since 1939. From the military point of view, the liberation of Poland eased the wartime shortage of Polish officers for service in the army and in theory meant that the Soviet officers seconded to the Polish armed forces could begin to go home.

Soviet Officers in the Post-war Polish Army 1945–48

The reconstruction of the Polish Army after the Second World War would have been a daunting task for any government. Six years of war and occupation had shattered the

14 Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej*, pp. 15–16.

15 Ibid., p. 20.

16 Ibid., pp. 21–22.

17 Kaczmarek, 'Wstawienie 2 armii WP', pp. 40–41.

18 Tadeusz Rawski, 'Praca polityczno-wychowawcza w 1 armii Wojska Polskiego w końcowym okresie wojny', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 3 (July–September 1974), p. 56.

19 Grzelak, Stańczyk and Zwoliński, *Bez możliwości wyboru*, pp. 110–11.

military infrastructure of the country. Barracks, training facilities and depots did not escape the destruction in Poland attendant on a brutal and prolonged occupation. The Saski Palazzo in Warsaw, for example, that had housed the Polish Ministry of Defence in the inter-war period had been reduced to rubble. Although the acquisition of former German military barracks in the 'recovered' western territories to some extent replaced damaged or lost facilities in territory ceded to the Soviet Union, rebuilding the Polish military infrastructure required considerable resources and time. All these military needs would have to be met in a society suffering from severe dislocation and civil conflict and by an economy that was scarcely functioning.

In the context of these conditions, the manpower of the Polish armed forces was radically cut. In the closing phase of the war, the strength of the army had reached just under 340,000.²⁰ Post-war plans formulated in the autumn of 1945 envisaged reducing manpower to about 180,000 making up twenty infantry divisions.²¹ The actual strength of the armed forces between 1945 and 1949 was lower than the planned level and stood around 150,000 men.²² In the years immediately following the war around 200,000 men were demobilized or transferred to the newly created Internal Security Corps (Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego, KBW) and the Frontier Defence Force (Wojsko Ochrony Pogranicza, WOP).²³

With a greatly reduced peace-time strength, the wartime military problem of the shortage of Polish military officers became a problem that could be swiftly rectified. The demobilization meant that potentially fewer professional Polish officers would leave military service compared to their seconded Soviet counterparts and the large number of conscripts who had completed their wartime service. Reducing the army was one means of solving the military problem of the lack of experienced Polish military officers. Another means of ending the shortage of Polish officers was by making full use of all officers available. The pool of Polish military officers at the conclusion of the war was diverse and more than adequate from a military point of view to build the peace-time Polish army. From POW camps in Germany many thousands of Polish officers had been released. Special programmes were set up to screen these officers and short courses launched to improve their military skills.²⁴ In addition to officers liberated from POW camps, thousands of soldiers from the Polish forces in the West returned to Poland. In 1947 these numbered over 33,000 and among them were over 2,100 officers.²⁵

The shortage of Polish officers, however, was not simply a military problem. The formation of the post-war officer corps was fundamentally a political issue since the Polish Communists and their Soviet masters sought to construct a new political order in Poland.

20 Wacław Jurgielewicz, 'Stan liczebny i organizacyjny ludowego Wojska Polskiego w przeddzień zakończenia drugiej wojny światowej', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 2 (April–June 1967), p. 157.

21 Jerzy Poksiński, 'Kierownictwo partyjne siłami zbrojnymi' in Andrzej Paczkowski (ed.), *Instytucje państwa totalitarnego Polska 1944–1956*, Warsaw, 1994, p. 104.

22 See *ibid.*, p. 95, 'Army Strengths', *Military Review*, 24, 1949 (November), p. 72, and Mikołaj Plikus (ed.), *Mała kronika ludowego Wojska Polskiego 1943–1973*, Warsaw, 1975, p. 253.

23 Zdzisław Stapor and Julian Kaczmarek, 'Węłowe problemy sztuki wojennej ludowego Wojska Polskiego w latach 1942–1975', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 4 (November–December 1975), p. 38. The KBW and WOP together amounted to 40,000–50,000 men.

24 Between 1945 and 1949 the proportion of officers from the pre-war army ranged from 80 per cent to 9 per cent on the short-term improvement courses. See Tadeusz Konecki, 'Zawodowe szkolnictwo ludowego Wojska Polskiego w pierwszym powojennym dziesięcioleciu. Organizacja i dydaktyka', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 2 (April–June 1974), p. 337.

25 See Andrzej Paczkowski, *Aparat bezpieczeństwa w latach 1944–1956: taktyka, strategia, metody. Część I Lata 1945–1947*, Warsaw, 1994, p. 149.

As Władysław Gomułka, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, PPR), recognized that 'the army as such is a very important organ, part of the state apparatus, we will give very close attention to its affairs'.²⁶ In May 1945 Gomułka indicated in a lengthy report to Moscow the scale of difficulties Polish Communists faced in building a politically reliable officer corps:

I wish to say a few words about the Polish Army. We are also working in that area and we are expanding the Polish Army. We have a plan to expand the Polish Army to twenty divisions this year. But the greatest difficulty – is the officer corps. We do not have officers; we are very short particularly of senior officers. We are able to acquire quickly lower- and middle-level cadres, but we are unable to resolve the issue of senior officers in a short time. It will require years. Certainly we are unable to build the Polish Army in its entirety on the officer corps of the former [pre-war] Polish Army because, fundamentally, it is a reactionary corps [...]. Also, for example, the Red Army freed several thousand Polish officers from camps in Germany, held by the Germans since 1939, but we have very little use for them. We have vetted them and we are convinced that we are able to take 10 per cent, a maximum of 15 per cent of these people into the Army; the others were not desirable from the political point of view; they are a dangerous element; that is why we will not have them.²⁷

Gomułka's thinking on how to build a new officer corps to serve 'democratic Poland' envisaged a long-term strategy to eliminate the last vestiges of the pre-war military leadership. Reliable workers and peasants were to be trained in officer schools to defend the interests of People's Poland.²⁸ Until the 'cadres' could be rebuilt the Polish army would still need experienced officers to be able to function. Communist suspicions about the political reliability of pre-war Polish officers and military necessity thus ensured the continuing presence of Soviet officers during the building of the post-war LWP.

The numbers of Soviet officers seconded to the Polish Army fell dramatically after the war. With the large-scale reductions in strength initiated in the second half of 1945, there was no need to have so many officers. The percentage of Soviet officers serving in the Polish officer corps dropped to 24 per cent in 1946, 10 per cent in 1947, 7.5 per cent in 1948 and 6.0 per cent in 1949.²⁹ Although the departing Soviet officers were warmly thanked in a directive (*rozkaz*) issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish Army in July 1945 suggesting that their work was completed in Poland, the fact was that not all of them were going home.³⁰ There remained a strong Soviet presence in command and staff positions throughout the Polish army including the general staff and the central institutions of the Polish Ministry of Defence. In this respect, the role of the Soviet officer cadres changed little in the post-war period. Soviet officers left lower-level positions in line units and other organizations to be replaced in the overwhelming majority by Poles.

While the overall percentage of Soviet officers serving in the Polish officer corps at more junior levels plummeted, the drop in command and staff positions was less pronounced. Table 1 indicates the number of Soviet officers in the Polish army with the rank of general and the percentage they formed of the total number of serving generals.³¹ It

26 Report by Gomułka to the International Information Bureau, All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 10 May 1945, cited in Dawid and Kochański (eds), *Polska-ZSRR struktury podległości*, p. 113.

27 Ibid.

28 Ibid.

29 Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej*, p. 150.

30 Directive issued by the Commander-in-Chief of the Polish army, 30 July 1945, in Włodzimierz T. Kowalski (ed.), *Dokumenty i materiały do historii stosunków Polsko-Radzieckich*, vol. VIII, *styczeń 1944–grudzień 1945*, Warsaw, 1974, pp. 567–68.

31 Table 1 based on data in Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej*, p. 47.

is clear that in the period 1945 to 1948 senior Soviet officers continued to play a prominent role in the Polish army, though their numbers were reduced fairly fast.

Table 1: Soviet Generals in the Polish Army 1945–48

Date	Total no. of Generals	Soviet Generals	
		(number)	(%)
11 Jun 45	69	60	87
10 Oct 45	62	49	79
6 May 46	55	40	73
15 Apr 47	51	27	53
31 Dec 47	58	22	38
1 Jun 48	50	20	40
31 Dec 48	53	16	30

From the point of view of exercising influence over a large military organization, the role of colonels in command and staff officers in central institutions and major military units is important. The decline in the number of Soviet colonels serving in the Polish army was not nearly as rapid as among lower ranking officers between 1946 and 1948 as indicated in Table 2:³²

Table 2: Soviet Colonels in the Polish Army 1946–48

Date	Total no. of Colonels	Soviet Colonels	
		(%)	
5 Mar 46	206	100	
25 Jul 46	199	97	
1 Oct 46	156	76	
1 Jan 48	120	58	

The Soviet generals and colonels serving in the Polish army in the second half of the 1940s could be found mostly in key positions. They were prominent in the central institutions of the Polish Ministry of Defence where they often headed departments and sections, in the central staffs at the military district level and in divisional and regimental staffs. In these posts Soviet officers continued to be represented in higher percentages relative to their overall percentage as part of the Polish officer corps. Table 3 gives aggregate numbers and percentages of Soviet officers in such posts.³³

Table 3: Soviet Officers in Command and Staff Posts 1947–49

Date	Total no. of Officers	Soviet Officers	
		(number)	(percentage)
1 Jan 47	1570	595	37.8
1 Apr 48	1566	315	20.1
1 Jan 49	1564	319	20.4

³² Table 2 based on data in *ibid.*, p. 48.

³³ Table 3 based on data in *ibid.*, p. 51.

Conclusion

The Soviet cadres serving in the Polish army clearly wielded considerable power. The rapid fall in the overall number of Soviet officers from wartime levels did not reduce significantly their authority in the Polish army given their continuing presence in command and staff posts.

Soviet officers were not the only group to influence the reconstruction of the post-war Polish People's Army. A considerable number of pre-war Polish officers re-entered the army and occupied a number of senior posts. While their presence in these posts can be explained by the pressing need for experienced officers to rebuild the army after the dislocation of war and occupation, they nevertheless represented different military practice and ideas from their Soviet counterparts. In the first few years after the war, 39 per cent of professional officers in the general staff were from the pre-war army with a quarter of them senior officers with staff experience and the remaining three-quarters junior officers (up to captain) in the pre-war army.³⁴ The most prominent of these officers was Major-General Stefan Mossor, who became Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Mossor played an important role in the direction and planning of operation 'Wisła' against Ukrainian nationalists in south-eastern Poland in 1947.³⁵ Pre-war army officers also represented a significant proportion of the staff at military academies and schools. They were a prominent group at the newly created General Staff College and the first commandant and organizer of the Military Technical Academy was a pre-war officer.³⁶ Although these pre-war officers would soon be systematically purged from the army, they clearly exercised some influence on the development of the Polish army in the immediate post-war years. Little is known about them except in the context of the oppression they subsequently suffered at the hands of the Communist regime.³⁷

Despite the fact that in the period of transition after the war the Polish officer corps had elements of diversity, it does not alter significantly the short and long-term impact of the Soviet officers in the Polish army. One of the most important and immediate functions of the Soviet cadre was to exercise control of the Polish army in support of the policy aims of the Soviet Union. Given the hostility felt towards the Soviet Union in the pre-war Polish army and among the population at large, the need for the presence of reliable Soviet officers was a necessity for Soviet policy in Poland. It is significant that the Polish army's role in operations against internal groups opposing the Communist regime was limited. It offered substantial aid in terms of national reconstruction particularly in removing millions of land-mines and other military munitions and restored communications such as destroyed bridges.³⁸ The Polish army aided the Communist authorities during the referendum of 1946 and the parliamentary election of 1947 but its role was in supporting propaganda efforts

34 Kazimierz Frontczak, 'Rozwój władz naczelných i instytucji wojskowych ludowego Wojska Polskiego w latach 1945–1947', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 3 (July–September 1973), p. 444.

35 For a brief biography of Mossor see 'Miscellanea Archiwalne', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 4 (October–December 1973), pp. 249–50. On his role in operation Wisła, see Eugeniusz Misiło, 'Polska polityka narodowościowa wobec Ukraińców 1944–1947' in Wojciech Wrzesiński (ed.), *Polska – Polacy – mniejszości narodowe*, Wrocław, 1992, pp. 391–412.

36 Ryszard Piotrowski, 'Pierwszy komendant WAT', *Polska zbrojna*, 20 February 1998, p. 28, and Aniela Uziembło, 'Akademia', *Polska zbrojna*, 13 June 1997, pp. 28–29.

37 Mossor and a number of other pre-war generals and colonels were arrested and imprisoned in the late 1940s: see Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej*, p. 64.

38 See Zygmunt Wojdalski, *Wojsku społeczeństwu 1944–1948*, Warsaw, 1982.

and not in violent coercion.³⁹ The only exception to the post-war pattern of keeping the army out of direct involvement in internal repression operations was the conflict with Ukrainian insurgents in south-east Poland.⁴⁰ A number of Polish army units took part in operation 'Wisła'. Many of their rank and file consisted of Poles displaced from territories incorporated into the Soviet Union (western Ukraine) who could be relied upon completely in military operations.⁴¹ Given the obvious doubts the Communists harboured regarding the utility of the army in internal repression, the presence of the Soviet cadre provided a vital prop for a Polish Communist regime. Soviet officers ensured that the army would remain under control or neutral during the period of consolidating Communist power in Poland. Apart from the role they had in ensuring the reliability of the army, Soviet officers had an important role in laying the foundations of a Polish People's Army modelled closely on the armed forces of the Soviet Union.⁴² The continuing post-war presence of Soviet cadre in senior military positions gave the Polish regime the time necessary to build a Polish officer corps capable of acting as a reliable organ of state power.

39 Leszek Grot, 'Działalność ochronno-propagandowa Wojska Polskiego w czasie referendum (30.6.46 r.) i wyborów do Sejmu RP (19.1.1947 r.)', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 2 (April–June 1974), pp. 173–200.

40 Determining the number of army casualties in internal operations can be difficult. One article on the army's role lumps together the statistics of army deaths on operations with that of the KBW. See Leszek Grot, 'Działania ludowego Wojska Polskiego przeciwko zbrojnemu podziemiowi w latach 1944–1947', *Wojskowy przegląd historyczny*, 3 (July–September 1973), p. 496.

41 See: Misiło, 'Polska polityka narodowościowa wobec Ukraińców 1944–1947', p. 400.

42 Nalepa, *Oficerowe Armii Radzieckiej*, pp. 156–59.

34 Jan Racek, Zdeněk Nejedlý and the Construction of Czech Music History after the Second World War

GEOFFREY CHEW

In around 1785, C. F. D. Schubart wrote:

None of the provinces [ruled by Joseph II], perhaps none in the whole of Germany, outshines Bohemia in music [...]. Wind instruments in particular have been cultivated with such diligence that the Bohemians now surpass not only Italy, but also the rest of Germany [...]. The Bohemian chamber style is beyond argument the most beautiful in the world.¹

Schubart was not the only writer of his time to think thus;² and in the following century, the exceptional musicality of the Bohemians (later interpreted as 'Czechs') became a well-known Romantic commonplace, which came in due course to influence the writing of history — and not merely music history. Accordingly, at the beginning of his general history of Czech music, Jan Racek pays tribute to it, in characteristic (even if less than ideally elegant) terms: 'In Czech history music occupies a quite exceptional position, due not only to its particular creative and artistic nature, which is the product of the natural, healthy musicality of the whole of our popular national society, but also to its remarkable vocation as an agent of revival and generally in terms of cultural politics.'³

Racek, like other modern Czech cultural historians, is using the commonplace here in order to fill in the gaps in a history of vernacular literature, and especially to span the allegedly silent period before the National Revival, and in so doing is allowing music to fulfil the political role of defining the nation. A closer look at the writing of music history in Bohemia and Moravia immediately after the Second World War will, I believe, demonstrate that cultural politics during that period required music to play precisely this role, among others that were imposed on it.

The sentence quoted above is from the second edition of Racek's history. It was a thorough revision of the first edition of 1949,⁴ to propound a new orthodoxy in Czech music history; and indeed the first edition had itself been claimed by Racek to be polemical. I shall be considering the revisions and their rationale, but it may be advisable first to sketch the pre-war development of Czech musical historiography.

Although accounts of music and musicians in the Bohemian Lands, including Schubart's, had been published well before the onset of the Czech National Revival, music

1 Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart, *Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst* [c. 1785], posthumously ed. Ludwig Schubart, Vienna, 1806; quoted here according to Jürgen Mainka (ed.), *Christian Friedrich Daniel Schubart. Ideen zu einer Ästhetik der Tonkunst*, Leipzig, 1977, p. 86.

2 Of other eighteenth-century commentators on the musicality of the Bohemians, Charles Burney is probably the best known. See his account of his journey to Central Europe, gathering material for his general history of music, in Percy A. Scholes (ed.), *An Eighteenth-Century Musical Tour in Central Europe and the Netherlands; being Dr. Charles Burney's Account of his Musical Experiences*, London and New York, 1959; however, the phrase 'conservatory of Europe', referring to Bohemia and often ascribed to Burney, seems to be unverifiable.

3 Jan Racek, *Česká hudba od nejstarších dob do počátku 19. století*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1958, p. 9.

4 Jan Racek, *Česká hudba od nejstarších dob do počátku 19. století*, Prague and Brno, 1949.

history in Czech was essentially a product of that movement. The earliest continuous narrative synthesis of national music history to appear in Czech was a small volume published in 1891 by Josef Srb-Debrnov.⁵ Srb-Debrnov constructed Czech music history in terms of four periods: vocal music up to the seventeenth century; instrumental music of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; music of the first half of the nineteenth century; and 'music with national character' (*hudba s rázem národním*), of the second half of the nineteenth century. This periodization of history owes much to music historiography of the period in France and Germany, with 1600 interpreted in round terms as the date at which modern music is initiated by a supposed 'monodic revolution' in the Italy of Monteverdi and his contemporaries. But Srb-Debrnov links this conventional framework with Czech history by conflating 1618, the date of the beginning of the Estates' Uprising, with that of the monodic revolution. And in this, besides his identification of his friend Smetana's *Prodaná nevěsta* (The Bartered Bride, 1866) as the decisive moment at which 'music with a national character' first appears in the Bohemian Lands, he provided a lasting legacy, which still influences Czech musical historiography.

There is a clear link of continuity in particular between Srb-Debrnov's framework for the history of Czech music and that of all his successors, including Zdeněk Nejedlý, the single author who has most clearly influenced Czech musical historiography during the twentieth century. Nejedlý, born in Litomyšl in 1878, went up to Prague University in 1896, and read history under Jaroslav Goll and the sociologist T. G. Masaryk and aesthetics under Otakar Hostinský. In 1908 he became professor of musicology at the University, and in the next half-century he wrote copiously on a variety of subjects. In 1904 he had already published a brief history of Czech music, and he continued to publish on the music of the Hussite period in the decade before the First World War.

Despite his breadth of learning, the interpretation of Czech history that he developed even as early as the first decade of the twentieth century was forceful and polemical; it remained essentially unchanged for the next thirty years—though the manner in which he expressed it changed after the Second World War. As he put it in 1914 in his *Spor o smysl českých dějin* (Controversy Concerning the Meaning of Czech History), Czech national history, when interpreted in terms of 'scientific realism', is a drama in three acts, namely the Hussite period, the post-White Mountain (1620) era, and the nineteenth-century revival of Czech culture.⁶ This scenario of two periods of national splendour separated by a period of national oppression, the 'darkness' of Jirásek's mythopoeic novel of the same period,⁷ is theatrical, almost operatic. It conflated Srb-Debrnov's third and fourth periods, sharpening the latter's polemical purpose and placing Smetana at centre stage in the denouement of the final act. And indeed much of Nejedlý's musicological energy went after the First World War into documenting this view of Smetana exhaustively (rather than altering it substantially), most notably in a biography of the composer. Eleven volumes were projected, but even the four that were completed and published remain a massive achievement.⁸

Nejedlý's background and development have been well characterized by Jaroslav Střítecký and Josef Hanzal in their introduction to an anthology of his writings.⁹ Nejedlý

5 Josef Srb-Debrnov, *Dějiny hudby v Čechách a na Moravě*, Prague, 1891.

6 Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Spor o smysl českých dějin: pokus o filosofii českých dějin*, Prague, 1914.

7 Alois Jirásek, *Temno: historický obraz* [written 1912–14], Prague, 1915.

8 Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Bedřich Smetana*, 4 vols, Prague, 1924–33. Another influence on Nejedlý's view of Smetana was provided by his teacher Hostinský, in Otakar Hostinský, *Bedřich Smetana a jeho boj o moderní českou hudbu*, Prague, 1901.

9 Jaroslav Střítecký and Josef Hanzal (eds), *Zdeněk Nejedlý: Umění staré a nové: výběr ze studií*, Prague, 1978.

himself claimed to have been formed by the Litomyšl environment of his heroes, Smetana and Jirásek, and to have read Palacký's history of Bohemia before going up to university, so that he arrived in Prague with his historical ideas (and his cultural canon) ready-formed. But, as Střítecký and Hanzal point out, in his youth Nejedlý was something of an outsider in the small-town atmosphere of Litomyšl. His father, Roman Nejedlý, was a *kantor*, one of the teacher-musicians typical of rural life in Bohemia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and Nejedlý's own interpretation of the activity of the cantors shows some ambivalence. He was contemptuous of their philistine attitudes and achievements even though regarding them as the guardians of the continuity of national culture during the period of greatest national oppression, because he was deeply sensitive in his own way to the values of high culture, judged from an essentially Romantic, idealist point of view.¹⁰

From a historiographical point of view, the dialectical content that Nejedlý places within his central, 'dark', period of Czech history, the period of these cantors, is of particular interest. In the secondary literature of the first half of the twentieth century, the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries had almost always been dealt with purely in terms of composer or performer biographies, often drawing on the surviving autobiographical memoirs of cantors. Nejedlý in the 1920s and 1930s himself used this tradition, sketching the art of the village cantors of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as something well known to Smetana — but he provides a new Marxist twist. While acknowledging that these cantors were usually engaged in providing music for local parish churches in order to provide an outstanding public spectacle, Nejedlý goes on to suggest that

our cantors, like our people in general, soon transformed this task of theirs into something quite different [...]. They turned the church into a theatre, or, better, a concert hall, where music was played not in order to heighten the splendour of the church, but rather to allow the people to hear something beautiful, and to allow the local musicians to play something beautiful.¹¹

So in Nejedlý's view they were essentially conducting a guerrilla campaign, as a class, for two centuries or more, whose success was independent of the artistic worth of their music. This campaign was articulating the class conflict that potentially occurs in every age and society, between the proletariat (represented by the cantors) and the higher social classes (represented by clergy and Church authorities). In this way their music is represented as the bearer of the essence of the nation through the period of 'darkness', with a dynamic that had inevitably to issue in the National Revival of the nineteenth century. The social significance of this music is authentic and excuses any artistic shortcomings it may have. And a reciprocal relationship is set up between Nejedlý's revolutionary hero, Smetana, and the cantors. He guarantees their credentials, since they are his equally revolutionary predecessors, and they are the representatives of the nation as he was later to be; on the other hand, they guarantee his credentials, since they set up the historical imperative to be fulfilled in him. Both are authentic, and together they provide the continuity of Czech national culture through the period of darkness.

This extraordinary vision in later years continued to provide a pretext for the study of Baroque music by other Czech scholars. And it will already be clear that it permitted a wholly secular interpretation of the almost entirely sacred repertory of the Czech Baroque — in opposition to Roman Catholic and other possible religious interpretations, of which a well-known example is the interpretation of the Czech Baroque by Zdeněk Kalista,¹² that still seemed viable to some even after the Second World War. Nejedlý referred his

10 Ibid., pp. 7–10.

11 Nejedlý, *Bedřich Smetana*, III (*Praha a venkov*), Prague, 1929, p. 410.

12 Zdeněk Kalista, *České baroko: studie, texty, poznámky*, Prague, 1941.

understanding of Czech history, as driven by essentially secular and national, rather than religious, forces, to Goll.¹³ This is of obvious relevance to the Baroque, but especially marked in the interpretation (as a revolutionary, national, essentially secular movement) that Nejedlý placed upon the fifteenth-century Hussite movement, in the studies of Hussite song that he had been producing since the beginning of the century. And Nejedlý's interpretation of the Hussite movement, as well as his interpretation of the revolutionary significance of the cantors, became touchstones of historical orthodoxy in post-war Czechoslovakia.

Nejedlý spent the war years living in the Soviet Union with his family and teaching at Moscow University, and on his return to Czechoslovakia he was soon heavily involved in politics: he was appointed Minister of Education, Arts and Sciences in 1945 and again (after a couple of years as Minister of Social Welfare) between 1948 and 1953. (As the Moravian musicologist Gracian Černušák observed diplomatically in the early 1950s, in his article on Nejedlý in *Grove's Dictionary*: 'He has been honoured with many titles and distinctions as one of the most influential personalities in Czechoslovak public life. No wonder [...] his work as a musicologist has been entirely abandoned.')¹⁴ It was during this time, however, that Nejedlý returned to the theme of national history in his political tract *Komunisté — dědici velikých tradic českého národa* (The Communists, Heirs of the Great Traditions of the Czech Nation, 1946),¹⁵ now placing his historical views in the service of strident ideology, making little pretence of disinterested scholarship. In this work, he defends the thesis that Communists should, after the model provided by the Soviet Union, set high value on national culture, which can be understood only with reference to its revolutionary social meaning. The new, coercive rhetoric that he adopts makes a direct comparison with his earlier works problematic in some ways, even though he himself explicitly stresses the continuity between old and new: 'I do not wish to expatiate on my own work towards the understanding and evaluation of Czech national tradition and culture, but it is certainly characteristic that it was a Communist who had to explain and demonstrate [in his Smetana monograph written decades earlier] the unique national significance of our most national artist, Bedřich Smetana, to our bourgeoisie.'¹⁶ And he returns to his neo-Revivalist idea of the three great period divisions of Czech history, now developing the theme of the class conflict that characterizes them, and their inevitability. And once again he interprets the music of the period preceding the National Revival as the means by which the people heroically, against all the odds, managed to preserve the continuity of national culture and to resist religion: 'They constrained [the people] with intolerable statutory labour and also stuffed them full of the most disgusting superstitions, but they sang on and joyfully sang, so that they should not be overcome by despair — 90 per cent of our national folk-songs are the product of this tragic period.'¹⁷

The same themes, the continuity of secular Czech history and its revolutionary character, presented in similar rhetorical terms, were given even stronger political expression and significance in the speech that Nejedlý delivered at the Eighth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in 1946, when he called on his comrades in rousing terms to proceed to victory, supported by the 'unified, beautiful, democratic' national tradition that stretched from the Hussites to Smetana, whose *Má vlast* (My Country, c. 1872–79), at

13 Střítecký and Hanzal (eds), *Umění staré a nové*, p. 11 and *passim*: their Introduction includes a sound discussion of the intellectual currents surrounding Nejedlý in Prague.

14 Gracian Černušák, 'Nejedlý' in Eric Blom (ed.), *Grove's Dictionary of Music & Musicians*, 5th edn, London, 1954, vol. 6, pp. 46–47.

15 Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Komunisté — dědici velikých tradic českého národa*, 3rd edn, Prague, 1950.

16 Ibid., p. 11.

17 Ibid., p. 22.

the congress concert, was contradicting all the aspirations of the bourgeoisie.¹⁸ And at the Ninth Congress, once the Communists had gained power, he outlined a programme to propagate this vision in terms of education at every level.¹⁹

After the war, the task of producing a synthesis of music history to support the new educational programme fell principally to Jan Racek, a teacher in Brno, who had been a pupil of Vladimír Helfert at the University of Brno. Helfert had in 1936 published a monograph on modern Czech music, written for a foreign readership.²⁰ During the war he was imprisoned, and he died in 1945. Racek was a Czech musicologist of the old Positivist school, trained in the collection and evaluation of sources, and producing copious editions of old music and of Janáček's letters. In these respects he was not totally unlike Nejedlý. He had won his credentials by writing a dissertation on Smetana, in which the national vocation of the composer was stressed,²¹ by giving a successful series of lectures on medieval music, published in 1946,²² and by publishing a small but influential book suggesting a new periodization of Czech Baroque music.²³ And he began, immediately after the war, to write for the Communist newspaper *Rovnost*. In short, of his generation he was the obvious choice to write a comprehensive history. This can be understood also if one thinks of the alternatives, such as Václav Čihák, who published a philosophy of music history in 1946:²⁴ Čihák's book, though based on a more interesting basic idea than Racek's, relating music as it does to systems of philosophy, is less well organized, is over-complex for the polemical purposes that any history of music at that time would have had to fulfil, and does not map easily onto Nejedlý's historical vision.

Racek published the first edition of his history, *Česká hudba*, in 1949. It is not quite in all respects what one might expect from a comprehensive national history: it ends before the National Revival, well before Smetana. This limitation corresponded to Racek's own interests and specializations. Furthermore, a monograph integrating the music history of the Czechs and the Slovaks might have seemed desirable for political reasons after the war (especially since František Zagiba had in 1943 produced a scholarly history of early music in Slovakia,²⁵ which emphasizes the Germanic affinities of the culture of the area and dismisses the Slavonic ones, as one might expect in a book published in Slovakia at that date). Against this — and no doubt this was a decisive consideration in the minds of those who thought along the same lines as Nejedlý — a thoroughly integrated Czech and Slovak

18 Zdeněk Nejedlý, address to Eighth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in *Sněm budovatelů: Protokol VIII. řádného sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa ve dnech 28.–31. března 1946*, Prague, n.d. [c. 1948], pp. 73–75.

19 Zdeněk Nejedlý, address to Ninth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, in *Protokol IX. řádného sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa v Praze 25.–29. května 1949*, Prague, 1949, pp. 321–30.

20 Vladimír Helfert, *Geschichte der Musik in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik*, Prague, 1936 (2nd, partly revised, edn, 1938), and *Histoire de la musique dans la République Tchèqueoslovaque*, Prague, 1936.

21 Published as Jan Racek, *Vlast a národ ve Smetanově hudebním dramatu (Smetanova Má vlast)*, Brno, 1939, 2nd edn as *Idea vlasti, národa a slávy v díle Bedřicha Smetany: skladby vokální a dramatické*, Prague, 1947.

22 Jan Racek, *Středověká hudba*, Brno, 1946.

23 Jan Racek, *Duch českého hudebního baroku: příspěvek ke slohové a vývojové problematice české hudby 17. a 18. století*, Brno, 1940. For listings of further works by Racek, see *Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brněnské university*, 14, 1965, F9, and *Bibliografie profesorů Jana Racka, Bohumíra Štědrone a Zdeňka Blažka: K jejich jubilejnímu roku 1985*, Brno, 1986.

24 Václav Čihák, *Filosofie dějin hudby*, Prague, 1946.

25 František Zagiba, *Dejiny slovenskej hudby od najstarších čias až do reformácie*, Bratislava, 1943.

history of music would have been bound to dilute the significance of the great historical landmarks (the Hussite period, the Battle of the White Mountain) as fully national experiences.

The chronological limitation is in some ways harder to understand. Racek excused it, but not entirely plausibly, by writing that he had intended the book as a supplement to Helfert's book on modern music. However, the first edition is headed 'Volume 1', which suggests that Racek may originally have intended to extend the chronology, although it is not clear how this might have been done. If he had really planned to use, or revise, Helfert's monograph as his second volume, a supplement on the nineteenth century would have been necessary for comprehensive coverage.²⁶ And there are other puzzling aspects of the book. For instance, in the preface to the second edition, he drops hints that the first edition had been intended as a polemic: 'The stimulus to the origin [of the first edition] was the urgent need at that time, after the Second World War, to provide information for foreigners about Czech musical culture, and particularly to correct some mistaken and false conceptions of Western music scholars and critics concerning the stylistic substance of historical Czech music.'²⁷

Clearly the book — which only ever appeared in Czech — has never effectively provided foreigners with information about Czech music, though it is possible that it was intended as a counter-blast to Rosa Newmarch's wartime monograph *The Music of Czechoslovakia*, and that Racek wished to criticize aspects of her book such as her stress on the Catholic fervour of the Czechs.²⁸ It is also possible that Racek was thinking, at the end of the war, that the first edition of his book might be translated for export as Helfert's had been in the 1930s; his interests were largely in Western European music, and indeed his first article was published in French.²⁹ Nevertheless, failing any further explanation, the sentence is hard to take at face value.

The omission of the modern period, however, also meant the avoidance of a potential clash with Nejedlý's views. Nejedlý's interpretation of Czech music after Smetana, though not crucial to his historiographical construction, was rather different from that of most other Czech scholars, and from those of the Brno circle in particular. Nejedlý was cool towards the music of Dvořák and, especially, Janáček; in an extended review of Janáček's *Jenůfa*, published in 1916 after its Prague première, he had already argued that Janáček was far less national a composer than Smetana, and that he had betrayed the nationalist cause.³⁰ Indeed his construction of a trinity of modern Czech composers comprised Smetana, Fibich and Ostrčil; and Racek, since the 1930s a specialist in the music of Janáček as well as in early music, was largely responsible for popularizing the alternative trinity of Smetana, Dvořák and Janáček.

26 Racek may still have intended, or hoped, to complete it in the 1950s: the limitation to 'Volume 1' is still included in the bibliography to Gracian Černušák, 'Racek, Jan' in Blom (ed.), *Grove's Dictionary of Music & Musicians* (see note 14 above), vol. 7, p. 4.

27 Racek, *Česká hudba* (1958 edn), p. 5.

28 Rosa Newmarch, *The Music of Czechoslovakia*, London, 1942. The Foreword was written by Edvard Beneš.

29 Jan Racek, 'Les Madrigaux à voix seule de Luzzasco Luzzaschi: Contribution à l'histoire de l'origine du style de la monodie italienne', *Revue musicale*, 13, 1932, pp. 11–23.

30 Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Leoše Janáčka Její pastorkyňa*, Prague, 1916. Coolness towards Janáček was shared in 1916 by Helfert, even though he was later to be thought of as having created a 'true Moravian school' of musicology; see *Bibliografie profesorů Jana Racka...* (see note 23 above), p. 5. And as for Dvořák, no notice need be taken of the persistent rumour that Nejedlý was antipathetic to the composer because he had been rebuffed when he sought to marry Dvořák's daughter.

Whatever the reason, the framework of the book remained as it was, effectively as a torso, and Racek chose, or was put under pressure, to leave it thus; it is evident that this framework was already serviceable for the new educational purposes that Nejedlý had in mind. But there are clear signs that the 1949 edition of Racek's book was not ideologically pure enough for the new situation. And indeed Racek had to be subjected to some re-education so that he could undertake the revisions, which (whatever he wrote in the preface to the new edition) are not simply a matter of removing traces of ephemeral polemics.

There are traces of the official reaction to the first edition of Racek's book in the comments made in a series of lectures at the Education Faculty of Prague University around 1949 by the musicologist Josef Plavec: these were mimeographed and published informally.³¹ Ostensibly the task was carried out as an act of *pietas* by a group of his students, who collated their notes from his lectures, and had him look them over before publication.³² One might suspect, however, that the real reason for the publication of this monograph was to alert all concerned to the dangers of ideological deviation and to provide authoritative interpretations of existing bibliography. It contains interesting and revealing annotations concerning most of the earlier literature; for example, Srb-Debrnov is summarily dismissed ('first book of its type, not scholarly, a haphazard collection of data without historical evaluation'), and Nejedlý's little book of 1904 is predictably praised as 'the principal handbook for study'. Racek's book is characterized by Plavec as a 'summary account with valuable pictorial supplements, although it adheres to Pekař's conservative conception of Czech history, with a one-sided apologia for the Baroque era; it underestimates the revolutionary contribution of Hussitism and the original artistic creativity of the Czechs; it is necessary to read it critically'.³³ The allusion to Pekař appears to be shorthand for Racek's references to Hussite song as sacred monophony and his failure to be sufficiently critical of the Baroque Church.³⁴

Moreover, shortly afterwards, a large and heavily ideological account of Czech music history was published by Igor Belza in Moscow.³⁵ Although the author knew Czech, this work must have depended on extensive information supplied by Czech contacts, no doubt including Nejedlý, and seems to have been intended to set out the parameters within which music history was now to be written in Czechoslovakia. It outlines the whole sweep of Czech 'classical music' history from the Middle Ages to the twentieth century, in the context of a general social and political history of the nation. Besides this it supplies a view, orthodox for the time, of the development of Marxism-Leninism in Czechoslovakia. And it gives a canon of Czech 'realist' writers (in the socialist sense) who had contributed to this development, all of whom are said to have followed the 'great, invincible ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin': Jiří Wolker, Stanislav Kostka Neumann, Josef Hora, Marie Majerová, Marie Pujmanová, Ivan Olbracht, Vladislav Vančura and Vítězslav Nezval (once the latter had been brought 'honestly to realize his errors, break away from his reactionary tendency and join the ranks of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia'). Within this canon, the single musicologist mentioned is Nejedlý:

31 Josef Plavec, *Dějiny české hudby*, 2 vols, Prague, n.d. [c. 1950].

32 Ibid., II, p. 105.

33 Ibid., I, p. 1.

34 At the Second Congress of Czechoslovak Historians, 5 October 1947, the Marxists' campaign to discredit the first-rate Positivist Pekař came to a head. A somewhat half-hearted attempt to find some good in Pekař is to be found in Jiřina Popelová, *Rozjímání o českých dějinách*, Prague, 1948.

35 Igor Belza, *Očerki razvitiia cheshskoi muzykal'noi klassiki*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1951.

The struggles of Czech musicians for an ideological, realist art in that period [the 1920s and subsequently], just as at present, were headed by Zdeněk Nejedlý. Here one ought to quote the words recently spoken about this prominent, erudite Communist by the President of the Czechoslovak People's Democratic Republic, Klement Gottwald: 'Zdeněk Nejedlý entered the camp of the working class as a socialist, not in discord with the fact that he loved Jirásek and Smetana, in no disagreement with the fact that he was a guardian of our history and culture, but precisely because he loved Jirásek, Smetana, Němcová, and preserved the heritage of the past; because he deeply understood the sense and logic of our history, and comprehended that the labouring class, together with all working people, should prove to be a new, fundamental strength of the nation, a preserver and continuer of all the very best that the nation had ever created.'

In these words are distinctly expressed the significance of the democratic tradition of the classical heritage for the formation of a progressive ideological attitude, for the construction of a new, socialist culture. Following the wise instructions of Lenin and Stalin, the Czech Communists have steadfastly and consistently preserved the classical heritage of the past from the destructive encroachments of bourgeois modernism and cosmopolitanism. And in this respect especially can be seen the great merits of Zdeněk Nejedlý, placing the pure springs of Smetana's works in opposition to the cloudy torrents of the musical deformities of the West that were flooding over bourgeois Czechoslovakia.

Boldly laying bare these deformities, Nejedlý has consistently advocated the realist position of the great Czech masters, remaining loyal to the precepts of Smetana and Dvořák and educating a new generation of young composers.³⁶

Although not part of this prestigious group, Racek is mentioned by name during Belza's discussion of Hussite hymns. Belza cites his monograph *Středověká hudba*, ostensibly deferring to his authority in order to dismiss the religious significance of this repertory:

The contemporary Czech historian and musicologist, Jan Racek, in the course of his lectures about medieval music which were given at the Arts Faculty of the University of Brno (Brno, 1946) underlines the fact that Čapek, in his short treatise dated 1417, speaks about the meaning of the hymn ['Ktož jsú boží bojovníci'] for the support of the warrior spirit of the army, for the raising of the morale of the soldiers [...]. It is extremely important to note in connection with this that many Hussite songs went far beyond the limits of religious content.³⁷

Belza here appears to be praising Racek's views; yet the passage might well have seemed just as alarming to Racek as Plavec's negative criticism, emphasizing as it does that the arbiters of the new orthodoxy were still regarding his interpretation as insufficiently 'Gollian' in Nejedlý's sense. In fact Belza's book illustrates the fact that attitudes and ideologies were hardening generally in the early 1950s; indeed this was true in the West as well as in Czechoslovakia, as is obvious from the riposte to Racek that appeared in West Germany in 1956, Rudolf Quoika's *Die Musik der Deutschen in Böhmen und Mähren*.³⁸ Quoika completely sidelines the importance of the early seventeenth century as an historical boundary, and interprets both the hymn of the Hussite period and Smetana as local Czech outgrowths from an essentially German root.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that Racek had to prove his reliability by writing a history of Russian music up to the October Revolution,³⁹ despite the fact that he had never previously published in the area and was not to do so again. This obliged him to read a

36 Ibid., pp. 499–500.

37 Ibid., pp. 46–47.

38 Rudolf Quoika, *Die Musik der Deutschen in Böhmen und Mähren*, Berlin, 1956.

39 Jan Racek, *Ruská hudba od nejstarších dob až po Velkou říjnovou revoluci*, Prague, 1953. The book seems likely to have been written before the appearance of Belza's monograph, since the Preface is dated 15 December 1951.

good deal of Soviet musicological literature (in his preface, he thanks Ludvík Kundera and Gracian Černušák for helping him to find his way through it). The publisher's blurb underlines the purpose which the book was intended to fulfil, both for its author and for its readers:

In every branch of our daily life there is beneficially apparent an increasing co-operation with the greatest socialist country of the world, the Soviet Union. A thorough acquaintance with the Soviet Union has become a personal maxim for each of us [...]. For this reason, Dr Jan Racek's book on Russian music is very timely. And it is also topical, because the musicologist Igor Belza has recently published in the Soviet Union his detailed account of the history of Czech music.

All the above may make it easy to see why Racek found it necessary, subsequently in the 1950s, to revise his monograph on Czech music history very thoroughly, to ensure its conformity with the current ideological requirements (which were in fact rather simple). Yet the layout and plan, even the sentence structure, of the book were substantially the same as they had been before; his method of revision, even for radical, ideological purposes, was a very conservative, cut-and-paste one — which might in any case have been inevitable, given the speed at which the task had to be accomplished. Each sentence of the book essentially remained in place, but was revised in detailed wording, with a systematic elimination of references to religion (even to the extent of frequent elimination of the word *duchovní* [spiritual] in reference to music), the addition at key points of the word 'revolutionary', the elimination of anything that might suggest discontinuity in the national tradition, and of any references to Germans and Germany other than as a foreign nation and country.

Racek's procedure in carrying out his revisions may be exemplified first by considering his account of the composer Jan Dismas Zelenka, in which his alterations are not very extensive. Zelenka was one of the most prominent composers of the post-White Mountain period, and the circumstances of his biography are rather more ambiguous than usual. He made his career 'in exile', according to the post-war Czech interpretation, writing church music for the Saxon court in Dresden. This court, unusually for German courts, was attestably in contact with Prague; Zelenka himself, like many other musicians from German courts even less in contact with Bohemia, is known to have visited Prague in 1723 for the coronation festivities of that year; he had contacts with the Jesuits, and compositions with Czech texts are attributed to him. In his 1949 discussion of Zelenka, Racek is already constructing an image of Zelenka's music as generally simpler in melodic character than other music from the German-speaking world, and by this token typically Czech. He ignores the fact that Zelenka is a composer of sacred music, and he is already suggesting that his work contributes towards Nejedlý's and Goll's vision of an unbroken line in Czech culture:

An outstanding representative of Czech Baroque music in the late seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth is *Jan Dismas Zelenka* (1679–1745), born at Louňovice in Bohemia [...].

The technical structure of his compositions resembles Bach's polyphony, but his melodic style and some of his onomatopoeic and coloristic effects are simpler and more folk-like [*prostší a lidovější*] than Bach's. In Zelenka's works we may also observe a deliberate attempt at simplifying the musical expression. We can see that the rich polyphonic texture of German music of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries disagreed with the Czechs, even at this climactic period of Baroque music. Continually we encounter the tendency to simplify accepted models and to accommodate them to Czech musical thought. Here once again there is manifested a more conservative spirit, linked rather with folk tradition than with the assertive progressive traits of European music. This conservatism, stemming largely from the

domestic folk tradition, did not manifest itself only as a retrospective element, but above all as one that maintained the continuity of Czech musical thought in an unbroken line even in the difficult post-White Mountain times, when artistic musical creativity was almost eradicated for good in the Bohemian Lands. Therefore all the inadequacies that appear in the formal, architectonic and compositional simplicity of seventeenth-century Czech composers are again counterbalanced by a far more lively, expressive and fresh melodic inspiration and a multifaceted rhythmic richness. In these elements of Czech musical thought we must also seek for the independent features of Czech musical culture even in this stylistic period. We may easily find this basic feature of the stylistic essence of Czech Baroque music particularly in the work of Zelenka.⁴⁰

It is instructive to compare this with the later version. Sentence by sentence the two versions correspond, yet small details alter the sense in significant ways. In 1949 he wrote of 'conservatism' and 'retrospective elements' as being part of Zelenka's equipment, and contrasts these with the 'assertive, progressive' traits of German and Italian music. But in 1958 these purely musical judgements had become ideologically inadmissible, because conflated with their political equivalents. Accordingly they are deleted and replaced with the politically positive term 'traditionalism', meaning a healthy regard for the freshness and unpretentiousness lacking in the stuffy music of the Baroque, but one that remains open to the revolutionary potential of folk music. The suggestion in the earlier version that the continuity of Czech culture was under threat during the 'darkness' is deleted. And, a small but telling detail, 'Louňovice' in the earlier version becomes 'Louňovice under Blaník' in the later, with an implicit appeal to patriotism, symbolized by Blaník.⁴¹

An outstanding representative of Czech music in the late seventeenth century and the first half of the eighteenth is indisputably *Jan Dismas Zelenka* (1679–1745), born at Louňovice under Blaník [...].

The technical structure of his compositions resembles Bach's polyphony and the Venetian school, but the melodic style and some of the onomatopoeic and richly developed coloristic effects are simpler and much more folk-like [*prostší a mnohem lidovější*] than Bach's. Hence in his compositions there can at times be heard a typically Czech, ardent, folk-like melody. Overall one can say that in Zelenka's works we may observe a deliberate attempt at simplifying the musical expression, for Zelenka was closely linked with the Czech milieu and with Czech folk composition [...]. Also in Zelenka's works we may assert that the rich polyphonic texture of German music of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was foreign to the Czechs. Continually we encounter the tendency to simplify accepted models and to accommodate them to Czech musical thought. This Czech traditionalism, stemming largely from the domestic tradition of folk music, manifested itself as an agent that maintained the continuity of Czech musical thought in an unbroken line even in the difficult post-White Mountain times. The ostensible inadequacies of a technical nature that appear in the compositional simplicity of seventeenth-century Czech composers in the light of the developed compositional technique of world music are, on the contrary, balanced by a far more lively, expressive and fresh folk melodic style, a multifaceted rhythmic sense and a richness of tuneful invention. In these elements of Czech musical thought we must also seek the independent features of Czech musical culture even in this stylistic period.⁴²

This procedure is typical of most of Racek's revisions. But a more radical approach was necessary in the section dealing with the hymns of the Hussite movement, as must already have been clear to Racek from Plavec's criticisms. The Hussite movement was absolutely central to Nejedlý's historiography; his attitude to it in the 1940s and 1950s is epitomized

40 Racek, *Česká hudba* (1949 edn), pp. 92–93.

41 In a modification of the Arthurian legend, an army of knights lay asleep inside the Blaník hill, waiting to defend Bohemia at its time of greatest need.

42 Racek, *Česká hudba* (1958 edn), pp. 110–11.

in the final remarks in the preface to the reissue of his study of Hussite hymn and song, which use it essentially as a pretext for topical agitprop:

Only one thing more — the wish that in the future too, always and in everything, we should recognize and fulfil the heritage of the Hussite revolution, and that, following its footprints, we should learn also to be what it was. Lo, here too — it began with unpretentious song, and finally the song ‘Ktož jsú boží bojovníci’ thundered across all Europe. May we too be thus!⁴³

The Hussite hymn ‘Ktož jsú boží bojovníci’ (Those Who Are the Warriors of God) had been quoted for symbolic reasons by Smetana in the spirit of nineteenth-century nationalism; the medieval accounts of its use, echoing ancient sources that speak of the miraculous effects of music, refer to its power to neutralize the fighting spirit of the enemy in battle. For Stalinists in the 1940s and early 1950s it became a key historical moment in the definition of national self-awareness as, ironically, it had done for the Czecho-Slovak legionaries in Russia towards the end of the First World War. Belza provides a typically colourful version of its significance, together with an indication of the reason for its central importance within the historical construction now required of Czech music:

This song, with an amazing power resounding later in the symphonic poem *Tábor* of Smetana and in other works by Czech classical composers, was sung not only by the warriors of Jan Žižka and Prokop the Great, but also by the Czech partisans and troops fighting against Hitler [...]. [It] may be characterized as a national anthem, a call to battle against the enemy. Such are many other hymns of the Táborites, prefiguring some of the features of the Lutheran chorale, called by Engels, as is well known, the ‘Marseillaise of the sixteenth century’. We are perfectly justified in saying, for this reason, that in Bohemia was born the ‘Marseillaise of the fifteenth century’, for this title completely corresponds to the revolutionary feeling which is undoubtedly manifested in the Hussite songs.⁴⁴

Now Racek had referred already in his *Středověká hudba* to the political significance of this song. He had written there of the function of Hussite song as a manifestation of anonymous, folk resistance to ‘aggressive Germanic expansionism’, and had referred to its modern as well as its medieval significance. Although his account differs from Nejedlý’s and Belza’s in its rhetoric, it does not do so significantly in substance:

The Hussite hymn [...] was in essence a powerful anonymous manifestation of folk creativity, springing from the collective folk Hussite movement. Hence its amazing melodic power, projected particularly in polemical and belligerent songs, of which ‘Ktož jsú boží bojovníci’ (first half of the fifteenth century) became the most expressive manifestation of warlike ardour and the anthem of the Hussite soldiery [...]. Finally, [...] the song ‘Ktož jsú boží bojovníci’ became a directly political and national theme in modern Czech music (Smetana).⁴⁵

The passage dealing with Hussite song in the first edition of *Česká hudba*, three years later, draws on this passage: Racek used the same cut-and-paste method of revision that we have already seen in action in his work, altering the first two sentences above to refer to the repertory as ‘a manifestation of anonymous folk musicality, which sprang up from the collective Hussite movement as a powerful and devastating strength of simple, but by that token more magnificent, melodic invention’.⁴⁶ The passage on the war songs, too, was

43 Nejedlý’s large-scale work on the history of Hussite hymn and song had first been published at the beginning of the century and was reissued at this time: Zdeněk Nejedlý, *Dějiny husitského zpěvu*, 6 vols, Prague, 1954, I, p. 13.

44 Belza, *Očerki razvitiia cheshskoi muzykal’noi klassiki*, pp. 45–46.

45 Racek, *Středověká hudba*, p. 7.

46 Racek, *Česká hudba* (1949 edn), p. 33.

directly based on a sentence from the earlier monograph, and mentions the 'powerful and intimidating "Ktož jsú, boží bojovníci"' as 'the most expressive phenomenon of belligerent enthusiasm and the anthem of the Hussite soldiery [...], from the point of view of form, [...] indisputably one of the technically most perfect songs that has come down to us from the Hussite period'.⁴⁷

This material was left more or less untouched in the later revision of *Česká hudba*, even though the 'underestimate [of] the revolutionary contribution of Hussitism and the original artistic creativity of the Czechs' that Plavec had criticized clearly required extensive revisions. Instead, in his 1958 edition of the section on Hussite hymn and song, Racek adopted another strategy, which had many imitators in musicological monographs in Czechoslovakia in subsequent years. He still drew on his cut-and-paste method, but in a slightly different sense, by inserting new supplementary material in several additional paragraphs. Their ideological slant is more extreme than that of the musical discussion that frames them, but this slant is not allowed in this instance materially to affect the constructions offered in the previous version; one might almost describe the paragraphs as instant detachable ideology.

The technique is worth observing in detail, and so the 1958 insertion into the discussion of Hussitism is reproduced below. The framing passages also found in the 1949 version are here shown in bold type, so that the method of revision is clear, although the exact wording of these passages in the earlier version is not reproduced here and differs in slight detail. Interpretative details that are either new to, or more strongly emphasized in, this version include the references to the 'Hussite revolutionary movement'; the interpretation of Hussitism in terms of pan-Slav and pro-Russian sentiment; and the anti-German, patriotic, nationally self-aware and revolutionary sentiment:

The strength of Czech creative thought was most powerfully manifested in the second period of its development, in the Hussite period, in the period of the Czech Reformation, when there takes place not only the greatest exertion of national awareness but also **a great expansion** of Czech folk creativity, which we may best observe in **Czech folk sacred song**. The Hussite revolutionary movement, which had far-reaching political consequences, met with a powerful reception and kindled numerous revolutionary movements in almost the whole of Central Europe. At the same time it is historically attested that the revolutionary Hussite movement attempted in the period of the first crisis of Czech feudalism to make links with the Slavonic East. The Hussites sent their people to Russia to find support there for their great reforming movement. So one may say that the consciousness of the Slav origin of the Czechs was powerfully reinforced in the Hussite period. At that time the Czechs counted themselves members of a great Slav family. This consciousness was also manifested publicly, in particular in the manifesto to the Czech regions in 1420. Finally, a fifteenth-century anonymous writer, in the *Krátké sebrání z kronik českých k výstraze věrných Čechův*, quite openly encourages the Czechs to engage in this Slav politics.

The revolutionary Hussite movement also intervened substantially in Czech cultural life, because never previously in Czech history, and perhaps never afterwards, do we meet with as powerful a popular uprising as precisely in the Hussite era. For the Hussite movement, which was the first manifestation of the great revolutionary strength of the Czech people, shattered the foundations of secular as well as ecclesiastical feudal power. At that time Czech feudal society experienced a serious internal crisis under the pressure of a powerful military intervention. This great change in social and political relationships, of course, also had a significant influence on the formation of medieval Czech culture, and it is reflected in all Czech art of the time, thus naturally also in music. Art and culture become accessible to broad strata of the people. Czech language and literature develop, using realistic and satirical

47 Racek, *Česká hudba* (1958 edn), pp. 36–37.

subject-matter. The knowledge and use of the Scriptures become general. Even the great opponent of the Hussites, Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini (later Pope Pius II), after his visit to Tábor in 1451 recognized the high level of education of the Czech people of the time.

Even if Czech medieval culture is an expression of medieval scholastic mysticism, above all the Hussite movement struck deeply into the dogma of the Roman Church and forced a confrontation between the two. Even the ruler ceased to be an absolute monarch as a consequence of the Hussite movement. This serious crisis of feudalism was the consequence not only of social conflicts in the outside world, but also of domestic conflict between the urban poor and the predominantly German patriciate. With this revolution we decisively anticipated the revolutions that took place only later in neighbouring states, and indeed a whole century later than in Bohemia. In this it is necessary to consider also the great historical significance of the revolutionary Hussite movement. The Hussite struggle was supported by powerful patriotic enthusiasm and by this means exerted a decisive influence on the further development of questions of nationality in the Bohemian Lands. Czech national self-consciousness was strengthened, which led also to an unprecedented reinforcement of Czech cultural self-reliance and linguistic purity. The struggle of the Czech people against secular and ecclesiastical feudalism, and also against social serfdom, lasted for almost the entire Middle Ages. The Hussite Wars, which were a patriotic war of the Czech peasants and people against the sovereign power of the hierarchy of the Holy Roman Emperor, the aristocracy and the German urban patriciate, rooted a revolutionary tradition in our nation which became the dominant motif of all the Czech struggles of liberation and of principled ideological action, and also in the field of culture.

This principled action is manifested particularly clearly in music, and specifically in Hussite hymn and polemical, political song. Hence we may explain the otherwise surprising fact that **at the time when European music concludes the great epoch of the *ars nova* and passes to the new stylistic area of Netherlandish polyphony, there is created in Bohemia under the powerful influence of the popular Hussite movement a new epoch of Hussite monophonic song: the Hussite sacred and polemical folk-song.**⁴⁸

A substantially different vision of the period is provided in the interpolation; and yet the original text proceeds almost unchanged, with all its original assumptions and prejudices, once the interpolation is past.

In summary, then, it may be said that the reconstruction of Czech music history along a particular type of Marxist lines was always very likely, given the dominance of Zdeněk Nejedlý in the field for a full generation before the Communists came to power after the war — a scholar and politician whose interpretations were forceful, politically serviceable, and scarcely avoidable by any scholar who wished to see findings in print. This reconstruction was put into effect in a process stretching over more than ten years after the war. During this time, Jan Racek (no doubt like others) gradually and increasingly placed himself at the disposal of an ideology whose rhetoric soon became more strident and triumphalist. The result was, most obviously, a music history with Nejedlý's own favourite Hussite period as a key turning point, interpreted in a way (again largely due to Nejedlý) which places music at a central position within cultural history as a whole; this is the characteristic twentieth-century Czechoslovak re-interpretation of the Romantic commonplace, concerning the innate musicality of the Bohemians, which I cited at the beginning of this chapter. It was also a music history in which Nejedlý's central age of darkness received a good deal of attention, partly because of Nejedlý's own Marxist interpretation of that period and partly because Racek was a Baroque specialist. This development opened the way to more than one generation of intensive research into the Czech Baroque in music — something that has placed an indelible stamp on Czech musicology.

48 Ibid., pp. 32–33.

35 Reflections of Ideological Values in the Standard Concise Dictionary of Czech (1937–52)

TOM DICKINS

Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the ‘ideological’ implications and directions of four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* (Dictionary of the Czech Language), spanning a period of fifteen years and embracing four radically different political systems, from the end of the Czechoslovak First Republic to the beginning of the Communist regime.¹ The dictionaries in question, henceforth generally referred to as Váša-Trávníček (1937), Váša-Trávníček (1941), Váša-Trávníček (1946) and Trávníček (1952), serve to illuminate a number of the prevailing linguistic referents relating to the cultural, socio-political and economic norms of the times. They also offer an insight into the existing (generally accepted or officially sanctioned) interpretations of the history of the Czech (and Slovak) people and provide an indication of the influences of state-controlled censorship and of self-censorship on the lexicographical process.

I show to what extent and in what ways lexicography portrayed the past and sought to reflect (and perhaps even to modulate people’s perceptions of) the changing realities of the period. A supplementary objective is to illuminate the role played by the lexicographers themselves and to consider their motives and the influence they brought to bear on the character and emphases of the different editions of the dictionary. The chapter thus focuses on areas of vocabulary broadly connected with the country’s evolution, with abstract ideas and concepts, with ‘philosophical’ and artistic trends and with a wide range of social and linguistic phenomena determined by political developments.

It is taken as axiomatic that all developed society is run according to a set of values and ideas that broadly constitute an ideology (or competing ideologies). Any study of ideological values will inevitably be tainted by the author’s own experiences and preconceptions and will always entail a degree of subjectivity. However, despite the difficulty of achieving an impartial analytical perspective, it is possible to make reasonably balanced deductions about the ideological implications of dictionary entries on the basis of detailed comparison with other editions of a dictionary and through reference to appropriate historical and political studies. It would also seem legitimate to include informed speculation, where circumstantial evidence and the influence of Váša and Trávníček’s personal views strongly indicate a particular interpretation.

This chapter does not seek to offer a definitive explanation of the term ‘ideology’ since, as Terry Eagleton observes in the opening line of his work, *Ideology: An Introduction*, ‘Nobody has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology’.² The

1 The dictionaries are: Pavel Váša and František Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1st edn, Prague, 1937, 2 vols, 1747 pp.; Pavel Váša and František Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1941, 1 vol., 1671 pp.; Pavel Váša and František Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 3rd edn, Prague, 1946, 1 vol., 1765 pp.; and František Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 4th edn, Prague, 1952, 1 vol., 1801 pp. The print-runs for the 1937, 1941, 1946 and 1952 editions of the dictionary were 20,000, 10,000, 10,000 and 50,750, respectively.

2 Terry Eagleton, *Ideology: An Introduction*, London and New York, 1991, p.1.

metalanguage employed in any explanation of 'ideology' will almost invariably include terminology whose meaning is in itself dependent on a series of unavoidably subjective cultural and socio-political presuppositions. Suffice it to say that any working definition should include at least some reference to the notion of ideas and values exerting a decisive influence on the character of a given society or on the judgements of an individual. This study will confine itself to the definitions proposed by three concise dictionaries: (1) (i) 'the system of ideas at the basis of an economic or political theory (*Marxist ideology*)', (ii) 'the manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual (*bourgeois ideology*)' (*The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English*, Oxford, 1995), (2) 'a body of ideas that reflects the beliefs of a nation, political system, class, etc.' (*Collins Concise Dictionary*, Glasgow, 1995), and (3) (out of deference to the dictionary under discussion): 'the science of ideas and of the "ideational" aspect of something, a series of conceptions, a way of thinking: Marxist, German [...] ideology', (*Slovník jazyka českého*, 1941, 1946 and 1952).³

The second, third and fourth editions of *Slovník jazyka českého*, revised by Trávníček, are broadly similar in terms of their overall content since they all draw heavily on the first edition of the dictionary. However, there are distinct ideological differences between the four editions (especially between the first and second editions, on the one hand, and between the third and fourth editions, on the other). The first edition of the dictionary has something of the character of an encyclopaedic dictionary (but without illustrations) and would appear to have been largely the work of Pavel Váša.⁴ The second, third and fourth editions have more in common with traditional concise dictionaries. All four dictionaries include lexical innovation in an attempt both to 'modernize' language and to reflect changing socio-political and ideological values. Váša-Trávníček (1941) illustrates the parameters of the Germans' lexicographical tolerance in the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, while Trávníček was able to demonstrate his commitment to Communism in 1952 through a combination of selective omission, the introduction of new terminology and the re-definition of a number of existing entries (which was deemed to be sufficiently in keeping with the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism to merit official approval).⁵ Whatever Trávníček's personal convictions, he did not at any time engage in such excessive censorship or indulge in so much propagandizing as to impair seriously the merits of the first edition.

Váša-Trávníček (1937) was the first concise Czech-Czech dictionary available to the wider public, thus representing a major contribution to corpus planning and to the systematization of usage.⁶ Although it is now dated and includes numerous idiosyncrasies, it has arguably only ever been surpassed by Váša-Trávníček (1946).⁷ When T. G. Masaryk

3 The division of ideology into 'Marxist' and 'bourgeois' is helpful, but it tends to obscure the existence of alternative ideologies, such as Nazism (referred to in the definition suggested by *Slovník jazyka českého*).

4 *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1937, is replete with proper names and foreign terms and includes a great many references to the Habsburg Monarchy and the National Revival. The input of Pavel Váša into *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1952, was not officially recognized at the time and legal proceedings were taken out against František Trávníček in the 1960s to win *de jure* recognition of Váša's contribution. Reluctance to give official credit to Pavel Váša, who was a committed Christian, might in part explain why there were no further editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* after 1952.

5 Trávníček was awarded the Klement Gottwald State Prize in 1948, at least partly in recognition of his political services, and he was rector of Brno University from 1948 to 1959.

6 The fact that the first edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* sold out within two years testifies to the level of popular demand for a concise dictionary.

7 The successor to *Slovník jazyka českého*, edited by Josef Filipec and František Daneš, *Slovník spisovné češtiny pro školu a veřejnost*, Prague, 1978, 799 pp., is somewhat more theoretical and

read of the forthcoming publication of Váša-Trávníček (1937) he was unambiguous in his enthusiasm: 'Today so many people preach about their love for the nation but, I ask you, what sort of unattractive and uneducated language do they use when they preach. They call it patriotism, and yet we do not even have a decent, practical dictionary of our own language. You have to speak Czech well before you can think well in Czech. A good dictionary of this sort will be of greater service to the nation than many of the so-called patriotic slogans'.⁸

Masaryk was undoubtedly right to highlight the importance of Váša-Trávníček (1937) in terms of standardizing lexical usage and increasing people's range of vocabulary. However, a cautionary note needs to be added about the extent to which any dictionary can enhance conceptual awareness. Dictionaries exert a limited influence on the way in which an individual manipulates or interprets language. Dictionary definitions may arguably contribute in a small measure to the user's perception of the world through reinforcing understanding of abstract meaning and by implying the relative status of an entry. Furthermore, dictionaries can help to develop and to extend the applications and semantic range of existing terminology and can even introduce new and unfamiliar terms to the user. However, since the function of dictionaries is primarily to reflect lexical change rather than to initiate it, they only make a minimal contribution to the task of re-educating the public and re-moulding national consciousness.

Dictionaries have a symbolic significance which extends well beyond their practical impact on linguistic behaviour. They carry an unparalleled (if somewhat questionable) authority which legitimizes lexical innovation and they serve as the main arbiter in all forms of metalinguistic discussion. The Czech Communists understood the role played by language in mediating socio-political and economic change and thus appreciated the value of codifying the new linguistic norms which they regarded as a defining and irreversible feature of socialist life. Trávníček cites 'the great Stalin' in his (predictably doctrinaire) foreword to the 1952 edition: 'The lexicon has changed in the sense that it has been supplemented by a considerable number of new words and phrases, which have arisen as a result of the emergence of new socialist production and the new state, new socialist culture, a new style of social life, a new morality, and finally as a result of a growth of technology and science. There has been a change in the meaning of a series of words and phrases which have assumed a new everlasting significance.'⁹

This study begins with a general introduction to lexicography and terminology processing and then offers a detailed overview of the content of each of the dictionaries. The remainder of the text provides an analysis of a range of individual lexical items and phrases, which are sub-divided into four categories: (i) pre-1918 history and the development of the Czechoslovak state, (ii) politics and contemporaneous society, (iii) neologisms, loan-words and other attributed terms and definitions, and (iv) religion, philosophy and the arts. Ideologically motivated omissions are accorded a similar status to politically inspired re-definitions and some attention is paid to other seemingly deliberate omissions, to apparent oversights and to a variety of barely explicable anomalies.

includes far more technical entries, but omits encyclopaedic references. For a useful brief summary of the main differences in approach, see David Short, *Czechoslovakia*, Oxford, Santa Barbara, CA and Denver, CO, 1986, p. 209. See also David Short's comprehensive review of *Slovník spisovné češtiny pro školu a veřejnost* in the *Slavonic and East European Review*, 58, 1980, 1, pp. 106–08.

8 Váša and Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1937, p. 1.

9 Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1952, pp. ix–x.

Comments on Lexicography and Terminology Processing

Lexicographers have traditionally relied on a number of (mainly written) canonical sources, including other dictionaries, language journals, translations and literary works to define the content of a new dictionary. In this respect Váša-Trávníček (1937) is typical. However, where a radical transition in society intervenes to disrupt the lexicographical process, dictionary writers may be obliged to re-define or omit existing terms and to extend the range of vocabulary available in order to conform with and to convey the new realities. Trávníček was faced with this situation on three separate occasions, in 1941, 1946 and, most notably, in 1952. After the Communist take-over in 1948, Trávníček sought to re-write *Slovník jazyka českého* in the spirit of Stalinism, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the influence of the Czechs' 'bourgeois' cultural and political heritage. Trávníček was clearly not responsible for determining the exact nature of the lexical changes but his interpretation of the new norms none the less contributed significantly to Czech language planning.

Robert Cooper summarizes the options open to linguists charged with the task of lexical innovation, as follows: 'When language planners choose to coin a new term rather than approve an existing one, they face two alternatives: (1) build the term from indigenous sources, either by (a) giving a new meaning to an existing word, (b) creating a term based on an indigenous root, or (c) translating a foreign term (creating a loan translation) or (2) borrow a word from a foreign language.'¹⁰ Trávníček (1952) includes a wide range of new terms based on indigenous sources and of Russian loan-words relating specifically to Soviet reality and to the political concepts of Marxism-Leninism. The user is made keenly aware of the new 'socialist' vocabulary, but is not necessarily fully apprised of all its implications. However good a dictionary may be, it can only shed limited light on new and unfamiliar concepts since the language used in dictionary definitions is inevitably somewhat self-referential and paraphrastic.

Dictionaries are primarily a source of lexical information and much less a sociological or linguistic tool. While they might serve to extend speakers' lexical range, they do not change or re-organize thought. As Ronald Wells points out, 'Arguments that a dictionary "shapes" the language, and the corollary notions that a dictionary sets or preserves a standard of usage, are relics from an age that fervently yearned for a rational cosmic order' — like the Marxist-Leninists.¹¹ Dictionaries such as *Slovník jazyka českého*, which are not based on a statistically viable corpus, do not even necessarily reflect with any degree of accuracy the linguistic norms of the day.

Semanticists and pragmaticists, in particular, have been keen to highlight the inaccuracies and the practical limitations of dictionary definitions. Saeed sums up the three major difficulties or 'challenges' associated with dictionary definitions as (i) the problem of circularity (the constraints imposed on the user by the linguistic system in which he or she operates), (ii) the question of exactness (establishing whether linguistic knowledge differs from general knowledge), and (iii) the role of context (the meaning of an utterance in a given situation).¹² Since dictionaries deal largely in abstractions (indeterminate words or phrases removed from the sentence as a whole), they cannot offer a precise semantic analysis of a lexeme.¹³ Most dictionary entries suggest the *potential* meaning of a word or

10 Robert L. Cooper, *Language Planning and Social Change*, New York, Port Chester, NY, Melbourne and Sydney, 1989, p. 151.

11 Ronald A. Wells, *Dictionaries and the Authoritarian Tradition*, The Hague and Paris, 1973, p. 119.

12 John I. Saeed, *Semantics*, Oxford, 1997, pp. 6–7.

13 See Howard Jackson, *Words and their Meaning*, New York, 1988, p. 126.

phrase in the system of language and inevitably ignore contextual meaning and the force of the utterance (that is, the speaker's intention).¹⁴ Naess has argued that dictionaries also avoid specific reference to the S-relation (semiotic relation) between the *definiendum* (the 'designation') and the *definiens* (the dictionary entry). In Naess's terminology the S-relation is 'the one usually referred to by saying that a designation "expresses" a concept' (except where the *definiendum* is conceived of as a class of objects, rather than as a single concept, for example *democracies* as opposed to *democracy*).¹⁵

Despite the factors which suggest the limitations of lexicography as a means of defining language, the content, structure and methodology of dictionaries do matter. Dictionary writers are in a unique position to establish a hierarchy of lexical items and to highlight the significance of socio-political concepts and historical events. Of paramount importance are the lexicographers' initial selection of entries, the wording and length of the definitions, the introduction of new definitions, the decision to attribute (or avoid attributing) a linguistic form or phrase to a public figure and the repetition of certain key terms. In the context of this study, the repeated references to *(státní) převrat v roce 1918* (the state coup in 1918, 'the establishment of the Czechoslovak Republic') in Váša-Trávníček (1937) and *v třídní společnosti* (in a class society) in Trávníček (1952) are especially significant.¹⁶ Other devices which may be employed to suggest the socio-political direction of the dictionary and the status of the various entries include parenthetical qualifications, italics, inverted commas and the capitalization of initial letters. Much of the 'ideological' content of a dictionary resides in the detail. Dictionaries may not offer the scope of a textbook or a political pamphlet to re-interpret past and present realities, but unlike other publications they are a constant source of reference and users tend to trust them implicitly.

All four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* manifest a number of methods for defining lexical items, of which the most important are probably the combinations of synonym and description, analysis and description, and synonym and analysis. Sager identifies seven discrete types of dictionary definition: definition by (i) analysis, (ii) synonyms, (iii) paraphrase, (iv) synthesis (identifying relations, or description), (v) implication (using the word in an explicative context), (vi) denotation (listing examples, by extension), and (vii) demonstration (ostensive definition).¹⁷ Váša and Trávníček make quite extensive use of

14 See, for example, Jenny Thomas, *Meaning in Interaction: An Introduction to Pragmatics*, London and New York, 1996, pp. 2–4, and V. N. Vološinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, translated by Ladislav Matějka and I. R. Titunik, Cambridge, MA and London, 1992, pp. 101–02.

15 In cases where the *definiendum* is conceived as a class of objects, 'The *definiens* may be some properties, and the S-relation may accordingly be a relation between a class of objects and certain properties of all the objects of that class'. See Arne Naess and associates, Jens A. Christophersen and Kjell Kvalø, *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity*, Oslo and Oxford, 1956, pp. 30–32.

16 Headwords, which are given in italics, appear in the order of the dictionary entries, where appropriate. Translations of headwords, if required, are given in brackets in roman and may be followed by the dictionary definitions in inverted commas. A definition in square brackets (within the round brackets) either denotes the use of round brackets in the original entry or my translation or clarification of a term where the Czech definition does not suggest an obvious equivalent or is unclear or where no explanation or description is offered in the original. Ellipses [...] are occasionally used to indicate the omission of a part of a definition which is not considered relevant in the context of this chapter. Where there is a loan-word from another language, the language appears in roman, followed by a colon.

17 Juan C. Sager, *A Practical Course in Terminology Processing*, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, PA, 1990, pp. 42–43.

definition by analysis, synonyms and synthesis and they also include paraphrase and implication, but they exclude altogether definition by denotation and demonstration.

Naess has considered the problem of defining one of the terms referred to in this study, namely 'democracy', and has reached the conclusion that the analyst cannot avoid appearing as a participant in the ideological debate. He argues that there are three broad categories of definition for a term such as 'democracy': (i) 'normative' (regulating usage within a certain intended field of application), (ii) 'descriptive' (describing usage, past or present, within a certain class of situations or persons), (iii) 'real' (giving a condensed characterization covering all *denotata* of the term).¹⁸ The definitions suggested in the majority of dictionaries, including *Slovník jazyka českého*, tend to belong to the descriptive category. However, Trávníček (1952), in accordance with Zhdanov's concept of 'revolutionary romanticism', occasionally opts for a normative definition: instead of relying on an established precedent to determine meaning, he focuses on the future use or interpretation of a designation (on reality as it should be and not as it is).

The differences between the methodological approaches of the four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* are on the whole marginal and generally reflect established lexicographical conventions rather than a coherent policy determined by ideological precepts. Hence, this chapter avoids detailed discussion of the theory of terminology processing and, instead, concentrates on those characteristics which serve both to distinguish one edition from the others and to suggest some of the prevailing values of society from the mid-1930s to the early 1950s.

Outline of the Content of Slovník jazyka českého

The first edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* (1937) has a strong cultural, literary and socio-political orientation, with a great many of the entries either referring or attributed to well-known Czech writers. Váša and Trávníček point out in their Introduction that they had actually found it necessary to reduce the 'cultural' content originally planned and, in particular, the number of references to proper nouns (especially names).¹⁹ The dictionary nevertheless suggests a long-established tradition in which language is the most profound expression of the nation's identity and, by extension, is a major justification for the creation of an independent state.²⁰ Váša-Trávníček (1937) includes numerous allusions to events in Czechoslovak history and tends to draw on examples relating to Czech realities (with comparatively little explicit reference to Slovakia). Not surprisingly, a special status is accorded to Masaryk and to the establishment of the Czechoslovak state in 1918, for example *28. říjen 1918 je mezníkem v čs. dějinách* (28 October 1918 is a turning-point in Czechoslovak history). The content suggests broad support for the (liberal democratic) values of the First Republic and implies a rejection of the Habsburg Monarchy through criticism of the upper classes and German hegemony, for example *aristokracie* ('governing body [against the monarchy (*sic*) and democracy]'), *demokracie* ('government of the

18 Naess, *Democracy, Ideology and Objectivity*, pp. 26–27.

19 Váša and Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, 1937, p. v.

20 Interestingly, Václav Havel implies in his play *Vyrozumění* (The Memorandum, 1965) that totalitarianism reduces language to a form of non-communication which serves to undermine the concept of individual and national identity. The play centres on a memorandum written in an artificial (bureaucratic and 'totalitarian') language called *ptydepe* which proves to be a directive for the dissolution of an entire programme called *ptydepe*. As Robert Pynsent has observed in *Questions of Identity: Czech and Slovak Ideas of Nationality and Personality*. London, New York and Budapest, 1994, p. 34, 'Since identity must always be communicated before it can exist in any meaningful sense, and since the most common form of communication is verbal, *ptydepe* might be called an expression of non-identity.'

people against the monarchy etc.’), *nadprávi* (precedence, ‘unjust claims by the Germans in old Austria’), *lid* (the people, ‘the non-aristocrats against the aristocracy’) and *obecný lid* (the common people, ‘ordinary people against the upper classes’).²¹ References to the First World War feature quite prominently, for example *setnina Nazdar* (‘Czech Company of the Foreign Legion during the Great War’) and *čs. zahraniční odboj (za světové války)* (Czech foreign resistance [during the Great War]). There are also several references, understandably rather non-committal in character, to the ‘German question’, for example *anschluss* (‘expression designating an attempt at or the possibility of annexing Austria to Germany’), *hakenkrajc* (German swastika, ‘symbol of the new German movement called *hakenkrajclerství*’), *národnost* (nationality, ‘nation, especially the part of a nation in a state where another nation has supremacy: the German “nation” in Czechoslovakia’) and *Třetí říše* (Third Reich, ‘Germany under Hitler’).

Much of the emphasis in the dictionary is on Czech ‘themes’, but it is not parochial. A significant number of the entries relate to foreign cultural, geographical and historical phenomena and the dictionary also includes dozens of loan-words and calques (usually from German, French, English, Italian or Russian, and sometimes courtesy of the Czechoslovak Legions). A high proportion of the ‘cultural’ allusions inevitably reflect the Czechs’ long-established links with Germany, for example *učil jsem se idiomu svých předků (o poněmčeném Čechovi)* (I learnt the idiom of my forebears [about a germanized Czech]), *kurs němčiny* (a course in German), *podřeknouti se němčinou* (to slip into German, ‘to switch to the language of one’s forebears and divulge that it is more common than Czech’) and *styky Čechů s Němci* (Czechs’ relations with the Germans).

Although Czech–German relations had been problematic prior to 1918, Masaryk had consistently opposed the Slavophil tendencies of many of his compatriots and had rejected the notion of Russian authoritarianism as a bulwark against German imperialism. Jacques Rupnik, amongst others, has been at pains to stress the Western ‘bourgeois’ orientation of the Czechs in the First Republic: ‘Czechoslovakia was, between the wars, the most unabashedly middle-class society, looking westwards in terms both of trade and of culture’.²² This may be partially confirmed by English terms such as *cash*, *Christian science*, *diehards* (‘name of the extreme right wing of the British Conservative Party, derived from the military slogan “die hard!”’), *hands off* and *homerule* and by French phrases such as *c’est la guerre* (‘war is war’), *Dieu et mon droit* (‘God and my right, the slogan of British kings’), *enfant terrible* and *fait accompli*, none of which, incidentally, appears in later editions of the dictionary.

However, Váša-Trávníček (1937) also includes innumerable references to the Czechoslovak legionaries in Russia, for example *legionáři prošli celou Sibiří* (the Czechoslovak legionaries made their way across the whole of Siberia), *udýchaný (dobrovolník)* (‘volunteer who joined the Russian Legions only in 1918’) and *upocený / upocenec* (‘volunteer who joined the Legions only at the time of their departure from Russia’) and several allusions to Soviet Communism, for example *eser* (plural *eseři*) (‘Russian Socialist Revolutionaries [now in emigration]’) and *kulak* (‘smallholders and enemies [*sic*] of the Soviets’). The definitions in entries relating to the Soviet Union are characterized by an understated neutrality and are as disengaged as to give virtually no intimation of the terror of Stalinism. By the mid-1930s the Czechs were again primarily preoccupied with the Germans and were little inclined to reflect on the shortcomings of lands populated largely by fellow Slavs.

21 Until the First World War Masaryk had believed that it might still be possible to achieve a satisfactory compromise ensuring the Czechs autonomy within Austria; see, for example, J. W. Bruegel, *Czechoslovakia Before Munich*, Cambridge, 1973, p. 7.

22 Jacques Rupnik, *The Other Europe*, London, 1989, p. 16.

Terms connected with philosophy, the arts and religion appear in large numbers in Váša-Trávníček (1937). There are a great many references to the Christian faith, in particular expressions and quotations from the Bible. The compilers include several references to Judaism and to the changing perceptions of the Jews amongst German speakers in the mid-to late 1930s, for example *asemitismus* ('movement with the aim of defending Christian people against Semitic influence; a more moderate form of antisemitism') and *Nearijec* (Non-Aryan, 'according to today's conception often a Semite, Jew'). All four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* are weak on definitions of a more theoretical nature (for example, linguistic, technological terminology). Furthermore, economic issues are not addressed in great detail in any edition of the dictionary, although reference is made to some of the most successful Czech and German firms, for example AEG, Agfa, Baťa and Včela (1937, 1941 and 1946 editions), and to a number of capitalist concepts, for example *merkantilismus* ('economic view that precious metals, production and trade are the main source of prosperity') and *taylorismus* ('American work system [devised by the American engineer Taylor]') (all editions).

Váša-Trávníček (1941) is important primarily for three reasons: (i) because the decision to publish the dictionary under the German Protectorate lent an official seal of legitimacy to the Czech language, (ii) because of the light which the dictionary sheds on the limits of cultural tolerance at this time, and (iii) because the dictionary largely defined the content of Váša-Trávníček (1946) and strongly influenced Trávníček (1952). Váša-Trávníček (1941) did not serve any overtly propagandistic purposes since it explicitly avoided allusions to the structures, concepts and slogans of Nazism and, indeed, contained hardly any entries which identified it as the product of the Occupation.²³

To Trávníček's credit, he does not appear to have made too many unnecessary compromises with the censors in 1941. He was able to take advantage of the fact that Nazism was not underpinned by such a coherent or rigid ideology as, say, Soviet Communism. Váša-Trávníček (1941) was the only edition of the dictionary to merit a review in any of the serious linguistic journals and the reviewer, Mathesius, chose to lay particular stress on the contribution made by dictionaries to the nation's linguistic heritage. The review describes the dictionary as 'a significant achievement for our language culture', and praises both Váša for the core material which he had gathered over a period of twenty years and Trávníček for his more recent involvement.²⁴

The German censors or their Czech lackeys seem to have taken the pragmatic view that, although a new edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* might not significantly help to further their cause, it would at least 'set the record straight' by deleting a number of potentially problematic entries from the first edition. The vast majority of references to famous people is thus removed (except where the names are used adjectivally or as part of an abstract noun), so too are numerous details which might be taken to represent Czechoslovak history as a process of liberation from the Germans. Váša-Trávníček (1941) also seeks to minimize the extent of the links between the Czechs and the Russians by excluding specific reference to the Czecho-Slovak Legions and their role in the First World War. Although the second edition of the dictionary was completed by February 1941 (about four months before the German invasion of the USSR), it still conveys some of the prevailing anti-Soviet sentiments (which reflected Hitler's own long-held hostility to the Soviet Union). Compare, for example, the definitions of *bolševik*: ('derived from 'bolšij' = greater; Bolsheviks was the name for the supporters of the former Russian Social-Democratic Party opposed to the Mensheviks, the minority'), Váša-Trávníček (1937);

23 There are no references to any Nazi terminology or to imposed social and political norms.

24 Bohumil Mathesius, 'Slovník jazyka českého', *Slovo a slovesnost*, 7, 1941, p. 168.

(‘member of Russian extremist Communist Party; from ‘bolšij’ = greater, the majority’), Váša-Trávníček (1941, 1946).²⁵

Váša-Trávníček (1946) again omits nearly all reference to specific individuals and to their biographical details, and appears at least partially to acknowledge the validity of the reassessment of the past in Váša-Trávníček (1941). There are very few references to the Czecho-Slovak legionaries and the First Republic is almost entirely ignored, thereby suggesting Trávníček’s personal rejection of the values and the legacy of the ‘bourgeois’ state. Amongst the most glaring omissions are references to Masaryk himself, such as *masarykovský duch* (the spirit of Masaryk) and to the foundation of the state, for example *washingtonská deklarace* (Washington Declaration, ‘proclamation of Czechoslovak independence on 18/10/1918’) (the examples cited here are from the 1937 edition).

It is possible that some of the omissions from the third edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* were simply oversights, since Trávníček must have been under considerable pressure to finish his revisions of the dictionary by the summer of 1946. However, there appears to be too consistent a pattern to the themes excluded from Váša-Trávníček (1946) for it to be pure chance. Trávníček managed to find time to attribute sources for a wide range of new entries not acknowledged in the previous edition of the dictionary and he specifically highlights in his Foreword the importance and scope of the changes which he had been able to incorporate.²⁶ It would seem very strange that terms relating to the period of German rule, such as *háčovština* (‘Hácha’s policies, especially humiliating the weak’), *henleinovec* (‘supporter of the “Hitlerite” policies of Henlein’) and, indeed, *nacismus* (‘German National Socialism’), should take precedence over entries celebrating the creation of an independent Czechoslovak state, unless the selection of material was in some way ideologically motivated. On the face of it, post-war Czechoslovakia was a parliamentary democracy, but it had very strong socialist leanings and many people felt a profound sense of disillusion with the British and French for their complicity in the Munich Agreement, which paved the way for the Occupation.²⁷ Those Czechs who had expressed pro-Russian sympathies in the First Republic felt that their views had been vindicated.

25 It seems unlikely that Trávníček, who was known for his left-wing sympathies, would have described the Bolsheviks as ‘extremist’ had he not felt under an obligation to do so. The fact that the same definition is retained in Váša-Trávníček (1946) would appear to have been an oversight rather than proof that Trávníček underwent a last-minute conversion to Soviet-style socialism in the late 1940s.

26 Váša-Trávníček (1946) contains all the entries attributed to public figures in Váša-Trávníček (1941) and around thirty additional sources not included in the second edition of the dictionary. Amongst the names acknowledged in the 1946 edition of *Slovník jazyka českého*, but not the 1941 edition, are Pavel Eisner, Egon Hostovský, Karel Hynek Mácha, Václav Řezáč and Edvard Valenta, of whom only Hostovský appears in Váša-Trávníček (1937). Public figures acknowledged by Váša-Trávníček (1946) but omitted in the fourth edition of the dictionary include the economist K. Engliš, the philosophers J. L. Fischer and Josef K. Kratochvíl, the liberal politician and first prime minister Karel Kramář and the historian František Šembera.

27 Only parties approved by the National Front (the Czechoslovak Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party, the National Socialist Party, the (Catholic) People’s Party, and the Slovak Communist Party [KSS], the Slovak Social Democratic (or Labour) Party [SSD], the Slovak Democratic Party [SDP] and the Slovak Freedom Party [SSS]) were allowed to put up candidates in the May 1946 elections. The Communists achieved 37.94 per cent of the total vote in Czechoslovakia, 40.7 per cent of the vote in Bohemia and Moravia, and 30.48 per cent in Slovakia. See, for example, Victor S. Mamatey and Radomír Luža (eds), *A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918–1948*, Princeton, NJ, 1973, pp. 404–05.

After the Communist seizure of power in February 1948 Trávníček clearly found it expedient to persist with a number of the policies adopted in 1941 and 1946, such as the decision to omit any proper names relating to people. The inclusion of biographical information in *Slovník jazyka českého* (1952), especially where people were still living, would have posed editorial problems and may even have entailed an element of risk for the author. At the time of the publication of the fourth edition of the dictionary the highest ranks of the Communist Party, including the Deputy Prime Minister, Rudolf Slánský, were in the process of being purged. Of the list of public figures acknowledged as sources on pages XIII to XV of Trávníček (1952) none appears to have been a major victim of the purges, although Marie Švermová, wife of Jan Šverma, one of the leaders of the Slovak National Uprising in 1944, was expelled from the Party in 1951 and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1954.²⁸

The final edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* testifies both to the victory of Soviet-style socialism and, perhaps paradoxically, to the limitations of ideologically motivated lexicographical reforms, especially when they are based on existing editions of an established dictionary. Trávníček (1952) contains sufficient lexical innovation to identify it as the product of a radically different political system. Yet, in order to reflect more accurately the official interpretation of history and the imposed values of his day, Trávníček would have needed to abandon earlier editions of the dictionary altogether and embark on a new and ambitious scheme, more along the lines of *Slovník spisovného jazyka českého* (Dictionary of the Czech Literary Language) (1960–71) or *Slovník spisovné češtiny pro školu a veřejnost* (Dictionary of Literary Czech for Schools and the General Public) (1978).

In his Foreword to the dictionary Trávníček asks his users to decide for themselves how successfully he has demonstrated Stalin's words that 'language makes it possible to change a person's views'.²⁹ Any analysis of Trávníček (1952) would have to conclude that the author fails to produce a dictionary which embraces the new lexical norms enthusiastically enough to indicate an unequivocal commitment to the goal of re-interpreting reality. For all Trávníček's omissions, attempted re-definitions and new entries, the 1952 edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* still owes far more to the earlier editions of the dictionary than it does to the engaged rhetoric and emotive clichés of Stalinism.

Granted, there are a few purely propagandistic entries, such as *šlingovština* ('the methods of work and conduct of Otto Šling, an enemy and betrayer of socialism'), *titovština* ('Tito's policies in Yugoslavia in the service of imperialism') and *trumanovec* ('supporter of the imperialist policies of the American President Truman'). Trávníček likewise proposes a number of uncharacteristically crude and unscholarly definitions, for example *mnichovák* ('person agreeing with the bourgeois policies of the First Republic, which led to Munich and to the extinction of the Czechoslovak Republic'), *Panevropa* = '*Všeevropa*' (pan-Europe, 'imperialist struggles directed against the Soviet Union') or *sionismus* ('reactionary Jewish attempts to set up a bourgeois state in Palestine'). Furthermore, he clearly curries official favour by acknowledging eminent Communists such as Gottwald, Zápotocký and Stalin. Amongst the most striking 'Gottwaldisms' are

28 For a comprehensive account of the show trials, see Jiří Pelikán (ed.), *The Czechoslovak Political Trials, 1950–1954*, London, 1971. The leading ideologues acknowledged by Trávníček are Klement Gottwald (Chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, 1929–53), Václav Kopecký (Minister of Information, 1945–53), Zdeněk Nejedlý (Minister of Education, Science and Art, 1948–53), Ladislav Štoll (Deputy Minister of Education, 1952–53), Jiří Taufer (Deputy Minister of Information, 1950–53) and Antonín Zápotocký (Minister President, 1948–53).

29 Trávníček, *Slovník jazyka českého*, p. X.

dalekosáhlost ([political] adventurism), *kanónenfutr* (cannon-fodder, 'soldiers sacrificed for the class interests of the ruling exploitative class'), *lihobaron* ('capitalist in the distilling business') and *pažravý americký imperialismus* (voracious American imperialism), while quotations from and references to the Soviet leader include *národ* (nation, Stalin: 'commonality of language and culture, and also territory and mental disposition, which has arisen historically, manifesting itself in commonality of culture'), *praporečník míru* (standard-bearer of peace [about Stalin]) and *přeskok z jedné kvality do druhé* (Stalin: a leap from one standard of quality to another). Nevertheless, however eye-catching these distortions and idiosyncrasies may be, they are not indicative of the tone or content of the dictionary as a whole.

What is most noteworthy about Trávníček (1952) is not the degree of ideological conformity demonstrated, but the extent to which the dictionary appears to uphold many of the established norms of the First Republic. At a time when Christians were undergoing severe persecution Trávníček retained nearly all the religious references, including several which might have been regarded by the Communists as peripheral or ideologically unsound, such as *desátek* = *deset Otčenášů* (Ten Lord's Prayers), *kniha knih* = *bible* (the book of books = the Bible), *přísahati při živém Bohu* (to swear by the living God), *z mrtvých vstalý Kristus* (Christ resurrected from the dead) and *vtělení Pána Ježíše* (the Incarnation of Jesus). Similarly, he persisted with a great many foreign terms, including anomalous English phrases such as *all right*, *five o'clock tea*, *lawn-tennis* and *selfmademan*, and with most of the entries attributed to Masaryk, including *obrazopocta* ('veneration of icons') and *odvoj* ('dénouement, development'), which first appeared in Váša-Trávníček (1946). He also retained numerous apparently anachronistic terms, such as *kolčakovština* ('the machinations of the Siberian [White] Army of Admiral Kolchak') and *kornilovec* ('volunteer, soldier in Kornilov's Russian army during the First World War' [Kornilov = co-founder of the anti-Bolshevik Volunteer Army]). Both these terms, together with the noun *kerenština* ('conduct in the spirit of Kerenski, a toady of the bourgeoisie'), which is only found in the fourth edition, served primarily to condemn class treachery.

The user of Trávníček (1952) is left with the distinct impression that Trávníček's grasp of revolutionary detail was somewhat patchy and that his commitment to change was not matched by a willingness to subject the lexicographical process to the same ideological strictures that he theoretically endorsed for society at large. Several of the references suggest only partial familiarity with the Soviet line, for example *bakuninismus* ('the revolutionary teachings of the Russian Bakunin') and *zoščenkovština* ('direction of literary art in the spirit of the Soviet writer Zoshchenko, distorting Soviet reality') —Bakunin had rejected Marxist solutions and Zoshchenko's work had been roundly condemned by the Soviet cultural establishment in 1946.

Pre-1918 History and the Development of the Czechoslovak State

Váša-Trávníček (1937) is replete with references to Czech history and especially to the emergence of a radical intellectual opposition in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Understandably, particular importance is attached to the Allies' recognition of the Czechoslovak National Council on 18 October 1918 and to the foundation of the independent Czechoslovak Republic ten days later.

Several of the key figures of the National Revival are mentioned in Váša-Trávníček (1937), for example Josef Dobrovský (1753–1829) described by Masaryk as *rytíř ducha* (knight of the spirit, 'outstanding thinker and scholar'), Josef Jungmann (1773–1847) and Jan Kollár (1793–1852), but others who might have been expected to appear in the second volume are omitted (except as sources), for example Pavel Josef Šafařík (1790–1861) and František Palacký (1798–1876). Váša-Trávníček (1937) also includes entries relating to

important patriotic organizations founded from the 1860s to the 1890s, such as the *Sokol* (Falcon, 'Sokol gymnastic organization; counterpoint to the German *Turnverein*'), *Orel* (Eagle, 'Catholic gymnastic association'), *Umělecká beseda* ('Guild of Arts, society in Prague'), *Ústřední matice školská* (Central Education Foundation, 'association aimed at equipping and supporting Czech schools, as against *Deutscher Schulverein*') or to their adherents, for example *slávista* ('member of the Prague literary society Slávie in the 1890s'). There are similarly references to journals and newspapers associated with nationalist aspirations, for example *Čas* (Time) and *Rozhledy* (Review). Both the progressive movement *Repeal* (Repeal Club, 'Prague radical association of 1848') and its adversaries, *sedmašedesátník* (a sixty-sevener, 'one of the sixty-seven opponents of the Prague revolution in 1848; symbol of reaction') merit inclusion, as does the invented grouping of young patriotic and socialist revolutionaries *Omladina* ('Prague progressive movement of the 1890s'). Two of the more radical German groups are also mentioned indirectly: *lasalák* ('member of a workers' physical education association named after Ferdinand Lassalle') and *spartakovec* ('supporter of radical socialism in Germany'). The policy of German eastward expansion is likewise acknowledged: *německý* [German] *Drang nach Osten* (omitted in all subsequent editions). However, there is no space in Váša-Trávníček (1937) for the vast majority of state institutions and organizations, such as the *Reichsrat*.³⁰

Many of the other phrases relating to Austria-Hungary do not suggest obvious ideological orientation, but their inclusion in *Slovník jazyka českého* (1937) is significant since it testifies to the lexicographers' enduring interest in this period of Czech national development. Typical are entries such as *austrofil* ('supporter of Austria and its policies'), *austroslavismus* ('Slav consciousness within the framework of the old Austrian Empire'), *Mladočech* (Young Czech, 'name of Czech liberals before the [1918] coup'), and *Staročech* (Old Czech, 'member of the Czech Conservative Party before the [1918] coup'). Expressions of a more light-hearted nature include *černožlutý* (black-yellow = 'fabricated in an Austrian [kind of] way [pejorative]') and *trojchlup, trojchlupý Bismarck* (three-haired Bismarck, 'humorous; he was caricatured as having three hairs on his head').

The First World War and the subsequent formation of the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, France and Italy also produced a rich source of new terms, such as *Červená věž* (Red Tower, 'hill in High Tatras, during the Great War = Viennese political prison'), *Čtyřdohoda/pakt Čtyř* (Four-Power Pact, 'War alliance between Britain, France, Russia and Italy'), *Čtyřspolek* (Central Powers, 'union of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey during the Great War') and *Ma(f)fie* ('secret Czechoslovak anti-Austrian association in the Great War'). Váša-Trávníček (1937) includes reference both to the creation in 1916 of the first foreign military unit, *Česká družina* (Czech Corps, 'the first detachment of the Czecho-Slovak Legions, the first regiment in the Russian army in the Great War') and to the Siberian anabasis, *sibiřská anabase* ('the march of our "Russian" Legions through Siberia'). These entries, which were amongst the most enduring of the terms relating to the legionaries, were deemed to be of sufficient historical importance to be retained by Trávníček in 1946 and 1952.

The first edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* contains several more specific references to the legionaries who served in Russia and a surprising array of Russianisms which consequently found their way into the Czech language. The majority of these entries relate directly to military themes, for example *bitva u Bachmače* (Battle of Bakhmach, 'famous from the Siberian anabasis'), *Čeljabinsk* (Cheliabinsk, 'town in Russia, famous from the

30 The best general study of this period of Czech history is Elizabeth Wiskemann, *Czechs and Germans: A Study of the Struggle in the Historic Provinces of Bohemia and Moravia*, London, Melbourne and Toronto, 1967.

history of the Russian legions'), *čin* (rank), *denščík* (military messenger), *hodit pod kozírek* (to throw under the peak of a military cap = 'to pay homage (legionary [term])'), *ČOL* (Czecho-Slovak legionary community), *nábor: u rus. legion. = získávání do legií* (amongst legionaries in Russia = recruitment to the Legions), *okop* (= *zákop*) (trench), *rozvědčík* ('member of reconnaissance patrol'), *štyk* ('bayonet') and *vzvod* ('military detachment'). However, there are also a number of Russian loan-words reflecting everyday usage and realities, for example *morda* ('vulgar = mouth, gob'), *odprávka* ('dispatching of trains'), *otpusk* ('holiday') and *žulík* ('intrusive person, scoundrel'). Two even quainter Russian borrowings (albeit not specifically identified as 'legionisms') are *charašo* ([stressed on -*šo*] 'fine, good, well') and *pašol* ([stressed on -*šol*] 'shove off'). The Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia were so well organized that they produced their own magazines, *Čechoslovan* ('defunct journal of the Russian Czechs') and *Houpačky* (Swings, 'humorous and satirical journal of the Russian legionaries'), which are not referred to in Trávníček (1952).³¹

Entries relating to Russian and Soviet history are fairly common in Váša-Trávníček (1937) and are, generally speaking, neutral in tone. There are, however, a few exceptions, such as the references to *černosotěmec* ('member of the Black Hundred = anti-revolutionary groups in Russia [active 1905–7], retrograde, reactionary'), which implied clear criticism of the excesses of tsarism, and to Viktor Mikhailovich Chernov ('[born 1878] Russian revolutionary' [purged in 1934 for Trotskyist sympathies]) or *kadět* ('cadet, supporter of Milyukov's [pro-Tsarist] Constitutional Democratic Party'). The organizations *Črezvyčajka* ('Commission in Soviet Russia for the elimination of anti-revolution') and its immediate successor *GPU* ('Soviet [State] Political Administration') are also mentioned, as are such disparate terms as *stachanovec* (Stakhanovite, 'worker in Russia achieving outstanding efficiency') and *Christos vokres ... voistinu voskres* (Russian: Christ has risen ... he has risen indeed).

Váša-Trávníček (1937) is the only Czech-Czech dictionary so far published which seeks to do any justice to the foundation of the Czechoslovak state or to shed any real light on the First Republic.³² The crucial concept of (*státní*) *převrat* (state coup) is repeated on numerous occasions and relates specifically in Váša-Trávníček (1937 edition only) to the 1918 overthrow. It also gives rise to the related adjectival forms *dopřevratový* (pre-1918 overthrow), under the entry *Prešpurk* ('pre-[1918] coup name of Bratislava'), and *popřevratový* ('post-1918 coup'), both as a separate entry and as the prepositional phrase *po převratě*, for example under *Nebojsa* ([Slovak] 'the name of a Czech loose-leaf journal after the 1918 coup') and *Masarykovo Athenaeum* (Masaryk's *Athenaeum*, 're-established for a time after the [1918] coup') (also in the 1941 and 1946 editions, but without reference to the coup).

References to Masaryk and to associations and concepts associated with his name are commonplace in Váša-Trávníček (1937), for example *Ideály humanitní* (*Masarykův spis*) (Humanitist Ideals [Masaryk's work]) (also in the 1941 and 1946 editions), *Masarykova akademie práce* (Masaryk Work Academy), *Masarykova letecká liga* (Masaryk Flying League), *ujasnit si své názory* (*oblíbený výraz Masarykův*) (to clarify one's thoughts [a

31 Estimates of the numbers serving in the Legions generally vary from 40,000 to 60,000. For an authoritative account of the Czecho-Slovak Legions in Russia, see John Silverlight, *The Victors' Dilemma: Allied Intervention in the Russian Civil War*, London, 1970.

32 According to Josef Kalvoda, *Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy*, Washington, DC, 1978, p. 3, the Czechoslovak Communist Party took a consistently negative stand towards the First Republic until 1935 when it applauded the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty of Alliance. The negative attitude was quickly re-asserted and was maintained after the Communist seizure of power in 1948.

favourite phrase of Masaryk's]) (also in other editions, but without any mention of Masaryk) and *Hrad* (Prague Castle, 'transferred meaning = President Masaryk, minister Beneš and their closest circle').³³ Váša-Trávníček (1937) captures Masaryk's belief in the beneficial concept of the democratic state, which also informs later editions of *Slovník jazyka českého*; see, for example, *loyálnost ke státu* (loyalty to the state), and *astatismus* ('opposition to the state establishment, statelessness, the opposite of *étatisme* [according to Masaryk]'). Both Masaryk and Beneš took the view that the Czechs and Slovaks constituted a single Czechoslovak nation, as reflected in the terms *Čechoslovák* ('1. today the official collective name for the Bohemians, Moravians, Silesians and Slovaks; before the Great War it also meant Czech; 2. in general a citizen of the Czechoslovak state, including Germans et al.') and *Čechoslovan* ('older name = Czech, Czechoslovak') (omitted for obvious reasons in the 1941 edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* and re-defined in the 1952 edition as an 'older concept').

Beneš's main concern was to safeguard Czechoslovak independence and national security and, for that reason, he placed great faith in the League of Nations, *Společnost národů*, (a term only included in the 1937 edition of the dictionary) and in alliances such as *Malá dohoda* (Little Entente, 'Czechoslovak-Yugoslav-Romanian alliance' [1920–38]) (understandably omitted from the 1941 edition).³⁴ Alliances also featured prominently in domestic politics. There were a series of coalitions suggesting a strong sense of common purpose, which is reflected in Váša-Trávníček (1937), for example, *české koalované strany = sdružené k podpoře vlády* (Czech coalition parties = affiliated in support of the government) (not referred to explicitly in later editions of the dictionary). The reference to *Pětka* ('the group of five representatives of the ruling parties') is predictably confined to Váša-Trávníček (1937) but, strangely, the notion *rudozelená koalice vládní* (Red-Green government coalition), based on the cooperation of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats, the Czech National Socials, the Czech Agrarians and the Slovak parliamentary parties, is not mentioned until the 1941 edition.

The most remarkable aspect of Váša-Trávníček (1941) is how unexceptional and unexceptionable it is. The overwhelming majority of entries was spared from censorship, including most of the references to Austria-Hungary. However, the derogatory term *kaizerismus* ('direction in German politics agreeing with Kaiser Wilhelm'), was deleted, as were virtually all allusions to the First World War. There is likewise no explicit reference to the Czecho-Slovak Legions, for example the Czech Corps or the Battle of Bakhmach. (Many of the legionaries had as a consequence of their anti-German sentiments had their pension rights removed in the Protectorate.) The definition of *legie* ('voluntary forces') is acceptable as far as it goes, but it gives no indication of the specific connotations of the term in a Czech context. The entry *odboj* (resistance, 'rebellion, uprising, revolutionary activities') is likewise no longer identified with the Legions, and several other phrases are similarly re-defined, for example *udýchaný (dobrovolník)* ('[a volunteer] who signs up very late') (the obfuscation of the historical context and the use of the present tense of the verb suggest a universality of meaning which *udýchaný* did not originally connote). While most of the Russianisms associated with the legionaries are retained in Váša-Trávníček

33 For information on some of the more culturally and socially orientated organizations, see, for example, Norman Stone and Eduard Strouhal (eds), *Czechoslovakia: Crossroads and Crises, 1918–88*, Basingstoke and London, 1989.

34 For further details about Beneš and the League of Nations see, for example, William V. Wallace, *Czechoslovakia*, London and Tonbridge, 1976, pp. 159–61. R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Czechs and Slovaks*, London, New York and Melbourne, 1943, p. 339, defined the three aims of the Triple Entente as 'to prevent Habsburg restoration, to prevent territorial revision in favour of Hungary, and to prevent the Anschluss of Austria to the Reich'.

(1941), their origins are not explained. No definition is proposed for *Trojdohoda*, (compare Váša-Trávníček (1937): 'pre-war Triple Entente between France, Russian and Britain') or for 'Four-Power Agreement' or 'Central Powers', but, rather illogically, the dictionary does define *Dohoda* (Alliance, 'Anglo-French-Russian confederacy'). The term *Maf(f)ie* is also included in Váša-Trávníček (1941), but its transferred meaning (of Czech secret First World War association) is not acknowledged.

The foundation of the First Republic was seen as a historical aberration by the Nazis and is therefore barely mentioned in Váša-Trávníček (1941). Amongst the more striking omissions from the dictionary are 'overthrow of the state', 'Washington Declaration', *Československo* (Czechoslovakia), *republika Československá* || *Československá republika* (Czechoslovak Republic), *Čechoslovák* (*Čechoslovan*) (Czechoslovak), *MNO* = *Ministerstvo národní obrany* (Ministry of Defence), 'Little Entente', *Čechoněmec* (Czech-German, 'German from the Bohemian Lands') and all references to Masaryk (except as a source). The terms *anschluss* and *rusko-československý*, *-český* = *týkající se Ruska a Československa* (Russian-Czechoslovak, -Czech = concerning Russia and Czechoslovakia) are also omitted. Entries relating to Russia and the Soviet Union are sometimes re-defined, for example 'Bolshevik', or deleted altogether, for example *industrializace Ruska* (the industrialization of Russia), *rudá garda na Rusi* (Red Guard in Russia), *Rusko se evropeisuje* (Russia is becoming europeanized, 'Russia is adapting itself to the rest of Europe'), *menševik* (Váša-Trávníček (1937): 'member of the minority of the former Russian Social Democratic Party'). However, terms which have no bearing on German realities or may suggest negative political phenomena, for example 'Russian Socialist Revolutionary' and 'Commission in Soviet Russia for the elimination of counter-revolution', are usually retained.

Váša-Trávníček (1946) adheres closely to the definitions given in the second edition of *Slovník jazyka českého*, although it also contains numerous new entries and is ninety-four pages (or 5.63 per cent) longer. Once again the Czecho-Slovak Legions barely merit a direct mention, but this time it is not because of their opposition to Germany in the First World War but because they had been engaged in conflict with the Bolsheviks from May 1918 to February 1920. The Czechs were now indebted to the Red Army for liberating most of them from Germany and Trávníček's lexicographical discretion (or expedience?) was in tune with the official policy of promoting closer co-operation with the Soviet Union.³⁵ Now that Czechoslovakia was finally rid of its historical foe, Trávníček was able to fill in again the missing details of the First World War alliances. He was also permitted to allude to the Occupation of Czechoslovakia and to the Second World War (although the entry *světová válka* [World War] refers specifically to 1914–18). In addition to the terms *arijec* ('a non-Semite, according to the German Nazi concept'), and other words based on Protectorate or German names, such as 'Hitlerite' and 'Nazism', Váša-Trávníček (1946) includes a variety of new entries connected with the Second World War, for example *germanisátor* ('someone who germanizes'), *gestapo* (German: *geheime Staatspolizei*), *koncentračník* ('concentration camp prisoner'), *koncentrák* ('concentration camp'), *okupant* (occupying force, 'someone who occupies something [or another land]') and *povstaliště* ('location of uprising'). Needless to say, there is no reference to the German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939.

In post-war Czech society the *Národní fronta* (Trávníček [1952]: National Front, 'confederation of political parties after the Second World War'), held an absolute

35 Even Beneš abandoned Masaryk's pro-Western stance and conceived the notion of Czechoslovakia as a bridge between the east and west. He believed that good relations with Stalin and Soviet Russia would lessen the risk of a Communist take-over.

monopoly of power and the Communists were the largest single party.³⁶ The Communists exercised control over the Ministries of Education and Information and therefore had greater access to printing facilities and materials than the other parties. According to Josef Kalvoda, the Communist-run or Communist-orientated periodicals initially enjoyed considerable preferential treatment: in May 1945 'five Communist-controlled dailies in Prague were given enough paper to publish 1,030,000 copies, while the dailies of the other parties of the National Front printed some 743,000 copies.'³⁷ However, while individual journalists and authors may have found their freedom of speech restricted, there was no overt censorship of the press or of books in the Third Republic.³⁸

None of the changes implemented in Váša-Trávníček (1946) was enforced by politicians, even though Trávníček may have felt under moral and psychological pressure to reflect popular sentiment. Trávníček was not obliged to continue to omit references to the First Republic and Masaryk which had been deleted from the previous edition of *Slovník jazyka českého*, such as '28 October 1918 is a turning-point in Czechoslovak history', *masarykovské slovo* (a Masarykism) and 'Masaryk's *Athenaeum*'.³⁹ That he chose to do so, therefore, can only be interpreted as a personal ideologically motivated decision.

The period of left-wing quasi-democracy came to an abrupt end with the Communist take-over in 1948 and stricter censorship was effectively re-imposed. From the Communist perspective February 1948 was an infinitely more significant date than October 1918. It marked a new departure in Czechoslovak history and rendered everything which had preceded it subject to re-interpretation. Trávníček (1952) uses the term *předúnorový* (pre-February, 'established, former, before February [in 1948]'), in much the same way as Váša-Trávníček (1937) had used 'pre-1918-coup'. Trávníček's task of re-writing the historical aspects of *Slovník jazyka českého* in accordance with the dictates of the Communist regime was considerably facilitated by the fact that he had already deleted most of the references to the Czecho-Slovak Legions and the First Republic. However, he probably still had to make more substantive changes than he had done under the Nazis to satisfy the demands of the new order.

In the fourth edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* Trávníček categorically dismissed all the previous attempts by reform-minded individuals and movements to change the structures of society, for example *národník* (Russian: 'petty-bourgeois radical intellectual in the second half of the nineteenth century; enemy of Marxism') and *syndikalismus* ('bourgeois attempts at changing conditions of production'). Instead, he pinned his colours firmly to the mast of the new socialist system and indicated an unambiguously pro-Soviet stance. Trávníček (1952) includes, *inter alia*, a particularly striking new reference to the Russian Civil War: *intervence (čtrnácti států proti Sovětskému Svazu)* (intervention [of the fourteen states against the Soviet Union]). The only explicit references to the period 1918 to 1938 in Trávníček (1952) again assume contextual knowledge: *agrárník* ('supporter of the Agrarian Party [in the First Republic]') and *hradní politika (za 1. republiky)* (Castle politics [in the First Republic]). Whereas both the time prior to the First Republic and the

36 By March 1946 the Communists had built up a membership of over one million and they also had considerable influence in the Revolutionary Trade Union Movement, whose membership had reached nearly two million by the end of 1946. See Paul E. Zinner, *Communist Strategy and Tactics in Czechoslovakia, 1918-48*, London, 1963, pp. 123-26 and 159-68.

37 Josef Kalvoda, *Czechoslovakia's Role in Soviet Strategy*, p. 205.

38 This point is emphasized by William V. Wallace, *Czechoslovakia*, p. 257.

39 Note that the old-fashioned, pejorative term *at(h)enčík* ('contributor to Masaryk's *Athenaeum* on the Köninginhof and Grüneberg Manuscripts') is included in Trávníček (1952), as well as in the second and third editions of the dictionaries.

German Protectorate are treated as the 'pre-history' of the socialist state, the period 1918 to 1938 is now almost assigned the status of 'non-history'.

Trávníček (1952) includes all the references to the Occupation and the Second World War which were introduced in the third edition of the dictionary, such as 'concentration camp prisoner' and 'supporter of the "Hitlerite" policies of Henlein', and sometimes suggests a (not so subtle) shift in or extension of meaning, for example *háčovština* ('[the Protectorate president, Emil] Hácha's politics, humiliating the weak, betraying the nation and state for the benefit of the bourgeoisie'). The fourth edition of the dictionary also adds several new entries relating to Nazism and the Protectorate, such as *esesák* ('member of Hitler's groups called 'Sturmstaffel[n]' [abbreviation SS]')⁴⁰, *genocidium* (genocide, 'an act or conduct aimed at the eradication of nation, race or religious group'), *hlinkovec* ('supporter of the policies of Andrej Hlinka before the Second World War'), *il(l)egální* ('for example underground activity during the Occupation'), *kolaborant* ('collaborator, generally with the enemy, with Nazism in the Second World War'), *Mnichov* (Munich, 'symbol of our national and state catastrophe in September 1938, caused by the bourgeoisie here and abroad, in the West') and *rasismus* (racism, 'programmatic Nazi doctrine about the inequality of races and about the superiority of the so-called Aryan races over others'). The most obvious new references to the immediate post-Nazi period are 'National Front' and several phrases relating to the Marshall Plan (which Czechoslovakia rejected on Stalin's insistence): *marshallisovaný stát* ('[a state] which has accepted the Marshall Plan, and is subordinate to it'), *marshallisovati* ('to include [...] in the Marshall Plan, to exert influence [...] in the spirit of this plan') and *marshallista* ('a participant in the Marshall Plan, militarily orientated').⁴¹

References to the history of Soviet Communism are far less predictable. Most of the entries pose little, if any, difficulty, for example *bolševisovati* ('to give a Bolshevik character [to]'), (compare *zburžoasněti* ['to take on a bourgeois character']), *komisař* (commissar, 'minister [formerly, in the Soviet Union]'), *kulak* (Russian: [redefined as] 'wealthy farmer who exploits small-scale farmers and is an enemy of collectivization, [known here as] *združstevnění*' [not included as a dictionary entry]), *leninská teorie poznání* (the Leninist theory of cognition), *marx(ismus)-leninismus* ('developed (form of) Marxism, elaborated by Lenin'), *partijní* (Russian: party [adj.]) and *sovětisace* (sovietization, 'transferring, imparting a Soviet character [to]'). Several of the -isms are overtly negative in meaning, for example *antisovětismus* (anti-Sovietism) and *trockismus* (Trotskyism, 'treacherous tendency in the Bolshevik party, whose main representative was Trotsky').⁴²

Trávníček chose in the fourth edition to make reference to a number of organizations which the Communists had either closed down or had subordinated to the authority of the National Front, such as the 'Sokol gymnastic organization' and *skauting* (scouting) / *skaut* (scout, 'member of pre-war youth organization, [also known in Czech as] *junák*'). Trávníček likewise does not appear to have been required by the censors to make many

40 Trávníček means *Schutzstaffel(n)*. He would appear to have confused SS with SA, *Sturmabteilung(en)* (Storm Troopers).

41 For further details of the Marshall Plan, see, for example, Hubert Ripka, *Czechoslovakia Enslaved: The Story of the Communist Coup d'État*, London, 1950, pp. 50–71, and Josef Korbel, *The Communist Subversion of Czechoslovakia*, Princeton, NJ, 1959, pp. 181–83.

42 Wolf Moskvich, 'Planned Language Change in Russia since 1917' in Michael Kirkwood (ed.), *Language Planning in the Soviet Union*, Basingstoke and London, 1989, p. 94, notes that 'During Stalin's rule, with its mass persecution of "enemies of the people", words in -izm were ascribed a negative connotation: *men'shevizm* (Menshevism), *uklonizm* (deviationism), *trotskizm* (Trotskyism), *egalitarizm* (egalitarianism), *freidizm* (Freudism), and so on.'

concessions over religion and nowhere does he seek to indicate the state's commitment to atheism. Nor, indeed, does he cast any negative aspersions on the Czech and Slovak *émigré* communities or on the officially despised 'Londoners' (omitted from the dictionary), who served in Britain during the war, or the equally mistrusted former members of the International Brigade, *interbrigáda* ('voluntary brigade which fought on the side of the Spanish democrats for freedom before the Second World War').

Politics and Contemporaneous Society

The First Republic largely took its ideological lead from T. G. Masaryk, whose personal authority ensured the success of his special brand of rather paternalistic patriotic 'democracy'. Czechoslovakia from 1918 to 1938 was a thriving state, notwithstanding the government's failure to deal adequately with the problems of social welfare or to address sufficiently seriously the legitimate grievances of both the Slovaks and the German minority. The pro-Western, 'bourgeois' orientation of the establishment is suggested in Váša-Trávníček (1937) by the nature of some of the cultural, socio-political and economic references, for example *pravice* (the right, 'in politics = moderate conservative direction, its supporters'), *rotarián, lev, lvíce salonů || salonní lev, lvíce* (lion of society, 'someone who likes to mix in drawing-room circles' [sic]), *vyšší (společenské vrstvy)* (higher [social strata]), 'higher placed, better-educated people'), *žargon* (slang, 'speech of the lowest social classes'), *anglo-československá banka* (Anglo-Czechoslovak Bank), *na domě je hypotéka* (the house is mortgaged) and *trust* ('industrial association, cartel'). However, the dictionary also includes reference to revolutionary political activists such as Breshko-Breshkovskaia, Ekaterina ('[1844–1934] Russian revolutionary, known as the grandmother of the Russian revolution') and to radical reform movements and ideologies, for example, *chartismus* ('British working-class movement in the years 1836–1855') and *komunismus* (Communism, 'socialist direction proclaiming communal ownership of property and the dictatorship of the proletariat').⁴³ One particularly eye-catching entry, which perhaps suggests the dichotomy between establishment policy and the values of the left-leaning intellectual circles, is *časopis rudne* (the journal is inclining towards Communism).

The second edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* is much more circumspect in its treatment of German themes than Váša-Trávníček (1937), especially where entries might imply or invite subjective responses to the occupying power. Amongst the most significant omissions from the dictionary are *germanofil* ('lover of things German'), *germanofob* ('enemy of things German'), *germanomanie* ('unrestrained love for things German'), *hitlerismus* ('Hitler's political and social direction and in its spirit') and *hitlerovec* (plural -ci) (Hitlerites, 'Hitler's supporters, German National Socialists') (the definitions cited are from the first edition). Interestingly, Váša-Trávníček (1937) devotes forty-five lines to entries under the lexeme *Germán*, whereas the second edition of the dictionary has only twenty-eight lines. Neither Váša-Trávníček (1941) nor the later editions of the dictionary include reference to *Reichsprotektor* or to the *Národní souručenství* (National Partnership), which representatives of all political parties, except the Communists, were obliged to join.⁴⁴ Váša-Trávníček (1941) also omits a number of other entries relating to the Germans' enemies and allies: *antifašismus* (anti-Fascism, 'movement against Fascism'), *černá košile* (black shirt, 'part of the Fascist uniform, transferred meaning = Fascist') and

43 As elsewhere (in all four editions of the dictionary), when dealing with socialism/Communism and/or the Soviet Union, the use of terminology is careless. 'The dictatorship of the proletariat' refers specifically to socialism.

44 See Jaroslav Krejčí, *Czechoslovakia at the Crossroads of European History*, London and New York, 1990, pp. 157–58.

protifašista (anti-Fascist, 'opponent of Fascism'), in Trávníček (1952), and *žluté nebezpečí* (yellow peril, 'threat from yellow-skinned race'), in the 1946 and 1952 editions. More striking still is the inclusion for the first time in 1941 of *čechofil* (Czechophil, 'a friend of the Czechs, inclined towards them'), *kontrašpionáž* (counter-espionage, 'the overthrow and neutralization of espionage') and *kontrrozvědka* (*sic*) (Russian: counter-intelligence, 'intelligence service against foreign intelligence'). The entry *čechofil* is evidence of Trávníček's patriotic intent, while the other two phrases may suggest his increasing familiarity with the instruments used to suppress opposition.

There is very little in the third edition of *Slovník jazyka českého* to identify it specifically with the post-war, pre-Communist period, except for the 'historical' references and the re-introduction of terms such as 'Czechoslovakia'. One or two new entries imply greater awareness of the instruments of politicization and 'socialization', such as *agitka* ('campaigning poem, slogans'), *brigáda* (work team, 'group of people, detachment, mainly [relating to] work'), *propagandismus* ('making propaganda') and *ROH* = *Revoluční odborové hnutí* (Revolutionary trade-union movement). The concept of *kolektivisace* (collectivization) is also mentioned for the first time, as is *proletkult*, although the definition, 'proletarian culture, the promotion thereof', does not give any real indication as to the character or policies of the organization.⁴⁵ A few other new entries also reflect changing perceptions and realities, for example *českožidovský* (adjective relating to a [nationally conscious] Jewish Czech), *dvouletka* = *dvojletní plán* (Two-year plan, 'economic, production') and *styky Čechů s Rusy* (Czechs' relations with the Russians), replacing 'Czechs' relations with the Germans' (in the first two editions of the dictionary). However, Váša-Trávníček (1946) was published too early for there to be any stronger suggestion of the broad Socialist platform of the National Front or of Beneš's policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union. The only allusion to Stalin is purely incidental and again relates to the period of the war: *katuška* (Russian: katushka, '"Stalin organ", a cannon with several barrels').

Trávníček (1952) represents a radical departure from the previous edition of *Slovník jazyka českého*, even though it retains much of the character of the 1946 publication. In limiting the number and scope of his new entries and re-definitions, Trávníček is broadly pursuing a policy endorsed by Stalin with respect to Russian. Françoise Thom points out that, unlike N. Ia. Marr, who believed in a kind of universal non-verbal, thought-based language, Stalin realized that the official ideology would be jeopardized if its essential emptiness or 'nothingness' were to be exposed by highlighting the precise nature of the linguistic innovation. 'Stalin knew instinctively that he must at all costs conceal the esoteric change which was taking place in the Russian language. That is why he so often stressed that Russian had hardly changed since the Revolution, except for some new words'.⁴⁶ It is perhaps also worth noting here how quickly Russian replaced German as the official first foreign language in Czechoslovakia; see, for example, the references to 'Russian course', instead of 'German course', and *mluviti zběžně rusky* (to speak fluent Russian), instead of *mluviti zběžně francouzsky* (to speak fluent French), in all the earlier

45 *Proletkul't* is defined by A. M. Prokhorov (principal editor), *Bol'shoi entsiklopedicheskii slovar'*, Moscow and Saint Petersburg, 1997, p. 966, as 'a cultural-educational and literary-artistic organization (1917–32) of proletarian initiative in various fields of art, particularly in literature and the theatre. The nihilistic denial of cultural heritage and the separatism of its leaders and ideologists (A. A. Bogdanov, V. F. Pletnev) inflicted great damage on the development of artistic culture'. Lenin considered Proletkul't too independent-minded and placed it under the direction of the Commissariat of Education.

46 See Françoise Thom, *The Language of Soviet Communism*, translated by Ken Connelly, London and Lexington, 1989, pp. 108–13.

editions of the dictionary. Predictably, however, Trávníček (1952) retains the phrase *lámaná němčina* ('broken German').

The most common and manifest indication of change in Trávníček (1952) is the attribution of the phrase 'in a class society' to a wide range of socio-political and economic disparities which are ascribed to the class structure of capitalist democracy. Entries which merit this epithet include *dav* (mob, 'in a class society = the lower classes'), *obecný lid* (the common people, 'ordinary people against the upper classes [in a class society]') and *výsada* ('special right, privilege [in a class society]'). Occasionally the old order is juxtaposed with the new; see, for example *individualismus* ('1. [in a class society] attempt to assert the importance, independence, rights of the individual against those of the whole 2. [in socialist society] attempt of the individual to assert his/her skills in work for the [good of] the whole'). Elsewhere the terms 'capitalist' and 'bourgeois' are used as near synonyms for 'class': *merkantilismus* ([re-defined as] 'a bourgeois economic view'), *nobilita* ('nobility, prominent social class [in feudal and capitalist society]'), *solidarita* = *solidarismus* (solidarity, 'programmatic doctrine rejecting the class struggle and proclaiming class solidarity; = socialism, Communism [in bourgeois scholarship, which deliberately omits the terms socialism and Communism]') and *městská společenská spodina* (urban social dregs, 'the lowest classes [under capitalism]'). Other diverse references to capitalism are included under *imperialismus* (imperialism, 'transferred meaning = imperiousness, striving for supremacy, expansionist politics, capitalism in the period of monopolies'), *katorga* (Russian: 'hard forced labour, especially in the mines [under feudalism and capitalism]') and *reformismus* (reformism, 'attempts at reform, at correction; in the workers' revolutionary movement, reactionary efforts to preserve the capitalist order'). Trávníček (1952) implies that negative social phenomena are so inextricably linked to the structures of class society that even miscreants may now be associated exclusively with the past, for example *Pepík* ('young member of Prague low society before the Second World War').

In Czechoslovakia of the 1950s capitalism was synonymous with the systematic exploitation of the working class, as evidenced by Trávníček's definition: *kapitalismus* ('method of production where the means of production are in private ownership; the workforce is a commodity and creates surplus value which is appropriated by the owners of the means of production'). Within this framework there were no advantages to capitalist democracy over Communism. Michael Waller points out that 'For the Marxist there is nothing transcendental about rights, liberty and democracy; the words themselves may have a long life, but what they mean will depend upon the dominant ideology at any given time, which will in turn depend upon the prevalent means of production.'⁴⁷

All economic and political powers were effectively under the control of the Communist Party in the 1950s, hence the special importance accorded in the fourth edition of the dictionary to the entries *KSČ* (abbreviation = the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), *KSS* (abbreviation = the Communist Party of Slovakia), *rodná KSČ* (Russian: our beloved Communist Party of Czechoslovakia) and *stranickost vědy a umění* (the partisanship of science and art, 'partiality to the truth, progress, the working class and the Communist Party which is the body responsible for progress and the truth and their propagator').⁴⁸ Trávníček (1952) suggests the historical inevitability of the victory of Marxism-Leninism

47 Michael Waller, *The Language of Communism: A Commentary*, London, Sydney and Toronto, 1972, p. 107.

48 Trávníček defines *rodný* in this context as *milý, milovaný* (beloved, cherished). Larissa Ryazanova-Clarke and Terence Wade, *The Russian Language Today*, London and New York], 1999, p. 95, quote a similar example: *rodnoe sovetskoe pravitel'stvo* (beloved Soviet government).

and of the socialist economic revolution through the inclusion of the phrase *neúchylná cesta k socialismu* (the unswerving path to socialism). Anybody in opposition to the new order was deemed to be an enemy of the state or a traitor; see, for example, *úchylkář* (political deviationist, 'person who deviates [from Marxism]'), introduced as an equivalent to the Russian word *uklonist*, *býti v cizích službách* (to be in the service of another country) and *mrva* (Gottwald: 'police informer, agent, nark; from Mrva, an undercover agent in the workers' movement killed by a member of Omladina').

The official language of the early Communist period was replete with allusions to the need for vigilance and to the resolve of the Party to implement its policies and to root out the class enemies. Trávníček (1952) is at pains to stress the thoroughness of the regime's methods of investigation: *prověrka* = *prověření*; *prověřiti koho* = *důkladně prozkoumat jeho činnost, názory* (vetting; to vet someone = to investigate thoroughly his/her activities and views). The dictionary further implies the determination of the Party by citing Gottwald's reference to the resilience of the Bolsheviks: *bolševická zákalka* (Bolshevik steeling).

Other anomalous entries which might be taken to indicate the changing values and structures of society include *pravdovec* ('a reader of the Bolshevik *Pravda* before the First World War, a worker brought up in the revolutionary spirit') and *chozrasčot* (Russian: 'running an enterprise based on its own profitability'). Economic references with a negative resonance, such as *krisová úroveň výdělků* = *jako za krise* (Gottwald: crisis level of earnings = as in a crisis) and *zmítati se v hospodářské krizi* (to toss about in an economic crisis), are equally common and are clearly directed at the conditions prevailing under capitalism.

Neologisms, Loan-words and Attributed Terms and Definitions

Considerable attention has already been paid to the importance of lexical innovation and borrowed words in all four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého*. However, there is a small number of entries which have so far escaped reference, since they relate to the once enormous (but politically increasingly peripheral) Czech and Slovak *émigré* communities in America, dating back to 1848.⁴⁹ Váša-Trávníček (1937) introduces a handful of delightfully unlikely neologisms such as *hefr* (heifer), *horiapovati* ('to make haste, to hurry'), *kolovetr* (cultivator), *kornhaskovati* ('to husk maize'), *lunchovati* (to have lunch) and *společenská konvence* (social convention, 'gathering'), all of which are included in the 1941 and 1946 editions, and all of which, except for *lunchovati*, are omitted from Trávníček (1952).⁵⁰ The significance of the omission of these incongruous Anglicisms from the final edition of the dictionary should not be overstated, but it may be seen as a further minor indication of the Communists' anti-American world-view. The presence of a sizeable Czech community, largely hostile to Communism, in the country which more than any other had come to define the evils of capitalism was a source of some inconvenience to the authorities, not least because of the threat of further emigration.

Váša-Trávníček (1941) provided very few significant new foreign language entries, although the dictionary did introduce a number of Germanisms which had been overlooked, such as *biedermeier* ('German culture in the post-Napoleonic period') and *halt!* ('wait, look out!'). Almost all the Germanisms in the third and fourth editions of the

49 According to Thomas Čapek, in his brief introduction 'Czechoslovaks in the United States' in Bohumil E. Mikula, *Progressive Czech*, Chicago, IL, 1936, pp. 33–35 (p. 34), the 1920 census reported 622,796 Czechs and 619,866 Slovaks.

50 None of the terms has survived into the latest edition of *Slovník spisovné češtiny pro školu a veřejnost* or *Slovník spisovného jazyka českého*.

dictionary, except those relating to the rise of Nazism and the Second World War, originally appeared in Váša-Trávníček (1937).

Trávníček (1952) is much more innovative when it comes to Russian loan-words. Amongst the new lexical items which reflect the changing economic and cultural realities are *kádry* ('workers, functionaries'), *kombajnér* (combine harvester driver), *puťovka* ('record of daily tasks and performances, and of work impediments') and *stěngazeta* ('wall newspaper, written by hand or type-written'). The dictionary also re-defines the meaning of some of the better established Russianisms, for example *běloručka* (Russian: 'a person with white hands who does not work, a bourgeois'); (compare the corresponding definition in Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'a person with white hands who does not work with his/her hands'). Trávníček likewise cites two of Lenin's neologisms for the first time: *chvostismus* (tailism, [coined by Lenin] "standing in the tail, in the queue, behind", opportunistic political direction, giving free rein to the lack of control of a movement') and *otzovismus* (recallism, 'opportunistic tendency in the Russian Social Democratic Party after the 1905 revolution, demanding amongst other things the removal [otzyv] of the workers' representatives from the Duma').⁵¹ The decision to include the latter entry, which is not even attributed to Lenin, strikes the reader as somewhat odd in view of the historical specificity of the reference. Lenin's name is evoked surprisingly rarely in Trávníček (1952), although he does appear again in the neutral example *v knize je odkaz na Leninův spis* (there is a reference to Lenin's work in the book).

Stalin is mentioned rather more frequently than Lenin in Trávníček (1952), although the definition of *stalinismus* ('Stalin's contribution to Marxism') does not suggest any clear differentiation from Leninism. The most notable lexical items re-defined by Stalin are *nadstavba* (superstructure, 'in its ideological meaning, political, legal, religious, artistic and philosophical views of society and their corresponding political, legal and other institutions'), 'nation', 'nationality' and *zvrát* (turn around, 'sudden, pervasive change in development, linked to the overthrow of the existing power and the creation of a new power'). However, pride of place for re-definitions and neologisms in Trávníček (1952) goes to Gottwald, who adopted Lenin's technique of coining terms directed at his adversaries and their activities. Amongst his more memorable contributions, not previously cited, are *hitlerofilský* ('inclined towards Hitler'), *monopolista* ('monopolist capitalist'), *profašistický* ('favourable to, predisposed towards Fascism, striving for its realization'), *pravo-agrárnický* (right-wing agrarian [adj.]), *pučismus* ('inclination towards putsches'), *revisionisovati* ('attempts to revise peace agreements and Marxism'), *stagnovati* ('to stagnate, not to develop'), *špiclík* ('transferred meaning = intelligence officer, informer, police agent, diminutive [pejorative]') and *velkoagrárnický* (large-scale agrarian [adj.]). Not only does Gottwald focus almost exclusively on negative phenomena but, like Lenin, he also shows a particular penchant for diminutives and other derivatives.⁵² Similarly negative in tone, but of a less overtly political nature, are neologisms attributed to Zápotocký, for example *kravalisovat (proti komu)* ('to kick up a fuss [about someone]'), *prozahálka* (= *prozahálení*) ('lazing away') and *přecitlivělec* (= *přecitlivělý člověk*) (over-sensitive person). Trávníček's selection of lexical items illustrates graphically both his ability to demonstrate his personal loyalty to the leadership and also, perhaps more important, his perception that he needed to do so. It was not sufficient for someone in

51 Moskvich, 'Planned Language Change in Russia since 1917', p. 96, points out that 'Lenin introduced many new words ending in -izm: *otzovizm* (recallism), *khvostizm* (tailism [limitation of political aims to those intelligible to the backward masses]), *ura-patriotizm* (hurrah-patriotism), and so on.' See also note 42 and Ryazanova-Clarke and Wade, *The Russian Language Today*, p. 11.

52 Ibid., p. 89.

Trávníček's position merely to attest to his convictions in the Foreword; he actually had to re-affirm his devotion to the cause and its principal representatives through his choice of entries.

In terms of cultural history, the phrases attributed to Masaryk are just as interesting as those identified with Stalin, Gottwald and Zápotocký. The decision by Trávníček in 1941 to introduce new Masarykisms such as *akcička* ([diminutive of *akce*] 'conduct, activity'), *barikádní boj* (fighting on the barricades) and *jinorodec* (foreigner) suggests the limitations of censorship at this period and the extent to which the first president could still be recognized as a historical national figure. While it might be possible to construe some sort of ideological significance from Trávníček's selection of these entries, their main significance lies simply in the fact that their inclusion was permitted. By way of comparison, it should be noted that the Communist authorities likewise allowed Trávníček to acknowledge Masaryk's contribution in the 1952 edition; see, for example, *jinonárodní* ('member of another nation') and *z křesťanských církví je nejkultičtější pravoslaví* (the most cultic of the Christian churches is the Orthodox).⁵³

Religion, Philosophy and the Arts

Amongst the innumerable references to the Christian faith in Váša-Trávníček (1937) are some which hint at the Czechs' traditional anti-clerical stance, for example *klerikalismus* (clericalism, 'originally = striving after priestly prerogatives, now = political Catholicism, attempt at political exertion of power by the Catholic Church, misuse of religion for political purposes') (also in other editions of the dictionary). Strangely, *Koniáš* ('a byword for censorship, annihilator, destroyer of books, and of culture [from the Jesuit Father Koniáš]') is not mentioned until the second edition of the dictionary. In view of Hitler's enthusiasm for burning books, this could be interpreted as an attempt by Trávníček to engage in covert criticism of the Nazi regime. The inclusion of religious terms in Trávníček (1952) is far less surprising, given the need for the appropriate lexicon in the promotion of atheism. Very few religious expressions are deliberately omitted from the fourth edition of the dictionary, although one exception is *Bůh je imanentní příčina světa = neexistuje mimo svět* (God is the immanent reason for the world = He does not exist outside the world).

Trávníček (1952) includes most of the philosophical concepts and movements mentioned in the other editions of *Slovník jazyka českého*, but sometimes the entries are re-defined either to suggest the values and precepts of the new social order or simply to distance the user from any association with a particular -ism. Compare, for example, *behaviorismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'psychological trend in philosophy'; Trávníček (1952): 'American psychological trend'), *freudismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'instinctual psychology founded by Freud'; Trávníček (1952): 'reactionary psychology founded by Freud'), *kosmopolitismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'world citizenship, spiritual movement taking the whole world as its homeland'; Trávníček (1952): 'world citizenship, reactionary doctrine disclaiming allegiance to a certain nation, movement taking the whole world as its homeland'), *nihilismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'denial of positive values'; Trávníček (1952): 'decadent movement denying everything'), *pacifismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'a movement striving for continuous peace'; Trávníček (1952): 'a movement striving for continuous peace [under capitalism and those who serve it]'), *subjektivismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'view that knowledge is dependent on the subject; striving for personal happiness'; Trávníček (1952): 'trend of idealistic philosophy, denying objective truth and

53 Masaryk's works were put on the Index in 1953, hence most of the terms attributed to him are omitted from later Czech–Czech dictionaries.

assuming that the outside world exists only in the mind of the observer; = bourgeois form of sociology maintaining that the development of society is driven by ideas and by outstanding individuals') and *universalismus* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'ethical trend basing morality on society [the family, the nation...]'; Trávníček (1952): 'bourgeois ethical trend basing morality on society [the family, the nation...]'). It is noticeable that several of the definitions in Trávníček (1952) are more specific and apodictic than in the 1946 edition of the dictionary (which broadly reflects the norms of the earlier editions).

The different emphases of the four editions of *Slovník jazyka českého* are perhaps slightly better illustrated with respect to the arts, since the dividing line is not drawn exclusively between the pre- and post-1948 editions of the dictionary. There is at least one (rather uninformative) reference to an important German literary concept: *asphaltliteratur* (Váša-Trávníček (1937, 1941): 'literature not complying with the spirit of today's Germany'; Trávníček (1946, 1952): 'literature not complying with the spirit of Hitler's Germany').⁵⁴ Váša-Trávníček (1941) also introduces the terms *bazarovština* (= *bazarovský duch*, *-ské smýšlení*) (Bazarov's spirit, Bazarov's views, 'from Turgenev's hero Bazarov in *Fathers and Sons*') and *českočínská zeď* (Czech Chinese wall, 'between the Czechs and the rest of the world, Czech cultural insularity'). It would probably be wrong to attach too much significance to these entries, although the latter does appear to reflect a lack of national self-confidence which could only have been exacerbated by the German occupation.

Although all four dictionaries include references to a wide range of artistic terms, it is again Trávníček (1952) which engages in the most radical and unambiguous re-interpretation of existing entries (often involving the omission of pertinent details or the insertion of a qualifying phrase). Suffice it to mention *davista* (Váša-Trávníček (1946): 'adherent of the *DAV* literary trend, of collectivism'; Trávníček (1952): 'adherent of the Slovak political and nationalistic literary trend, named after the periodical *Dav*'), *Devětsil* (Váša-Trávníček [1946]: 'group of Czech artists and writers promoting Poetism, the collection of work published by them'; Trávníček [1952]: *devětsilec* 'member of a group of Czech writers who published the collection *Devětsil*'), *poetismus* (Váša-Trávníček [1946]: 'attempt to produce pure poetry'; Trávníček ([1952]: 'decadent attempt to produce pure poetry'), *imaginismus* (Váša-Trávníček [1946]: 'Russian poetic movement'; Trávníček [1952]: 'petty-bourgeois Russian poetic movement'), *ruralismus* (Trávníček [1946]: 'rusticity, fondness for the countryside, enthusiasm for it as an artistic movement'; Trávníček [1952]: 'rusticity, fondness for the countryside, enthusiasm for it as an artistic movement [in the capitalist spirit]') and *surrealismus* = *nadrealismus* (Váša-Trávníček [1946]: 'originally a French literary movement'; Váša-Trávníček [1952]: 'decadent literary movement').

Trávníček (1952) introduces considerably more new literary concepts than the second and third editions of the dictionary, of which the most important is *socialistický umělecký realismus* (Socialist Artistic Realism, 'art truthfully depicting reality').⁵⁵ Other entries

54 *Asphaltliteratur* was a derogatory term used by the Nazis in the 1920s and 1930s for works which dealt with social problems and the unsavoury aspects of contemporary life, generally in an urban setting. Most of the works, such as Alfred Döblin's *Berlin Alexanderplatz* (1929), employed the 'Neue Sachlichkeit' style. *Asphaltliteratur* was considered corruptive of the German 'Volkspsyche' and works associated with the movement were banned after 1933.

55 Zhdanov's definition of Socialist Realism at the Congress of Soviet Writers, August 1934, referred to realism imbued with 'revolutionary romanticism'. Socialist Realism was the guiding principle of all creative output in the early 1950s, and everyone connected with the artistic world was expected to conform to its dictates. Writers not endorsing Socialist Realism in the

cited for the first time also relate almost entirely to the influence of Soviet culture: *kultprop* (Russian: 'acronym from *kulturní* and *propaganda*, = Cultural and Propaganda Section of the KSČ'), *kultpropčik* ('member of Kultprop'), and *rappovec* ('member of the Soviet [sic] Proletarian Writers' Association called RAPP, Communist proclaiming his/her artistic views'). There are two striking references to the once enthusiastically pro-Communist Russian writer Vladimir Maiakovskii: *pozemšťanství a rouhačství Majakovského* (the earth-mindedness and blasphemous quality of Maiakovskii) and *talmudista* ('in translations from Stalin and Maiakovskii = a person who does not make out the proper sense of something very well and simplifies it'). However, most Czechs would probably not have had a sufficient knowledge of Maiakovskii's work to have understood the significance of the last two entries. The user is thus left wondering whether Trávníček was merely paying his compulsory due to Maiakovskii or whether he genuinely felt moved by the spirit of the time to acknowledge the (uncrowned) Russian poet laureate.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to shed light on an aspect of Czech cultural history which has hitherto been largely ignored by scholars. The ideological implications of *Slovník jazyka českého* have been explained mainly in terms of the political structures of society and the established lexicographical norms, although the dictionary writers' own world-views have also been borne in mind. Of the four editions of the dictionary, Váša-Trávníček (1937) is of greatest historical significance since it was the first work of its type to be published. Váša-Trávníček (1941) is of interest primarily for what it tells us about the limitations imposed on Czech lexicographical independence under the Protectorate. The 1946 edition of the dictionary is worthy of note both for its intrinsic merits and for the lexical changes which it introduced or consolidated (although regrettably its impact was minimal due to its very low print-run). The final edition, Trávníček (1952), is of critical importance because it is the first dictionary which attempted to reconcile Marxist ideology (in a Stalinist setting) with Czechoslovakia's 'bourgeois' traditions and the concomitant linguistic norms. There is little indication in either the 1941 edition or the 1952 edition that they were written under extreme totalitarian regimes, thereby appearing to confirm Stalin's suggestion that large-scale lexical innovation is not a necessary pre-condition for radical political transformation.

The very lack of precision in dictionary definitions, which Chomsky has consistently highlighted, accords the lexicographer the opportunity to avoid engaging in polemical discussion about the broader implications of a particular entry.⁵⁶ Someone consulting *Slovník jazyka českého* for the first time is immediately struck by the apparently arbitrary nature of much of the content and is bound to reflect on more recent advances made in the use of statistically viable linguistic corpora. Ironically enough, however, had Trávníček drawn largely on official publications to determine the composition of the 1941 and 1952 editions of the dictionary, the number of political clichés and other ideologically motivated phrases would have been substantially greater and the quality of the dictionaries would have been significantly impoverished. *Slovník jazyka českého* would almost certainly have also included even more references to and acknowledgements of the leading ideologues and government or Party functionaries. Furthermore, Trávníček would have had an academically based justification for omitting many of the existing entries which related exclusively to the erstwhile bourgeois values and social structures.

early 1950s either wrote for the drawer or abandoned their art altogether. The poet Konstantin Biebl (1898–1951), who was accused of 'dangerous formalism', resorted to taking his own life.

56 See Anna Wierzbicka, *Semantics: Primes and Universals*, Oxford and New York, 1996, p. 250.

For all the examples cited in this paper which can be interpreted as evidence of the influence of ideology on the content of *Slovník jazyka českého*, there are dozens more where the lemma or the designation remains fundamentally the same in all four editions of the dictionary. Whatever pressures may have been brought to bear on Trávníček and whatever external constraints may have been imposed on the editorial and production processes, the value of each of the dictionaries as a reference source remains largely undiminished. In none of the dictionaries is lexicographical integrity irredeemably sacrificed on the altar of political conformity, even if Trávníček (1952) does occasionally resort to purely formulaic epithets. While Trávníček was obliged to make some concessions to the censors in 1941 and 1952, there is no indication that he was motivated primarily by the desire to subordinate the functions and meaning of language to ideological precepts.

36 Horses for Courses, or: Hitching Czech to the Soviet Bandwagon

DAVID SHORT

The aim of this chapter is to trace, from evidence available above all in the main Czech language journal, *Naše řeč* (NŘ), renowned for its history of purism, and to a lesser extent the specialist linguistic journal *Slovo a slovesnost* (SaS), the processes of the change of the Bohemian Lands from German Protectorate to Soviet satellite. It considers changes both in language use and in linguistic attitudes.

All great shifts in the history of a society are reflected in language, including thinking about language. The quantity of material emanating from both linguists and the man on the Smíchov tram in response to changes in Czech since 1989¹ is striking. The end of the Second World War was no less a turning-point, bringing with it the end of the nazified Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, the re-unification of Czechoslovakia (less Ruthenia) and a potential political vacuum in the sense that the country might, theoretically, have become pro-Western, or pro-Soviet, or indeed somehow gone it alone. February 1948, however, sealed the country's fate, and that meant the rapid sovietization of official, and even fairly informal discourse. One thinks of the many committed individuals for whom the address *soudruh* 'comrade' or the greeting *Čest práci!* 'Honour to labour!' became entirely normal, or the everyday colloquialisms *Svaz* (or the even more colloquial *Sajuz*) '[Soviet] Union' or *esenbák* 'policeman' (based on the abbreviation *SNB* for the police) used by anyone. These were features of the language reflecting the *realia* of an imposed regime, just as other features had been imprinted on language and its use during the war by the Germans, though these had been borne less readily, given that the Germans could never have enjoyed the measure of popular support accorded to the Russians as liberators.

Language change and thinking about language in the period up to 1948 might be expected to be telling, as indeed it is. Three main strands may be identified: they might be described as settling accounts with the recent past, asserting the new present and signposting the future; the first two are more active, dynamic, the third passive and insidious as regards language change but dynamic in linguistic thought, at least in some quarters. Settling accounts with the past is active de-germanization, while signposting the future consists in sporadic proto-sovietization. All three strands come together in the first NŘ editorial after the liberation. I quote it in full. Expressions of the first and second strands are self-evident; I italicize those expressions which I take to be signposts to the future, since they are expressions which took on their own resonance after February 1948:

After six years of unutterable persecution we can breathe freely again. The brutal power of Nazi Germany has disintegrated beneath the blows of the *victorious Red Army* and the troops of our Western allies. The Czech people will preserve *into eternity* its gratitude to *our great liberators* for having once and for all hammered our mortal enemy so that never again will he stifle us or arrest us on *our path of progressive thought and free labour*.

We enter the new life with a profound sense of gratitude to and respect for all our *martyrs and warriors*, who gave their lives for our liberty. We perhaps all have among them someone

1 See Edward Adderson: 'Spontaneous and Non-Spontaneous Reactions to Changes in Czech since 1989', MA dissertation, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London, 1997.

who was near and dear to us and whom we mourn in these great days. Glory and eternal remembrance to them all!

Of the challenges awaiting us in our liberated motherland, not the least will be work on the further enhancement of our dear mother tongue, with the immediate priority of cleansing it of the filthy sediment left by those six terrible years of German despotism.

Let us embark on new, joyous work with our new lease of life!²

I begin with the linguistic assertivity of the present, which cannot be entirely divorced from attitudes to the recent past against which it is a direct reaction.

What we are dealing with is a neo-Revivalist, protectionist trend, redolent of original Revival attitudes and often strident in its anti-Germanism. A relatively calm expression of it comes in a fairly late editorial in *NŘ* by Jiří Haller, though similar ideas crop up time and again:

At this time of general national peril, however, there was also an awakening of a strong sense of national awareness — no less strong perhaps than it was during our National Awakening at the beginning of the nineteenth century. All of us, without distinction, recognized how unique, precious and irreplaceable our national language was and how irritably sensitive we actually were whenever it was interfered with or jeopardized.³

The evolution of the language had been 'badly held up by the baleful influence of the German martial overlordship, which had impinged on these practical domains [science, economics, bureaucracy and standards of public speaking at meetings and in the media] far more often and more violently than in the artistic sphere'.⁴

This same article looks back to an earlier contribution in *NŘ* and argues that fears 'lest this general and sincere interest in language might be no more than a sign of post-revolutionary fervour which would gradually wane as the days progressed' had been unfounded. It is none the less striking that the volume of material in *NŘ* directly relevant to this chapter does actually decline annually between 1945 and 1948, rising again in 1949. However, in this 1947 paper Haller is still drawing equations such as 'Czechness = purity' and using metaphors such as that requiring of writers that they apply to their language the 'attentive and considerate' love of a musician for his instrument. The earlier article to which Haller alludes⁵ is the corporate effort of all the editorial board of *NŘ*. It takes a broad look at the public-interest aspect of the defence of the language and contains many of the recurrent points made about the recent damage done to Czech by German; it is a textbook sample of its kind, with references to the language's *obránci* 'defenders', to the link between the 'spirit' of the language and the spirit of the nation, to the role of writers as the vigilant vanguard of language use (followed by teachers, parents and journalists); it uses the inevitable metaphor of the garden to be cultivated, later expanded by reference to the 'accursed thistles' that have infested the 'rich meadow of the beautiful Czech language';⁶ it suggests the introduction of language overseers in editorial offices, radio

2 [The editors], 'Jsme svobodni!', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 2, p. 25.

3 jh [= Jiří Haller], 'Do čtvrtého desíletí', *NŘ*, 31, 1947, 1, pp. 1–3 (1).

4 Haller is also the author of an earlier, less bleak, article in which he outlines the quite extensive work done in support of the language, in particularly difficult conditions after the closure of the Czech universities, by the Friends of the Czech Language ('Kruh přátel českého jazyka za války', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 3–4, pp. 89–95). This is not the place to recount the work done, but Haller's recalling it does fall within the 'defensive' strand of thinking about language during the transition.

5 'Čistota mateřského jazyka se stává veřejným zájmem', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 5–6, pp. 127–38.

6 The historical overview of all — not just wartime — intrusions of German items into colloquial Czech merits closer study of its own, as does the remaining discussion of current lexical and syntactic shortcomings, pp. 133ff.

stations and theatres.⁷ Because the article seeks to show the extent of the public interest in the issues, it quotes widely from both the central and provincial press. It is also interesting from the point of view of other sources and authorities quoted: Czech left-wing writers come as no surprise, but we also encounter the 'young English left-wing poet Stephen Spender' (p. 129) and V. I. Lenin (p. 137). Finally, like many contributions in this spirit and from the same source, the article ends with a rallying cry: 'Let us complete the building of our new, free republic also in the sphere of the mother-tongue!' This constitutes another hint of proto-sovietization of expression.

A recurrent theme, and one that touches the individual most closely, is the handling and use of proper names (personal names, street names, the very name of the country), for 'few things are so sensitive to change or disruption as the national character of names and titles. This was brought home to us best during the German occupation, when Nazi frenzy went so far that even our Czech surnames barely stood up in their Czech form.'⁸ Apart from references to the removal of German street names and the like, the article deals *inter alia* with: (i) the reinstatement of *Československo* (and so on) unhyphenated; (ii) the introduction of *národ český* and *národ slovenský* to replace *československý národ*, and with it the restriction of the word *Čechoslovák* to designation of citizenship (this was going against the view Beneš still generally upheld during the war that there was one Czechoslovak nation); (iii) the rewriting of registers of births, marriages and deaths, which had been only in German during the Protectorate, the object being to standardize, and ultimately codify forms of Czech given names, and to obliterate occasional occurrences of female surnames in the form *Novotný-ová*; (iv) the establishment of rules for when and only when it is appropriate to write names with the surname first — the 'Hungarian order' (a 'banal ill' observed by the author in expatriate journalism in particular, but also in the use of teenagers, in imitation of how their names figure in class registers; it is appropriate solely for the purpose of various alphabetized lists); (v) replacement of German conventions in the layout and signing of official correspondence; (vi) the beginnings of the spontaneous process whereby place-names containing the element 'German' were being altered (*Německý* > *Havlíčkův Brod*; *Německá* > *Orlická Rybná*, with others likely to follow); the author hopes that such local initiatives will avoid solutions ending in *-ov*, which is simply unimaginative; (vii) the return of most street names to their pre-1938 form, with an appeal that new names should not be clumsy (like *ulice 28. října* [Street of 28 October] or *ulice II. pluku Stráže svobody* [Street of 2nd Guardian of Freedom Regiment], of which the latter were better rejected [it was, eventually] and the former simplified to *ulice říjnová* [advice ignored to this day]); several new names point in a Soviet direction (*Sovětská*, *Rudoarmějská*); (viii) the 'confusing' usage whereby newspapers capitalize all the words in their title, instead of just the first;⁹ this is followed

7 The article itself is followed (p. 139) by the text of a public notice issued by the council of Greater Zlín on its recently founded language advice centre and listing the numerous language-managerial activities for which it was to be responsible. It is fulsomely praised by the editors of *NŘ*, who further note that the patriotic gymnastic Sokol organization had been asked to include language culture in its various programmes, and that a similar idea would be put to the Union of Czech Youth (p. 140).

8 Karel Erban: 'Jména a názvy v nové republice', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 3–4, pp. 76–79.

9 Erban is himself a little confused here, or the source of further confusion: his rebuke embraces *Svobodné Slovo* and *Svobodné Noviny*, which used capitals throughout, but mentions the 'erstwhile' *Lidové noviny* (lower-case 'n'), despite the fact that when published, *Lidové Noviny* was fully capitalized (as were *Moderní Revue*, *Národní Listy* and others before the war). In other words, the general usage was clearly at variance with *Pravidla českého pravopisu*, the standard handbook of orthography, which might therefore have been revised in favour of established practice. In the sequel the Erban line did assert itself.

by a discussion of rules of capitalization generally, since current, haphazard practice at the whim of individual writers is often at variance with the rules as laid out in the orthographical handbook *Pravidla českého pravopisu*, which itself needs refining, since it has nothing at all to say in some areas; (ix) the emotional, but under-motivated tendency in some quarters to write *Němec* 'German' with lower-case n-;¹⁰ this is the most graphic single detail relating to a linguistic settling of accounts with the recent German past and is one of many addressed in the ensuing discussion in this chapter, first by the phonetician Bohuslav Hála.¹¹

Aspects of several of these issues re-arise throughout the period. An article by Josef Beneš, 'Jaké české příjmení si vybrati?',¹² places the bohemicization of surnames in the context of the National Revival (still uncompleted) and the 'purification' of names by the 'eradication of alien names, especially surnames' after both world wars.¹³ He gives an account of the interchange of Czech and German names in Czech, German or ethnically mixed areas of the country, pointing out that the 'language' of a name meant nothing as regards the nationality of its bearer. The main concern is, however, that in the current rush to shed German (or German-sounding) surnames people should be mindful of such considerations as euphony or (possible) vulgarity; the ideal choice would be the rare type of Czech surname, even a unique one, or a name lost by the extinction of some old family (p.128). There had not previously been any major tradition of name-changing among the Czechs, though the spicier surnames widely encountered in Moravian Wallachia and certain names consisting of an elsewhere vulgar word had been changed. Also many Jews had, Beneš alleges, adopted German surnames at the time of Munich in a vain attempt to avoid persecution.

10 Pavel Tigrid identifies at least one such quarter: 'at the time, the spelling of "němec" with a small "n" was used consistently in the National Social press': Tigrid, *Kapesní průvodce inteligentní ženy po vlastním osudu*, Toronto, 1988, reprint, Prague, 1990, p. 205. An article by Josef Batelka, 'Svoboda, lidství, mír' in *Evangelický kalendář 1999*, Prague, 1998, pp. 53–55, quotes a student's 'message from Sachsenhausen' in verse, in which *němec* is written with lower-case 'n'. This wartime usage is footnoted by the editors in the following terms: 'The poem was written in the Sachsenhausen concentration camp. Hence we have left the expression "němec" with a small letter, as was the custom at the time for designating Nazi Germans as enemies. [...] The attempt to introduce the spelling of Germans with a small letter did not last long after the war ended'; the poem first appeared in print in *Svět v obrazech* (21 November 1945), where it is attributed to Jiří Batelka. I am grateful to Eva Znojilová of Brno for drawing my attention to this reference. The crude attitude attacked by Erban was that the Germans were animals, hence the lower-case 'n'. Tigrid quotes a similar attitude, 'from a 1945 pamphlet by my journalist colleague from *Obzory*, the weekly of the Catholic People's Party': 'We have legitimate grounds for not viewing the Germans as people'; note, however, the capitalization. The post-war linguistic view remained that Germans were a nation, and so capital 'N' was alone appropriate.

11 'Několik poznámek k Erbanovu článku "Jména a názvy v nové republice"', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 7–8, pp. 177–80. Hála is much concerned by the phonological, phonetic and aesthetic aspects of new place, street and personal names. He also refers to *němec* as the 'currently regular spelling with a small n-' (but compare note 10, and proceeds to defend it as having a semantics different from *Němec*. Moreover, to worry about such matters is, on Erban's part, to waste time over trivia. Erban's response ('Odpověď k Hálovým poznámkám', *ibid.*, pp. 180–83) reiterates his previous view and does not advance the discussion any further.

12 *NŘ*, 30, 1946, 4–5, pp. 78–86; *ibid.*, 6–7, pp. 121–28.

13 That this was neither a peculiarly Czech matter, nor purely of the time of writing, is illustrated by examples from inter-war Estonia, Hungary and the USA (*ibid.*, pp. 78–9) and Poland–Lithuania (p. 81).

In an implied response to Beneš's article, František Pátek writes that attention must also be paid to forenames.¹⁴ His aim is frankly political: 'Some parents gave their children born during the Occupation names such as Adolf, Bruno, Herta or Hilda; today their political thinking should be put to the test.'¹⁵ The real period gem in the context of surnames had come from a local, oddly purist initiative: 'At one factory they wanted to bohemize the noun *stachanovec* [stakhanovite] after the first local pioneer [of shock-work]. The new name (according to *Naše Pojizeří* of 9 August 1945) did not take on, because the pioneer of hard work in question was called Měkota [Softie].'¹⁶

There was also a period interest in modes of address, with its own hints of sovietization. In a small piece concerned with the etiquette of address and journalistic licence,¹⁷ we learn when it is appropriate to address the president *bratře presidente* 'Brother President' (never) or *pane presidente, bratře (doktore) Beneši* 'Mr President, Brother (Dr) Beneš' (the latter at meetings of the Sokol movement). On the other hand, we learn in what sounds like the spirit of non-sovietization why it is wrong of the pro-government press to refer to *předseda vlády soudruh Fierlinger* 'Minister President, Comrade Fierlinger', merely on the grounds that Fierlinger owed allegiance to a party in which 'comrade' was the normal address. The inference is that the pro-government press is kow-towing, in defiance of etiquette. The same piece reports that all members of the Czechoslovak armed forces used to address each other *bratře* 'brother', which at the time had been viewed as 'democratic', but which also harks back to the practice of the Czecho-Slovak legions. That is clearly no longer so.

The orthographic handbook also came in for revision. Parallel de-germanization and proto-sovietization appeared in its 1946 edition, 'largely unchanged from the 1941 edition'. In a brief summary of the changes that were made, Emanuel Smetánka and Vladimír Šmilauer reported,¹⁸ *inter alia*: the deletion of changes imposed by the erstwhile Office of the Reichsprotektor, including the capitalization of *Vůdce* 'Führer' and *Říše* 'Reich'; the re-insertion of items suppressed by the German censor, including *Československo*, *Sokol*, *Zeyer* [a Jewish writer]; the restoration of the spelling *luterán* 'Lutheran' and its derivatives; the inclusion for the first time of contemporary items 'the spelling of which is sometimes uncertain', including *Revoluční garda* 'Revolutionary Guard', *Ústřední rada odborů* 'Central Council of Trade Unions', *závodní rada* 'works council', *místní národní výbor* 'local national committee';¹⁹ these innovations were in all the satellite countries and are dealt with by László Péter in his chapter.

Other new publications reviewed (generally favourably) in *NŘ* in this period include handbooks largely associated with the purity of the language, such as Antonín Opravil's

14 'Křestní jména a příjmení', *NŘ*, 31, 1947, 5–6, pp. 118–19.

15 Ibid., p. 118.

16 Ibid., p. 119.

17 Jiří Daňhelka: 'Oslovování presidenta republiky', *NŘ*, 30, 1946, 2–3, pp. 52–53.

18 'Nové vydání Pravidel českého pravopisu 1946', *NŘ*, 30, 1946, 1, p. 7. The notice contains the assurance that the State Publishing House will in due course publish a detailed account of all such changes. An article by Bohuslav Havránek in *SaS*, 'Zásady pražského lingvistického kroužku a nová kodifikace spisovné češtiny' (*SaS*, 10, 1947–48, 1, pp. 13–23), incorporates a critical survey of the changes, but against the background of the continuing differences between the scholars of the Prague Linguistic Circle and the formerly purist *NŘ* circle. It is free of any anti-germanism or embryonic sovietization.

19 *Místní národní výbor* as the term for the lowest administrative unit of the 'rule of the people' was instituted in the 'revolutionary period of 1945': see 'MNV' in Karel Tauš, *Slovník cizích slov, zkratk, novinářských šifer, pseudonymů a časopisů pro čtenáře novin*, Blansko, 1946 (hereafter *Slovník cizích slov, zkratk...*), p. 422. The term survived until c. 1990.

*Nikoli... nýbrž... Kopa hříchů proti dobré mateřštině*²⁰ (Not... But... Two-Score Sins against Good Mother Czech, 1945), chiefly aimed against germanisms. The hyperbolic, cloying language used in new book titles, while in part traditional, is positively endemic in this period, as in the case of the normally staid František Oberfalcer's *Krásná, čistá, svatá řeč mateřská* ([Our] Beautiful, Pure, Holy Mother-Tongue, 1945) or Pavel Eisner's *Bohyně čeká: traktát o češtině* (The Goddess Awaits: A Treatise on Czech, 1945). Václav Flajšhans's long article in *NŘ*, 'Bohatství češtiny' (The Riches of Czech),²¹ is an attack on those who operate with such 'fictions' as that Czech has over one million words²² and an explanation of the principles behind the creation of the 200,000-entry Academy dictionary of Czech. One point relevant to the present chapter is the reference to that dictionary's failure to include 'such common words today as *kolaborant*, *kolaborantský*, *kolaborantství*', that is, words to do with 'collaboration' with the German occupiers.

The prevailing attitude to the recent political, and partly linguistic, pressures from Germany is conveyed in the 1947 editorial to *NŘ*.

Even in recent years *Naše řeč* has tried to work according to the principles on which it was founded and which have become its tradition. Not even the six brutal years of the German rule of terror managed to silence its voice completely,²³ although there was little left about which it was permitted to write at all. After all, it was not even permitted to write that a germanism was an error or to quote examples from other Slavonic languages, and rather than give Slavonic names from German or German-occupied areas in the warped German form as required by a German regulation, we avoided such subjects for the time being.²⁴

At the period people are still recalling the 'power' of the language under the Protectorate, as attested by a letter to *Svobodné noviny* (10 February 1946) from Jaroslav P. Blažek, reproduced in *NŘ*.²⁵ The letter is full of passionate rhetoric and exclamation marks and praises the skill of Czech teachers in communicating a message even in the presence of a member of the SS: if they said '*bejvávalo*' (in the good old days things used to be), the students would understand '*bude*' (things will be); many teachers had, however, suffered imprisonment for failing to control the class when the words *Vůdce zhynul*, *vůdce zhynul!* (The leader [thus *Führer*] is dead) from K. H. Mácha's 1836 work *Máj* (Spring) were read.²⁶

Probably the earliest clear sign of future sovietization came in the Košice Government Programme, which first reckoned with the introduction of compulsory Russian in Czechoslovak schools. The 1945 volume of *NŘ* already carries its own indication of an

20 This is one of a number of purist publications accorded a negative review in *SaS*: see Alois Jedlička, 'Na okraj nových brusů', *SaS*, 10, 1947–48, 1, pp. 57–60. Jedlička is barely kinder to a new school textbook of Czech from the Haller stable: see idem, 'Strohé brusičství v učebnici českého jazyka', *ibid.*, 4, pp. 251–52.

21 *NŘ*, 30, 1946, 1, pp. 1–4, and *ibid.*, 2, pp. 25–33.

22 Including items such as K. Adam and V. Jaroš, *Slovník správné češtiny*, which had recently appeared (date not stated) and allegedly contained 500,000 words, while, with 'word' properly defined, it actually contained only 40,000.

23 This is an interesting point: *NŘ* was indeed published without interruption, while *SaS*, the more 'linguistic' of the two main journals, was suspended in 1943.

24 Haller, 'Do čtvrtého desetiletí' (see note 3 above), p. 1.

25 'Z našeho tisku', *NŘ*, 30, 1946, 1, pp. 16–17.

26 No statistics are given for the number of teachers who suffered this fate. Post-1942 editions of *Máj* had the offending words replaced by *Pán náš zhynul* ('Our lord is dead').

early interest in, or leaning towards, the Soviet Union.²⁷ Apart from the hints already mentioned as incidental to some other feature of the articles quoted, this volume contains 'Voices from the USSR on the Mother-Tongue'²⁸ (given precedence in its particular rubric over the article on the purity of Czech²⁹), and Haller's 'Care for the Mother-Tongue in Soviet Schools and Czech Schools' (also placed first in the same rubric of a later issue).³⁰ The former celebrates the memory of the Czech Marxist linguist Jan Frček, who had brought Soviet views on language to Czech notice before the war and had, for that reason, been executed by the Germans. The 'voices' of the title are those of Lenin, Kalinin and Stalin, with allusions *passim* to Lenin's wife and the writers Maksim Gor'kii and Mikhail Zoshchenko. The two main issues are the necessity that language be intelligible (hence the rash of loan-words in Russian should be wiped out or avoided as appropriate), and that the language's purity and efficiency needs to be constantly overseen ('fought for'). Since it is also the instrument by which policy is implemented, intelligibility has a major socio-political dimension; pompous Communist trade-unionists do no service to the cause if their speeches, larded with opaque loan-words, provoke such responses as: 'Can't understand a word he says; he must be a Bolshevik.' The authors' conclusion deserves quotation *in extenso*, for the information it gives on the political atmosphere of the period of transition (from socialism to socialism, as Michal Bauer puts it):

Two crucial lessons follow from the report we have presented. The first is to recognize that, as attested by the dramatic development of the young Soviet culture, a standard language can flourish only if protected from the clumsiness and arbitrariness of individuals and if it is managed by a disciplined regard for purity,³¹ expediency and efficiency of expression. The second [...] is that the political and ideological leaders of the Soviet people, above all Lenin and Stalin, [...] found the time [...] to be the supreme guardians of the mother-tongue. In that respect they should be an example to the entire world and particularly to us.³²

This is evidence enough that the familiar slogan, *Sovětský svaz náš vzor* (The Soviet Union — Our Model), commonly associated with the days of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, goes right back to the moment of liberation, at least as far as *NŘ* is concerned. Reflection of the growing importance of Russian in schools is also found in *SaS*, in Bořivoj Novák's review article on new Russian textbooks.³³ Its main function is to describe two major post-war Czech works, but it also mentions many minor publications of dubious quality which, like the textbooks, respond to the new opportunity 'to show an uninhibited interest in Russian' and whose first aim was to enable Czechs at large 'to converse more or less well with Soviet soldiers'. One small pronunciation guide³⁴ is much

27 As far as *SaS* is concerned, evidence of a growth in Czech interest in things Russian after the war is revealed in the number of books on Russian topics reviewed; on the whole they do not concern language.

28 'Hlasy z SSSR o mateřském jazyce' (hereafter 'Hlasy z SSSR'), *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 5–6, pp. 121–27.

29 See note 5.

30 'Péče o mateřský jazyk v sovětské škole a v české škole' (hereafter 'Péče o mateřský jazyk'), *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 7–8, pp. 183–87.

31 The idea of 'language purity', much in evidence among the *NŘ* circle, is one of the matters considered by Alois Jedlička in 'Otázky jazykové výchovy', *SaS*, 10, 1947–48, 3, pp. 142–51. Like other articles in *SaS* it is apolitical and, as might be expected, takes the functional approach to language description, language policy and language teaching. Jedlička has little time for the *NŘ* group.

32 'Hlasy z SSSR' (see note 27 above), pp. 126–27.

33 'Nové učebnice ruštiny', *SaS*, 10, 1947–48, 3, pp. 181–86.

34 Ladislav Šwirka and František Trávníček, *Ruská abeceda a výslovnost*. Brno, 1945, 16pp.

praised, despite the failure to correct some misprints in the appended Soviet national anthem.

In his 'Péče o mateřský jazyk', Haller quotes from a 1945 article in *Pravda* by People's Commissar V. P. Potemkin, though he confines himself to the Commissar's thoughts on mother-tongue teaching in schools 'because in large measure they also apply to us'.³⁵ The main problem in both the Soviet and Czech cases is 'formalism' — rote-learning without understanding; formalized instruction in grammar, but little study of language and its use. As the author points out, there is nothing new in the complaint; what matters here is that, again, the Soviet Union is held up as a model: 'At Soviet secondary schools eight or nine lessons a week are devoted to language. It sounds almost grotesque when we recall that in the new [Czechoslovak] curriculum only four hours a week have been accorded to the mother-tongue, that is, fewer even than there used to be.'³⁶

The unsigned 'Hlasy z SSSR', also discusses the opposite pole of a Russian full of loan-words, namely the excessive penetration of colloquialisms, dialectisms and other non-standard features in speeches and the media. Lenin, Gor'kii and their ilk were equally against such degeneration of the language. According to the authors, the fact that it seems to be a concomitant feature of a people's democracy is no fault of the working class who rise to positions of authority, and it goes hand in hand with another ill — an apparent pomposity arising from the lack of linguistic finesse. There is some evidence in *NŘ* of both these features of 'proletarianization' (if not actually sovietization) in post-war Czechoslovakia as well. In a marginal note by Vojtěch Suk we read:

The BBC, the glorious British Broadcasting Corporation (may the good Lord grant her long life; she gave us strength and refreshment during the war), looks after the English language and perfect diction; our radio has no such concerns. I sometimes hear addresses which carry shades of the slums; sometimes they use the pronunciation that was current seventy years ago. In a single morning programme I recently heard *šstudent* and *korešpondent* (twice) — we really do not need this kind of thing.³⁷

And in another marginal note by 'fpb': 'Since the revolution [May 1945] certain individuals who can barely put even a simple sentence together have entered state offices and [nationalized] companies. Such people are also appearing in places responsible for issuing press releases. And these are often written in a style for which a fourth-year high-school student would be failed.'³⁸ The sample of officialese he then quotes strikes me as typical of the entire later (Communist) period, which suggests, again, that 'newspeak' began with the liberation rather than with the Communist take-over.³⁹ The author's

35 'Péče o mateřský jazyk', p. 183.

36 Ibid., p. 187.

37 'Rozhlas a mluva', *NŘ*, 29, 1945, 9–10, p. 215. On the same page Suk, not a linguist but an anthropologist and ethnologist at the Science Faculty of Brno University from 1923 to 1949, has another marginal note, complaining this time of inappropriate linguistic innovation, namely the penetration, as a buzz-word, of *nesvoboda* 'unfreedom' to refer to the wartime period as the opposite of the new *svoboda* — a minor example of language innovation in a time of change. Suk argues that the word does not exist (is not in the dictionary), is too weak for the purposes intended, and should be replaced by the less mealy-mouthed *poroba*, 'bondage'.

38 'Neznalost českého jazyka v státních úřadech', *NŘ*, 31, 1947, 1, pp. 19–20.

39 I quote the notice from the Cabinet Office in full: 'The time for the receiving of previously unannounced visitors by desk-officers of the Cabinet Office has been set for Wednesday and Thursday from 9–13 hours. It is requested that unannounced visits not be exercised outside these times and that visits on visiting days be restricted to the minimum degree. For the purpose of expeditious handling of the objects of visits it is recommended that the Cabinet Office be advised of an intended personal visit in advance, with the accompaniment of written

conclusion is a patriotic appeal to the recent German practice as better than current conditions: 'During the Occupation there had to be a German language expert in every office. Surely it should be possible to find someone expert in Czech at our ministries and in the Cabinet Office who would be capable of preventing our mother tongue from being so desecrated.'

An area of language perceived as relatively new and meriting comment is the proliferation of abbreviations and acronyms. Emil Václav Kopecký published at his own expense a dictionary of these items from a variety of 'familiar languages' (including wartime German).⁴⁰ The emphasis is on items that have arisen 'since the liberation'. Kopecký's reviewer upbraids him for a number of omissions (and redundant inclusions), but it is clear from the examples discussed that some Soviet 'internationalisms' were already well established, and that, like some others (UNRRA, UNESCO), their origin had become 'obfuscated'; they include *sovchoz* and *kolchoz*. The proliferation of such items was obviously of such magnitude that Kopecký promised subscribers to his book quarterly updates.⁴¹

One period 'internationalism' not of Soviet provenance, but with Soviet connections, was 'iron curtain'. Interestingly, it was possible for *NŘ* to write about *železná opona* as late as issue 4–5 of vol. 32 (1948), some time after 'Victorious February'.⁴² Described as referring to 'the airtight barrier between political blocs, specifically between the Eastern and Western Blocs', it was 'appearing almost daily in the press whence it had 'penetrated the popular imagination and idiom'.⁴³

documentation on the matter, and that then a summons to attend discussion of the matter in person be awaited.' Rather sensibly, the anonymous commentator for *NŘ* appends a stylistically more appropriate (and more lucid) version of the same message: 'Previously unannounced visitors are received by desk-officers of the Cabinet Office only on Wednesdays and Thursdays between 9 a.m. and 1 p.m. It is requested that unannounced visits be avoided outside these hours and that on visiting days they be kept to a minimum. The purpose of the visit will be achieved more speedily if the visitor gives notice in advance, submits written documentation and waits until he is invited to attend in person' (ibid., p. 20). The point is also made, and illustrated, that the cumbersome style had already become the target of caricature.

40 Václav Kopecký, *Zmatek zkratek*, private print (place and date of publication not stated), reviewed by L. Klimeš in *NŘ*, 32, 1948, 1, pp. 11–12.

41 It may be assumed that few, if any, such updates ever appeared. The post-1989 transition has bred a no less impressive range of acronyms and abbreviations, many native, but many more, and more opaque, emanating from Brussels.

42 O. F. Babler: "'Železná opona'", *NŘ*, 32, 1948, 2–3, p. 60.

43 The purpose of the article is to identify the source of the expression: one 'St. Vincent Trowbridge', who claims (*Notes and Queries*, 193, 1, 10 January 1948) that his use of it in the weekly *Sunday Empire News* on 21 October 1945 gives him authorial priority (though regrettably no copyright) over Winston Churchill, to whom it had already come to be attributed without question. In reality neither claimant had priority: while *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* (Oxford and New York, 1981) cites Churchill's 1946 address at Westminster College, Fulton, USA ('An iron curtain has descended across the Continent') as the best-known use of the expression, it notes: 'The expression iron curtain had previously been applied by others to the Soviet Union or its sphere of influence, e.g. Ethel Snowden, *Through Bolshevism Russia* [1920]; Dr. Goebbels, *Das Reich* [25 Feb. 1945]; and by Churchill himself in a cable to President Truman [4 June 1945]' (p. 71). *Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable* (centenary edition, revised by Ivor H. Evans, 6th corrected impression, London, 1978), notes the popularization of the phrase by Churchill's Fulton speech and mentions Ethel Snowden's use, but also says 'it was used previously in Germany by Count Schwerin von Krosigk on 2 May 1945, and by Lord Conesford in February of that year [...] and the Queen of the Belgians, in 1914, spoke of a bloody iron curtain between her and the Germans', p. 572).

By 1949, *NŘ* is discussing linguistic matters that are very much a product of the new regime. František Daneš discusses the new military terminology;⁴⁴ a review of Vilém Pech's then new dictionary of loan-words reveals that such sovietisms as *stěngazeta* (wall newspaper) and *katuše* ([Second World War] rocket-launcher) are already part of modern Czech;⁴⁵ a review of E. S. Istrina's *Norms of the Russian Language and Language Culture* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1948) is spun out to the unusual length of six pages;⁴⁶ Miloš Dokulil, the leading Czech lexicologist, discusses the claims for a place in the language of the expressions *lidovýchova* 'education of the people' (acceptable), *lidovláda* 'people's rule, democracy' (acceptable at a pinch), and *lidospráva* 'management by the people' (unacceptable);⁴⁷ the distinguished linguist Bohuslav Havránek describes the challenges faced by Czech linguistics under the Five-Year Plan, and signs off with the salutation: 'Hail to the linguistic five-year plan! Hail to our entire Czechoslovak five-year plan!';⁴⁸ and Ctirad Bosák writes about Lenin and linguistics, concluding:

Lenin himself also had a masterly command of language and expressed his brilliantly clear ideas with precision. The power of his arguments was invincible. It is to Lenin's credit that language has been accorded the standing that it merits. Only in the Soviet Union has linguistics become a co-builder of the new life.⁴⁹

Answering a practical need arising in full force from the new regime, Havránek discusses the principles of transcribing Russian proper names into Czech. It is a serious piece of scholarship, based on contrastive phonology; it makes no reference to either Soviet linguistics or the talents of the linguist Lenin. Instead, the by then usual political requirement of such gestures is probably satisfied by the first chain of (non-problematic) examples: *Lenin, Stalin, Leningrad, Puškin, Lermontov, Tolstoj*.⁵⁰

The generally apolitical tenth volume of *SaS* is the last of its kind. Volume 11 (1948–49), while seeking to remain objective, nevertheless catches up with the times. Evidence is in Ctirad Bosák's 'The Soviet campaign against linguistic idealism',⁵¹ a report on 'the victory of the materialist tendency of Michurin over Morganite idealism' in biology and a discussion of analogously opposing trends in linguistics as discussed by Academician Meshchaninov and F. P. Filin (director of the Institute of the Russian Language) at a recent Soviet linguistics conference in Leningrad. Bosák is perhaps the first Czech to promote 'the new Marrian teaching, which is alone acceptable to Soviet linguists' (p.133).⁵² The

44 'Novinky ve vojenském názvosloví', *NŘ*, 33, 1949, 5–6, pp. 113–14. Unfortunately nothing is said regarding any newly appropriate modes of address across ranks.

45 L. Janský, 'Vilém Pech: *Velký slovník cizích slov*. Prague, Kvasnička a Hampl, 1949, XII-809 str.', *ibid.*, pp. 114–16.

46 M. Helcl, 'Ruská studie o otázkách jazykové normy a kultury', *ibid.*, 7–8, pp. 145–50. The review points out where Czech linguistics would differ in method and interpretation from this Soviet handbook, but also cites Czech Marxist linguists and refers to the Institute of the Russian Language, which had by this time been established in Prague.

47 *NŘ*, 33, 1949, 3–4, pp. 58–62.

48 'Český jazyk do pětiletky', *ibid.*, 1–2, pp. 6–7. Like much else, this article is a fine balancing act between the objectively academic and period sycophancy. In 1951 Havránek also published a small work on Stalin's views on language; he was so respected and, indeed, loved that the editors of *Slovník českých spisovatelů* (1964) omitted it from his bibliography.

49 'Lenin a otázky jazyka', *ibid.*, pp. 8–9 (marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of Lenin's death).

50 'Psaní ruských jmen v češtině', *ibid.*, 3–4, pp. 41–46.

51 'Sovětský nástup proti lingvistickému idealismu', *SaS*, 11, 1948–49, 2, pp. 132–35.

52 Nikolai Iakovlevich Marr was the author of the theses which shaped Marxist-Leninist linguistics; his work was continued ('successfully developed') by Ivan Ivanovich Meshchaninov. (For more on Marr and Meshchaninov see the chapter by Nigel Gotteri.) The

bulk of the article consists of the Czech translation of a resolution adopted on 20 October, 1948 by the Council of the Marr Institute of Language and Thought and the Leningrad Section of the Institute of the Russian Language of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Amongst other things it contains fulsome praise for Lysenko, Lenin and Stalin, an attack on the 'decadent culture of the bourgeois West' and an onslaught against the 'reactionary' linguists who have allegedly taken control of university language departments, readers' jobs at publishing houses, syllabus boards, the editorial board of *Russkii yazyk v shkole* (The Russian language in schools) and so forth, and have thus caused the flood of textbooks 'written in an alien spirit', and trained postgraduates or edited scholarly works in a spirit that is 'inimical to progressive Soviet science' (pp.134–35). The second-hand use of Soviet sources in the sovietization of *SaS* includes a fairly long piece by Meshchaninov⁵³ and a review article by Karel Horálek, 'Ze sovětské fonologie' (Some Soviet work on phonology),⁵⁴ which is, however, politically unbiased, critical where criticism is due, and defensive of Soviet phonologists unfairly criticized at home. He also makes the point that it is in phonology that Western and Soviet scholars are least far apart. As was to become the pattern in the next four decades, Horálek ends on a positive note: '[critics] must not forget that the products of Russian and Soviet phonology have won world-wide recognition'. The final item to be mentioned from this first sovietizing issue of *SaS* is a review of M. Cohen's *Linguistique et matérialisme dialectique*,⁵⁵ which is criticized for its failure to refer to the research findings of Soviet linguists and is compared unfavourably to the analysis of the complex nature of language in *Illusion and Reality* by the 'English Marxist Caudwell'.⁵⁶

The two main linguistic journals I have discussed are not the only type of published source to reveal what was happening to Czech language and society in the gap between the end of the war and February 1948. Another source would be the first volume of Czechoslovak Radio's *Jazykový koutek* (Language Corner).⁵⁷ A work like Karel Tauš's *Slovník cizích slov, zkratek ...* (Dictionary of Loan-words, Abbreviations ...) ⁵⁸ contains many a rich seam. While it lists, for example, hundreds of twentieth-century daily papers and other print media from all over the world,⁵⁹ and the ciphers and pseudonyms of scores of Czech writers and journalists (many forgotten) of the previous 100 years, it also reveals coincidentally the extent to which street-names were already being changed (it gives

apparent new-found enthusiasm for Marrism among the Czechs came a bit late in the day, given that Stalin himself was to attack Marr in *Pravda* in 1950.

53 'Nové učení o jazyku v SSSR v jeho současné vývojové fázi', *SaS*, 11, 1948–49, 1, pp. 1–7.

54 *SaS*, 11, 1948–49, 2, pp. 166–69.

55 Paris, 1948, reviewed by J. Ellis, *ibid.*, p. 183. It is interesting to note that this review is apparently by a foreigner.

56 That is, the poet and philosopher Christopher Caudwell (Christopher St. John Sprigg, 1903–37). The full title of the work mentioned is *Illusion and Reality: A Study of the Sources of Poetry* (London, 1946).

57 B. Havránek, A. Jedlička and F. Váhala (eds), *Jazykový koutek Československého rozhlasu: první výběr*, Prague, 1949, 291pp. This consists of printed versions of short broadcasts on a wide range of linguistic themes and was intended for the general public.

58 This is not a time-serving political handbook, but an objective record of the state of affairs. It contains many reflections of de-germanizing and proto-sovietizing, but also much information from 'Allied' and other sources.

59 For Czechoslovak items, the annotations also include such details as when they stopped appearing on the outset of war, and when (if) publication restarted. For example, *Anglický zpravodaj* (English Reporter) is recorded as pre-war only.

addresses for many Czech institutions);⁶⁰ the new political terminology; period reactions against the war and Protectorate, revealed by, for example, the inclusion and definition of such loan-words as *antinacismus*⁶¹ and, surprisingly *bacon*;⁶² proto-sovietization of government, as revealed by, for example, the description of the structure of the Ministry of Information, beginning with Section I — information on the USSR;⁶³ and a wide range of newly important Soviet terms.⁶⁴

If language really is the spirit of the nation as the *NŘ* school was proclaiming immediately after the war, then that spirit gradually became more and more Stalinized. We may not reject glib statements that language reflects the society that uses it. That 'society' consists of individuals, even in an anti-individualist, radically collectivist period. The linguists I have been discussing were all individuals individually responsible for their part in deepening the redness of the Czech spirit.

In the 1990s, in another transition, I am not sure what colour the journalists, more than linguists, are turning the Czech spirit. I presume Eurocratic blue. The five-pointed star assures continuity.

60 For example, the offices of *Svobodné noviny* are at Red Army Square, Brno, and the printers of the Prague edition were in Stalin Blvd. Other names were also changing: in 1945 the Brno National Theatre was renamed the Mahen Theatre after Jiří Mahen, the writer who, in May 1939, committed suicide in protest at the German occupation (see 'Jiří Mahen' in Tauš, *Slovník cizích slov, zkratek* [see note 19 above], p. 396–97).

61 Ibid., p. 40: 'Movement against German Hitlerite Nazism, movement against the regime of Hitler's so-called Third Reich, which, through its imperialist hankerings, led the entire world into the boundless misery and suffering of the years 1939 to 1945, when anti-Nazism prevailed and liberated all the freedom-loving nations of Europe from the Nazi yoke.'

62 Ibid., p. 57: '(from English) — really salt pork, salt meat, denotes a special kind of Danish salt meat exported chiefly to England; during the war, after Denmark was attacked by German troops, stocks of this meat became German booty, put into circulation under regulations for the restricted supply of occupied territories.'

63 'MI', ibid., p. 414.

64 *Krasnaja zvezda*, *krasnoarmějec*, *Komsomol* and numerous Russian words and acronyms based on *Sověť*, *sov-*, *glav-*, *gos-* etc. The density of such 'novelties' is highest in the Addenda, reflecting the accelerating rise in the sovietization of the language.

37 Polish Linguistic Issues at the End of the Second World War: Unfinished Business, *Język Polski* 1939–45

NIGEL GOTTERI

This chapter examines issues reflected in the journal *Język Polski*, published in Cracow to this day under the aegis of the Society of Devotees of the Polish Language, which managed to resume publication promptly after the War. The last fascicle of the last pre-war volume of *Język Polski* is a treasure unfortunately not found in all bound library volumes. Volume 24 (1939) was not, in fact, completed until 1945. Issue 5, containing just the four pages 129–32, is dated March–April 1945. The issue begins with the words of the editor, Kazimierz Nitsch: ‘Renewing our work after five and a half years of the toughest captivity in our history we must first of all devote a few words to those of our active members and colleagues who are no longer with us, either fallen in battle or murdered, or who ultimately could not withstand the cruel conditions of life.’ There follows a list of nine linguists, with brief details of who they were and how they had died, and a promise of proper obituaries to come.¹ Nitsch adds ‘One may also have serious doubts about a few other labourers in the field of Polish language, but we prefer to believe that they are alive and that we will benefit from further fruits of their research.’ These words look forward to at least the hope of business as before.

Next, small items of unfinished linguistic business clear the decks for urgent and non-urgent issues to come: ‘Since we have so little space in this issue, too little for longer articles, we will use it for supplementary material on questions discussed recently in *Język Polski*, so as not to need to return to them later.’ There follows a note by Stanisław Urbańczyk on the word *księżniczka* ‘princess’. There are then a few lines from Nitsch about whether, when working into Polish, one translates *na polski* or *na polskie*; both expressions have precedents in Mickiewicz, the former suggesting Russian influence and the latter German, so neither is to be rejected. The section concludes with a short note on the etymology of *oryl* ‘raftsman’.

A little space remains for the section devoted to administrative matters. The outbreak of war had found the fourth part of Volume 24 (1939) partly typeset. In the spring of 1940 when Nitsch had returned from the concentration camp, this fourth part had been successfully completed and published, without the knowledge of the German authorities and with the fictitious date of July–September 1939. Since it was impossible to send copies out to members of the Society and to subscribers, they had been distributed as far as possible to friends. Anyone entitled to a copy who had not received one, or who had not received the fifth fascicle completing the volume, was now invited to apply to the *Język Polski* office, giving precise details not only of their present address but also of their pre-war address, and the method by which they had received copies before the War — in person, by post, or via a local group or representative. These people were promised the first normal post-war issue, in which new rates and methods of payment would be set out. Although it was not yet possible to foresee all the details of the re-activation of the Society of Devotees of the Polish Language and the journal *Język Polski*, the editorial committee were convinced that it could be done, chiefly with the help of the Ministry of Education.

1 See also Kazimierz Nitsch, *Ze wspomnień językoznawcy*, Warsaw, 1960.

The editorial committee for the number that straddled the war consisted of Zenon Klemensiewicz, Tadeusz Lehr-Spławiński, Antonina Obrębska-Jabłońska and Stanisław Urbańczyk; they had lost one member, Henryk Oesterreicher, during the war.

Before the number charmingly closes with five corrections to misprints in earlier numbers of the volume, there is a report of the last pre-war meeting of the Society which had taken place in the first half of 1939. Papers had been given by T. Estreicher, on the history of Polish chemical terminology, Nitsch, on whether there were Jewish influences in the Polish linguistic system, and K. Misson, on the improvement of Polish. Two 1945 meetings are reported in the same item. Meeting 92 of the Cracow Circle of the Society, its first since the War, had taken place on 25 February 1945, and had been devoted to the ten active members of the Society who had died during the war. The next meeting on 8 March 1945 had heard A. Kleczkowski discussing the origin of *figiel* 'prank'. The General Meeting with the normal agenda was announced, and it would hear a paper by Klemensiewicz on enthusiasm for the language in the history of Polish.

Speech Culture and Enthusiasm for the Language

The first proper 1945 number of *Język Polski* begins with the first part of Klemensiewicz's paper.² His topic might be seen as obvious, given the nature of the Society at whose meeting the paper would be given. However, the war years had made *miłośnictwo* (enthusiasm, devotion, passion) for the language at best a luxury, and there was now both opportunity and urgency to return to the cultivation, preservation and renewal of the language.

Surveying Polish speech culture work since the War, Markowski and Satkiewicz³ discern two periods, of which the first (1945–70) continues the pre-war tradition of emphasizing grammatical and lexical correctness, homogeneity of norms, and the dissemination of good practice. Poland, reconstituted after the First World War, had had to concentrate on standardizing a language which had previously been taught differently (to the extent that it had been tolerated and taught at all) in three different 'countries'. Even very soon after the Second World War, though, there were hints of what was to characterize the subsequent period; some variations within norms were considered admissible, and notions of speech culture were broadening to include more than mere correctness.⁴

During the war, education had not been able to function normally, and much normal contact with the written-printed word was lost. Consequently, two principal means of maintaining norms and disseminating models had been unavailable, and general awareness of norms, and knowledge about language, had deteriorated. This was the case especially among younger people, whose education had been prevented or dislocated by the war, and whose language had been confronted only with local models and norms. On a simple map of Europe, Poland had shrunk and moved westwards, but its population underwent much more complex movements than such a map would suggest. The frequency and drastic

2 Zenon Klemensiewicz, 'Miłośnictwo języka w dziejach polszczyzny', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 1–7; Zenon Klemensiewicz, *W Kręgu języka literackiego i artystycznego*, Warsaw, 1961, pp. 7–19.

3 A. Markowski and H. Satkiewicz, 'Kultura języka w powojennej Polsce' in Jan Miodek (ed.), *O zagrożeniach i bogactwie polszczyzny. Forum Kultury Słowa Wrocław 1995*, Wrocław, 1996, pp. 11–24.

4 See also H. Kurkowska, 'Próba charakterystyki socjolingwistycznej współczesnego języka polskiego' in Kurkowska (ed.), *Współczesna polszczyzna. Wybór zagadnień*, Warsaw, 1981, pp. 7–46.

nature of post-war population movements brought socially and geographically distant language varieties into close contact with one another. The most obvious was the organized westwards transfer of population from the eastern *Kresy* under the guise of 'repatriation', but alongside it there was an internal migration; individuals moved from country to town, and native Varsovians were scattered all over the country as result of the destruction of Warsaw. Especially in the 'recovered territories' in western Poland, these movements resulted in concentrations of people from widely differing social and geographical backgrounds, and with wide variations in their awareness or grasp of the common language (*język ogólny*). In this situation linguists saw it as important that they should help to integrate Poland linguistically, by promoting a consistent, homogeneous model of Polish. Stanisław Szober's dictionary, *Słownik ortoepiczny*, was published in 1937, forming the fullest pre-war description of that model, and indeed remained the chief source of information on Polish linguistic norms until *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny* PWN appeared in 1973. Later editions of his orthoepic dictionary were already retitled *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny* (Dictionary of Correct Polish);⁵ Szober had died on 29 August 1938. Widely used by editors, proof-readers and linguistic advisers, Szober's dictionary still exerted a strong indirect influence on usage. Markowski and Satkiewicz suspect that it contributed much to the conservative and conservationist attitude to the language which still finds echoes today. Szober came from a conservative, 'purist' tradition,⁶ whose aim was to combat supposed impurities in the language, whether foreign borrowings and influences, or regionalisms, dialectalisms or colloquialisms. In the introduction to his dictionary, Szober refers to the linguistic usage of the educated classes and of the writers of the last hundred years as his basic criterion. While allowing archaisms, he showed little tolerance of common non-standard features. In Markowski and Satkiewicz's view, this is clear even in the 1958 edition of the work, though the most glaring examples of this attitude had been removed by its editor Witold Doroszewski.

Zenon Klemensiewicz and Witold Doroszewski, who had both begun their speech culture work before the war, saw it as their duty to foster knowledge about language and its social role. Like Jan Miodek today, they analysed processes operating within the language, including those that give rise to real or alleged errors. Far from limiting themselves to normative rulings, they tried to arouse public interest in and awareness of linguistic issues. After the war there was a clear market for advice on linguistic correctness — there was a new intelligentsia wishing to use the language efficiently, especially young people acquiring an accelerated education. Daily papers ran columns on language, and courses in language skills were mounted for teachers, journalists, publishing workers and employees of state institutions. Doroszewski's radio programmes, in which he answered listeners' written queries, had originally started in 1935 and began again in 1948, gaining huge popularity. (He presented them until his death in 1976.) Texts from the programme were published in a series of four entitled *Rozmowy o języku* (Conversations about Language, 1948–54), and the programme subsequently spawned the three volumes of *O kulturę słowa* (Cultivating the Word, 1962, 1968, 1979).

In the immediate post-war period, though, it was chiefly dictionaries and guides to spelling, pronunciation and inflection that furthered speech culture. Later years show a growing interest in the thinking on which recommendations were based, but in the early stage of linguistic uncertainties and occasional chaos, the overriding need was naturally for definite, straight, authoritative answers on matters of correctness. This did not altogether prevent linguists from reflecting on questions underlying the whole speech culture

5 Stanisław Szober, *Słownik poprawnej polszczyzny*, Warsaw, 1948 and 1958.

6 Compare A. Kryński, *Jak nie należy mówić i pisać po polsku*, Warsaw, 1920.

enterprise: Doroszewski's *Kryteria poprawności językowej* (Criteria of Language Correctness) appeared as early as 1950, and was preceded by two major discussions in *Język Polski*.⁷

Urgent Business, Geographical Names

The first issue of *Język Polski* for 1945 turns next to the urgent issue of geographical names. Urbańczyk, referring to post-war developments in Polish language studies, writes that it was above all the study of names that was experiencing a golden age.⁸ A good number of monographs on regional place names appeared at this time, as did studies on personal names, on word-formation in names, and proposed classifications of geographical and personal names. The intensity and urgency of interest in onomastics was in 1957 to lead to the appearance of a new specialized journal *Onomastica*, published in Wrocław, with Witold Taszycki as its first general editor and Stanisław Rospond as secretary of its first editorial board. The immediate onomastic question in the first issue of *Język Polski* for 1945 is the geographical names of the river(s) and town Nysa. Taszycki, as his title 'Nazwa rzeczna i miejscowa Nysa' suggests, has decided in favour of *Nysa*.⁹ His opening sentences encapsulate the nature, topicality and urgency of such problems, even though the particular case might seem comparatively straightforward: 'The name of the river which, together with the Oder, is to form the western border of Poland, bears in newspapers and periodicals, but also in various scholarly works, a name in three frequently-occurring forms: *Nisa*, *Nissa* and *Nysa*. And we may occasionally encounter a further form *Nyssa*.'

Taszycki disposes of the double 's' quickly as a purely orthographical imitation of the German Neisse, which suggests that the 's' was not, at least in his view, pronounced long or double. The choice remained, then, between *Nysa* and *Nisa*. There was no current Polish name for the River Neisse or the town of Nysa. Historical sources, with their inconsistent orthography, were not adequate to provide a ruling, either; Taszycki cites a document (*Liber foundationis episcopatus Wratislaviensis. Codex diplomaticus Silesiae XIV*) which uses the forms *Nysa*, *Nyssa*, *Nissa* and *Niza*. Pfuhl's Lusatian Dictionary of 1866 gives both *Nisa* and *Nysa*. Other Lusatian sources suggest a preference for *Nysa*. Jakub Parkoszowicz's treatise on orthography gives support for *Nysa* by distinguishing between the pronunciation of what would now be *nyski* 'of (the) Nysa' and what would now be *niski* 'low', which he would have acquired from Polish-speaking Silesians from the Nysa area living and studying in Cracow. The Polish form *Nisa* Taszycki sees as a later Polish version created on the basis of the German *Neisse* after contact with the original Polish version of the name had been lost. The pattern this followed would have corresponded with pairs like *Meile* — *mila*, *Leine* — *lina*, *Speicher* — *spichrz*; 'This clearly shows that not only *Nissa* with double "s" but also *Nisa* with one "s" bears the imprint of German influence. This should be removed by giving the name back its original form.' After this, Taszycki investigates the etymology of *Nysa*.

The discussion of *Nysa* continued, in fact, to excite informed and uninformed passions, and was the minutest tip of an extremely large onomastic iceberg, which occupies much space in the post-war issues of *Język Polski* and elsewhere. That there was tension between the needs for discussion and urgency is shown by the fact that over 30,000 geographical

7 J. Łande, 'W sprawie polityki językowej', *Język Polski*, 27, 1947, pp. 33–38; Zenon Klemensiewicz, 'Poprawność i pedagogika językowa', *Język Polski*, 27, 1947, pp. 38–46, reprinted in Stanisław Urbańczyk (ed.), *Polszczyzna piękna i poprawna. Porady językowe*, Wrocław, Warsaw and Cracow, 1966, pp. 11–24.

8 Stanisław Urbańczyk (ed.), *Encyklopedia języka polskiego*, Wrocław, 1992, p. 150.

9 Witold Taszycki, 'Nazwa rzeczna i miejscowa Nysa', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 7–11.

names were settled in the period 1946–51. Until that was achieved, it was not uncommon for railway, post and public administration respectively to be using three different names for the same place.¹⁰

In 1945 three institutions, all of which had existed in Poland before the Second World War, were interested in place-names. The first was the Instytut Śląski in Katowice, of which Roman Lutman was director before the war. Lutman was interested in place-naming straight after the war and inspired Taszycki's interest. The next was the Instytut Zachodni in Poznań, under Mikołaj Rudnicki.¹¹ Then there was the Instytut Mazurski, covering an area mainly in the Olsztyn Province but including Ełk and two other areas of the Białystok Province.¹² After the war, the Commission on the Process of Establishing Place Names (Komisja Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych), an advisory body of the Ministry of Public Administration, prepared material for discussion. There were two regional centres. In Cracow Taszycki was chairman, with the other members, Urbańczyk, Sławski, Halina Safarewiczowa, the historian Władysław Semkowicz and Żofia Kozłowska-Butkowa. The Polish Academy of Arts (Polska Akademia Umiejętności, PAU) at the same time set up, under Nitsch, a Geographical Names Committee (Komitet Nazw Geograficznych). Meanwhile in Poznań, there was a group led by Rudnicki, based on the Instytut Śląski. The commission overseeing this activity was led by the geographer S. Srokowski (till 1950), and had as its members Nitsch, Rudnicki, Taszycki and delegates of ministries; the historian Semkowicz (till 1949) and the linguist Stanisław Rospond were deputy members. Experts whose evidence and advice were sought were the linguists Jan Safarewicz, Urbańczyk and the Germanist Ludwik Zabrocki, the geographers M. Klimaszewski (Cracow), A. Wrzosek (Poznań), K. Kolańczyk, then director of the Instytut Zachodni, and J. Leyding-Mielecki, director of the Instytut Mazurski in Olsztyn. The secretary of the commission was B. Ostrowski. The commission was concerned with all geographical names, names of towns, villages, rivers, hills and so on. The people responsible for the recommendations were careful, moderate, well-informed, scholarly people, working with enormous urgency.

There were several methods of finding suitable Polish names for places in recovered territories: (i) old Polish and other Slavonic texts were searched for names; names that appeared to be germanized versions of Slavonic names were re-polonized; (ii) in the case of purely German names, it was often possible to reactivate an extinct Slavonic name from nearby; (iii) names were sometimes invented (*chrzty* 'baptisms'), but in keeping with names and features in the area. Taszycki claims that there were few outright baptisms.¹³

10 For some references see B. Siciński, 'Ustalanie polskich nazw miejscowości na Ziemiach Zachodnich jako złożony proces kształtowania się fragmentu normy językowej (na przykładzie Dolnego Śląska)' in Miodek (ed.), *O zagrożeniach i bogactwie...*, pp. 171–78. For a survey of onomastics in Poland, see S. Gala, 'Onomastics in Poland: From the 19th-century beginning to the present', *Historiographia Linguistica*, 25, 1998, 1–2, pp. 87–114. For an historian's evaluation of some of the work, see E. Rymar, 'Ocena ustalenia nazw miejscowych na obszarze dawniej Nowej Marchii przez Komisję Ustalania Nazw Miejscowych w latach 1946–1949', *Onomastica*, 30, 1985, pp. 51–68. For an illuminating conversation on this whole topic in March 1998 I am much indebted to Maria Malec of the Polish Academy of Arts in Cracow, who studied with some of the linguists involved.

11 See F. Antkowski, [Bibliography of Mikołaj Rudnicki's work up to 1959], *Slavia Occidentalis*, 20, 1960, pp. 19–27, and Z. Brocki, [Bibliography of Rudnicki's work, 1960–74], *Slavia Occidentalis*, 36, 1979, pp. 9–14.

12 See also the pithy Introduction to Stanisław Rospond, *Słownik nazw geograficznych. Polski zachodniej i północnej. I: Polsko-niemiecki. II: Niemecko-polski*, Warsaw, 1951.

13 Witold Taszycki, 'Przywrócenie śląskim nazwom polskiej postaci', *Język Polski*, 54, 1974, pp. 375–78.

Space permits only a few examples. Kasmannsburg, of which the *Kas-* was taken to be Slavonic in origin, became the Polish name Kosmowo. Roskaten (thus called in German since 1286) became Polish Rosochate, named after the lake. Kranichpfuhl, in which the *-pfuhl* was thought (erroneously, says Rymar) to be cognate with Polish *pole*, became Żurawie Pole. The village Dobropole had been in German Doberpfuhl. Where the namers went astray, they can surely be forgiven. They were anxious not to be, and they were not, capricious or arbitrary, yet their task was extremely urgent. Further examples give the flavour of their decisions: Niedźwiedź for Barenbruch, as if reconstructing an earlier Slavonic name for which the German name might itself have been a translation; Sokulsko for Falkenstein, as the name Sokulsko was apparently already in use among Poles resettled there at the end of the war (Rymar states that the railway station was already called Sokoły)¹⁴; Grabowo was the name given to Buchholz, on the basis of the nearby Grabowsee (its German name); small settlements were occasionally given names based on larger places nearby, such as Rychnówek near Rychnów, Rówienko near Równo; Kopin became the Polish name for German Hopfenberg on the basis of the nearby Koppensee (its German name). This reflected a desire to retain local colour. Lipie Góry became the Polish name for Mansfeld, at the foot of the Lindeberge (Lipiogóry, now Lipinki); Czartowo became the Polish name for Grützort, on the basis of the nearby Teufel-See.

Some names were borrowed from other Slavonic areas entirely: Lasocin, Niesułów, and Niewierz came from the Mecklenburg area beyond the Oder. Some places in Pomerania were named after people: thus Fürstenau became Barnimie and Marienhof became Warcisław. Other inventions were based on the nature of the terrain, thus Czarnolesie (formerly in German Kesselgrund), Jezierzyska, Przywodzie, Zagajno.

According to Maria Malec, the card indexes created at the time still exist, one in Instytut Języka Polskiego PAN in Cracow and one in Poznań — in the Main Library of the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań.

Some Business as Usual

There then follows in *Język Polski* 25 a vigorous piece by Nitsch on the need for some orthographical reform.¹⁵ Doroszewski, representing a devastated Warsaw, and subsequently more likely to be seen on the pages of *Poradnik Językowy*, once it had resumed publication in late 1948, contributes a piece on the word *zakopiański* ('of Zakopane').¹⁶ Two items by Nitsch on uncertainties in contemporary language deal with *dać sobie rady*, 'manage, cope', whose continued coexistence with *dać sobie radę* is later devoutly wished by Maria Dąbrowska,¹⁷ and the meaning of *rodzeństwo* 'siblings', which latter had been discussed before the war. It would be misleading to suggest that all the linguistic issues reflected in the pages of *Język Polski* were major or even urgent issues. There was, for example, a suggestion that a new, improved term for 'syllable' should be adopted — *tchnionka*, based on *tchnienie* 'breath'.¹⁸ Maria Dłuska, then a phonetician, later a literature scholar, did not agree, as the very titles of her responses show:¹⁹ 'It is never advisable to replace an unclear term with a defective one. [...] *Tchnionka* is a defective term, as it suggests that a syllable is something it in fact is not (because though

14 Rymar, 'Ocena ustalenia nazw...' (see note 10 above), p. 58.

15 Kazimierz Nitsch, 'O nową reformę ortografii', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 11–23.

16 Witold Doroszewski, 'Forma *zakopiański*', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 25–26.

17 Maria Dąbrowska, 'Od strony pisarza', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 87–91.

18 J. Rączy, 'O *tchnionce*, zwanej dotąd *sylabą* czy *zgłoską*', *Język Polski*, 25, 1945, pp. 93–95.

19 Maria Dłuska, 'Sylaba czyli *zgłoska*, ale nie *tchnionka*', *Język Polski*, 26, 1946, pp. 23–24, and 'Jeszcze o *tchnionce*, zwanej *sylabą* lub *zgłoską*', *Język Polski*, 26, 1946, pp. 56–57.

we do not yet exactly know what a syllable is, we do know what it is not). A term giving an erroneous connotation as to the nature of the phenomenon it names is pointless, however “appealing” it may be. This is why, as a phonetics specialist, I have to object to *tchnionka*.²⁰

Continuing Business, Polish Linguistics and Soviet Linguistics

The first issue of Volume 27 (1947) of *Język Polski* begins with a paper by Kuryłowicz on recent Russian linguistics.²¹ Kuryłowicz illustrates the difficulties and dilemmas facing Polish linguists during and after the war. He had taken up the Chair of Indo-European Linguistics at the University in Lwów (Lemberg) in 1927, and it was in Lwów that he found himself living first under Soviet, then under German occupation, where he continued his work in the underground university. In his last year in Lwów, without regard for the possible consequences, as Kałkowska points out, he gave a lecture which criticized official Soviet linguistics based on the views of N. Ia. Marr.²² In fact, Kuryłowicz not only gave a lecture, but he also published the article in *Język Polski*. If Kuryłowicz was apparently heedless of possible repercussions, so too was at least one of his colleagues, Nitsch. Nitsch was invited to write a short article for the daily paper *Wolność* (Freedom) in 1947. For some reason it was not published, but it does appear in a small collection of Nitsch's memoirs under the title ‘Polsko-rosyjskie stosunki językoznawcze’ (Polish–Russian Linguistic Relations). Nitsch notes with satisfaction that a number of Russian linguists had contributed articles to *Rocznik Slawistyczny* (Annual of Slavonic Studies). After the First World War, however, links between Polish and Russian linguists were largely lost, partly because of the death during the war of Shakhmatov, after which Slavonic philology weakened in Russia, just as it was blossoming in Poland. Nitsch recalls that he made efforts to renew contacts with Russian linguists after the Second World War, ‘of which but a small piece of evidence is that I got Prof. J. Kuryłowicz to write for *Język Polski* [January–February 1947 issue] an informative article entitled “Russian Linguistics of the Recent Period”, in which he discusses the general linguistic views of N. Ia. Marr and I. I. Meshchaninov. It is to be expected that direct contacts will be forged not only in linguistics but in all branches of knowledge.’²³ As Polish inhabitants of Lwów were re-settled after the war, chiefly in Wrocław, Kuryłowicz and his family also went to Wrocław for two years, during which Kuryłowicz worked at the University there. He then accepted an invitation to Cracow, which was becoming the most important centre of linguistics in Poland. Kuryłowicz's activities were seriously curtailed in 1949–56, when English, German and comparative philology were not taught, and research was constricted. Persistent rumour has it that Kuryłowicz was denounced. As far as I have been able to ascertain, he was not suspended from the University in Cracow, but he was not allowed to teach.²⁴

Nikolai Iakovlevich Marr (1865–1934) was a Russian linguist and archaeologist, a specialist in Caucasian languages, credited with adding significantly to our knowledge and

20 Ibid., p. 57.

21 Jerzy Kuryłowicz, ‘Językoznawstwo rosyjskie ostatniej doby’, *Język Polski*, 27, 1947, pp. 1–7. See also A. Kałkowska's review of the memorial volume for Kuryłowicz edited by W. Smoczyński, *Język Polski*, 57, 1997, pp. 205–07.

22 Ibid., p. 207.

23 Nitsch, *Ze Wspomnień językoznawcy*, pp. 159–62 (162).

24 For appreciations of Kuryłowicz, see J. Rusek, ‘Jerzy Kuryłowicz (26 August 1895–28 January 1978)’, *Historiographia Linguistica*, 25, 1998, pp. 141–46; J. Safarewicz, ‘Jerzy Kuryłowicz as an Indo-Europeanist’, *ibid.*, pp. 147–52, and A. Heinz, ‘Jerzy Kuryłowicz as a Theorist of Language’, *ibid.*, pp. 153–60.

understanding of the structure and history of Caucasian languages. In the 1920s, wishing to give linguistics a Marxist slant, and looking for relationships between Caucasian languages and other languages, he had created a theory of the class nature of language and the stage-by-stage development of the world's languages. He posited a single origin for languages, tracing the vocabulary of all languages back to four hypothetical elements: *sal*, *ber*, *jon* and *roš*. In his view, language, as an element of the superstructure of a socioeconomic system, changed with that system. Linguistic change also resulted from the mixing of languages. Marr divided languages into those of the primal period, which corresponded to the generic community — monosyllabic, isolating languages, and languages corresponding to nomadic societies — agglutinating languages. The third stage was represented by the remains of the Japhetic languages with the most archaic structures (Caucasian, Basque). Marr's Japhetic theory was named after the Biblical Japheth, just as the Semitic and Chamitic languages were named after Shem and Ham, the brothers of Japheth. Class societies were linked with inflected languages, Semitic and Promethean (Indo-European). Marr called his views a new doctrine of language, while others called it simply Marrism. He and his followers adopted revolutionary terminology and were able to gain considerable political influence and greatly to restrict the activities of linguists with either a comparative or a Structuralist bent. Their stifling and isolating effect on Soviet linguistics was brought to an end by public discussion in *Pravda* (from June to August 1950), in which Stalin himself took part (the Polish version of his article *W sprawie marksizmu w językoznawstwie* appeared in 1951). Stalin pointed out the pseudo-Marxist and extreme left-wing nature of the arguments put forward by Marr and his successors.

In his *Język Polski* paper on Russian linguistics, Kuryłowicz somewhat pointedly expresses approval for the work of Ivan Ivanovich Meshchaninov (1883–1967), a Russian linguist and archaeologist who specializes in the dead languages of the Caucasus and Central Asia. One of the leading supporters of Marr's theory, he contributed to the development of the theory of syntactic categories, a syntactic typology of the world's languages and the theory of the clause. Kuryłowicz describes Meshchaninov as the greatest living Soviet linguist. He notes with satisfaction that though Meshchaninov was a Marrist, he did valuable linguistic work, having put the official doctrine somewhat in the background. First, he contributed a great deal to linguistic typology through his work on ergativity, which pushed linguistics in the direction indicated before the First World War by Hugo Schuchardt, August Fick and Christian Cornelius Uhlenbeck. In his work on the new doctrine of language²⁵ morphological matters predominate over official doctrine. In his work on stage-by-stage development of word and sentence/clause,²⁶ he is fundamentally concerned with clause structure in various types of language, an interest which also influenced research on ergative constructions. (In ergative languages the subject of intransitive clauses is expressed by the same case as the patient [undergoer] in transitive clauses.) While Kuryłowicz is unsure of Meshchaninov's threefold division of the clause into subject, predicate and object, he applauds the fact that Meshchaninov takes the clause as the basic linguistic phenomenon, in preference to the word. Finally, he warmly welcomes Meshchaninov's recent book on clause elements and parts of speech,²⁷ to which Kuryłowicz expects a positive response in Western linguistic literature:

In Meshchaninov, Russian linguistics has found a representative who has turned it back in a purely scholarly direction, from being dislocated by extraneous considerations. From the

25 Ivan I. Meshchaninov, *Novoe uchenie o iazyke — stadial'naia tipologiiia*, Leningrad, 1936.

26 Ivan I. Meshchaninov, *Obshchee iazykoznanie. K probleme stadial'nosti v razvitii slova i predlozhenia*, Leningrad, 1940.

27 Ivan I. Meshchaninov, *Chleny predlozheniia i chasti rechi*, Moscow and Leningrad, 1945.

chaotic picture presented by Soviet [Kuryłowicz uses the word *sowieckimi*, rather than the preferred *radzieckimi*] publications of the most recent generation, in Meshchaninov there emerges the outline of a general linguistic theory built on morphological typology and the priority of the clause [*zdanie* in Polish, like *predlozhenie* in Russian, is used of both sentence and clause], able to take a prominent position alongside western European linguistics.

For *Język Polski*, Marrism was later bidden farewell in an article by Tadeusz Lehr-Spławiński. Lehr-Spławiński regretted that Polish-Soviet collaboration had not been able to develop in linguistics as it had in other areas of learning, because of the hegemony of Marr's pupils. He noted the vigorous linguistic discussion in *Pravda* inaugurated by the Georgian linguist Arnol'd Stepanovich Chikobava and expressed approval of Stalin's timely intervention:

Stalin, while stressing that as a non-linguist he was not going in for linguistic technicalities, in the clear and sober manner characteristic of him has thrown light on the contentious issues from the standpoint of Marxist teaching, of which he is today without doubt the most authoritative exponent. His opinion, captured in the form of concise, terse answers to the four questions put to him, has dealt Marrism and the Marrists a downright crushing blow.²⁸

So language was not a superstructure on the economic-social infrastructure, nor was it the creation of a particular class. Language was a social phenomenon. At the end of his article, Lehr-Spławiński comments that the criticisms in Soviet journals for failing to acknowledge Marrism, levelled at papers published by Kuryłowicz and himself, were now clearly unjustified. No doubt Lehr-Spławiński was delighted that, thanks to Stalin, Soviet linguists could now see that their Polish colleagues had been right all along.

28 Tadeusz Lehr-Spławiński, 'Przełom w językoznawstwie radzieckim,' *Język Polski*, 30, 1950, p. 169.

38 The Label *Pre-socialist* in Hungarian Lexicography of the 1950s

PETER SHERWOOD

The first monolingual dictionary of Hungarian was the six-volume work of Gergely Czuczor and János Fogarasi *A magyar nyelv szótára* (Dictionary of the Hungarian Language). Though the publication of this linguistic dinosaur between 1862 and 1874 straddled the *Ausgleich*, it is a quintessential product of the nationalist sentiment flowing from the Enlightenment, compiled mainly in the 1840s and the early 1850s. While the following hundred years saw the publication of several substantial bilingual dictionaries, progress in monolingual lexicography was slow before the break-up of the Dual Monarchy because of the explosion of lexis in virtually every field, and later perhaps because of the problems of defining Hungary and ‘Hungarianness’. Even apparently bulky works, such as József Balassa’s two-volume *A magyar nyelv szótára* (1940), amount to little more than lists of words, thin on definitions and illustrative examples. A new, major monolingual dictionary was well overdue after the Second World War, and the totalitarian regime from 1949 provided subsidized scholars with a subsidized framework for scholarship and peace — at a price — for them to work in. The price was an unending struggle between the Party and the scholars, with the latter having to make many compromises each day in order to prevent less scrupulous servants of the former from taking their bread.

A group of younger specialists first mooted an Academy Dictionary of Hungarian (ADH) at the beginning of 1949,¹ and the work of collecting material began at once under the grammarian Dénes Szabó. Work on the first two letters of the alphabet was well underway by the autumn of 1950, when the outstanding language scholar and English specialist László Országh (1907–84) took charge of a team drawn largely from the then newly-established Institute of Linguistics of the Hungarian Academy, and eventually became chief editor of the ADH (Géza Bárczi was co-editor). The preparation of a work on the scale we know now began only in late 1951 but was, perhaps surprisingly, substantially complete by the middle of the decade. The seven volumes appeared in reasonably rapid succession between 1959 and 1962. A brief account of the editing process and other aspects of the ADH can be found in Országh.² Since 1989 the ADH has been considered from a sociolinguistic perspective by Kontra,³ while Czigány⁴ has drawn attention to the fate of key individual words of this period.

However, the vast amount of information about the Hungarian language recorded in the ADH was exploited almost immediately — for purely linguistic purposes. The far-sighted

1 L. Országh (ed.), *A szótárírás elmélete és gyakorlata a Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótárában*, Budapest, 1962, p. 119.

2 Ibid., pp. 117–32.

3 M. Kontra, ‘A Magyar Nyelv Értelmező Szótárának két kiadása volt’, *Magyar Könyvszemle*, 110, 1994, pp. 433–34; idem, ‘Országh László életművének néhány tudománytörténeti vonatkozása’, *Nyelvtudományi Közlemények*, 94 [1994–95], 1997, pp. 201–19; idem, ‘Political Censorship in the Defining Dictionary of Hungarian’, *Solanus*, new series, 11, 1997, pp. 41–50; idem, “‘Stubborn as a Mule Calls for a Dialectical Representation’: On Undoing and Redoing Corpus Planning in Hungary” in M. Clyne (ed.), *Undoing and Redoing Corpus Planning*, Berlin and New York, 1997, pp. 31–60.

4 L. Czigány ‘Államosított szavaink átviágítása, avagy szótáríróink diszkrét bája’, *Kortárs*, 43, 1999, 7, pp. 1–32.

Ferenc Papp had all 58 000 head-words computer-coded by a team at the University of Debrecen and produced by 1967 the *a tergo* dictionary of Hungarian, *A magyar nyelv szóvégmutató szótára* (1969), which, with its useful grammatical codes, has been vital to the empirical study of the grammar of an agglutinating language like Hungarian. Some of the other ADH codes or style labels are of particular interest for the study of Hungarian language and society, but were perforce neglected under Communism. Head-words labelled ÚJ (new) are listed *a tergo* on pp. 593–94 of Papp's work. These are defined, by József Bencédy, as 'words that have come into being in the last few decades or have become widespread during that time. These are chiefly words of socialist society and economic order, which have recently become assimilated [*újabban meghonosodott*]. Here belong, too, those words which are today used in new senses.'⁵ Many head-words labelled SZOC E are listed by Kornai.⁶ Bencédy's definition is as follows: 'SZOC E (= *a szocializmus építése előtti* "before the building of socialism"). We have applied this label to words of bourgeois capitalist society. Of these many are still in use today, applied either to conditions obtaining in our motherland at the beginning of the century, or in discussing capitalist countries today.' It is with the latter label that this paper is concerned; though the examination of both labels together would be even more rewarding, demands of space mean that a more detailed analysis of the label ÚJ must be left for another occasion.

Unfortunately, the two published lists of words and senses labelled ÚJ and SZOC E are incomplete and so of limited use. The search programme used to produce these lists picked up SZOC E and ÚJ only if either of these was the first style code to the right of the head-word, and on the same line. The programme thus leaves out, first, words with more than one sense and with only one (or more) of these sense(s) labelled (that is, all items in the Appendix with a figure other than 0 in column B); second, head-words and senses with another style or range code preceding these two (for example, Kornai's list has *részvényes* 'shareholder', but misses *részvény* 'share' before it, and *részvénytársaság* '(joint stock) company' after it, because in these cases the abbreviation for Economics, [*Közg.*], precedes)⁷; and, finally, longer head-words which push the codes mentioned into the next line (for example, *szolgalegény* 'servant, farmhand'). Kontra is aware of some of these problems, but not, perhaps, of their scale. This chapter makes accessible for the first time the entire stock of head-words and word-senses in the ADH marked with the code SZOC E: the Appendix lists some thousand items, about three times as many as Kornai.

Although the labels SZOC E and ÚJ are hardly 'hard-core' lexicographic labels and typically do not translate easily into style labels even in other monolingual dictionaries, they are in their own way chronological (as well as style) labels and must be seen in the context of the more traditional time-span labels which ADH also employs. The following, deliberately unpolished, glosses are translated from Országh,⁸ where the wording is again attributed to Bencédy. Words and senses may be marked as follows. ELAV(ULT) 'obsolete'; such words 'disappeared from use by the mid-nineteenth century'; note how easily this label is conflated with SZOC E in less formal discussion.⁹ ELAVULÓBAN 'obsolescent' ('increasingly rare, slowly being pushed to the periphery of the language of everyday life, for example, *bajonett*, *árvaház* "orphanage"). RÉG(I) 'old/archaic' ('words or senses that are old or fairly old, which, although understood by a contemporary speaker without the need for further explanation, nevertheless live on only in the language of the

5 Országh (ed.), *A szótárírás elmélete...*, p. 54.

6 A. Kornai, 'Szótári adatbázis az akadémiai nagyszámítógépen', *Műhelymunkák a nyelvészet és társtudományai köréből II*, June 1986, pp. 68–71.

7 Ibid., p. 70.

8 Országh (ed.), *A szótárírás elmélete...*, p. 54.

9 For example, Czigány 'Államosított szavaink átvilágítása', p. 9.

older generation. Words labelled thus would today be replaced by other words. These are not to be confused with words typical of past historical periods [for example, *aga*, *bán2*], which continue to be unique labels for those particular contents'). The latter are usually marked TÖRT(ÉNELEM) 'history'.

The two codes SZOC E and ÚJ provide an interesting example of transition, labelling (respectively) items which it was thought would disappear with the triumph of socialism and items by which these would begin to be replaced in the new order. Kontra has discussed (with invaluable archival material) the nature of the censorship that plagued the ADH and shown how the censorship resulted in what he calls the second edition of the first two volumes of the ADH, some entry-words and example sentences in these having aroused ire within and without Hungary. Yet according to Országh 'in the final phase of the work, after the draft manuscript was ready, it seemed necessary to have the manuscript of several hundred entries assessed from the point of view of Marxist-Leninist ideology by suitable people, so that their views might support the editors in the creation of the final text.'¹⁰

The very careful language suggests that, although entries were no doubt scrutinized from the ideological point of view, in fact, from volume III onwards (when Országh took charge), only a selection was offered to the censors and even this selection was in a semi-ready state, the principles of the dictionary as a whole having been agreed well beforehand. It is likely that only the simple insertion of labels was possible. Thus it seems that, despite all the criticisms that have been levelled at the ADH, including what follows, and without going into the strongly didactic and now dated nature of some of its illustrative material (though see some comment on this below), in the case of these two labels we are dealing with opinions about concepts, rather than a serious distortion of the dictionary by them. This is one reason why the ADH has survived almost forty years as a valuable tool for those serious about using Hungarian. These opinions about the old and new orders can now be tested against experience at the end of a century which Hungary began as a part of a greater European unit; in this context, the transition of 1945–49 needs to be set against the as yet unfinished re-transition that began in about 1989, and compared with the experience of neighbouring countries and peoples. I hope that the database below for SZOC E will focus attention on the other transition to which this volume is devoted, and also contribute to comparative work (such as that of M. Clyne on 'East German' and K. Janicki on Polish)¹¹ on the lexicographical corpora of Central Europe in the twentieth century.

A first look at the database suggests the following points, some of them tentative:

(1) Head-words with senses labelled both SZOC E and ÚJ show how a number of terms from the pre-war regime were retained and redefined, an important point to bear in mind when discussing the terminology of the Communist regime. In the sea-change these implied an anchor that did not in fact exist. Examples include *államügyész*, *bank*, *deklasszált*, *gyermeknap*, *tanárjelölt*, *kisgyűlés*, *leányotthon*, *nyereségrészesedés*, *pártcsoport*, *szakvizsga* (particularly clear examples underlined).

(2) It is possible to document in detail the unremitting attack on private ownership and private gain. A special sense of *dolgozik* 'to work' is admitted as its sense 2, marked *főleg* SZOC E (mainly pre-socialist) 'pursuing activity for one's own gain' with examples including 'he works in the paper industry'; sense 3 is reserved for 'activity in the interest of the community'. Similarly, *üzletet vezet* 'runs a shop' is split into (1) 'runs the shop as

¹⁰ Országh (ed.), *A szótárírás elmélete...*, p. 124.

¹¹ K. Janicki 'Sociolinguistics in Poland: History and Prospects' in J. Harlig and C. Pléh (eds), *When East Meets West: Sociolinguistics in the Former Socialist Bloc*, Berlin and New York, 1995, pp. 165–84.

its manager', and (2) 'runs one's own shop', with the latter marked SZOC E. (Only some 8 per cent of the items are verbs). While *folyószámla* 'current account' or *számlatulajdonos* 'account holder' is SZOC E if run by an individual: a corporate referent is unmarked. Further work along these lines will reveal that sometimes a new sense is identified (instead of, say, a metaphorical extension of the old) largely to make a Communist point: *végperc* 'dying moment(s)' (a compound not listed in more recent dictionaries) is split into two senses, the second illustrated by *a reakciós rendszer végpercei* 'the dying days of reactionaries'. The semantic criteria here are transparently political rather than linguistic.

(3) Adjectives, which form less than 10 per cent of the items in the SZOC E list, are also frequently assigned a distinctive sense when their referent noun is not favoured or desirable in the new society. The implication is that one will not find this quality attaching to a particular noun in the future, but the notion that one may wish to discuss the world outside Hungary seems not always to have occurred to the lexicographers. One sense of *rongyos* 'ragged, bedraggled' is marked SZOC E: 'poor, penniless and therefore looked down on; miserable'. Likewise *magányos* 'lonely', where a separate sense, 4, is SZOC E: 'in an exploitative society <a person> who fails to find his/her place and lacks company'. *Vegyes* 'mixed, assorted' is SZOC E and pejorative in sense 2: '<as used by pompous people who isolate themselves from working folk:> an *ad hoc* group which includes those that the speaker regarded as being of lower standing than him/herself and whom — esp. if they were members of the working classes — (s)he looked down on or despised.' Under socialism the saying 'a poor man is dogged by poor luck', is clearly inappropriate (*szegény*). *Szilárd* 'stable' is SZOC E with *piac* 'market' or *tőzsde* 'stock market', but unmarked otherwise, even with reference to prices or money. On occasion one wonders at the vehemence of the lexicographer, as in Kontra's find *jótékony* 'charitable': 'SZOC E <in an exploitative society> [a well-to-do person or institution] giving donations to selected "poor folk" in a humiliating manner while using philanthropic and religious slogans to conceal the necessity for radical social change.'¹²

(4) The nature of some of the inevitable inconsistencies is worth attention in that even some defining word might be non-SZOC E although the entry-word has this label. This further confirms that form (sound, register, connotation, etc.) plays a role in SZOC E labelling; it is not all a matter of content. *Házmeester* 'concierge' is SZOC E, for its connotations, but 'defined' as *házfelügyelő*, which as an entry is marked Official. *Bolsevista* and *szocialista*, in the sense 'Social Democrat', are similarly SZOC E but defined by unmarked one-word definitions: *bolsevik* and *szociáldemokrata*, respectively. In other cases there is a kind of word-family discrepancy in marking: *gróf* 'count', is marked History, while *grófné* and *grófnő* 'countess' are both SZOC E; similarly, *főúr* 'aristocrat' is also marked History, while the adjective *főúri* is SZOC E. On the other hand, all but one (pre-sixteenth century) sense of the entire word-family of *báró* 'baron' is SZOC E; one wonders if the lexicographers were here thinking of the large number of unhistorical (and often Jewish) barons created in the final decades of the Monarchy. As for *fajvédő* 'pertaining to racial protection, racist' unmarked and *fajvédelem* 'racial protection, racism' labelled SZOC E, perhaps there was more confidence about the policy, rather than its adherents, being swept away by the tide of history.

(5) As this last example suggests, referents cannot be abolished by mere lexicographic fiat. From the automatic SZOC E accorded the *cseléd* 'servant, maid' family of words, Kontra¹³ cites *cselédszoba* 'servant's room' as a physical part of many flats and houses that will survive well into the twenty-first century despite the change in the social status of

12 Kontra, "Stubborn as a Mule", p. 36.

13 Ibid., pp. 46–47.

its occupants. Nor has the 'national minority' sense of *kisebbség* been abolished by 'socialism'.

(6) In fact, the list should help identify areas of Hungarian life which have been particularly affected by the transition to Communism. Finance and Politics seem most important, with Politics being of widest interest. The codes in the list will, it is hoped, assist further analysis. Here I note only adjectives and verbs referring to the peoples that surround Hungary. Historic ones like *rác* 'Serb', *tót* 'Slav (in historic Hungary, later) Slovak' and *oláh* 'Wallachian, Romanian'¹⁴ were replaced under Communism by *szerb*, *szlovák* and *román*, respectively. Interestingly, only *rác* and *oláh* are marked SZOC E. The only other pejorative verb of the type *elmagyarosít* 'make Hungarian (often forcibly)' is *elcsehesít* 'make Czech'. Perhaps an important factor is the presence and proportion in inter-war Hungary of the peoples forming the three post-Trianon nations.

(7) Finally, the words and senses marked SZOC E need to be taken together with many of the Communist illustrative sentences in ADH, which show with particular clarity how the 'pre-socialist' prescriptivism of Hungarian linguistics in many ways fitted in well with the socialist prescriptions of Stalinist Hungary. Just as the comment *mainly in the plural* following *függönykarika* 'curtain-ring' slides from the description of language into that of a conventional domestic tableau, so — more strikingly — does the definition of *susogó mássalhangzó* 's(h)ibilant' (s. v. *susogó*) reflect the cultural furnishings of the times rather than anything properly linguistic when it avers that such sounds occur 'especially in connection with the Russian language'.

14 On the last, see Peter Sherwood's review of *A magyar nyelv történeti-etimológiai szótára 1967–1973* in *Slavonic and East European Review*, 56, 1978, 2, p. 292.

*Guide to Appendix: The label SZOC E in
the Academy Dictionary of Hungarian (1959–62)*

column A: entry-word; longer entries are sometimes subdivided by Roman numerals I, II, etc., which are here added to the entry-word

column B: sense(s); within each sense, finer distinctions are marked by lower-case a, b, c, d, etc.

0: (SZOC E refers to) entire entry

1: (SZOC E refers to) sense marked 1. in ADH; etc.

columns CDE: spheres or domains in which entry-word or sense is found; given in the order found in ADH, with 0 marking location of SZOC E label

B	Banking	C	Economics
D	Public Administration	E	Commerce, Trade
F	Finance	G	Health
H	History	I	School, Education
J	Law	K	Military
L	Gaming	M	Agriculture
P	Politics	Q	Sport
S	Theatre	T	Science
U	Business	V	Religion
W	Media	Y	Railways

column F: Style and usage labels

- 1 metaphorical use (*átv*)
- 2 colloquial usage (*biz*)
- 3 official use (*hiv*)
- 4 rustic (*nép*)
- 5 rare (*ritk*)
- 6 pejorative (*rosszalló*)
- 7 journalese (*sajtó*)
- 8 elevated usage (*vál*)
- 9 mocking or sarcastic (*gúny*)

column G: Number of stems in entry-word (NB historically, and bound items, like *fel-* in *felár*, count also, but not simple co-verbs)

column H: Word-class of entry (mainly)

- A adjective
- H noun (human)
- N noun (non-human)
- S salutation, form of address
- V verb
- X used when entry is found only as part of one or two set phrases

column I: translation/explanation, and sometimes comments. Bracketed [v. ÚJ id.] means at least two definitions, glossed SZOC E and ÚJ (new) respectively, in same entry: see text; [def!] marks notable or illuminating definitions; [eg!] indicates that the illustrative example is interesting.

Appendix: List of items in the *Academy Dictionary of Hungarian* (1959–62) marked SZOC E (pre-socialist).

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
adópenztár	0	0				3	N	board of inland revenue
adóprés	0	0			6	2	N	tax burden
adótiszt	0	0			3	2	H	revenue officer
agitátor	1	P	0			1	H	propagandist
agrárpárt	0	P	0			2	N	agrarian party
agrárproletár	0	P	0			2	H	agricultural labourer
ajánló	2	P	0			1	H	sponsor (of applicant)
alacsony	4bcd	0			16	1	A	lowly (origin, rank)
aláíró	2	C	0			1	H	subscriber (e.g. of bond)
alázat	4	0				1	N	in: 'I beg to report'; else unmarked
alázatos	3	0				1	S	in: 'your humble servant'; else unmarked
alispán	0	D	0			2	H	elected head of <i>vármegye</i>
aljegyző	0	0				2	H	county clerk; clerk of court
alkusz	0	C	0			1	H	broker
alkuszdíj	0	C	0			2	N	brokerage, commission
államfogház	0	J	0			3	N	state prison (lenient)
államkincstár	2	0				3	N	state treasury
államköltséges	0	0				2	X	state-maintained (place, scholar)
államrendőrség	0	D	0			2	N	state police
államsorsjáték	0	0				3	N	state lottery
államsorsjegy	0	0				3	N	state lottery ticket
államtudomány	0	T	0			2	N	political science
államügyész	0	J	0			2	H	state prosecutor [v. ÚJ id.]
állomány	3	D	0			1	X	early retirement of pre-1952 civil servants
alpolgármester	0	D	0			3	H	deputy mayor
amerikázik	1	0				1	V	go slow
angolkisasszony	0	V	0			3	H	Mary-Ward nun
anyaghitel	2	0				2	N	credit in the form of goods
aratógazda	0	0			4	2	H	leader of harvesting gang
aratómunkás	0	0				2	H	harvester
aratósztrájk	0	0				2	N	harvesters' strike
áresés	0a	E	0			2	N	fall in prices, slump

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
árfolyam	1a	F	0			2	N	price, quotation, exchange rate
árja	3	0				1	A	'non-Jew in Fascist usage'
árlap	2	C	0			2	N	daily commodities index
árrombolás	0	E	0			2	N	dumping, undercutting
áruhitel	0	E	B	0		2	N	commodity credit
árutőzsde	0	E	0			2	N	commodity (esp. corn) exchange
áruváltó	0	0	E			2	N	trade bill of exchange
árvapénz	0	0				2	N	assets of the orphans' court
árvaszék	0	D	0			2	N	orphans' court
árvaszéki	0	D	0			2	A	pertaining to above
árvaügy	0	0				2	N	matters pertaining to above.
áthozat	2	0			3	1	N	amount brought forward [note: illustrative sentence contains date 1958]
ázsiai	2	0			53	1	X	<i>x állapotok</i> barbarian conditions
bajtársi	1	0				1	X	<i>x egyesület</i> nationalist/racist fraternity
bálanya	0	0				2	H	lady sponsor of ball
banda	4	0			4	1	N	team of agricultural workers
bandagazda	0	0			4	2	H	leader of such a team
bank	1	0				1	N	[collects surplus capital; v. ÚJ id.]
bankár	1	0				1	H	banker
bankbetét	0	B	0			2	N	bank deposit
bankfiú	0	0			26	2	H	young, affluent banker
bankház	0	0				2	N	bank
bankkölcsön	0	0				2	N	bank loan
bankóprés	0a	0			4	2	N	inflationary policies [<i>rég</i>]
banktőke	0	0				2	N	bank assets
bankuzsora	0	0				2	N	banks' usurious rates
banküzlet	0	C	0			2	N	deal; small bank premises
bankvezér	0	0				2	H	director of bank; banking mogul

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
bankzárlat	0	C	F	0		2	N	closure of banks
bányajog	2	J	0			2	N	mining rights
bárca	7	0				1	N	(prostitute's) licence
bárcás	2	0				1	X	<i>x kurva</i> licensed prostitute
báró	1	0				1	H	baron
bárói	0	0				1	A	baronial; a baron's
báróné	1	0				2	H	baroness [wife of baron]
bárónő	0	0				2	H	baroness [in own right]
báróság	0	0				1	N	barony
becsületbíróság	0	0				2	N	tribunal/court of honour
beházasodik	2	0				1	V	marry into [money, rich family]
bélista	0	0				2	N	unemployed civil servants post-WWI
bélistás	0	0				2	H	one on such a list
bélistáz	0	0				2	V	put on such a list
beltag	1	E	0			2	H	partner, Lloyd's-type 'name'
benősül	0	0			2	1	V	= <i>beházasodik</i>
bentkosztos	0	0			4	2	H	live-in (employee); boarder (school)
bércséplés	0	M	0			2	N	threshing by hired hand
béresII	0	0				1	H	hired hand (usu. for oxen)
béresgazda	0	0				2	H	head of hired hands
béreslegény	0	0				2	H	young farm labourer
bérlőII	1	0				1	H	lessee of farm/factory, for profit
beszegődik	0	0			4	1	V	enter service, hire oneself out (farm)
betegbiztosítás	0	0				2	N	private health insurance
betét	7	E	0			1	N	part of assets
bíróviselt	0	0				2	H	ex-magistrate
biztos	2	0				1	H	policeman; detective
biztosíték	2a	J	0			1	N	deposit; guarantee
bolsevista	0	P	0			1	H	= <i>bolsevik</i> [which is unmarked]
bordély	0	0			8	1	N	bordello
bordélyház	0	0			3	2	N	id.
bordélyos	0	0			2	1	H	brothel madam/keeper
borkereskedő	0	0				2	H	wine merchant

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
botosispán	0	0				2	H	farm overseer
börze	0	D	0			1	N	stock exchange
börzejátékos	0	0				2	H	player on the stock exchange
börzés	0	0				2	H	id.
börzeügylet	0	0			6	2	N	deal, transaction [6: <i>kissé</i>]
börzéz	0	0			6	1	V	play on the stock exchange [6: <i>gyak</i>]
börziáner	0	0			26	1	H	= <i>börzés</i>
bukás	5	E	0		1	1	N	becoming insolvent
bukik	9	E	0			1	V	become insolvent
bukott	6	E	0		1	1	A	(state of being) insolvent
buktat	7	E	0		5	1	V	make insolvent
cégbíróság	0	E	0			2	N	court of registration, Companies' House
cégjegyzék	0	E	0			2	N	company register
cégtárs	0	E	0			2	H	partner in firm
cégvezető	0	E	0			2	H	manager
címzetes	0	0				1	A	honorary (title)
cívis	0	0				1	H	old (Debrecen) family
cselák	0	0			9	1	H	Czech
cseléd	1	0				1	H	(maid)servant
cselédbér	1	0				2	N	servant's wages
cselédház	0	0				2	N	servants'/staff/farmhands' quarters
cselédkönyv	0	0				2	N	servant's permit/licence
cselédlakás	0	0				2	N	servants'/staff quarters
cselédlány	0	0				2	H	maid, serving girl
cselédlépcső	0	0				2	N	back stairs
cselédnyúzás	0	0				2	N	exploitation of servants
cselédség	0	0				1	N	the servant class
cselédsor	0	0				2	N	the fate of being a servant
cselédszerző	0	0				2	NHA	staff agency
cselédszoba	0	0				2	N	maid's room [Kontra, "Stubborn as a Mule", pp. 46–47]
cselekvő	3	J	E	0	5	1	A	available (assets)
csendestárs	0	E	0			2	H	sleeping partner
csendőr	1	0				2	H	gendarme; military
csendőrörs	0	0				3	H	gendarme post

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
csendőrség	0	0				2	N	gendarmerie; military
csendőrsortűz	0	0				4	N	volley fired by gendarmes
csizmás	2	0			6	1	HA	‘uncivilized person’
csőd	1	J	E			1	N	bankruptcy
csődbíróság	0	J	0			2	N	court of bankruptcy
csődeljárás	0	J	0			2	N	winding up, liquidation
csődper	0	J	0			2	N	bankruptcy case
csődtömeg	1	J	0			2	N	bankrupt’s sequestered assets
csődtömeggondnok	0	J	0			3	H	liquidator, administrator
csődtörvény	0	J	0			2	N	law on bankruptcy
deklasszált	1	0				1	A	déclassé [v. ÚJ id.]
demokrata	2	0			6	1	A	not aristocratic or gentlemanly [6: <i>gyak</i>]
demokratikus	2	0			6	1	A	plebeian [6: <i>gyak</i>]
demokratizál	2	0				1	V	make available to the wider public
demokratizálódik	2	0				1	V	become available to the wider public
diákszövetség	2a	0				2	N	students’ union [def!]
diákvezér	0	0				2	H	student leader
díjas	2	0				1	X	clerk/trainee paid by the day
díjbirkózó	0	0				2	H	professional wrestler
díjnok	0	0				1	H	clerk paid by the day [<i>díjnokoskodik</i> unmarked]
díjtalan	2	0				1	X	unpaid trainee clerk
direktrisz	0	0			58	1	H	woman director
díszdoktor	0	0				2	H	doctor <i>honoris causa</i> [def!]
diszkvalifikál	2	0				1	V	rule out of order (social behaviour)
díszmagyar	0	0				2	N	nobles’ apparel
disszidál	2	P	0			1	V	leave political party [v. ÚJ id.]
dividenda	0	F	C			1	N	dividend [<i>diszkont</i> , <i>dömping</i> : unmarked]
dohányjövedék	0	E	0			2	N	tobacco monopoly income

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
dolgozik	2	0				1	V	profit for oneself [def! v. ÚJ id.] [uniquely: <i>főleg szoc e</i>]
dologház	0	J	0			2	N	workhouse
döntvény	0	J	0			1	N	important court ruling/decision
döntvénytár	0	J	0			2	N	the Law Reports
dugsegély	0	0			6	2	N	shady discretionary payments
egyes	5a	I	0			1	N	top mark
egyesbíró	0	J	0			2	H	judge ordinary
egyke	2	0				1	N	only-childism
egykerendszer	0	0				2	N	the institution of having only one child
egykez	0	E	0			1	N	monopoly trading
egyoldalú	2	0				2	X	'unilateral note' (duelling)
elcsehesít	0	0				1	V	bohemicize [def!]
elemi	4	0				1	X	primary school
elemista	0	0				1	H	child at junior school
elfogadóII	2	E	B	J		1	H	consignee, payee, drawee
elfogadvány	0	E	B	J		1	N	acceptance form
elit	2	0				1	A	high-class
ellenzék	1	P	0			1	N	(the) opposition
elmagyarosít	0	0				1	V	magyarize
előkelő	1	0				1	A	distinguished socially [def!]
előljáráóság	1	0				2	N	magistracy
előnév	1	0				2	X	noble's forename/prefix
elszerez	1	0				1	V	secure employment for staff
eltoloncol	0	0				1	V	transport, deport
emléklap	3	K	0			2	N	certificate
engedmény	3	E	0			1	N	discount [<i>diszkont</i> unmarked]
érdekházasság	0	0				2	N	marriage of convenience [eg!]
érdekszövetkezet	2	0				2	N	cartel
értékII	1c	F	0			1	N	nominal value of banknote
értékIII	2	F	0			1	N	the banknote itself
értékpapír	0a	E	0			2	N	share

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
értékpapír-üzlet	0	E	0			3	N	dealing in shares
értékpiac	0	E	0			2	N	share market
értéktőzsde	0	E	0			2	N	share exchange
esküdt	1	0				1	H	juror; deputy
év	4c	0				1	N	'financial year'
évjáradék	0	0				2	N	annuity
exportcég	0	E	0			2	N	exporter (firm)
fajmagyar	0	0				2	H	racially pure Magyar
fajrokon	2	0				2	N	racially kin people
fajvédelem	0	P	0			2	N	racial protection [<i>fajvédő</i> unmarked]
farkaskölyök	2	0				2	H	cub (scout)
fegyház	0	J	0			2	N	penitentiary
fegyházbüntetés	0	J	0			2	N	punishment in a penitentiary
felár	0	E	F	0		2	N	surcharge, premium
felhajt	7	E	0			1	V	force/drive up (prices)
félingyenes	0	I	0			2	AH	reduced-/half-cost
felléptet	4	0				1	V	sponsor candidate
felmegy	6b	F	0			1	V	rise (shares)
félproletár	0	0				2	H	(factory) worker with own plot
felsőII	3a	0			2	1	N	V-VIII secondary school [v. ÚJ id.]
felügyelőII	0a	0				1	H	administrator (of assets)
felver	7	o			1	1	V	= <i>felhajt</i>
félvér	3	0			2	2	H	'half-Jew(ish)'
fenséges	1	0				1	S	addressing royalty [<i>felség</i> unmarked]
fezör	0	0			6	1	H	wheeler-dealer
fiatalúr	0	0				2	S	young man (form of address)
filiálé	0	0			7	1	N	branch
filmcsillag	0	S	0			2	H	film-star
filozófia	2a	I	0			1	N	psychology/logic (secondary school)
filozófiai	2	I	0			1	A	pertaining to above
fizetéscsökkentés	0	0				2	N	pay cut [<i>fizetésemelés</i> unmarked]
fizetéstelen	0	0				1	A	unsalaried

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
fogadalom	2a	0				1	N	oath of office (lower-grade)
fogadónap	2	0				2	N	at-home day
fogadóóra	2	0				2	N	hours (of opening)
fogdmeg	1	0			29	2	H	cop
fogház	1	J	0			2	H	detention centre, prison
folyószámla	0a	E	0			2	N	<i>individual's</i> current account
	5b	E	0			1	N	turnover
forgat	7a	F	0			1	V	endorse
forgatmány	0	F	0			1	N	endorsed paper
forgatmányos	0	F	0			1	A	endorsee
forgatmányoz	0	F	0			1	V	endorse
forgatóII	1	F	0			1	H	endorsee
főbíró	1	0			2	2	H	district judge
főhivatalnok	0	0				2	H	top civil servant
főigazgató	1	I	0			2	H	district school administrator
főintéző	2	M	0			2	H	top agricultural engineer
főispán	0	D	0			2	H	head of county administration
főjegyző	0	D	0			2	H	deputy to above
főkapitány	3	D	H			2	X	'chief constable'
főkapitányság	0	0				2	N	office of the chief constable
főkortes	0	P	0			2	H	chief lobbyist
földbirtokos	0	0				2	H	landowner
földesúr	0	0				2	H	land-owning magnate
főméltóságú	0	0				2	S	(Your) Grace
főpolgármester	0	0				3	H	mayor of Budapest
főszolgabíró	0	D				3	H	district judge
főtanácsos	0	0				2	H	counsellor
főúri	1	0				1	A	aristocratic [<i>főúr</i> , marked Tört].
főügyész	2	0				2	H	public prosecutor
frakció	2	0				1	N	faction [v. ÚJ id.]
fürdős	1	1				1	H	bathhouse-/spa-owner
gabonabér	0	0				2	N	payment in kind in agricultural work
gabonapiac	1	0				2	N	grain market

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
garniszálló	0	0				2	N	hotel of dubious repute [cf. <i>butik</i>]
gazdaifjú	0	0				2	H	young farmer
gazdakör	0	0				2	N	farmers' club
gazdalegény	0	0				2	H	farmer's son
gazdatiszt	0	0				2	H	farm manager
géprész	2	0				2	N	threshing machine owner's share of crop
gimnázium	1	0				1	N	secondary school [v. ÚJ id.]
grófné	0	0				2	H	countess [<i>gróf</i> marked Tört]
grófnő	0	0				2	H	countess (in her own right)
gründöl	0	C	0		2	1	V	establish [6: <i>néha</i>] [def!]
gyámpénz	0	0				2	N	money held in trust for those in care
gyáriparos	0	0				2	H	industrialist, factory owner
gyártulajdonos	0	0				2	H	factory owner [= <i>gyáros</i> but unmarked]
gyermekmenhely	0	0				3	N	children's refuge/shelter
gyermekmunka	1	C	0			2	N	child labour
gyermeknap	2	0				2	N	Day of the Child [v. ÚJ id.]
gyermekszoba	2	0			1	2	N	Kinderstube, manners
habilitál	0	0				1	V	sich habilitieren
hadapród	0	K	T	0		2	H	cadet
hadapródiskola	0	K	T	0		3	N	cadet school
hadapródjelölt	0	K	T	0		3	H	trainee cadet
hadapród-őrmester	0	K	0			4	H	commissioned cadet [before 1945]
hadimilliomos	0	0				2	H	war profiteer [First World War only]
haditörvényszék	0	K	0			3	N	military court, court martial
hadseregszállító	0	0				3	NHA	army supplier [= <i>hadiszállító rég</i>]
hajdú	2	0				1	H	bailiff
hármás	4a	I	0			1	N	good/satisfactory (mark)
haszonrész	1	C	0			2	N	share of the profits

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
haszonrészesedés	1	C	0			2	N	receiving a share of the profits
határidőügylet	0	E	0			3	N	deal on futures market
hátirat	1	F	0			2	N	= <i>forgatmány</i>
ház	8	0			1	1	N	'(lower) House of Parliament'
házasságközvetítés	1	0				2	N	marriage broking
házasságközvetítő	1	0				2	HN	marriage broker
házbirtok	0	0				2	N	house [as property]
házfeloszlítás	0	P	0			2	N	end of parliamentary session
házgondnok	1	0				2	H	concierge
házi	1c	G	0		2	1	H	<i>x terhes</i> 'pregnant woman working in hospital to pay for own confinement'
házcseléd	0	0				2	H	servant
háziezred	0	K	0			2	N	local regiment
házikisasszony	2	0				3	H	belle of the ball
háziszolga	0	0				2	H	servant (male)
háziúr	0	0				2	H	landlord, house owner
házmester	1	0				2	H	= <i>házfelügyelő</i> , which is <i>hiv.</i>
háznagy	2	0				2	H	sergeant-at-arms
házparancsnok	0	0				2	H	air-raid warden (Second World War)
házzsabály	0	P	0			2	N	standing orders
hecclap	0	0			2	2	N	scandal-sheet, rag [newspaper]
hegybíró	1	D	0			2	H	leader of wine-growers
hegyközség	0	D	0			2	N	wine-growing community
helyettes	2	0				1	HA	'acting, deputy'
helyszerző	0	0				2	HNA	(house-)staff agency
hentesinas	0	0				2	H	butcher's lad
henteslegény	0	0				2	H	young butcher
hentessegéd	0	0				2	H	butcher's assistant
herceg	1	0				1	H	prince (of blood royal)
	3	0				1	H	'in certain monarchies...'
hercegi	0	0				1	A	princely, prince's
hercegnő	0	0				2	H	princess

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
hercegség	0	0				1	N	principality, principedom
hirdet	2	0				1	V	'árverést, versenytárgyalást x
hitelintézet	0	F	B	0		2	N	credit bank [announce (auction, bid)]
hivatalszolga	0	0				2	H	office junior [v. ÚJ: hivatalsegéd]
hólabda-rendszer	2	E	0			3	N	pyramid-selling
huligán	1b	P	0			1	H	vandal [v. ÚJ id.]
huncutság	2	0				-	X	villainy ['a politika úri x, az urak x-a']
húsiparos	0	0			3	2	H	meat trader [but <i>húsipar</i> unmarked]
illemtanár	0	0			5	2	H	teacher of deportment
illetményhivatal	0	0				2	N	salary office
immúnis	2	P	0			1	A	enjoying diplomatic immunity
immunitás	3	P	0			1	N	diplomatic immunity
impresszárió	0	0				1	H	impresario
inas	1	0				1	H	trade/craft apprentice/assistant
	2	0				1	H	valet
inasiskola	0	0			2	2	N	school for professional training
ingatlaniroda	0	0				2	N	estate agent
ingyenhely	0	0				2	N	free place
injekcióz	2	0			15	1	V	pump money into sthg
ínségadó	0	0			3	2	N	poor tax
ínségmunka	0	0			3	2	N	relief (work)
ínségsegély	0	0			3	2	N	relief, aid
intellektuális	4	0				1	X	'serious fraud (office)' [before 1949]
intelligencia	2	0				1	H	village administrators, intelligentsia
intéző	2	M	0			1	H	bailiff, steward
intézkvény	3	E	0			1	N	banker's draft
intézkvényez	0	E	0			1	V	draft
intézkvényezett	0	E	0			1	H	drawee
iparbáró	0	0			76	2	H	industrial magnate [6: <i>gyak</i>]
ipariskola	0	0				2	N	vocational school

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
iparkamara	0	0				2	N	chamber of industry
iparmágnás	0	0			7	2	H	industrial magnate
iparosinas	0	0				2	H	industrial apprentice
iparostanuló	0	0			3	2	H	industrial trainee
iparraiziskola	0	0				3	N	technical school
ipartestület	0	0				2	N	industrial association
iroda	1a	0				1	N	office in professions [def!]
irodaigazgató	0	0			3	2	H	(public) office manager
ismétlőiskola	0	I				2	N	domestic/agricultural school
ispán	1	0				1	H	estate steward [the official is 2. Tört]
istállómester	2a	0				2	H	stable manager on large estate
istállótulajdonos	0	Q	0			2	H	stable owner
ítélőtábla	0	J	0			2	N	board/court of appeal
játékengedély	1	S/ L	0			2	N	theatre or gaming licence
játékklub	0	0				2	N	casino, gaming club [def!]
javítóintézet	0	0				2	N	borstal, detention centre
jegyIII	3a	C	F	0		1	N	banknote
jegyIV	0a	K	0			1	N	military note, dispatch
jegyez	2	P	E	0		1	V	be quoted on stock exchange; vouch for
jegyző	3	0				1	H	parish/town clerk [pre-1949]
jegyzőség	3	0				1	N	county office, town hall
jelleg	3	0			3	1	N	<i>cím és x</i> 'name and title' [occ. <i>tréf</i>]
jó	4	0				1	A	'belonging to the upper strata' [def!]
jobb	4	P	0			1	N	the right (in parliament)
jogakadémia	0	I	0			2	N	law school
joggyakornok	1	0				2	H	trainee lawyer
jószágigazgató	0	0				2	H	estate manager
jótékony	1	0				1	A	charitable [def!]
jótékonykodik	0	0				1	H	give regularly to charity
jótékonyság	1	0				1	N	support of charities
kabinetalakítás	1	P	0			2	N	forming of the cabinet
kabinetiroda	0	0				2	N	cabinet office

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
kabinetkérdés	0	P	0			2	N	cabinet matter
kadét	1	0				1	H	cadet [but <i>kadétiskola</i> only Tört.]
kakastollas	1	0				2	XH	<i>x (kalap)</i> gendarme('s cock-feather hat)
kamara	2	0				1	N	chamber, guild (professions')
kamat-rabszolgaság	0	0			7	3	N	interest-bondage
kapitány	6	0				1	H	(police) captain
kardbojt	2	K	0			2	N	sword-knot (as symbol of officer caste)
kardcsörtető	1	0				2	AH	sabre-rattling
kardpárbaj	0	0				2	N	sword duel
karpaszomány	0	K	0			2	N	officer's pips
karpaszományos	0	K	0			2	AH	army officer [pre-1945]
kaszinó	1	0				1	N	(building of) gentlemen's club
kaszinótag	0	0				2	H	member of gentlemen's club
kaszírnök	0	0				2	H	woman at till, checkout girl
kasznár	0	0				1	H	estate manager (above <i>ispán</i> in rank)
kasszanap	0	F	0			2	N	payday
kaszt	2	0			16	1	N	caste, 'closed reactionary group'
katalógus	2	I	0			1	N	register
katonaiskola	0	0			2	2	N	school for sons of army officers
katonásdi	2	0			9	1	N	playing at soldiers in Horthy's army
kaució	0	0				1	N	bail
kegydíj	0	0				2	N	discretionary pension
kegydíjas	0	0				2	H	discretionary pensioner
kegyelmes	3	0				1	S	address to ruler, nobility, people
kegyúr	0	J	V	0		2	H	patron, advowee
kéjelgés	2	0			3	1	N	<i>titkos x</i> unlicensed soliciting
kéjnök	0	0			3	2	H	prostitute [def!]
kékharisnya	0	0			6	2	H	bluestocking [def!]

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
kényszeregyezés	0	E	0			2	N	settling with one's debtors
kényszerkölcsön	0	0				2	N	compulsory loan to state [def!]
kényszermunka	1	J	0			2	N	forced labour
kényszernyugdíjaz	0	0			3	2	V	forced early retirement
képviselő-testület	0	D	0			3	N	county or community council
kereskedelmi	5	I	0			1	AN	trade/commercial school
kereskedelmista	0	I	0		2	1	H	student at trade school
keresztanya	2	0			7	2	H	woman who launches ships
kertészsegéd	0	0				2	H	under-gardener
kicenzúráz	0	0				1	V	censor [cf. Kontra, 'Ország László', p. 45]
kifutóII	1	0				1	H	office boy/girl, gofer
kihallgatás	4	0				1	N	audience
kihívóII	1	0				1	H	challenge to a duel
kihúz	0	0			1	1	V	<i>x-za vkinek a lába alól a földet</i> deprive s.o. of their living on the land
kijáróII	2	0			6	1	H	fixer
kiköt	3	K	0			1	V	army punishment: tie to column/tree
kilök	3	0			12	1	V	throw out of job
kimenő II	2	0				1	N	time off
kimenőnap	0	0				2	N	day off
kincstári	1a	F	0			2	A	<i>x jegy/utalvány</i> treasury bond
kisasszony	1b	0				2	H	a town miss
	2	0				2	S	Miss
	2	0				2	A	<i>telefonos x telephonist</i> (woman) etc.
	3	0				2	H	young lady of the house [táj]
kisbéres	0	0				2	H	young lad working on farm
kisbíró	1	0				2	H	town crier
kisebbség	2a	P	0			1	N	minority
kisebbségi	2	P	0			1	A	minority
kisember	0	0			7	2	H	the man in the street
kisgazda	1	0				2	H	smallholder, small farmer

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
kisgyűlés	2	D	0			2	N	local meeting [v. ÚJ id.]
kiskocsi	3	0				2	N	small carriage
kiskorú	2	0			15	2	A	people not ready for self-government [def!]
kisközség	0	D	0			2	N	parish council
kistájgerol	0	0			2	1	V	winkle tenant out by raising rent
kistökés	0	0				2	H	entrepreneur
kollekció	0a	E				1	N	(salesman's) range/samples
komenció	0	0			4	1	N	payment in kind to farm workers
komenciós	0	0			4	1	A	pertaining to above
komorna	0	0				1	H	lady's maid
komornyik	0	0				1	H	(head) butler
kondíció	3	0				1	N	terms of trade
konkurrencia	0b	E	0			1	N	competition (among tradesmen only)
konvenció	3	M	0			1	N	agreed annual payment in kind
konzorcium	0	C	0			1	N	consortium
kormányalakítás	0	P	0			2	N	formation of a government
kormányfőtanácsos	0	0				2	H	state counsellor [1922–44]
kormányképviselő	2	P	0		5	3	H	government MP
kormánylap	0	0				2	N	government paper
kormánylista	2	0				2	N	government slate
kormánynyilatkozat	0	P	0		7	2	N	government statement
kormánypárt	0	P	0			2	N	governing/government party
kormányajtó	0	0				2	N	government press
kormánytanács	2	0				2	N	council/authority named by government
kormánytanácsos	0	0				2	H	member of above
kormányzóII	3	0				1	H	governor [bank, body, religious order]
koronabirtok	0	0				2	N	crown property
koronajáradék	0	C	0			2	N	crown rent
koronaügyész	0	J	0			2	H	crown counsel
kortes	0	0				1	H	canvasser
kortesfogás	0	0				2	N	canvasser's trick

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
korteshadjarat	0	0			7	3	N	intensive campaigning, electioneering
korteskedés	0	0				1	N	canvassing, campaigning
korteskedik	0	0				1	V	ibid.
koszt	4	0			1	1	N	<i>x-ba ad/helyez(pénzt)</i> lend short-term
kosztkamat	0	0				2	N	(usu. very high) short-term interest
kosztoltat	2	F	0			1	V	= <i>kosztba ad/helyez</i>
kosztpénz	2	F	0			2	N	= <i>kosztkamat</i>
kosztüzlet	0	B	0			2	N	borrowing short-term at high rates
könyves	3	E	0			1	A	account (customer); 'szoc, <i>biz e'</i> !
könyvesII	0	Q	0			1	H	bookie
könyvkiadóII	0	0				2	H	publisher (person); firm unmarked
könyvszakértő	0	F	0			2	H	<i>hites x</i> qualified accountant [to 1950]
könyvügynök	0	0				2	H	door-to-door bookseller
körjegyző	0	D	0			2	H	district notary
körjegyzőség	0	D	0			2	N	office of above
kötés	12b	E	0			1	N	deal (on stock exchange)
	14	E	0			1	N	block of shares
közalapítvány	0	0			3	2	N	public endowment/foundation
középbirtok	0	0			3	2	N	land between 50 and 500 <i>morgen</i>
középbirtokos	0	0			3	2	H	owner of above
középosztály	1	0				2	N	middle class [def!]
közgyám	0	0			3	2	H	public trustee, orphans' court
közhivatalnok	0	0				2	H	civil servant
közjog	0	J	0			2	N	constitutional law
közrendőr	0	0				2	H	(police) constable
községháza	0	0				2	N	parish hall
községtanács	0	0				2	N	parish council
közszerzemény	0	J	0			2	N	couple's joint asset
köztisztviselő	0	0				2	H	= <i>közhivatalnok</i>
kulcsár	1	0				1	H	steward, pantryman
kultúregyesület	0	0				2	N	educational organization

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
kultusz	4	0			2	1	N	the Ministry of Culture
kultuszminiszter	0	0				2	H	Minister of Culture [not <i>hiv</i>]
kultuszminisztérium	0	0				2	N	the Ministry of Culture [not <i>hiv</i>]
kultusztárca	0	0				2	N	the cultural portfolio [not <i>hiv</i>]
kupec	1	0			6	1	H	knacker
kupon	0a	C	F	0	5	1	N	coupon, warrant
kurátor	1	0				1	H	curator
kúria	2	0				1	N	High/Supreme Court [until 1949]
kúriai	0	0				1	A	pertaining to above
kurzus	2	B	E	0		1	N	rate, price
küldönc	3	K	0			1	H	batman
küldvény	0	0				1	N	discounted bill (of exchange)
különbözeti	3	E	0			1	A	<i>x ügylet</i> option/time deal
kültag	2	E	0			2	H	sleeping/silent partner
külterület	0	0				2	N	outskirts [=kültelek: <i>kissé vál</i>]
kvesztor	0	0				1	H	bursar
kvesztúra	0	0				1	N	bursar's office
lakáj	1	0				1	H	liveried servant
lány	4	0			2	1	H	maid
lapbizományos	0	W	0			2	H	newspaper wholesaler
laptulajdonos	0	W	0			2	H	newspaper owner, magnate
latifundium	0	0			7	1	N	great estate
lázadás	2	0				1	N	(up)rising [def!]
leányintézet	2	C	B	0		2	N	branch, affiliate
leánykereskedelem	0	0				2	N	white slavery
leánykereskedő	0	0				2	H	white slaver
leányotthon	1	0				2	N	girls' hostel/home [v. ÚJ id.]
leányvállalat	0	C	B	E		2	N	subsidiary, sister company
lelencház	0	0				2	N	foundlings' home
lелencügy	0	0			3	2	N	policy on foundlings
leszerződött	0	Q	0			1	V	sign up (sportsman <i>only</i>)
letört	3	0			1	1	A	<i>x bér</i> starvation wages

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
levente	2	0				1	H	pre-army military organization
	3	0			2	1	N	member of above [under Horthy]
leventeoktató	0	0				2	H	teacher of such members
levezetés	6a	0			15	1	N	family tree
libériás	0	0				1	A	liveried
lókupec	0	0			26	2	H	knacker [6: <i>gyak</i>].
lovagias	2	0				1	A	chivalrous
ludovikás	0	0				1	H	officer trained at Ludovika pre-1945
maga2I	1b	0				1	S	within family ['affected use']
	2	0				1	S	you ['condescending']
magánalkalmazott	0	0				2	H	non-state employee
magánbank	0	0				2	N	private bank [<i>magáncég</i> unmarked]
magándetektív	0	0				2	H	private detective
magánhivatalnok	0	0				2	H	non-state employee
magániskola	0	0				2	N	private school
magánjog	0	J	0			2	N	civil law
magánlátogatás	0	0			7	2	N	private call
magánnyomozó	0	0				2	NH	private detective
magántisztviselő	0	0				2	H	non-state employee
magántitkár	0	0				2	H	private secretary
magántőke	0	C	0			2	N	private capital/assets
magányos	4	0				1	H	isolated in exploitative society [def!]
magyar	5a	0				1	X	<i>x betegség</i> tuberculosis
magyarosít	1	0				1	V	magyarize [def!]
majoros	1	0				1	H	tenant-farmer
marhakereskedő	0	0				2	H	cattle-dealer
másodelnök	2	0				2	H	second-ranking judge
megbízott II	0a	0				1	H	second (in duel)
megfogható	1a	0				1	A	<i>x vagyon</i> tangible assets
megóv	4	E	0		5	1	V	= <i>megóvatol</i>
megóvás	2	E	0		5	1	N	protesting of a bill
megóvatol	0	J	E	0		1	V	protest a bill
megpeticionál	0	P	0			1	V	challenge

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
megterhel	5	0			1	1	V	burden (with excessive tax <i>only</i>)
megyegyűlés	2	0				2	N	county assembly. [not <i>hiv</i>]
megyeháza	0	0				2	N	county hall
méltóság	3	0				1	NS	honour/eminence/dignity
méltóságos	2	0				1	S	honourable/eminent
menedékhely	2	0				2	N	<i>éjjeli x</i> night shelter, doss- house
menedzsel	0	E	0			1	V	manage, run
menedzser	1	0				1	H	manager
ménieskar	0	K	0			2	N	army horse-training establishment
menhely	2/3	0				2	N	children's/adults' refuge
mentőegyesület	0	0				2	N	first- aiders'/ambulancemen's league
mezei	4/5	0			2	1	H	non-Budapest MPs/students
mezőrendőri	0	J	0			2	X	<i>x kihágás</i> agricultural offence/crime
mintacsomag	0	E	0			2	N	sample box
mintakollekció	0	E	0			2	N	samples, range
munkaadó	0	0				2	H	employer
munkamegszüntetés	2	0			5	2	N	strike
munkanélküli	0	0				2	H	unemployed (person) [def!]
munkanélküliség	0	0				2	N	unemployment
munkapiac	0	C	0			2	N	the job market
munkásbiztosítás	0	0				2	N	insuring workers
munkásbiztosító	0	0				2	H	pertaining to, or the institution above
munkáscsapat	3	Q	0			2	N	gang, crew
munkásegylet	0	0				2	N	workers' league/association
munkásellenes	0	0				2	A	anti-worker
munkáselőadás	0	0				2	N	lecture for workers
munkáskérdés	0	0				2	N	the worker question [def!]
munkáskizárás	0	0				2	N	lock-out
munkáskör	0	0				2	N	workers' circle
munkáslap	0	0				2	N	workers' paper

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
munkásnyúzó	0	0				2	AH	exploiter/exploiting of workers [def!]
munkássztrájk	0	0				2	N	workers' strike
munkaszolgálat	0	K	0			2	N	forced labour
munkaszolgálatos	0	K	0			2	AH	person taken for forced labour
munkatábor	0	0				2	N	military camp for students [def!]
nadrágos	1	0				1	A	city (person)
nagybérelő	0	0				2	H	major agricultural leaseholder
nagybirtok	0	0				2	N	land above 500 <i>morgen</i> [pre-1945]
nagybirtokos	0	0				2	H	owner of above
nagyiparos	0	0				2	H	major industrialist, mogul
nagykapitalista	0	0				2	AH	capitalist, plutocrat
nagykereskedő	0	0				2	H	wholesaler
nagyközség	0	D	0			2	N	large village as administrative unit
nagyméltóságú	0	0				2	S	most excellent, honourable
nagyság	5	0			1	1	S	(your) honour/grace
nagysága	0	0			2	1	S	m'lady
nagyságos	2	0			3	1	S	your honour/grace [def!]
nagyvágó	1	0				2	H	wholesale butcher
nagyvilág	1	0			8	2	N	high society [def!]
nagyvilági	0	0			8	2	A	pertaining to above
napidíjas	0	0				2	H	day-labourer
néger	2	0			1	1	H	deviller [<i>argó</i>]
négyesII	4	I	0			1	N	grade 4 at school
nemzetgazdaság	0	C	0		7	2	N	the country's economy
nemzetvédelmi	1a	P	K	0	3	2	X	war propaganda machine [Second World War]
	2	0			3	2	A	Horthy, counterrevolutionary
népkonyha	0	0				2	N	soup-kitchen [def!]
népkör	0	0				2	N	women's/people's institute
névházasság	0	0				2	N	marriage of convenience
nőegylet	0	0				2	N	women's institute/league
nyereségrészesedés	2	0				2	N	profit-sharing [v. ÚJ id.]

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
nyugdíjalap	1	0				2	N	pension fund
obligó	1	E	F	0		1	N	liability
okkázio	2	E	0			1	N	bargain
oláh	0	0				1	H	Romanian [def!]
oláhság	0	0				1	N	the Romanians
óradíjas	2	0	I	0		2	H	hourly-paid (person)
országzászló	0	0				2	N	permanently displayed state flag [def!]
orvosegyetem	1	0				2	N	medical faculty/university
osztalék	1	C	F	0		1	N	dividend
osztály	5b	0				1	N	civil service rank
	8	0				1	N	class in lottery
osztályfőnök	1	0				2	H	head of department in civil service
óvás	3	J	E	0		1	N	protest
óváslevél	0	J	E	0		2	N	letter of protest
óvatol	0	E	J	0		1	V	lodge a protest
óvatolás	0	J	E	0		1	N	lodging of a protest
őfelsége	0	0			3	2	S	His/Her Majesty
őfensége	0	0			3	2	S	His/Her Highness/Majesty
őméltósága	0	0				2	S	his/her honour/grace
őnagyméltósága	0	0				3	S	id.
őnagysága	1/2	0			3	2	S	his/her excellency [<i>nagyságos</i>]
önállósul	1	0				2	V	set up on one's own [def!]
önkéntes I/II	3/2	K	0			2	AH	volunteer
őregbéres	0	0			4	2	H	gaffer
őregbíró	0	0			4	2	H	immediate past judge in village
őregdiák	1	0			5	2	H	eternal student
ősjogász	0	I	0		9	2	H	eternal law student
őskeresztény	2	P	0			2	H	pure Christian ['Fascist use']
őskutatás	0	0				2	N	search for noble or non- Jew ancestors
őspróba	0	0				2	N	proof of noble ancestry
összeférhetetlenség	2	J	0			1	N	irreconcilable conflict of interest [v. ÚJ id.]
ötös	4	I	0			1	N	bottom mark [v. ÚJ id.]
páholy	3	0				1	N	lodge (Freemasons')

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
palota	2a	0				1	N	big residence of city rich [def!]
panama1	0	0				1	N	(large-scale) fraud
panamázás	0	0				1	N	carrying out of above
panamázik	0	0				1	V	carries out above
panamista	0	0				1	H	fraudster
papír	4	B	0		2	1	N	securities
parádés	1a	0				1	X	<i>x kocsis/ló</i> carriage driver/horse
paraszt	3	0			6	1	H	peasant [as insult/joke]
	8	0				1	H	policeman [<i>argó</i>]
parasztnyúzó	0	0			6	2	A	harrassing the peasantry
parasztság	3	0			6	1	N	act of insulting/vulgar behaviour
párbaj	0	0				2	N	duel
párbajdüh	0	0				3	N	duelling mania
párbajhős	0	0			69	3	H	duelling bravo [6: <i>gyak</i>]
párbajképes	0	0				3	A	able to duel
párbajkódex	0	0				3	N	duelling rules
párbajozik	0	0				2	V	take part in a duel
párbajsegéd	0	0				3	H	[one of duellers'] second[s]
párbajvétség	0	0				3	N	break the law by duelling
parkett-táncos	0	0				2	H	gigolo
pártcsoport	2	0				2	N	parties in alliance [v. ÚJ id.]
pártharc	0	0				2	N	struggle between parties
pártkassza	0	0				2	N	bourgeois party's coffers [def!]
pártközi	0	P	0			2	A	inter-party
pártvillongás	0	0			8	2	N	party strife
parvenü	0	0			68	1	H	upstart
pasas	3	0			2	1	H	punter (prostitute's)
pénztár	6	0				2	N	friendly society
pénzügyigazgató	0	0				2	H	financial manager
pénzügyigazgatóság	0	0				2	N	district financial office
petíció	1	P	0			1	N	challenge to election result
peticionál	1	P	0			1	V	issue challenge to above
pillangó	4	0				1	N	prostitute ('euphemistic')
pisztoly	2	0				1	N	duel with pistols

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
plebejus	3	0			5	1	A	intellectual involved with the people
plebsz	2	0			6	1	H	the plebs
plutokrácia	0	0			7	1	N	plutocracy
plutokrata	0	0			7	1	H	plutocrat
polgár	4	I	0			1	X	<i>egyetemi x</i> university student
polgári	2	0				1	A	<i>x iskola</i> higher elementary school
polgári II	0	0				1	N	= <i>x iskola</i>
polgárista	0	0				1	H	child at <i>polgári</i>
polgármester	0	D	0			2	H	mayor
polgárőrség	0	0				2	N	territorial army, civil defence corps
poliklinika	0	G	0			1	N	outpatients' clinic [def!]
postamester	1	0				2	H	postmaster
pótadó	0	0				2	N	supplementary tax, surtax
pragmatika	0	0				1	X	<i>szolgálati x</i> civil servants' rules
prémium	0	E	0			1	N	bonus [v. ÚJ id.]
próbaszolgálat	1a	K	0			2	N	trial period (for soldiers)
prokurista	0	E	0			1	H	authorized signatory
prolongál	1a	E				1	V	renew (a bill)
prostituált	1	0			3	1	H	prostitute
protekció	1	0			6	1	N	patronage, influence
protekciós	0	0			6	1	AH	s.o. who knows the right people
protezsál	0	0				1	V	use one's influence on s.o.'s behalf
provokáció	3	0				1	N	grounds for duel
provokál	3	0				1	V	provoke a duel
pucer	0	K	0		2	1	H	orderly
püspökség	3	0				1	N	the bishopric as property- owner
rabatt	0	E	0			1	N	rebate, discount
rác	0	0				1	HA	(esp. Hungarian) Serb [pre-Second World War] [cf. <i>tót</i> unmarked [def!]]
rádiótársaság	0	0				2	N	radio broadcasting company
rangosztály	0	0				2	N	rank

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
rangsor	1/2	0				2	N	rank(ing) in society/office
rátenyerel	2	0			16	1	V	clamp down on [def!]
rendelet	3	E	F	0		1	N	<i>vki x-ére</i> [bill payable] to s.o.
rendkívüli	4	I	0			2	A	lacking full university status [- <i>rendes</i>]
rendőrbíró	0	0				2	H	stipendiary magistrate
rendőrkapitányság	0	0				2	N	police headquarters [not <i>hiv</i>]
rendőrtisztviselő	0	0				2	H	civil servant in police force
részletosztály	0	E	0			2	N	hire purchase department
részletüzlet	0	0			5	2	N	hire purchase shop
részvény	0	C	0			1	N	share(s)
részvényes	0	0				1	H	having share(s), share owning
részvénytársaság	0	C	0			2	N	(joint stock) company
revíziós	0	P	0			1	A	revisionist (<i>revízió</i> , <i>revizionista</i> , <i>revizionizmus</i> [all unmarked])
rombol	3a	E	0			1	X	<i>xárakat</i> flood the market [all unmarked]
rongyos	2a	0				1	A	poor, bedraggled [def!]
sajtófőnök	0	P	0			2	H	press chief [cf. ÚJ <i>sajtófelelős</i>]
sas	3	0			12	1	H	member of party symbolized by eagle
segéd	1	0				1	H	(semi-)skilled labourer [to 1952]
	3	0				1	H	duellist's second
segédfogalmazó	0	D	0			2	H	assistant drafter of texts
segédjegyző	0	D	0			2	H	assistant notary
segédlevél	0	0				2	N	journeyman's certificate
segédtiszt	3	0				2	H	bailiff's assistant
segélydíjas	0	0			3	2	H	person on supplementary benefit
segélyegyesület	0	0				2	N	benevolent society [<i>segélydíj</i> unmarked]
sommás	2	J	0			1	X	<i>x eljárás, ítélet, kereset</i> summary
sörfőző II	1a	0				2	H	brewery owner (only)

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
spekuláns	0	0			6	1	A	speculative [<i>spekulál</i> , - <i>áció</i> unmarked]
suszterinas	0	0			6	2	H	apprentice cobbler [<i>suszter</i> unmarked 6 only]
süllyed	7	0			1	1	V	sink (low), decline [def!].
szabotál	2	0				1	V	sabotage [def!]
szakosztály	0b	J	0			2	N	department, section [law]
szaktanács	2	J	0			2	N	council [law]
szakvizsga	4	D	0			2	N	higher examination [v. ÚJ id.]
szállodás	0	0				1	H	hotel owner, hotelier
számadás	2	E	0			1	X	<i>tegye x-ba tudósítás</i> <i>szerint/nélkül</i>
számadó	1	M	K	0		1	AH	quartermaster/accountant
szamárlétra	0	0			9	2	N	automatic progression, Buggins's turn
számgyakornok	0	0			3	2	H	trainee accountant
számlabélyeg	0	E	0			2	N	receipt stamp
számlatulajdonos	0	E	F	0		2	H	account-holder (person) [v. ÚJ id.]
számszék	0	0				2	N	(Budapest) court of accounts
számtartó	0	0				2	H	estate bookkeeper
szanál	1	F	E	0		1	V	rescue financially
	2	0			2	1	V	sack, or cut pay
szanatórium	1a	0				1	N	palatial private hospital
szegényII	0	0				1	X	<i>x embernek a szerencséje</i> <i>is x</i> <i>a x (ember)t az ág is húzza</i>
szegényadó	0	0			2	2	N	poor tax
szegénygondozó	0	0			5	2	H	social security officer
szegényház	0	0				2	N	poorhouse
szegényjog	0	J	0			2	N	legal aid for poor
szegénynegyed	0	0				2	N	inner city, poor part of town
szegénységi	0	0				1	X	<i>x jog, bizonyítvány</i> certificate of means test
szegényszag	0	0			6	2	N	smell of poverty
szegényügy	0	0			3	2	N	poor relief [def!]
szegődés	2	0			4	1	N	signing on, hiring oneself out [<i>rég</i>]

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
szegődik	3	0			4	1	V	signs on, hires oneself out [rég]
szegődmény	0	0			3	1	N	contract relating to above
szegődményes	0	0			3	1	A	pertaining to contract
szegődtet	0	0				1	V	hire [person], take on (temporarily)
szelvényív	0	C	F	0		2	N	sheet of coupons
szeminárium	0	I	0			1	X	<i>jogi x</i> private law school
szemlélő	2	K	0			1	H	army inspector
szenior	1	I	0			1	H	group leader
szentel	1c	0				1	X	<i>zászlót x</i> consecrate flag
szentesít	1	0				1	V	sanctify, sanction
szenvedő	6	E	J	0	5	1	X	<i>x vagyon</i> unrealisable assets; debts
szeretetadomány	0	0				2	N	charitable gift, donation
szeretetsomag	1	0				2	N	charitable parcel
szeretetház	0	0				2	N	hospice, asylum
szféra	2bc	0				1	X	<i>a magasabb -ák</i> 'ruling class' [def!]
szilárd	3a	F	0		1	1	A	<i>x piac/tőzsde;</i> <i>árak/ft/pénz/valuta</i> [unmarked stable]
szobalány	1	0				2	H	chambermaid
szoci	0	0			269	1	H	Social Democrat[6: <i>gyak</i>]
szocialista	2	0				1	HA	Social Democrat [v. ÚJ id.]
szolgabíró	1	D	0			2	H	magistrate
szolgál	1	0				1	V	serve, be a/s.o.'s servant
szolgálattétel	1a	0				2	N	service, duty
szolgalegény	0	0				2	H	serving lad
szolgáló	1	0				1	A	serving [noun unmarked]
szolid	4	E	0			1	A	not financially risky
szoros	5	E	0			1	X	<i>x számla</i> cash only
szükségmunka	0	0				2	N	compulsory labour
táblabíró	2	0				2	H	appeal court judge
tábori	3	K	V			1	X	<i>x lelkész/pap</i> army chaplain
talon	3	B	0			1	N	talon, stock
tanácselnök	2	J	0			2	H	chair of court panel [v. ÚJ id.]

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
tanácsjegyző	0	0				2	H	council secretary
tanácsnok	0	0				1	H	alderman, councillor
tanárjelölt	1	0				2	H	graduate not yet qualified [v. ÚJ id.] [to teach]
tanárképző	0	0				2	N	teacher training college
táncmester	2	0				2	H	owner of dance school
tanfelügyelő	0	I	0			2	H	teaching inspector
tanfelügyelőség	0	I	0			2	N	Board of Education
tanoncév	0	0				2	N	year of apprenticeship
tanoncidő	0	0				2	N	time of apprenticeship; one's articles
tanonciskola	0	0				2	N	apprentice training school
tantiem	1	C	0			1	N	dividend
tanügy	0	I	0		3	2	N	education
tanügyi	0	I	0		3	2	A	pertaining to educational matters
tanyásII	1	0				1	H	lowly farm employee
társ	2	0				1	H	(business) partner
társadalomtudomány	3	T				2	N	social studies (as university subject)
társalkodónő	0	0				2	H	lady companion
társaság	1b	0			8	1	N	<i>a x</i> high society [8: <i>kissé</i>]
	3a	J	E	0		1	N	(limited, etc.) company
társaságbeli	0	0			8	1	A	pertaining to <i>társaság</i> 1b, 3a
társasági	4	K	0			1	AN	civvies; civilian dress
tartaléktőke	0	C	0			2	N	reserves
távházasság	0	0				2	N	proxy marriage (in Second World War)
tekintetes	0	0				1	S	honourable, your honour
termelőszövetkezet	2	0				2	N	agricultural co-operative [v. ÚJ id.]
terménytőzsde	0	C	0			2	N	corn (etc.) exchange
testőr	0	0				2	H	bodyguard, guardsman
testőrség	0	0				2	N	the (body)guard
tisztelet	3	0				1	S	<i>alázatos x-em</i> my humble respects
tiszti	5	0				1	X	<i>x főorvos/főügyész</i> chief medical/legal officer
tisztiszolga	0	0				2	H	batman [pre-1945]
tisztiügyész	0	0				2	H	county attorney

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
tisztújítás	2	0				2	N	re-election of officers
tisztújító	0	0				2	A	pertaining to above
titkos	5	0				1	X	<i>x kéjelgés</i> unlicensed; <i>x tanácsos</i> privy councillor
tolonház	0	0				2	N	house of detention
tolonckocsi	0	0				2	N	prison van
toloncol	0	0				1	V	move on, deport
topán2	0	K	0			1	N	military cap ornament
tőke2	3	F	0			1	N	(large sum of) money earning interest
tőkeadó	0	E	0			2	N	tax on profitable investment
tőkeerős	0	E	0			2	A	with solid capital
tőkepénz	0	0				2	N	= <i>tőke2</i>
tőkeszegény	0	E	0			2	A	under-capitalized
tőkeszükséglet	0	E	0			2	N	capital requirement
tömeg	5	0				1	H	the masses (condescending) [def!]
tömegnyomor	0	0				2	N	mass poverty
törpebirtok	0	M	0			2	N	dwarf holding
törvénybíró	0	0				2	H	deputy chief magistrate (local)
törvénycikk	0	J	0			2	N	statute, act, article
törvényerejű	1	J	0			2	A	<i>rechstkraftig</i>
törvényesít	2	J	0			1	V	have declared legitimate (an illegitimate child)
törvényhatóság	0	D	0			2	N	local/municipal authority
törvényhatósági	0	D	0			2	A	pertaining to above
törvényhozó	0a	J	0			2	X	<i>x hatalom</i> joint legislative power of ruler and parliament
törvénynap	3	J	0			2	N	assize day
törvénszék	1	J	0			2	N	court of law, tribunal
törvénszéki	0	J	0			2	A	pertaining to above
törvénytelen	2	0				1	X	<i>x gyermek</i> illegitimate child
törvénytelenít	0	0				1	V	declare illegitimate
tőzsde	0	C	0			1	N	stock exchange
tőzsdejáték	0	0				2	N	speculation
tőzsdelovag	0	0			9	2	N	speculator

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
tőzsdés	0	0				1	AH	member of the stock exchange
tőzsdetag	0	0				2	H	id.
tőzsdeügynök	0	0				2	H	dealer
tőzsdézik	0	0				1	V	play the market
túladóztatás	0	0			57	1	N	over-taxation
túlkínálat	0	E	0			1	N	glut
túlnépesedés	0	C	0			1	N	overpopulation [def!]
túlnépesség	0	C	0			1	N	overpopulation [def!]
túltermelés	1	C	0			1	N	overproduction
újgazdag	0	0			6	2	H	nouveau riche
úr	1	0				1	H	member of ruling class
	2	0				1	S	form of address to above
uradalmi	0	0				1	A	manorial
uradalom	1	0				1	N	manor, estate
uraság	2	0				1	N	lord, lord of the manor
urasági	0	0				1	A	pertaining to above
úrasszony	3	0				2	S	Mrs (on envelope)
úrhölgy	0	0			8	2	S	id.
úri	1	0				1	A	pertaining to <i>úr</i> [6 senses!]
úrias	0	0				1	A	characteristic of gentlemen
úriasszony	0	0				2	H	lady (of ruling classes)
úriember	0	0				2	H	gentleman
úriház	0	0				2	N	country house etc.
úrilány	0	0				2	H	young lady (of ruling classes)
úrinő	0	0				2	H	lady (of ruling classes)
úriszoba	0	0				2	N	gentleman's room/study
úrleány	2	0			8	2	S	Miss (on envelope)
úrlovas	0	0				2	H	Gentleman (as opposed to Player)
úrnő	0	0				2	H	lady (of ruling classes)
úrvezető	0	0				2	H	gentleman owner-driver
utazóII	3	E	0			1	H	traveller, travelling salesman
utcalány	0	0				2	H	tramp, prostitute [def!]
uzsorabér	0	0				2	N	rock-bottom wages
ügyész	2	0			3	1	H	civil servant acting in legal capacity

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
ülnök	2	D	0			1	X	árvaszéki <i>x</i> official dealing with orphans and the destitute
ülősztrájk	0	0			5	2	N	sit-in
üzletvezetőség	0	Y	0			2	H	regional railway management
vádtanács	0	J	0			2	N	grand jury
vagyonadó	0	0			3	2	N	property tax
vagyonbukott	0	J	0			2	H	bankrupt
vagyondézsmá	0	0				2	N	supertax on assets
vagyonváltság	0	0				2	N	supertax on assets
vákáncsos	0	0				1	H	subsistence farmer also using common land
váltóII	1	J	E	C		1	N	bill of exchange, promissory note
váltóadósság	0	F	0			2	N	debt consisting of bills of exchange
váltóbélyeg	0	0				2	N	duty on bill of exchange
váltócédula	2	0			4	2	N	bill used as currency early 19th cent.
váltóhamisítás	0	J	0			2	N	forging of bills
váltóhitel	0	F	0			2	N	credit against a bill
váltójog	0	J	0			2	N	law relating to bills
váltókezes	0	J	F	0		2	H	guarantor of bill
váltókezesség	0	J	F	0		2	N	guaranteeing of bill
váltókölcson	0	F	0			2	N	acceptance credit
váltóleszámítolás	0	E	F	0		2	N	discounting of bills
váltótárca	0	E	C	0		2	N	holdings, bills in hand
váltótörvény	0	J	0			2	N	Bills of Exchange Act
váltóúrlap	0	P	0			2	N	blank bill
vándortanító	1	0				2	H	peripatetic teacher
városatya	0	0			2	2	H	town councillor, city father
védasszony	2	0			8	2	H	patroness
védett	3a	M	0			1	X	<i>x birtok</i> ring-fenced agricultural debtor
védlevél	0	0				2	N	safe-conduct, pass
védőanya	1	0			3	2	H	patroness of child protection league
védőlevél	0	0				2	N	= <i>védlevél</i>
védőőrizet	0	0			3	2	N	protective custody

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>
végeladás	0	E	0			2	N	closing-down sale
végelbánás	0	0			3	2	N	enforced premature retirement
végkiárusítás	0	E	0			2	N	= <i>végeladás</i>
végkielégítés	0	J	0		3	2	N	severance pay
vegyes	2	0			6	1	A	motley (crew) [def!]
versenytárgyalás	0	0			3	2	N	competitive bid(ding)
vezet	6b	0				1	X	<i>üzletet x</i> (a) manages business, unmarked; (b) has own business, marked
viceházmester	0	0				2	H	deputy concierge [not <i>hiv</i>]
vigéckedik	0	0			29	1	V	be a traveller, salesman
virilista	0	0				1	H	top taxpayer
visszváltó	0	E	F	0		2	N	renewed bill of exchange
vitéz	4	0				1	S	title of nobility awarded by Horthy
vitézi	1	0				1	A	pertaining to above ['or <i>irod'</i>]
vizesnyolcas	2	0			129	2	H	hapless gofer
volontőr	0	0				1	H	unpaid trainee/worker
záloglevél	0	B	0			2	N	mortgage bond, debenture
zálogüzlet	1	F	0			2	N	security for loan [<i>zálogügylet</i> unmarked]
zárda	2	0				1	N	convent school (only)
zárdanövendék	0	0				2	H	convent-educated girl
zugbankár	0	0			9	2	H	shady banker/dealer
zugiskola	0	0			6	2	N	unlicensed/shady school
zugsajtó	0	0			7	2	N	tabloid rag(s)
zugszálló	0	0			6	2	N	cheap hotel
zugtőzsde	0	C	0			2	N	unlicensed stock exchange
zugügylet	0	E	0		6	2	N	shady deal
zsellér	2	0				1	H	serf, villein
zsellérház	0	0				2	N	serf's cottage
zsellérkedik	2	0				1	V	live the life of a serf
zsellérsor	0	0				2	N	the life of a serf
zsírál	0	B	0			1	V	endorse (a bill)
zsíró	0	0				1	N	bank giro
zsíróforgalom	0	B	0			2	N	clearing system
zsúrfiú	0	0			9	2	H	lounge lizard

39 Between State and Nation: The Central Czech Amateur Theatre Association, 1945–48

ANDREAS BECKMANN

Introduction

In contrast to other Central and East European countries where Communist regimes were more less imposed on an unwilling population, the Czechoslovak Communists enjoyed remarkable popular support. In the first post-war elections in 1946 the Party came out easily ahead of its rival in the Bohemian Lands. Though its support among the Czech populace seemed to be ebbing a year later, there was little determined resistance and, indeed, a great deal of support for the Party when it finally took power in February 1948. How did the Communists manage to shed their recent past and become at least acceptable to so much of the Czech population?

A number of historians have emphasized the conditions that existed at the end of the war.¹ In important respects, 1945 did present a completely new starting point. The expulsion of the Germans, redistribution of land, a new, more populist political culture, and above all the changed geostrategic situation were all direct outcomes of the Second World War that the Communists used to maximum effect to build their power. But the slate was wiped only half clean. Indeed, much of the Party's success was due to its remarkable ability to use what already existed for its own ends – to graft onto and bend existing traditions, structures and interests. To explain the success and popularity of the Communists after the war, we have to focus not only on what they built anew, but also how they managed, remarkably successfully, to rewrite much that already existed. This is especially clear in the case of the Ústřední matice divadelních ochotníků českých (ÚMDOČ) — the Central Czech Amateur Theatre Association.

Though for various reasons the ÚMDOČ has slipped through the cracks of Czech historiography and is little known even among historians of Czech theatre, it was due to its very size a significant cultural and social force, almost on a par even with the much better-known Sokol gymnastic association. By 1946 the organization included more than 3,000 individual amateur theatre troupes with over 250,000 members in Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia.² In comparison, Sokol boasted one million members, though it must be pointed out that around half of these were children.³ A profile of the members of both organizations might look roughly similar: predominantly middle class, with clerks, state administrators, teachers, and small-business owners especially well-represented. Like Sokol, the ÚMDOČ was painted brightly with the red and white of Czech nationalism. The ÚMDOČ saw amateur theatre, as the Sokol saw physical training activities, as central to cultivating

1 See Karel Kaplan, *Nekrvavá revoluce*, Prague, 1993, and Jörg K. Hoensch, *Geschichte der Tschechoslowaischen Republik, 1918–1978*, 2nd edn, Stuttgart, 1978.

2 Josef Hudeček, 'Náš vývoj a vyboj', *České lidové divadlo*, 26, 1946, 8–9 (November). The best source of information regarding the ÚMDOČ is the organization's journal, which appeared under various names from 1918 through 1948: *Československé divadlo* (1918–39), *České divadlo* (1939–45), *Lidové divadlo* (1945), *České lidové divadlo* (1946–48). Another excellent source of general as well as more specific information are the organization's detailed annual reports. For secondary sources see the as yet unpublished manuscript on amateur theatre in the Bohemian Lands, to be published by ARTAMA, Prague in 1998–99.

3 Zora Dvořáková, *T. G. Masaryk. Sokol a dnešek*, Prague, 1991, p. 46.

Czech national consciousness and improving the nation. While Sokol sought to make Czechs physically more fit, the ÚMDOČ saw its major work as raising the cultural level of the nation. The nationalism of both organizations translated into a strong antipathy towards the nation-less Communist Party throughout the inter-war period. In contrast to Sokol, though, which offered some of the more determined opposition to the Communist Party after the war, the ÚMDOČ became almost bedfellows with the Communists between 1945 and 1948. Explaining this difference in paths after the war requires going back to the ÚMDOČ's establishment in the latter half of the nineteenth century and examining the organization's ambiguous relationship to political authority, and its place in Czech society over the decades.

The History of the ÚMDOČ

The origins of the ÚMDOČ at the laying of the foundation stone of the National Theatre in 1868 provides the best example of the strong mix of culture and politics that remained central to the organization throughout its existence.⁴ The week of festivities surrounding the event, which attracted tens of thousands of Czechs and more than a few fellow Slavs, was by far the greatest display of Czech nationalism and the biggest party to take place in the Bohemian Lands in the nineteenth century.⁵ The completed theatre provided ultimate proof that the Czechs could match the Germans in cultural achievement — and thus, by clear extension, were fit to rule themselves.

Along with others celebrating the establishment of this temple of the Czech nation, the founders of the ÚMDOČ saw a clear connection between cultural development and the achievement of political independence. Steeped in the ideas of Herder and nineteenth-century Romanticism, and with the cultural intelligentsia blazing the way of national development, it comes as little surprise that those assembled in Prague in 1868 considered culture to be the primary mark of a nation's level of civilization. More than the size of its armies or the production of its factories, it was a nation's achievement in theatre, literature, music, and art that determined its relative position on the world stage.

The festivities organized around the establishment of the National Theatre suggest the significance of theatre to Czech culture and the national movement. In an age before television, theatre was — next to the local pub — perhaps the leading form of entertainment for Czechs living in urban and rural areas alike. But it was also the most prominent window display for showing off the cultural achievements of the nation. Alone among the arts, drama combined the contributions of the different muses, from the playwright's text and accompanying music to the scenery and even theatre building, to create a powerful impact of sight, sound, and emotion. It was also public, requiring not only the presence of the actors on stage, but also of their audience in order to occur. And, unlike music, theatre was centrally concerned with language, the primary attribute of Czech nationality. Thus, the significance of drama for the Czech national movement went far beyond the actual material presented on stage. It served as an important focus — in time, space, as well as popular consciousness — for developing Czech society. Little wonder that, as the tide of national consciousness swelled, so many Czech communities

4 L. Klosová, 'Ochotnické divadlo (1848–1886)' in F. Černý and L. Klosová (eds), *Dějiny českého divadla, III*, Prague, 1977. For an overview of the ÚMDOČ's development see: František Herman, *Ústřední matice divadelního ochotnictva československého, 1886–1926*, Prague, 1926.

5 For a good description of the celebration see Stanley B. Kimball, *Czech Nationalism: A Study of the National Theatre Movement, 1845–83*, Urbana, IL, 1964.

focused on building a proper theatre or in taking over a German one, nor that theatre was so often at the centre of political imbroglio.

While established theatres like the National Theatre ascended the heights of artistic achievement for the glory of the Czech nation, they did so mainly for the edification of the urban élite. In contrast, the amateur theatre buffs organized in the ÚMDOČ took on the task of bringing Czech national consciousness and culture to the broad masses in the nether reaches of the country. If the National Theatre and other so-called 'stone theatres' were stretching the point of the pyramid of Czech culture and the nation, then the ÚMDOČ and its member troupes were building its base. The association of amateur theatre groups grew quickly, and by the end of the nineteenth century included the greater part of the amateur troupes playing in the Bohemian Lands.

The metaphor of a pyramid is apt for the way the ÚMDOČ looked on culture and national development. It assumes the existence of a clear standard of measurement, with 'high' culture and 'low' culture, 'good' theatre and 'bad' theatre easily distinguishable. For the ÚMDOČ, this standard remained remarkably constant. Even in the inter-war period, as an exuberant avant-garde innovated and experimented with new styles and approaches, the ÚMDOČ clung to realism and a rigid repertoire stacked with Czech national(ist) classics from the previous century. Works by Tyl or Jirásek always headed the list of plays recommended by the ÚMDOČ to its member groups. Of the estimated 22,833 plays performed by amateur groups belonging to the ÚMDOČ between 1923 and 1926, 19,970 were by Czech authors, while most of the remaining 2,863 were by other Slavs.⁶ Modern works by Čapek, Konrad and Langer, for example, made up a strong contingent from the 1920s onwards. Plays by Shakespeare featured prominently in repertoires before the First World War, included both as classics of world drama as well as a certain act of defiance against the Habsburg authorities. Russian plays, especially classics by the likes of Chekhov, grew in number in the inter-war period and especially after 1945, inspired by a sense of Panslavism rather than an admiration for Soviet socialism.

In addition to distributing lists of recommended plays, the ÚMDOČ also cultivated Czech theatre by organizing regular courses and examinations for amateur actors, directors, and technicians, publishing guidebooks and a regular magazine. Especially from the 1920s, it also organized regional and even national amateur theatre competitions. Not surprisingly for an organization focused on strengthening Czech nationality, the ÚMDOČ always devoted special attention to proper use of language and correct diction and pronunciation. Articles and guidebooks published by the organization, for example, urged their readers to avoid using words or sounds that might seem German.⁷

The mission of 'raising' the Czech nation and Czech national culture that the ÚMDOČ took upon its shoulders justified not only encouraging the development of 'good' culture, but also discouraging what it considered 'bad' culture. The organization periodically launched fierce attacks against what it called 'trash' and 'kitsch', for example, light comedies and operettas. It was also not above exerting pressure to bring what it called 'wild' troupes with dubious repertoires to heel. Building the pyramid of Czech culture demanded careful planning to avoid unnecessary waste in energy and resources. After 1918, for example, the ÚMDOČ urged the 'rationalization' of Czech theatre; this included bringing all amateur theatre under one central organization and uniting local troupes to cut down on wasteful competition.

In short, the ÚMDOČ took its work extremely seriously. It is, however, impossible to gauge the full impact that the amateur groups organized in the ÚMDOČ had on Czech

6 [Anon.], 'Československé veřejnosti!', *Československé divadlo* 6, 1928, 11, p. 138.

7 Cf. Ibid.

society, but some indication is provided by the numbers — in 1936, for example, some 1,500 troupes that put on more than 8,000 plays and at least 32,000 performances⁸ — as well as by the enthusiasm and dedication evident in accounts of many of the amateur players. By the time the Czechs gained their independence, the ÚMDOČ had come to consider itself a leading cultural force with a claim to respect from the political leaders of the newly independent nation.

The establishment of an independent state considerably changed conditions in which the ÚMDOČ was operating. The removal of the Czech-German conflict as a central issue opened Czech politics and culture to new influences, concerns and orientations. Amateur theatre followed the politicians in fracturing into a cacophony of competing interests and parties. By the end of the nineteenth century workers had begun dropping out of the theatre groups of the ÚMDOČ to establish their own. In the wake of the Third International, these in turn divided into two main associations, one Communist and the other Social Democratic. Catholic amateur theatre groups were established within Orel (the Catholic competitor of Sokol), and Sokol members who had belonged to the ÚMDOČ left the organization to establish their own drama groups within their parent organization. Though some of the more extreme right-wing parties established amateur groups as well, most of these enterprises were prevented by the censors. Other organizations, such as the Red Cross and Union of Firefighters, also became involved in amateur theatre, as both entertainment and a means of generating income.

The loss of workers and youth reinforced the prevailing characteristics of the organization as predominantly middle class, middle-aged and conservative. Amidst the fracturing of Czech society, the ÚMDOČ painted itself as above the fray, as devoted purely to artistic achievement in the interest of the nation as a whole.⁹ But as one Social Democratic critic remarked, the organization and the art it cultivated increasingly appeared as simply the expression of one of many partisan interests.¹⁰ Though the ÚMDOČ remained the most significant organization in amateur theatre throughout the inter-war period, its position and brand of culture were increasingly questioned and undermined, and looked more and more partisan and outdated. With less need to cultivate national consciousness, the organization shifted its emphasis somewhat towards raising the cultural level of the Czech population. The slightly updated mission kept the organization at what it saw as the heart of the national interest, and justified the organization's continuing efforts to control amateur companies and their repertoires. Frustration over the ÚMDOČ's conservatism provoked an increasing number of complaints and led to the secession of one of one of the organization's leading members and several of the most dynamic amateur groups.¹¹

The proposal for a new Theatre Law that the ÚMDOČ spent much of the 1920s and 1930s trying to get passed reveals much about the issues and challenges that the organization was contending with.¹² The fact that the organization appealed to law to deal with these problems, as well as the persistence with which it kept at it and the bitterness of the disappointment when these efforts proved futile, indicates the reception that the organization expected to get from the political authorities of the nation.

8 [Anon.], 'Pane presidente republiky!', *Československé divadlo*, 16, 1938, 2, p. 27.

9 See F. Herman, 'Nedomyšlené důsledky', *Československé divadlo*, 3, 1925, 8, p. 60.

10 Cited in F. Herman, 'Svůj k svému — i v divadelním ochotnictví', *Československé divadlo*, 11, 1933, 16, p. 10.

11 The organization suffered its greatest loss in 1925 when Vojtěch Blahník left the ÚMDOČ over differences over dramatic style and established the more modern Tylova obec; see [Anon.] *Pražský okrsek Ústřední matice divadelního ochotnictva*, Prague, 1948, pp. 7–8.

12 See H. Frank, 'Divadelní zákon?', *Československé divadlo*, 9, 1931, 14, p. 93.

A central feature of the proposal worked out by the ÚMDOČ in co-operation with the Masaryk Institute for Popular Education in the early 1920s was the abolition of all commercial ventures in theatre. Using an argument later wielded with great effect by the Communist Party, the ÚMDOČ argued that money polluted and distorted culture, debasing it to kitsch.¹³ To enable Czech theatre to develop and flourish, something of vital interest to the nation, it had to be freed of the tethers and distortions created by the need to fill the box-office till. Unfortunately for the ÚMDOČ, 'kitsch' and 'trash' were extremely popular. Commercial ventures that were more than willing to cater to this demand provided major competition for amateur theatre groups with a more staid repertoire of Jirásek and Tyl. Thus, the proposed legislation would have 'cleaned up' what was put on stages — and also removed a major source of competition for amateur groups.

The ÚMDOČ proposal went farther than this. It also stipulated that in order to be engaged in the serious work of presenting plays, an organization could not be distracted by extraneous interests or activities. This included a great part of the organizations involved in amateur theatre, including political parties but also organizations like Sokol or the Red Cross. As practically the only organization focused exclusively on cultivating the dramatic arts, the ÚMDOČ could expect to reap a monopoly over amateur theatre from such a law.

As the sole representative of amateur theatre, the ÚMDOČ also expected the legislation to put it on an equal footing with professional theatre. Relations between professional and amateur theatre had long been strained — not only because the established theatres tended to turn their noses down at the amateur stage, but also because the two were often in serious competition with one another for audiences. Repeated attempts to come to some agreement between the ÚMDOČ and professional associations had always ended in frustration.

The draft legislation also saw all theatres subordinated to state supervision, though the development of theatrical and artistic creativity, it was understood, would be completely free. The Achilles' heel of this artistic freedom, and one that made the organization vulnerable two decades later, was that 'permission to put on a theatrical performance should be given only if there is a guarantee of expert artistic direction'. To ensure that this was the case, the ÚMDOČ recommended a 'state theatrical commission', 'censorship commission', and that district theatre commissions be established which would be attached to the Ministry of Culture. Finally, the ÚMDOČ called for the creation of a special state theatre fund that would provide generous subsidies to support the cultivation of this area of culture that was of such vital importance to the national interest.

Despite strong and persistent pressure from the ÚMDOČ and some other groups, the Theatre Law stalled, remaining in government committees and bureaucrats' desk drawers throughout the inter-war period. Commercial interests certainly played some role in this; but the fact that the law was not a priority for the government seems to have been more important.¹⁴ In other words, there was a huge gulf between the expectations of the ÚMDOČ and reality.

The revival of the German–Czech conflict at the end of the 1920s and its intensification in the 1930s served to blow new wind into the sails of the ÚMDOČ and raised the profile of the organization. With the increasing threat of Germany, the ÚMDOČ saw a return to its

13 Comments on the threat posed by commercialism appeared in *Československé divadlo* articles throughout the inter-war period. For example, *Československé divadlo*, 11, 1933, 13, p. 198; 'Československé veřejnosti!', *Československé divadlo*, 6, 1928, 11, p. 138; 'Proti divadelnímu braku (schválená resoluce)', *Československé divadlo*, 11, 1933, 14, p. 74.

14 The draft legislation remained at the ministries and in committees throughout the inter-war period and never reached a government meeting let alone the floor of Parliament. Julius Mitlöhner complained about the opposition of commercial interests to the theatre law: J. Mitlöhner, 'Námítky k divadelnímu zákonu', *Československé divadlo*, 16, 1938, 7.

original mission. In articles, speeches, and at rallies the amateur theatre organization portrayed itself as manning the nation's ramparts, supporting Czech national consciousness and Czech communities in the Sudeten border areas. For a competition to encourage the writing of serious pieces of drama depicting the life of Czechs living in the border areas, the ÚMDOČ was sure to specify the manner of depiction: the plays should show the ordinary Czech folk (*malý český člověk*) defending itself against the Germanization attempts of the more powerful. In following this motif, playwrights were to emphasize the importance of Czech amateur theatre in reinforcing the Czechs in this struggle.¹⁵ One contributor to the ÚMDOČ magazine *Československé divadlo* captured the significance of the German threat for the fortunes of the organization particularly well. After spending paragraphs complaining about a lack of respect for amateur theatre, a lack of national consciousness and a youth only interested in 'senseless plays with songs', he ended his article: 'Czech culture, the Czech nation face a new and yet so old German danger; Czech amateur theatre must once again man the ramparts as it did a hundred years ago! Let us take up work again with joy, let us not be ashamed to admit that we are national, that we like our language and our Czech culture, let us be proud of our beautiful Czech tongue!'¹⁶

External events helped the ÚMDOČ in its aim to transform its annual festival of amateur theatre, the Jiráskův Hronov, into a major celebration of Czech nationalism. The week-long event took place every August starting in 1931 in the town of Hronov and was dedicated to the nineteenth-century playwright Jirásěk. Every year was devoted to a larger theme such as 'Amateur Theatre in the Service of the Nation' in 1930, or 'The Borderlands' in 1933. The theatrical performances — in which works by Jirásěk naturally predominated — were interspersed with speeches, outings to surrounding points of historical and cultural interest, as well as a number of pious acts of patriotism, including the high point of the week, the pilgrimage to Jirásěk's grave. The ÚMDOČ always sent out dozens of invitations to the nation's leaders and took pains to attract national coverage by the press. The greatest coups in this respect came in 1933 and 1938.

In 1933, the ÚMDOČ was almost too successful in attracting the attention of the nation's political leaders to the Jiráskův Hronov celebration: coming just months after Hitler's coming to power in Germany and devoted to the Czechs living in the Sudeten areas, the Jiráskův Hronov that took place in August 1933 became a lightning rod that attracted especially representatives of the far right of the political spectrum.¹⁷ General Gajda, leader of the Czech Fascist party, appeared with eighty of his followers; denied admission to one of the performances, they caused a disturbance that almost closed down the whole festival. The keynote speeches of Senator Emil Hrubý and Fischer — who, though scarcely more moderate than Gajda and his followers, were nevertheless given a rapturous welcome — were ultimately censored by Czechoslovak Radio for being too inflammatory, a move that predictably unleashed a string of protests in the right-wing media and prompted the National Democrats and others to publish the full texts of the speeches in their newspapers.¹⁸

The Jiráskův Hronov festivals that took place in 1937 and 1938 under the official patronage of President Beneš and the premier, Hodža, respectively, were surrounded by much less controversy.¹⁹ Coming as German pressure on Czechoslovakia mounted, the

15 [Anon.], 'Dramatická soutěž našich hraničářů', *Československé divadlo* 6, 1928, 9, p. 21.

16 [Anon.], 'Kam s nimi?!', *Československé divadlo*, 11, 1933, 16, p. 306.

17 F. Herman, 'Jiráskův Hronov 1933', *Československé divadlo*, 11, 1933, 14, pp. 212–13.

18 *Národní listy*, 28 August 1933, p. 1 (the entire issue was devoted to the events at the Jiráskův Hronov); *Lidové listy*, 29 August 1933, p. 6.

19 [Anon.], 'Dvacet let Československé republiky', *Československé divadlo*, 16, 1938, 8, pp. 113 and 122.

celebrations were grasped by the nation's leadership as a way to rally the nation in a time of danger. In all three cases it was outside circumstances – the threat of Germany and the need to rally the nation -- rather than the ÚMDOČ's own inherent importance that secured VIP attendance at these events.

The ÚMDOČ after the Second World War

The ÚMDOČ actually flourished under the German Protectorate. Despite suffering repression, heavy censorship, loss of members to labour-drafts, imprisonment and even execution, the total number of amateur groups belonging to the organization grew from 1,740 in 1943 to 2,126 by the end of 1945.²⁰ The organization returned to its roots. Theatre once again became a focus for national life, attracting greater audiences and volunteers, especially young people. Theatre, and especially amateur theatre, provided one of the few places where Czechs could assemble. This explained part of the organization's gains, but not all, since the ÚMDOČ also benefited from the misfortunes of its rivals. The associations of workers' theatres as well as the Sokol and Orel were forbidden by the authorities; many of these troupes found refuge under the wings of the ÚMDOČ.²¹

Thus, the ÚMDOČ emerged from the Second World War stronger than ever before and confident of its service to the nation in its time of need. It expected that this would duly translate into a better position in Czech society than the organization had enjoyed in the inter-war period. 'In the most difficult times for the Czech nation, amateur theatre stood firmly in its positions and staunchly fulfilled the duties it had taken upon itself' wrote the general secretary of the organization. 'Today [the ÚMDOČ] stands in the forefront of all cultural organizations, and I believe that the time is not far off when amateur theatre will take the position that its work has earned it and that it will be recognized as a part of national culture.'²²

Within the first few weeks after the end of the war, the ÚMDOČ set about regrouping organizations around the country after the total ban on theatre of the last eight months of the war and scrambled to organize another Jiráskův Hronov in August. Many of the district organizations reported difficulties especially due to loss of members, many of whom were drafted into military service or had moved to the border areas from which the Sudeten Germans were being expelled.²³

The central office also went about consolidating its control over the mass of member groups scattered around the country. The discipline on which the ÚMDOČ prided itself clearly did not apply to all member troupes. The groups that the ÚMDOČ leadership complained about were especially newer members of the organization, for whom the ÚMDOČ was probably little more than a convenient umbrella under which to ride out the storm of German occupation. A mass of directives and work plans went out from the central office, and pressure was exerted on district organizations to bring 'wild' groups under control.²⁴ Besides the indifference of such groups to administrative matters, the ÚMDOČ leadership was principally concerned about the plays that they were presenting. Both the central office and district authorities went to considerable lengths to assure that member and even non-member groups assembled their repertoires from the list of plays officially approved by the central office.

20 [Anon.] *Roční zpráva 1944–45*, Prague, 1945, p. 14.

21 Bořivoj Srba, 'České ochotnické divadelní hnutí v letech nacistické okupace a druhé světové války 1939–1945' (unpublished typescript), p. 45.

22 *Roční zpráva 1944–46*, Prague, 1945, p. 5.

23 *Roční zpráva 1946*, Prague, 1946: see reports of individual districts.

24 *Roční zpráva 1944–45*, Prague, 1946, p. 10.

The rationale for this was the same as it had been in the past: the need to assure artistic quality and maintain cultural standards in the interest of edifying the Czech nation. A number of the district organizations managed to negotiate agreements with local officials in charge of overseeing culture that allowed the ÚMDOČ to vet applications for plays to be performed, giving the organization effective control not only over its own member groups, but over amateur groups outside the ÚMDOČ, too. Thanks to such an arrangement, the district office in Brno could report that 'It seems that we have done more for the cleansing of amateur and theatrical repertoires than professional stages and Prague itself.'²⁵ The district leadership's heavy-handed methods, it had to admit, did not sit well with all members of the organization, and there were 'signs of dissatisfaction in certain circles of our membership'. Still, it was clear to the leadership at least that only in this way would it be possible for amateur theatre to shake off its sense of inferiority and gain in importance ('even if the audience does not wish it').²⁶ Member groups were also required to participate in regular district competitions so that 'they [could] be ranked according to their quality among the other theatre groups in the district. This competition shows us where our mission is obstructed, where people are not working as they should be, and we can immediately act to raise the level where this is necessary.'²⁷

Post-war conditions were favourable to amateur theatre, and particularly to the ÚMDOČ. The inter-war system had failed; the end of the war was accompanied by expectations of a new order that would avoid past mistakes. The general movement was towards a society that would be more popular, in which the masses would play a stronger role; that would be more united, less fractured among competing parties and interests; and in which the state would be more active, particularly in regulating the economy. In theatre, this translated to greater emphasis on playing for a more popular audience; creating a more unified, 'rationalized' organization of theatre production; as well as a greater role for the state in supporting and regulating both professional and amateur stages.

Under such conditions, general secretary Josef Hudeček could justifiably see amateur theatre 'standing on the threshold of a new era'.²⁸ The ÚMDOČ now could lay special emphasis on its essential populism — theatre by the masses and for the masses. The shift in political scenery and national priorities in this regard finally gave the organization an advantage over established theatre that traditionally catered to smaller circles of theatre-goers with deeper pockets and a more rarefied sense of artistic appreciation.

One ÚMDOČ district official's remark that 'we are conscious of the fact that no one gives us anything and that we have to fight and struggle for everything'²⁹ seems barely justified when looks at the wide range of organizations that gave the ÚMDOČ seats and even chairs on their boards. The ÚMDOČ gained representation in the Ministry of Culture and Education's theatre committee; the cultural commission of the ÚRO, the controlling body of the massive national trades-union organization; the theatre and culture committees of a large number of state organs, including, for example, the Provincial and District National Committees, the Masaryk Institute of Popular Education, the Circle of Friends of the Czech Language and the Association of Friends of Lusatia.

Calls for greater unity and 'rationalization' echoed what the ÚMDOČ had been saying throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The ÚMDOČ now threw itself with enthusiasm into the

25 *Roční zpráva 1946*, p. 28.

26 *Ibid.*

27 *Ibid.*, p. 23.

28 *Roční zpráva 1944–45*, p. 6.

29 *Ibid.*, pp. 23–24.

efforts to merge the various amateur theatre organizations into a united whole.³⁰ A special relationship was quickly worked out with the ÚMDOČ's Slovak counterpart, the Ústredie slovenských ochotníckych divadiel, which was then consummated with the participation of a number of Slovak amateur theatre groups at the Jiráskův Hronov celebration in August. The ÚMDOČ had an extra advantage in its efforts to unite amateur theatre since the German occupation had already made the first steps in this direction with the incorporation into the ÚMDOČ of a number of other troupes. Representatives of the various organizations involved in amateur theatre — including both the Communist and Socialist workers' theatre associations, the Union of Czech Firefighters, the Czech Youth Association, and the cultural department of the Ministry of Defence — met and created the Central Committee of Czech Amateur Theatre. The committee did not get very far in actually bringing about a union of Czech theatre. Within the first few weeks after the end of the war, representatives of the ÚMDOČ and the Svaz dělnického divadelního ochotnictva československého (DDOC) — the Communist-dominated workers' theatre association — had met and the latter agreed not to re-establish itself and to leave its groups within the ÚMDOČ. Talks with Sokol, on the other hand, which had quickly re-established itself at the end of the war, eventually foundered. After some promising one-on-one negotiations between the two organizations, relations were broken off over recriminations that Sokol was urging its former members to leave the ÚMDOČ and return to Sokol. Despite the strong support of the Communist Minister of Education Zdeněk Nejedlý, talks broke down and attempts to unite amateur theatre remained frustrated until after February 1948.³¹

Typically enough, the ÚMDOČ was quick to find a role for itself in the broader tasks facing the nation, and to try to ingratiate itself among the political leadership. It firmly aligned itself behind the new government and gave its full support to the Košice Programme. With characteristic drama, the ÚMDOČ pledged itself to serve the nation: 'We will not show our love for the nation in words, speech, but in active deeds: with all our might we will work to raise the cultural level of the broad masses, that is, to raise our nation to be among the most cultured nations on earth!'³² The organization expected that its past and present dedication to the nation would finally find recognition among the political leaders.

It did, though from an unexpected quarter. Despite constant solicitations from the ÚMDOČ, support from President Beneš and the National Social Party — the party that, given its background, membership and programme might have seemed closest to the amateur theatre organization — remained lukewarm to indifferent. The ÚMDOČ was bitterly disappointed in 1946 when President Beneš did not serve as honorary patron of the Jiráskův Hronov festival and anniversary celebration. 'Our request was not even sent on by the Office of the President for the reason that the ÚMDOČ was not an organization of national significance', the organization's general secretary reported indignantly.³³

It was the Communist Party — avoided by the ÚMDOČ like the plague up to the Second World War — that after 1945 proved the most ardent supporter of the amateur theatre organization. At the ÚMDOČ's anniversary celebrations later the same year, the president was once again unable to accept personally amateur theatre's 'love, devotion, and gratitude' because of his busy schedule. But the speech made by the Communist Minister of Information Kopecký, expressing his admiration and appreciation for the organization and all manner of support, more than made up for this disappointment. It was, remarked

30 Josef Hudeček, 'Sjednocení ochotnictva', *České lidové divadlo*, 25, 1945, 9 (August), pp. 12–13.

31 [Anon.], 'COS', *České lidové divadlo*, 27, 1947, 6 (June), pp. 79–80.

32 *Roční zpráva 1946*, p. 26.

33 *Ibid.*, p. 7.

Felix Buřil, the general secretary of the organization, 'the first time that the ÚMDOČ received official recognition, in public and in a manner befitting the organization's importance from the lips of a government representative'. Kopecký's National Social colleague, the Minister of Education Jaroslav Stránský, it was expressly noted, failed to attend.³⁴

Kopecký's words of support for the ÚMDOČ were not hollow. Indeed, his party must have been instrumental in gaining the organization representation in so many organizations after the war, especially the Central Trades Union Organization and so many of the district committees. Through Zdeněk Nejedlý, the Party provided the greatest encouragement for attempts to unite amateur theatre in a single organization.

The proposal for a new theatre law worked out by Nejedlý in 1945 even exceeded the wants-list assembled by the ÚMDOČ in the 1920s; besides turning into formal law the ban on commercial interests already passed by presidential decree, the proposal counted on a single unified organization of amateur and professional theatre as well as state funding across the board. The Communist Party mobilized its forces in the halls of government, through the trades unions, in factories and in the theatres themselves to pressure for passage of the law, but had to wait till after the 1948 coup to have the bill rubber-stamped by parliament.

The greatest obstruction to passing the bill — and perhaps the greatest thorn in the side of the ÚMDOČ — seems to have come from Jaroslav Stránský, leader of the National Social Party. As Minister of Culture and Education from 1946 to 1948, Stránský was a fiscal conservative who was loath to stretch the public purse too much in support of culture and unwilling to restrict the variety of interests catered for in the stage productions. An alternative proposal for the theatre law that Stránský tabled on taking over the ministry met none of the ÚMDOČ's expectations.³⁵ Intense pressure from the Communists forced the minister to rework the proposal, but Stránský managed to block the new bill in committees until after February 1948.

The support the Communist Party gave to the ÚMDOČ paid off handsomely. Up until their assumption of power in February 1948, the Czechoslovak Communists pursued a cultural policy that was substantially in agreement with that of the ÚMDOČ. Association with the ÚMDOČ provided the Communists one more proof that the Party was indeed reformed, acceptable, and had the best interests of the nation at heart. The amateur theatre organization not only fitted well with the Party's requirements for popular culture, but also had a similarly rigid and narrow view of art that centred on realistic performances of warmed-up classics and conventional nationalism. Thanks to resurgent Panslavism, the ÚMDOČ was still amenable to incorporating a number of Russian works into its repertoires. Tractor stations, collective farms, and other hallmarks of Socialist Realism, however, did not really become mandatory features of the Czech stage until after the Communist take-over. The repertoires that the ÚMDOČ brought to all corners of the Bohemian Lands fanned the Czech nationalism which the Czech Communists used to billow their sails. Equally important, the amateur group also provided an effective means of assuring that other messages and forms of drama were kept off the stage, and that independent groups were reined in. Finally, the ÚMDOČ proved an enthusiastic supporter

34 Ibid., p. 9. For Kopecký's speech see 'Závažná slova', *České lidové divadlo*, 26, 1946, 8–9 (November), pp. 119–21.

35 František Smažik, 'Na okraj divadelního zákona', *Lidové divadlo*, 25, 1945, 3 (October), pp. 34–35; 'Divadelní zákon', *České lidové divadlo*, 27, 1947, 2 (February), pp. 17–18. Also *Kulturní politika*, 5 (5 November 1945), p. 1.

of a number of the Party's initiatives, including the first Two-Year Plan and the 'Art for the People' movement.³⁶

One naturally asks whether the Communist Party after 1945 did not control the ÚMDOČ directly, as was the case with a number of other organizations. In the available records of the ÚMDOČ as well as of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, there is no indication of any successful Communist infiltration or take-over, or even the attempt to do so. The Party archives reveal just how concerned the Communist leadership was about Sokol, and document some of the measures taken against the organization, yet scarcely any mention is made of the ÚMDOČ. In fact, the leadership of the ÚMDOČ remained constant. Though Party members certainly played a greater role in the ÚMDOČ than they had before the war, their numbers and influence apparently remained limited. Even after the war, and after the incorporation of other groups, the ÚMDOČ remained solidly middle-class.

Indeed, the character of the organization — its rhetoric, style, actions, and mission — remained remarkably constant from the latter part of the nineteenth century through 1948. The Communist Party did not need to control the ÚMDOČ because the organization was easily convinced by the Communists that they were both marching down the same path to the same future for the nation. One ÚMDOČ leader could reasonably and sincerely remark that 'With happiness we see that for all of sixty years we have been striding towards the order that is being born, and thus without difficulty we join the front ranks towards a new, free life.'³⁷

It soon, too late, became clear that the Communist order was far different from that the amateur players aspired to. Following the February coup, the ÚMDOČ suddenly had the opportunity to experience the control from above that it had applied to 'wild' troupes in the past. The Jiráskův Hronov of 1948 was met with the first broadsides against the ÚMDOČ's 'bourgeois' repertoire, which was out of step with the new era; this was followed by the first forced resignations from the organization. By 1950 the ÚMDOČ's *Gleichschaltung* into a state amateur theatre organization was complete.

Conclusion

A fundamental question in looking at the ÚMDOČ in the period up to February 1948 is how it was possible for the organization to be so easily won over by the Communist Party. Past and future experience showed all too clearly that the Communists had a very different vision of theatre, politics, and the development of the Czech nation. Even at the time there were enough unsettling indications of this, like reports of the 'Socialist Realism' that Zhdanov was calling for in the Soviet Union and the measures taken against Anna Akhmatova and the Leningrad journals.

Vital in squaring this circle for the ÚMDOČ was nationalism. In the Bohemian Lands, perhaps more than anywhere else in Central and Eastern Europe, the Communists managed with a remarkable degree of credibility to don the mantle of Czech nationalism and pose as a staunch defender of the nation's interests. The poor fit was helped by the experience of the war and Russian liberation, but also by the bitter disappointment of Munich.

Nationalism is important, but probably not enough to explain the close relations between the ÚMDOČ and Communists after the Second World War. After all, Sokol, though similarly nationalist, remained largely immune to the Party's siren call. Despite all that separated them, what the ÚMDOČ and the Communists did share, and what brought them

36 The 'Art for the People' movement in many ways fitted perfectly with the ÚMDOČ's programme and interests. Cf. 'Všenárodní význam Umění lidu', *České lidové divadlo*, 27, 1947, 9 (October), unpaginated insert.

37 *Roční zpráva 1946*, p. 20.

together, was a common vision of the 'political use of culture' — that is, that high culture should be politically didactic and centrally administered. Both organizations thought that theatre should teach people how to be citizens in the post-war world. What helped gloss over the deeply different conceptions of that world and helped seal the relationship between the two was the willingness of the Communists to concede the ÚMDOČ so many of the privileges it craved, and had demanded of the inter-war government. The development of the ÚMDOČ from its origins around the foundation stone of the National Theatre in 1868 gave the organization a claim to national leadership and the acknowledgement and support of this special position by the political authorities. This attitude and expectation (would 'complex' be too strong a word?) goes farthest in explaining why the amateur players in the ÚMDOČ, like many others in Czech theatre, were so amenable to the Communist Party between 1945 and 1948.

The ÚMDOČ probably presents an extreme example. Few other organizations moved so far, from opposition to co-operation, in their relationship with the Communists. But the case of the amateur theatre organizations is therefore all the more indicative of the way the Party managed to build bridges to existing interests and traditions. Looking at the period 1945–48 through the prism of power politics has made us focus on conflict and differences and overlook the interests people and organizations shared — genuinely or merely apparently — with the Communist Party.

40 Anxiety in the Early Works of Dominik Tatarka

KATHLEEN HAYES

In the article 'Neznáma tvár' (The Unknown Face, 1940), Dominik Tatarka (1913–89) writes of the 'dangers' of Realism and Naturalism: 'The epoch of literary Realism and Naturalism, in so far as it was a reflection of philosophical Positivism, was not only unfaithful in world literature, but also dangerous. It is well-known how severely this art was judged and condemned as entirely materialistic and experimental because it sacrificed form for content, emotion for sensation, the ideal for reality, because it did not shrink from bad taste, vulgarity or even cruelty.'¹ In the same essay, Tatarka appears to argue against Realism when he writes that: 'the reality of art is truer and more real than the truth of Nature and history because only a limited person does not see that the most "real" person is he who is unreal, who wants to realize himself according to his own conception and faith, at the price of tragic effort and labour.'² In the essay 'O duchovnú orientáciu v slovenskej beletrii' (On Spiritual Orientation in Slovak *belles-lettres*), also published in 1940, Tatarka rejects the utilitarian conception of art: 'The utilitarian view of literature has not suited and does not suit literary creation.'³ He believes that the aim of *belles-lettres* is 'rather to allow one to experience a segment of the reality of the senses and of the heart, than to judge and measure it with a moralist and politically opportune rule'.⁴ This conception of art is manifest in his early works published during the Second World War, but can hardly be reconciled with his post-war novel *Farská republika* (The Parish Republic, 1948). One can find clues, however, to the apparently radical change in Tatarka's aesthetics in his essays from 1940. In them he also writes that the problems of form which writers must tackle change with the changing spirit of the times; that creative power is manifest in the posing of a problem and its resolution.⁵ He also writes that a work of the spirit, that is, a work of art, is more truthful and real to him than Nature, because the work of art is a correction, an improvement and a shaping of Nature: 'The creation of the spirit, which imposes meaning on natural events, is constantly taking place within and around the individual.'⁶ Such a statement appears to justify the propagation of an ideological message in *Farská republika*.

I shall consider changes in Tatarka's prose in the period following the war. To do so, I must go back earlier than 1945. Tatarka's first book, a collection of short stories, was published under the title *V úzkosti hľadania* in Bratislava in 1942.⁷ The title, 'In the anxiety of seeking', introduces the, perhaps banal, theme of a search for the meaning of

1 Dominik Tatarka in Petra Bombíková (ed.), *Kultúra ako obcovanie*, Bratislava, 1996, pp. 9–10.

2 Ibid., p. 10.

3 Tatarka, 'O duchovnú orientáciu v slovenskej beletrii' in Bombíková (ed.), *Kultúra ako obcovanie*, p. 14.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid., p. 16.

6 Ibid., p. 15.

7 Jozef Bžoch notes that one of the paradoxes of the wartime Slovak state was that Catholic, Lutheran, Communist, nationalist and other writers were permitted to publish alongside one another. A further paradox, he writes, is that this tolerance did not recur until after 1989. Jozef Bžoch, 'Náčrt dějin slovenské literatury 1945–1990', Dagmar Perstická and Lea Přerostová (eds), *Dominik Tatarka a ti druzí*, Brno, 1991, pp. 13–26 (14).

existence, and this theme is constant in all the stories. It also constitutes the dominant theme in Tatarka's next two book publications, the novel *Panna Zázračnica* (The Miraculous Maiden, 1944), and *Farská republika*. The object of Tatarka's attention remains consistent over this period. The author of *Farská republika* is still recognizable as the author of the earlier works. Indeed, he makes use of the same motifs, for example, the motif of the mother who betrays her beloved son.⁸ The changes in the works cannot be explained as a move from concentration on the life of the psyche to concentration on external events, since the author's concern with both mental and material existence is evident in his later works, too. Nor can the changes in his writing be explained simply as the development of a writer from a stage of experimentation to a distinctive stylistic maturity. *Démon súhlasu* (The Demon of Consent/Conformity), first published in the periodical *Kultúrny život* in 1956, manifests a continuing interest in narrative experimentation. The text is narrated from the point of view of a character whose skull has been split open.⁹

In the end, the changes in Tatarka's early works can be explained by the rather banal hypothesis that the author finds, at least temporarily, certainty in his search for existential meaning.¹⁰ He finds that meaning in the Communist struggle on behalf of the working class.¹¹ His first two works are pervaded by an atmosphere of anxiety, frustration and despair; these 'intermediate' states of mind of the characters find their reflection in a prose replete with paradoxes, veils, confusion and mystery. The reader is sometimes as lost as the characters, unable to determine what is meant to be dream and what is meant to be reality', what takes place in the characters' heads and what actually happens. The reader is taken into a nightmare landscape in which events follow a strange, unpredictable course, and this nightmare overwhelms the traces of the everyday. The devices the author uses to obscure the text and unsettle the reader are also expressions of the themes he treats.

In *Farská republika*, by contrast, certainty has been attained, and this certainty is manifest in the transparent quality of the prose. The narrative follows a more or less straightforward, chronological line, shifting in time and place only when the focus moves from the experience of one character to another. The author does concentrate on both the inner life of the main characters and the external circumstances in which they find themselves, but there is no confusion about what is 'real' and what imagined. There is little confusion in point-of-view; the third-person narrator almost always indicates who is the

8 In 'Kohútik v agónii', Tatarka presents a mother who feels responsible for the death of her son. See 'Kohútik v agónii' (1946), *Prútené kreslá. Rozhovory bez konca*, Bratislava, 1967, pp. 139–81. For the same motif, see also Tatarka's short story 'Posol prichádza', *V úzkosti hľadania*, Turčiansky sv. Martin, 1942, p. 103; and Dominik Tatarka, *Farská republika* [1948], Bratislava, 1963, pp. 201–07.

9 Tatarka himself, though a Communist, claims to have suffered under Stalinism. He writes of *Démon*: 'Perhaps it was the first satire of its kind in Czechoslovakia directed at people who hide their own cowardice behind general acquiescence with everything and everyone, satire directed at people who have given up thinking with their own minds and try to think with some imagined collective brain...'. See Antonín J. Liehm, *Generace*, Prague, 1990, p. 158.

10 For an analysis of the appeal of the Communist ideology for intellectuals in Eastern Europe after the Second World War, see Czesław Miłosz, *The Captive Mind* (1953).

11 For a statement of Tatarka's support for the Communist Party and his adoption of a different understanding of the role of art, see: Dominik Tatarka, 'Manifest socialistického humanizmu' (1948), *Proti démonom. Výber statí o literatúre a výtvarníctve*, Bratislava, 1968, pp. 99–101. He states here that his views were influenced by his experience of the Slovak Fascist state and the National Uprising in 1944. Tatarka was expelled from the Communist Party in 1970 and became one of the most important figures of Slovak dissent. He was one of the first Slovaks to sign Charter 77. See *Dominik Tatarka a ti druzí*, pp. 139–40.

subject of thoughts expressed. The characters themselves are also two-dimensional; some critics distinguish between the unambiguous portraits of the Communist underground activist Lyčko, and the greedy, opportunist officer of the Fascist Hlinka Guard Minár, on the one hand, and the more detailed depictions of the central characters on the other. This distinction is not, however, completely accurate. The writer assigns a moral status to all the characters in *Farská republika*. If the moral status of a complex character, such as that of the American-Slovak John Menkina, seems ambiguous and thus threatens to undermine the simple scheme the author has established, the author violates the parameters of the character, and portrays him acting in an appropriate but implausible manner. In the early works, the characters dominate the text; the internal conflicts they suffer and their states of mind dominate the story. In fact, sometimes the story dribbles away, lost in the morass of the characters' anxiety. Morality is also important in the early works, but the reader is left to make judgements on the basis of the characters' self-assessments; final judgements are problematized.¹² In *Farská republika* the characters are subservient to the story, which serves to illustrate an ideological certainty; the characters are sometimes uncooperative and so must be forced to play their assigned roles. Thus, ironically, Tatarka violates the 'integrity' and 'freedom' of his characters in the same manner that the authoritarian clerical state which he criticizes violates the population over which it has control. It would be wrong to suggest, however, that Tatarka's prose here ever descends to the flatness characteristic of a lackey of the Communist regime, as his *Prvý a druhý úder* (First and Second Blow, 1950) does.

I consider Tatarka's early works in chronological order, concentrating on the theme of anxiety. The first short story in *V úzkosti hľadania*, 'Podvojná rozprávka' (A two-sided tale), manifests the author's interest in narrative experimentation and favourite themes of Decadent writers of the *Fin de siècle*. At the opening of the brief short story, the third-person narrator relates that a frightened woman stops a young man in front of a house with a wooden balcony. She appeals to him to come and comfort a girl who is dying, all alone in this town which is not her home. The girl had once appealed to him, but then he had forgotten her. Out of decency, the confused young man acquiesces; at the girl's insistence, he agrees to tell her a story to distract her from thoughts of death. There we find a reference to the title of the collection; anxiety here is existential anxiety: 'Out of compassion for the girl, and from a social fear of death, he eagerly set to inventing words and an implausible story in order to free himself and the girl from the anxious awareness that they were in the presence of death.'¹³

With the young man's narration, the short story moves into the realm of the fairy-tale or *exemplum*. This tale, which starts as a digression, takes over the story, and sets the tone for the rest of the collection. It is an allegory of life in the present. A fowler who lived long ago, 'in a time which did not fly, but hung and weighed heavy like a burden, somewhere far away in the seventy-seventh land, where sand flowed and water lay in dunes, but it might also be here'.¹⁴ The comparison between the land of the fairy-tale and the wartime Slovak state is further expressed by the descriptions of the countryside through which the fowler travels, devastated by marching soldiers, a dead land, wasted by war and covered in debris and corpses.¹⁵ Here, however, the landscape also constitutes a *paysage de l'âme*. The comparison between inner and outer devastation recurs throughout the collection. The motif of time and existence as a burden also recurs throughout the work, as does the motif of the world turned upside-down. The fowler wanders over the land; he is unable to lure

12 This approach to moral judgement is evident also in 'Kohútik v agónii'.

13 Dominik Tatarka, 'Podvojná rozprávka', *V úzkosti hľadania*, pp. 7–8.

14 Ibid., p. 8.

15 Ibid., p. 9.

birds into his snares. Three times he is in despair, at the point of dying of hunger. Three times he whistles in great longing and each time a bird answers his call. It is a strange bird, whose feathers seem to change colours. Each time the bird settles in his trap, but begs the fowler to spare its life. The first time, the bird claims to be love, but the fowler swears that he does not know what love is when he is hungry. He tries to kill the bird, but it escapes. The next time it appears, the bird claims to be pain. Again, the fowler tries to kill it, but the bird escapes. The third time it appears, the bird claims to be life, and again the fowler swears he will kill it. The characters depicted in this collection sometimes follow the pattern of the fowler; they are at the point of starvation; they long for some kind of redemption, and yet when it appears to them, they threaten to destroy it. Sometimes they are rather like the bird, unsettled and threatened.

The short story concludes with a device characteristic of the collection as a whole: one narrative level insinuates itself into another. The girl realizes that the young man is Death itself, and her heart bursts in horror.

The key themes and motifs of the first short story reappear in the title story of the collection. Here, the narrator lies in a hospital, recovering from an accident; the story consists of the preamble to this accident. Like the girl in the first story, the narrator is suffering from an illness, but his suffering is more spiritual than physical. He addresses his friend, to whom the story is told: 'I am threatened by nothingness. I have to struggle more vigorously for the existence of things and people than I do for the recovery of my own organism. I think a lot about people I met in my life so that I won't suffocate on emptiness [...] Out of necessity I bring you to life. I shape you so that you will really live for me, so that you will populate my empty space.'¹⁶ This passage also reveals the layers of narration with which the author plays: the narrator relates a story of what happened to him, but creates characters, too. The narrator also seeks the meaning of the events that he relates; the meaning that the world gives to external events is nonsensical, and this lack of sense creates anxiety. The activity of the artist is thus an attempt to escape anxiety through the creation of meaning.¹⁷

The artificial quality of the text is heightened through the use of the motif of the portrait, borrowed from Oscar Wilde's *The Picture of Dorian Gray* (1891). The short story is addressed to a painter who had once made a portrait of the narrator. The narrator, when he travels abroad, leaves this portrait in the care of a family with whom he is acquainted in his home town. When he returns home, he finds that the father has abandoned the family, and that in the meantime the wife, Marta, has fallen in love with the figure in the portrait. The portrait has a symbolic function similar to that in *Dorian Gray*; the narrator states: 'It was an expression of my youth and beauty in the past'.¹⁸ In the present, the narrator is no longer worthy of the image in the portrait;¹⁹ he has become jaded and filled with disgust at the world. He has lost his beauty. Marta, like the bird in the first story, may offer the narrator a chance of redemption from his spiritual desert. The bird, one recalls, reappeared as love, as pain and as life. Like the bird, Marta makes three significant appearances in the narrator's life: the first time, when he returns from abroad, she offers him her love, which he rejects, choosing instead to indulge his lust with another, more sensual and simple, woman. The narrator comments: 'through her efforts I learned that my own simplicity is my most abundant source of pleasure'.²⁰ In rejecting Marta, the narrator becomes less

16 Tatarka, 'V úzkosti hľadania', *V úzkosti hľadania*, p. 23.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., p. 24.

19 He comments: 'A vague distress overwhelmed me, as if I didn't measure up to my own portrait.' Ibid., p. 27.

20 Ibid., p. 32.

attractive, at least according to Marta, who tells him: 'Where are your eyes, moist with enthusiasm? There is ash in them. Where is your strong man's smile? Instead of that you have a wrinkle of fatigue around your mouth and a grimace on your lips. [...] You have killed my love, killed yourself. You have disfigured your own face.'²¹ To avenge herself, Marta destroys the portrait.

The second time Marta appears as the embodiment of pain. She visits the narrator, who has gone to the mountains to purify his body and soul. She has become pregnant by another man whom she does not love. She wants to have an abortion because the foetus was not conceived in a love union, and because she is afraid that the authorities will take away her first child. The narrator says of her: 'This woman was now nothing more than a piece of flesh, a piece of densely woven nerve fabric, suffering terribly from the very act of perception, for whom even pain was hardly dignified.'²² She asks the narrator to accompany her to the doctor's surgery, because the doctor requires that her partner be present, in case anything should happen to her. The interpretation of Marta as a bird caught in a trap is further suggested by the description of the callous doctor's medical instruments: 'Forceps of the most diverse shapes, small forceps and ones with long jaws, both straight and in the form of claws, tweezers, scissors, scalpels, more forceps, some kind of awl and a hoop, all shining and cold in the blue lights, all placed in order on the cloth.'²³ It appears that the narrator misses this second opportunity that Marta offers him. When he visits her once after the operation, she suggests that they go for a swim in the river Váh. She appears to the narrator as a mermaid.²⁴ After their swim, Marta tells the narrator that he again appears beautiful to her, as he was in the portrait. The narrator rebuffs her with a cynical comment and the opportunity of the moment is lost.²⁵

The third time, Marta reappears in the narrator's lodgings in Prague. The narrator compares her to a bird and comments: 'I avoided making any sudden gestures, saying anything that would scare her away. You see, she had travelled from far away and settled here for a moment as if by a miracle.'²⁶ She is searching for her husband, who has never returned home; thus, the title of the short story refers to an activity on the level of the plot, as well as to the narrator's metaphysical anxiety. From a newspaper clipping which the narrator includes in the story, one learns that Marta was killed by a car as she ran across the street, believing that she had seen her husband in a crowd of people. The narrator was injured as he ran after her. The reader learns that she had been chasing an illusion; her husband had not actually been present at that place on that day. Her death had no meaning. The reader has the impression that the narrator remains, like the fowler, in a wasteland after the death of life. There appears to be no condemnation of the narrator other than that which he expresses himself. He is aware of his own powerlessness, despair and moral weakness. The author does not condemn him from a standpoint of morality existing outside the text. The narrator suffers from the lack of moral order in his world, and it is this chaos, and the despair he suffers on account of it, that the short story portrays.

The title of Tatarka's second book, *Panna Zázračnica*, refers to one of the characters, Anabella. She has something in common with the bird with changing feathers, described in 'Podvojná rozprávka'; she is frequently described as having come from far away,²⁷ and she

21 Ibid., pp. 31–32.

22 Ibid., p. 36.

23 Ibid., p. 38.

24 Ibid., p. 42.

25 Ibid., p. 43.

26 Ibid., p. 44.

27 See, for example, Dominik Tatarka, *Panna Zázračnica*, Turčiansky sv. Martin, n.d. [1944], p. 18.

appears in the setting of the novel as if she were a supernatural creature blown there by chance. She is above all foreign to the environment depicted. Like the bird, her nature appears to change: for the other characters, she is love, hope, mystical knowledge, inspiration, life itself.²⁸

Anabella is what she is for the other characters; her actual existence as a person in the setting of the novel is always in doubt. For the most part, the story is told by a third-person narrator; however, the narrator concentrates alternately on the mental experiences of various characters, including Anabella. The central character is the painter Tristan, the dominant personality in a group of young male artists living in a city in the Slovak state. The narrator describes their fascination with Anabella, who is drawn into their midst through the agency of Tristan. She forms relationships with all of them and acts as their muse. Tristan, however, insists that Anabella does not exist; she is his creation.²⁹ He had invented her as a character in order to amuse his friends. She then seemed to take on a life of her own. In maintaining this ambiguity between Anabella's 'real' and 'unreal' status, the narrator blurs the line between reality and the imaginative world. Each of the artists conceives of Anabella according to his own nature and needs.³⁰ The narrator states that all of them, however, long for Anabella as they do for the world beyond the borders of the Slovak state, in which they are trapped.³¹ Thus she fascinates them as a possibility of escape. By providing them with inspiration for their art, she represents escape through the imagination, through the internal world.

Although there are few references to the wartime state, it is ever-present in the atmosphere of the novel. One of the narrator's friends tells a story about Tristan sitting for hours on a rubbish dump; when the friend asks what he is doing there, Tristan answers 'I'm distilling horror and dread.'³² This is one of the functions of art described in the novel and may also summarize the artistic project of the author himself. The narrator describes Tristan's visit to the railway station late at night, a favourite motif of Tatarka's. He describes the soldiers, workers, tramps, children and villagers sleeping in the concourse. Tristan is fascinated by the scene: the contrast of the cold architecture and the groups of diminutive, pale, tired people. The whole atmosphere stimulates him and he makes sketches of the scene. The narrator's comment draws attention to the function of art, with reference to Tristan's sketches: 'He distilled here his horror, as they used to say.'³³

It is in the railway station that Tristan first sees Anabella, dressed in black, with a little black suitcase, sitting in a corner by herself. As well as representing the nebulous hopes of the artists, Anabella may also represent the Jews of Slovakia, many of whom had already been deported to camps at the time the novel was published.³⁴ Like the Jews, Anabella is dislocated and set apart from society; she is cut off from her past and has no clear future. She has no relatives. According to Tristan, Anabella had told him that she was seeking

28 One of the characters describes her as a bird: the dove that brought the sign of hope to Noah. Ibid., p. 63.

29 Ibid., p. 42.

30 See, for example, *ibid.*, p. 63.

31 'Because in the twilight of the Republic they still had the possibility of seeing the wide world, and now they were imprisoned here; they longed for her as they did for the wide world.' Ibid., pp. 75–76.

32 Ibid., p. 10.

33 Ibid., pp. 13–14.

34 On the fate of the Jews of Slovakia, see, for example: Erich Kulka, 'The Annihilation of Czechoslovak Jewry', *The Jews of Czechoslovakia*, vol. III, Philadelphia and New York, 1984, pp. 262–328.

death in their town; and that she had no reason to live when all her loved ones were dead.³⁵ Anabella states that her mother and father had died a terrible and violent death.³⁶ She feels that she comes closer to them through her own experience of death, when her sculptor friend makes a death mask of her face. If Anabella is intended to represent the Jews, through her the narrator depicts the Jews as betrayed by the community, just as Anabella eventually leaves the city, disillusioned by the artists' lack of trust in her. At any rate, she has knowledge of horror and death which the other characters lack. She herself states that she is fleeing from death and some vague horror.³⁷ Escape through obsession with Anabella does not constitute a perfect escape, as she reminds the artists of death and fear.

Anabella is also associated with patterns of imagery related to water. Legends about her first spread because Tristan recounts that he had jumped headfirst into a river for her sake, not because he had wanted to kill himself, but, as the reader learns, because he had seen her under the water.³⁸ It is implied that she lives in the world of mystery, of the spirit and of the imagination; but also perhaps, that she comes from the underworld like the enchanted maiden Janko dies for in the Slovak Romantic Janko Král's poem. The artists' fascination with her is a fascination with death and with life, hope and the imagination. Tristan states that he would suffocate if she disappeared; he can breathe the air only through her, in her presence.³⁹ This prefigures the comment by Tomáš Menkina in *Farská republika* that all decent people in the Slovak state are like fish out of water. Anabella constitutes an element which makes life tolerable for the artists. Tristan maintains that she never satisfies entirely, like life itself. If she represents life, it is life which is constantly threatened by violence, horror and death.

Anxiety is the dominant motif in *Farská republika* and most characters are assigned a value according to their response to anxiety. Set during the first years of the wartime Slovak state, the Slovaks are depicted as ridden with anxiety. The non-Jewish Slovaks are anxious, according to the narrator, because they fear the power of the Germans to which they have tied themselves. It goes without saying that the Jews in the state are anxious.

But not everyone is: those proletarians who remain alive are not anxious because they are determined to fight for their future. Likewise the Communists have conquered anxiety with Reason. The novel concentrates on the fate of two main characters: the uncle, John Menkina, and his nephew, Tomáš Menkina. They represent the Slovak people, and the options they choose in their escape from anxiety constitute the options available to the Slovaks in general. While the characters are casting about for some certainty, the narrator has already attained that redemption from fear, and the text is determined by this certainty; the narrative is straightforward Realism.⁴⁰ The text itself may be interpreted as manifesting the author's escape from the uncertainty of narrative experimentation to the safe realm of Realism; at any rate, the transparent nature of the text mirrors his secure world view.⁴¹

The novel begins with the return of the uncle, John Menkina, to his hometown in Slovakia, Žilina. He has been in America for the past twenty-six years and has visited only occasionally. He is an American citizen, but he longs to put down roots and re-establish

35 Ibid., p. 32.

36 Ibid., pp. 115, 118.

37 Ibid., p. 41.

38 Ibid., p. 30.

39 Ibid., p. 47.

40 The term 'Realism' is used here in the sense defined by Stern; a mode of writing premised on the view that there is one reality in the world and that this view is not in need of proof. J. P. Stern, *On Realism*, London and Boston, 1973, pp. 52–54.

41 See Tatarka's statement in 'The aim of art cannot be the production of illusions [...] it can only be the activating of the human being.' pp. 99–100.

himself in the community, making a home with his sister-in-law Margitka and his nephew Tomáš. John returns when the Slovak state has just been created and the Poles have seized land which was part of former Slovak territory. Anxiety colours his first impressions on returning home; the narrator describes his reactions to the people he sees sleeping in the railway station: 'He could not move even a step from the door with his luggage. While he stood there, straddling a group of sleeping people, an insect crawled over his body. Anxiety reached for his throat. The sight of the men in the depth of sleep gave him the feeling that everything was moving, moving somewhere, crawling somewhere like an insect over a corpse growing cold.'⁴² John Menkina finds that the villa which he had built for himself years before, and which he had rented out to a Jewish doctor, has been occupied by the Hlinka Guard officer Minár. A former petty clerk, Minár typifies the ruthless, money-grabbing individual who has improved his economic and social status through exploiting the misery of the Jews.⁴³ The author consistently attacks those who have profited during the war in the Fascist state. Menkina turns to a Jewish lawyer for advice on how to retrieve his property, but the lawyer, like all Jews portrayed in the novel, expresses despair, and tells Menkina that his situation is hopeless and that he might as well give up.⁴⁴ The uncle at first appears to accept his status as an outsider in a corrupt society; locals avoid him because he is 'an American'. He lives as a tenant in his former house, subservient to those who have confiscated his property. Yet he maintains his dignity and refuses to accept charity from his new 'landlords'. Eventually, however, the uncle's complexity is sacrificed for the sake of the schematic symmetry of the novel. The author wishes to depict the gap between the generations, to contrast the corruption of the bourgeois elders with the enthusiasm of the young Communists. Moreover, he wishes to contrast the influence of the capitalist United States with that of the socialist Soviet Union. Thus he depicts the uncle as succumbing to the desire for comfort and security; the uncle buys a hotel which has been 'aryanized' at a cheap price and settles down to the life of a property owner. Indeed, the despicable Minár, who had ousted John Menkina from his own property, helps the uncle buy the hotel. The uncle's decision seems in violation of his character as it has been presented to the reader in the first few chapters of the novel. The uncle's total moral collapse is presented through his acceptance of Minár: 'Mr Minár is a decent person [...] he is a good Slovak soul';⁴⁵ and through his acceptance of the Slovak state as a good thing.⁴⁶ The hotel itself, patronized by local, as well as German and Polish officials, symbolizes the rotten society: 'The old hotel, the Klappholz Hotel, in itself a terrible burden, is also burdened down with a hundred-year-old past, with all possible sins of the townsfolk.'⁴⁷ That the uncle's decision to pursue material security at the expense of his fellow citizens and in violation of moral standards is intended to represent one path pursued by Slovaks, as well as natural capitalist immorality, in their flight from fear and insecurity, is made clear in the nephew's condemnation of his uncle:

I thought that you were a saint, a strange Slovak saint [...]. I saw in you all the Slovak Menkinas. And I believed. The Menkinas really do know how to survive on nothing, on feeling. You once said that in America people live on dollars and that here at home, in the country, we live on mercy. That's how you lived. You knew how to live with a pure heart even as a caretaker in your own house. When I saw you walk down the street I believed that the little nation of Menkinas did not want to have anything to do with the filth going on

42 Tatarka, *Farská republika*, p. 7.

43 Ibid., p. 57.

44 'Or give in. Give in Mr Menkina.' Ibid., p. 20.

45 Ibid., p. 255.

46 'We can be glad that we have our own Slovak state.' Ibid., p. 256.

47 Ibid., p. 268.

around it. I believed that this little nation would preserve its innocence, except for the biggest ravenous ravens. [...] The Germans took over the factories, the Menkinas were satisfied with the offer of aryanization. You try to persuade yourself, my uncle, that you aryanized out of goodness, indeed out of love. But where did your virtue lead you? What goodness? Stupidity, stupid trust. The devil knows it's false. It's a black blank mind, that is what it is. You don't know and don't want to know about corruption in your own house. You only serve drinks and rake in money in a Christian fashion. Just as the Jewish publicans served drinks and made money.⁴⁸

One notes the nephew's anti-Jewish sentiment, retained despite his hatred of the Fascist state.

The fate of this nephew (Tomáš Menkina), the other main character, represents the other option open to Slovaks. At the beginning of the novel, Tomáš is alienated from himself and from his surroundings. He despises himself for having taken part as a soldier in the German invasion of Poland.⁴⁹ He harbours hatred and disgust for the nationalist propaganda of the new Slovak state. He believes that the Slovaks are enslaved, just like the Poles.⁵⁰ Tomáš's frustration is intensified in that he cannot ignore what is going on around him; as a schoolmaster, he is obliged to educate his pupils in the 'national' and 'Christian' spirit of the day,⁵¹ and his nausea brings him to a state close to despair. His frame of mind is characteristic of the young generation of teachers with whom he works. The narrator comments of Tomáš's colleagues:

They all unconsciously breathed in the atmosphere of those years. They were all poisoned. These young people were asked to perform a great task: to raise the young in a Christian and national spirit. At the same time, naturally, it was assumed that they agreed with this spirit of intolerance and violence. All the worse for those who did not agree with it. They served the state for a meagre wage like venal women.⁵²

It is in this state of all-consuming loathing, self-loathing and anxiety that the character comes to believe in socialism as the one hope for the future.

Tomáš turns to Communist ideology because it appears to offer answers. In his state of powerlessness, he fantasizes about a Communist hero who suffers no doubts, knows how he should act.⁵³ The character who embodies this certainty is Pavol Lyčko, a member of the underground Central Committee of the Communist Party. At first, Tomáš's enthusiasm for Communists is based on his admiration for the adventurous Lyčko. However, when Tomáš is arrested on the suspicion that he is involved in the production of Communist leaflets, he gains a more solid appreciation for the ideology. During his interrogations in prison, he learns the contents of the leaflets, which he has never seen himself, from remarks made by his tormentor. He learns that the Communists argue that the Germans must lose the war. The Communist author of the leaflets offers a way out of a hopeless situation: 'The writer of the pamphlet turned against the apocalyptic horror of the world with a daring idea. He broke down the uncertain, but thus all the more oppressive, burden of the awareness of life with reason; in reason he sought a weapon against it; he changed it into an economic reality; he defended himself with statistic; he did not submit or give up. He believed, but with a rational belief. And he fought.'⁵⁴ Tomáš's experience in prison

48 Ibid., pp. 257–58.

49 Ibid., p. 32.

50 Ibid., p. 37.

51 Ibid., p. 131.

52 Ibid., p. 59.

53 Ibid., p. 105.

54 Ibid., p. 225.

causes him to think more about Communism. The false accusation made against him, that he is a Communist activist, is made true. In prison, he also learns what it means to be part of a collective of those who suffer and are persecuted by the regime. Needless to say, the impact of imprisonment on a person's spirit appears to be rather idealized; the narrator states: 'In prison, they strip a person of his personal cares and teach him to think in a more broad-minded manner.'⁵⁵

For Tomáš, the character through whom the narrator appears to speak, workers and Communists are identified with hope, energy, determination.⁵⁶ This determination is personified, for example, by Lyčko's working-class mother. At the funeral of the dispossessed proletarian Paulínka Husáříčka, Lyčková makes a speech in which she affirms that the working-class will not abandon its battle against poverty and against its oppressors (the Germans, and by implication, capitalist exploiters) until it attains victory.⁵⁷ Those who are disaffected, but not Communist, are mere shells of human beings and have no future. This attitude is personified by the character Lašut, Tomáš's one-time friend, turned traitor. The narrator expresses Tomáš's view when he states: 'Lašut was sour because he only smelled of Communism. If he were a Communist, he wouldn't be sour.'⁵⁸ One might note that Lašut is described as being 'one-quarter Jewish', and that Tomáš Menkina regards this mixture of blood as an explanation of the 'vague, but exhausting languour' which he has always sensed in Lašut.⁵⁹ Of course, this can be understood as merely deriving from Lašut's fear for his own skin. But it does suggest an identification of Jews with anxiety, and they are repeatedly portrayed in the novel as a people without a future.⁶⁰ Only those who do not suffer from anxiety have a future: the Communists.

55 Ibid., p. 243.

56 This character is based, to some extent, on Tatarka's own experience as a teacher during the war. See Perstická and Přerostová (eds), *Dominik Tatarka a ti druzí*, p. 143.

57 *Farská republika*, p. 185.

58 Ibid., p. 216.

59 Ibid., p. 107. The phrase reflects a conventional antisemitic perception of Jews as suffering from the ills of modern civilization. On stereotypes of the Jews, see: Sander Gilman, *The Jew's Body*, New York and London, 1991.

60 See, for example, *Farská republika*, pp. 134, 238.

41 The Path towards Socialist Realism in Czechoslovakia, 1945–48

TIM BEASLEY-MURRAY

There is no doubt that each regime has its own writing, the history of which remains to be written.¹

This chapter traces the pre-history of Socialist Realism in Czech and Slovak literature by examining writers' attempts to find a new form of writing fit for a socialist world. My argument is based on the assumption that the tendency towards Socialist Realism in Czechoslovakia has its own literary, philosophical and historical grounds.² This view contradicts Western or post-Communist critics who see the move towards Socialist Realism as the 'lifeless appropriation of Soviet models'³ and the embracing of 'a pre-fabricated theory of art, proclaimed at the Moscow Writers' Congress of 1934 by Zhdanov.'⁴ It also contradicts Czech and Slovak Communist critics who see this move as the unproblematic expression of historical inevitability.⁵ Particularly, in the case of the former, I suggest that certain factors which helped to lead towards Socialist Realism exist well before the imposition of any party-line. Moreover, if not entirely new in the immediately post-war period,⁶ these factors are strengthened and the perception of them acquires a greater urgency in the years 1945–48. I also point to factors in the literary, linguistic and philosophical consciousness of Socialist Realism already evident in its pre-history, which contributed to making possible its collusion with and participation in the

1 Roland Barthes, *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, Paris, 1972. Page references are to Susan Sontag (ed.), *A Roland Barthes Reader*, London, 1993, pp. 31–61 (42).

2 One way of understanding the interplay of forces which lead literature in the direction of Socialist Realism is to put the problem in the terms of Czech Structuralism. Developments immanent to literature provide an impetus towards Socialist Realism. There are also developments in other spheres — historical, philosophical, linguistic and political — which, when translated into the literary sphere, manifest themselves as further determinations of this direction. The metamorphosis of Czech Structuralism from its origins in Russian Formalism, uninterested in questions of extra-literary reality, to a method which considers itself to be in harmony with the doctrine of orthodox Stalinism is itself also a case of this kind. The causes of this metamorphosis were both internal and external to the immanent development of Structuralism. Moreover, I am convinced that an analysis of this metamorphosis, for which the years 1945–51 were a decisive phase, would throw light on the questions which this chapter raises. In 1951, following the publication of writing on linguistics bearing Stalin's name, Structuralism succumbed to an infertile Stalinist orthodoxy. The volumes of the Prague Linguistic Circle's journal, *Slovo a slovesnost*, document this development fully.

3 Lubomír Machala and Eduard Petrů (eds), *Panorama české literatury*, Prague, 1994, pp. 310–11.

4 Alfred French, *Czech Writers and Politics, 1945–1969*, Boulder, CO, 1982, p. 31.

5 Thus, for example, Josef Hrabák, Dušan Jeřábek and Zdenka Tichá, *Průvodce po dějinách české literatury*, Prague, 1976. *Průvodce* describes the way in which 'the engagement of social literary creation expanded, and all progressive prose writers came to grips with this problem.' (p. 498) A similar rhetoric of inevitability is employed by histories of Slovak literature. See Stanislav Šmatlák, *Dejiny slovenskej literatúry*, Bratislava, 1988, pp. 538–66.

6 A reaction against Modernism and the excesses of the historical Avant-garde is, for example, a feature of Neue Sachlichkeit in inter-war Germany.

violence and repression of the Stalinist state. To make this case, I examine three works. Two appeared in 1945 in the first months after the end of the Second World War. One was written by Peter Karvaš (born 1920), a Slovak Communist journalist and writer, the other by Jarmila Svatá (1903–63), a Czech writer. My third text is a speech by the Czech Communist ideologue, Ladislav Štoll (1902–81), delivered a month after the Communist Party take-over of 1948.

The Failure of Literature — Jarmila Svatá

Svatá's work appears neither Socialist nor Realist. Although the text at issue, *Milenci SS-smrti* (The Lovers of SS-death)⁷, shows a general left-orientation, this manifests itself more as enthusiasm for the Red Army as liberators and sentimental attachment to Russian folk-songs than as a genuine ideological position. Indeed, the ideological position which underpins Svatá's text is a crude Czech and Panslav nationalism which expresses itself in an unpleasant racism.⁸ Likewise, the text does not conform to prescriptive Marxist aesthetics. Svatá had been associated with the inter-war group of Avant-garde artists, Devětsil. A cousin of Devětsil's main theorist, Karel Teige, she had been the group's only exponent of Poetist dance, working with E. F. Burian in the *Osvobozené divadlo* (Liberated Theatre), before turning to literature after her marriage in the early 1930s. *Milenci SS-smrti* displays a sensibility which is rooted in those Avant-garde aesthetics. Nevertheless, Svatá's text displays a literary and moral consciousness similar to that of the Karvaš text, which throws light on the grounds for the emergence of Socialist Realism in post-war Czechoslovakia. *Milenci SS-smrti* does this primarily by revealing a literary consciousness which accepts its own impotence in the face of 'history' and hence calls for a new form of writing.⁹

Writing of the First World War, Walter Benjamin had analysed the effect of the shock experience of war on the capacity to narrate.

With the World War a process began to become apparent which has not halted since then. Was it not noticeable at the end of the war that men returned from the battlefield grown silent — not richer but poorer in communicable experience? What ten years later was poured out in the flood of war books was anything but experience that goes from mouth to mouth. And there was nothing remarkable about that. For never has experience been contradicted more thoroughly than strategic experience by tactical warfare, economic experience by inflation, bodily experience by mechanical warfare, moral experience by those in power.¹⁰

In Benjamin's terms: experience (*Erlebnis*) had made narratable experience (*Erfahrung*) impossible. There is no doubt that in Svatá a similar crisis of narration manifests itself. It is

7 Jarmila Svatá, *Milenci SS-smrti* (The Lovers of SS Death), Prague, 1945.

8 Svatá's venomous treatment of the Germans, if understandable, shows the same essentialist, biologically based racism of which she accuses the Germans themselves. For an extreme example of this, see Eva Klenová, *Tvé děti, Evropo*, Prague, 1947. Svatá's racism is borne out in the following comment: 'all this happened in Europe in the years 1938–45, not in the Middle Ages, not even in the unexplored parts of Africa, and the order came from a white man, a German, a doctor!' Svatá, *Milenci SS-smrti*, p. 51. This form of racism, in the name of a false European universalism, which consists in lament and shock that the horrors of the war should have taken place in civilized Europe rather than brutal and primitive Africa, is common in the period. See, for example, Zdeněk Němeček, *Evropská kantiléna*, Brno, 1945.

9 A recurrent theme of the text is the general complicity of Western culture in the horrors of the war. Svatá expresses this with her repeated reminders of Germany's claim to be the nation of culture *par excellence*.

10 Walter Benjamin, translated by Harry Zohn, 'The Storyteller: Reflections on the Work of Nikolai Leskov,' in *Illuminations*, London, 1992, pp. 83–107 (83–4).

difficult to compare the impact of the two wars. The Second World War and the period preceding it, however, served perhaps only to increase the effect that Benjamin describes. This increase is manifested in phenomena such as the effect of totalitarian methods of propaganda and control, planned genocide, the impact of war on entire civilian populations in occupation, *Blitzkrieg*, the carpet-bombing of cities, and a war that was truly global. These phenomena had an impact alien to those who knew only the First World War.¹¹ Svata's text, written in response to these circumstances, expresses a sense of the impossibility of narration.

Svata's *Milenci SS-smrti* portrays life in the concentration camp, Mauthausen, in the years 1943–5, based on the account of a former prisoner, Václav Václavík. Like other writers of the time,¹² Svata clearly felt compelled to take part in the process of documenting the horrors of the German concentration camps.¹³ This concern is expressed in the dedication: 'to those who did not see and thus do not want to believe or who forget too quickly.' If the reader expects, however, that the text will adopt the sober, pared-down, ostentatiously non-literary style that one normally associates with the serious business of documenting such phenomena, these expectations are soon confounded.

Svata writes the text in the vivid present. On the one hand, this tense portrays the narrated events of Mauthausen not as objective historical events but from the point of view of the ephemeral subjective consciousness. On the other, this point of view confers on the text the authority of personal witness.¹⁴ A similar ambiguity results from the highly emotional, at times almost Expressionist tone of much of the text. Svata's style mixes different registers and techniques, the juxtaposition of which results in ambiguity rather than documentary authority. Lyrical, descriptive and rhetorical passages, bordering on melodrama, and references to art and literature clash with the bare statement of brutality, the listing of the names of SS guards or the documenting of simple statistics. I give one passage to exemplify this:

Move, move, move! [...] The motif of the wooden clogs dully squelches along the muddy path [...]. The wooden clogs of the damned go down the 186 stone steps into the abyss of the Mauthausen mine [...]. There are dreams from which one violently awakens [...] with the feeling of being abandoned, lost between Heaven and Earth, of metaphysical anxiety. One would not be able to recount the confused sequence of their images; happily it has been lost somewhere in the unconscious; all one knows, however, is that [...] one has witnessed and

11 Benjamin's essay, written in 1936, keeps — as does all his work — one eye on the present. The impact of Fascism and the shadow of a war which Benjamin was keenly aware of but did not live to see in its full horror are implicitly present in this essay.

12 *Milenci SS-smrti* appeared as part of a wave of texts dedicated to reporting the horrors of the concentration camps — almost exclusively from the viewpoint of Czech political prisoners. As the following title, typical of these texts in general, indicates, these texts share Svata's sense of moral outrage and responsibility to document and inform: for example, R. Blank, *Mrtvý se vrátil: politický vězeň číslo 34880, svědek nacistických vražd žaluje* (The Dead Returned: Political Prisoner no. 34880, Witness of Nazi Murders, Makes His Accusation), Prague, 1945. See Derek Paton's chapter in this volume.

13 That the text was not a passing preoccupation for Svata is clear since in 1946 she published a play based on the material of *Milenci SS-smrti*: Jarmila Svata (with Václav Václavík), *Nenapravitelní*, Prague, 1946.

14 Jorge Semprun's memoir of Buchenwald, *Literature or Life*, also employs the vivid present. In this case, the theme of ambiguity between the subjective and objective — between literature and life, in a sense — is consciously developed. The vivid present is one way of developing this since it blurs the distinction between *Erzählzeit* and *erzählte Zeit*. See Jorge Semprun, *Literature or Life*, translated by Linda Coverdale, New York, 1997.

participated in events passing beyond the normal order of human actions, that the impressions and experiences of them hovered on the dark borders of madness.

[What is this?] The Egypt of the Pharaohs come to life? A drawing by Doré come to life? A monstrous dream? One hopes so, certainly, after all, this can't be reality! Prisoner no. 28907, this is reality! Know, before it's too late, that this is an April morning of 1943, and what you see is German Fascism hard at work wiping out its prisoners [...]. For the second time today truth and dream are becoming far too dangerously confused.¹⁵

Svatá strives to document. Details such as the number of steps down to the mine and her habitual use of the prisoner's number demonstrate this. The devices she uses, however, are literary: the repeated metonymic reference to the prisoners by means of their clogs, a device which is laid bare by the use of 'motif'; the shift in narrative point of view which allows the digression on dreams; the rhetorical questions, dialogized monologue which centres on a comparison of Mauthausen with the work of an artist and a biblical story. What is important here, however, is the underlying theme of the inability of narrative and literary form to convey the experience of the camps. The shock experience of Mauthausen explodes traditional form, and it is only through explicit negative reference to art and narrative or through disjointed use of literary techniques that Svatá is able to express her own narrative failure. If one takes Svatá's own image of the experience of the camp as something repressed into the unconscious, her text becomes the site of near hysterical activity, where fragments of what once made sense are thrown together in a fashion which seems beyond the author's conscious control, in a desire to express the sense of the senseless. In so doing, whether conscious of it or not, Svatá also demonstrates the 'impossibility' of narrative and the shattered nature of literary language.

Such a text produces unease and paradox:

Chroniclers of 1938–1945 Europe, remember all this! And reject all deceitful books and dramas and sketches and narrations, full of all sorts of nonsense about human heroism, written like documents or in the desire for literary glory by those whose only experience of the period was the empty rustling of paper on desks! Reject them, because truth does not wear the smart costume of deceitful feelings, for its bloody lips do not speak literary slogans about humanity; it does not narrate impotent cock-and-bull stories about the heroism of comradeship... Reject them, for bloody truth and nothing but bloody truth will drive the guilty to justice.¹⁶

The reader knows that Svatá's text is written on the basis of another's testimony. Thus the appeal to the chroniclers, repeated throughout the text, is misplaced. Svatá stands in the position of just such a chronicler. Furthermore, her text is exactly what she advises future writers to reject — an attempt at document, written by someone who did not live through the camps, loaded with 'literary slogans,' and concerned with the heroism of comradeship. In this sense, Svatá cannot claim to speak with the bloody lips of truth. For all that, Svatá's text does not seem to wear a smart costume of deceit; rather it wears the bloodied rags of the consciousness of failure. Furthermore, it displays the sense that, as a narrative form, it is doomed to disappear with the coming of a new writing which, Svatá presciently implies, will be concerned with judgement. Svatá herself does not attempt this form of writing. For her it is in the future, making her own text a curious intermediate form. To see a writer at work, trying to build a coherent new world out of the ruins of the old, I turn to Peter Karvaš.

15 Svatá, *Milenci SS-smrti*, pp. 28–29.

16 Ibid., pp. 68–69.

Towards Socialist Realism

(1) Literature and Reality — Karvaš

Most (The Bridge)¹⁷, by Peter Karvaš, is a collection of essays written from a Communist point of view for Slovak newspapers. Its style largely conforms to the conventions of narrative journalism. One of these essays, 'The Mass Production of Charity,' describes the problem of reintegrating former partisans into society and satisfying their material needs. It begins as follows: 'And a man came down from the mountains [*I prišiel človek z hor*]. This is not the beginning of a fashionable Realist novel but a reality which is, after all, not in the least extraordinary today.'¹⁸

Because the reader reads the essay from the page of the newspaper or in a collection of essays, she or he will be aware that this cannot be the beginning of a novel. But this first sentence contains other elements which compel Karvaš to point out that this is no novel. First among these are the aesthetic qualities of the rhythm of the sentence. It is an iambic tetrameter, strongly marked as such by the placing of the monosyllable 'i' at the beginning of the line, a common device in the writing of verse. This poetic quality points away from the documentary towards literature. The initial 'i' is also the initial 'and' of the Bible and fairy tales. Second, the non-specific nouns in the sentence — a man, the mountains — lend the statement a universal and symbolic quality. One might read the man as standing for all men. The mountains might be viewed as a symbol for the wilderness. There are associations with the return of Moses from Sinai with the law. These suggestions would serve the ideological purpose of the author. The partisan, like Moses, could be seen as a prophet bringing commandments for a new era. The crucial aspect of the opening sentence is the fact that it bears the mark of the novel: that is, the preterite.

Roland Barthes argues that the preterite, or in French, the *passé simple*, performs a crucial function:

The function of the preterite is no longer that of a tense. The function it plays is to reduce reality to a point of time, and to abstract, from the depth of a multiplicity of experiences, a pure verbal act [...] directed towards a logical link with other acts [...]: it aims at maintaining a hierarchy in the realm of acts [...] it calls for a sequence of events, that is for an intelligible narrative. This is why it is the ideal instrument for every construction of a world; it is the unreal time of cosmogonies, myths, History and Novels. It presupposes a world which is constructed, elaborated, self-sufficient, reduced to sufficient lines, and not one which has been sent sprawling before us, for us to take or leave.¹⁹

Although the preterite as a grammatical category does not exist in Slovak, the aesthetic quality of Karvaš's opening sentence, strengthened by its monumentality and its echoes of the Bible and fairy-tale, is that of a novel's preterite. This quality in the first sentence is so powerful that it demands the disclaimer of the second sentence. As a result of the preterite form, the opening sentence acquires a weightiness, a naturalness; it begins to order reality. Given the political import of the material at hand, it entirely suits Karvaš's purpose that this should be the case; after all, it is only right that the return of the partisan from the mountains should be presented as a natural step in an ordered and necessary chain of events. The defeat of the Germans and the victory of socialism metonymically gain an aura of inevitability. Barthes argues that the bourgeoisie could present its own power as natural and thus necessary partially as a result of the naturalizing force of its dominant Realist

17 Peter Karvaš, *Most: výbor z novinárskej činnosti z revolučných čias* (The Bridge; A Selection of Journalistic Activity from Revolutionary Times), Bratislava, 1945.

18 Ibid., p. 57.

19 Barthes, *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, pp. 45–46.

discourse: 'It was thanks [to the techniques of Realism] that the triumphant Bourgeoisie of the last century was able to look upon its values as universal and to carry over to sections of society which were absolutely heterogeneous to it all the names which were parts of its ethos.'²⁰ Since revolutionary socialism seeks to show that it is itself the natural and inevitable result of history, socialist writing is also obliged to employ a mode of expression which presents a world fashioned in its own image, one which is ordered, universal and natural. The techniques of what was previously 'bourgeois' Realism must be adapted to the socialist cause. This necessity is not merely a question of accessibility to the workers or of cultural policy. It is a philosophical necessity.

If it is true that the techniques of Realism authenticate and order the world in a way which suits Karvaš's purpose, one must ask why the second sentence denies the novel-like qualities of the first, why the text establishes an explicit and exclusive opposition between two distinct phenomena: on the one hand, the techniques of Realism and the claims of Realism to provide direct access to reality, and on the other hand, reality itself. The answer lies in the two-fold nature of the discourse of the Realist novel. Barthes puts it as follows:

[The preterite] is a lie made manifest [...]. It creates a content credible, yet flaunted as an illusion; it is the ultimate term of a formal dialectics which clothes an unreal fact in the garb first of a truth then of a lie denounced as such [...]. [It gives] to the imaginary the formal guarantee of the real, but while preserving in the sign the ambiguity of a double object at once believable and false. The task of writing in the novel is to put the mask in place and at the same time to point it out.²¹

It is this that unsettles Karvaš. Realist discourse may order and naturalize a view of the world as real, yet it also highlights its own moment of illusion. Karvaš is suggesting that the task of Socialist writing must be to harness the mimetic and ordering powers of Realism, whilst denouncing its quality of illusion.

This task is a serious, if naive, attempt to politicize writing. The German Romantics had ascribed to art a radical, political message. Yet if, as Schiller argued in *On the Aesthetic Education Of Man* (1794), art had provided the individual with the utopian promise of a future wholeness which the division of human activity had destroyed,²² the increasing autonomy of the institution of art in bourgeois society had neutralized the radical potential of this promise. The bourgeois institution of art became an affirmative counterpart to the mechanisms of alienation and oppression of bourgeois society. As Herbert Marcuse writes in the essay, 'On the Affirmative Character of Culture': 'The decisive characteristic [of culture in bourgeois society] is the assertion of a universally obligatory, externally better and more valuable world that must be unconditionally affirmed: a world essentially different from the factual world of the daily struggle for existence, yet unrealisable by every individual for himself "from within" without any transformation of the state of fact.'²³ As a result, the affirmative character of culture contains both a 'remembrance of

20 Ibid., p. 48.

21 Ibid., p. 47-8.

22 Schiller expresses this idea with economy and wit in the following passage: 'It must therefore be wrong if the cultivation of individual powers involves the sacrifice of wholeness. Or rather, however much the law of nature tends in that direction, it must be open to us to restore by means of a higher Art the totality of our nature which the arts themselves have destroyed' [so muß es bei uns stehen, diese Totalität in unserer Natur, welche die Kunst zerstört hat, durch eine höhere Kunst wieder herzustellen]. Friedrich Schiller, translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L.A. Willoughby, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man*, Oxford, 1967, Sixth Letter, p. 42.

23 Herbert Marcuse, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, *Negations; Essays in Critical Theory*, London, 1988, p. 120.

what could be' and a 'justification of the established form of existence.'²⁴ Bourgeois society is happy to allow the 'remembrance of what could be' to exist only as potential. Hence, it preserves in art the distance from practice which keeps art at the level of illusion. Socialist writing, however, must make the promise real. This demands that the utopian quality of art be presented not as a possible future but as the real and necessary future. The distance and illusion of art must be eliminated.²⁵

Karvaš makes use of literary techniques to present the real whilst simultaneously denouncing such techniques as giving a false view of the world — as in the opening of 'The Mass Production of Charity.' The attempt, however, to divorce the truth content of art from its character as illusion fails. One cannot use the mask and not point to it. From a different perspective, Karvaš fails as a result of the contradiction which is inherent in the task which he sets himself. How can one write a new reality into being?

(2) *Language and Reality — Karvaš and Štoll*

At the heart of *Most* lies a concern with the semiotic nature of language. This concern is apparent in 'New Life.' This essay opens with an attack on the slogan, 'A New Life,' as merely that, a slogan rather than a reality: 'There is no doubt; we are beginning a new life. We hear it at every step; every newspaper tells us about it and every public speaker talks about it.' Language and material reality, however, are at odds: 'And you go about in yesterday's suit on yesterday's pavement; you sleep in yesterday's bed, under yesterday's ceiling; you talk to yesterday's people about yesterday's things. Suddenly you begin to feel that you are as much a part of the old life as the new. You start having doubts about the new life and you have a strong suspicion that it is just a matter of an empty phrase.'²⁶ The phrase does not correspond to reality. Karvaš argues that we are stuck in an abyss which is not merely that of transition from one government to another; this is also the abyss which gapes between sign and referent. The question remains: 'isn't there a deeper, more penetrating and more essential difference between the old and the new life than between the signs of the old regime and the signs of the new?'²⁷ Signs are not to be trusted. The difference between the old and new regimes must be realized and overcome not merely at the level of sign but at the level of the real. In Husserl's terminology: the bracketing of the referential world is a political problem. The task of socialist writing is to make of semiotic material and reality a complete and natural union.²⁸

24 Ibid., p. 98.

25 Here, Socialist Realism comes close to its anathema, the historical Avant-garde. In the view of Bürger, the historical Avant-garde also attempts to break down the barrier between life and art, by launching an assault on the institution of art, in order to release the liberating power of art. Ultimately both attempts fail. What distinguishes the two failures is that the historical Avant-garde, on the one hand, leads to a paradoxical aestheticism and hence to the impotent domination of art over everyday life; Socialist Realism, on the other, leads to an equally paradoxical death of what was originally seen as art's power in ideological stagnation and the stultifying domination of political life over art. Nevertheless, the two movements share far more than is immediately apparent. Thus for example, in both the theme of the 'new man' is important; both are characterized by the belief that art can help bring about a new reality. Moreover, in post-war Czechoslovakia, it would be surprising if aspects of the spirit of the inter-war Avant-garde — still alive if weak — did not have an influence in some fashion on texts ostensibly written in the spirit of Stalinism. See Peter Bürger, *Theory of the Avant-garde*, translated by Michael Shaw, Manchester, 1994.

26 Karvaš, *Most*, p. 48.

27 Ibid., p. 48.

28 The relationship between language and reality is of particular importance for Socialist writing. There is no doubt, however, that a sense that language and literary style need bringing back down to earth, as close as possible to the objective world of facts, is common to writers of

The literary strategy which Karvaš adopts is a fusion of abstract and concrete terminology. 'One cannot step into the New Life as if into a taxi. One cannot start the New Life like a stroll or a cabaret number. One cannot obtain a New Life like a new umbrella or a new driving licence.'²⁹ For Karvaš, however, the capitalist model of exchange implicit in this quotation is not sufficient. Karvaš seeks a materialist form of language. New Life must be created through work. Material must refashion language. New Life, he writes, will be the work of your hands and your heart. Still an ambivalence remains: 'it is in our power to create this world around us, to dig it out of the earth, to conjure it up out of working hours.' Karvaš may exhort the reader to dig the new world out of the earth, but he himself conjures it up with a linguistic sleight of hand. Finally, he falls back on paradox to synthesize new life, reality and language. 'Lips should speak less. Hands, brains and hearts have the word. In yesterday's suit, under yesterday's ceiling.'³⁰ The word is made concrete, and hands, brains and hearts are given voice.

Karvaš's text displays a resistance towards the arbitrary nature of semiotic material. As Barthes argues in his essays on Brecht,³¹ bourgeois Realism seeks to deny the arbitrary nature of semiotic material, running the sign together with the referent. This is crucial to the bourgeoisie since it presents the world of the bourgeoisie as natural. The exploitation of the arbitrary nature of signification, as effected for example by the historical Avant-garde, reveals the cultural and not the natural aspect of meaning. It reminds the bourgeoisie that it, too, is cultural, a result of history rather than of nature. Socialist writing cannot afford to consider the open-ended nature of signification. It must present a world which is unequivocal, necessary and natural.³² In post-war Czechoslovakia, the sense that socialist writing must be hostile towards the arbitrary nature of signification is indicated in a different form by Ladislav Štoll, in his 1948 speech, tellingly entitled 'Face to Face with Reality.'³³

various political persuasions throughout Europe in this period. There is a number of reasons for this trend: first, it is a purely literary reaction against Modernism, second, a rejection of Modernism on the grounds that its claims to a social and political radicalism had been proved false, and hence that Modernism itself had been complicit in the horrors of Nazism and the world war, and third, a perception that language had been corrupted and manipulated by the use of propaganda — by regimes of all descriptions — and in the squabbling of political factions. For evidence of this last point, see George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* or 'Politics and the English Language' (1946) in *Inside the Whale and Other Essays*, London, 1960, pp. 143–57. The rise to hegemonic prominence of Existentialism with its emphasis on the virtues of Camus's *clarté* and *lucidité* and Sartre's *bonne foi* is also part of this general trend.

29 Karvaš, *Most*, p. 48.

30 Ibid., p. 49.

31 See, for example, Roland Barthes, 'Les Tâches de la critique brechtienne,' in *Essais critiques*, Paris, 1964, pp 84–89, particularly p. 88.

32 This situation sheds further light on the uneasy relationship between the literary and the non-literary in Karvaš's text. As Paul de Man remarks: 'the statement about language, that sign and meaning can never coincide, is what is precisely taken for granted in the language we call literary. Literature, unlike everyday language, begins on the far side of this knowledge; it is the only form of language free from the fallacy of unmediated expression.' If this is true, then literature — the naming of nothingness, as de Man refers to it — in its laying bare of the impossibility of making sign and meaning coincide, functions as a permanent bad conscience of a discourse such as Stalinism which lays claim to the unmediated expression of truth. Paul de Man, 'Criticism and Crisis,' in *Blindness and Insight*, London, 1983, pp. 3–19 (17).

33 Ladislav Štoll, 'Skutečnosti tváří v tvář,' in *Úmění a ideologický boj I (1945–1959)*, Prague, 1972, pp. 71–104. This was an influential speech. The occasion was a discussion in Prague of the problems of contemporary culture. Other speakers were the Minister-President, Klement Gottwald, Václav Kopecký, the Minister of Information, and Zdeněk Nejedlý, former Minister

Štoll quotes the critic, F. X. Šalda (1867–1937): 'The [worker's and peasant's] serious and honest relationship to manual work is clearly the key which opens and makes accessible the secrets of artistic creation.'³⁴ Following this assertion, Štoll analyses how the worker perceives the world as opposed to the bourgeois. I quote the passage in full:

The first, the worker's relation towards the world is essentially sensuous, ardent, graphic and creative. The second [the bourgeois] relation is cold, cynical and financially speculative. Let us take note of the way in which, for example, the metalworker looks at a piece of metal, the potter at a piece of clay, the carpenter at a plank of ash from whose plane curls a beautiful, fragrant spiral of woodshaving. This is a relation in which, in Marx's words, material smiles with poetic radiance on man. Šalda was right. This is the relation which also produces the secrets of artistic creation [...]. The money man, however, looks at the object in an utterly different fashion. He sees in the object merely the commodity, its abstract imprint, a fetish. Such a man does not care what he buys and sells, whether the metal is copper or iron, the plank pine or ash. In such a man, rich, beautiful creative life is extinguished; his brain begins to swell at the expense of the heart and passions; and an abstract and speculative point of view kills in him the beautiful, human, creative potential, not only in relation to the world of objects, but also in relation to people, to women, to children, to Nature, to the nation and to works of art.³⁵

There are conclusions here to be drawn for a political philosophy of language and literature which remain implicit in Štoll's speech. What does the potter see when he looks at a piece of clay? In Marxist terms: he sees in it the use-value of the pot, a value which is determined by and inseparable from the material properties of the clay. In formal terms: he sees in it the image of the pot which he wishes to create. This mental image is also determined by the material properties of the clay at hand. The bourgeois, however, sees in the clay an expression of exchange-value. It is the nature of an economy based on exchange that the amount of exchange-value represented by the clay could just as well be represented by a quantity of linen or any other commodity.³⁶ The relation between the clay and the image of the quantity of exchange-value which the bourgeois sees in it, is, then, in one sense, arbitrary.³⁷

The artist views the world and forms an image of the world in verbal-ideological material. It follows that if, on the one hand, she or he is a bourgeois consciousness, dominated by the categories of commodity form and reification, the image that she or he produces will exist in alienated, abstract and partially arbitrary relation to the world from which it is drawn. Such a view will result in a distance between vision and reality, image and meaning, sign and referent.³⁸ This will manifest itself in a language that shows its

of Education. Tristan Tzara and Louis Aragon also took part. The proceedings were collected in M. Kouřil (ed.), *Sjezd národní kultury*, Prague, 1948. Štoll's paper subsequently came out separately and in English, French, German and Spanish translations.

34 F. X. Šalda, Foreword to the fourth edition of his ideological novel, *Loutky i dělníci boží* quoted in Štoll, p. 75.

35 Štoll, *Úmění a ideologický boj*, p. 78.

36 See Karl Marx, *Capital*, I [1867], reprint, London, 1988, pp. 125–77.

37 In another sense, the relation is determined by the amount of labour-time required to extract the amount of clay at hand understood in relation to the total sum of social labour.

38 Štoll does not elaborate on the implications of his words. He does, however, hint at these issues in the following passage: 'From the beginning capitalist social organization was essentially an inhospitable territory for art. In it, artists experience an insoluble discrepancy between their vision and reality.' (p 81) Lukács argues that the feeling of a chasm between vision and reality, between subject and object, can be attributed to the effects of commodification and reification on all areas of activity in capitalism. This argument would fit better in Štoll's argument and would follow logically from his comments. See Georg Lukács, *History and Class*

awareness of a distanced, abstract and arbitrary relationship to the reality of which it speaks. The proletarian writing consciousness, on the other hand, will create an image determined by the object with which it works. Vision and reality, image and meaning, sign and referent will present themselves as a necessary continuum. This will manifest itself in a language which highlights its concrete nature, claims unmediated access to the referential world, and suppresses the polyvalence and the arbitrary moments of its semiotic nature.³⁹

Štoll suggests that such a relationship to reality can be established from the standpoint of the consciousness of the worker. He presents this consciousness as a historical and natural constant and hence as a present source from which a healthier mentality can be drawn. In support of his claim he quotes Marx:

The labour process [...] is purposeful activity aimed at the production of use-values. It is an appropriation of what exists in nature for the requirements of man. It is the universal condition for the metabolic interaction between man and Nature, the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and it is therefore independent of every form of that existence, or rather it is common to all forms of society in which human beings live.⁴⁰

This is a questionable use of Marx's authority. Štoll tears this passage out of the context of Marx's argument that, far from being unchanging, the labour process is subject to developments in the mode of production. Although the labour process is still directed towards the production of use-values — since without use-values there can be no exchange-values — what distinguishes advanced capitalism is precisely the fact that the entire mode of production is geared towards the production of exchange-values. The worker is not exempt from the effect of the rule of commodity exchange on consciousness. On the contrary, the worker suffers most of all insofar as he himself is commodified as a source of labour.⁴¹ The worker whose relationship with reality Štoll praises so highly is by no means the industrial worker of developed capitalism, and Štoll shows himself a poor Marxist by suggesting so. Štoll's worker is, if anything, an idealized image of the artisan of pre-capitalist times.⁴²

It follows that what Štoll designates the source of an unmediated relationship with reality, the worker who is not alienated from the objective world, has been lost with the development of capitalism. One might speculate that Socialism may eventually bring into

Consciousness, London, 1990. One can arrive at the characterization of bourgeois literary consciousness by following Lukács's suggestion that the problem of commodities must be considered as the structural problem of all phenomena in capitalist society, including language — a phenomenon that Lukács entirely fails to take into account. It would follow that capitalism knows a language that exhibits the characteristics of reification, and a literature — the self-consciousness of language — that exhibits its consciousness of its own reification.

39 For more on the relationship between signification and commodity form, see Feruccio Rossi-Landi, *Linguistics and Economics*, The Hague, 1977, and Paul Thibault, *Re-reading Saussure: The Dynamics of Signs in Social Life*, London, 1997, pp. 187–207.

40 Štoll, *Úmění a ideologický boj I (1945–1969)*, p. 76. Marx, *Capital*, I, p. 290.

41 Here Štoll diverges from the thought of Lukács with which otherwise the speech shares points in common. Lukács argues that the total reification and dehumanization of the worker in capitalism makes it possible for a proletariat which has come to consciousness to become both the subject and object of the historical process. This realization would give the proletariat the power both to understand history and to change it. Whilst Lukács's solution is often criticized, it is more sophisticated and defensible than Štoll's undialectical faith in a proletariat immune to the forces of history. See Lukács, 'Reification and the Class Consciousness of the Proletariat' in *History and Class Consciousness*, especially pp. 178–82.

42 Štoll's position, then, is fundamentally one of Romantic anti-capitalism — a standpoint which Štoll attacks in his speech (p. 81) and which is certainly not the orthodox Marxist position he strives to adopt.

being a new relationship between subjects and their world which would correspond to the notional pre-capitalist harmonious relationship between humanity and the world. This, however, will not happen as fast as Štoll implies. The optimism of the following statement is misplaced — on the basis of the Marxist terms with which it seeks to operate: 'from the moment that the working class appeared on the scene of history [...] for the artist the insoluble contradiction between vision and reality fell away.' If Štoll is wrong here, truly Socialist writing must once again adopt the tense which has historically been natural to it: the future. Certainly, the task of creating socialist writing cannot be achieved by rhetoric like Štoll's.

(3) *Towards Violence*

Štoll's optimism, however, hides something more sinister. The continuation of the statement above reads as follows: 'From that moment, and especially from the moment of the emergence of the Socialist state, the poet's vision of society is recognized by government; it works in harmony not only with the desires of the broad masses of the people but also with the goal of the Socialist state of a higher and happier stage of the development of society.'⁴³ The suggestion of coercion lurks visibly. In the eyes of cultural politicians and long-term Stalinists such as Štoll, Socialist writing in the future tense would not be enough. It would have to be forced into the present.⁴⁴

Karvaš's concerns are similar to Štoll's. In *Most*, language and semiotic phenomena are condemned as indicators of a superficial and artificial existence, one that is idealist not materialist, bourgeois not Socialist. This, too, leads to a position which advocates judgement and violence. In an essay on political badges [*odznaky*], Karvaš points to the ease with which these can be changed with each new regime. In other words: Karvaš explicitly refers to the arbitrary nature of signification. In this 'era of badges', Karvaš would prefer people to wear them 'next to their hearts, on their bare, bleeding chest.'⁴⁵ Likewise, in 'The Most Reliable Establishment of Identity,' he argues that identity documents do not identify the morality of the document holder. In an essay which more or less demands a police state and a thought police, Karvaš yearns for a moral X-ray machine which would not only see through the superficial to the real, but would also be able to judge it.

Any utterance which contains a claim to absolute truth can become condemnation. As Barthes writes: 'In the Stalinist world, in which *definition*, that is to say, the separation between Good and Evil, becomes the sole content of all language, there are no more words without values attached to them, so that finally the function of writing is to cut out one stage of a process: there is no more lapse of time between naming and judging, and the closed character of language is perfected.'⁴⁶ Karvaš's preoccupation with the instability of meaning and the inability of signs to provide truth aids him in his Stalinist condemnation. A tone of insidious threat permeates the essays. In 'On Doubters' he writes: 'if anyone does not want to come to terms with the victory of Truth, he should enter a monastery or shoot himself. If anyone does not want to come to terms with the victory of Truth, he should get to know the secret police intimately.' It is not only counter-revolutionaries and Fascists who fall into this category, but anyone who has any doubts at all about the establishment of people's democracy. 'Doubts are not a touching expression of concern about public affairs. They are direct proof that not long ago these doubters stood in the

43 Štoll, *Úměni a ideologický boj*, p. 83.

44 For Štoll's activity in the imposition of a repressive party line in cultural affairs, see French, *Czech Writers and Politics, 1945–69*, pp. 73–76.

45 Karvaš, *Most*, p. 92.

46 Barthes, *Le Degré zéro de l'écriture*, p. 41.

opposite camp.⁴⁷ This Stalinist position is, on the one hand, a matter of political expediency. On the other, it arises from a certain understanding of the relationship between language and reality, sign and referent.

Although Svatá is keen to condemn the Germans and the brutality of the camps, her ideology — the Czech and Panslav nationalism of an earlier era⁴⁸ — is too close to the racism of Fascism to speak coherently. It is part of a world now in ruins. Her language is insufficient to close the gap between naming and judgement. Hence, she calls for a new form in which the chroniclers of the future will bring those responsible to justice. Štoll and Karvaš, however, are confident that they speak for the spirit of history, and thus that they can, like Socialist Realism, name and judge reality in one blow.

47 Karvaš, *Most*, p. 82.

48 But a nationalism that will be exploited by the Communists of the people's republic. See Papoušek's and Bombíková's chapters in this volume.

42 1948: From Socialism to Socialism: Czech Literature and the Party

MICHAL BAUER

One of the notions that have long lain heavy on Czech literary history is the illusion that Czech literature enjoyed normal 'democratic' development during the Third Republic, 1945–48. The tendency is to overlook or brush aside individual cases of undemocratic procedures and to point to the broad range of authors publishing and the large number of books published. Literary historians frequently invoke the idea that writers had now recreated a continuity with the state literature had been in before the Munich Agreement and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. They claim that nothing changed until the Communist take-over of February 1948.

In fact, the changes began to take place on liberation, in May 1945. 1948 represented a year of transition from one type of socialism to another, or from several ideas of what socialism was to the realization of a single idea. In general terms, one may state that it represented a transition from notions of 'humanist socialism' to the realization of Stalinist socialism.

Attacks on Roman Catholic writers were launched straightaway, in May 1945. At first it looked as if the debates about 'Catholic literature' that ensued were simply part of the debates about the role of literature as a whole which informed the period. In some periodicals much was written about the cultural orientation of the liberated Czechoslovak Republic, whether it should turn to the East or the West, or indeed in both directions, a view apparently held by Václav Černý;¹ naturally, many Czech writers and critics were wary of any orientation to the West, given the fact that Britain and France had signed the Munich Agreement.² Much was also written about 'trash literature' (the publication of inexpensive paperback popular novels had resumed), about a crisis of culture (a theme of Masaryk and the philosopher Rádl in the First Republic) and problems with the selling of books, about artistic freedom (there were polemics about the work of Paul Valéry, instigated by Černý's essay).³ Much was written about the awarding of the title National Artist, both in general terms (whether it made any sense; concerns that the awarding of such a title was an import from the USSR) and in particular to whom it should or should not be awarded and why.⁴

The debate about Roman Catholic writers turned out to be more sinister than the other debates. It began in the first few weeks after the liberation with defamation; Catholic writers were accused of collaboration. These attacks were led by the Communist press

1 See Václav Černý, 'Mezi Východem a Západem', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, pp. 69–74. But see also Peter Bugge's chapter in this volume.

2 Václav Černý, 'Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem (K problematice socialistické kultury u nás, 1)', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, pp. 141–45. This was the beginning of a series of eight articles about Socialist culture that continued into 1946.

3 Václav Černý, 'Básník Paul Valéry', *Kritický měsíčník*, 6, 1945, pp. 217–27.

4 The most important contributors to the polemics that arose around this title were František Kovárna and Václav Černý in *Kritický měsíčník*, and Bohuslav Brouk, Kamil Bednář, Miroslav Rutte, Jan Kořínek and once more František Kovárna in *Svobodný zítřek*. The only writer to be awarded the title without there being disputes in newspapers and periodicals was the poet Josef Hora. His award was, however, posthumous.

(*Tvorba, Rudé právo, Kulturní politika*).⁵ The Communists started this onslaught because, with rare exceptions, ageing and middle-aged Christian writers refused to have anything to do with socialism. In fact, Communists had started their attacks in the 1930s; now they simply became extreme. It is as if they were taking revenge on the Church for their own martyrs, particularly Julius Fučík.⁶

The attacks concentrated on the élite among Christian writers,⁷ on their periodicals (*Řád, Akord, Vyšehrad*), and also on periodicals linked with the People's Party (*Obzory, Vývoj*), and their editors. The Communist Minister of Information, Václav Kopecký, began trying to ban Roman Catholic periodicals in December 1945, and continued his campaign throughout 1946, and in 1947. The Soviet ambassador, V. A. Zorin, also tried to interfere with their publication in February 1947, and some were confiscated in May 1947. The Communists were particularly keen on using political means to get rid of writers who had denied the possibility of salvation by the Soviets and Communism at the end of the 1930s,⁸ and had instead turned to Czech spiritual traditions and to national self-analysis. Whether or not any of them actually collaborated with the Germans has never been investigated.

The so-called Cleansing Commission of the Syndicate of Czech Writers came to no firm decisions on the matter. This Commission, led by Václav Černý, functioned in the second half of 1945. It claimed that it had no political authority, only artistic, and so its conclusions would affect only membership of the Syndicate and openings for publication, that it constituted an internal organization of the literary community and had no links with law-enforcement agencies.⁹ None the less it is evident from the archives of the Syndicate that particularly law-enforcement agencies were interested in the Commission's findings and that they received any information they requested.¹⁰

On 29 May 1945, in his speech to cultural functionaries, the Communist Minister of Education, Zdeněk Nejedlý, spoke of 'a ruthless scrutiny of art and scholarship', of the need 'to fight evil without regard to person. The cause of the nation and the Republic comes before everything!'¹¹ He called for works of art directed at the broad masses, a culture in which the artist must learn from the people (that is, the working class); writers should go into factories and villages and learn to 'to recognize reality'. When Nejedlý and

5 Among the authors of attacks on Roman Catholic intellectuals were Václav Běhounek, K. J. Beneš, Jan Pilař and Jiří Taufer. Amongst the labels attached to Catholic writers were 'collaborators', 'vermin', 'evangelists of Fascism', 'Czech Hitlerites', 'disciples of Goebbels' and 'spokesmen of Hitlerite anti-Bolshevism'.

6 The Communist underground activist, Julius Fučík, was executed by the Germans in 1943. He became a Communist cult figure, especially after the mildly censored publication of his *Reportáž psaná na oprátce* (Report Written in the Noose, 1945). The cult reached hysterical proportions after the Communist take-over. Innumerable portraits of him appeared in literature, film, as well as sculptures and paintings. He became the official model for Czechoslovak youth, as a fighter against Nazism and an admirer of the USSR. Milan Kundera got caught up in this hysteria and produced a panegyric to Fučík, a narrative lyric poem, *Poslední máj*, Prague, 1955, issued in an even more ideologically sound 2nd edn in 1961, and 3rd edn, 1963.

7 Jan Čep, Jakub Deml, Jaroslav Durych, Bedřich Fučík, Václav Renč and Jan Zahradníček.

8 The most conspicuous of these was Jan Zahradníček's 'Pláč koruny svatováclavské', *Obnova*, 2, 1939, 41, pp. 1ff., which subsequently appeared as a New Year's greeting from the publishing house Akord in 1939. Latest edition in Jan Zahradníček, *Dílo*, 4 vols, III, Prague, 1995, pp. 194–97.

9 Václav Černý, *Paměti III (1945–72)*, Brno, 1992, pp. 54ff.

10 Uncatalogued, unnumbered deposit of the Syndicate of Czech Writers, held by the Museum of National Literature (Památník národního písemnictví), Prague, hereafter PNP.

11 This speech was first printed three years later in 1948, in the revived Communist periodical *Var*, 1, pp. 5–21. It thus opened the periodical's Stalinist era.

others spoke of a 'new art', they meant the imitation of Soviet art and demonstrations of the merits of Socialist Realism. Indeed, this aesthetic norm became as it were a legal norm. Many artists, especially Christians, were condemned to many years' imprisonment on the basis of their works. Their verse was read out in court (as was the case with Josef Palivec), that verse declared hostile to the people, and thus the poet himself became an 'enemy of the people'.

Nejedlý's speech from May 1945 opened a whole series of analogous speeches, labelled programmatic or theoretical, and these speeches laid down the rules which eventually all writers would be meant to abide by. The Party used particularly Kopecký, Nejedlý, Ladislav Štoll and Taufer to formulate the basic principles that were then enunciated at meetings of Communist writers, and at Party congresses. It was not difficult to find writers willing to join in the fun. One of these, formerly the liveliest of the poets of the inter-war Avant-garde, was Vítězslav Nezval who, in February 1949 applied to give a speech at a writers' congress; he was informed he should discuss his speech with Communist Party officials.¹² After February 1948, nothing happened in the writers' organization that had not been approved by the Central Committee of the Party beforehand.

February 1948 may have changed the intensity of the pressure on writers, but the trend had been there before. The writers' organization had made its attitude to the senior members of the Communist Party clear before 1948; for example, in October 1947 it invited such as Gottwald and Kopecký to meetings with writers, where the subject of discussion was Czech writers' sojourns in the USSR. On the day after the Communist putsch, on 26 February 1948, the Syndicate of Czech Writers sent a letter of congratulation to the new Gottwald government, expressed support for its policy towards the arts and proclaimed its loyal 'participation in the socialist construction of the Republic'.¹³

At least before February 1948, there had been some possibility of expressing political thoughts without the clichés, even though the path to Socialism was clearly mapped out for the writers. In June 1946 at the Congress of Czech Writers, the president of the Syndicate, František Halas, spoke of how it was necessary for literature to demonstrate to the readers how 'the moral greatness of Socialism wins the battle for justice'¹⁴ and of how it was necessary to synchronize art with the process of democratizing and socializing society.¹⁵ In their public resolution the writers avowed their desire to become builders of a Socialist society. In his speech President Beneš emphasized, in words that often repeated thoughts expressed by Václav Černý in *Kritický měsíčník*, that artistic freedom was necessary, but that it was only a part of human freedom.¹⁶

In March 1949, the path to socialism was confirmed at the congress of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, whose president was Jan Drda. Here there were no more words about artistic freedom; instead it was stressed that the writers' task was to be 'standard-bearers of our path to Socialist morrows',¹⁷ active builders of Socialism, people with a thorough knowledge of Marxism-Leninism. The statutes of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers ran as follows:

The mission and task of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers are:

12 PNP deposits, see note 10 above.

13 Ibid.

14 See Jan Kopecký (ed.), *Účtování a výhledy. Sborník prvního sjezdu českých spisovatelů*, Prague, 1948, p. 14.

15 Ibid., pp. 265–66.

16 Ibid., pp. 17–27. Also printed in *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, pp. 269–77.

17 Oldřich Kryštofek and Jan Noha (eds), *Od slov k činům. Sjezd československých spisovatelů 4–6. března 1949*, Prague, 1949, p. 173.

1. To stimulate writers' creative participation in the building of Socialism in our fatherland; to facilitate the conditions for such participation; to build up immediate and continuous contacts between writers and Socialism-building workers in factories, in the fields and in other places of work; through discussions, indoctrination, through the Union's press and by other means to turn writers' attention to all the concrete questions and political tasks which are put before us by our people's democratic system, so that, through their civil judgement, political education, and profound knowledge of working people and their environment, writers become fitted to create new works that faithfully and truly portray reality in its revolutionary evolution, works that actively participate in the Socialism-building efforts of our nation.

2. To find and educate writers among workers, agricultural labourers and other strata of the work-force through continuous support of literary creativity in the broadest ranks of the working classes [...]; to participate in the activities of workers', agricultural labourers' and Komsomol literary circles; to communicate the artistic experience of qualified writers and critics to young and beginning authors.

3. To implement creative co-operation between Czech and Slovak literature through a systematic mutual exchange of the experience of writers and critics from both fraternal nations. To make close working contact with the literatures of other Slav nations and other people's democratic states and to strengthen bonds of solidarity with progressive writers all over the world. But in particular to give prominence to the glorious example of mighty Soviet literature, devoted as it is to the people and loved by the people, and to adopt its new artistic principles.

4. To make writers familiar with the teaching of Marxism-Leninism, on the basis of which it is uniquely possible to construct an ideationally clear picture of the world; make them familiar with the history of the working-class movement, with the international significance of the victory of Socialism in the USSR. Through this education to strengthen in writers their progressive patriotism, coupled with politically conscious internationalism, and rejecting bourgeois nationalism as strongly as false cosmopolitanism.

In fulfilling these tasks we shall approach the ideal of a literature, socialist in content and national in form, and we shall successfully overcome the residual values of the decadent, self-serving formalism that hinders the progressive evolution of our literatures.¹⁸

The Union of Czechoslovak Writers grew out of the Syndicate of Czech Writers at the beginning of 1949. A day after the Communists seized power in Czechoslovakia, a so-called Action Committee¹⁹ began its work within the Syndicate together with an Investigation Commission. The task of both the Committee and the Commission was to expel all authors who, according to the views of the new political leadership of the state, were not suited to being builders of Socialism. Two lists were drawn up, one counting writers who could remain in the Syndicate, the other those who were to be expelled. A first wave of expulsions took place in February, March and April 1948, and a second in March and April 1949, when the expulsions took on gigantic dimensions. That was so because, among other things, a fairly large number of Czech writers had escaped abroad.

This was the atmosphere that faced young writers. A considerable number of these professed allegiance to the official norm, Socialist Realism. The ruling class ('the vanguard of the working-class') offered many bribes to young authors and most of them submitted. These bribes consisted in early acknowledgement of their literary importance;

18 Ibid., pp. 173–74.

19 The members of the Action Committee were Václav Běhounek, K. J. Beneš, Jan Drda, Vladislav Haškovec, Bohuslav Havránek, Adolf Hoffmeister, Václav Lacina, Marie Majerová, Jiří Mařánek, Vojtěch Mixa, Jan Mukařovský, Vítězslav Nezval, Karel Nový, Vladimír Procházka, Marie Pujmanová, Václav Řezáč and Jiří Taufer. The activities of the Committee and the Commission have never been written about. I have based my material solely on the PNP deposits for the Syndicate and the Union (see note 10 above).

many were soon awarded State Prizes; their poems were included in school readers; relative to their age, they were appointed early to high positions (editors-in-chief of periodicals, chief commissioning editors of publishing houses and so forth); their works appeared one after another with large print-runs; or they assumed senior political functions. The best known of such writers still alive in the 1990s were Jaromír Hořec, Milan Jungmann, Pavel Kohout, Milan Kundera, A. J. Liehm and Karel Šiktanc, all of whom became dissidents after the Soviet occupation of 1968. There were dozens of others.

On the other hand, dozens of real poets' and fiction-writers' works were removed from libraries and destroyed; they themselves were often arrested and imprisoned and, in a few cases, executed. These writers were, so to speak, replaced not only by the young enthusiasts, but also, to a large degree, by 'new artists', usually shop-floor workers. In the second half of 1949 a campaign was run called 'Workers for Literature'; 750 people applied with examples of their work. Many of them were subsequently 'indoctrinated' in the art of creative writing.

The Communists also tried to teach readers the norm of Socialist Realism. Another intensive campaign was organized for readers, the Fučík Badge Project. This campaign started in 1950 and was directed mainly at young people, secondary-school pupils, undergraduates, national servicemen. To earn the Fučík Badge these young people had to read prescribed texts (mainly by Communist and 'progressive' Czech authors, and, naturally, by Soviet authors), watch several Soviet and Czech films and then undertake an oral examination before a special board. Analogous to the Fučík Badge was the Jirásek Campaign,²⁰ which was one of the first cultural efforts of the 'first worker president', Klement Gottwald, in 1948 (Beneš had resigned in June). A collected works of Jirásek was published, which was intended to support the rejection of the Catholic conception of Czech history and, to a degree, to replace academic historiography. Jirásek's novels were also used to support Nejedlý's view that the building of socialism was founded on the innate revolutionary nature of the Czech people which had first manifested itself in the Hussite Wars (or, as they were called, Hussite revolution).

Between 1945 and 1947 the majority of prominent writers agreed on the path to Socialism for the Czechs. Their understanding of the concept, however, varied enormously. For example, in his *Život s hvězdou* (Life with a Star), written during the transition period but published in 1949, Jiří Weil, demonstrated a link between Existentialism and socialism: identifying with the collective of workers was the way of escaping existential secluded hopelessness. Existentialism was, of course, a *bête noire* of the Marxist-Leninists. Some of the younger Catholic writers also felt an affinity to Socialism, as is clear from the papers delivered at a meeting of young writers in March 1948. Some writers called themselves Socialists, but not Marxists, like, for example, the essayist and theorist Jindřich Chaloupecký. Václav Černý also called himself a Socialist. All this comported with the left-wing nature of the First Republic, and the fact that T. G. Masaryk was invoked in the period of transition by writers of virtually all political persuasions.

Where, however, there was conflict was in the various camps' views of artistic freedom. The representatives of 'synthetic realism' (Jiří Hájek, Jan Kloboučník, Sergej Machonin, Ivan Skála, Michal Sedloň, Jan Štern, and sometimes Pavel Kohout) maintained that the freedom of the artist was subordinate to politics; they declared that it was necessary 'to

20 Alois Jirásek (1851–1930), though from a literary historical point of view most important for well-made social drama, was celebrated as a nationalist historical novelist. He was, with the composer Smetana, at the very centre of modern Czech culture for Zdeněk Nejedlý. See Geoffrey Chew's chapter in this book.

limit freedom at a time when Socialism is under threat'.²¹ The Marxists at this meeting emphasized the duty of the artist to society, to the working classes, and the positive relationship of artists to socialist society and the common people. The absolute freedom of the artist was defended by Jiří Kolář, Chalupecký and Jan Grossman; but they also supported Socialism. Kolář, for example, said, 'The more we believe in Socialism, the less damage will be done.'²² At the same meeting Hořec spoke of the need to nationalize publishing houses and to plan artistic creativeness; works of art should be bespoke, and what Czech literature really lacked was an equivalent of Fadeev's *Molodaia gvardiia*.

Václav Černý's view on Socialism is at least a little better thought out, as we see particularly from his series of articles on Socialist culture.²³ Here he writes of 'socialist humanism' and 'the humanism of socialism',²⁴ and of the need to appreciate art primarily on the basis of quality; he believes the artist should be given the utmost freedom. He cannot conceive of Socialism without such freedom, in literature as in life. One only wonders what he really meant by freedom. To be sure, he was one of the most vociferous defenders of artistic freedom in the immediate post-war period, but in his argument he invokes Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, and declares the Soviet Union to be a 'model and exemplary moral support'.²⁵ (In his favour, one may say, however, that he does not advocate blind imitation of the Soviets.) His party-line-toeing rejection of Gide's *Retour de l'U.R.S.S.*, pronounced at the Congress of Czech Writers on 17 June 1946, in which he defends the personality cult, is disquieting.²⁶

February 1948 resulted in re-evaluation, not only an imposition of artistic norms. For example, a poem '1. máj 1947' (1 May 1947, published in *Tvorba*) by the doyen of Communist political and erotic verse, S. K. Neumann (he died at the end of June 1947 and so never saw his dreams fulfilled), launched an attack on President Truman. In 1947 it was considered an aberration, but in 1948 it became a sign-post of the 'new' poetry. Such changes were not usually sudden; on the whole, the Communist regime wore a democratic mask for a year or so. What was said, however, often did not mean the same thing to the speaker as it did to her or his audience. At the Congress of National Culture in April 1948, the ideologue Ladislav Štoll spoke of Socialist Realism as 'factual humanism' (*reálný humanismus*) and praised the Neumann of '1. Máj 1947' as 'a valiant guardian of poetry and the interests of the Czech people';²⁷ he demanded a re-evaluation of art, and in particular the liquidation of trends like Existentialism and subjectivism. At the same congress Václav Kopecký invoked artistic freedom, but, on the other hand, spoke of an art that must serve the common people. In his speech he also gave a positive evaluation of theorists who only a few weeks later would be expelled from cultural life, Chalupecký and Karel Teige. In April they still counted as 'excellent representatives of our fine-arts theory'.²⁸

21 A meeting of such writers in the Umělecká beseda held soon after the Communist take-over. A volume of the proceedings was prepared for publication, but never appeared, because much was said there that did not comport with the demands which the new rulers put on writers and critics. I have again used material from the PNP, the deposits for Umělecká beseda (see note 10 above).

22 In the record of the general discussion, *ibid.*

23 See note 2 above.

24 Černý, 'Ještě jednou: mezi Východem a Západem', p. 144.

25 *Ibid.*

26 Reprinted as 'Osobnost a kolektivum (K problematice socialistické kultury u nás, 7)', *Kritický měsíčník*, 7, 1946, p. 278.

27 Miroslav Kouřil (ed.), *Sjezd národní kultury. Sbírka dokumentů*, Prague, 1948, p. 80.

28 *Ibid.*, p. 128.

At the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia in May 1949, Kopecký declared that 'the writers' front must be as broad as possible; all writers should be included', but there was a fundamental condition that they should have a positive relationship to the common people, to the people's democratic state and to socialism.²⁹ Of those who now wielded power he said:

We are re-evaluating anew [*sic*] the fruits of Czech and Slovak literature; we are investigating the literary works written during the bourgeois era, and we are ensuring that we distribute among the people those works of national literature which can have a good educative impact, those which can benefit the intellectual renewal of the nation and which help our Socialist endeavours [...]. We put in the front rank writers of a Socialist orientation who are determined to lead Czechoslovak literature in the service of the working classes on their path to Socialism.³⁰

In other words, only Socialist Realist writers would be published. Kopecký's definition of the norm is, however, somewhat vague: 'The methodology of Socialist Realism is writing realist artistic works in the Socialist spirit.'³¹ What he means is that all writers should portray the life of the common people in accordance with the interests of the Communist Party.

Kopecký excluded so-called '*úpadkové umění*' (decadent art in the non-literary historical sense; the term used for the deprecation of art by Masaryk and Rádl — and their disciples), by which he meant works exhibiting such bogey-trends as individualism, formalism, Existentialism or Decadence. In fact these concepts were used indiscriminately at the time, simply as designations of what was not Socialist Realism. We also come across as terms of abuse the Soviet-inspired 'anti-realism' and the Masaryk or Beneš-inspired 'anti-democratism'. Realism and Surrealism were allegedly the products of the 'putrefaction of bourgeois culture' and Sartre's writing was labelled 'an apology for the animal instincts in humanity' (see Aleksandr Sobolev's work on Lenin's theory of reflection).

In June 1949, the Union of Czechoslovak Writers, in the interests of assuring that recognized poets could be gathered into the cause of Socialist Realism, discussed the virtual penury of two poets, the ex-Communist Jaroslav Seifert and the Communist Vladimír Holan; the Union decided their works should be published to alleviate their poverty. Štoll had said that he would send reliable people to visit Holan in order to 'tear him out of the clutches of the influence of Chalupecký's group'.³² Analogously, as late as April 1950, the presidium of the Union's Czech section defended Seifert against criticism in the Party weekly *Tvorba* levelled against his work, *Píseň o Viktorce* (Song about Viktorka, 1950), because 'Czech culture should not frivolously get rid of writers of real quality and thus offer weapons to reactionaries.'³³

Ladislav Štoll appears to have been the vulgarest of vulgar Marxists in his pronouncements on the Stalinist party-line. His *Třicet let bojů za českou socialistickou poesii* (The Thirty-year Struggle for Czech Socialist Poetry, 1950) began as a lecture, but was published as a book three months later. He was particularly aggressive there about the by then deceased František Halas (who thus could not defend himself), but also those

29 Václav Kopecký, *Vedení nepřemožitelným učením marxismu-leninismu vybudujeme socialismus v naší vlasti. Referát na IX. řádném sjezdu Komunistické strany Československa v Praze dne 28. května 1949*, Prague, 1949, p. 41.

30 Ibid., pp. 39–40.

31 Ibid., p. 41.

32 PNP deposit for the Union of Czechoslovak Writers (see note 10 above).

33 Ibid.

whom he saw as influenced by Halas. If we compare the short-hand record of his lecture with the book, we find that the latter is far stronger.³⁴

The line taken by Štoll, Kopecký and Nejedly was to dominate Czech literary politics for a good ten years and then to enjoy a revival in the 1970s, and less clearly, the early 1980s. That revival also included the old chestnut, whether the true tradition of Czech poetry lay with Nezval or with Halas; the literary bureaucrats, naturally, adhered to Štoll's view. Štoll had been director of the Academy's Institute of Czech Literature from 1962 to 1968, but, at the age of seventy he regained that post in 1972 and remained in post until his death in 1981. His own 'struggle for socialist poetry', thus, lasted from the 1920s to four of five years before it became finally clear that Socialism was doomed.

34 Ibid.

43 Czech Women Writers in Transition

ROBERT B. PYNSENT

Introduction

The Second World War saw a boom in Czech publishing,¹ a boom in which women played a disproportionately large part. At the same time, fewer women writers than men were imprisoned or killed by the Germans. Nevertheless, the near Naturalist social novelist and antisemite, turned near pornographer, Anna Ziegloserová, and the Masarykian feminist essayist, F. F. Plamínková, were executed by the Germans in 1942 during the reprisals for the assassination of Heydrich. The initially feeble anti-feminist, then pugnacious political journalist, Milena Jesenská, was arrested by the Gestapo in November 1939 and finally died in the Ravensbrück concentration camp in 1944. The actress, radio dramatist and author of one *Bildungsroman*² where the heroine eventually discovers that the sexual is not always bad, Milena Balcarová, was arrested in November 1941 and died in the same camp in 1945. Towards the end of the 1950s, the Czechoslovak Communist Party decided the public needed a Moravian female Communist writer hero to complement the Bohemian male cult figure Julius Fučík; they chose the virulently anti-Christian and unswervingly pro-Stalin, but enormously courageous, Marie Kudeříková, who was arrested by the Gestapo in December 1941 and executed in Breslau in 1943. Her intimate prison journal was published in 1961.³ The vast majority of women who published during the war introduced patriotic motifs into their works, sometimes blatant, sometimes not. Historical novels, novels about adolescence, and novels about art or artists constituted the chief vehicles for this patriotism. Patriotism almost entirely replaced feminism, which had, generally speaking, been weakening as a literary ideology in Czech literature since the establishment of the republic in 1918.

This chapter has two parts. First, I shall briefly demonstrate through a survey of a dozen or so writers that, normally, the term 'transition' is virtually useless as a literary historical characterization, especially for the 1945–48 period; it works as a purely historical label for a time when some writers did publish in the post-war period works written before or during the war while already writing work of a different idea content. Politicians were, however, using the term 'transition' and the impact of the constant repetition of the notion that the Czechs and Slovaks were now living in the transitional state of a 'people's democracy' that would lead to Socialism is evident in some of the writers I treat.⁴ For some intellectuals May 1945 represented the chance to resume the First Republic, in a modified, better form, though for some it meant the chance to build something entirely new: there was no transition, simply a clear break. At the time, Communists regarded the building of socialism as having started with May 1945, not with the 'Victorious February', the coup of 1948. In her fourth collection of verse, Herma Svozilová, for example,

1 See also Pavel Tigrid's statement that 'cultural life in the home country during the war was remarkably alive, even if in fetters', *Kapesní průvodce inteligentní ženy po vlastním osudu*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1990, p. 204.

2 Milena Balcarová, *Můj přítel Giulio*, Prague, 1945 (posthumously).

3 Marie Kudeříková, *Zlomky života. Listy z vězení*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1962. A third edition, which still failed to create the cult the Party desired appeared not long after the Soviet occupation (Prague, 1975).

4 See for example, Jon Bloomfield, *Passive Revolution. Politics and the Czechoslovak Working Class 1945–1948*, London, 1979, pp. 80 and 155.

recounts the tale of a nearly sixty-year-old woman who had been wondrously transformed by 1945; after a life-time of charring, she is suddenly blessed with a job in a factory, and soon publishes an *engagé* poem in a newspaper.⁵ The second part of this chapter will contradict the first part in that it demonstrates that the term 'transition' may be usefully employed in the analysis of a literary work. It treats, almost exclusively in political terms, for this chapter essentially restricts itself to politics in literature, a trilogy by Helena Dvořáková, *Pád rodiny Bryknarů* (The Fall of the Bryknar Family), whose first part was written during the German Protectorate, whose second part was written mainly during the Protectorate (about two-thirds), and whose third part was written between 1945 and 1948. It is probably unique in that its theme is economic and social change and transition in the nineteenth century and its ideological content registers the author's political change and transition in the mid-twentieth century; the author appears to move from nationalism, to Marxism, and then to the notion of a Czech *Sonderweg* under the guidance of the ghost of the President-Liberator, T. G. Masaryk.

I

In order to ascertain the ideological change that took place in women writers' work with the end of the war, I have to compare their post-war works with one or two of their wartime or pre-war works. I omit writers not attempting anything but *Trivalliteratur* (for example, Jiřina Parmová or Anna-Marie Klosová), for such writing seems to have barely reacted to the 'brutal peace' in which 'alongside the physical destruction were more intangible wounds [...] changing moral and mental perspectives changed individual behaviour, and thence society and politics'.⁶ I divide my writers into four groups according to type of reaction to 1945.

In the first group I put three writers who published books only up to the reprisals for the assassination of Heydrich and who were subsequently silent until after the war, Marie Majerová, Sonja Špálová and Věra Vášová. Majerová was a Communist, expelled from the Party in 1929 when it became Stalinist, but who always maintained her loyalty to Communist-Party socialism. During the Communist period in Czechoslovakia, it was said that there were only two Czech women writers, one a bitch, and one a lady. Majerová was the bitch.⁷ Before the First World War she wrote fiction concerned mainly with poor women or outcasts, and manifested contemporaneous feminist concerns. Between the wars, she wrote politically committed Realist works and an experimental socialist utopian novel. During the Second World War, she wrote an anti-idealist, didactic, stylistically anaemic novel, *Robinsonka* (Miss Crusoe, 1940), which became the most-read of her works because it remained a prescribed text for twelve-year-olds throughout the

5 Herma Svozilová-Johnová, 'Ta báseň končí slovy', *Tvé nové kráse*, Prague, 1949. Before this collection, she had published under her maiden name, Herma B. Svozilová; even though her well-heeled lawyer husband, Oldřich John (1907–61), had published her first and third collections at his own expense. John was a powerful man as chairman of the constitution committee of the constitutive National Assembly and perhaps she added his name to her *nom de plume* as a political statement. Svozilová's poem reflects historical fact: '55,750 women joined industry in the first half of 1947 and 73 per cent of these had previously been engaged only in household or domestic work', Bloomfield, *Passive Revolution*, p. 159.

6 Mark Mazower, *Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century*, London and New York, 1998, p. 222. Mazower states that the most obvious of these changes was 'the erosion of respect for property rights'. Another writer concludes that the Protectorate had broken the Czechs' moral backbone anyway, and that the advent of people's democracy simply encouraged the corruption of even more Czechs: Jan Stránský, *East Wind Over Prague*, London, 1950, p. 169 and *passim*.

7 The lady was Marie Pujmanová. See below.

Communist period. Her chief literary achievement in the period of transition consisted in adapting in 1947 her lively 1914 novel about Parisian anarchists, *Náměstí Republiky* (Place de la République), to suit Stalinist demands, whereby she omitted one of the main characters, Nad'a, because she was a Russian anarchist. Two years later (1949–50) she adapted what was probably her best structured and psychologically most complex novel, *Nejkrásnější svět* (The Most Beautiful World, 1923), whereby the beautiful young middle-class fighter for workers' rights no longer dies at the end, but is about to recover in order to fight on for socialism. Compared with Majerová, Špálová made a minor contribution to the development of Czech literature; her collection of incandescent, quasi-Surrealist verse inspired by erotic sadness, *Černý motýl* (The Black Butterfly, 1926), promised something far more original than what was to come, fiction and fictionalized biographies with under-elaborated or indistinct themes and motivation. During the war, she published three works of patriotic fiction, the first two with strong anti-German undertones. The last of the three, *Kníže básníků* (A Prince of Poets, 1940; as New Year greeting from the Prague Literary and Art Club for 1941), expresses the atmosphere of the times by presenting a study of the Romantic Karel Hynek Mácha's (1810–36) pessimism; furthermore, it concerns the poet's death in a part of Bohemia at the time in the Reich. In the transition period, Špálová published a further two novels. In that it traces the life of a strong young female outsider, the first, *Polyxena* (1946), written 1941–43, is reminiscent of her pre-war feminist novel, *Žena bez masky* (A Woman Without a Mask, 1931). With its fusion of cosmopolitan adventure story and social and religious criticism, it typifies a debased form of the *fin-de-siècle* romance common in 1940s *Trivialliteratur*. Špálová claims that she wrote the second of these novels, *Petruška a soudruzi* (Petruška and the Comrades, 1947), between 1935 and 1937. Kunc asserts that the author had failed to find an adequate 'artistic or ideological' form for the problems she was treating.⁸ It is not clear whether she published the novel in an attempt to hop on the Communist bandwagon or as a warning to her readers about the true nature of Communists. The fact that she has bohemicized her Christian name to 'Soňa' could suggest either. The novel traces the activities of a Prague Party cell in the 1930s. Whatever Špálová intended, the result constitutes a portrayal of the disunity and political failure of the Czechoslovak Communist Party before the war, condemns the Soviet Union's abandonment of the International Brigade in Spain, and while trying to explain why Jews as outsiders naturally became members of the 'party of the disinherited', demonstrates that the Nazis were right about a Judaeo-Bolshevik plot threatening Western civilization; simultaneously the novel condemns forthrightly the Germans' murdering of the Jews. Only those who love the soil, rural Communists, the Social Democrats, and possibly the true bourgeois idealist Communist *femme fatale* Helena, remain true to the socialist cause. Unlike other writers of the period, Špálová finds Communists quaintly romantic. Vášová, a Bohemian Brethren presbyter, was far from things Communist. Before the war, for example in the psychologically observant Realist short stories of the collection, *Dcery Adamovy* (Daughters of Adam, 1938), she concerns herself with man's physical and mental oppression of women, indulges in some Protestant moralizing, and manifests some old-fashioned patriotic fear of Czech children being germanized in charitable institutions. Her wartime collection of verse, *Balady a meditace* (Ballads and Meditations, 1941), contains some devotional poems, but consists mainly of intimate and occasional pieces. In one poem, she boldly expresses the hope that no Czech will now betray his country.⁹ Her post-war collection of prose, *Služebnice neužitečná* (A Useless Servant, 1947), begins with a series of sketches with Christian moral themes, but ends with

8 Jaroslav Kunc, *Slovník českých spisovatelů beletristů 1945–1956*, Prague, 1957, p. 416.

9 Věra Vášová, 'Společenství stolu', *Balady a meditace*, Prague, 1941, p. 9.

a gently political piece, an account of the male first-person narrator's visit to north-west Germany in 1922. It constitutes a fictionalized discussion of the Germans' sense of humiliation and frustration. For the period it interests us because it is not misotheutonic, except perhaps in the portrayal of the education of a little boy into barbaric belligerence or in the narrator's ironic comment on the fact that the local Lutheran church is almost empty on Sundays probably because the German God had apparently abandoned the Germans.

My second group comprises three authors, all considered mainstream, who published extensively during the war, but virtually ceased publishing *belles-lettres* for the period of transition or longer. Jarmila Glazarová published one of her three novels during the war, the half-ethnographic, half-feminist analysis of marriage as a prison, *Advent* (1939). Her *Chudá přadlena* (The Poor Spinner-Woman, 1940) comprises a series of ethnographic sketches of Beskyd Mountains life; except in style and in narratorial intrusions, this work comes far closer to reportage than to fiction. She also published one work for children, *Zahradník Hejduk* (Hejduk, the Gardener, 1944). She did not publish again until 1950, and from then on she devoted herself to travel and political journalism, and some stories for children. She clearly did not publish immediately after the war, not because of any emotional shock, but because she became an ardent politician; in 1946–48 she was cultural counsellor at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Moscow. Anna Maria Tilschová began writing as the stylistically most sophisticated of the Czech Naturalists, but when the public could not accept such writing from a woman, especially in its expression of female sexual desire, she ceased publishing books for ten years and then began writing studies of social decay, first amongst the patriciate, then amongst the workers and Jews of Ostrava, and then amongst the provincial bourgeoisie. During the war, she first seems to be returning to a mystical version of T. G. Masaryk's 'humanistic' personal religion with *Tři kříže* (Three Crosses, 1940), but then she proceeds to patriotism with the neo-Revivalist novel about the painter Josef Mánes (1820–71), *Orlí hnízdo* (The Eyry, 1942). This novel is remarkable in that it contains antisemitic remarks about industrialists. Though antisemitism pervades Czech women's literature before the war, it is virtually non-existent in 'high' literature during the war. (One exception is to be found in a brief paragraph in Olga Barényiová's first novel *Janka* [1941], but the same author treats Jews with little but compassion in *Hra pro Danielu* [A Play for Daniela, 1944], which also contains the first allusion in locally published Czech literature to the death camps.) One more, unnaturally optimistic, novel by Tilschová, *Návrat* (The Return, 1945), a grandiose, sentimental work about a surgeon falling in love with the daughter of a patient whose life he had saved, appeared just before the liberation, but after that she published nothing but a short study on the writer Božena Benešová, in 1948. Tilschová had ceased writing (apart from an unfinished novel, *Babylon*), though she remained revered by the new Establishment, because her time was past, and she clearly found socialism uninspiring. The third writer in the second group, Milada Součková, defected to the West after the Communist take-over while a member of the diplomatic corps. She began writing her sparse verse, her deconstructive short-stories and novels about writing in the 1930s. Her wartime collection of verse, *Žlutý soumrak* (Yellow Dusk, 1942), consists of a series of verbal sculptures employing motifs mainly from Chinese poetry. Only rarely intimate, these stylized contemplations on friendship and the erotic, on Nature and on the essence of verse, aim at a distilled lyricism, probably to contrast with the grim, fear-laden drabness of the Occupation. Her fascination with the imagination of pubertal girls and the creativity of gossip, as well as her determination to be an author and not an authoress, expressed in *Amor a Psyché* (Cupid and Psyche, 1937), are still evident in her literary analytical collection of tales, *Škola povídek* (Story School, 1943). The chief narrator of this collection is male; he dissects, sometimes parodies, sometimes pretends to imitate stories from various periods and movements. The most

radical artistically of her wartime works is the Shandyesque *Bel canto* (1944), on the most superficial level a parody of all those novels by such as Špálová and Barényiová, but also writers of the *Fin de siècle*, about young women seeking independent success in life, especially on the stage, actually constitutes a story about a male narrator in search of characters, of plot, and of narrational rhetoric. The theme of Time matches the achronological nature of the novel, but also reflects the Time-consciousness that was as inherent in literature of the Second World War as it had been in Baroque and Decadent literature (and for the same reason: an awareness of impending or actual disaster). Barényiová published a technically similar novel immediately before the end of the war, *Román* (Novel, 1945). In the transition, Součková brought out only one work, an essay on 'the death of the novel' with a few playful fiction-like episodes, *Hlava umělce* (The Head of the Artist, 1946); the 'narrator' of this essay is male again.

My third group comprises a selection of women writers who were publishing during the war and for whom the end of the war appeared to mark mainly a chance to express emotions and interpretations they had suppressed during the war, or to express shock at the conditions in concentration camps in particular. All these writers, with the exception of Helena Hodačová, manifest a major change in ideas, sometimes even in form and lexis in comparison with their wartime, sometimes also pre-war, works. The poet Růžena Žižková published many of her works together with her aesthete husband, Otokar Žižka.¹⁰ From her first collection, *Bílý akt* (White Nude, 1937), to the end of the war, Žižková manifests herself as primarily a somewhat mawkish sensualist whose sexual desire is usually decorative, though as the war continues she accrues ever more of Žižka's belatedly Symbolist mystical qualities. Nevertheless, she joined literary resistance to the Germans in the first year of the war¹¹ when she published, albeit in only seventy copies, her *Rondely za TGM* (Rondels in Memory of T. G. Masaryk, 1939), elegaic verse claiming that though the nation is now wreathed in sadness, its citizens threatened by the executioner's axe, the people, together with Jan Masaryk, will continue to watch over the mother-country. In her contributions to the couple's *Pšenice a hrozny* (Wheat and Grapes, 1940), within her normal sensualist soil-worship, she also rejects large-scale capitalism (like Masaryk, and Czech nationalists, at least since the 1890s). One of the most common sub-genres of Czech poetry after the war was a verse diary of events from the Munich Agreement to the Liberation. The Žižkas' apocalyptic version of this sub-genre, *Válka* (War, undated; 1946?), aims primarily at an unmelodramatic evocation of cataclysm. The Germans are not mentioned by name, but, for example in Canto 6, celebrating the Prague Uprising, the Žižkas do bombastically call for revenge on them: 'Go and murder/the swine of Sodom, the cursed brutes/who every day laid the metal of mines beneath you/And if you become tired remember Theresienstadt.'¹² The Žižkas show no signs of converting to Communism, but they do call the Soviet Union 'Comrade Rassija',¹³ and it does appear time-serving when they point out that the Soviet Union is not only the saviour from Nazism, but also the provider of food. Their bombastic, barely comprehensible expression of love for Russia, however, sounds Panslavist rather than socialist (I do not forget Stalin's talk of 'Leninist

10 Žižka is sometimes Otokar, sometimes Otakar on the title-pages of his works. In the copy of Arthur Breisky's *Střepy zrcadel* he dedicated to his wife, he writes himself Otokar.

11 Kunc gives the publication date as 1937 in *Slovník soudobých českých spisovatelů. Krásné písemnictví v letech 1918–45*, Prague, 1946, p. 964. The copy I use for this essay is, however, clearly dated September 1939; the publisher is F. J. Müller, Prague. It is no doubt significant that Kunc omits the Žižkas altogether in his 1957 dictionary; he also omits Vášová (see note 8 above).

12 Růžena and Otokar Žižka, *Válka*, Třebíč, n.d., p. 53.

13 Ibid.

Panslavism'): 'Oh, how we love you, land in which peace wakes/you through whom both muzhik and hero cut as with a sword/blow your muscular wind from corn-laden days/into our barking days.'¹⁴ The cycle ends with a condemnation of those who perceive the need for another war; that is also a period topos, but the Žižkas do not name the West. Marie Glabazňová, whose mysticizing verse comes closer to Žižka's than Žižková's, has a less ordinary response. Gloom and anxiety, mitigated by motherhood and belief in an afterlife, pervade her own wartime collection, *Růže z tmy* (A Rose from the Darkness, 1944). Expressions of Roman Catholic piety mingle with Symbolist visualizations of hereditary memory, and the perception of the darling buds of May recalling death, or of autumn leaves resembling parched, cracked lips. Like the Žižkas' *Válka*, Glabazňová's first post-war collection, *Sestra smrt* (Sister Death, 1946), dedicated to the memory of the writer Vladislav Vančura, constitutes a lyrical diary of events from demobilization and Munich to shortly after liberation.¹⁵ The self-pity that occasionally seeped into *Růže z tmy* has become a personal sadness representative of the whole country's and the blood and clay of her body have become the blood and clay of the country. She records a spirit of revolt in herself during the war, a spirit inspired by God, but, on the other hand, she returns to 1890s patriotic masochism (or to Polish messianism) when she conceives of the Czechs as the Christ of nations. Her expression of gratitude for Soviet liberation¹⁶ constitutes the emotionally most convincing in Czech literature. She meditates on the origins of the Russians' horses as they ride victorious into Eastern Europe.

The actress Eva Klenová's inchoate first work, written mostly during the Occupation, but quickly finished off and published during the Prague Uprising, *Harlekýn Zero* (Harlequin Zero, 1945) is a verse tale about a pessimistic failed actor; after the Germans have closed Czech theatres some socialist underground group mounts an underground production, which is broken up by the Gestapo. She also published at about the same time a radical adaptation of a Lope de Vega play;¹⁷ here she follows a feminist line on male sexual behaviour towards women and on the protection of the human rights of prostitutes. In these works Klenová preaches some superficial vitalism. For the period of transition, her most important work is her disjointed, ill-constructed (most of the long narrative consists of the main character, Jan Novák's, autobiography as related to a fellow prisoner, Pravda [Truth], in his delirious state after having been badly beaten by the Gestapo), racist psychological study of evil, *Tvé děti, Evropo!* (Your Children, Europe, 1947). The racism does not concern the Jews, although the one Jewish character, a member of a Communist resistance group, proves too weak to conduct his duties; moral weakness constitutes one of the most frequent elements of nineteenth-century antisemitism to appear in Czech post-war antisemitism.¹⁸ Klenová's racism concerns the Germans, tacitly represents the obverse of the reinvigorated Panslavism that followed the war. Jan Novák appears to typify the

14 Ibid., p. 57.

15 For no apparent reason, she omits events from 1943. The Germans' execution of Vančura in 1942 had been designed to break the Czechs' morale; none of those who died in the war was so celebrated in post-war literature as Vančura until after the Communist take-over. In 'Vladislavu Vančurovi', she characterizes the novelist as 'lord of beauty and enchanter of the power and splendour of words': Marie Glabazňová, *Sestra smrt*, Kroměříž, 1946, p. 34.

16 I have not come across any woman writer expressing gratitude for the American liberation of the western part of Bohemia.

17 *El Castigo sin venganza*: Eva Klenová, *Soudce ... nikoli mstitel. Hra o třech dějstvích (šesti obrazech)*, Prague, 1945.

18 In *Kapesní průvodce* Tigrid writes of post-war Czech antisemitism (p. 191), but also of antisemitism among Czechoslovak soldiers in the British Army (p. 99). Mazower writes of antisemitism intensifying all over continental Europe after 1945: see *Dark Continent*, p. 219.

apathetic Czech, in contrast to his activist sister. His cruelty to animals as a child is sadistic and that manifests itself later in his need for blood or at least the smell of burning flesh or fur when he copulates with his would-be girlfriend. He is red-haired like any decent villain (and many conventional German or Jewish villains in Czech literature from Romanticism onwards), lonely, selfish, ambitious and mendacious. The reader may at first feel disquiet at the fact that he has a John Smith of a Czech name, but soon we learn that he had been adopted, that his real name is the equally John-Smithian Hans Mayer; this explains not only his sadism and deceit, but also the fact that he learns German so easily and feels attracted to a young Nazi who suddenly joins his class at grammar school. With this novel Klenová self-consciously addresses the old nature-or-nurture argument and comes firmly down on the side of nature. Germans are naturally brutes and the concentration camp scenes Jan Novák sees in his delirium demonstrate that the murdering of the Jews and such as his sister constitutes a natural development of his own sadistic killing and maiming of animals. Although Klenová stereotypically praises socialism through the words of Jan's adoptive father about the obliteration of class difference through a new world order governed by the workers, her emotions evince nationalism more than anything else; apart from in the racism or haematic nationalism behind the novel's theme, Klenová's national ideology manifests itself most clearly in the lengthy episode describing the Pragers' reaction to T. G. Masaryk's death.

Where Klenová's reaction to the war is hysterical, the older actress writer, and performer of avant-garde dance, Jarmila Svatá's, was one of shocked compassion. Neither writer is of essence party-political. Before and during the war, Svatá was a satirical writer. Her pessimistic, jolly social caricature, *Sedm kamarádů slečny Vivian* (The Seven Friends of Miss Vivian, 1938), constitutes a picaresque prose morality play: an innocent, playful, beautiful girl is an admirable, healthy human being while she lives in a dream world where she acts out the role of a young English aristocrat — and the role of the ghost indispensable for any English castle. A hard-nosed, athletic newspaper reporter lures her into life, whereupon she makes the acquaintance of the Seven Deadly Sins — except that Gluttony is replaced by Luxury and Sloth by Mendacity. Her fall to the Seventh Sin, Lust, determines she should pursue the career of a film star, makes her hard, selfish and successful. In this sarcastic inverted fairy-tale, Svatá satirizes primarily the Czech intelligensia, whom she considers vapid and effete. Her next novel, *Petr zbláznil město* (Petr Sent the Town Mad, 1944), satirizes the Czechs in general, from worker to rich man, from barmaid to civil servant. The anonymous provincial town where most of the action takes place constitutes a sarcastically conceived microcosm of Protectorate Bohemia. The only decent human being, apart from one little girl, is the zoo-keeper, František, who scarcely ever leaves the zoo to enter the Town, has arms like cudgels, not much brain, but an unstinting loyalty and love for the animals, particularly the lion, Petr. Petr escapes and spends a night in the Town and discovers that its inhabitants are selfish sybarites, most of them drunkards or cowards or both, and many of them are either frustrated, such as, for example, the spiritualists, or preoccupied with sex. The censors appear not to have noticed that Petr represents the Czech heraldic lion, that his cage no. 14 represents the day the first German troops entered rump Bohemia and Moravia (that is, one day before the Occupation began officially), and that the bus the lion mounts to enter the Town is the no. R III, that is, Third Reich. The chief refrain in the novel concerns the hooves of Time trotting through Petr's night on the Town; it probably parodies contemporaneous literary Time-consciousness. She employs a variant on that refrain, however, in her next work, her shocked reaction to, and attempt at a literary rendering of, the memories of a Czech former Gestapo employee, Václav Václavík's, experiences as a political prisoner in Mauthausen and then in the slave-labour camps, Schlier and Linz III, *Milenci SS-smrti* (SS-Death's

Lovers, 1945). She employs the refrain here as a belletrizing device in what is primarily a documentary work, and seemingly a work of propaganda demanding retribution on anyone who had ever served in the SS. Although her narrator refers to the work as notes (*zápisky*),¹⁹ and claims it constitutes a truthful account of one man's war, it is actually a literary work with a suitably constructed beginning, middle and end, and with an heroic hero, a Yugoslav partisan who organizes the blowing-up of a secret-weapon plant, and even the soon-to-be obligatory wise Soviet officer. Apart from the odd scene like that of the Jewish male ballet-dancer performing his sensational *danse macabre* as the Germans command him before they shoot him, Svatá has either tried too hard to reproduce in writing what she has heard from Václavík or she has been too impatient or too shocked to control her emotions enough to use her aesthetic skills. No Czech woman writer, except possibly Libuše Hanušová, changed as much as Svatá at the end of the war. Still she possessed sufficient artistic awareness to endeavour to re-form and thus give more emotive power to her story; the result of this not entirely successful endeavour was her one play, based on part of *Milenci SS-smrti* (pages 99–138), the three-act *Nenapravitelní* (The Incurables, 1946). The novel contains tirades on the SS, on Germans' natural imperialism, on the evils of Nietzsche, on Czech police informers, and expressions of admiration for fellow Slavs, for Yugoslav moral stature, physical beauty and strength of will, for the Russians' love of their country and its art, love of Stalin and for their role as saviours of Europe. The drama, though by virtue of the genre more easily receptive to such tirades and though it transmits propaganda messages, lacks the stentorian sententiousness of the prose work. The stage-directions indicate that the impact of the play will rely a great deal on the background acoustic effects. The work still contains the ideally unperturbed Russian major, and the brave Yugoslav partisan officer, but it also contains another Slav type, a stereotypically undisciplined, well-nigh hysterical Pole. The main message of the play is that all Germans are dangerous, aggressive, bloodthirsty barbarians,²⁰ a message similar to that of Klenová's novel.

Hodačová began as primarily a feminist writer during the war and remained one during the transition. Her first novel, *Zítřka už nepřijdu* (From Tomorrow You Won't See Me Again, 1942) concerns the baneful impact of early marriage on young *bourgeoises*. Not long after her honeymoon, the heroine, who had not even waited to do her matric, becomes anorexic, and has to have an abortion. Naturally, everything eventually ends happily with her determined to live her own life and to educate herself. This simple, racy novel manifests no patriotism, except perhaps allusively, in the Masarykian statement of the heroine's best friend: 'Life is work and love.'²¹ The poetry-writing heroine of Hodačová's next novel, *Eolova harfa* (Aeolian Harp, 1943) does do her matric, and goes to university, marries and divorces. The feminism, concerning the empowerment of women, is stronger here than in the first novel. The author's first post-war novel, *Mrak* (Dark Cloud, 1946), treating the sexual awakening of a young girl who discovers she was born out of wedlock, might be understood as reacting to changing times on two very minor grounds. Contemporaneous Slavism may be reflected in the fact that the girl's father is working at a

19 Jarmila Svatá, *Milenci SS-smrti*, Prague, 1945, p. 148.

20 See especially Jarmila Svatá, *Nenapravitelní. Příběh o 3 jednáních z nacistického tábora Attnang*, Prague, 1946, pp. 73–74. Kunc omits the prose and the dramatic work from his bibliography of Svatá in his 1957 dictionary (see note 6 above). Theoretically that could have been because of the Tito partisan hero, but it is more likely that having as a narrator or dramatic character a Czech who had previously worked for the Gestapo was no longer acceptable. Furthermore, for all the praise of the Russian, and his love for Stalin, neither of these works is pro-Communist; Svatá has not 'understood' that socialism has 'necessarily' defeated Fascism.

21 Helena Hodačová, *Zítřka už nepřijdu*, Prague, 1942, p. 225.

book on Slavonic dramaturgy (*sic*). Secondly, the fact that she, a *bourgeoise*, is attracted to a working-class boy who teaches her the meaning of Truth might, just, reflect the advent of socialism as the Establishment ideology. Both these aspects of the novel could, however, easily occur in pre-war works. Unlike any other of the women writers I consider in this chapter, Hodačová becomes a profounder writer in the transition, albeit in a work she claims to have written in 1944, *Tři doby* (Three Ages, 1946). *Tři doby* consists of three tales of three generations so closely interwoven that they form a novel, albeit a novel with lacunae. On the one hand, it constitutes an old-fashioned Naturalist study of mental sickness; on the other, it is a subtle psychological study both of male tyranny and of female emancipation. Nothing in *Tři doby* reflects the war or the 'brutal peace'.

My fourth group of writers comprises those whose literary reaction to the end of the war was primarily political rather than emotional. Some of these turned or returned to Communist ideology, some to a 'humanist' Masarykian road to socialism. Marie Pujmanová represents the chief example of a woman writer who returned to Communist writing during the transition. Before the war, after a distinctly feeble, incoherent attempt at prose of psychological analysis, Pujmanová published the stylistically and ideologically most sophisticated Czech Marxist-Leninist industrial novel of the pre-war period, *Lidé na křižovatce* (People at the Crossroads, 1937). Though the main story of this panoramic novel concerns a worker at the Baťa shoe factory who overcomes the bourgeois residual values implanted in him by his aspiring mother and becomes haematically class-conscious, Pujmanová shows most interest in the middle-class family of a Communist lawyer, who, in a not unMasarykian manner, regards the period between the wars as a 'period of transition and preparation';²² hence the title of the work. During the war, Pujmanová published her escapist study in child psychology, especially the psychology of anxiety, *Předtucha* (The Premonition, 1942). It was possible to interpret Majerová's *Robinsonka* politically: the child's loss of her mother representing the Czechs' loss of independence, and her own learning to cope with life and, in the end, an *ersatz* mother representing the determination to build a new independence within constricted circumstances. *Předtucha* is more optimistic; the children here believe they have lost their parents in a train crash (the father is a linguist and a purist), but it turns out that they have not, although the parents will remain abroad for a little: in other words, one might say, the Czechs' independence will return. Following a convention of the Revivalist village novel, the chief danger arises from the mysterious outsider, come to deprive Jarmila of her virginity; she is saved by her fear for her parents' safety and by her ultimate relief that they are hale abroad. Pujmanová's first literary reaction to the end of the war was another of those lyric diaries of war and liberation, *Radost i žal* (Joy and Grief, 1945), which begins with a sarcastic condemnation of Neville Chamberlain and ends with a neo-Revivalist eulogy to the Czech language. Her dirge for Milena Jesenská is also neo-Revivalist in that she compares her death with that of the Protestant rebel scholar, Jessenius, executed on Old Town Square in 1621.²³ Similarly to Glabazňová, Pujmanová besings Vančura for his exploitation of language, though here a socialist undercurrent, a call for *engagé* art, enters: 'Oh, Vladislav/Knight of the Czech

22 Marie Pujmanová, *Lidé na křižovatce*, 12th edn, Prague, 1948, p. 300. Czech writers began writing *en masse* of a given period as a transitional age in the 1890s, like other Europeans. The term or concept has been used for almost every period during the twentieth century except those of the two World Wars. One notes that the terms 'the building of Socialism' for the first fifteen years after the Second World War and 'Normalization' for the 1970s, and sometimes the 1980s, also implied transition.

23 Jessenius (Jan Jesenský, 1566–1621). Milena's aunt, the prolific author of verse, fiction and drama, Růžena Jesenská (1863–1940), was convinced she was descended from that late Renaissance heliocentrist and translator of Savonarola.

language/temper our pens/temper our hearts.’²⁴ Those who fight on the barricades in the Prague Uprising are avenging angels come down with their hand-grenades to rout the German evil. If she has not made it clear enough before, she nails her colours to the Communist mast in her love poem for the Red Army. Soviet soldiers arrive as a sootier wind from the East to create beauty out of death and destruction. Nevertheless Pujmanová’s avowal of allegiance to Stalinist Communism comes only with her first post-war work of fiction, the collective historical novel, *Hra s ohněm* (Playing with Fire, 1948), where she continues the saga begun in *Lidé na křižovatce* and where the Communist lawyer shares the limelight with Georgi Dimitrov and a young schoolmistress, heiress to the Baťa concern, who becomes a good Communist. Like Špálová in *Petruška a soudruzi*, Pujmanová condemns the failure of German socialists, and like Svatá, she appears to consider being a German almost a crime in itself. Of course, the Czech bourgeoisie, represented by Ró, tend to be weakling sybarites likely to collaborate with the Germans. No true Czech patriot can be anything but socialist. Pujmanová returns to Communism, but Svozilová turns to Communism for the first time after the war. Never anything but an inept poet, a change almost comparable with Svatá’s takes place between the naively philosophising erotic verse of her first collection, published just before the war, *Neděle* (Sunday, 1938) and her second collection, her contribution to the sub-genre of the lyric diary of events from the Munich Agreement to the liberation, *Kavalkáda* (The Cavalcade, 1945). A tendency to sentimentalization still manifests itself, for example in her description of the anxiety involved in listening to foreign wireless broadcasts, but so does a growing sarcasm in her mistrust of the West. Panslav elements recur; for example, she envisages Munich as having decided ‘to devastate the trusting Slav face’,²⁵ and the Russians as a Slav body that had shed its blood for Europe, and had spent the twenty years between the wars usefully building socialism and arms factories for the salvation of the West, while the West had been dancing and getting drunk. The chief reason for the Czechs to be grateful to the Soviets is, however, that they had prevented Hitler from fulfilling his design to annihilate the Czechs. In one poem, Svozilová goes further than any other writer in 1945 in expressing in verse Party doctrine: she rebukes those broadcasting from abroad for calling on the Czechs to rebel, to indulge in futile bloodshed before a true revolution was possible.²⁶ Svozilová’s next collection, *Zázrak miji nás* (A Miracle Passes By, 1947) combines a sentimental view on childbirth with expressions of the need to fight for peace. Another writer to turn to Stalinist Communism after the war was Libuše Hanušová. If she is remembered for anything in her pre-war fiction it is for *Anarchie srdcí* (The Anarchy of Hearts, 1929), an antisemitic feminist novel about the empowerment of women, which treats ‘new’ subjects like the discovery of a *bourgeoise* that she has married a homosexual or racketeering among officers behind the lines in the Great War. Her post-war novel, *Nepovoláním vstup zakázán* (No Entry Except on Business, 1948) concerns the first year of the Protectorate and the founding of Communist resistance groups. It also constitutes a defence of the Hitler–Stalin pact and interprets Stalin’s requisition of eastern Poland as an act of Panslav salvation.

Those in the fourth group of writers who returned after the war to Masarykian thinking, all too conscious of the political power of the Communist Party, normally endeavoured to demonstrate that T. G. Masaryk’s or Beneš’s path was the Czech path to socialism and that

24 Marie Pujmanová, *Radost i žal*, Prague, 1945, p. 58.

25 Herma J. Svozilová, *Kavalkáda*, 2nd edn, Brno, 1947, p. 11.

26 See ‘U radia’ in *ibid.*, pp. 29–31. Svozilová is trying to follow the Party line and implicitly criticizes the West, and possibly the ‘earliness’ of the Prague Uprising. The transition-period jokes about broadcasts, however, actually made fun of what Radio Moscow had urged Czechs to undertake against the Germans.

this path did not seriously conflict with what the Communist Party claimed to desire. Naturally, such compromising views could and sometimes did transform Masaryk into a fellow-traveller. Milena Nováková's pre-war semi-documentary nationalist novel, *Ted' nebo nikdy* (Now or Never, 1936), apotheosizes Masaryk, Masaryk's conception of the Hussite national tradition, and Czech resistance against Austria at home and abroad during the Great War. She frequently gives Masaryk the epithet he acquired in the 1880s, during the Battle of the (forged) Manuscripts, 'pastýř' (the pastor/shepherd). Most important for this chapter, Nováková emphasizes the delusive nature of Panslavism and the unreliability of Russian publications. After the war, she pursues the Masaryk cult through the erstwhile president's American wife, Charlotte, who had been a member of the Social Democratic Party since 1905. In her emotional study, *Věrná socialistka Charlotta Garrigue Masaryková* (The True Socialist, Charlotte Garrigue Masaryk, 1948), Nováková fuses Charlotte's socialism with her patriotism; she had been the 'mother of Czech liberation' from the Habsburgs, 'the Czechs' teacher of social consciousness',²⁷ and had actively contributed to laying the foundations for the development of 'a socialist system covering the whole world such as we [...] are bringing to fruition today'.²⁸ Charlotte had persuaded Masaryk not to leave Prague in disgust at Czech responses to the Polná blood-libel trial and thus had preserved 'this fighter for Truth, justice, rights, decency and universal values' so that he could become the President-Liberator. It was also Charlotte who had set him on the path to develop 'the old Czech tradition of militant humanism into socialist political consciousness',²⁹ and who had aided the political education of Beneš by lending him books when he had been in hospital with a broken leg incurred in a soccer accident. Thus she had been instrumental in making Masaryk and Beneš the creators of 'democratic socialism', and this democratic socialism and 'national and spiritual freedom' had been the Masaryks' only goal, as it was now the only goal of Czechoslovakia reborn.³⁰

Hana Klenková's political path resembled Nováková's, though she showed serious concern for the reasons why Czech society allowed itself to fall into that state of inertia which had allowed the Czechs to submit to the Munich Agreement. A trifle over-sentimental and over-didactic, her best known but not best-written novel, *Slunečná Farma* (Sunny Farm, 1939), recounts the life of a New York slum child who, after realizing that socialist activism was ineffective in improving the lot of the poor, becomes a housemistress in the reform-school of which she has herself once been an inmate. Nurture overcomes nature. She learns from a man who loves her but whom she will not accept because of her social vocation and her belief that a useful life must be based on Masaryk's principles: 'What decides a human being's lot is not Good or Evil, but Truth. Naturally, martyrdom is not Truth. Joy in work, even small-scale work, but work growing from a love for everything living, closing its eyes to nothing and always believing in something better — that is the truthful fulfilment of the life of a modern human being.'³¹ Klenková's far more sophisticated post-war novel, *Regina Lorencová* (1947), consists of a long confessional letter from the eponymous heroine to a journalist who had left for Paris on the day she had decided to become a good wife to her Lutheran priest husband; a lorry runs over the latter on that same day. Unusually for the transition, but like Hodačová's *Tři doby*, this work has a strong feminist streak. On the one hand, the novel constitutes an essay on freedom, and on love; on the other, it meditates on why the Czechoslovak First Republic

27 Milena Nováková, *Věrná socialistka Charlotta Garrigue Masaryková. K 25. výročí jejího skonu*, Prague, 1948, p. 7.

28 Ibid., p. 8.

29 Ibid., pp. 14–15.

30 Ibid., pp. 22 and 29.

31 Hana Klenková, *Slunečná Farma*, Prague, 1939, p. 298.

had failed as a democracy, and failed to fulfil Masaryk's intentions and beliefs. In Klenková's view, all the signs of this failure are there by 1935, when the novel's action ends. Regina's own failings represent the failings of the First Republic: 'I wanted freedom, but was not free in myself.'³² Following Masaryk, Klenková inveighs against the immediately post-Great War fashion for leaving the Church, for would-be liberal anti-clericalism, against the large number of semi-educated among the Czech intellectual élite and against the influence of Herbartism in Czech schooling;³³ she also attributes considerable influence to the Czech Fascists. Truly liberal Czechs realize by 1933 that, 'we have made many mistakes [...]; we have still to re-educate the Czechs, to turn them away from their selfishness, mendacity and petty-mindedness towards civil conscientiousness, Truth and moral strength'.³⁴ Only two parts of the story appear directly to reflect the author's experience of German occupation, those episodes concerning the representatives of two groups Hitler intended to kill, homosexuals and Jews. She attacks First Republic prejudice towards the homosexuals and devotes many pages to explaining their lot to the reader and defending their usefulness to society (the homosexual Běda is a particularly successful businessman). Her conclusion is bold for the times, though a compromise: we have no right to condemn homosexuals, but we must have compassion for their abnormality. She maintains that First Republic society was antisemitic through and through, another bold statement for the times. Unwittingly, however, she stereotypes her Jewish character, Jarda (whose mother is actually Gentile, and so his Jewishness is of the mind), in much the same manner as Klenková in *Tvé děti, Evropo...!* Jarda lacks moral fibre and when he can bear his 'Jewishness' no longer, he commits suicide. Furthermore, Jarda reads literature of the very sort that, at the turn of the century, Masaryk had condemned as morally corrosive, Baudelaire and Rimbaud. Klenková also made a contribution to the Masaryk cult in a brief work from the same year as *Regina Lorencová, Náš president* (Our President, 1947), and she uses Beneš in much the same way as Nováková had used Charlotte Masaryk. The work consists of nineteen letters from a mother to her young son in which she maintains she will explain the meaning of Beneš's term 'people's democracy';³⁵ she does nothing of the sort. Masaryk remains 'our faith and hope and the meaning of our life, even though he is no longer among the living', 'our spiritual leader [...] who will never abandon us as long as we remain faithful to him'.³⁶ When Beneš had been elected to succeed Masaryk as president, 'Unity prevailed over hatred and truth over lie. The Czechs had looked into their hearts and found Masaryk's commandment: live morally, in purity and democratic unity.'³⁷ At the same time, however, just in one statement at the end, Klenková willy-nilly supports the Communist cause in praising Beneš's meeting with Stalin in November 1943 and the resultant pact. She thus implies that this pact accorded with Masaryk's spiritual leadership.

Finally, I take the perhaps idiosyncratic case of the actress writer, Olga Scheinpflugová. From among her pre-war novels one might mention the attempt at an avant-garde fairy-tale, *Babiola* (1930), about a French sea-side waif who through her intellect and sexual attractiveness achieves success in Paris as a writer, then actress, then singer, and who, once the whole world is at her feet, brings global peace. Probably her most widely read pre-war novel was, however, *Balada z Karlína* (A Ballad from Karlín, 1935), a pessimistic amalgam of late nineteenth-century Realism and the inter-war novel of psychological

32 Hana Klenková, *Regina Lorencová*, Prague, 1947, p. 13. See also p. 30.

33 Ibid., pp. 93, 133, 171 and 246.

34 Ibid., p. 383.

35 Hana Klenková, *Náš president. Listy o životě doktora Edvarda Beneše*, Prague, 1947, p. 7.

36 Ibid., pp. 12 and 91–92.

37 Ibid., p. 92.

analysis, about the state of anxiety in which a mangle-woman lives for twenty years after being banished from her rural home; this anxiety only increases when, on inheriting money, she is persuaded that, for the first time in her life, she should look for a man. Both novels have the lack or non-enjoyment of sexual intercourse as a subsidiary motif, and this motif becomes more important in her largest novel, which she spent a great deal of the war writing, the stylized autobiography, *Český román* (A Czech Novel, 1946), whose title had been suggested to her by Masaryk. The novel sets out to represent an intimate account of her friendship with the allegedly asexual Karel Čapek (1890–1938), a writer who had by this time become a symbol of Czechness among the bourgeoisie — although the great majority of Czech intellectuals before the war had rejected his cosy golden-mean views. In this novel, Čapek suddenly loses his impotence on the advice of a Vienna doctor (*sic*), and enjoys a brief, happy marriage with Scheinpflugová, referred to in the third person simply as Olga throughout. The novel fuelled the already glimmering Čapek cult, but, more important, it provided apparently intimate evidence in support of the cult of Masaryk as a man, and a thinker. *Český román* also constitutes an assessment of Czech history from the middle of the Great War to 1945, within which Masaryk becomes the epitome of Czechness. Scheinpflugová has Čapek state that ‘There cannot be anything more Czech than [Masaryk’s] life, evolution and destiny.’ Masaryk is the man who gave the Czechs ‘national fame and freedom’ while remaining the ‘guardian of the world’s moral order’. He had taught Čapek ‘how difficult and unrewarding the work of Truth and the service of justice was’,³⁸ and his spirit had lived on somewhat melodramatically during the German occupation: ‘The rebelliousness of the Hussites and the nobility of Masaryk’s world-view, his consciousness of right and Truth hovered like an indestructible shield over the occupied country where arrogant, short-sighted tyrants were selling their souls to the devil.’³⁹ Scheinpflugová makes no attempt at reconciling Masaryk with the Communists, omits, like all but Hanušová, the German–Soviet pact, but does manage to introduce some Slav feeling from the beginning, which justifies the nature of the welcome she gives Soviet liberation. Her mother, we learn, had believed in a united Slavdom under the leadership of the Russians, and she is herself offended by the Poles’ greedy desire for Moravian Silesia, whereby they ‘refused to listen to any Slav conscience they might have’. In contrast, the liberating Russians are ‘brothers by tongue and blood’ and have ‘healthy, broad Slav faces’.⁴⁰ *Český román* barely excels popular literature. The first of the two plays she wrote during the Occupation but could not publish, *Guayana* (Devil’s Island, 1945), concerns a miscarriage of justice. The theme of the play is actually the relationship between love and responsibility, but at the time it was interpreted as an allegory on the Czechs’ lot during the Protectorate; the French authorities who had wrongly imprisoned the main male character for murder were understood to represent the Germans. His wife’s love secures his release. The second play, *Viděla jsem Boha* (I Saw God, 1945) is set during a particularly brutal dictatorship, which is clearly intended to stand for the Protectorate. Here the regime is toppled by personal, non-institutional Christian faith. No doubt Scheinpflugová intended to embody in her heroine a Masarykian form of Christianity, such as Tilschová presented in *Tři kříže* (and before the war in her novel, *Vykoupení* [Redemption, 1923]), but the heroine’s faith here more closely resembles that portrayed by Vášová in her short stories. Scheinpflugová’s somewhat wooden family-chronicle novel, *Žlutý dům* (The Yellow House, 1947), constitutes a coming to terms with people’s democracy. She argues two ideological points. First, it is good if rich farmers lose their estates, since the proud lives they had enjoyed had actually been an unnatural prison; the Czechs are natural peasants,

38 Olga Scheinpflugová, *Český román*, Prague, 1946, pp. 316, 200 and 234.

39 Ibid., p. 606.

40 Ibid., pp. 502, 620 and 623.

plebeians, and people's democracy will return rich farmers to their natural Czech state, relieve them of the false burdens of 'family' and inheritance. Secondly, people's democracy represents a natural evolution towards a socialism of the sort the rural Czech had been striving for since 1848, a socialism which will destroy class hatred. *Žlutý dům* conveys a National Social, by no means a Communist, message.

II

Before the war Helena Dvořáková could not decide how or what she wanted to write. For example, *Mámení* (Delusion, 1928), a novel about a honey-trap, where a disfigured Soviet agent saves a good Czech from Magyar machinations, combines a psychological study of lust with the attributes of a *Boys' Own Paper* adventure-cum-detective story. Notably, given the way Dvořáková's attitudes will progress, the honey set in the trap is Suzanne, a Hungarian Jew, who had once owned a sweet-shop and once worked as a night-club whore, and a Jew called Taussig is a Hungarian agent in the Czechoslovak Ministry of National Defence. In contrast to *Mámení*, her *Veliký proud* (The Great Current, 1932), constitutes a novel about maternal love and self-sacrifice and considers, in sometimes Naturalist detail, the variety of possible types of victimhood women may suffer in modern society. A woman's altruism and maternal love for all humanity transforms a one-sided, fanatical male scientist into a complete human being. Dvořáková reached artistic maturity during the war with *Doktorka Diana Holcová* (Diana Holcová, PhD, 1941), where she has shed the influence of *Trivialliteratur* that had been rather too evident in her pre-war novels. This feminist novel of psychological analysis, set mostly in Rome and Prague, traces a young woman's trials in love, then sexual intercourse, then abandonment by the father, then in lone motherhood, and her final decision to quit all the conventional pastimes and roles of women and to devote herself to a career as an academic. Since Dvořáková makes Diana an historian, she gives herself ample opportunity to pass patriotic comments on the Czech past, a common method for asserting national cultural independence during the Occupation.

Similar historicizing patriotism lies behind her choice to write a novel on the development of Libeň, a largely farming village in the mid-nineteenth century, into a proletarian community by the 1890s and finally, at the very beginning of the twentieth century into a part of Greater Prague, *Pád rodiny Bryknarů*. The first volume, *Na nový květ* (New Burgeoning, 1943), takes the reader from 1854 to the late 1860s. The imprecision of dates at the end of this volume allows her to omit the Austro-Prussian War; otherwise in her quest for historical verisimilitude she would have had to express or to have her characters express pro-Prussian sentiments; that might have resembled collaboration. The action of the second volume, *Bílými plameny* (Through White Flames, autumn 1945), lasts from 1872 (though one inconsistent reference to the January 1868 demonstration against Dualism suggests 1869) to 1887, and of the third, *Prapory nad městem* (Flags Over the City, 1948), from 1890 to 1901. It is pertinent to the subject of this chapter, to the theme of the trilogy itself, and to an understanding of the political reason for Dvořáková's choosing the period she has that by the end she notes the similarity of that period to the time in which she is writing. The central character of *Prapory nad městem* states that 1890 is a moment of transition, from self-help and social romanticism to socialism, indeed to Marxist socialism.⁴¹ Although she tries to persuade her readers or reviewers in her afterword that the trilogy constituted Socialist Realism, in fact in tracing the development of socialist ideas in Libeň, Prague, and to a degree in the whole of Austria and in France,

41 Helena Dvořáková, *Prapory nad městem*, Prague, 1948, pp. 38–39. Henceforth I shall refer to this novel as Part III and cite page numbers of quotations within the text.

she actually traces a Czech *Sonderweg*. She describes, first, the way the intellectuals, particularly from the old patriciate, take over the working-class movement from the workers and, secondly, how simultaneously the young Czech intellectuals of the 1890s believe in a socialism mitigated by Masaryk. In Part III, there are, we note, virtually no working-class characters of any significance, except Jarka Cabalka, who pops in and out on account of his devotion to the central character.

Dvořáková maintains a Realist approach to her subject-matter and to her means of expression throughout. She has clearly studied Libeň local history thoroughly and, in the first two volumes, she meticulously describes and explains local architectural, institutional and demographic developments and the impact national events have on the populace of Libeň. When Libeň ceases to be the permanent centre of attention in Part III, the only volume written entirely after the war, and the only volume where matters erotic dominate matters political, local or national, Dvořáková is rather too frequently careless. For example, she has Masaryk lead the Battle of the Manuscripts from the periodical *Čas* rather than *Athenaeum*; she has Samuel Smiles instead of John Stuart Mill as the author of *The Subjection of Women*; she has the dandy Arthur Breisky (1885–1910) coming down to Prague in the 1890s; naturally, he was too young to adopt his dandy style before the end of the first decade of the twentieth century. She maintains a Realist treatment of Time throughout. In *Na nový květ*, however, more episodes take place simultaneously than in the other two volumes and she frequently employs a device whereby we do not learn how one episode ends until we are well into a subsequent or parallel episode. In the other volumes episodes tend to flow in a linear chronological sequence. Also in *Na nový květ* she introduces a huge amount of information on landmarks, customs, traditions, fashions, historical events, clothing, tradesmens' tools and so forth, but she succeeds in having the reader accept such information as Realist local colour, never appears didactic as, for example, Tilschová and Špálová do in their descriptions of nineteenth-century Prague. The vocabulary of this first volume is vast: period slang, colloquialisms in dialogue, technical terms and a large number of inventively formed or rare words, especially verbs. In her use of verbs and in her sparse imagery based almost entirely on similes, it is as if she had read some rule-book on Realist style. The vocabulary of *Bílými plameny* is not as rich and perhaps the fact that in her afterword she acknowledges having drawn on Jan Neruda's (1834–91) *feuilletons* for a period lexis indicates that she was aware of this. Her imagery remains, however, based on the simile. The use of similes diminishes in Part III, and here, although she still employs some period technical terminology, she no longer retains the archaisms that suffused *Na nový květ* and were still in ample evidence in *Bílými plameny*. The lexis of Part III is more or less standard for the 1940s. We may interpret this development in the narratorial language of the trilogy as representing an attempt to reflect the development of literary linguistic self-confidence among the Czechs during the second half of the nineteenth century. Furthermore, Dvořáková's development of her lexis comports with the dominant moods of the three volumes, the first being rhapsodic, the second elegaic and the third that of a lyrical ballad. All this said, she has still taken more care with the first than the subsequent volumes; indeed, with the first Dvořáková is clearly endeavouring to lure the readers into believing that they are reading a text from the 1850s or 1860s: the language of expression becomes part of the would-be documentary nature of the novel. Dvořáková's representation of psychological motivation develops roughly in accord with the development of the language. In *Na nový květ*, with the exception of one powerful scene where we follow the mind of a woman crazed with terror for her husband's safety during the great fire of Libeň in 1863, the narrator builds up the psychologies of characters through percipient analyses of actions and reactions. This method is still evident

in *Bílými plameny*, but here it begins to be replaced by interior monologue, which then becomes virtually the sole method of monitoring the movements of the mind in Part III.

Linguistically then, stylistically if one will, the trilogy is Realist, as are the devices used to reproduce characters' psychologies. The choice of two families, one might argue three, to represent social, political and economic developments is not associated with the period or mode of literature, though it is common in the Dickens, Balzac and even Galsworthy versions of Realism that have had an impact on Dvořáková's writing. The plot is, however, essentially Romantic, and particularly in the first two volumes one is sometimes, somewhat incongruously, reminded of Gustav Pfleger-Moravský (1833–75). The plot acquires ever greater Romantic qualities in Part III, where the main character has many characteristics of a Czech Decadent hero: he is the last of a long line, impoverished, flounders in a world of intellectual ideals, and falls in love with a *femme* who is literally *fatale* (called Suzanne like the spy in *Mámení*). The core of the Romantic plot, however, lies not in this hopelessly hardliner Marxist's love-life, nor in his idealist actions. It lies in the fact that the author has constructed her plot around the idea that the old Czech patriciate, petty nobles before the Counter-Reformation, should, first, represent the best in mid-century philanthropy, should then be ousted by industrialist parvenus, some of them sound, socially aware men (Kadlec and, younger, Václav Doubek), but most of them greedy and immoral (Kroupa, Plíva, Padevět); these patricians fail by deciding they should imitate the parvenus, because philanthropy and property speculation do not mix, but then realize that only through socialism can they assume their role as the leading forces in society. Employing such a Romantic outline plot in a Realist work might serve as a propaganda device: a demonstration that the old Czech traditions are best served today by the Marxists. If Dvořáková intended that, one could claim that her trilogy more or less demonstrates the Stalinist cultural ideologue, Zdeněk Nejedlý's, view that in the Middle Ages, the Czech petty nobility represented a progressive political force analogous to that of the Czech proletariat in the twentieth century. A true Czech patriot, aware of the Czechs' history, must be a Marxist today (in the 1940s).

The central family of the trilogy is the Bryknars. Jan Bryknar is the main character of *Na nový květ* and his son, Martin, of the other two novels. They are the patricians, former petty nobility. Jan also has a daughter, Zdeňka, who retains her patrician social views until Martin's death, when, after studying his library and his letters from a socialist friend in Paris, she becomes a convinced Marxist socialist. The second family is that of the poor tailor, Václav Doubek, who comes from the country and settles in Libeň, and gradually builds up his business until he owns a factory and then a chain of factories with associated companies all over the Slav world. Doubek achieves his riches through industry, determination and good, honest business acumen. He has six children, but his wife, Gustýnka, dies after bearing the last two, twin girls. The first three, Michal, Vilém and Berta, thus go through puberty without a moral education. Zdeňka suffers nothing of that, and Martin only passingly when their mother is sent to a madhouse: but they are patricians. Michal is a selfish sybarite who takes over two of his father's factories and does well because, unlike his father, he grossly exploits his workers; because he is rich and handsome, he manages to marry into the nobility — but nobility with a German name — and has a son, Hubert. His wife's family and soon his wife, too, despise him for his uncouth background and he is soon estranged from them and pursues sexual adventures with under-age girls. He it is who more or less accidentally kills Martin with a hammer, because his Czech-Moroccan mistress loves him. Vilém is equally bad, an embezzler, fraudster and drunkard from his teens, then a bad actor, first in an itinerant troupe, then in Marseilles, then in a seedy music-hall and some suburban theatres; then he seems to live off card-sharpping and, finally, already half deranged by his alcoholism, he appears to be

working as a police agent when he tries to shoot Martin Bryknar. Berta starts off badly, canoodling with one of her father's proletarian employees, but Zdeňka tactfully finds her a farmer husband to keep her out of trouble and she soon becomes well-nigh a caricature of the buxom, feracious peasant-woman. Eventually Zdeňka Bryknarová agrees to marry Doubek, not because she responds to Doubek's love and admiration of many years' standing, but because — and such are the ways of the patriciate — she needs to save Martin from bankruptcy. For quite some time before the marriage, she had begun to take a quasi-maternal interest in Doubek's fourth child, Jan with his Byronic limp. Within the Romantic plot structure, the reader must conclude that the fact that Zdeňka had cultivated Jan's intellectual abilities in childhood and inculcated her values in him resulted in his proving a proud defendant in the Omladina affair,⁴² his becoming a university teacher and, most important, his fervent adherence to Masaryk's views. Jan becomes a close friend of Martin's and Martin has the last word in their discussion on the relative values of Masarykism and Marxism. But where Dvořáková argues the Masaryk view cogently, she does not do the same for Marxism, thus does not actually intellectually support her patriotic vision of the Czech nobility re-assuming a leading role in society as Marxists. I would contend that this not so much constitutes a minor inconsistency in the novel as it reflects the state of mind of many Czech intellectuals in the 1940s transition, unable to decide between Masaryk and Marx and looking for a compromise between them. Furthermore, one might argue that in having the patrician Zdeňka bring Jan up intellectually led to a way of thinking that diluted patrician Marxism into middle-class Masarykism. Zdeňka also brings up Doubek's twin daughters and, in the period mode, educates their bodies rather than their minds, although, to be sure, they do soon belong to the Libeň young intellectual set that meets in Zdeňka's house. Mainly, however, she develops their talent for 'classical' dance of the Isadora Duncan brand. They end up happily, and propitiously, married in Vienna.

The Doubek family represents the new bourgeoisie as the Bryknars represent the patriciate. Both families produce modern intellectuals in the second generation. To complete her scheme, Dvořáková has a third family representing initially smallholders, but then the proletariat; this family, the Hlaváčeks, produce an intellectual in the third generation. The lots of the Hlaváčeks are intertwined with those of the Doubeks and Bryknars from the beginning. Doubek first encounters the smallholder Matěj Hlaváček when he is walking to Prague and Matěj is the first to give him board in Libeň; eventually he marries Matěj's daughter. Meanwhile Jan Bryknar, whose wife had become frigid after the birth of Martin, over-confident, trusting seigneur that he is, has begun an adulterous relationship with the red-head, Marie Anna, wife of the spiteful, oleaginous, triangular-headed minor local government official with the possibly slightly germanized name, Krejczárek, and sister of the also red-haired fraudulent, scheming, embezzling surveyor-cum-property speculator, Ignác Kroupa. Kroupa and Krejczárek encourage Jan Bryknar to fulfil his dream and found a Libeň savings bank to help the poor, to be president of the bank and take responsibility for its assets. Kroupa and his cronies set about defrauding the bank of its money; the fraud is discovered by a kind parvenu industrialist whose wisdom

42 In September 1893, the authorities declared martial law in Prague in order to curb the activities of various 'progressive' youth organizations. In February 1894, what amounted to a show trial took place of young intellectuals and others which claimed to be trying representatives of a large organization called Omladina. Sixty-eight 'members' of the non-existent Omladina received prison sentences. One of the more prominent of those sentenced was the poet S. K. Neumann (1875–1947), who was first an anarchist and then a Communist; his seventieth birthday was much celebrated in Czech verse. Among women writers, Pujmanová includes a poem to him in her *Radost i žal* (see note 24 above).

and education have been greatly enhanced by twenty-seven years in America. Kroupa and Krejczárek blackmail Bryknar into covering the bank's losses by threatening him with a suit for adultery when he threatens them with a suit for fraud. He pays by selling most of the shares in Zdeňka's dowry, and realizing that they could continue to blackmail him on account of Marie Anna, he shoots himself in the head. Kroupa also manages to persuade Matěj Hlaváček to sell him most of his land. Eventually Matěj realizes what a paltry sum Kroupa had paid him and is anyway depressed by no longer having his land to work; he also commits suicide. Neither patrician nor peasant is a match for the wiles of the new entrepreneur society. Matěj's son, the bricklayer Frantík, introduces Martin Bryknar to socialist ideas when he is still a student; at this stage (*Na nový květ*), however much he likes Frantík, Martin condemns the working classes. Later, when Kroupa's sons are ensuring they can drive Martin into bankruptcy on account of his failed enterprise to build three tenement blocks on land newly reclaimed from the river, and especially after he has been so shocked by conditions in the shanty town outside Libeň, *Na dědinkách* (the impact of this visit on Martin is psychologically unconvincing), Martin becomes ever more interested in socialism. Frantík Hlaváček takes him to Social Democrat pubs and eventually to a secret meeting aboard a dredger. Finally, when Frantík is dying of tuberculosis contracted during his time as a political prisoner, he hands over his Party responsibilities to Martin. These family connections do not stop here. In the Libeň young intellectuals' club, watched over by Martin's unmarried cousin Týna in Zdeňka's house, Doubek's twins become friends of Frantík's step-nephew, an historical character with a fictional step-uncle, the Decadent poet, Karel Hlaváček (1874–98). Dvořáková creates these parallels and instinctive friendships between the Bryknars and the Hlaváčeks in order to support her patriotic Romantic plot.

She uses the figure of Karel Hlaváček to introduce another strand of *fin-de-siècle* Czech intellectual life, a strand that seemed to be as opposed to Masaryk as it was to Marxism. Before he appears in the club, Martin had once met him as a twelve-year-old boy by the swampy wasteland around Libeň. This encounter alludes to Hlaváček's Rimbaudesque portrayal of sensitive child outsiders imbuing the poison of knowledge into their eyes beside a swamp in his cycle *Mstivá kantiléna* (Cantilena of Revenge, 1898):

He was not good-looking; indeed he was positively unsightly with his rather coarse features, blubbery lips and tall, gangling stature, all arms and legs. There was nothing attractive about this figure with his patched clothes and his sullen, unhappy face. Nevertheless there was something so strikingly individual about him that Martin suddenly put his hand on his shoulder and asked him who he was.⁴³

Dvořáková's description of his writing verse in his head while in something like a trance is over-sentimental; on the other hand, her association of his verse with the unconscious and the *paysage de l'âme* serves her aim as a novelist to represent something of the thought of the period: '[The dreaming young man] for a moment fixed his attention on the tangible, three-dimensional reality around him, and so awakened, cut himself off from his inner being; the landscape of his soul was extinguished. And the acoustics and form of his verse slipped away with his vision [...]. His lines withdrew, sank back into his unconscious' (III, p. 59). Dvořáková's interpretation of Hlaváček's active membership of the Sokol patriotic gymnastics association, is that exercising in the Sokol gym, he never has 'the terrifying, murderous feeling that I must somehow escape from life' (III, p. 87); he declares that poetry is for him an 'escape from petty, wretched, fettered everyday life into the realm of supreme freedom [...], into a liberty and beauty where I am master' (III, p. 91). Dvořáková

43 Helena Dvořáková, *Bílými plameny*, Prague, 1945, p. 631. See Rimbaud's 'Les Poètes de sept ans'.

also, however, has Hlaváček interpret the Gueux of *Mstivá kantiléna* in the way Marxist critics liked for almost a hundred years: the Gueux represented 'tattered workers or day-labourers' and he was a Gueux, 'poor and sick' (III, p. 92).

She uses Part III to come to terms with Czech attitudes to outsiders of another kind, the Jews.⁴⁴ She soon links the 'Jewish Question' with Masaryk, too. First, she introduces the wise, kind Libeň Jewish doctor, Stein, somewhat stereotyped with his curly black hair, and given how he develops, she clearly employs the condescending pejorative 'Židáček' hypocoristically (III, p. 7). In associating Czech antisemitism of the 1890s with bourgeois capitalist radical nationalism, she may be endeavouring to give a Marxist view or, more likely, may be embodying in an historical event her revulsion at the Germans' systematic murder of the Jews, or even expressing a belief that Czech antisemitism was something of the distant past. She has Martin suggest that capitalists and landowners used antisemitism as a means of diverting the masses' attention from the social question. At the same time, Martin says that, 'yes, some Jews in this state do bear great guilt. For example, the vodka and brandy distillers in Slovakia, Galicia, Bukovina. But clearly to incite the unthinking mob against them is, in my view, vile' (III, p. 271). He considers antisemitism perverted: as a result of the Hilsner ritual-murder trial, 'For over six months now, rancour against the Jews, revulsion at them and a general lust for revenge have been smothering all other movements, tearing the masses down to a subhuman level because indirectly, through reading, they can satisfy their repressed proclivities and all sorts of monstrous passions' (III, p. 274). He also suspects that the real grounds are economic: 'The atmosphere in this country is positively sticky with envy and a perverted racial lust for revenge. For, in essence, the background to all this antisemitism is nothing more than non-Jews' envy of the Jews' greater initiative in commerce and their efficiency altogether' (III, p. 283). Masaryk's stand against the inane ritual-murder superstition had led to his being abandoned by Czechs of all sorts, 'except perhaps the workers' (III, p. 276).

Thereby Dvořáková is actually using that part of the Masaryk cult that emphasized his closeness to the workers,⁴⁵ rather than suggesting some lack of racism in the working classes as a Stalinist critic might have wished to imagine. She implies Masaryk's contempt for jingoism and the worship of false national legends or qualities that jingoism involves in the venomous economically and sexually exploitative Michal Doubek's reaction to Gebauer and Masaryk's argument in the Battle of the Manuscripts: 'Philosophers of national suicide... repulsive, downright repulsive! This sort of perversion could have only been cooked up in some sterile academic brain. Someone called these nihilists, that professor who came from Vienna to Prague, poisoners of wells' (III, p. 12). Dvořáková's view on which way the Czechs would like to go after the post-war transition is clear from the following, which actually contains for the contemporary Czech reader also references to the 'betrayal' of the Social Democrats in the Great War and recent Stalinist obfuscation on the roles of nationalism and internationalism such as they knew from Zdeněk Nejedlý:

'We young people acknowledge in principle that socialism is right. It is no coincidence that during this year's miners' strike in Kladno Professor Masaryk travelled there to lecture to the

44 Just as Součková introduces Weininger's *Geschlecht und Charakter* as the heroine of *Bel canto*'s favourite reading matter as an anti-Nazi jibe (actually, Weininger was the only Jewish writer Hitler admired), so Dvořáková introduces Heine: Helena Dvořáková, *Na nový květ*, 2nd edn, Prague, 1945, p. 294.

45 Those who wished to emphasize this aspect frequently referred to the fact that Masaryk had done a blacksmith's apprenticeship.

miners on the eight-hour working day in the Printers' Club.⁴⁶ He and the whole of our movement are working for a broader approach to socialism.

'On the other hand, however, we should like to create a different, our own, a pure Czech form of socialism resting on the humanist idea. That is where Michal is right: pursuing internationalism diverts the workers' interest away from questions that concern the whole nation...'

'That's all very nice, my boy, somehow pure and honest', said Martin, 'but the fact remains that our party bases itself on the principles of scientific — you understand? — scientific socialism, that it does not exclude nationality, but is resorting to internationalism for temporary tactical reasons.' (III, p. 77)

Even after the 'Victorious February' a great many Czechs still did not believe the Masarykian cause was entirely lost. For example, in 1950 in Hranice a certain Josef Hladký published privately, 'in the hope of a better future', an anthology of twelve pre-war poems by twelve poets, including Žižková, celebrating the life of T. G. Masaryk.

Conclusion

Dvořáková still believes, then, that once the Czechs have been through the fire of Marxist socialism, they will soon find their own natural path to Masarykian socialism. The majority of the women writers I have treated clearly hoped for that Masarykian path, considering this path, or something like it, the only path out of the post-war moral morass and atmosphere of fear. That is explicit in Dvořáková, Klenová (in spite of all her hysterical racism), Klenková, Nováková and Scheinpflugová. Since pre-war Stalinism fails in Špálová, one may safely assume, she will feel no attraction to 1940s Communism whatsoever.⁴⁷ That goes also for those writers with Christian or theosophical mystical leanings, Glabazňová, Vášová and Žižková. Svatá demonstrated there was little ideologically sound about her with her concentration-camp ideological novel and subsequent play. Hanušová disappeared from the literary scene, had perhaps been insensitive in writing about the Hitler–Stalin pact. Hodačová was writing outside politics, though she showed a faint sign of Masarykian ideology. Součková defected. That leaves us just with Majerová, Glazarová, Pujmanová, Svozilová and Tilschová who by their actions or writing or both embraced Communism. That is a third of the writers I have considered.

Historians of 1945–48 in Czechoslovakia have usually concentrated on politics and economics to explain why Gottwald and his fellows organized the coup of February 1948: for example, the movement to the right within the Social Democratic Party; the Slovaks with their majority of Democratic Party voters; disquiet at Stalin's forbidding Gottwald to become party to the Marshall Plan; the drought of 1947 and accompanying trade deficit incurred by the fulfilment of the Two-Year Plan and consequent discontent, especially among the rural population who had initially benefitted most from the Communist Party's government leadership since 1945; a fear lest the number of Communist voters fell dramatically from the 1946 number in the elections planned for May 1948.

The examples of the dozen or so women writers I have looked at suggest that a very large proportion of the Czech intelligentsia had no desire whatsoever for a Soviet-style socialist society in Czechoslovakia. Furthermore, it may be important that these writers are women. In Czech politics also, two women took particularly strong stands against

46 The Communist writer Majerová gives prominence to this episode in her chronicle of the industrialization of Kladno, based on one family, *Siréna* (The Siren, 1935) — another of those novels she modified in 1947, but she left the Masaryk episode in.

47 Like Hodačová, Klenková and Scheinpflugová, Špálová ceased publishing in 1948 and only began again during the Thaw at the end of the 1950s.

sovietization, the People's Party Helena Koželuhová⁴⁸ and the National Social Milada Horáková. (The former later defected and the latter was executed.) For women, Red Army liberation meant mass raping, quite apart from the destruction of their homes by Soviet looting.⁴⁹ It is, indeed, banal to conclude that, if the majority of the population had clearly felt favourable towards the Communists, Gottwald would not have had to engineer his coup. Nevertheless, it is perhaps useful to be able to demonstrate on the basis of *belles-lettres* that the coup was necessary if Stalinism was to rule safely. It did not matter to Gottwald that most members of the large Czech middle classes whom these women writers represented had little faith in Communist happy morrows.

48 Koželuhová also published her one novel during the transition period, *Sněžná romance* (A Snow Romance, 1946). This somewhat cosy detective story includes mockery of the Decadents, like Klenková's novel. Here, however, the attack is directed not at the French, but at the Pole Przybyszewski and, indirectly, at Nietzsche. After she had escaped to Germany Koželuhová was condemned to death *in absentia*.

49 For a brief account of this, see Stransky, *East Wind over Prague* (see note 6 above), pp. 27–37.

Index

- Aachen, 249
 Ableitinger, Alfred, 195
 Abrams, Bradley, 181
 Acheson, Dean, 5, 165, 187
 Achleitner, Friedrich, 292
 Aczel, Richard, 14
 Aczél, Tamás, 301
 Adam, B., 280, 282
 Adam, K., 390
 Adams, Richard, 226
 Adderson, Edward, 385
 Adenauer, Konrad, 47, 51, 52, 56
 Adibekov, G. M., 188
 Adler, N., 88, 93
 Adler, Victor, 48
 Admont, 45
 Adomeit, Hannes, 120
 Adorno, Theodor, 77, 285
 Adriatic, 100
 Ady, Endre, 299
 Aeschbacher, Adrian, 253
 Afghanistan, 37
 Agrarian party (Czech[oslovak]), 172, 176, 177, 179, 194, 372, 374
 Ainsztein, Reuben, 59, 69
 Akhmatova, Anna, 233, 453
 Albania, 34
 Albrich, Thomas, 45, 57
 Alcock, Anthony Evelin, 35
 Alcohol, 25, 153, 278
 Alexander, Field-Marshal Harold, 112
 Allied Control Commission (Austria), 34; (Finland), 34, 36; (Germany), 133, 134; (Hungary), 23, 32, 216, 220–29; (Italy), 228
 Alter, Peter, 138
 Aman, A., 335
 Americans, United States of America, xiii, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48, 53, 54, 57, 86, 121, 124, 130, 131, 133, 134, 137, 138, 141, 142, 145, 158, 159, 162–70, 182–93, 196, 197, 220, 221, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 235, 242, 252, 262, 270–78, 279, 280, 288, 292, 303, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, 326, 327, *continued*
 Americans, USA *continued*
 369, 379, 381, 388, 462, 490. *See also* Washington
 Amnesty for Nazis (Austria), 49, 51
 Amur, River, 270, 276
 Ancona, 110
 Andelson, J., 93, 95
 Anders, General Władysław, 10, 339
 Andersch, Alfred, 280, 283, 284
 Andor, Esztor, 19, 28
 Andreas, *see* Pucher, Konrad
 Andrew, John, xiv
 Andrzejewski, Jerzy, 58
 Anglo-American Commission for Palestine, 42
Anschluß, 39, 40, 50, 52, 53, 74, 100, 103, 289, 290, 292, 365, 372
 Anti-clericalism, 51, 218, 258, 381, 496
 Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ), 102
 Antisemitism, 5, 7, 39–57, 61, 64–65, 69–70, 73–74, 78, 82, 87–99, 139, 239, 296, 297, 302, 464, 485, 488, 490, 494, 503. *See also* Jews, Racism and Shoah
 Antkowski, F., 401
 Aragon, Louis, 304, 473
 Aristocracy, nobility, 29, 97, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 195, 216, 219, 304, 358, 364, 409, 414, 416, 417, 419, 420, 421–22, 432, 440, 500
 Arrow Cross movement, 7, 8
 Artman, Hans Carl, 292
 Aryanization, 5, 41, 49, 51, 55, 56, 84, 243, 462, 463
 Asemitism, 366
 Association of German Socialists (BDS), 122
 Athens, 67, 101
 Atlantic Charter, 113
Aufbau, 280, 281, 282
Aufklärung, *see* Enlightenment
 Augenthaler, Zdeněk, 164
 Auschwitz, 2, 71–72, 73, 77, 81, 82, 83, 86, 145, 284, 332

Austria, Austrian, 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, 16, 24, 26, 28, 32, 34–35, 36–37, 39–57, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 120, 124, 141, 194–99, 243, 288–93; zones of occupation: (American), 42, 45, 46, 196; (British), 13, 94, 196; (Soviet), 34, 35, 195. *See also* Habsburg dynasty/Monarchy
 Austrian Anti-Fascist Movement, 105;
 ~ People's Party (ÖVP), 51, 54, 194, 195, 288, 291. *See also* Christian Socialist Party (Austrian)
 Austro-Marxism, 48, 49
 Austro-Prussian War, 498
 Autocracy, 26, 28, 217, 219, 246, 273.
See also National Socialism and People's democracy
 Avbelj, Viktor, 107

Babits, Mihály, 300
 Babler, Otto František, 393
 Bach, Johann Sebastian, 248, 354, 355
 Bachmann, Hanns-Martin, 26
 Bachmann, Robert C., 243
 Baczko, B., 205
 Baden-Württemberg, 46
 Bader, Douglas, 84
 Bader, William B., 35
 Badgarstein, 45
 Bad Ischl, 45
 Bagiński, W., 334
 Bahúlová, M., 263
 Bailer, Brigitte, 51, 52
 Bailey, G., 121
 Bakhmach, Battle of, 370–71, 372
 Bakuš, Mikuláš, 257, 258
 Bakunin, Mikhail, 234, 235, 236, 369
 Balassa, József, 406
 Balász, Béla, 294
 Balcarová, Milena, 485
 Balkans, 28, 174, 183
 Baltic states, 80, 132. *See also* Estonia and Lithuania
 Balzac, Honoré de, 500
 Bance, Alan, 280
 Banks, banking, 29, 30, 39, 131–36, 163, 164, 166, 169, 186, 195, 196, 220, 291, 302, 304, 411, 413–14, 417, 422, 423, 428, 437, 442
 Baran, Zbigniew, 208

Barck, Karl-Heinze, 257
 Bárczi, Géza, 406
 Barenbruch/Niedźwiedź, 402
 Barényiová, Olga, 488, 489
 Barker, Elisabeth, 20, 35, 101
 Barker, Thomas M., 108
 Barlog, Boleslav, 253
 Baron (Polish patriot), 333
 Baron, Karol, 259
 Barthes, Roland, 465, 469–70, 472, 475
 Bartók, Béla, 255
 Baske, S., 156, 157
 Batelka, Josef, 388
 Bátorová, Mária, 260
 Baudelaire, Charles, 259, 496
 Bauer, Michal, 14, 326, 391
 Bauer, Otto, 40, 48, 49
 Bautzen, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118
 Bavaria, 46, 172
 Bayreuth, 249
 BBC, 74, 392
 Beales, Derek, 26
 Beasley-Murray, Timotheus, 9
 Bebler, Aleš, 110
 Becher, Johannes R., 280
 Becker, Heribert, 259
 Beckermann, Ruth, 49
 Bednář, Kamil, 233, 477
 Beer, Kurt, 75
 Beethoven, Ludwig van, 247, 248, 251, 253, 254
 Běhounek, Václav, 71, 321, 478, 480
 Behring, Eva, 75
 Bela Krajina, 110
 Belarus, 80
 Belgium, Belgians, 31, 42, 81, 148, 317, 318
 Belgrade, 111
 Bell, Bishop George, 138
 Beller, Steven, 39
 Belsen, 86, 145
 Belza, Igor, 352–53, 354, 356
 Belzec, 41
 Bencédy, József, 407
 Benda (Czech People's Party M.P.), 178
 Benedek, Marcell, 218, 220
 Beneš, Edvard, 2, 9, 11, 13, 14, 20, 23, 29, 71, 72, 81, 82, 163, 174, 175, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 189, 191, 197,

continued

- Beneš, Edvard *continued*
 198, 199, 204, 230, 240, 266, 270,
 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278,
 351, 372, 373, 377, 389, 448, 451,
 479, 481, 483, 494–95, 496
- Beneš, Jiří, 2, 15, 81–82
- Beneš, Josef, 388, 389
- Beneš, Karel Josef, 478, 480
- Beneš, Vojta, 273–74
- Beneš, Václav L., 31
- Benešová, Božena, 488
- Benešová, Marie, 2
- Benjamin, Hilde, 127
- Benjamin, Walter, 466–67
- Benn, Gottfried, 283
- Beran, Josef, Cardinal, 14
- Berchtold, K., 291
- Berend, Iván T., 24, 25, 28
- Berghahn, Marion, 138, 139
- Beria, Lavrenti Pavlovich, 121, 339
- Berkeley, 192–93
- Berlin, 1, 52, 115, 117, 119, 120, 123,
 124, 133, 140, 143, 150, 152–53, 208,
 241, 243, 244, 249, 250, 251, 253,
 254, 280, 282; ~ Blockade, 13, 121,
 125, 126, 279, 280; ~ Wall, 16, 128
- Berling, General Zygmund, 10, 339
- Berman, Jakub, 91, 210
- Bernhard, Thomas, 293
- Bernstein, Michael André, 59–60
- Bernstein, Rabbi Philip, 46
- Beskyd mountains, 488
- Bessarabia, 6
- Bettauer, Hugo, 43
- Bevin, Ernest, 190, 224, 225, 228
- Białystok, 401
- Biber, Dušan, 13, 100, 104, 112
- Bibó, István, 297–98
- Bidault, Georges, 191, 192
- Biebl, Konstantin, 383
- Bienkowski, Witold, 89
- Bierut, Bolesław, 93, 98, 311
- Bílek, Petr A., 306
- Birkenau, *see* Auschwitz
- Birkert, A., 281, 282, 283
- Bischof, G., 293
- Bismark, Otto Eduard Leopold, Prince
 von, 370
- Bizonia, 1, 13, 125, 279. *See also*
 Germany
- Black market, 45, 46, 144, 148, 152,
 153, 157, 158
- Blaga, Lucian, 297
- Bláha, Arnošt, 82
- Bláha, Jan, 84–85
- Blahník, Vojtěch, 446
- Blamberger, G., 281, 282
- Blaník legend, 355
- Blank, R., 467
- Blaszczyk, Henryk, 96
- Blatný, Ivan, 326
- Blažek, Jaroslav P., 390
- Blom, Eric, 349, 351
- Bloomfield, Jon, 485, 486
- Blum, Ignacy, 337
- Bockelmann, Rudolf, 245, 256
- Bodzenta, Erich, 196
- Boehringer, G., 282
- Bogdanov, A. A., 377
- Bohemia, Bohemian Lands, 5, 8, 9, 18,
 24, 25, 26, 31, 38, 43, 45, 72, 79, 117,
 171, 172, 194–99, 265, 277, 346, 372,
 385, 443–54. *See also* Czech and
 Czechoslovakia
- Bohemia and Moravia, Protectorate of,
 7, 37, 79, 85, 162, 200, 317, 360, 366,
 372, 375, 383, 385, 390, 396, 449,
 485–504
- Böhlen, 159
- Bohlen, Charles, 183
- Böll, Heinrich, 284, 291
- Bombíková, Petra, 10, 16, 455, 476
- Bonhoeffer, Dietrich, 138
- Bonn, 52. *See also* Germany, Federal
 Republic
- Bor, Josef, 14
- Borbándi, Gyula, 296
- Borchert, Wolfgang, 14, 291
- Bordihn, Peter, 150–51, 154, 155
- Bordziłowski, Major-General Jerzy, 337
- Borejsza, Jerzy, 311
- Borów, 7
- Bosák, Ctirad, 394–95
- Botz, Gerhard, 40, 41, 42, 52, 56
- Bouvier, B., 157
- Boyer, John, 39
- Brabec, Jiří, 271, 320
- Braham, Randolph L., 23
- Braidotti, Rosi, 65
- Bramstead, E. K., 28

- Brandenburg, 24, 113, 114, 116, 117
 Brandys, Kazimierz, 312, 313, 335
 Bratislava, 8, 164, 263, 264, 371
 Bratny, Roman, 311
 Braun, Bruno, 71
 Braunthal, Julius, 49
 Brecht, Bertold, 283, 284, 472
 Bredel, Willi, 280
 Breisky, Arthur, 489, 499
 Breitner, Hugo, 48, 49
 Bremond, Henri, 259
 Brenner, Michael, 44
 Breshko – Breshkovskaia, Ekaterina, 376
 Breslau, 7, 139, 485. *See also* Wrocław
 Breton, André, 258, 259, 260
 Breza, Tadeusz, 61, 312–13
 Brezhnev, Leonid Il'ich, 14
 Březovský, Bohuslav, 275
 Brill, David, 44
 Brill, Herman, 122
 British, Great Britain, United Kingdom, xiii, 3, 4, 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 19, 31, 41, 42, 43, 45, 52, 53, 54, 72, 100–12, 117, 119, 124, 137–48, 159, 182–93, 220–29, 232, 233, 274, 276, 279, 288, 318, 367, 370, 376, 477. *See also* England *and* London
 Brno, 79, 83, 350, 351, 353, 360, 388, 392, 396, 450
 Brocki, Z., 401
 Brod, Petr, 74
 Brodzka, A., 312
 Broniewski, Władysław, 329, 330, 332, 333
 Broszat, Martin, 143
 Brouk, Bohuslav, 477
 Brožová, Věra, 230, 232
 Brubaker, Rogers, 89
 Bruegel, Johann Wolfgang, 365
 Bruins, John, 189
 Brunngraber, Rudolf, 292
 Bruntál, 164
 Brušák, Karel, 233
 Brus-Wegrowska, D., 93, 94
 Brzeski district, 96
 Bubeníček, R., 271
 Buchanan, Jane Denistoun, 201
 Bucharest, 223
 Buchenwald, 71, 76–77, 86, 122, 467
 Buchheim, Christoph, 133
 Buchholz/Grabowo, 402
 Budapest, 8, 39, 81, 222, 223, 224, 228, 294, 297, 300, 301, 303, 419, 430, 436
 Budín, Stanislav, 320–21
 Bug, River, 340
 Bugge, Peter, 477
 Bukovina, 6, 503
 Bulgaria, 10, 11, 13, 32, 34, 75, 198, 223, 224, 226, 370
 Bunčák, Pavel, 258
 Bünde, 143
 Buquoy family, 175
 Buras, Jacek S., 60
 Burešová, Jana, 179
 Bürger, Peter, 471
 Burian, Emil František, 83, 466
 Buriánek, František, 306–07, 309
 Buřil, Felix, 452
 Burleigh, Michael, 115
 Burney, Charles, 346
 Butler, R., 223
 Bydgoszcz, 92
 Byrnes, James Francis, 185–86, 193
 Byron, George Gordon, Lord, 501
 Bžoch, Jozef, 455
 Cała, Alina, 94, 96
 Campbell, Ronald, 101
 Cambridge, 139
 Camus, Albert, 472
 Čáp, Alois, 76, 77
 Čapek, Jan, 353
 Čapek, Karel, 274, 307, 320, 445, 497
 Čapek, Tomáš, 271, 379
 Carinthia, 13, 100–12, 195
 Case, Sue-Ellen, 68
 Catholics, *see* Churches
 Caudwell, Christopher, 395
 Čech, Svatopluk, 271, 276
 Čep, Jan, 478
 Čepička, Alexej, 3
 Černušák, Gracian, 349, 351, 354
 Černý, František, 444
 Černý, Václav, 197, 230–40, 270, 322, 326, 477, 478, 479, 481, 482
 Chałasiński, Józef, 312
 Chałubiński, Mirosław, 208, 209, 210

- Chalupecký, Jindřich, 270, 481, 482, 483
 Chamberlain, Arthur Neville, 493
 Changes of 1989–91, 1, 3, 7, 16, 17, 33, 119, 207, 295, 306, 338, 385, 393, 396, 408
 Chaplin, Charlie, 254
 Charter 77, 16, 456
 Checinski, Michael, 94
 Chekhov, Anton Pavlovich, 445
 Cheliabinsk, 371
 Chemnitz, 151, 155
 Cherbourg, 164
 Chernov, Viktor Mikhailovich, 371
 Chew, Geoffrey, 9, 481
 Chicago, 252, 270–71, 276, 317
 Chiasm, 200–06, 258
 China, Chinese, 488
 Chomsky, Avram Noam, 383
 Chopin, Frédéric François, 315, 329
 Christian belief, sentiment, Churches in general, 29, 156, 201, 261–62, 302, 319, 354, 360, 366, 369, 479, 485, 487, 504
 Christian Democratic Union (Germany), 47, 114, 123, 125, 126, 127, 154–55
 Christian Socialist Party (Austria), 39, 40, 49, 51, 108. *See also* Austrian People's Party
 Christophersen, Jens A., 363
 Churches: (Bohemian Brethren), 200, 487; (Calvinist) 200, 299; (Lutheran), 356, 389, 455, 488, 495; (Orthodox), 1, 273, 381; (Roman Catholic), 42–43, 54, 88, 90, 96, 97, 101, 115, 172, 195, 198, 205, 257–62, 271, 281, 295, 302, 303, 317, 348, 352, 358, 381, 455, 463, 477–78, 481, 490, 496
 Churchill, Winston Leonard Spencer, 13, 17, 19, 72, 110, 112, 183, 185, 223, 235, 271, 279, 393
 Čihák, Václav, 350
 Ciołkosz, Lidia, 61
 Cioran, E.-M. (=Émile C. Rășinari), 297
 Clam – Gallas family, 175
 Clare, George, 52–53
 Clarke, Katherine, 328
 Clary – Aldringen family, 175
 Claudel, Paul, 259
 Clay, General Lucius, 133, 141, 190
 Clayton, Will, 185
 Clementis, Vladimír, 164, 190, 199, 267, 276–77, 278, 325
 Clissold, Stephen, 109
 Clyne, Michael, 406, 408
 Cohen, M., 395
 Cohen, Percy, 91
 Cohn, Ernst J., 139
 Čolaković, Rodoljub, 104
 Cold War, xiii, 1, 13, 44, 51, 53, 129, 145, 155, 182, 196, 207, 274, 279, 281, 327
 Collaboration (with Germans), 4, 15, 42, 78–79, 84, 174, 197, 241–56, 318, 390, 477, 478, 492
 Comecon, 198
 Comenius, Jan Amos, 272
 Cominform, 9, 189, 197, 228
 Comintern, 12, 100, 108, 109, 110, 271
 Communism, Bolshevism, in general, 1, 4, 5, 7, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19, 24–25, 28, 30, 32, 33–34, 37–38, 45, 53, 55, 79, 80, 90–99, 112, 120, 125, 145, 155, 171, 183, 194, 209, 214, 217, 220, 223, 228, 238, 239, 251, 271, 272, 273, 275, 276, 281, 298, 338, 340, 391, 392, 407, 410, 443, 456, 496
 Communist Party: (Austrian), 1, 40, 42, 44, 45, 105, 106, 108–09, 110, 194, 195, 196, 288, 289, 291; (Czechoslovak), 3, 7, 11, 21, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 78, 85, 117, 171, 173, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182–93, 194, 195, 197–98, 205, 230, 231, 234, 235, 240, 260, 268, 269, 274, 278, 306, 307, 322, 325, 326, 327, 349–50, 352–53, 358, 361, 367, 368, 371, 373, 374, 378, 379, 383, 443, 444, 446, 447, 451–54, 465, 477–84, 485, 486, 487, 493, 494–95, 497, 504–05; (Finnish), 36, 192; (French), 18, 186, 197; (German), 8, 116, 120, 122, 123, 127, 128, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 157, 280, 282, *see also* SED; (Greek), 192; (Hungarian), 20, 22–23, 30, 217, 219, 222, 224, 225, 227, 294–305, 406, 408; (Italian), 186; (Polish), 22, 29, 31, 90–91, 95, 97,

continued

Communist Party *continued*

207, 208, 210, 212, 316, 331, 334,
336, 337, 338, 341–42, 344, 345, *see*
also Polish United Workers' Party;
(Slovak), 176, 194, 259, 261, 263–64,
267, 268, 367, 455, 456, 461, 462,
463–64, 469; (Slovene), 100, 102,
104, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111;
(Soviet), 3, 122, 131, 234, 306, 339,
342, 365, 373; (Yugoslav), 105, 110,
121
Conesford, Henry George Strauss, Lord,
393
Connelly, Ken, 377
Constance, 314
Constructivism, 300
Cooper, Robert L., 362
Čop, Tone, 105
Copenhagen, 244, 245
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 332
Cornwall, Mark, 173
Cottbus, 114, 118
Council for Assisting Refugee
Academics, 139
Counter-Reformation, 293, 500
Coverdale, Linda, 467
Cracow, 58, 70, 96, 207–15, 397, 398,
400, 401, 402, 403
Crampton, Richard J., 198
Crete, 101
Criminality, 46, 95, 144, 146–48, 152–
53, 157–58. *See also* Black market,
Plundering *and* Rape
Črnomelj, 106
Croatia, Croats, 11, 13, 24, 101, 104, 111
Cromwell, Oliver, 301
Crossman, Richard, 42
Croswitz, 113
Csécsy, Imre, 217, 218, 219–20
Csepeli, György, 27
Csicsery-Rónay, István, 33, 303
Csillag, 302
Cuckold Mission, 106
Cukier, Mojzesz, 96
Curtius, Ludwig, 246–47
Ćwik, Kazimierz, 210
Cybulska, Maja Elżbieta, 61
Cyprus, 13
Cyril and Methodius, ss, 266
Cyž, Jan, 115, 116

Cyž, Jurij, 115

Czech, Czechs, 2, 3, 7, 11, 15, 16, 31,
43, 71–86, 116, 258, 265, 270–78,
306–09, 315, 317–27, 346–96, 410,
415, 443–54, 487–505

Czechoslovak, Czechoslovakia, xiii, xiv,
3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24, 29, 31, 33–34, 35, 36,
38, 44, 46, 71–86, 107, 110, 113, 115,
117, 129, 132, 162–206, 230–40, 258,
259, 263, 264, 265, 266–67, 269, 294,
300, 309, 316, 318, 322, 324, 356,
465–76. *See also* Bohemia, Moravia,
Slovakia *and* Sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia

Czechoslovak-Soviet trade agreement,
162

Czerenyey, Géza, 33

Czigány, Lóránt, 38, 406, 407

Czuczor, Gergely, 406

Dąbrowska, Maria, 402

Dachau, 82, 83, 332

Dagan, Avigdor, 74

Dalí, Salvador Felipe Jacinto, 257

Daneš, František, 360, 394

Daňhelka, Jiří, 389

Daniell, Raymond, 193

Dannenberg, Robert, 48

Dante Alighieri, 76

Danube, River, 8, 41, 226

Danzig, 8, 123

Darvas, József, 298

Das goldene Tor, 281, 282

Daszyński, Ignacy, 208

Datner-Spiewak, Helena, 94

DAV, 267, 382

Davies, Joseph E., 183

Davies, Norman, 6, 7, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24,
27, 29, 30, 33, 34, 93

Dawid, Józef, 339, 342

Dawidowicz, Lucy S., 75

Deakin, Lt-Col. F. W., 107

Deblin, 98

Debrecen, 222, 407, 415

Decadents, 203, 204, 457, 483, 489, 500,
502, 505

Deighton, A., 278

Delavigne, Casimir, 68

De Man, Paul, 472

- Demény, Pál, 18
 Deml, Jakub, 478
 Democracy (including 'new democratic' and 'bourgeois democratic'), 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 39, 47, 49, 69, 78, 101, 104, 106, 113, 116, 119, 124, 127, 129, 132, 145, 150, 151, 155, 157, 171, 177, 180, 181, 182, 184, 185, 189, 191, 198, 216, 220, 223, 224, 226, 229, 230, 236, 237, 265, 271, 273, 274, 295, 296, 300, 307, 311, 326, 342, 363, 364–65, 367, 376, 378, 389, 416, 477, 479, 482, 495, 496.
See also People's democracy
 Democratic Left Party (SLD – Polish), 215
 Democratic Party (SDS – Slovak), 194, 264, 268, 367, 504
 De-Nazification, 47, 50, 51, 52, 53, 56, 125, 144–45, 196, 241, 250, 251
 Denmark, 31, 246
 Depression, the, 7, 27, 285, 309
Der Ruf, 280, 282, 283
 Deutsch, Julius, 48, 49
 Devětsil, 382, 466
 Devlin, Kevin, 36
 Dewey, C., 132, 135
 Di Biagio, Anna, 12, 187, 188
 Dickens, Charles, 500
 Dickins, Tom, 9
 Dickson, P. G. M., 25
 Diedrich, Torsten, 158, 160
 Dilog, Rudolf, 259–60
 Dimitrov, Georgi, 12, 494
 Displaced Persons, 45, 46, 48, 54, 56–57, 73, 115, 144, 195
 Dixon, Pierson John, 190
 Dixon, Robert, 139
 Djilas, Milovan, 10, 194, 195, 198
 Dłuska, Maria, 402–03
 Dmowski, Roman, 88, 89
 Dnieper, River, 81
 Dniester, River, 18
 Döbeln, 151
 Doberpfuhl/Dobropole, 402
 Döblin, Alfred, 281, 282, 283, 285, 286–87, 382
 Dobříš, 325
 Dobrowolski, Stanisław R., 210, 334, 336
 Dobrovský, Josef, 272, 273, 369
 Dobrzyn, 90
 Doctors' Plot, 121
 Dokulil, Miloš, 394
 Dollfuß, Engelbert, 40, 289, 290
 Domoslawski, A., 89
 Domowina, 113–18
 Doré, Gustave, 468
 Doroszewski, Witold, 399, 402
 Dostoevskii, Fedor M., 274, 324
 Drabek, Anna M., 194
 Dragneva, Dessi Velitchkova von, xiv, 73
 Drápala, Milan, 230, 234, 238
 Drašner, František, 3
 Drava, River, 108, 109, 110
 Drda, Jan, 237, 479, 480
 Dresden, 6, 115, 297, 354
 Drews, Peter, 230
 Drobner, Bolesław, 4, 207–15
 Drtina, Prokop, 190
 Duclos, Jacques, 188
 Dulles, J. Foster, 163
 Duncan, Isadora, 501
 Ďuriš, Július, 173, 176, 180
 Durych, Jaroslav, 478
 Durzak, M., 283, 291
 Dusek, P., 290
 Dutch, *see* Netherlands
 Dvořák, Antonín, 351, 353
 Dvořáková, Helena, 486, 498–504
 Dvořáková, Zora, 443
 Dygat, Stanisław, 312–16
 Dzierżyński, Feliks, 336
 Eagleton, Terry, 359
 East Prussia, 123
 Ebert, Friedrich, 118
 Ečer, General Bohuslav, 79, 80–81, 82
 Edgcumbe, Major-General O. P., 229
 Edelman, Marek, 60, 95
 Eden, Robert Anthony, 182, 223
 Edinburgh, 201
 Effenberger, Vratislav, 259
 Egorova, Natalia, I., 188
 Egypt, 101, 141
 Ehnert, Günter, 122
 Eichmann, Adolf, 41
 Eisenach, 158

Eisenhower, General Dwight David, 184, 197
 Eisner, Pavel, 231, 367, 390
 Elbe, River, 17–18, 21, 23–27, 30–32, 37
 Eliade, Mircea, 297
 Elisabeth, Queen of the Belgians, 393
 Etk, 401
 Ellenbogen, Wilhelm, 48, 49
 Ellis, J., 395
 Ellrich, 2
 Eluard, Paul, 258
 Embacher, Helga, 46, 48, 53, 55
Emberség, 301, 302
 Engelbach, H., 281
 Engelbert, M., 156, 157
 Engels, Friedrich, 234, 237, 352, 356, 482
 England, English, 26, 28, 61, 74, 233, 315, 365, 369, 379, 392, 403, 491.
 See also British
 Enlightenment, 17, 26, 67, 77, 142, 218, 310, 406
 Engliš, Karel, 367
 Eötvös, Károly, 297
 Eppel, Peter, 291–92
 Erban, Karel, 387
 Erdélyi, József, 297
 Estonia, 388
 Estreicher, T., 398
 Esterházy family, 25
Étatisme, 26–28, 372
 Etzel, Matthias, 141
 European Union, 221, 396
 Evans, Ivor H., 393
 Evans, Richard J., 144
 Evans, Robert J. W., 26
 Evans, Stanley, 226
 Existentialism, 312, 472, 481, 482, 483
 Expressionism, 284, 467
 Ezrahi, Sidra DeKoven, 70

 Fabry, Rudolf, 257, 260
 Fadeev, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich, 301, 482
 Falkenstein/Sokulsko, 402
 Falta, Josef, 272
 Fascism, 1, 7, 15, 20, 30, 45, 49, 50, 54, 79, 97, 101, 105, 113, 119, 122, 123,
 continued

Fascism continued
 132, 235, 248, 258, 266, 277, 280, 283, 299, 302, 303, 304, 307, 319, 322, 323, 376, 413, 448, 456, 457, 462, 467, 468, 475, 492, 496. *See also*
 National Socialism
 Federmann, Reinhard, 292
 Fedor, M., 263
 Feingold, Marko, 46, 51, 55
 Fejg, (Polish Communist), 91
 Fejtő, François, 10–11
 Feminism, 79, 198, 485, 486, 487, 488, 490, 492, 494, 495, 498
 Feodor, Michal, 259
 Ferenc, Tone, 100, 102
 Feuermann, Emanuel, 244
 Fibich, Zdeněk, 351
 Fick, August, 404
 Fierlinger, Zdeněk, 163, 165, 173, 189, 194, 389
 Figl, Leopold, 43, 48, 49, 51, 55, 197
 Filin, F. P., 394
 Filipec, Josef, 360
 Filipowicz, Halina, 2
 Filitov, Aleksei M., 13
 Fink, Karl, 168
 Finland, Finns, 9, 31, 32, 34–37, 192, 223, 224
 First Polish Corps, 338
 First World War, xiii, 9, 27, 39, 44, 72, 74, 82, 216, 217, 278, 284, 290, 291, 294, 308, 347, 356, 365, 366, 370, 372, 373, 398, 403, 404, 420, 445, 466, 467, 486, 494, 496, 497
 Fischer (Czechoslovak right-wing politician), 448
 Fischer, Ernest, 291
 Fischer, Josef Ludvík, 367
 Fiume, 104, 110
 Flajšhans, Václav, 390
 Flesch, Carl, 243
 Fleming, Donald, 182
 von Flocken, J., 149, 153
 Fogarasi, János, 406
 Földes, Margit, 33
 Formalist school, 257, 319, 465
Forum, 298, 301
 Fraenkel, Josef, 50
 France, French, xiii, 18, 20, 26, 28, 31,
 continued

France, French *continued*

37, 42, 72, 81, 82, 84, 117, 119, 122,
141, 142, 143, 172, 183, 184, 186,
188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 227, 232,
235, 245, 257, 258, 275, 276, 279,
282, 288, 314, 317, 318, 321, 322,
347, 365, 367, 370, 377, 477, 496,
497, 498

Francis Joseph I, Emperor, 31

Frank, H., 446

Frank, Hans, 79

Frankel, Johnathan, 93

Frankfurt on Main, 125

Frapwell, Hayley, xiv

Frátrik, Ján, 260

Frček, Jan, 391

Freedom and Independence (WiN –
Poland), 92, 97

Freedom Party (Austrian), 288;
(Slovak), 194, 367

Free German Youth (FDJ), 149–50,
154–61

Freemasons, 90, 217, 219, 294, 322, 432

Freidenreich, Harriet Pass, 44

French, Alfred, 465, 475

French Revolution, 217, 219, 220, 248

Freud, Sigmund, 375, 381

Friedmannová, Sylvia, 73

Friszke, Andrzej, 88, 90

Fröhlich, Elke, 244

Frommer, Ben, 181

Frontczak, Kazimierz, 344

Fučík, Bedřich, 478

Fučík, Julius, 14, 71, 478, 481, 485

Fulbrook, Mary, 24, 155, 281

Fulton, 17, 279, 393

Fürstenau/Barnimie, 402

Furtwängler, Elisabeth, 245, 253

Furtwängler, Wilhelm, 241–56

Futurism, 43, 60

Gábor, Andor, 294

Gábor, Péter, 18

Gabrovšek, Franc, 101

Gaddis, John Lewis, 13, 183, 188, 190,
191

Gajda, General Radola, 448

Gala, S., 401

Gałczyński, Konstanty Ildefons, 312

Galicia, 215, 503

Galician Jews, 39, 43, 503. *See also*
Ostjuden

Galsworthy, John, 500

Gardner, Lloyd C., 19

Garewicz, J., 92

Gascoigne, A. D. F., 224, 225

Gash, Norman, 31

De Gaulle, General Charles André
Joseph Marie, 235

Gavrilović, Milan, 101

Gay, Peter, 26

Gebauer, Jan, 503

Geehr, Richard S., 39

Gelléri, Andor Endre, 294

Gellert, František, 163

General elections, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36, 44,
119, 129, 163, 164, 177, 185, 188,
189, 194–95, 198, 216, 217, 223, 224,
227, 238, 264, 269, 344, 367, 443

Gerashchenko (Soviet official), 134

Gerdely, Sándor, 294

German, Germans, 2, 3, 10, 13, 14, 15,
20, 22, 23, 25, 27, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33,
42, 43, 47, 50, 54, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67,
69, 71, 72–73, 75–76, 79, 82, 84, 85,
88, 89, 100, 102, 103–04, 105, 109,
110–11, 117, 167, 170, 171–81, 197,
199, 216, 218, 230, 236, 241–56, 258,
265, 268, 271, 273, 275, 278, 291,
293, 294, 295, 300, 303, 304, 306,
315, 318, 319, 320, 332, 340, 350,
355, 356, 358, 360, 364, 365, 376,
377–78, 382, 385, 386, 388, 390, 391,
393, 397, 403, 408, 443, 444, 445,
446, 447–49, 461, 462, 463, 466, 467,
469, 476, 478, 485, 489, 490–91, 494

German Democratic Republic, 1, 16,
116, 119, 124, 126, 128; *see also*
Germany, Soviet zone of occupation;
~ Economic Commission (DWK),
125, 126, 135; ~ Liberal Democratic
Party (LDPD), 114, 123, 125, 126,
127, 154–55; ~ Soviet Non-
Aggression Pact, 6, 100, 120, 373,
494, 497, 504

Germany, xiii, 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 17, 26–27,
40, 41, 44, 46, 51, 52, 55, 56, 103,
107, 162, 164, 166, 172, 183, 184,
190, 196, 198, 221, 228, 263, 266,

continued

Germany *continued*

279–87, 289, 342, 346, 347, 354,
370, 373, 488; zones of occupation:
(American), 46, 47, 131, 153, 281;
(British), 14, 131, 137–46, 153,
279–80; (French), 131, 153, 281;
(Soviet), 5, 6, 8–9, 12–13, 26, 34,
81, 113–36, 149–61, 280–81, 282,
283
Germany, Federal Republic of, 52, 121,
124, 126, 130, 161, 279, 288
Gerrits, A., 88, 93
Gerschenkron, A., 25
Gestapo, 9, 15, 42, 71, 80, 183, 194,
317, 373, 485, 490, 491
Gibianskii, Leonid Ia., 5, 7, 8, 79, 183,
188
Gide, André, 233, 240, 482
Gietych, J., 92
Gilbert, Martin, 8
Gilman, Sander, 464
Glabazňová, Marie, 490, 504
Glazarová, Jarmila, 488, 504
Globocnik, Odilo, 41
Głowiński, Michał, 66
Gnadenwald, 45
Goebbels, Paul Josef, 241–46, 249–50,
252, 254, 256, 393, 478
Goes, Albrecht, 14
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 241, 248,
253
Goga, Octavian, 297
Goldberg, Szymon, 244
Goldfarb, Alvin, 58, 59
Goll, Jaroslav, 347, 349, 353, 354
Gömbös, Gyula, 220
Gombrowicz, Witold, 311, 312, 313
Gömöri, George, 295, 333
Gomułka, Władysław, 91, 93, 311, 342
Gorbach, Alfons, 55
Gorbachev, Mikhail Sergeevich, 16, 119,
129
Gori, Francesca, 8, 12, 13, 187, 188
Göring, Hermann Wilhelm, 241, 243,
244, 245, 249
Gorizia, 106
Gor'kii, Maksim, 391, 392
Goschler, Constantin, 46
Gosk, H., 311, 312, 313, 314
Gotteri, Nigel, 394

Gottwald, Klement, 11, 80, 184, 186,
187, 190, 191, 197, 198, 200, 238,
268, 272, 326, 327, 353, 368–69, 379,
380, 381, 472, 481, 504
Götz, František, 73, 306–07, 321, 325
Grafenuer, B., 104
Grand Coalition (Austria), 54, 195, 288
Grass, Günter, 14, 284
Graz, 45, 108
Greater German People's Party
(Austria), 40
Great War, *see* First World War
Greece, Greeks, 13, 34, 68, 81, 190, 192,
193, 225
Greene, Graham, 327
Gross, Jan, 5, 7, 78–79
Gross, Natan, 60
Grossman, Jan, 321, 482
Grot, Leszek, 345
Grotewohl, Otto, 128, 157
Grott, B., 88
Gruber, Karl, 55
Gruchmann, Lothar, 137
Grunberger, R., 152
Gründgens, Gustaf, 243
Grünwald, Matthias, 256
Grünhut, Max, 139
Gruppe 47, 14, 280
Grützort/Czartowo, 402
Grynberg, Henryk, 60
Grzelak, Czesław, 337, 338, 339, 340
Grzesiuk-Olszewska, S., 331
Gusev legend, 302
Gutman, Israel, 59, 95
Gutman, Y., 89
Gyarmati, György, 20, 32
Gyertyán, Ervin, 18
Gypsies, 71, 73, 83

Habek, Fritz, 292
Habjan, Vlado, 105
Habřina, Rajmund, 72, 76, 77–78, 81, 82
Habsburg dynasty/Monarchy, 9, 21, 26,
38, 39, 74, 171, 172, 208, 215, 273,
288, 289, 290, 293, 360, 364, 365,
370, 406, 409, 445, 495. *See also*
Austria
Hácha, Emil, 37, 367, 375
Hacker, I., 55
Haire, John, 226

- Hajdu, Tibor, 29
 Hájek, Jiří, 73, 79–80, 233, 306, 481
 Hála, Bohuslav, 388
Haladás, 219
 Halas, František, 75, 80, 204, 479, 483–84
 Halász, Gábor, 294
 Halle, 150, 157
 Haller, Jiří, 386, 390, 392
 Hamburg, 145
 Hammond, Thomas T., 18, 21, 33, 35, 36
 Hanák, Péter, 23
 Hanisch, Ernst, 194, 195, 196
 Handke, Peter, 293
 Hankiss, Elemír, 94
 Hanuš, Miroslav, 275
 Hanušová, Libuše, 492, 494, 497, 504
 Hanzal, Josef, 347, 348
 Harlig, Jeff, 408
 Hartmannová, Eva, *see* Schmidt-Hartmann, Eva
 Harvey, Sir Oliver, 191
 Haselsteiner, Horst, 194
 Hasidim, 69
 Haškovec, Vladislav, 480
 Hathaway, Robert, 182, 183
 Hauptmann, Gerhart, 303
 Havel, Václav, 364
 Havlíček, Jaroslav, 306, 308
 Havlíček, Karel, 272
 Havránek, Bohuslav, 389, 394, 395, 480
 Hay, G., 280, 281, 283
 Hayes, Kathleen, 15
 Healey, Denis, 227
 Hebrew, 83
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 218
 Heidenreich-Dolanský, Julius, 232
 Heine, Heinrich, 503
 Heinschke, C., 281
 Heinz, A., 403
 Heise, J., 150, 153
 Helcl, M., 394
 Helfert, Vladimír, 350, 351
 Heller, Ágnes, 299–300
 Helmer, Oskar, 42, 49, 50–51, 54
 Helsinki, 36
 Henlein, Konrad, 367, 375
 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 496
 Herbst, A., 157
 Herder, Johann Gottfried von, 239, 276, 444
 Herf, Jeffrey, 47
 Herford, 143
 Herling-Grudzinski, Gustaw, 95
 Herman, František, 444, 446, 448
 Hermlin, Stephen, 282
 Hertz, Aleksander, 91–92
 Hertz, Paweł, 312, 313
 Hesse, 46
 Heydrich, Reinhard, 41, 79, 485
 Hibner, W., 333–34, 336
 Hilsner, Leopold, 495, 503
 Himmler, Heinrich, 251
 Hindemith, Paul, 243–44, 246, 247, 254, 256
 Hirschfeld, Gerhard, 138
 Historicism, 14, 37, 171–73, 219, 234, 265, 296, 328–36, 347, 498
 Hitler, Adolf, 2, 8, 11, 22, 41, 50, 52, 53, 79, 95, 105, 120, 137, 149, 182, 184, 192, 242–43, 244, 245, 246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 256, 281, 284, 290, 292, 301, 303, 305, 356, 365, 373, 376, 381, 382, 448, 478, 494, 496, 503
 Hitler Youth (HJ), 150, 154
 Hladký, Josef, 504
 Hlaváček, Karel, 203, 502–03
 Hlbina, Pavel G., 259–60, 261
 Hlinka, Andrej, 375
 Hobsbawm, Eric, 12
 Höcker, Klara, 251
 Hodačová, Helena, 489, 495, 504
 Hodrová, Daniela, 324
 Hodža, Milan, 272, 448
 Hoensch, Jörg K., 197, 296, 443
 Hoffmeister, Adolf, 271, 480
 Hofman, J., 150, 154
 Hohe Tauern, 101, 103, 105
 Holan, Vladimír, 204, 483
 Holešov, 74
 Höllering, Franz, 292
 Hollis, Major-General Sir Leslie, 111
 Holmberg, Arthur, 60
 Holocaust, *on one difficulty of term*, 83; *otherwise see* Shoah
 Holý, Jiří, 307
 Holzner, Johann, 292
 Home Army (AK – Poland), 4, 92, 330, 340

- Homoláč, Jiří, 230
 Homolyai, Rezső, 220
 Homosexuality, 83, 84, 286, 494, 496
 Honecker, Erich, 120, 129, 150, 154, 155
 Honner, Franz, 110, 111
 Hopfenberg/Kopin, 402
 Hora, Josef, 352, 477
 Horáková, Milada, 14, 198, 278, 505
 Horálek, Karel, 395
 Hořec, Jaromír, 481, 482
 Horthy, Admiral Miklós nagybányai, 7, 217, 220, 424, 429, 431, 442
 Horváth, János, 299
 Horváth, Márton, 299, 300, 302, 305
 Hosking, Geoffrey, 87, 93
 Höss, Rudolf, 82
 Hostinský, Otakar, 347
 Hostovský, Egon, 271, 275, 306, 317–27, 367
 Howard, Douglas, 103
 Hrabák, Josef, 465
 Hrabovec, Emilia, 197
 Hranice, 504
 Hromádka, Josef Lukl, 270, 272, 273–76, 278
 Hronov, 448
 Hrubín, František, 203–04
 Hrubý, Emil, 448
 Hruška, Petr, 278
 Huch, Ricarda, 282
 Hudeček, Josef, 443, 450, 451
 Hungarians, Hungary, xiii, 2, 4, 5, 7–8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 28, 29–30, 32, 33–34, 35, 36, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 81, 82, 110, 129, 162, 172, 173, 174, 175, 183, 190, 191, 192, 198, 199, 216–29, 258, 268, 277, 294–305, 372, 387, 388, 406–42, 498
 Hungarian Soviet Republic, 216, 296, 301; ~ Uprising (1956), 295, 296, 298; ~ 'War of Independence' (1848–49), 219, 302; ~ Workers' Party, *see* Communist Party (Hungarian)
 Hurban, Vladimír S., 162
 Hurdes, Felix, 291
 Hurst, Sir Cecil, 140
 Husák, Gustáv, xiv, 266, 267
 Huss, John (Jan Hus), 200, 270, 272
 Husserl, Edmund Gustav Albrecht, 471
 Hussite movement, 347, 349, 352, 355–58, 495; ~ Wars, 38, 81, 200, 351, 353, 481, 497
Huszadik Század, 217, 218, 219
 Huttner, Markus, 138
 Hvišč, Jozef, 260
 I. G. Farben, 85–86
 Illés, Béla, 294, 302
 Illyés, Gyula, 296, 298, 302, 303
 Impressionism, 257
 Independence Party (Hungary), 216
 Innerhofer, Franz, 293
 'Insurgent tradition' (Polish), 58, 68–70
 Ireland, 31, 172
 Irzykowski, Karol, 312
 Ismay, General Hastings Lionel, 110
 Isonzo, River, 101, 111
 Israel, 23, 44, 46, 47, 52, 55, 71
 Isser, Edward R., 59
 Istóczy, Győző, 295
 Istria, 104, 110
 Istrina, E. S., 394
 Italians, Italy, 13, 20, 35, 81, 101, 102–03, 104, 107, 109, 111, 122, 140, 172, 185, 186, 188, 192, 193, 196, 227, 346, 347, 355, 365, 370, 498
 Iwaszkiewicz, Jarosław, 313
 Jackson, Howard, 362
 Jacobs, J.F., 169, 170
 Jagiellon dynasty, 310, 313
 Jahnke, K., 150, 155
 Jakobson, Roman, 319–21, 326
 Jakubův, František, 321–22
 Janáček, Leoš, 350, 351
 Janicki, K., 408
 Janion, Maria, 58, 63, 328, 329, 332
 Jánošík, Juraj, 10
 Janoušek, Pavel, 240
 Janský, L., 394
 Janů, Míla, 78
 Japan, 184
 Jaroš, V., 390
 Jasay, Anthony, 18
 Jastrun, Mieczysław, 330
 Jászi, Oszkár, 217, 218, 219–20
 Jech, Karel, 74, 176
 Jedlička, Alois, 390, 391, 395
 Jedlicki, J., 93

- Jékely, Zoltán, 303
 Jelenski, Jan, 87–88
 Jelinek, Gustav, 52, 54, 56
 Jelínek, Ivan, 317
 Jellinek, Georg, 28
 Jena, 139
 Jeřábek, Dušan, 465
 Jerusalem, 71, 101, 330
 Jesenská, Milena, 75, 485, 493
 Jesenská, Růžena, 493
 Jeske-Choinski, Teodor, 88
 Jessenius, Jan, 493
 Jesuits, 354, 381
 Jews, 2, 5, 7–8, 9, 20, 23, 24, 35, 36, 39–99, 137, 139, 195, 197, 199, 208, 216, 242, 252, 253, 293, 294, 298, 300, 301, 303, 304, 317, 319, 322, 323, 366, 368, 377, 388, 398, 409, 413, 418, 432, 460–61, 462, 463, 464, 487, 488, 490, 491, 492, 496, 498, 503. *See also* Antisemitism, Galician Jews, Ostjuden, Racism and Shoah
Język Polski, 397–405
 Jirásek, Alois, 14, 347, 348, 353, 445, 447, 448, 481
 Jirásek, František, 80
 Jiříček, Evžen, 322
 Joan of Arc, 252
 Jochmann, Rosa, 51
 Jöckel, Heinrich, 78, 82, 84, 85
 John, Oldřich, 486
 Johnson, Barbara, 60
 Johnson, Lonnie R., 20, 23
 Johnson, Uwe, 284
 Jones, David, 226
 Jones, Major William, 107
 Joó, Tibor, 294
 Joselewicz, Berek, 69
 Joseph II, Emperor, 346
 Joyce, Mary, xiv
 József, Attila, 299
 Judenberg, 45
 Juhász, William, 33
 Julian March, *see* Venezia Giulia
 Julius Caesar, 76
 Jünger, Ernst, 241, 283, 284
 Jungmann, Josef, 322, 369
 Jungmann, Milan, 481
 Jurgielewicz, Wacław, 338, 341
 Kačer, Adolf, 272
 Kaczmarek, Julian, 341
 Kaczmarek, Kazimierz, 338, 340
 Kaden-Bandrowski, Juliusz, 313
 Kądzielski, J., 311
 Kafka, Franz, 75
 Kahn-Freund, Otto, 140
 Kain, Franz, 292
 Kaiser, Joachim, 241
 Kalandra, Závěš, 199
 Kalinin, Mikhail Ivanovich, 391
 Kalista, Zdeněk, 348
 Kałkowska, A., 403
 Kaltenbrunner, Ernst, 41
 Kalvoda, Josef, 371, 374
 Kamenec, Ivan, 265
 Kamenka, Eugene, 21
 Kamenz, 116
 Kamińska-Szmaj, I., 90
 Kanitz, Gerhard, Count, 254
 Kant, Immanuel, 218
 Kantorowicz, Alfred, 281, 283
 Kapferburg, 45
 Kaplan, Karel, 176, 183, 185, 188, 191, 197, 198, 199, 240, 443
 Karafiát, Jan, 200–06
 Karajan, Herbert von, 243, 248–50
 Kardelj, Edvard, 102, 104, 105, 107, 109, 110
 Kardos (Pándi), Pál, 299
 Karelia, 36
 Karmal, Babrak, 37
 Károlyi, Count Mihály, 216, 222
 Karvaš, Peter, 466, 468–72, 475–76
 Kasmansburg/Kosmovo, 402
 Kasprzak, M., 333–34, 336
 Kassák, Lajos, 295, 300, 302, 303
 Katowice, 401
 Katyń, 10, 339
 Katz, Jacob, 43
 Katz-Suchy (Polish Communist), 91
 Kekich, Ernest, 168, 169
 Kende, Péter, 33
 Kende, Zsigmond, 218, 220
 Kennan, George F., 183, 189, 190, 193
 Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 262
 Kenney, Padraic, 7, 214
 Kerenski, Aleksandr, 369
 Kerschbaumer, Gert, 51

- Kersten, Krystyna, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95
 Keszi, Imre, 301, 302
 Kéthly, Anna, 30
 Kattenacker, Lothar, 137, 138, 140
 Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeevich, 128, 197, 306
 Kielce, 70, 94–99
 Kilian, A., 127
 Kiliński, Jan, 69
 Kimball, Stanley B., 444
 Kindermann, Heinz, 292
 Király, István, 298, 299
 Kirby, David Gordon, 36
 Kirkwood, Michael, 375
 Kisielewski, Stefan, 312, 313, 330–31
 Klácel, František Matouš, 234
 Kladno, 503, 504
 Klagenfurt, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108, 109, 112
 Klaus, Josef, 41
 Klaus, Václav, 230
 Kleczkowski, A., 398
 Kleiner, Juliusz, 330
 Klemensiewicz, Zenon, 398, 399, 400
 Klemperer, Otto, 242, 302–03
 Klenková, Hana, 12, 495–96, 504, 505
 Klenová, Eva, 466, 490, 492, 504
 Klessmann, C., 153
 Klimaszewski, M., 401
 Klimeš, L., 393
 Kloboučník, Jan, 481
 Klonovsky, M., 149, 153
 Klosová, Anna-Marie, 486
 Klosová, Ljuba, 444
 Klugmann, Major, 106
 Kneipp, Sebastian, 76
 Kniewski, W., 333–34, 336
 Knight, Robert, 42, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56
 Kochański, Aleksander, 339, 342
 Kocka, J., 125
 Kocourek, V., 319
 Kocsis, Károly, 23
 Kodolányi, János, 297
 Kohlmeier, G., 132, 135
 Kohout, Pavel, 205, 481
 Kolańczyk, K., 401
 Kolář, Jiří, 482
 Kolb, Ernst, 54, 291
 Kolchak, Admiral Aleksandr, 369
 Kolín, 164, 167
 Kollár, Jan, 12, 232, 267, 272, 273, 276, 278, 369
 Kołłątaj Smithy, 67–68
 Kolman, Arnošt, 200
 Koloski, Laurie, 4, 208
 Kolpa, 102
 Komissarov, V. P., 132
 Komsomol, 155, 387, 451, 480. *See also* Free German Youth *and* Young Pioneers
 Kondrashev, S. A., 121
 Konecki, Tadeusz, 341
 Koneczny, Feliks, 92
 Konev, Marshal Ivan Stepanovich, 184–85, 266
 Koniáš, Antonín, 381
 Konrad, Edmond, 445
 Kontra, Miklós, 406, 408, 409, 415, 425
 Konstevaia, Ekaterina, 200
 Kopecký, Emil Václav, 393
 Kopecký, Jan, 479
 Kopecký, Václav, 368, 451–52, 472, 478, 479, 482–83, 484
 Kopejková, Drahomíra, 176
 Korbel, Josef, 375
 Korean War, 196
 Kořínek, Jan, 477
 Kornai, András, 407
 Körner, Theodor, 48
 Kornilov, General Lavrenti, 369
 Korom, Mihály, 22, 23
 Korošec, Anton, 103
 Kortás, 295, 302
 Kościuszko, Tadeusz, 68, 69
 Kosel, Heiko, 114
 Košice, 174, 175, 194, 263, 300, 390, 451
 Kosicka, Jagwiga, 60
 Kossak-Szczucka, Żofia, 89
 Kossuth, Lajos, 38, 296
 Kosztolányi, Deszö, 299, 300, 301
 Koťátko, Jiří, 174, 175, 177, 179, 181
 Kott, Jan, 311
 Kouřil, Miroslav, 473, 482
 Kovács, Béla, 302
 Kovács, Imre, 34, 302
 Kovács, Mária M., 27
 Kovárna, František, 78, 231, 477

- Kowalski, Roman, 85
 Kowalski, Włodzimierz T., 342
 Kozelsk, 339
 Koželuhová, Hana, 14, 505
 Kozik, Zenobiusz, 210
 Kozłowska-Butkova, Žofia, 401
 Kozłowski, Krzysztof, 215
 Kožmín, Zdeněk, 306
 Kozumplík, František, 272
 Krajcová, Jarmila, 2
 Kraków, *see* Cracow
 Král', Janko, 461
 Krall, Hanna, 60
 Kramář, Karel, 276, 367
 Kramář, Vincent, 231
 Kramer, Alan, 144
 Kranichpfuhl/Zurawie Pole, 402
 Krátký, Karel, 186, 188
 Kratochvíl, Josef K., 367
 Kraus, Herbert, 51
 Kraus, Ota, 71–72, 73, 75, 76, 77, 81, 82, 83–84, 85
 Krauss, Clemens, 249
 Krauss, Gottfried, 241
 Krauss, K., 281
 Krauss, W., 291
 Kreisky, Bruno, 50, 55, 197
 Krejčí, Jaroslav, 376
 Krejčová, Helena, 74
 Krek, Miha, 101, 102, 103, 104
 Krenz, Egon, 119, 129
 Kreutz, Rudolf, 292
 Kridič, Boris, 102, 106, 109
 Krtíl, Ann, 317
 Krúdy, Gyula, 301
 Kryński, A., 399
 Kryštofek, Oldřich, 479
 Ksiezy Mlyn, 98
 Kuchynka, Josef, 12
 Kudeříková, Marie, 485
 Kuhar, Alojzij, 101
 Kuhar, Lovro, 101–02
 Kulka, Erich, *see* Schön, Erich
 Kulturbund, 116, 280, 281, 282
 Kumos, Zbigniew, 337
 Kun, Béla, 216, 217, 220
 Kunc, Jaroslav, 487, 489, 492
 Kundera, Ludvík, 354
 Kundera, Milan, 478, 481
 Kunert, Andrzej Krzysztof, 58
 Kunschak, Leopold, 49
 Kurella, Alfred, 280
 Kurkowska, H., 398
 Kurpiński, Karol, 68
 Kuryłowicz, Jerzy, 403, 404–05
 Kusin, Vladimír, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189
 Kuznetsova, Raisa, 231, 238
Kužnica, 310, 311
 Kvalø, Kjell, 363
 Kvapil, Josef Š., 318
 Kwaśniewski, Aleksander, 215
 Labour Party (Slovak – Social Democrats), 194, 367
 Lacina, Václav, 480
 Lacina, Vlastislav, 176, 178, 179
 Lagarde, Paul de, 241
 Lajčiak, Milan, 205
 Laffan, Robert, 103
 Lampe, Alfred, 93
 Land reform, 24, 29, 31, 33, 73, 125, 167, 169, 171–81, 217, 222, 279, 304, 443, 497–98
 Lande, J., 400
 Lanford-Holt, J. A., 226
 Langgässer, Elisabeth, 283
 Langer, František, 445
 Langer, Lawrence L., 59
 Langer, Norbert, 292
 Language, *see* Politicization of language and Toponyms
 Łaski, Jan, 68
 Lassalle, Ferdinand, 370
 Latawski, Paul, 10
 Laufer, Jochen, 125, 131
 de Lauretis, Teresa, 68
 Laurin, Arne, 271
 Laušman, Bohumil, 163
 Law, H. G., 182
 League of Independents (WdU – Austria), 51, 288
 Lebert, Hans, 293
 Lederer, Viktor, 71
 Lehr-Splawinski, Tadeusz, 398, 405
 Leibholz, Gerhard, 138
 Leichter, Käthe, 51
 Leichter, Otto, 49, 51
 Leino, Yrjö, 36

- Leipzig, 150, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 241, 248
 Leivick, H., 59
 Lemberg, 98, 208, 209, 403
 Lemburg, Hans, 230, 237
 Lengyel, György, 27
 Lenin, Vladimir Il'ich, Leninism, 80, 120, 155, 234, 236, 237–38, 301, 335, 352, 353, 375, 380, 391, 392, 394, 395, 482, 483, 489–90. *See also* Marxism, Marxism-Leninism
 Leningrad, 121, 335, 394, 395, 453
 Lenino, Battle of, 338
 Lepowski, T., 93
 Lermontov, Mikhail Yurevich, 394
 Lerner, Max, 193
 Lernet-Holenia, Alexander, 292
 Leskošek-Luka, Franc, 106, 109, 110
 Lettrich, Jozef, 264
 Levittoux, Karol, 332–33
 Levy, R. S., 297
 Lewin, Leopold, 333
 Lewis, Paul G., 21
 Leyding-Mielecki, J., 401
 Ležáky, 7
 Libeň, 488–504
 Libya, 13
 Lichodziejewska, F., 333
 Lidice, 7, 14, 72, 82
 Liehm, Antonín Jaroslav, 317, 325, 326, 456, 481
 Lifka, Thomas E., 191, 193
 Lindeberge/Lipinki, 402
 Lindner, M., 285
 Lindsay, Major Franklin, 106, 108
 Link, Christoph, 26
 Linstead, Hugh, 226
 Linz, 41, 45, 46, 491
 Lipniak-Majorat, 7
 Listopad, František, 321
 Lithuania, Lithuanian, 22, 388
 Litomyšl, 347, 348
 Litván, György, 27, 33, 218
 Litván, József, 220
 Ljubljana, 81, 104, 110, 111
 Lobkowitz family, 84–85
 Löbl, Eugen, 167–68, 169, 170
 Lobodowski, Andrzej, 91
 Locke, John, 28, 141
 Lockhart, Sir Robert H. B., 187
 Łódź, 58, 96, 98, 213
 Loewe, Lothar, 154
 London, xiii, 10, 13, 29, 37, 58, 61, 91, 102, 105, 111, 135, 139, 224, 244, 265, 276, 277, 320, 321, 326, 338, 339, 340, 376. *See also* British
 Long, Fern, 318
 Longo, Luigi, 188
 Losonczy, Géza, 298, 302
 Lotarski, Susane S., 18, 22, 24, 27, 29, 31, 32
 Loth, Wilfried, 8
 Lothar, Ernst, 292
 Louňovice, 354
 Lower Austria, 195
 Lozovskii, S. A., 132
 Lubaszeska, Antonina, 64
 Łubieński, Tomasz, 58, 62
 Lublin Committee, 28–29; ~Manifesto, 332, 335; ~republic, 32, 340
 Lueger, Karl, 39
 Lukács, György (Georg), 280, 285–86, 294, 295–96, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 303, 304–05, 473–74
 Lukacs, John, 294
 Lukácsy, Sándor, 299
 Lukes, Igor, 11, 183, 184, 187, 189, 190
 Lukeš, Zdeněk, 175
 Lusatia, Upper and Lower, 113–18, 450
 Lusatian Peasants' and Workers' Party, 116
 Lutman, Roman, 401
 Luxemburg, Rosa, 209
 Luža, Radomír, 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 194, 198, 367
 Lwów, *see* Lemberg
 Lyrical Prose (Slovak trend), 259
 Lysenko, Trofim Denisovich, 395
 Maastricht Treaty, 17
 McCagg, William O., 39
 Macartney, C. A., 22, 224
 McCauley, Martin, 6, 8, 10, 18, 19, 20, 27, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 120, 155, 184, 220
 McDonald, Iverach, 102
 McGreery, General Sir Richard, 112
 McElligot, Anthony, 86
 Mácha, Karel Hynek, 367, 390, 487
 Machala, Lubomír, 465

- Machcewicz, P., 92
 Machonin, Sergej, 481
 Maciejewska, Irena, 60, 61, 66, 68
 Mack, William, 94
 Mackiewicz, J., 91
 Macintosh, Malcolm, 18, 33
 Macmillan, Maurice Harold, 112
 McNeil, William H., 26
 Macura, Vladimír, xiv, 203, 206
 McVeigh, J., 292
Magyarok, 295
 Mahen, Jiří, 396
 Mai, Günther, 132, 133
 Maiakovskii, Vladimir, 203–04, 232, 383
 Mainka, Jürgen, 346
 Maister, General, 105
 Majdanek, 86, 145
 Majer, Václav, 174
 Majerová, Marie, 352, 480, 486–87, 493, 504
 Major, Ákos, 33
 Malchow, 150
 Malec, Maria, 401, 402
 Małecka, Anna, 58
 Málek, P., 230
 Malenkov, Georgii Maksimilianovich, 197
 Maletin (Soviet official), 134, 135
 Malik, J., 135
 Malkin, Sir William, 140
 Maltzan, Countess Maria von, 8
 Malycha, A., 128
 Mamatey, Victor S., 18, 22, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 194, 198, 367
Manchester Guardian network, 138
 Mánes, Josef, 488
 Mańkowski, Zygmunt, 58
 Mann, Erika, 251, 253
 Mann, Thomas, 14, 82, 241, 242, 251–52, 253, 255, 283, 285–86, 287
 Mannheim, Hermann, 140
 Mansfeld/Lipie Góry, 402
 Mantl, Wolfgang, 195, 196
 Márai, Sándor, 300–01, 302, 303–05
 Mařánek, Jiří, 480
 Marat, Jean Paul, 301
 Marchfeld, 196
 Marčok, Viliam, 260
 Marcuse, Herbert, 470–71
 Marenčin, Albert, 259
 Marienhof/Warcisław, 402
 Marin, Bernd, 56
 Marincovic (Austrian M. P.), 45
 Marko, Miloš, 269
 Markowski, A., 398, 399
 Markowski, Mieczysław, 211
 Marr, Nikolai Iakovlevich, 377, 394–95, 403–05
 Marr, Wilhelm, 297
 Marshall, Barbara, 138
 Marshall, General George Catlett, 184, 187, 190–91, 192
 Marshall Plan, 13, 158, 186–88, 190, 191, 193, 196, 197, 279, 375, 504
 Martínek, Josef, 271–72
 Marx, Karl, 234, 235, 352, 473, 474, 482
 Marxism, Marxism-Leninism, 7, 14, 15, 37, 38, 80, 86, 119, 124, 169, 202, 218–19, 236, 259, 279, 282, 294, 298, 299, 302, 304, 310, 311, 348, 352, 358, 360, 362, 369, 374, 378–79, 380, 391, 394, 404–05, 408, 466, 474, 475, 479, 480, 481, 482, 486, 493, 498, 500, 501, 502, 503
 Masaryk, Jan, 74, 186, 187, 189, 190, 192, 193, 197, 198, 230, 240, 268, 271, 278, 321, 322, 325, 327, 489
 Masaryk, Tomáš Garrigue, 9, 79, 199, 232, 239, 265, 266, 272, 273–74, 275, 276, 347, 360–61, 365, 367, 369, 371–72, 373, 374, 376, 381, 477, 481, 483, 485, 486, 488, 489, 491, 492, 493, 494–96, 497, 499, 501, 502, 503, 504
 Masaryk(ová), Charlotte Garrigue, 495, 496
 Mašek, Vojta, 270, 276
 Mašica Serbska (Sorbian Foundation), 118
 Mastny, Vojtech, 4, 10, 13, 18, 19, 32, 183, 187, 188, 189, 191
 Matějka, Ladislav, 363
 Materski, Wojciech, 339
 Mathesius, Bohumil, 366
 Matthews, H. Freeman, 187
 Matušek, Josef, 80
 Maurer brothers, 55
 Maurer, Jadwiga, 58

- Mauthausen, 15, 55, 72, 76, 81, 82, 467–68, 491
 Mazover, Mark, 5, 8, 486, 490
 Mazowiecki, Tadeusz, 215
 Mečiar, Stanislav, 277
 Mecklenburg, 402
 Medinger, Wilhelm, 178
 Mediterranean sphere, 13, 226
 Meducki, S., 94, 96
 Meehan, Patricia, 138
 Mehringer, H., 122
 Meissl, Sebastian, 53
 Měkota (Czech shock-worker), 389
 Melbourne, William Lamb, Viscount, 31
 Melhuish, K. J., 28
 Melicher, Jozef, 260, 261
 Mendelsohn, E., 89, 93
 Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, Jakob Ludwig Felix, 248
 Mengele, Josef, 73
 Menuhin, Sir Yehudi, 241
 Méray, Tibor, 295, 301
 Meshchaninov, Ivan Ivanovich, 394, 395, 403–05
 Messianism, 6, 12, 63, 202, 204, 205, 232, 239, 330, 490
 Měšťan, Antonín, 232, 278, 325
 Meyer, J., 285
 Meyer, P., 93
 Michal, Jan M., 25
 Mich, W., 89
 Michelangelo di Lodovico Buonarroti Simone, 287
 Mihlic, Joanna, 2
 Michurin, Ivan Vladimirovich, 394
 Mickiewicz, Adam, 213, 311, 314, 315, 330, 331, 397
 Midgley, David, 4
 Miechów, 215
 Mihailović, Draga, 102
 Mihálik, Vojtech, 261, 262
 Mikoian, Anastasii Ivanovich, 132
 Mikołajczyk, Stanisław, 14
 Mikula, Bohumil E., 379
 Mikuž, Metod, 105, 109, 110, 111
 Milín, 266
 Mill, John Stuart, 31, 499
 Miłosz, Czesław, 214, 456
 Milyukov, Pavel, 371
 Minc, Hilary, 91
 Mindszenty, József, Cardinal, 14, 304
 Miodek, Jan, 398, 399, 401
 Mirovská, Inna, 74
 Miśło, Eugeniusz, 344, 345
 Miśkiewicz, Benon, 337
 Misson, K., 398
 Mitlöhmer, Julius, 447
 Mittelbau *see* Nordhausen-Mittelbau
 Mitten, Richard, 49, 57
 Mitter, A., 160
 Mixa, Vojtěch, 480
 Modernism, 203, 257–62, 283, 284, 285, 287, 299, 301, 302, 310, 353, 465, 466, 472, 479
 Modra, 8
 Modráček, František, 171–72
 Moldanová, Dobrava, 74
 Molnár, Erik, 38
 Molotov, Viacheslav Mikhailovich, 125, 133, 134, 135, 136, 183, 186
 Monier, Yvette, 143
 Monteverdi, Claudio, 347
 Montwiłł (Polish patriot), 333
 Moore, Col. Peter, 111
 Moravia, 25, 43, 83, 167, 171, 172, 177, 349, 372, 485. *See also* Bohemian Lands
 Moravian Slovakia (Slovácko), xiii; ~ Wallachia (Valašsko), 388
 Morgan, Thomas Hunt, 394
 Morrison, Herbert, 192
 Morson, G. S., 328
 Moscow, Muscovite, 1, 9, 11, 13, 17, 18, 25, 33, 52, 73, 97, 101, 110, 112, 113, 114, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125, 126, 128, 129, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 184, 188, 193, 196, 197, 198, 199, 224, 228, 232, 265, 271, 272, 273, 276, 278, 280, 290, 294, 295, 299, 300, 335, 338, 342, 349, 352, 465, 488, 494
 Moser, Jonny, 42, 45
 Moskovich, Wolf, 375, 380
 Moss, Arnold, 318
 Mosse, Werner, 138
 Mossor, Major-General Stefan, 344
 Motulko, Ján, 261
 Mrva, Rudolf, 379
 Mühlviertel, 194
 Mukachevo, 267

- Mukařovský, Jan, 480
 Mulley, Klaus-Dieter, 53
 Müller, D., 280, 282
 Müller, Heiner, 60, 284
 Munich, 125, 280; ~ Agreement, 9, 11, 72, 75, 182, 183, 184, 187, 192, 197, 270, 274, 318, 319, 322, 327, 367, 368, 375, 388, 453, 477, 489, 490, 494, 495
 Mur, River, 104
 Murphy, D. E., 121
 Myant, Martin R., 185
 Myth of victimhood (Austrian), 54–56, 197; (Polish), 88, 90, 97, 98, 329, 330. *See also* White Mountain
- Nadler, Josef, 292
 Naess, Arne, 363, 364
 Nagy, Ágnes Nemes, 295
 Nagy, Ferenc, 30, 227, 302, 304
 Nagy, László B., 298
 Naimark, Norman, 5, 7, 8, 79, 153, 183
 Nalepa, Edward Jan, 337, 338, 340, 342–43, 344, 345
 Nałkowska, Żofia, 14, 312
 Napiontkowa, M., 334
 Náprstek, Vojtěch, 270, 276
Národná obroda, 263–69
Naše řeč, 385–96
 Nation, nationhood (concept), 64, 101, 208, 266, 290, 291, 292, 322, 328, 346, 364, 365, 369, 444
 Nation, R. Craig, 13
 National Armed Forces (NSZ – Poland), 92, 97; ~ Democratic Party (Czechoslovak), 172; ~ Democrats (Poland), 88, 89
 Nationalism, 6, 9, 10, 15, 21, 24, 40, 50, 51, 73, 75, 78, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 92, 93, 94, 99, 116, 117, 171–81, 198, 216, 239, 258, 260, 272, 273, 277, 313, 319, 320, 326, 328, 344, 351, 356–58, 361, 406, 443–54, 455, 463, 466, 476, 480, 481, 486, 491, 495, 498, 503
 Nationalization, 27, 29, 73, 125, 126, 162–70, 172, 185, 196, 198, 214, 217, 227, 266, 304, 392
 National minorities, 22, 35, 113–18, 376, 410
- National Peasant Party (Hungary), 22, 34
Nationalrat (Lusatia), 114–15, 117
 National Revivals, 15, 172, 202, 203, 232, 234, 265, 272, 276, 277, 346, 347, 348, 350, 360, 369, 386, 388, 488, 493
 National Socialism (Nazism), 2, 4, 5, 9, 13–14, 16, 22, 35, 40–57, 61, 62, 71, 72, 76, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 95, 103, 113, 115, 117, 119, 120, 122, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 137, 138, 139, 140–41, 142, 144–45, 147, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 158, 174, 179, 183, 194, 195, 200, 227, 241–56, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 289, 290, 291, 292, 301, 303, 304, 319, 320, 326, 360, 366, 367, 373, 374, 380, 381, 382, 385, 388, 391, 472, 478, 487, 489, 491
 National Socialists (Czech), 117, 177, 178, 180, 194, 195, 198, 367, 372, 388, 451, 452, 498
 NATO, 121, 190, 191
 Nečas, Jaromír, 2
 Nečasová, Věra, 2
 Nedo, Pawoł, 115, 116
 Neff, Vladimír, 306, 308, 322
 Neisse, River, 123, 124, 400
 Nejedly, Roman, 348
 Nejedly, Zdeněk, 200, 272, 273, 278, 307, 326, 346–58, 368, 451, 452, 472–73, 478–79, 481, 484, 500, 503
 Němcová, Božena, 353
 Němec, Bohumil, 172
 Němec, Ludvík, 22
 Němeček, Zdeněk, 466
 Németh, László, 298, 302, 303
 Neruda, Jan, 499
 Netherlands, Dutch, 31, 37, 41, 81, 358
 Neuengamme, 83
 Neumann, Franz, 137
 Neumann, Stanislav Kostka, 270, 352, 482, 501
 Neurath, Konstantin von, 79
 Newmarch, Rosa, 351
 New York, 317, 318, 319, 320, 327, 495
 Nezval, Vítězslav, 203, 260, 352, 479, 480, 484
 Nedere Tauern, 105

- Niederle, Lubor, 166
 Niemojewski, Andrzej Jan, 88
 Nietzsche, Friedrich, 76, 244, 285, 286, 492, 505
 Nikisch, Arthur, 241
 Nitsch, Kazimierz, 397, 398, 401, 402, 403
 Nitze, Paul H., 169
 NKVD, 9, 95, 97, 127, 153, 194, 199, 339
 Noha, Jan, 479
 Nordhausen-Mittelbau, 2, 81
 Normandy, 322
 Norway, 31, 37, 322, 326
 Norwid, Cyprian, 329, 333
 Nosek, Miloslav, 307
 Nosek, Václav, 198
 Nossack, Hans Erich, 291
 Novák, Bořivoj, 391
 Nováková, Milena, 495, 496, 504
 Novomeský, Ladislav, 264, 266–67
 Nový, Karel, 480
 Nuremberg, 245, 250, 255; ~Trials, 5, 6, 79, 81, 145
 Nysa (town), 400. *For river see Neisse Nyugat*, 295

 Oberfalcer, František, 390
 Oberleiner, W., 288
 Obrdlík, Antonín, 83
 Obrębska-Jabłońska, Antonina, 398
 Oder, River, 400, 402
 Odložilík, Otakar, 273, 274, 321
 Oellsner, Fred, 126
 Oesterreicher, Henryk, 398
 Okáli, Daniel, 267
 Okrzeja, S., 333–34
 Olah, Franz, 55
 Olbracht, Ivan, 352
 Olsztyn, 401
 Opelík, Jiří, 308, 309
 Opletal, Jan, 79
 Oppenheimer, Fritz E., 141
 Opravil, Antonín, 389
 Oranienburg, 332
 Örley, István, 294
 Orlicki, J., 95
 Orlik, I. I., 187, 192, 193
 Országh, László, 406, 407, 408
 Ortutay, Gyula, 298

 Orwell, George, 37, 205, 472
 Orzechowski, Emil, 212
 Oslo, 186
 Ossowski, Stanisław, 95–96
 Ostashkov, 339
Ostjuden, 42, 44–45
 Ostrava, 488
 Ostrčil, Otakar, 351
 Ostrowski, B., 401
Ost und West, 281, 282–83
 Otáhal, Milan, 176
 Otwinowski, Stefan, 58–70
 Outrata, Vladimír, 169
 Oxaal, I., 40, 52, 56
 Oxford, 103, 139
 Ozsváth, Z., 295

 Paasikivi, Juho Kusti, 192
 Paczkowski, Andrzej, 90, 91, 93, 94, 98–99, 341
 Palacký, František, 12, 232, 272, 273, 370
 Palestine, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 50, 101, 368
 Palivec, Josef, 479
 Palmer, A. W., 22
 Pan-Germanism, 40, 46, 272
 Panslavism, 9–10, 11–12, 13, 72, 78, 81, 192, 232, 266–68, 270–78, 357, 365, 445, 452, 466, 476, 480, 489–90, 492–93, 494, 495, 497
 Pap, Károly, 294
 Papánek, Ján, 272, 320
 Papoušek, Vladimír, 9, 476
 Papp, Ferenc, 407
 Paris, 9, 101, 113, 164, 186, 187, 190, 191, 232, 257, 258, 268, 301, 315, 318, 487, 495, 496, 500
 Parker, S., 280, 284
 Parkoszowic, Jakub, 400
 Parmová, Jiřina, 486
 Parris, Matthew, 37
 Partisans, 13, 14, 44, 63, 65, 68, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 175, 335, 356, 469, 492
 Pascal, Roy, 293
 Pátek, František, 389
 Paton, Derek, 2, 3, 467
 Patraka, Vivian M., 60
 Patton, General George Smith, 8, 18

- Paul, Prince (Yugoslavia), 101
 Pauley, Bruce, 40, 41, 52, 53
 Pearl Harbor, 191
 Pears, Major W., 106
 Peasant Party (Hungary), 217, 296, 298, 302
 Pech, Vilém, 394
 Pechel, P., 154
 Pekař, Josef, 352
 Pelikán, Jiří, 368
 Pelinka, Anton, 50, 54, 196, 293
 Pelly, M. E., 221, 223, 224, 225
 People's Courts, 4, 29, 33, 137
 People's democracy, 2, 4, 11–13, 14, 15, 20, 30, 36, 37, 38, 73, 109, 207, 220, 266, 302, 392, 480, 483, 485, 486, 496, 497, 498
 People's Party (Czech), 117, 177, 178, 180, 194, 195, 367, 388, 478
 Pepper, Claude, 193
 'Percentage Agreements', 19
 Perels, Joachim, 142
 Peroutka, Ferdinand, 72, 235, 238
 Persia, 226
 Perstická, Dagmar, 455, 464
 Pest, 302, *and see* Budapest
 Pétain, Marshal Henri Philippe, 37, 304
 Péter, László, xiv, 1, 4, 21, 26, 28, 38, 389
Pětka, 31, 372
 Petőfi, Sándor, 296, 299
 Petřík, Vladimír, 260
 Petro, Michal, 10
 Petrov, Vladimir, 131
 Petrů, Eduard, 465
 Petschek, Victor, 163, 165, 166–67
 Peukert, D., 150, 152
 Peyer, Károly, 217
 Pfleger-Moravský, Gustav, 500
 Pfuhl, Christian (Pful, Kresćan Bohuwěr), 400
 Philosemitism, 47, 51, 61, 74
 Piast dynasty, 310, 313
 Piccolomini, Aeneas Silvius, 358
 Pick, Hella, 55
 Pieck, Wilhelm, 128, 135, 157
 Pike, David, 8, 1
 Pilař, Jan, 478
 Pilinszky, János, 295, 303
 Pilsen, 73
 Piłsudski, Józef, 88–89, 209, 339
 Piórkowski, J., 334
 Pioro, T., 92
 Piotrowski, Ryszard, 344
 Pirjevec-Ahac, Dušan, 105, 111
 Pisarski, Maciej, 93
 Piscator, Erwin, 284
 Plamenatz, John P., 21
 Plamínková, Františka F., 79, 485
 Plaschka, Richard G., 194
 Plavec, Josef, 352
 Pléh, Csaba, 408
 Plenča, Dušan, 111
 Pleshakov, Constantine, 184, 186, 188
 Pletnev, V. F., 377
 Plikus, Mikołaj, 341
 Plundering, 8, 34, 73, 115, 146, 153, 170, 194, 195, 278, 505
 Poetism, 257, 259, 260, 382, 466
 Pók, Attila, 4, 217
Pokolenie, 311
 Poksiński, Jerzy, 341
 Polan, A. J., 237
 Poland, Poles, xiii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6–7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28–29, 32, 34, 37, 39, 41, 45, 46, 49, 58–70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87–99, 117, 123, 129, 132, 144, 145, 168, 186, 188, 190, 198, 207–15, 232, 235, 266, 310–16, 328–45, 388, 397–405, 408, 462, 463, 490, 492, 494, 497
 Polgári [Burghers'] Democratic Party (Hungary), 217
 Police, 30, 33, 36, 45, 91, 97, 119, 126–27, 137, 160, 198, 225, 302, 385, 475, 501. *See also* Gestapo, NKVD and State Security
 Polish Insurrection (1794), 68;
 ~ October (1956), 312; ~ Peasant Party (PSL), 210; ~ People's Army (LWP), 337–45; ~ Russian War (1920), 90, 339; ~ Socialist Party (PPS), 88, 89, 97, 207, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 333; ~ United Workers' Party (PZPR), 92, 98, 210, 214, 334, *and see* Communist Party (Polish);
 ~ Uprising (1830–31), 68, 69, 214, 330; ~ Uprising (1863), 329, 330,

continued

Polish *continued*

- 333; ~ Workers' Party (PPR), 18, 91, 92, 93, 94, 210, 211, 212, 214, 311, 342, *and see* Communist Party (Polish)
- Politicization of art, 38, 230–40, 251, 253, 255, 259, 294–305, 306, 311, 313, 328–36, 352, 443–54, 465–84. *See also* Socialist Realism
- Politicization of language, 283, 284, 359–442. *See also* Toponyms
- Pollak, M., 40, 52, 56
- Pollakówna, Joanna, 211
- Polná, *see* Hilsner, Leopold
- Polonsky, Antony, 94
- Pomerania, 123, 402
- Pons, Silvio, 8, 12, 13, 187, 188
- Popelová, Jiřina, 73, 352
- Popov, A. N., 132
- Porkkala, 36
- Portugal, 317, 318
- Positivism (Polish liberal realism), 87, 310, 311
- Potemkin, V. P., 392
- Potsdam, 118, 125; ~ Conference, 113, 183, 196, 223, 225
- Považan, Michal, 257, 259
- Poznań, 401, 402
- Prague, 4, 8, 11, 12, 16, 32, 74, 79, 85, 113, 114, 115, 117, 118, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 173, 185, 186, 189, 192, 198, 199, 200, 232, 244, 257, 259, 262, 278, 319, 322, 325, 326, 327, 347, 352, 354, 374, 378, 394, 396, 444, 450, 459, 472, 491, 498, 499, 501, 503; ~ Linguistic Circle, 257, 319, 389, 465, 495; ~ Uprising, 12, 75, 266, 489, 490, 494
- Prauss, Herbert, 150, 152, 155
- Pražák, Albert, 12, 75
- Přerostová, Lea, 455, 464
- Přibáňová, Alena, 15
- Příbram, 266
- Prichard, Major Alfgar Hesketh, 106, 108
- Prieberg, Fred K., 242, 243, 245, 246, 247, 248, 252, 255, 256
- Princeton, 273
- Prisoners of war, 47, 54, 110–11, 117, 143, 144, 147, 154, 280, 314, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342
- Pritchard, Gareth, 8, 15, 152, 157
- Procházka, Vladimír, 480
- Prohászka, Lajos, 303
- Prokhorov, A. M., 377
- Prokop (Procopius) the Great, 356
- Prokš, P., 162
- Proudhon, Pierre Joseph, 235
- Prus, Bolesław, 87
- Prussia, 24, 26, 27, 243, 498
- Przyboś, Julian, 58, 62
- Przybysz, K., 89
- Przybyszewski, Stanisław, 505
- Pucher, Konrad, 109
- Pujmanová, Marie, 202, 309, 352, 480, 486, 493, 501, 504
- Pull, Ján, 266
- Puppet regime, *see* Quisling regime
- Purchla, Jacek, 208
- Purism (linguistic), 358, 385, 389–90, 493
- Pushkin, Aleksandr Sergeevich, 394
- Pynsent, Robert Bur-Ton, 6, 20, 38, 71, 74, 75, 364
- Quisling, Vidkun, 37
- Quisling regime (concept and usage), 37, 183, 223
- Quoika, Rudolf, 353
- Raab, Julius, 55, 56, 197
- Raabe, Peter, 246
- Racek, Jan, 346–58
- Racism, 14, 40, 46, 48, 49, 50, 55, 71, 72, 73, 74, 83, 84, 137, 139, 142, 242, 250, 304, 375, 377, 409, 413, 418, 466, 476, 490–91, 503. *See also* Antisemitism, Asemitism *and* Shoah
- Raławice, Battle of, 69
- Raczy, J., 402
- Radicals (Hungarian party), 34, 216–20, 298
- Radice, E. A., 27
- Rádl, Emanuel, 273–74, 477, 483
- Radnóti, Miklós, 294, 295
- Rady, Martyn, 24
- Rajk, László, 304
- Rak, Ján, 258
- Rákóczi II, Prince Ferenc, 38, 296

- Rákosi, Mátyás, 18, 30, 32, 33, 38, 220, 295, 302, 304
 Raków Academy, 67
 Ranke, W., 157
 Ránki, György, 24, 25, 28
 Rape, 8–9, 15, 20, 34, 73, 115, 123, 147, 153, 154, 194, 195, 278, 505
 Rathkolb, Oliver, 49, 53
 Rauchensteiner, Manfred, 195
 Ravensbrück, 51, 75, 78, 485
 Rawski, Tadeusz, 340
Rechtsstaat, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 35, 127, 129
 Recovered Territories (Poland), 7, 22, 341, 399, 401
 Red Army, 6, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 21, 22, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 73, 90, 111, 119, 127, 129, 153–54, 158, 184, 185, 191, 194, 196, 197, 198, 204, 205, 212, 216, 223, 227, 263, 267, 277, 278, 302, 303, 304, 316, 331, 336, 373, 385, 466, 494, 505
 Reformation, the, 67–68, 285, 357
 Reform Judaism, 43
 Reger, Max, 247
 Reiman, Pavel, 306
 Reinhartz, J., 89
 Reisel, Vladimír, 258, 260
 Reiter, Margit, 55
 Renč, Václav, 478
 Rendel, George, 103, 104
 Renner, Karl, 35, 40, 42, 49, 50, 51, 194, 290, 291
 Reparations, 35, 36, 105, 122–24, 132, 158, 162, 164, 166, 196, 290
 Resistance (war-time), 1, 5, 7, 8, 38, 42, 58–70, 79, 80, 104, 108, 150, 157, 199, 254, 489, 494. *See also* Partisans
 Reusch, Ulrich, 138
 Révai, József, 294, 295–96, 297, 299, 304
 Révay, József, 294
 Reynolds, David, 192
 Řezáč, Václav, 15, 235, 306–09, 367, 480
 Rheinhard (musician), 242
 Rhine, River, 28, 315
 Richter, Hans Werner, 280, 283
 Richter, Ludwig, 75, 257
 Ribičič, Mitja, 107
 Rieber, Alfred J., 19, 36
 Riebl, Joachim, 41
 Rieger, František Ladislav, 272, 273
 Riess, Curt, 254
 Rilke, Rainer Maria, 259
 Rimbaud, Arthur, 259–60, 496, 502
 Riordan, C., 280, 284
 Ripka, Hubert, 163, 166, 375
 Rjenč, Jurij, 117
 Roberts, Sir Frank, 228
 Rohrachner, Andreas, 51
 Rojko (Theresienstadt guard), 82, 85
 Romania, Romanians, 13, 21, 22, 23, 24, 32, 34, 36, 45, 46, 198, 223, 226, 258, 297, 372, 410, 432
 Romanov dynasty, 120
 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 13, 19
 Rose, P. L., 103
 Rosenfeldt, N. E., 121
 Rosenkranz, Herbert, 41
 Rosenthal, Alison, 182
 Roskaten/Rosochate, 402
 Rospond, Stanisław, 400, 401
 Ross, Albion, 191
 Rossi-Landi, Feruccio, 474
 Roth, Joseph, 290
 Roubal, Jiří, 75, 76, 81, 82, 84–85
 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 218
 Równo, Rówienko, 402
 Rozanski (Polish Communist), 91
 Rozenblit, Marsha L., 43
 Rudas, László, 304
 Rudel, Jaufré, 286
 Rudnicki, Mikołaj, 401
 Rudnicki, S., 88, 89, 90
 Ruhr, River, 124
 Rupnik, Jacques, 239–40, 365
 Rusek, J., 403
 Russia, Russians, 9, 17, 24, 25, 26, 28, 35, 56, 81, 82, 83–84, 88, 90, 106, 120, 131, 203, 214, 215, 232, 266, 267, 270, 274, 276, 278, 302, 303, 315, 319, 329, 356, 357, 366, 367, 370, 373, 377, 403, 445, 452, 466, 487, 492, 494, 495, 497, *and see* Soviet
 Russian Civil War, 35, 369, 374;
 ~ February Revolution, 120, 172;
 ~ language, 15, 127, 200–06, 267,

continued

Russian *continued*

- 305, 362, 365, 370–71, 373, 377, 379,
380, 390, 391–92, 395, 396, 397, 410;
~ October Revolution, 120, 204, 266,
267, 275–76, 353
- Ruthenes, 10. *See also* Sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia
- Rüthers, Bernd, 137
- Rutkowski, H., 333–34, 336
- Rutte, Miroslav, 477
- Ruzyně, 79
- Ryazanova-Clarke, Larissa, 378, 380
- Rybicki, Zygmunt, 211
- Rychnów, Rychnówek, 402
- Rymar, E., 401, 402
- Rzeszow, 96
- SA (Sturmabteilung), 52, 375
- Sachsenhausen, 79, 388
- Saeed, John I., 362
- Safarewicz, Jan, 401, 403
- Safarewiczowa, Halina, 401
- Šafařík, Pavel Josef, 272, 273, 276, 369
- Sager, Juan C., 363
- SAGs, 8, 126
- St Germain, Treaty of, 291
- St Louis, 270
- Salami tactics, 33, 34, 295, 302
- Salazar, António de Oliveira, 304
- Šalda, František Xaver, 232, 473
- Salzburg, 40, 45, 46, 51, 55, 195, 288,
292
- Sanacja*, 88, 89
- San Diego (California), 305
- Sandgruber, Roman, 196
- Sargent, Sir Orme, 102, 103, 111, 182,
224–25
- Sárközi, György, 294
- Sartre, Jean-Paul, 472, 483
- Satellite country, regime (concept and
usage), 37, 38, 169, 182, 188, 221,
223, 258, 385, 389
- Satkiewicz, H., 398, 399
- Savonarola, Girolano, 493
- Saxony, 113, 114, 116, 117, 151, 153,
159, 354
- Schäfer, H. D., 285
- Schaffer, Gordon, 157, 158–59
- Schalska, E. K., 140
- Schärf, Adolf, 49, 197
- Schatz, J., 91
- Schechner, Richard, 59
- Scheinpflugová, Olga, 496, 504
- Schiller, Johann Christoph Friedrich
von, 241, 470
- Schirdewan, Karl, 126
- Schlier, 491
- Schmalfuß, Kurt, 132
- Schmid, Kurt, 41
- Schmidt, Adalbert, 292
- Schmidt-Dengler, W., 291
- Schmidt-Hartmann, Eva, 230, 237, 238
- Schneider, Heinrich, 195
- Schneiders, Werner, 26
- Schoenberg, Arnold, 242, 243, 255, 285
- Schoenberg, Hans W., 22, 35
- Schoenerer, Georg von, 40
- Scholes, Percy A., 346
- Schön, Erich, 71–72, 73, 76, 77, 81, 82,
83–84, 85, 460
- Schönzeler, Hans-Hubert, 241, 245, 254
- Schöpflin, George, 4, 5, 6–7, 9, 20, 24,
32, 33, 87, 90, 93
- Schubart, Christian Friedrich Daniel,
346
- Schuchardt, Hugo, 404
- Schulmeister, O., 293
- Schulze, H., 157
- Schumacher, Claude, 59
- Schumacher, Kurt, 47
- Schurmann, Peter, 12, 113
- Schuschnigg, Kurt von, 40, 289, 290
- Schwartz, Robert, 50
- Schwarz, Wolfgang F., 75
- Schwarzenberg, Adolf, 175
- Schwarzenberg family, 172
- Schwerin von Krosigk, Count, 393
- Scott, H. M., 26
- Šebestík, Josef, 175
- Second Polish Army, 340
- SED (Socialist Unity Party, E.
Germany), 113, 114, 116, 118, 119–
30, 135, 149, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159,
160, 279, 281
- Sedloň, Michal, 321, 481
- Seidel, Hans, 196
- Seifert, Jaroslav, 483
- Šejnoha (Czechoslovak envoy), 320
- Šelep, Karel, 77, 82–83
- Šembera, František, 367

- Semenov, Vladimir, 120–21
 Semkowicz, Władysław, 401
 Semprun, Jorge, 467
 Šepič, Dragovan, 101, 103
 Serbia, Serbs, 13, 104, 258, 410, 434
 Sereny, Gitta, 41
 Serfdom, 24, 358
 Seton-Watson, G. Hugh N., 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 22, 24, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 220, 228
 Seton-Watson, Robert W., xiii, 372
 Seuter, H., 291
 Seyss-Inquart, Arthur, 41
 SHAEF, 140, 141
 Shafir, Shlomo, 47
 Shakespeare, William, 9, 211, 286–87, 445
 Shakhmatov, Aleksei Aleksandrovich, 403
 Shanghai, 41, 43
 Shapiro, Jeremy J., 470
 Shaw, Michael, 471
 Shcherbakov, Colonel-General A., 339
 Sheets, Harold F., 164, 167
 Sherwood, Peter, 9, 410
 Shirakawa, Sam H., 245
 Shmeruk, C., 89
 Shoah, xiii, 2, 14, 22, 23, 27, 33, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48–49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 56, 58, 59, 60–61, 67, 68, 71–86, 89, 91, 99, 249, 294, 295, 503
 Short, David, 9, 361
 Showalter, D., 154
 Siberia, 209, 369, 370
 Siciński, B., 401
 Sigismund III Vasa, 328–30, 332, 334
 Šiktanc, Karel, 481
 Silan, Janko, 261
 Silesia, 96, 123, 177, 372, 400, 497
 Silverlight, John, 371
 Simović, General Dušan, 101
 Sinka, István, 297
 Sirácky, Andrej, 267
 Sís, Vladimír, 78
 Sitnin, V. K., 133
 Skála, H., 169
 Skála, Ivan, 205, 481
 Skilling, H. Gordon, 184
 Skloot, Robert, 58, 59, 63, 70
 Sláma, Jiří, 195
 Slánský, Rudolf, 188, 199, 368
 Slav Committee (Bautzen), 113, 117
 Slave labour, 85, 150, 491
 Slávik, Juraj, 165
 Slavism, Slavophilia, *see* Panslavism
 Slavophobia, 40, 81, 82
 Slav Reciprocity, 12, 81, 232, 271, 273.
 See also Kollár, Jan
 Sławiński, Janusz, 66
 Sławski (Polish linguist), 401
 Slezák, Lubomír, 175, 176
 Šling, Otto, 368
 Śliwa, Michał, 208, 209, 210, 214
 Słonimski, Antoni, 330
 Slovakia, Slovaks, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 11, 16, 23, 24, 26, 31, 37, 38, 73, 76, 81, 82, 173, 175, 176, 179, 185, 188, 238, 257–69, 273, 277, 294, 300, 350, 364, 367, 372, 376, 379, 387, 410, 451, 455–64, 480, 483, 503, 504. *See also* Czechoslovakia
 Slovak National Council, 263–66, 269;
 ~ National Uprising, 7, 38, 263, 264, 265, 266, 268–69, 368, 456
 Slovenes, Slovenia, xiii, 10, 13, 35, 100–12, 265
 Slovene Liberal Party, 101; ~ National Liberation Army, 106; ~ People's Party, 102
 Slovo a slovesnost, 366, 385, 389, 390, 391, 394–95, 465
 Słowacki, Juliusz, 213, 311, 314, 315, 328–29, 330, 331
 Słucki, Arnold, 335
 Sluka (Czech M. P.), 178
 SMAD (Soviet Military Administration in Germany), 8, 114, 116, 117, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 149
 Smallholders' Party (Hungarian), 30, 32, 33, 34, 217, 224, 227, 298, 302, 303, 304
 Šmatlák, Stanislav, 465
 Smažík, František, 452
 Smetana, Bedřich, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 353, 356, 481
 Smetánka, Emanuel, 389
 Smíchov, 385
 Šmíd, Zdeněk, 321
 Šmilauer, Vladimír, 389

- Smiles, Samuel, 499
Smirnov, A., 134
Smith, Anthony D., 87
Smith, C., 284
Smith, Walter Bedell, 188
Smoczyński, W., 403
Snoj, Franc, 101
Snowden, Ethel, 393
Sobibor, 41
Sobolev, Aleksandr, 483
Social Democrats: (Austrian, incl. Austrian Socialist Party [SPÖ]), 35, 39, 40, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 108, 194, 195, 288, 289, 290, 291; (Czech), 73, 79, 117, 171, 173–74, 177, 178, 179, 180, 189, 194, 218, 272, 367, 372, 446, 451, 487, 495, 504; (German), 11, 47, 120, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 149, 150, 151, 154; (Hungarian), 20, 30, 34, 54, 216–17, 227, 298, 302, 303; (Polish – PPSD), 89, 208, 209, 212 *and see* Polish Socialist Party
Socialist Realism, 14–15, 237, 261, 281, 301, 305, 306, 382–83, 452, 453, 465–76, 480, 481, 482, 483, 498
Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, *see* Council for Assisting Academic Refugees
Sofia, 223
Sokol organization, 74, 370, 375, 387, 389, 443–44, 446, 447, 449, 451, 453, 502
Sokolovskii, Marshal Vasili, 125, 133, 134–35, 136
Sokorski, V., 339
Solidarność (Solidarity), 6
Solymosi, Eszter, 297
Šošta, Jan, 116
Sontag, Susan, 465
Sorbian National Committee, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117
Sorbs, 12, 13, 113–18, 400
Součková, Milada, 488–89, 503, 504
Soukup (Theresienstadt guard), 82
Soumar, Robert B., 272
South Tyrol, 35
Soviet, Soviet Union, xiii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11–12, 14, 17, 18–19, 22, 27, *continued*

- Soviet, Soviet Union *continued*
32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 44, 51, 53, 54, 55,
67, 71, 72, 73, 74, 78, 80, 81, 91, 92,
95, 98, 100, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111,
112, 115, 117, 118, 119–30, 145, 154,
162, 164, 165–66, 174, 181, 182–93,
196, 197, 204, 205, 207, 209–10, 212,
214, 221–29, 231, 233–34, 235, 237,
238–39, 266, 267, 270, 272, 273,
274–75, 276, 278, 279, 288, 294, 295,
296, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 316,
322, 335, 337–45, 349, 354, 362, 366,
368, 383, 385, 391–92, 394, 395,
403–05, 445, 453, 462, 465, 477,
478–79, 480, 481, 482, 485, 489, 490,
492, 493, 498
Soviet-Czechoslovak Pact (1943),
272–73, 496
Sovietization, 3, 10, 20, 127, 128–29,
130, 188, 228, 294, 303, 310, 345,
368, 375, 385, 389, 395, 396, 505
Soviet-Yugoslav Friendship Treaty, 106
Spain, 317, 376, 487
Špálová, Sonja, 486, 487, 489, 494, 499,
504
Spender, Stephen, 387
Spiegel, Tilly, 42
Spielfeld Strass, 102
Špitzer, Juraj, 259
Šprinc, Mikuláš, 260
Srba, Bořivoj, 449
Srb-Debrnov, Josef, 347, 352
Šrobár, Vavro, 163
Srokowski, S., 401
SS (Schutzstaffel), 52, 71, 76, 84, 195,
375, 467, 492
Stakhanovites, shock-work, 15, 160,
371, 389
Stalin, Joseph, 1, 5, 7, 9, 10–11, 13, 14,
18, 19–20, 22, 33, 37, 72, 80, 119,
120–21, 122, 123, 124, 125, 129, 134,
135, 160, 182, 183, 184, 186–87, 190,
191, 192, 194, 196, 198, 199, 205,
232, 233, 234, 238, 240, 271, 275–76,
306, 335, 338, 339, 352, 353, 361,
368, 369, 373, 375, 377, 380, 381,
383, 391, 394, 395, 404, 405, 482,
485, 489, 492, 494, 496, 504
Stalinism, 1, 3, 24, 36, 67, 81, 92, 119,
continued

Stalinism *continued*

- 155, 156, 159, 161, 203, 207, 215,
239, 240, 259, 273, 274, 298, 311,
316, 356, 360, 362, 365, 383, 410,
456, 465–66, 471, 475, 476, 477, 478,
486, 487, 494, 500, 503, 504
- Stańczyk, Henryk, 338, 339, 340
- Standeisky, Ě., 296
- Staněk, Tomáš, 178
- Stangl, Franz, 41
- Stanisławów, 55
- Stapor, Zdzisław, 341
- Stark, Tamás, 23
- Starobelsk, 339
- State Security: (Czechoslovak –
StB/ŠtB), 3–4, 9, 475; (E. Germany –
K-5, Stasi), 127, 129, 130;
(Hungarian – ÁVH, ÁVO), 18, 226,
227; (Polish – UB), 92, 95, 97, 98.
See also Police
- State Treaty (Austria), 35, 53, 197, 288
- Štefánik, Milan Rastislav, 266
- Steinhardt, Lawrence A., 163, 164, 165,
167, 187, 189
- Steinhoff, J., 154
- Steiniger, Rolf, 45, 51
- Steinlauf, Michael C., 91, 93, 94
- Stephan, A., 281
- Stepnik, K., 87
- Stern, Frank, 46, 47, 52
- Štern, Jan, 306, 481
- Stern, Joseph Peter, 461
- Sterne, Laurence, 489
- Sternfeld, Albert, 52
- Stettin, 123. *See also* Szczecin
- Stevenson, Ralph Skrine, 111
- Stewart, S. D., 228
- Stifter, Adalbert, 293
- Stiglbauer, Karl, 196
- Stirk, Peter, 86
- Stojadinovič, Milan, 100, 103
- Štoll, Ladislav, 232, 368, 466, 472–75,
476, 479, 482, 483–84
- Stone, Norman, 372
- Štornik, Ante, 10
- Stourzh, Gerald, 197
- Stransky, Jan, 486, 505
- Stránský, Jaroslav, 452
- Strauss, Herbert A., 139
- Strauss, Richard, 246, 247
- Stravinsky, Igor, 255
- Streibel, Robert, 41
- Strítecký, Jaroslav, 347, 348
- Strmeň, Karol, 260
- Strouhal, Eduard, 372
- Structuralism, 259, 319, 404, 465. *See*
also Formalist school
- Stuart (F. O. official), 225
- Štúr, Ľudovít, 266, 267, 277
- Styria, 40, 52, 105, 106, 109, 110, 194,
195
- Sub-Carpathian Ruthenia/Ukraine, 10,
267–68, 385
- Subotić, Ivan, 102
- Sudetenland, Sudeten Germans, 7, 8, 11,
14, 15, 22, 23, 85, 117, 172, 176, 181,
194, 195–96, 197, 199, 238, 306, 317,
448, 449
- Suk, Vojtěch, 392
- Šuppan, Arnold, 1, 194
- Surrealism, 203, 257–59, 260, 382, 483,
487
- Suslov, M. A., 191
- Svatá, Jarmila, 466–68, 476, 491–92,
494, 504
- Svátek, František, 199
- Švehla, Antonín, 180
- Šverma, Jan, 368
- Švermová, Marie, 368
- Sviták, Ivan, 182, 184
- Svoboda, Jiří, 323
- Svoboda, General Ludvík, 10, 198
- Svoboda, Wilhelm, 49, 50, 51
- Svozilová (-Johnová), Herma, 485–86,
494, 504
- Swain, Geoffrey, 33
- Swain, Nigel, 33
- Sweden, Swedes, 31, 187, 246
- Święch, Jerzy, 58
- Šwirka, Ladislav, 391
- Switzerland, 31, 170, 197, 227, 251, 319
- Sword, Keith, 339
- Symbolists, 257, 489, 490
- Szabó, Árpád, 299–300
- Szabó, Dénes, 406
- Szabolcsi, Miklós, 299
- Szajnok, Božena, 95, 97
- Szálasi, Ferenc, 37
- Századunk, 217
- Szczecin, 310. *See also* Stettin

- Szegedy-Maszák, Mihály, 14, 293, 303
 Szenczei, László, 218
 Szerb, Antal, 294
 Szigeti, József, 298
 Szklarska Poręba, 188
 Sober, Stanisław, 399
 Szpakowska, Małgorzata, 58, 62

 Tábor, 358
 Táborský, Edvard, 187, 189
 Tander, Julius, 48
 Tagliamento, River, 101
 Taszycki, Witold, 400, 401
 Tatarka, Dominik, 15, 455–64
 Tatra mountains, 370
 Taubmann, William, 186
 Taufer, Jiří, 368, 478, 479, 480
 Tauš, Karel, 389, 395–96
 Taylor, F. D., 169
 Taylor, Frederick Winslow, 366
 Teheran Conference, 123, 124
 Teige, Karel, 270, 466, 482
 Teska, Karel, 309
 Theresienstadt, 75, 78, 82, 83, 84–85, 489
 Thibault, Paul, 474
 Thiess, Frank, 247
 Third Prague Agreement, 16, 268
 Thirty Years' War, 172. *See also*
 Counter-Reformation *and* White Mountain
 Thom, Françoise, 377
 Thomas, Jenny, 363
 Thun-Hohenstein family, 175
 Thuringia, 122, 150, 156, 157
 Tichá, Zdenka, 465
 Tietjen, Heinz, 243, 249
 Tigrid, Pavel, 388, 485, 490
 Tilkovszky, Lóránt, 23
 Tilschová, Anna Maria, 488, 497, 499, 504
 Tiso, Jozef, 37, 260
 Tiszaeszlár, 297
 Tito, Marshal Josip Broz, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 121, 199, 368, 492
 Titunik, I. R., 363
 Togliatti, Palmiro, 109
 Tolstoi, Lev Nikolaevich, 274, 394
 Tomaszewski, J., 89, 93–94
 Tomaszewski, Stefan, 98
 Tomeš, Josef, 172
 Tomicki, Jan, 210
 Toponyms, nationalization/politicization of, 115, 302, 387, 396, 400–02
 Toporska, Barbara, 91
 Torgau, 17
 Toscanini, Arturo, 246
 Tóth, Miklós, 18, 34, 38
 Toufar, Josef, 3
Tovább, 301–02
 Träger, Josef, 319, 320, 321, 322, 327
 Transylvania, 22, 24
 Trapl, Miloš, 83
 Traugutt, Romuald, 333
 Trávníček, František, 359–84, 391
 Trávníček, Jiří, 306
 Treblinka, 41
 Trepte, Hans-Christian, 7
 Trianon, Treaty of, 216, 300, 410
 Trieste, 100, 102, 104, 106, 110
 Trinidad, 101
 Triolet, Elsa, 304
 Trofaiach, 45
 Trotskyism, 199, 371, 375
 Von Trott zu Soltz, Adam, 138
 Trowbridge, St Vincent, 393
 Truman, Harry Shippe, 183, 368, 393, 482
 'Truth', 83, 238, 275, 475, 490, 493, 495, 496, 497
 Turčány, Viliam, 260
 Turgenev, Ivan Sergeevich, 382
 Turjanica (Turianitsa), Ivan, 10, 267
 Turkey, 190, 193, 226, 370
 Turner, Ian, 138
 Tusor, Péter, 21
 Tyl, Josef Kajetán, 445, 447
 Tyrol, 40, 45, 52, 108, 195
 Tiul'panov, S. I., 127
 Tzara, Tristan, 258, 473

 Uherské Hradiště, 3
 Uhlenbeck, Christian Cornelius, 404
 Ujejski, J., 204
 Ujejski, Kornel, 332
Új Hang, 300
Újhold, 295, 298
 Ukraine, Ukrainians, 10, 80, 89, 267, 344, 345

- Ulbricht, Walter, 12, 120, 126, 128, 129, 149, 151, 158
 Ullman, Walter, 184, 185, 187, 189, 192
 Ulm, 243
 Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP), 210, 338
 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, *see* Soviet
 United Kingdom, *see* British
 United Nations Charter, 113
 United States of America, *see* Americans
 UNRRA, 185
 Upper Austria, 195
 Upton, Anthony, 36
 Urbán, K., 305
 Urbańczyk, Stanisław, 397, 398, 400, 401
 Urbanek, Mariusz, 215
 Urbánek, Zdeněk, 239
 Ušák-Oliva, Paľo, 260
 Uziembło, Aniela, 344

 Vacík, Miloš, 278
 Václavík, Václav, 467, 491–92
 Váh (Vaag), River, 459
 Váhala, František, 395
 Vajanský, Svetozár Hurban, 277
Válasz, 295, 298
 Valdevit, Giampaolo, 13
 Válek, Miroslav, 261
 Valenta, Edvard, 367
 Valéry, Paul, 236, 304, 477
Valóság, 299
 Vámbéry, Ármin, 220
 Vámbéry, Rusztem, 220
 Vančura, Vladislav, 79, 320, 352, 490, 493–94
 Vandenderg, Arthur, 191
 Varga, Béla, 302
 Varga, János, 217
 Varon, Benno Weiser, 40
 Váša, Pavel, 359–84
 Vášová, Věra, 486, 487, 489, 497, 504
 Vázsonyi, Vilmos, 216, 217
 Veber, Václav, 74
 Vedecká syntéza group, 257
 Vega Carpio, Lope Felix de, 490
 Veigl, Svetoslav, 261–62
 Venezia Giulia, 13, 100, 111
 Venezuela, 164
 Venice, 110, 355
 Veres, Péter, 297
 Verlaine, Paul, 203, 204, 259–60
 Versailles, Treaty of, 140
 Vértés, György, 298
 Veselá-Nyklová, Milena, 326
 Veselý, Jiří, 75
 Vévoda, R., 230, 234, 240
 Vienna, 35, 39–40, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 74, 108, 111, 194, 195, 198, 199, 241, 247, 249, 250, 270, 288, 370, 497, 501, 503; ~ Group, 14, 292
 Villach, 106, 108, 109
 Vilnius, 98, 339
 Vis, 102, 105, 108
 Vistula, River, 18, 81, 329, 331, 335
 Vltava, River, 81
 Vogel, Alois, 292
 Voivodina, 23
 Vokolek, Vladimír, 76, 77
 Volga, River, 81
 Volokitina, T. V., 187, 189, 191
 Vološinov, V. N., 363
 Voltaire, François Marie Arouet de, 291
 Von der Nüll, Edwin, 248, 250
 Voranc, Prežihov, *see* Kuhar, Lovro
 Voralberg, 45, 195
 Vormweg, H., 283, 284
 Voroshilov, Marshal Kliment, 32, 222
 Voskovec, Jiří, 271, 321, 325
 Vránek, J., 271
 Vrchlabí, 164
 Vyborg, 36
 Vyshinskii, Andrei Ianuarevich, 134, 186

 Wade, Terence, 378, 380
 Wadsworth, G., 226
 Wagner, Richard, 241, 244, 245, 248, 250, 255, 256, 303
 Wagrowiec, 90
 Waldheim (Saxony), 153
 Waldheim, Kurt, 53, 55, 56, 57, 197
 Waldstein family, 175
 Waldstein, Wilhelm, 292
 Wałęsa, Lech, 215
 Wallace, William V., 372, 374
 Waller, Michael, 378
 Wall Street, 79
 Walter, Bruno, 241, 242, 252, 253, 255

- Walton-Jordan, Ulrike, 4
 Wanat, Andrzej, 61
 Wandycz, Piotr S., 1–2
 Wangermann, Ernst, 293
 War crimes trials, 55, 227, 268, 284. *See also* Nuremberg Trials
 Warmiński, J., 334
 Warriner, Doreen, 20–21, 24
 Warsaw, 6–7, 39, 58–70, 97, 98, 207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 313, 315, 328–336, 399, 402; ~ Ghetto Uprising, 58–70; ~ Uprising, 58, 315, 330, 332
 Washington, 13, 47, 101, 163, 165, 168, 183, 187, 192, 251, 303, 367, 373. *See also* Americans
 Wasiliewska, Wanda, 210
 Wasilewski, Edmund, 328
 Ważyk, Adam, 335
 Weber, H., 155
 Wehdeking, V. C., 280, 281, 282, 283
 Wehle, Kurt, 74
 Wehler, Hans-Ulrich, 26, 27
 Weigel, Hans, 293
 Weil, Jiří, 85–86, 204–05, 240, 481
 Weimar Republic, 9, 141, 241, 301
 Weinheber, Josef, 292
 Weininger, Otto, 503
 Weinryt, B. D., 93
 Weislová, Hana, 317
 Weiss, Manfred, 297
 Weiss, Peter, 284
 Weiss, W., 291
 Wells, Ronald, 362
 Weöres, Sándor, 295, 298, 302
 Werben, 118
 Werich, Jan, 321
 Werth, Alexander, 193
 Werwolf organization, 15, 149, 153
 Wessling, Bernd, 244, 245, 249
 Westad, Odd Arne, 186
 Wettig, Gerhard, 12
 Weyrauch, Wolfgang, 283
 White Mountain, Battle of the, 171, 172, 173, 174, 198, 347, 351, 354, 355
 White Russia, *see* Belarus
 Widmer, U., 283, 284
 Wiegandt, Manfred H., 138
 Wiener, Oswald, 292
 Wierzbicka, Anna, 383
 Wiesenthal, Simon, 41, 55
 Wilder-Okladek, Friederike, 43, 46
 Wilhelm II, Kaiser, 372
 Wilkinson, Elizabeth M., 470
 Wilkinson, Lt-Col. Peter, 106–07, 108
 Willey, F. T., 226
 Williams, R. W., 280, 284
 Willoughby, L. A., 470
 Wilson, General Sir Henry Maitland, 110
 Winczer, Pavol, 260
 Windische Büheln, 104
 Winkler, J., 157
 Winkler, K., 329
 Wippermann, Wolfgang, 115
 Wishengrad, Morton, 59
 Wiskemann, Elizabeth, 370
 Wistrich, Robert S., 2, 5, 35, 39, 41, 43, 48, 74
 Witkiewicz, Stanisław Ignacy, 312
 Włoszczow, 98
 Wojciechowski, Aleksander, 211
 Wojdalski, Zygmunt, 344
 Wolf, Christa, 284
 Wolff, Christian, 26
 Wolff, Ernst, 140, 141, 143
 Wolff, Larry, 17
 Wolffsohn, Michael, 52
 Wolker, Jiří, 352
 Wolle, S., 160
 Woodward, Llewellyn, 112
 Wordsworth, William, 248
 Workers' University Society (TUR), 209
 World Jewish Congress, 48, 53, 57
 Wosik, Ewa, 339
 Woźniakowski, Jacek, 208
 Wróbel, Józef, 60
 Wrocław, 7, 86, 211, 311, 400, 403. *See also* Breslau
 Wrona, Z., 94, 96
 Wrzesiński, Wojciech, 344
 Wrzosek, A., 401
 Wygodzki, Stanisław, 332
 Wyka, Kazimierz, 311–12
 Wyman, D., 52
 Wyspiański, Stanisław, 213–14, 312, 314, 315, 332
 Yalta Conference, 19, 123, 182, 223, 228, 279

- Yarrow, Bernard, 163
 Yasamee, H. J., 221, 224, 225
 Yiddish, 43, 44, 73
 Young, James E., 59
 Young Pioneers, 154, 156
 Yugoslavia, Yugoslavs, 11, 13, 17, 23,
 34, 82, 100–12, 113, 117, 121, 126,
 183, 199, 225, 368, 372, 492

 Zabicki, Z., 312
 Zabrocki, Ludwik, 401
 Zachar, J. H., 271
 Zacharska, Anna, 58
 Zagiba, František, 350
 Zagreb, 110, 111
 Zahorska, Stefania, 58–70
 Zahradníček, Jan, 205, 478
 Zajety, Wojciech, 90
 Zakopane, 402
 Zakrajšek, Anton, 101
 Zápotocký, Antonín, 368, 380, 381
 Zawieyski, Jerzy, 60
 Zawisza, Artur, 333
 Zaworska, Helena, 312, 313, 329
 Zeellfeld, 102
 Zelenka, Jan Dismas, 354–55
 Żeromski, Stefan, 312, 314, 333
 Zeyer, Julius, 74, 389

 Zhdanov, Andrei A., 36, 121, 186, 188,
 197, 233, 301, 364, 382, 453, 465
 Zhukov, Marshal Georgii, 133, 134, 339
 Zeigloserová, Anna, 485
 Ziembicki, S., 329
 Žilina, 461
 Zinner, Paul E., 374
 Zionism, 43, 44, 95, 121, 199, 368
 Žižka, Jan, 356
 Žižka, Otokar, 489–90
 Žižková, Růžena, 489–90, 504
 Zlín, 387
 Zmorski, Roman, 332–33
 Znojilová, Eva, 388
 Zohn, Harry, 466
 Żółkiewski, Stefan, 335
 Zorin, Valerian A., 191, 198, 479
 Zoshchenko, Mikhail, 233, 369, 391
 Zschaler, Frank, 125, 132, 133, 135
 Zsolt, Béla, 218
 Zubok, Vladislav, 184, 186, 188
 Zuckmayer, Carl, 284
 Zurich, 208, 235, 245, 251, 253
 Zverev, A., 133, 134, 135
 Zwicker, Bruno, 83
 Zwitter, Fran, 102, 104–05
 Zwoliński, Stefan, 338, 339, 340
 Zygelboim, Samuel, 61

